


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PART I.

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CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES

OF THE

LATIN AND GREEK CHURCHES:

IN

TURKEY.

---

*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.*  
1854.

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# Correspondence respecting the Rights and Privileges of the Latin and Greek Churches in Turkey.

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## PART I.

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### No. 1.

*Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 3.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, May 20, 1850.*

A QUESTION likely to be attended with much discussion and excitement is on the point of being raised between the conflicting interests of the Latin and Greek churches in this country. The immediate point of difference is the right of possession to certain portions of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem. The Greeks are accused of having usurped property which belongs of right to the Roman Catholics, and of having purposely allowed the chapels, and particularly the monuments of Godefroi de Bouillon, and of Guy de Lusignan, to go into decay. The French Legation at this Court considers itself entitled by Treaty,—the Treaty, I believe, of 1740,—to take the lead in vindicating the alleged rights of the Latin Church; the French Consul at Jerusalem, M. Botta, has been recently here, and returns by-and-bye to assist the cause; and General Aupick, who has received instructions from Paris, and to whom I am indebted for a conversational overture on this subject, has applied for a conference, with the probable intention of bringing his case at once under the notice of the Turkish Government. It appears that the Pope has been moved to exert his influence in furtherance of the views adopted by France; and that all the Catholic Powers will be engaged by His Holiness to cooperate for the same purpose.

General Aupick has assured me that the matter in dispute is a mere question of property, and of express treaty stipulation. But it is difficult to separate any such question from political considerations; and a struggle of general influence, especially if Russia, as may be expected, should interfere in behalf of the Greek Church, will probably grow out of the impending discussion.

The Porte, I conceive, will do well to abstain from committing itself to either side without the maturest deliberation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

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### No. 2.

*Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, June 7, 1850.*

I HAVE to state to your Excellency, with reference to your despatch of the 20th of May, that you should watch, and report to Her Majesty's Government, the progress of the contest which you consider likely to arise between the Latin and Greek Churches in the Turkish dominions; but your Excellency will abstain at present from taking any part in that contest.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

## No. 3.

*Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 20.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, June 5, 1850.*

THE French Minister at this Court has communicated to me a *note verbale*, which he gave in at his late conference with the Grand Vizier and Aali Pasha, in support of the Roman Catholic claim to certain portions of the Christian Church at Jerusalem, appropriated, unjustly as he thinks, by the Greek ecclesiastical authorities. The note, of which I was not offered a copy, refers to Article XXXIII of the Treaty concluded in 1740 between France and the Porte, as the principal ground of right; and enumerates the several portions of the sacred edifices over which the claim extends. It is couched in firm though moderate terms, expressive of confidence in the soundness of the Latin title, and of the beneficial results to be expected from a just decision.

I am informed that the Spanish, Sardinian, and Neapolitan Representatives have severally given in notes to the Porte, seconding the French demand, and stating that they act by the express command of their respective Governments.

The Greeks, as on former occasions, are understood to be preparing for a vigorous resistance; and, judging from expressions which M. de Titoff has let fall in conversation, I have little doubt that they will be strongly, if not ostensibly, supported by Russian influence.

The Porte is fully aware of the important political considerations involved, and the strong conflicting passions likely to be engaged, in the pending controversy. It will probably be slow to commit itself to a conclusive answer; and its reception of General Aupick's application appears, though courteous, to have been reserved. Aali Pasha is evidently inclined to doubt whether the terms of the Treaty referred to by that Minister are calculated to bear him out in his view of the subject.

In reply to the General's communication of the *note verbale*, I confined myself to a simple acknowledgment of the confidence with which he had honoured me.

## No. 4.

*Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, June 24, 1850.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the manner in which, as reported in your despatch of the 5th instant, you received the communication made to you by General Aupick of the terms of the *note verbale* which he had delivered to the Turkish Minister with reference to the claim of the Latins to certain portions of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

## No. 5.

*Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 19.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, July 5, 1850.*

I AM not aware that any further step of an official character has been taken by the French Legation here concerning the holy buildings at Jerusalem since the *note verbale* delivered to Aali Pasha by General Aupick, and mentioned to your Lordship in one of my preceding despatches. The Porte, it would also appear, has not yet declared or taken any decision on the subject of that Minister's demand.

With respect to the Catholic Representatives, from whom, on such an

occasion, the French would naturally expect agreement and support, I learn that the Portuguese Chargé d’Affaires, in seconding General Aupick by means of an official note, acted entirely on his own responsibility; that the Spanish Minister has not yet taken a step of that character; that the Austrian Chargé d’Affaires has recently received instructions to support the Latin view of the question; and that the Belgian Minister, while continuing to plead for the repair of those chapels in which the monuments of Godefroi de Bouillon and his kindred crusaders were erected, abstains from bearing any direct part in the general claim asserted by France.

On the part of the Greek interest, nothing that wears the appearance of an angry or hostile opposition has yet been manifested; but no one seems to doubt that every nerve will be strained by that Church and Nation to maintain their present vantage-ground, and that Russian influence, however masked, will be vigorously exerted, as on former occasions, to defeat the attack of the Latin party.

Mindful of your Lordship’s instructions, I confine myself to the duty of watching from a distance any movements that may occur in the two antagonist camps. A Christian, having no immediate concern in the dispute, might reasonably wish to see the removal of a contention between the two Churches, which arrogate an exclusive guardianship of places sanctified by our common religion. But no Englishman, alive to the interests of a true European policy in the East, could witness without regret and anxiety the triumph of a political influence which would always be ready to overflow its bounds.

## No. 6.

*Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 3, 1850.*

I HAVE to state to your Excellency in reply to your despatch of the 5th of July, that you are quite right in not interfering in any way in the pending dispute between the Greek and Latin Churches respecting their claims to the holy buildings at Jerusalem, and in contenting yourself with attentively watching its progress, and reporting what takes place to Her Majesty’s Government.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

## No. 7.

*Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 6.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, July 19, 1850.*

INCLOSED herewith for your Lordship’s further information, is a copy of the note addressed by General Aupick to the Porte in recommendation of the French demand respecting the chapels and monuments at Jerusalem.

Aali Pasha assured me three days ago that nothing had yet been done by the Porte respecting that question, and that no orders had been sent to Jerusalem.

I avail myself of this opportunity to forward a transcript of all such Articles of the Treaty concluded between France and the Porte in 1740, as relate to the right claimed by France of protecting the Latins and, on their behalf, the holy places at Jerusalem.

## Inclosure 1 in No. 7.

*General Aupick to Aali Pasha.**Péra, Mai 28, 1850.*

LE Général de Division, Ministre de France près la Sublime Porte Ottomane, a eu l'honneur de donner lecture à son Excellence Aali Pasha, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté le Sultan, d'une dépêche par laquelle le Gouvernement de la République le charge de revendiquer efficacement en faveur des religieux Latins la possession des lieux saints que l'Article XXXIII des Capitulations de 1740 leur a garantie.

Ces lieux saints sont :

La Grande Eglise de Bethléem.

Le Sanctuaire de la Nativité, avec le droit d'y placer une nouvelle étoile, de changer la tapisserie de la grotte ; d'y agir, enfin, comme les possesseurs exclusifs.

Le Tombeau de la Sainte Vierge.

La Pierre de l'Onction.

Les sept arceaux de la Sainte Vierge dans l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre.

Le Gouvernement Français réclame encore pour les religieux Francs le droit de réparer la coupole de l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre ; et enfin, il demande que dans cette dernière église, toutes choses soient remises en l'état où elles étaient avant l'incendie de 1808. Il prouvera surabondamment que les sanctuaires et les droits ci-dessus énumérés appartenaient aux religieux Latins en 1740.

La franchise et le courage avec lesquels la Sublime Porte est entrée dans des voies d'amélioration morale et de civilisation ; l'adhésion qu'elle a donnée par sa conduite sage et mesurée aux grands principes du droit public Européen, laissent au Gouvernement Français la ferme conviction que, dans cette circonstance, il ne fera pas inutilement appel à la bonne foi et à l'esprit d'équité du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale ; et que celui-ci en fournira une nouvelle preuve par son respect pour les engagements dont la France réclame l'exécution.

Il mettra de la sorte et pour toujours un terme à des difficultés sans cesse renaissantes, et à d'interminables récriminations qu'il n'entre certainement pas dans sa pensée de vouloir perpétuer.

(Translation.)

*Pera, May 28, 1850.*

THE General of Division, Minister of France at the Sublime Ottoman Porte, has had the honour to read to Aali Pasha, &c., a despatch in which the Government of the Republic enjoins him earnestly to claim in behalf of the Latins the possession of the holy places guaranteed to them by the 33rd Article of the Capitulations of 1740.

Those places are :

The Great Church of Bethlehem.

The Sanctuary of the Nativity, with the right of placing a new star there, and changing the tapestry of the Grotto ; to act there, in fact, as exclusive possessors.

The Tomb of the Virgin.

The Stone of Anointing.

The Seven Arches of the Holy Virgin in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.

The French Government further claims for the Frank religious communities the right of repairing the cupola of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre ; and finally, it requires that in this last church all things should be replaced in the state in which they were before the fire of 1808. It will more than sufficiently demonstrate that the sanctuaries and rights above mentioned belonged to the Latin religious communities in 1740.

The frankness and the courage with which the Sublime Porte has entered upon a course of moral improvement and civilization ; the adhesion which by its wise and prudent conduct it has given to the great principles of the public law

of Europe, fully assure the French Government that in this matter it will not fruitlessly appeal to the good faith and equitable spirit of His Imperial Majesty's Government, and that the latter will afford a fresh proof thereof by its respect for the engagements of which France claims the execution.

By this means it will for ever put an end to difficulties which are incessantly recurring, and to interminable disputes which it certainly cannot desire to perpetuate.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 7.

*Articles des Capitulations Françaises ayant trait aux Eglises et aux Religieux.*

ARTICLE 1.—TOUS les Français qui iront et viendront à Jérusalem pour visiter les lieux saints, et les religieux qui demeurent dans l'Eglise appelé Camamé, ne pourront être inquiétés en aucune manière.

Article 32. Nos augustes ancêtres d'heureuse mémoire avaient autrefois permis aux nations ennemies qui n'avaient point d'Ambassadeurs spéciaux à notre fortunée Porte, d'aller et venir dans nos Etats sous la bannière de France pour y trafiquer et pour y visiter les lieux saints, et cela était consigné dans les capitulations accordées aux Français; mais plus tard quelques motifs avaient fait totalement défendre de venir dans nos pays aux dites nations, qui ont été exclues des capitulations. L'Empereur de France nous ayant, il y a quelque temps, témoigné par une lettre adressée à notre Sublime Porte qu'il désirerait que ces nations ennemies, à qui il était défendu de trafiquer dans nos Etats, eussent la faculté de visiter Jérusalem comme par le passé sans être aucunement inquiétées, et que si après quelque temps on leur permettait de venir dans nos Etats pour trafiquer que cela fût encore sous la bannière de France, nous avons accueilli la prière de cet Empereur en considération de l'ancienne amitié qui de père en fils existe entre lui et notre Sublime Porte depuis le règne de nos augustes ayeux jusqu'à présent. Nous avons donc ordonné que les individus appartenant aux nations Chrétiennes nos ennemis, qui sont en paix avec l'Empereur de France, et se rendant en pèlerinage à Jérusalem, pourront chaque fois qu'ils voudront tranquillement faire ce pèlerinage à Jérusalem, y aller et venir sûrement et librement comme par le passé, sans être molestés ni à l'arrivée ni au départ. Si plus tard nous serions dans le cas d'accorder aux dites nations la liberté de venir trafiquer dans nos Etats, alors elles pourront aller et venir sous la bannière de France, de la même manière qu'elles y venaient auparavant, sans qu'il leur soit permis en aucune façon de prendre d'autre bannière: les capitulations Impériales qui existaient anciennement depuis le temps de nos augustes ancêtres jusqu'à présent, seront renouvelées, et l'on y ajoutera à l'avenir les articles susdits, d'après un commandement Impérial orné d'un Hatti-Sheriff. Entre autres, personne ne s'opposera à ce que les évêques et autres religieux Catholiques dépendants de l'Empereur de France, de quelque nation qu'ils soient, exercent leur culte dans les localités où ils se trouvent déjà d'ancienne date, en se tenant dans les bornes de leur profession.

Article 33. Les religieux Latins qui résident présentement, comme de tout temps, en dedans et en dehors de Jérusalem, et dans l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre, dite Camamé, resteront en possession des lieux de pèlerinage qu'ils ont, de la même manière qu'ils les ont possédés par le passé; personne ne les molestera, et on ne les inquiétera point aussi par des demandes de contributions. Et s'ils avaient quelque procès qui ne peut être décidé sur les lieux, il sera renvoyé à notre Sublime Porte.

Article 34. Ceux des Français, et des autres nations qui en dépendent, qui se rendront à Jérusalem, ne seront point molestés ni en allant ni en revenant.

Article 35. On n'inquiétera point les deux ordres des religieux Français—à savoir, les Jésuites et les Capucins—dans la possession des églises qu'ils ont à Galata depuis longtemps; et comme l'une de ces églises a été brulée, elle sera reconstruite avec la permission de la loi, et restera au pouvoir des Capucins.

Personne ne molestera non plus les églises de la nation Française à Smyrne, à Seyde, à Alexandrie et dans les autres Echelles, et sous ce prétexte on ne pourra pas leur faire payer de l'argent.

Article 36. On ne les molestera pas lorsqu'ils prêcheront tranquillement l'évangile dans leur Hôpital situé à Galata.

Article 82. Ainsi que cela est arrêté dans les Articles anciennement stipulés et renouvelés aujourd'hui, lorsque les lieux que les religieux dépendant de la France possèdent à Jérusalem exigeront des réparations afin de prévenir que, par le laps du temps, ils ne tombent en ruines, les commandements nécessaires pour réparer ces endroits autant que la loi le permet, seront délivrés sur la demande de l'Ambassadeur de France à Constantinople; et aucun des Pashas, Cadis, Commandants, et autres officiers, ne mettront obstacle à une réparation autorisée par commandement. Mais il arrivait jusqu'ici que, sous le prétexte que les dits lieux avaient été clandestinement réparés, les autorités y faisaient chaque année de fréquentes visites d'inspection et frappaient d'amendes les religieux: cela a été pris en considération; et les Pashas, Cadis, Commandants, et autres officiers de ces contrées, ne pourront inspecter qu'une seule fois par année l'église que les religieux appellent Sépulcre de Jésus, ainsi que les autres églises et lieux de pèlerinage.

Les évêques et les religieux dépendant de l'Empereur de France seront protégés tant qu'ils se tiendront dans les bornes de leur état, et personne ne s'opposera à ce qu'ils exercent leur culte, d'après leurs us et coutumes, dans les églises qui sont en leur possession et dans les autres endroits qu'ils habitent.

Et lorsque les Rayas de Ma Sublime Porte auront des relations de commerce avec les Français, ils ne seront pas molestés contrairement à la loi sainte à cause de ces mêmes relations.

Les anciennes capitulations portent que les Français ne seraient point inquiétés lorsqu'ils prêcheront tranquillement l'évangile dans leur Hôpital situé à Galata; mais cet article n'est pas exécuté. Or, désormais, et d'après la teneur des dites anciennes capitulations, personne ne les molestera lorsqu'ils prêcheront tranquillement l'évangile dans le dit Hôpital, quelque part qu'il eût été transféré.

(Translation.)

*Articles of the French Capitulations bearing upon Churches and Religious Communities.*

ARTICLE 1. ALL the French who shall proceed to Jerusalem in order to visit the holy places, and the monks who dwell in the church called Camamé, shall not be molested in any way.

Article 32. Our august ancestors of happy memory had heretofore allowed hostile nations who had no special Ambassador at our fortunate Porte, to frequent our States under the French flag, in order to trade therein and visit the holy places there, and that was recorded in the Capitulations granted to the French; but at a later period certain reasons had caused the above nations, which were excluded from the Capitulations, to be wholly prohibited from coming into our country. The Emperor of France having, some time back, by a letter addressed to our Sublime Porte, expressed his desire that those nations which were prohibited from trading in our dominions might be allowed, as heretofore, to visit Jerusalem without molestation; and that if, after a certain time, they were permitted to trade in our dominions, they should still do so under the French flag, we have acquiesced in the request of that Emperor, in consideration of the ancient friendship which, from father to son, exists between him and our Sublime Porte since the reign of our august ancestors up to the present time. Accordingly we have ordered that persons belonging to the Christian nations who are at enmity with us, but at peace with the Emperor of France, and who are proceeding on a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, may, as often as they wish quietly to perform that pilgrimage, proceed thither and return thence freely and securely as heretofore, without molestation either on their arrival or on their departure. If at a

later period we should allow the said nations to come and trade in our dominions, they shall be at liberty to come and go under the banner of France, in the same manner as they did formerly; without their being in any way permitted to assume the protection of another flag; the Imperial capitulations which formerly existed from the time of our august ancestors until the present shall be renewed; and the aforesaid Articles shall henceforth be added thereunto, in obedience to an Imperial order and hatti-sherif. Among other things, no one shall prevent the bishop and other Catholic monks dependent on the Emperor of France, to whatever nation they may belong, from exercising their religious worship in the places in which they have been established of old, confining themselves within the limits of their profession.

Article 33. The Latin monks residing at present, as heretofore, within and without Jerusalem, and in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre called Camamé, shall continue to possess the places of pilgrimage which they now possess, in the same manner as they have heretofore possessed them, and they shall not be molested by demands for contributions. And if they should be engaged in any lawsuit which cannot be decided on the spot, it shall be referred to our Sublime Porte.

Article 34. The French, and individuals of other nations dependent on them, who shall proceed to Jerusalem, shall not be molested either in going or returning.

Article 35. The monks of the two French orders, namely, the Jesuits and Capuchins, shall not be disturbed in the possession of the churches which for a long time they occupy at Galata; and as one of these churches has been burnt it shall be rebuilt according to law, and remain under the control of the Capuchins. Neither shall any one molest the churches of the French nation at Smyrna, at Sidon, at Alexandria, and the other ports, and they shall not be compelled to pay money on this account.

Article 36. They shall not be molested when they shall quietly preach the gospel in their hospital at Galata.

Article 82. Accordingly as it has been determined by the Articles formerly stipulated and now renewed, when the places possessed at Jerusalem by the monks dependent on France shall stand in need of repair to prevent them from falling into ruin by lapse of time, the necessary orders for repairing those places as far as is permitted by law shall be issued on the application of the French Ambassador at Constantinople; and none of the Pashas, Cadis, Commanders, and other officers shall offer any obstacle to the execution of repairs authorized by order. But it has happened heretofore that, under the pretence of the said places having been clandestinely repaired, the authorities have subjected them every year to frequent inspections, and have imposed fines upon the monks: this has been taken into consideration; and the Pashas, Cadis, Commanders, and other officers of those countries shall be allowed to inspect only once a-year the Church called by the monks the Sepulchre of Jesus, as well as the other churches and places of pilgrimage.

The bishops and monks dependent on the Emperor of France shall be protected as long as they confine themselves within the limits of their profession, and no one shall obstruct them in the exercise of their worship according to their usages and customs in the churches possessed by them, and in the other places wherein they dwell.

And when the Rayahs of my Sublime Porte shall have commercial dealings with the French, they shall not be molested in defiance of the Holy Law on account of those same dealings.

The ancient Capitulations purport, that the French shall not be molested when they shall quietly preach the gospel in their hospital at Galata; but that Article has not been executed. Therefore, henceforth, and in conformity with the tenor of the ancient Capitulations, no one shall molest them when they shall quietly preach the gospel in the said hospital, to whatever quarter it may have been transferred.

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*Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 23.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, September 4, 1850.*

I TRANSMIT herewith in copy, for your Lordship's information, an instruction addressed lately by General Aupick to the chief interpreter of the French Mission for communication to Aali Pasha. It relates to the pending dispute between the Greek and Latin Churches of Jerusalem. I am not yet informed of the effect, if any, produced by so emphatic a recommendation of the subject advocated by France.

The Porte, in its embarrassment between the two conflicting interests animated by religious zeal, would, no doubt, be glad to find an issue in some private arrangement between the parties more immediately concerned. Those of her friends who wish to see her free from the operation of exclusive foreign influences, and who cannot close their eyes to the probable political consequences of that success which the French Government seeks naturally to obtain at the head of the Roman Catholic representatives, can hardly fail to sympathize with the Turkish Ministry in their view, if such be really their view, of the pending case.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 8.

*General Aupick to M. Cor.*

Monsieur,

*Therapia, le 12 Août, 1850.*

DANS la conférence que j'ai eu l'honneur d'avoir, le 28 Mai dernier, avec son Altesse le Grand Vizir et son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, il a été admis que les Capitulations entre la Sublime Porte et la France dont je réclamaï l'exécution en ce qui concerne les sanctuaires de Jérusalem, étaient en pleine vigueur.

J'ai déclaré de plus que postérieurement au Traité de 1740, un Acte diplomatique, consenti et signé par les deux Puissances, pouvait seul infirmer ou modifier régulièrement les dites Capitulations ; qu'en l'absence d'un Acte pareil, on ne pouvait avoir recours, pour le sens de l'Article 33 des Capitulations, qu'aux firmans antérieurs à l'année 1740 ou contemporains.

Depuis je vous ai chargé de demander à son Excellence Aali Pasha si, après l'examen de cette question auquel il avait annoncé qu'il se livrerait, il admettrait cette base de la négociation que je pose comme un principe incontestable, et qui a, d'ailleurs, le mérite de la circonscrire et de la simplifier.

Son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères en a fait savoir par votre entremise qu'il subordonnait toute réponse et toute décision à l'avis du Conseil des Ministres ; il a ajouté que la question ne pouvait lui être soumise pendant le Ramazan, et il espérait que je consentirais à ajourner jusqu'après le Bayram la délibération du Conseil sur cette affaire.

La revendication des sanctuaires de Jérusalem que je suis chargé par mon Gouvernement d'exercer, au nom des Traités qui depuis trois siècles unissent la France à l'Empire Ottoman, exige, je le reconnais, un sérieux et mûr examen, et je ne m'étonne ni ne me plains de la voir portée devant le Conseil des Ministres.

J'ai donc consenti au délai proposé. Je vous charge aujourd'hui de rappeler à son Excellence Aali Pasha et sa promesse et la manière dont la question a été posée par moi dans la Conférence du 28 Mai dernier.

L'Europe Catholique, amie de l'Empire Ottoman, attend avec impatience l'heureuse solution de la négociation commencée. La Sublime Porte y apportera la bonne foi et la loyauté qui n'ont fait défaut à aucun des actes du règne de Sa Majesté le Sultan ; mais son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères comprendra, je n'en saurais douter, l'importance que le Cabinet Ottoman doit attacher à ne pouvoir être, dans une circonstance d'un aussi haut intérêt, accusé de délais dont la nécessité ne serait pas manifeste.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) J. AUPICK.

(Translation.)

Sir,

*Therapia, August 12, 1850.*

IN the conference which I had the honour of holding, on the 28th of May last, with his Highness the Grand Vizier and his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, it was admitted that the Capitulations between the Sublime Porte and France, for the fulfilment of which, as far as regards the sanctuaries of Jerusalem, I was applying, were in full force.

I declared, moreover, that subsequently to the Treaty of 1740, a diplomatic Act, agreed upon and signed by both Powers, could alone invalidate or regularly modify the said Capitulations; that, in the absence of such an Act, recourse could only be had, in order to determine the true meaning of the 33rd Article of the Capitulations, to the Firmans antecedent to, or contemporary with, the year 1740.

I afterwards instructed you to inquire of his Excellency Aali Pasha whether, after the examination of this question upon which he had said that he would enter, he would admit that basis of negotiation which I lay down as an incontestable principle, and which has moreover this recommendation, that it circumscribes and modifies it.

His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs made known, through you, that his reply and decision were wholly dependent on the opinion of the Council of Ministers; he added, that the question could not be submitted to them during the Ramazan, and he hoped that I would consent to adjourn until after the Bairam the deliberations of the Council upon this matter.

The claim to the sanctuaries of Jerusalem, which I am instructed by my Government to insist upon in accordance with the Treaties which for three centuries have united France and the Ottoman Empire, requires, I acknowledge, serious and mature consideration, and I am not surprised at, and do not complain of, its being brought before the Council of Ministers.

I consented, therefore, to the proposed delay. I now instruct you to remind his Excellency Aali Pasha of his promise, and of the manner in which the question was stated by me in the conference of the 28th of May last.

Catholic Europe, friendly to the Ottoman Empire, awaits with impatience a satisfactory solution of the negotiation which has been begun. The Sublime Porte will bring to the discussion of it that good faith and sincerity which have never been wanting in any act of His Majesty the Sultan's reign; but his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs will appreciate, I can have no doubt, the importance which the Ottoman Cabinet must attach to their not being open to the accusation, in a matter of such great moment, of creating delays which are not manifestly necessary.

Accept, &amp;c.

(Signed)

J. AUPICK.

No. 9.

*Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 20.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, January 4, 1851.*

I AVAIL myself of the earliest opportunity to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, the accompanying translation of an official note, addressed to General Aupick on the 30th ultimo by the Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Your Lordship will perceive that it relates to the claim advanced by France on the part of the Latin Church to certain portions of the holy buildings at Jerusalem, and that the Porte endeavours to avoid, or at least to postpone, the responsibility of a decision, by proposing a Mixed Commission for the investigation of documentary evidence on both sides.

Inclosure in No. 9.

*Aali Pasha to General Aupick.*

(Traduction.)

*Le 30 Décembre, 1850.*

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la note que votre Excellence m'a adressée sous la date du 28 Mai dernier, et qui renfermait la demande de la restitution aux prêtres Latins des saints lieux à Jérusalem, dont la possession leur est assurée par l'Article XXXIII du Traité conclu entre la Sublime Porte et le Gouvernement Français l'an 1740 de l'ère Chrétienne, ainsi que quelques représentations sur certains points qui se rattachent à cette question.

Il est certain que la Sublime Porte a constamment et de tout temps été dans l'habitude d'exécuter avec droiture et de la meilleure foi du monde ses Traités avec les Puissances amies, et il n'est pas moins vrai de dire qu'un Traité qui n'a subi, à une époque quelconque, aucun changement, aucune modification, du consentement des deux Parties Contractantes, conserve toute sa vigueur dans toutes ses dispositions.

Seulement, et il est superflu de le dire, comme tous les Chrétiens des diverses croyances ont part aux saints lieux Chrétiens qui existent à Jérusalem, et qui sont visités par eux, chaque partie est en possession de plusieurs anciens firmans et titres. Cela étant, la Sublime Porte ne peut pas naturellement prononcer sur cette question, qu'au préalable une Commission Mixte n'ait vu et médité profondément les firmans et autres pièces authentiques et valables qui ont été données, soit avant, soit après, le Traité précité; et nul doute que le Gouvernement Français, qui a déjà donné tant de preuves de son amour pour l'équité et la justice, n'apprécie cette excuse bien fondée et ne l'accepte.

Voilà, M. le Ministre, ce que, par ordre de Sa Majesté le Sultan, j'ai été chargé de vous faire savoir, et je saisis, &c.

(Signé) AALI PASHA.

(Translation.)

*December 30, 1850.*

I HAVE had the honour of receiving the note which your Excellency addressed to me under date of the 28th of May last, and which contained a demand for the restitution to the Latin priests of the Holy Places at Jerusalem, the possession of which is secured to them by Article XXXIII of the Treaty concluded between the Sublime Porte and the French Government in the year 1740 of the Christian era, as well as certain representations upon some points connected with that question.

It is evident that the Sublime Porte has constantly, and from time immemorial, been accustomed to execute religiously, and with the most perfect good faith, its Treaties with friendly Powers; and it is not the less true, that a Treaty, which has not undergone any alteration or modification at any period whatever by consent of the two Contracting Parties, retains its full force in every particular.

Only, and it is superfluous to mention it, as Christians of all denominations have an interest in the Christian Holy Places which are in Jerusalem, and which are visited by them, each party is in possession of several ancient Firmans and titles. Such being the case, the Sublime Porte cannot of course pronounce upon this question until a Mixed Commission shall have previously seen and attentively considered the Firmans, and other authentic and valid documents which have been granted either before or after the above-mentioned Treaty; and there is no doubt but that the French Government, which has already given so many proofs of its love for equity and justice, will appreciate and accept this well-founded excuse.

This, M. le Ministre, is what I have been instructed, by order of His Majesty the Sultan, to acquaint you with; and I take, &c.

(Signed) AALI PASHA.

No. 10.

*Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 3.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, January 6, 1851.*

THE French Minister called upon me this morning, and after stating the substance of Aali Pasha's note to him on the subject of Jerusalem, informed me that he had given in a formal protest to his Excellency against that part of the Turkish communication which goes to include in the proposed inquiry such firmans and other public documents as may have been promulgated subsequently to the Treaty concluded between France and Turkey in the year 1740. He is of opinion that they cannot be admitted as objects of discussion without invalidating the principle maintained by his Government, which is, that no firman of a date posterior to the Treaty can be pleaded in bar of the Treaty's execution. I ventured to ask, without entering at all into the merits of the question, whether the subsequent firmans might not be admitted, under a suitable declaration on his part, with a view to the possibility of their containing relevant clauses which might be shown to be not in contradiction with the terms of the Treaty. I infer from General Aupick's answer that he is not at liberty to modify his present course of proceeding without fresh instructions from Paris.

No. 11.

*Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 3.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, January 7, 1851.*

I INCLOSE a copy of General Aupick's protest mentioned in another despatch, and I hasten to forward it herewith for your Lordship's more complete information. A Council, which is held to-day on the affairs of Samos, will probably be invited to take it into consideration, and this promptitude looks as if the result of the pending deliberation may perhaps prove favourable to the views of the French Government.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 11.

*General Aupick to Aali Pasha.**Péra, le 5 Janvier, 1851.*

LE Général de Division, Ministre de France près la Sublime Porte Ottomane, a reçu le memorandum que son Excellence Aali Pasha, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté le Sultan, lui a fait l'honneur de lui adresser, en date du 17 Safer, 1267 (30 Décembre, 1850), sous le No. 12, en réponse à la note que le Ministre de France avait eu l'honneur de remettre à son Excellence le 28 Mai, 1850, à l'effet de revendiquer efficacement, au profit des religieux Latins de la Palestine, la possession des lieux saints dont les Traités leur assurent la jouissance.

Si c'est avec une vive satisfaction que le Ministre de France a vu la Sublime Porte reconnaître l'existence et la pleine valeur des Traités dont la France, en cette circonstance, réclame l'exécution au nom de tous les Catholiques, c'est avec un douloureux étonnement qu'il a remarqué une déviation manifeste de ces principes dans la fin du memorandum que son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères a été chargé de lui communiquer.

En effet, étendre aux Actes postérieurs aux Capitulations de 1740, l'examen proposé par son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, n'est-ce pas infirmer partiellement les Traités dont la Porte reconnaît la pleine et entière validité? N'est-ce pas mettre en contradiction avec cette déclaration formelle "qu'un Traité qui n'a pas été modifié et changé du consentement des deux Parties Contractantes continue à être valable et en vigueur?"

Aussi, tout en considérant comme équitable la proposition de son Excellence Aali Pasha, en tant qu'elle ne concerne que les titres antérieurs à 1740, le Ministre de France se voit avec un profond regret obligé de protester formellement contre l'examen dont il est question de toutes pièces ou actes postérieurs à cette époque. En agissant ainsi, il éprouve le besoin de déclarer qu'il cède à l'accomplissement d'un devoir rigoureux et pénible.

En conséquence, et tout en renouvelant à son Excellence sa protestation formelle, tant au nom de la France qu'au nom de Catholicité tout entière, le Ministre de la République a l'honneur de lui faire savoir que ne pouvant accepter en aucune façon la discussion des documents postérieurs aux Traités que lient la France à la Sublime Porte, il va communiquer à son Gouvernement le memorandum de M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, et demander de nouvelles instructions.

(Signé) J. AUPICK.

(Translation.)

*Pera, January 5, 1851.*

THE General of Division, Minister of France at the Ottoman Porte, has received the memorandum which his Excellency Aali Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs of His Majesty the Sultan, did him the honour to address to him under date of the 17th Safer, 1267 (December 30, 1850), No. 12, in answer to the note which the Minister of France had the honour of transmitting to his Excellency on the 28th of May, 1850, with the view of asserting on behalf of the Latin monks of Palestine, claims to the possession of the Holy Places, the enjoyment of which is secured to them by the Treaties.

If the Minister of France has seen with lively satisfaction that the Sublime Porte recognizes the existence and full force of the Treaties, the complete execution of which France, in the present case, claims on behalf of all Catholics; he has observed with painful surprise a manifest departure from those principles in the conclusion of the memorandum which his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs was instructed to communicate to him.

In fact, does not the extending to Acts posterior to the Capitulations of 1740 of the examination proposed by his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, partially invalidate the Treaties, the full and entire validity of which is recognized by the Porte?—does it not contradict the formal declaration, “that a Treaty which has not undergone any alteration or modification at any period whatsoever by the consent of the Contracting Parties, continues to be valid and in full force?”

Wherefore while considering the proposal of his Excellency Aali Pasha to be just in so far as it concerns only the titles antecedent to 1740, the Minister of France feels himself, to his deep regret, obliged formally to protest against the proposed examination of any Acts or documents posterior to that epoch. In acting thus, he feels bound to say that he does so only for the fulfilment of a strict and painful duty.

Therefore, while repeating to his Excellency his formal protest, both in the name of France and in that of Catholicism at large, the Minister of the Republic has the honour to acquaint him, that being unable in any way to assent to the discussion of the documents posterior to the Treaties which unite France and the Sublime Porte, he will communicate to his Government the memorandum of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and apply for further instructions.

(Signed) J. AUPICK.

No. 12.

*Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 26.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, February 25, 1851.*

SOON after the arrival of the last steam-packet from Marseilles, General Aupick waited upon Aali Pasha and placed in his Excellency's hands an official note relating to the disputed question of the holy places at Jerusalem.

Of this note I have been favoured with a copy, which I have now the honour to inclose for your Lordship's information. It is couched in strong terms, and calculated to make a corresponding impression on the Turkish Ministers.

I learn, on the other hand, that M. de Titoff protests against all inquiry into the right of possession, and insists, in the Emperor's name, on the actual state of occupation.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 12.

*General Aupick to Aali Pasha.*

*Péra, le 23 Février, 1851.*

LE Général de Division, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de la République Française près la Sublime Porte Ottomane, a transmis à son Gouvernement le memorandum que son Excellence Aali Pasha, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté le Sultan, lui a fait l'honneur de lui adresser le 30 Décembre, 1850, sous le No. 12, en réponse à la note que le Ministre de France avait eu l'honneur de remettre à son Excellence le 28 Mai, 1850, à l'effet de revendiquer efficacement, au profit des religieux Latins de la Palestine, la possession de lieux saints qui leur est assurée par les Traités.

Sous la date du 28 Janvier de la présente année, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la République Française fait connaître au Ministre de France près la Porte que le Gouvernement Français ne peut prendre au sérieux un acte entaché d'une contradiction manifeste, ainsi que le Ministre de France l'a établi dans son réplique du 5 Janvier.

Pour la France, il s'agit de savoir purement et simplement si la Porte se considère comme liée encore à son égard par les Capitulations de 1740, alors qu'il est parfaitement établi qu'aucun Acte auquel la France ait pris part n'en a infirmé la valeur.

Le Ministre de France est en conséquence chargé d'insister pour que le Gouvernement Ottoman veuille bien s'expliquer enfin catégoriquement sur ce point. Si la réponse est satisfaisante, ajoute le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, rien ne s'opposera à l'ouverture d'une négociation dans laquelle le Gouvernement Français ne se refusera certes à aucun des changements qui pourront se concilier avec son bon droit et avec les intérêts essentiels d'une cause qu'il défend au nom de la Catholicité toute entière. Si, au contraire, la réponse était négative, ou, ce qui reviendrait au même, si le Gouvernement Ottoman continuait à se renfermer dans des allégations contradictoires, il ne pourrait en résulter, la Porte le comprendra, qu'une grave atteinte aux relations de la France avec elle.

En portant à la connaissance de son Excellence Aali Pasha cette appréciation par le Gouvernement Français du memorandum du 30 Décembre dernier, le Ministre de France ne peut qu'insister pour qu'il veuille bien lui faire connaître dans le plus bref délai possible la décision de son Gouvernement. Dans l'espérance qu'elle sera conforme aux sentiments bien connus de droiture et de loyauté qui animent le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale, le Ministre de France saisit, &c.

(Signé) J. AUPICK.

(Translation.)

*Pera, February 23, 1851.*

THE General of Division, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the French Republic at the Sublime Ottoman Porte, forwarded to his Government the memorandum which his Excellency Aali Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs of His Majesty the Sultan, did him the honour to address to him on the 30th of December, 1850, No. 12, in answer to the note which the Minister of France had the honour of addressing to his Excellency on the

28th of May, 1850, with the view of asserting in behalf of the Latin monks of Palestine, claims to the possession of the Holy Places, which is secured to them by Treaties.

Under date of the 28th January of the present year, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic informs the Minister of France at the Porte, that the French Government cannot treat seriously a document sullied by a manifest contradiction, as the Minister of France, in his reply of January 5, has proved it to be.

France desires to know, in plain terms, whether the Porte considers itself still bound to her by the Capitulations of 1740, it being perfectly established that no Act in which France has taken part has invalidated their force. The Minister of France is consequently instructed to press the Ottoman Government to be good enough to explain itself categorically upon this point. If the reply is satisfactory, the Minister for Foreign Affairs adds, there will be no obstacle to the opening of a negotiation in which the French Government will assuredly not refuse to agree to any alterations which may be consistent with its just rights and with the essential interests of a cause which it is defending on behalf of Catholicism at large. If, on the contrary, the reply should be in the negative, or what would amount to the same thing, if the Ottoman Government should continue to entrench itself behind contradictory statements, the Porte will understand that the result can only be a serious prejudice to its relations with France.

In bringing to the knowledge of his Excellency Aali Pasha the view thus taken by the French Government of the memorandum of the 30th December last, the Minister of France cannot but entreat him to be good enough to acquaint him as soon as possible with the decision of his Government. In the hope that it may be in accordance with the well-known sentiments of justice and uprightness which animate the Government of His Imperial Majesty, the Minister of France takes, &c.

(Signed) J. AUPICK.

No. 13.

*Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 26.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, March 6, 1851.*

AS far as my information extends, the question of the holy places at Jerusalem remains in the same state as when I last made mention of it to your Lordship.

Inclosed herewith is the copy of an official note given in by the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires. Your Lordship will observe that Austria pretends to a right of protection over the interests of the Latins similar in some degree to that which is asserted by France.

Inclosure in No. 13.

*M. de Klezl to Aali Pasha.*

*Constantinople, le 3 Février, 1851.*

LE Soussigné, Chargé d'Affaires de Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique près la Sublime Porte Ottomane, a reçu du Gouvernement Impérial l'ordre d'appuyer auprès d'elle les réclamations des religieux Latins en Palestine, ayant pour but de revendiquer les lieux saints et les privilèges dont ils furent successivement dépouillés.

Après avoir recueilli soigneusement les données et les matériaux qui étaient propres à jeter de la lumière sur l'objet de ces réclamations, le Gouvernement Impérial a acquis la conviction que les religieux Catholiques étaient dans leur bon droit. Dès lors il n'a pu hésiter un seul instant à leur prêter son concours en sa qualité de Puissance appelée par ses Traités avec la Sublime Porte à protéger le culte Catholique dans l'Empire Ottoman.

C'est donc en vertu des Articles XIII du Traité de Paix de Carlovitz et de

celui de Passarovitz, IX du Traité de Belgrade, et XII du Traité de Sistov<sup>9</sup> lesquels, ainsi qu'il est connu à la Sublime Porte, renferment des stipulations spéciales en faveur des religieux de Terre Sainte, que le Soussigné est dans le cas de signaler l'objet en question à l'attention toute particulière de son Excellence Aali Pasha, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté le Sultan, ainsi que M. l'Envoyé et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de France l'a déjà fait par la note qu'il a adressée à la Sublime Porte dans ce même but, et dont il a bien voulu donner connaissance au Soussigné.

Le Ministre Ottoman, en jugeant la question avec impartialité, ne pourra voir dans la demande des religieux Latins, appuyée aujourd'hui par le concours des Puissances Catholiques, autre chose que la revendication d'un droit tout aussi incontestable qu'il a été longtemps inconnu.

Il est évident que la nature même des engagements que la Sublime Porte a contractés à cet égard, enlève tout caractère de légalité aux Actes postérieurs à ces engagements et qui n'ont point été revêtus de l'assentiment commun.

Au surplus, les religieux Latins n'ont pas omis de réserver formellement leurs droits en présence des usurpations qui avaient lieu à leur détriment, ainsi qu'il conste par les renseignements authentiques que s'est procuré le Cabinet Impérial.

Dans cet état de la question, le Gouvernement Impérial d'Autriche pense que le moyen le plus simple et à la fois le plus efficace d'arriver à une solution satisfaisante, serait de confier à une Commission Mixte le soin de constater, avant tout, l'état de possession des Latins en 1740, époque où la jouissance des sanctuaires qui se trouvaient alors entre leurs mains, leur fut confirmée par des transactions solennelles.

C'est avec une pleine confiance dans la sagesse et l'esprit d'équité de la Sublime Porte, que le Soussigné croit pouvoir énoncer l'espoir que les efforts employés à cette œuvre d'un intérêt général aboutiront à un résultat conforme à la justice.

Il saisit, &c.  
(Signé) ED. DE KLEZL.

(Translation.)

*Constantinople, February 3, 1851.*

THE Undersigned, &c., has received orders from the Imperial Government to support the claims of the Latin monks in Palestine, having for their object the reassertion of their rights to the holy places, and to the privileges of which they were successively despoiled.

After having carefully reviewed the facts and materials calculated to throw light on the object of these claims, the Imperial Government has acquired the conviction that the Catholic monks are in the right. Thenceforth it could not hesitate a single instant to afford its concurrence, as a Power called upon by its Treaties with the Sublime Porte to protect the Catholic religion in the Ottoman Empire.

In virtue, then, of the XIIIth Article of the Treaties of Carlowitz and Passarowitz, of the IXth of the Treaty of Belgrade, and XIIth of the Treaty of Sistowa, which, as the Porte is aware, contain special stipulations in favour of the Catholic monks in the Holy Land, the Undersigned directs the special attention of his Excellency Aali Pasha, &c., to that object, as the Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary of France has already done by the note which for the same purpose he has addressed to the Sublime Porte, and which he has had the goodness to communicate to the Undersigned.

The Ottoman Minister, on taking an impartial view of the question, will not find in the claim of the Latin monks, supported at the present time by the Catholic Powers, anything beyond the reassertion of a right as indisputable as it has been disregarded for a length of time.

It is evident that the very nature of the engagements which the Sublime Porte has contracted in this respect deprives the acts posterior to those engagements, which have not been sanctioned by common consent, of any character of legality.

Moreover, the Latin monks have not omitted to make formal reservation of

their rights on the occasion of usurpations which had been made to their prejudice, as clearly appears from the authentic information obtained by the Imperial Cabinet.

In this state of the question, the Imperial Government of Austria conceives that the method at once the most simple and most efficacious of arriving at a satisfactory solution, would be to entrust to a Mixed Commission the duty of establishing, in the first instance, the state of the Latin possession in 1740, at which period the enjoyment of the sanctuaries then possessed by them, was confirmed to them by solemn engagements.

With full confidence in the wisdom and equity of the Sublime Porte, the Undersigned conceives that he may express the hope that the efforts made in regard to this matter of general interest, will have a result consistent with justice.

He avails, &c.  
(Signed) ED. DE KLEZL.

No. 14.

*Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 1.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, March 18, 1851.*

AGREEABLY to your Lordship's instructions, I have continued to abstain from taking any part in the pending dispute relative to the sacred buildings at Jerusalem. At the Porte, it appears, the question remains in the same state as when I last adverted to it.

No. 15.

*Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 2.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, May 19, 1851.*

I AM informed that the new French Minister at this Court has resumed the question of Jerusalem, by proposing to pursue the negotiation which his predecessor was unable to conclude. Fuad Effendi excused himself on the ground of not having participated in the previous discussions, and the question awaits the return of Aali Pasha from Broussa.

It would seem that M. de Lavalette in making his first communication expressed the importance attached to it by his Government, but intimated at the same time a readiness to treat the points at issue in a spirit of moderation and fairness.

It would seem that he has not made any communication on the subject to his colleagues, the Representatives of the Roman Catholic Powers.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 16.

*Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 19.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, July 4, 1851.*

THE Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has communicated to me an official note, addressed by his Excellency to the French Envoy, on the subject of the holy buildings at Jerusalem. A copy of it is herewith inclosed for your Lordship's information. It is to be followed by the appointment of a Mixed Commission. On the side of the Porte, as I am informed on good authority, Signor Aristarchi and Emin Effendi are to be appointed Commissioners. The former is Grand Logothete to the Greek Patriarch, and the Prince of Wallachia's Agent at the Porte.

## Inclosure in No. 16.

*Aali Pasha to M. de Lavalette.*

Traduit du Turc.)

*Shaban 1267. (Juin 1851.)*

LES notes que nous avons reçues de la part de votre prédécesseur, portant les dates du 6 Janvier et du 24 Février derniers, en réponse à la note officielle qui lui avait été remise sous la date du 17 Safer, 1267 (30 Décembre, 1850), relativement à certains lieux à Jérusalem, ont été prises en considération.

J'ai été peiné de voir par le contenu des dites notes que le Gouvernement Français a trouvé dans celle du Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse des contradictions.

La Sublime Porte, dont l'une des anciennes et constantes habitudes est aussi d'observer avec la plus grande loyauté et franchise des Traités avec les Puissances amies, n'hésite nullement à déclarer de nouveau que tous les Articles du Traité conclu l'année 1740 de l'ère Chrétienne, lesquels n'ont pas été modifiés par un autre Traité, conservent leur force et vigueur.

Seulement, il y a ceci à dire : c'est que le droit d'expliquer et de déterminer, de commun accord, et quand cela devient nécessaire, un Article, ou quelques Articles, des Traités conclus entre la Sublime Porte et des Puissances qui sont également amies comme la France, est un de ces droits qui appartiennent également à toutes les Puissances ; et le Gouvernement Français lui-même conviendra avec la Sublime Porte qu'aucun Gouvernement ne peut empêcher un autre d'user de ce droit. Mais les modifications dont il est fait mention dans la note de la Sublime Porte, dont l'intention et le désir tendent sans cesse à sauvegarder les droits légitimes et bien fondés de chaque partie, et lesquelles sont une conséquence de ces mêmes droits, ont au premier coup d'œil paru des contradictions au Gouvernement Français.

Vu donc que ces explications franches et loyales, et les nouvelles assurances données ici de nouveau du respect de la Sublime Porte pour les Traités seront, on aime à croire, appréciées par le Gouvernement Français aussi bien que par votre Excellence, que tout soupçon sera dissipé, et que les deux parties sont réellement animées du désir de maintenir et de resserrer de plus en plus les relations amicales qui existent entre les deux illustres Gouvernements, il y a tout lieu d'espérer qu'en se concertant ensemble on pourra aviser aux moyens de résoudre cette question d'une manière conforme à la dignité et aux droits fondés de toutes les parties.

Je saisis, &c.

(Translation.)

*Shaban, 1267. (June 1851.)*

THE notes which we received from your predecessor, dated the 5th of January and 23rd of February last, in answer to the official note which was addressed to him on the 17th Safer, 1267 (December 30, 1850), relative to certain places at Jerusalem, have been taken into consideration.

I have been grieved to see by the contents of the said notes that the French Government has found contradictory statements in the note of his Highness' Government.

The Sublime Porte, one of whose ancient and constant customs it is to observe with the greatest truth and sincerity her Treaties with friendly Powers, by no means hesitates once more to declare that all the Articles of the Treaty concluded in the year 1740 of the Christian Era, which have not been modified by any other Treaty, retain their full force and effect.

Only it is to be observed, that the right of explaining and determining by common consent, and when it is found necessary, one or more Articles of the Treaties concluded between the Sublime Porte and Powers which are as friendly to it as France, is one of those rights which appertain equally to all Powers ; and the French Government will itself agree with the Sublime Porte, that no one Government can prevent another Government from exercising that right. But the modifications mentioned in the note of the Sublime Porte, which always desires and purposes to uphold the lawful and well-founded rights of each party, and which modifications result from those very rights, have appeared to the French Government, at first sight, contradictory.

As, therefore, it is hoped that these frank and sincere explanations, and the fresh assurances now repeated of the Sublime Porte's respect for Treaties, will be appreciated by the French Government, as well as by your Excellency,—that all suspicions will be removed, and that the two parties are really animated by a wish to maintain and to strengthen more and more the friendly relations existing between the two illustrious Governments,—there is every reason to expect that, by common concert, they may devise means of settling this question in a manner consistent with the dignity and the just rights of all parties.

I take, &c.  
(Signed) AALI PASHA.

## No. 17.

*Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 2.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, September 17, 1851.*

IT appears that the negotiations respecting the holy buildings at Jerusalem are beginning to assume a more serious aspect. The Russian Government has manifested of late an increased interest in the maintenance of the Greek pretensions. M. de Lavalette informs me that the Latin right is clearly established by the Committee of Investigation, and that his Government is fully entitled to insist on the execution of the Treaty which records it. He gave me to understand that if the moderation of his Government, in seeking only a joint participation of the buildings in question, were not appreciated, the claim of undivided possession by the Latins would be urged with all the weight of a demand warranted by Treaty.

Amidst these conflicting demonstrations I cannot perceive any symptom of concession on the side of the Porte, nor do I conceive it probable that the Turkish Ministers will give way, unless their hands be fairly forced; but as I take no part in the contest, the tendency to concession may exist without its falling under my immediate notice.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

## No. 18.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 31.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, October 21, 1851.*

IN conversing with the Chancellor I have taken occasion to allude to the statement in Sir Stratford Canning's despatch of September 17, and while expressing my regret at the existence of any dispute as to rights having again arisen between the Greek and Latin Churches, I thought it advisable to observe that the contest was one from which Her Majesty's Ambassador had kept wholly aloof.

Count Nesselrode said that of this fact he was fully aware.

## No. 19.

*Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 31.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, October 17, 1851.*

I HAVE ascertained from official sources of information that M. de Titoff at his recent audience of the Sultan referred to the pending differences concerning the holy buildings in Syria, saying that the Emperor of Russia was persuaded that no change would be allowed to take place as to the possession of those sanctuaries.

The Sultan, as I am informed, replied that the Emperor's recommendation would be considered.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

*Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 26.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, November 4, 1851.*

THE French Envoy at this Court purposes to send M. de Reculot, the Principal Secretary of his Legation, to Paris, by the steam-packet of to-morrow, with his conclusive report respecting the disputed sanctuaries at Jerusalem and Bethlehem. According to his language in the conversations with which he has honoured me on this subject, and particularly during a visit which I received from him to-day, the question has assumed a character of extreme gravity. His several statements amount in substance to what follows :—

France, says M. de Lavalette, is entitled by its Treaty of 1740 with the Porte to vindicate the right of the Latins to an exclusive occupation of all the sanctuaries which they possessed at that time. The conferences lately opened here have resulted in a clear establishment of that right as applied to the holy buildings, ten, I believe, in number, most of which are now possessed jointly by the two communions, and some exclusively by the Greeks. M. de Lavalette, instead of pushing his right to an extreme, took upon himself the responsibility of declaring his readiness to extend the principle of joint possession to the whole number. In so doing he would have anticipated the instructions of his Government, and exposed himself to the animadversion of Rome and of certain parties in France. An arrangement to this effect was unofficially agreed upon between Aali Pasha and himself, when he learnt that the Russian Envoy had sent in a letter from the Emperor Nicholas to the Sultan, which immediately altered the intentions of the Porte, and left him no choice but that of either accepting an inadmissible proposal or appealing to his Government. The proposal, which he thought it impossible to accept, was that of including in the principle of joint possession all the sanctuaries now possessed exclusively by the Latins. This proposal was represented to me by the Turkish Ministers as embracing all the principal sects of Christianity ; but, whichever may be the correct version, it appears that M. de Titoff was as much opposed to it as M. de Lavalette. The former declared to the Turkish Minister, that he and his Legation would immediately quit Constantinople if the *status quo* of the sanctuaries were in any degree unsettled. The Porte has, in consequence, substituted another proposal, namely, that it would reserve its final decision until after a full investigation of the quarrel on which the several conflicting pretensions, including those of the Greeks, of the Latins, and of Russia, are respectively founded. This proposal is scarcely less distasteful to M. de Lavalette than the preceding one. He has acted with moderation throughout,—he has been careful not to commit his Government,—he has made no written communication except his opening note and such documents as were necessary for establishing the joint commission of inquiry,—and he is anxious to act with moderation to the last ; but at the same time he thinks it impossible to submit with honour to the present plan of proceeding,—his Government having embarked in the question cannot, with any degree of credit or consistency, stop short under the dictation of Russia,—the national party in France, the Catholic party there and elsewhere, will press for the full assertion of right under treaty,—and, as for himself, he will retire rather than be made the instrument, as he conceives he would be in the supposed case, of his country's humiliation ; nay more, if it depended upon him, he would not hesitate to make use of the great naval force now possessed by France in the Mediterranean, and by blockading the Dardanelles bring the question in debate forthwith to a satisfactory issue.

Such are the leading points of M. de Lavalette's conversation with me. Bearing in view the purport of your Lordship's instructions, which direct me to preserve a neutral course in these discussions, I have expressed no opinion on the merits of the case. To M. de Lavalette I have made such passing remarks as I thought most likely to abate any excess of heat or precipitancy in his proceedings, and I gave M. de Titoff a seasonable idea of the lengths to which, in opinion at least, our French colleague was disposed to urge his Government, hoping that, if he were not prepared for extremes, the intimation might incline him to be less peremptory with the Porte.

The Sultan's Ministers, though embarrassed by their position between the contending parties, have not yet expressed to me any apprehension of violence,

or coercion, as likely to proceed from either side. Their object, as usual, is to temporize ; their inclination would seem to be rather towards France ; not that they can feel any direct concern in the question at issue, but as deeming a concession to French influence less dangerous than the triumph of Russian sympathy for the Greeks, whose cause, however, as that of an important section of their own fellow-subjects, they can hardly afford to neglect.

It may be as well to add, that M. de Titoff stated to me in conversation, after being apprized of the language held by M. de Lavalette, that it was impossible for him (the Russian Envoy) to act otherwise, though he did not explain whether that impossibility arose out of the nature of the case, or solely from the peremptory character of his instructions.

In calling attention to the present complicated state of a question which may involve consequences disproportioned to its intrinsic importance, I merely discharge a duty which could not be neglected with prudence or propriety. It remains for your Lordship to consider the language and circumstances reported above, in connection with such evidence of the real intentions of France and Russia as may reach Her Majesty's Government from other sources of information.

Inclosed herewith are three statements, which may possibly assist your Lordship in estimating the merits and bearings of the pending question. The first gives a list of the sanctuaries supposed to have been possessed exclusively by the Latins in 1740. The second is a chronological sketch of the several Hatti-sheriffs issued by the Mahometan Sultans in favour of the Greeks. The third contains references to the principal Articles of the Treaties between Russia and Turkey which might be cited as giving to the former a right of interference on behalf of the ecclesiastical interests of the Greeks.

#### Inclosure 1 in No. 20.

##### *Etat des Sanctuaires exclusivement possédés par les Latins en 1740.*

##### A JERUSALEM :

1. Le Saint Sépulcre, c'est-à-dire, la grande coupole appelée coupole de plomb, et la petite coupole située sous la grande et recouvrant le tombeau même. Tout le parvis qui entoure le tombeau et l'espace circulaire entre les piliers du dôme et le mur, espace aujourd'hui rempli par des chambres bâties par des Grecs après l'incendie.

2. Le grand arceau qui sépare l'Eglise des Grecs du dôme, et qui sert de chœur aux Latins quand ils font leur cérémonies devant le tombeau.

3. La pierre de l'onction et le parvis qui l'entoure, jusqu'à la porte de l'Eglise et la chambre actuellement occupée par les Grecs.

4. La moitié méridionale du Calvaire, celle où Notre Sauveur a été mis en croix ; les quatre arceaux intérieurs qui forment la Chapelle d'Adam, en avant de laquelle se trouvaient les tombeaux de Godefroid de Bouillon et de Baudouin détruits en 1811 ; ainsi que cinq autres tombes royales placées au pied du mur du chœur de Grecs ; la chambre à côté de la Chapelle d'Adam.

5. La grotte de l'invention de la sainte croix et de l'escalier qui y conduit.

6. Tout le parvis et l'autel de l'Eglise de Ste. Madeleine ; les sept arceaux contigus dits arceaux de la Vierge, en bas comme en haut ; et la Chapelle dite de la Prison.

7. La petite église située à côté de celle de La Madeleine ; le couvent des religieux Latins, avec une moitié de la galerie de la grande coupole ; les chambres contigues, la citerne, la galerie au-dessus des sept arceaux de la Vierge, et un passage de plein pied pour arriver à la coupole.

8. La Chapelle dite de la Sainte Vierge en dehors de l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre au midi du Calvaire, et tout la place devant la porte de l'église.

9. Le couvent du Saint Sauveur avec ses dépendants, l'église, les jardins, &c.

##### Hors de Jérusalem :

10. Le Cimetière du Mont Sion.

11. Le Tombeau de la Sainte Vierge, avec les autels de St. Joseph, St. Joachim, et de Ste. Anne. Les clefs de l'église étaient dans les mains

des Latins, qui en avaient la garde exclusive ; les autres nations avaient cependant chacune un autel dans l'église, mais elles ne pouvaient célébrer sans la permission des Latins, et le tombeau même de la Sainte Vierge était exclusivement réservé à ceux-ci.

12. La Grotte de Gethsémane, avec les oliviers et des terrains voisins.

13. La Grande Eglise de Bethléem tout entière, sauf le baptistère ; la grotte de la crèche, et les deux escaliers qui y conduisent. Les religieux Latins avaient seuls les trois clefs, une pour la porte de l'église, les deux autres pour chacune des portes latérales de la grotte. Maîtres de l'église, ils pouvaient y entrer librement et y faire toutes les cérémonies de leur culte sur le maître-autel de l'église comme sur les deux autels situés dans la grotte, celui de la nativité et celui de la crèche. Une étoile d'argent portant une inscription Latine était clouée sur le marbre à l'endroit où Notre Sauveur est né. Une tapisserie portant les armes de Terre Sainte, et appartenant aux Latins, recouvrait les murs de la grotte. Les religieux Latins possédaient en outre à Bethléem la place devant l'église, tout le cimetière, et les magasins dits du moulin vieux.

14. Le couvent situé à côté de la Grande Eglise de Bethléem, avec la petite Eglise de Ste. Catherine et tous les terrains qui se prolongent jusqu'à la Grotte de la Nativité, et dans lesquels se trouvent les sanctuaires de St. Joseph, des Sts. Innocents, de St. Eusepe, des Sts. Saule et Eustasia, de St. Jerome ; du jardin contigu, et d'un autre jardin situé près de la grotte appelée Grotte du Lait.

15. La Grotte des Bergers et des terrains qui l'entourent.

16. L'Eglise de St. J. Baptiste dans le village de Aiakarem, avec le couvent et le jardin.

17. L'endroit où la Sainte Vierge a visité Ste. Elizabeth près du village de St. Jean (Aïntharem), et la Grotte de St. Juan dans le désert.

Sanctuaires possédés par les Latins en commun avec les autres nations en 1740 :

1. La moitié du Calvaire qui appartient en propre aux Grecs, celle où la croix a été plantée. Les Latins avaient et ont encore le droit d'y faire une cérémonie le Vendredi Saint.

2. L'Eglise du Tombeau de la Vierge, en ce sens—que les autres nations y avaient chacune un autel et y célébraient avec la permission et sous l'inspection des religieux Latins.

Sanctuaires et possessions desquels les Latins sont actuellement tout-à-fait exclus :

Jerusalem.—1. Les sept arceaux de la Vierge, et la Chapelle de la Prison.

2. Les deux arceaux inférieurs du Calvaire, la chapelle d'avant, et la chambre qui est à côté. Les tombeaux de Godefroid de Bouillon et de Baudouin ont été détruits.

3. Une portion du parvis autour de la pierre de l'onction, celle où étaient les autres tombeaux qui ont été détruits—les Grecs ayant avancé le mur pour agrandir leur église. La chambre de droite a été également usurpée par les Grecs.

4. L'espace situé entre les piliers même de la coupole et entre les piliers et le mur, espace que les Grecs ont rempli en y bâtissant des chambres. Ils ont également usurpé environ quatre piés de l'espace sous le grand arceau, en avançant, pour agrandir leur église, le mur qui la sépare de la coupole.

Hors de Jerusalem.—5. Toute l'église qui renferme le tombeau de la Sainte Vierge, et le jardin qui est à côté. Les Latins ne peuvent plus y célébrer, ni même plus y entrer sans la permission des Grecs, qui ont les clefs.

6. La Grande Eglise de Bethléem tout entière ; les deux escaliers qui conduisent à la grotte ; l'autel de la nativité dans cette grotte. L'étoile d'argent a été enlevée ; il ne reste plus que quelques lambeaux de la tapisserie appartenant aux religieux Latins. Les trois clefs sont actuellement entre les mains des Grecs.

7. La moitié de deux jardins du Couvent à Bethléem.

8. La place et le magasin dit du moulin vieux.

9. La Grotte des Bergers et les terrains qui l'entourent.

Sanctuaires appartenant exclusivement aux Latins en 1740, et à la jouissance desquels participent actuellement les autres nations :

1. Le Saint Sépulcre et le parvis qui l'entoure sous la grande coupole.
2. La pierre de l'onction.
3. La Grotte de la Crèche à Bethléem. Les Grecs et les Arméniens y célèbrent sur l'autel de la nativité, et les Latins sur l'autel de la crèche.

(Translation.)

*Condition of the Sanctuaries possessed exclusively by the Latins in 1740.*

#### AT JERUSALEM :

1. The Holy Sepulchre, that is to say, the grand cupola, called the leaden cupola, and the small cupola situated under the larger one, and covering the tomb itself. The entire court which surrounds the tomb, and the circular space between the pillars of the dome and the wall, now occupied by the chambers built by the Greeks after the fire.

2. The grand arch which separates the Greek Church from the dome, and which serves for the choir for the Latins when they perform their ceremonies before the tomb.

3. The stone of unction and the court which surrounds it, as far as the door of the church and the chamber now occupied by the Greeks.

4. The southern half of Calvary, that on which our Saviour was crucified ; the four interior arches which compose Adam's Chapel, in front of which are the tombs of Godfrey of Bouillon and of Baudouin destroyed in 1811 ; as well as five other royal tombs situated at the foot of the wall of the Greek choir ; the chamber at the side of Adam's Chapel.

5. The grotto of the invention of the holy cross, and of the staircase leading to it.

6. The entire court and the altar of the Church of the Magdalene ; the seven contiguous arches called the Arches of the Virgin, below as well as above ; and the chapel called the Prison Chapel.

7. The small church situated at the side of that of the Magdalene ; the convent of the Latin monks, with half of the gallery of the great cupola ; the adjoining chambers, the cistern, the gallery above the seven arches of the Virgin, and a covered passage leading to the cupola.

8. The chapel called the Holy Virgin's, outside the Church of the Holy Sepulchre to the south of Calvary, and the entire space before the door of the Church.

9. The Convent of the Holy Saviour, with the places appertaining to it, the church, gardens, &c.

#### Outside Jerusalem :

10. The Cemetery of Mount Sion.

11. The Tomb of the Holy Virgin, with the Altars of St. Joseph, St. Joachim, St. Anne. The keys of the church were in the hands of the Latins, who had the exclusive custody of them. Other nations, nevertheless, had each an altar in the church, but they could not perform service at them without the permission of the Latins, and the Tomb of the Holy Virgin itself was exclusively reserved for the latter.

12. The Grotto of Gethsemane, with the olive trees and the adjoining grounds.

13. The Grand Church of Bethlehem altogether, excepting the Baptistery ; the Grotto of the Manger, and the two staircases which lead to it. The Latin monks alone possessed the three keys, one of the door of the church, and the other two for each of the side doors of the grotto. Masters of the church they could freely enter and there perform all the ceremonies of their religion at the high altar of the church, as well as at the two altars situated in the grotto, that of the Nativity and that of the Manger. A silver star bearing a Latin inscription was fastened on the marble, on the spot where our Saviour was born. A piece of tapestry bearing the arms of the Holy Land, and belonging to the Latins, covered the walls of the grotto. The Latin monks possessed besides at Bethlehem the square before the church, the entire cemetery, and the buildings known as those of the old mill.

14. The convent situated by the side of the Grand Church of Bethlehem, with the small Church of St. Catherine, and all the grounds which extend as far as the Grotto of the Nativity, and in which are the Sanctuaries of St. Joseph, of the Holy Innocents, of St. Eusepius, of Saints Paul and Eustasia, of St. Jerome, of the adjoining garden, and of another garden situated near the grotto called the Grotto of Milk.

15. The Grotto of the Shepherds and the grounds which surround it.

16. The Church of St. John the Baptist, in the village of Aiakarem, with the convent and the garden.

17. The spot where the Holy Virgin visited St. Elizabeth, near the village of St. John (Aintharem), and the Grotto of St. John in the Desert.

Sanctuaries possessed by the Latins in common with other nations in 1740 :

1. The half of Calvary, which properly belongs to the Greeks, that on which the cross was placed. The Latins possessed and still possess the right of having a ceremony there on Holy Thursday.

2. The Church of the Tomb of the Virgin, on this understanding,—that the other nations should each have an altar there, and perform their ceremonies there, with the permission and under the surveillance of the Latin monks.

Sanctuaries and possessions from which the Latins are now altogether excluded :

Jerusalem.—1. The Seven Arches of the Virgin, and the Chapel of the Prison.

2. The two interior arches of Calvary, the chapel in front, and the chamber which is by the side. The Tombs of Godfrey of Bouillon and of Baudouin have been destroyed.

3. A portion of the court surrounding the stone of unction, that part where the other tombs were which have been destroyed, the Greeks having pushed forward the wall in order to enlarge their church. The chamber on the right has likewise been taken possession of by the Greeks.

4. The space situated between the pillars of the cupola, and between the pillars of the wall, which the Greeks have filled up by building chambers there. They have likewise usurped about four "pics" of space under the great arch, by pushing forward, in order to enlarge their church, the wall which separates it from the cupola.

Outside Jerusalem :

5. The entire church which incloses the Tomb of the Holy Virgin, and the garden by the side of it. The Latins can no longer perform their ceremonies there, nor even enter without the permission of the Greeks, who have the keys.

6. The Grand Church of Bethlehem altogether; the two staircases which lead to the grotto; the Altar of the Nativity in that grotto. The silver star has been carried off: there no longer remains anything but a few tatters of the tapestry belonging to the Latin monks. The three keys are at the present time in the hands of the Greeks.

7. The half of the two gardens of the convent at Bethlehem.

8. The place and the store known as that of the old mill.

9. The Grotto of the Shepherds and the surrounding grounds.

Sanctuaries belonging in 1740 exclusively to the Latins, in the enjoyment of which other nations now participate :

1. The Holy Sepulchre and the court which surrounds it under the grand cupola.

2. The stone of unction.

3. The Grotto of the Manger at Bethlehem. The Greeks and the Armenians perform their ceremonies there at the Altar of the Nativity, and the Latins at the Altar of the Manger.

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## Inclosure 2 in No. 20.

*Résumé chronologique de divers Hati-Chérifs rendus par les Sultans en faveur des Grecs, depuis l'an 15 de l'Egire (ère Chr. 636) jusqu'à nos jours, concernant le droit de possession et autres privilèges accordés aux Grecs des lieux saints à Jérusalem.*

(An de l'Egire 15, Ere Ch. 636.) Hazret-Omer-Hatap, le conquérant de Jérusalem, sous le Patriarcat de Sophronius, rendit un Actinané, en vertu duquel le Saint Sépulcre et ses dépendances ont été mises sous l'autorité du Patriarche Grec, et les autres rites et religions soumis à cet égard à son obéissance, ainsi qu'une immunité complète fut accordée au Couvent de Saint Sépulcre.

(862.) Le Sultan Mehemet, après la conquête de Constantinople, sous le Patriarcat d'Athanasius, lorsque ce Patriarche vint présenter ses hommages au Sultan, rendit un hati-chérif qui confirmait les Grecs dans tous leurs droits de possession et d'immunité des lieux saints antérieurement accordés.

(923.) Le Sultan Selim, après avoir conquis Jérusalem, rendit en faveur du Patriarche Attala (ou Dorothée) un hati-chérif confirmant les mêmes droits et privilèges des Grecs.

(933.) Le Sultan Suleiman, le Canuni, sous le Patriarcat de Germain, émit aussi un hati-chérif confirmatif.

(Sefer 1044. Djem-evel 1047.) Le Sultan Murat IV, sous le Patriarcat de Théophane, rendit deux hati-chérifs, l'un contre les Arméniens et l'autre contre les Papistes, lorsque ces derniers tentèrent d'expulser les Grecs des quelques lieux saints, dont ils étaient anciennement en possession, et après que cet acte d'agression fut jugé à Constantinople.

(Sefer 1054.) Le Sultan Ibrahim renouvela le hati-chérif de son prédécesseur contre les Papistes, et abrogea toutes les dispositions de réforme précédemment émises en leur faveur.

(Rebiul-êwel 1067. Muharem 1068.) Le Sultan Mehemet, à la suite d'un jugement formel, qui a eu lieu à Constantinople, émit deux hati-chérifs, par lesquels toutes les prétentions absurdes des Arméniens furent rejetées, et leurs empiètements sévèrement défendus.

(Rejib 1086. Zilhadji 1088.) Le même Sultan, sous le Patriarche Dossithée, à la suite d'un nouveau jugement qui a eu lieu entre les Grecs et les Papistes, rendit deux autres hati-chérifs, par lesquels les droits des premiers, ayant été pleinement reconnus, toutes les ordonnances précédentes, émises contre les Papistes, furent derechef confirmées.

(Djemadi-ul-akhir 1099.) Le Sultan Suleiman, à la suite d'une nouvelle contestation soulevée et jugée sous le Patriarcat de Méléty, renouvela les mêmes hati-chérifs sus-mentionnés.

(Zilcadé 1170 ?) Le Sultan Osman, sous le Patriarcat de Parthénus, lorsque les Papistes commencèrent leurs intrigues et leurs empiètements, par un hati-chérif spécial confirma les précédents, et interdit les réformes des Papistes.

(1171 ?) Le Sultan Moustafa renouvela le hati-chérif de son prédécesseur.

(1216-1218.) Le Sultan Selim, sous le Patriarcat d'Anthémos, rendit deux hati-chérifs contre les prétentions des Arméniens.

(Rejib 1223.) Le Sultan Mahmoud, dès son avènement, rendit deux hati-chérifs, concernant l'un les Papistes et l'autre les Arméniens, par lesquels il confirma tous les hati-chérifs antérieurement émis par ses prédécesseurs en faveur des Grecs.

(1224.) Lorsqu'en 1808 le Saint Sépulcre fut incendié, par un hati-chérif spécial la reconstruction de l'édifice en fut accordée de droit aux Grecs.

(1228.) Plus tard les Arméniens ayant fait valoir des prétentions, un hati-chérif en ordonna l'enquête.

(1236.) Sous le Patriarcat de Polycarpe, lorsque les Papistes expulsèrent par force les Grecs du Saint Sépulcre afin de les empêcher d'y célébrer l'office divin, et leur causèrent plus d'un empiètement, le Sultan Mahmoud rendit alternativement trois hati-chérifs en faveur des Grecs concernant le libre exercice de leur liturgie sous le dôme même du Saint Sépulcre.

(1252.) Enfin, lorsque les Arméniens au moyen de ruses et d'intrigues réussirent à obtenir l'autorisation de procéder aux réparations de l'Eglise de la Résurrection, de la Ste. Bythléème, et du Mont des Oliviers, un hati-chérif annula l'autorisation sus-mentionnée et accorda exclusivement aux Grecs le droit de faire des réparations générales.

(Zilcadé 1255. Sefer 1256.) Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan Abdul Medjid rendit quatre hati-chérifs pour renouveler les quatre hati-chérifs ci-dessous, savoir :

1. Le hati-chérif de l'année 1223, concernant les Papistes.
2. „ „ 1228, „ les Arméniens.
3. „ „ 1236, „ la Liturgie du Grecs.
4. „ „ 1252, „ les réparations.

(Translation.)

*Chronological Summary of the various Hati-Sherifs granted by the Sultans in favour of the Greeks, from the year 15 of the Hegira (636 of the Christian era) up to the present time, concerning the right of possession and other privileges granted to the Greeks regarding the Holy Places at Jerusalem.*

(Year of the Hegira 15, Chr. Era 636.) Hazret-Omer-Hatap, the conqueror of Jernsalem, under the Patriarchate of Sophronius, issued an Actinané, by virtue of which the Holy Sepulchre and its dependencies were placed under the control of the Greek Patriarch, and the other rites and religions made subject to him in this respect, so that complete immunity was accorded to the Convent of the Holy Sepulchre.

(862.) The Sultan Mehemet, after the conquest of Constantinople, under the Patriarchate of Athanasius, when this Patriarch came to do homage to the Sultan, issued a hati-cherif which confirmed the Greeks in all their rights of possession and immunities in regard to the holy places previously granted.

(923.) The Sultan Selim, after having conquered Jerusalem, issued a hati-cherif in favour of the Patriarch Attala (or Dorotheé), confirming the same rights and privileges of the Greeks.

(933.) The Sultan Suleiman, the Canuni, under the Patriarchate of Germain, also issued a confirmatory hati-cherif.

(Sefer 1044. Djem-evel 1047.) The Sultan Murat IV, under the Patriarchate of Theophane, issued two hati-cherifs, one against the Armenians and the other against the Papists, when the latter endeavoured to expel the Greeks from certain holy places, of which they formerly had possession, and after this act of aggression had been adjudicated on at Constantinople.

(Sefer 1054.) The Sultan Ibrahim renewed the hati-cherif of his predecessor against the Papists, and annulled all the reformatory acts previously issued in their favour.

(Rebiul-ewel 1067. Muharem 1068.) The Sultan Mehemet, in consequence of a formal judgment which took place at Constantinople, issued two hati-cherifs, by which all the absurd pretensions of the Armenians were put aside, and their encroachments strictly prohibited.

(Rejib 1086. Zilhadji 1088.) This same Sultan, under the Patriarch Dossithée, in consequence of a new judgment which was given between the Greeks and the Papists, issued two other hati-cherifs, by which the rights of the former, having been fully recognized, all the preceding ordinances issued against the Papists were confirmed anew.

(Djemadi-ul-akhir 1099.) The Sultan Suleiman, in consequence of a fresh dispute which had arisen and been decided under the Patriarchate of Meletus, renewed the same hati-cherifs above mentioned.

(Zilcadé 1170?) The Sultan Osman, under the Patriarchate of Parthenius, when the Papists commenced their intrigues and their encroachments, confirmed by a special hati-cherif the preceding ones, and prohibited the reforms of the Papists.

( 171 ?) The Sultan Mustafa renewed the hati-cherif of his predecessor.

(1216-1218.) The Sultan Selim, under the Patriarchate of Anthemos, issued two hati-cherifs against the pretensions of the Armenians.

(Rejib 1223.) The Sultan Mahmoud, on his accession, issued two hati-cherifs, one concerning the Papists, and the other the Armenians, by which he confirmed all the hati-cherifs previously granted by his predecessors in favour of the Greeks.

(1224.) When the Holy Sepulchre was burnt down in 1808, by a special hati-cherif the rebuilding of the edifice was by right accorded to the Greeks.

(1228.) Still later, the Armenians having advanced pretensions, a hati-cherif ordered an inquiry to be made into them.

(1236.) Under the Patriarchate of Polycarpe, when the Papists repelled the Greeks by force from the Holy Sepulchre, in order to prevent their celebrating divine service there, and were guilty of more than one aggression against them, the Sultan Mahmoud granted three hati-cherifs one after the other in favour of the Greeks, concerning the free exercise of their liturgy under the dome itself of the Holy Sepulchre.

(1252.) Lastly, when the Armenians, by means of wiles and intrigues, succeeded in obtaining authority to proceed to repair the Church of the Resurrection, of the Holy Bethlehem, and of the Mount of Olives, a hati-cherif annulled the authorisation above-mentioned, and accorded to the Greeks exclusively the right of making general repairs.

(Zilcadé 1255. Sefer 1256.) His Imperial Majesty the Sultan Abdul-Medjid issued four hati-cherifs to renew the four hati-cherifs undermentioned, namely ;

- |    |     |             |    |     |      |      |            |                        |          |
|----|-----|-------------|----|-----|------|------|------------|------------------------|----------|
| 1. | The | hati-cherif | of | the | year | 1223 | concerning | the                    | Papists. |
| 2. | "   | "           | "  | "   | 1228 | "    | "          | Armenians.             |          |
| 3. | "   | "           | "  | "   | 1236 | "    | "          | Liturgy of the Greeks. |          |
| 4. | "   | "           | "  | "   | 1252 | "    | "          | Repairs.               |          |

Inclosure 3 in No. 20.

*Traités entre la Russie et la Porte.*

*Traité de Constantinople du  $\frac{5}{16}$  Novembre, 1720.*

ARTICLE XI. IL est libre aux marchands des deux nations de voyager et de trafiquer en toute sûreté d'un état à l'autre. Il sera aussi permis aux Russes de faire des pèlerinages à Jérusalem et en d'autres lieux saints, sans qu'ils soient assujettis, ni à Jérusalem ni ailleurs, à aucun tribut Karatch ou Peskasch, ni à des exactions pécuniaires pour leurs passeports. Les ecclésiastiques Russes qui s'arrêteront sur le territoire de la Porte ne seront point molestés.

*Traité de Belgrade de 1739.*

Article XI. Il sera permis soit aux séculiers soit aux ecclésiastiques Russes, d'aller librement visiter, soit la cité de Jérusalem, soit les autres lieux qui méritent d'être visités, et il ne sera exigé d'eux aucun tribut ou paiement. On ne fera aucun tort ou violence aux ecclésiastiques Russes qui s'arrêteront sur les terres de la domination Ottomane.

*Traité de Koutchouk-Kainardji de 1774.*

Article VII. La Porte promet de protéger la religion Chrétienne et ses églises ; et il sera libre aux Ministres de Russie de faire des représentations en faveur de la nouvelle église dont il est parlé dans l'Article XIV (qui suit).

Article XIV. Il est permis à la Cour de Russie, outre la chapelle bâtie dans la maison du Ministre, de construire dans un quartier de Galata, dans la rue nommée Bey-oglou, une église publique du rit Grec, qui sera toujours sous la protection du Ministre Russe et à l'abri de toute gêne et avanie.

*Convention explicative de Constantinople du 21 Mars, 1779.*

Article VII.—1. La Porte ne troublera en aucune manière l'exercice de la religion Chrétienne dans ces provinces (Valachie et Moldavie), et il sera parfaitement libre aux Grecs de construire de nouvelles églises, comme de réparer les anciennes.

2. Elle restituera aux couvents, ainsi qu'aux particuliers, les terres et les biens qui leur appartenaient aux environs de Brailow, de Choezim, de Bender, &c.

3. Elle accordera aux ecclésiastiques de ces principautés les égards et distinctions dûs à leur rang.

(Translation.)

*Treaties between Russia and the Porte.**Treaty of Constantinople of the  $\frac{5}{16}$  November, 1720.*

ARTICLE XI. IT is lawful for the merchants of both nations to travel and to trade in perfect safety between one State and the other. Russians are also permitted to perform pilgrimages to Jerusalem and other holy places, without being subjected, either at Jerusalem or elsewhere, to the payment of any tribute, Karatch or Peskasch, or to pecuniary demands on account of their passports. Russian ecclesiastics who may remain in the territory of the Porte shall not be molested.

*Treaty of Belgrade of 1739.*

Article XI. It shall be lawful both for Russian ecclesiastics and for the laity, freely to visit both the city of Jerusalem, and other places worthy of being visited, and no payment or tribute shall be required from them. No wrong or violence shall be done to any Russian ecclesiastics who may remain on the territory under Ottoman dominion.

*Treaty of Koutchouk-Kainardji of 1774.*

Article VII. The Porte promises to protect the Christian religion and its churches ; and the Ministers of Russia shall be allowed to make representations in favour of the new church of which mention is made in Article XIV (which follows).

Article XIV. The Court of Russia is permitted, besides the chapel built

in the Minister's house, to build in the quarter of Galata, in the street named Bey-oglou, a public church of the Greek rite, which shall always be under the protection of the Russian Minister and secure from all vexation and exaction.

*Explanatory Convention of Constantinople of the 21st of March, 1779.*

Article VII.—1. The Porte will not interfere in any manner with the exercise of the Christian religion in these provinces (Wallachia and Moldavia), and the Greeks shall be perfectly at liberty to build new churches as well as to repair the old ones.

2. It will restore to the convents, as well as to private individuals, the lands and property which belonged to them in the environs of Brailow, of Choczim, of Bender, &c.

3. It will grant to the ecclesiastics of these Principalities all the consideration and distinctions due to their rank.

No. 21.

*Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 26.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, November 5, 1851.*

THE very serious character which M. de Lavalette imparted to his conversation with me yesterday respecting the state of his discussions with the Porte, as related by me to your Lordship in a despatch of the same date, induced me to have some communication on the same subject with Aali Pasha this morning.

His Excellency sent me word that the discussions were suspended with a view to investigating the various grounds of claim in a more comprehensive manner, and he appeared to entertain no apprehension of the consequences likely to result from M. de Lavalette's transmission of this intelligence to Paris.

The proposed suspension is not yet accepted by the French Envoy. According to Aali Pasha's account, it remains for further deliberation during the next few days. I presume, in consequence, that M. de Lavalette writes by the present occasion only to prepare his Government for an eventual decision in which he cannot acquiesce.

I learn, moreover that the Porte thinks favourably of the French claim without admitting it to its full extent; that M. de Titoff, instead of threatening to retire from Constantinople, had only declared his intention to protest in case of any change in the *status quo*; that Russia is considered by the Porte as having no right to interfere; and that the former proposal of the Porte, with respect to opening all the sanctuaries, extended to Christians of every established denomination; and, finally, that the Porte had no intention of communicating the Emperor of Russia's letter to the French Legation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 22.

*The Marquis of Normanby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 21.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, November 20, 1851.*

HAVING been yesterday informed that M. Reculot, the Secretary of the French Legation at Constantinople, had arrived in Paris express, in consequence of serious differences which had arisen between M. Lavalette and the Turkish Government on the subject of the negotiation which has for some time been going on with reference to the protectorate of the holy sepulchres, I spoke to M. Turgot this morning on the subject, and expressed an earnest hope that such a question would not be pressed at this moment to an extent likely to lead to a diplomatic rupture.

No. 23.

*Viscount Palmerston to the Marquis of Normanby.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, November 21, 1851.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch of the 20th instant, reporting the substance of your conversation with the French Minister of Foreign Affairs upon the subject of the difference which has arisen between the French Legation at Constantinople and the Turkish Government in regard to the holy buildings at Jerusalem.

I have to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the course which you have taken, and the language which you have held to M. Turgot in regard to this matter.

It would indeed be lamentable if, in the present state of Europe, a serious difference were to arise between France on the one hand, and Russia and Turkey on the other, upon a matter in itself so unimportant as the question which has been raised between France and Russia as to certain privileges in regard to the custody of a holy building at Jerusalem.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 24.

*Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 26.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, November 5, 1851.*

THE report, inclosed herewith in copy, relates to the pending discussions about Jerusalem. I forward it under an impression that it will contribute to give your Lordship a correct view of the sentiments entertained upon that subject by the leading Turkish Ministers, and of the spirit in which the Russian Government is prepared to urge its views upon the Porte.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 24.

*Report.*

AALI PASHA having privately informed M. de Titoff of the answer to be given to the French and Russians respecting the pending question of the Holy Land, the Russian Envoy yesterday called on him and remained there for about three hours, when a very warm discussion followed, in which M. de Titoff endeavoured to persuade him of the necessity for the Porte to delay the intended communication until he referred the matter to his Government and received the Emperor's opinion. But seeing that Aali Pasha answered the question evasively, by observing that he could not comply with such a request previous to his submitting the proposition to the Council, M. de Titoff then rejoined, that he thought it his duty to tell him frankly, that any further step foreign to the *status quo* of the holy places would exceedingly annoy the Emperor, in which case he (M. de Titoff) would find himself compelled to abandon the confidential ground upon which he had acted up to this moment, and officially protest against the Porte. He further added, that he very clearly sees the Porte's intention to accept the protectorate of France in this affair.

To this observation of M. de Titoff Aali Pasha replied that the Russian Envoy was mistaken, because the monks concerned being foreign subjects and not Rayahs of the Sublime Porte, the Protectorate of France was rather bearing upon other Foreign Powers than the Porte. M. de Titoff appeared to be aware that his last remark was misplaced, but too late.

## No. 25.

*Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 26.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, November 8, 1851.*

I AM informed by Aali Pasha that the Porte intends to refer the investigation of the Jerusalem question to a special Council of State composed of members of the Ulemah and some of the principal Ministers.

The object of this plan is, no doubt, to gain time, and to avoid an embarrassing decision with the least possible amount of offence to the adverse claimants, and of inconvenience to the Turkish Government. It does not appear that any written communication is to be made at present on the subject of the sanctuaries either to the French or to the Russian Legation, though, doubtless, an answer must be returned to the Cabinet letter presented by M. de Titoff. The language of Aali Pasha does not imply that the Porte entertains any immediate apprehension of coercive measures from any side.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

## No. 26.

*Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 8.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, November 19, 1851.*

THE French Envoy in his conversations with me continues to hold the same language respecting the affair of Jerusalem, which I have already reported to your Lordship. He asserts that, in his opinion, the honour of his country and Government would be compromised by acquiescence in the temporizing line of conduct adopted by the Porte in subserviency, as he conceives, to Russian dictation. The use of similar language to the Belgian Minister and to the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires would seem to have made a considerable impression on those gentlemen. Among the Turkish Ministers I perceive more symptoms of annoyance than of apprehension. The Grand Vizier and Aali Pasha, with whom I had some incidental conversation on the subject this morning, describe M. de Lavalette as being in error when he stated that they had both expressed to him a complete agreement with his opinions respecting the Latin claim, and their wish, unaccepted by the Sultan, to retire from office in consequence of their inability to act accordingly.

Since I had last the honour of addressing your Lordship on this subject, an exchange of official notes has taken place between the French Envoy and Aali Pasha. The points in question, as I am informed, are the suspension of the conferences of inquiry, and the appointment instead of a commission composed of Turkish Ministers and members of the Ulema. M. de Lavalette objects to both these measures, and the Porte persists in pursuing its own course.

The Russian Minister has not made any fresh move, as far as I know. His intimation of having the Emperor's orders to go away if the *status quo* of the sanctuaries were disturbed, was given to Aali Pasha by his dragoman unofficially. M. de Titoff's threat was that of a protest and the adoption of an official attitude, in case of the supposed contingency.

## No. 27.

*Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 16.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, November 27, 1851.*

I AVAIL myself of the opportunity to forward in copy the last correspondence which has taken place between Aali Pasha and the French Envoy.

Inclosure 1 in No. 27.

*M. de Lavalette to Aali Pasha.*

M. le Ministre,

*Therapia, le 14 Novembre, 1851.*

DANS la conférence que j'ai eu l'honneur d'avoir hier avec vous, votre Excellence m'a demandé d'ajourner sans terme défini les réunions de la Commission instituée d'un commun accord par la Sublime Porte et la Légation de France, pour examiner les documents officiels qui doivent préciser et définir d'une manière positive l'état de possession des saints lieux en 1740.

Votre Excellence n'ignore pas, et les procès-verbaux en font foi, à quel point en étaient arrivés les travaux de la Commission : les délégués Français ont présenté les documents sur lesquels reposent les droits des Pères de Terre Sainte : l'examen de ces pièces est terminé ; mais depuis quatre mois et demi, malgré les instances réitérées de la Légation et de ses Commissaires, les délégués du Cabinet Ottoman n'ont produit ni un titre ni un document à l'appui des prétentions contraires aux droits incontestables des Latins, à l'exception de l'Acte du Khalife Omar antérieur de plus de mille ans aux Capitulations et complètement étranger à la discussion.

C'est dans ces circonstances que votre Excellence me propose, sans assigner aucun motif à l'appui de sa demande, d'ajourner indéfiniment les travaux des Commissaires, après les avoir interrompus de fait par l'abstention de ses délégués dans les trois derniers séances.

Il demeure donc établi que toute interruption des travaux de la Commission proviendra du fait du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale et non du notre, et cela au moment même où la Sublime Porte était mise en demeure de produire les documents qui elle pouvait avoir à opposer à ceux que nous avons présentés.

Pour ma part, je dois me borner aujourd'hui à prendre officiellement acte de la demande qui m'est adressée par votre Excellence sans lui dissimuler que cette proposition implique un premier pas fait en dehors des engagements pris par le Cabinet Ottoman dans la note que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser le 29 Juin dernier.

Je charge M. Schefer, second dragoman de la Légation, de remettre cette lettre à votre Excellence.

Je saisis, &amp;c.

(Signé) LAVALETTE.

(Translation.)

M. le Ministre,

*Therapia, November 14, 1851.*

IN the conference which I had the honour to hold with you yesterday, your Excellency requested me to adjourn indefinitely the meetings of the Commission, appointed concurrently by the Sublime Porte and French Mission for the examination of the official documents which might specify and define in a positive manner the state of possession of the holy places in 1740.

Your Excellency is not ignorant, and the *procès-verbaux* show, to what point the labours of the Commission had arrived. The French delegates have laid before it the documents on which the rights of the fathers of the Holy Land rest; the examination of these documents is brought to a close: but for four months and a-half, notwithstanding the repeated invitations of the Mission and its Commissioners, the delegates of the Ottoman Cabinet have produced no title or document in support of the pretensions opposed to the indisputable rights of the Latins, with the exception of the Act of the Caliph Omar, anterior by more than a thousand years to the Capitulations, and having no bearing whatever on the discussion.

Under these circumstances your Excellency, without assigning any reason in support of your demand, proposes to me to adjourn indefinitely the labours of the Commissioners, after having actually interrupted them by the absence of your delegates from the last three meetings.

It is therefore made clear that any interruption of the labours of the Commissioners will, in fact, originate with His Imperial Majesty's Government

and not with mine, and that this will happen at the time when it was incumbent on the Sublime Porte to produce the documents which it might have to offer in opposition to those presented by us.

For my part, I must at present confine myself to taking note, officially, of your Excellency's request, without concealing from you that this proposal implies a departure from the engagements taken by the Ottoman Cabinet in the note which you did me the honour to address to me on the 29th of June last.

I direct M. Schefer, second dragoman of the Mission, to deliver this letter to your Excellency.

I take, &c.  
(Signed) LAVALETTE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 27.

*Aali Pasha to M. de Lavalette.*

(Translation.) Moharem 25, 1267. (November 20, 1851.)

I HAVE had the honour to receive the official note dated November 14th sent in by your Excellency, respecting the decision given concerning the Mixed Commission for examining into and taking into consideration certain documents relative to the places of holy pilgrimage at Jerusalem.

No. 28.

*Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 16.)*

(Extract.) *Therapia, November 28, 1851.*

THE time is fast approaching when the result of M. de Lavalette's reference to Paris on the subject of Jerusalem will be known, and, meanwhile, the Commission for further inquiry appointed by the Porte, holds occasional meetings with little progress, and still less prospect of an early termination.

No. 29.

*Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 19.)*

(Extract.) *Therapia, December 4, 1851.*

THE day after the arrival of the last steam-packet from Marseilles, the French Envoy called in succession on Aali Pasha and the Grand Vizier. The object of his visit to each of those ministers was the same. He informed them that although M. de Reculot had arrived at Paris before the departure of the courier, he had not been able to present his despatches in time to allow of their being answered by that opportunity. M. de Lavalette, however, added that he was in possession of instructions written previously, and that he was authorized by them to deal with the question of the disputed sanctuaries, in such manner as he might judge the dignity of France to require. He availed himself of the occasion to go over the old ground once more, and to repeat his complaints of the manner in which the Porte had acted on that subject towards him and his Government. It was evidently his aim to make a strong impression on the fears of the Porte, and to obtain thereby the appointment of an early period at which a final, and of course a satisfactory, answer should be given to him.

As Aali Pasha no less than M. de Lavalette related what had passed between them to me, I expressed myself to each of them, without entering into the merits of the case, in such terms as I thought calculated to prevent precipitancy on either side. I endeavoured, in particular, to dissuade the French Envoy from taking any step which might suddenly and, perhaps, irrevocably convert a quiet diplomatic discussion into a breach of those friendly relations which it is so desirable to maintain between France and Turkey, and which can hardly be put to hazard for a question involving little more than a religious

sentiment and the application of a Treaty permitted to lie more or less in abeyance for a century, without causing general surprise, and not impossibly some additional entanglement in the present situation of Europe.

## No. 30.

*Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 2, 1852.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, December 18, 1851.*

THE last French packet having been detained by bad weather, it was only on the 16th instant that M. de Lavalette appears to have received his expected instructions concerning the sanctuaries in Syria. He lost no time in waiting upon the Grand Vizier, at whose house he was met by Aali Pasha. Being accompanied by two interpreters, it would seem that he meant to produce an imposing impression on the Turkish Ministers. He began by asking him whether any decision had been taken with respect to the pending question, as he wished to transmit their answer to Paris on the following day. He added, with expressions of regret, that if the answer were such as to hurt the honour and dignity of France, he should be obliged to break off the negotiation, and to open thereby a door to serious consequences, which would prove detrimental to both parties, and particularly to Turkey.

Aali Pasha stated, in return, that he was not yet prepared to comply with M. de Lavalette's demand, but he requested the delay of a few more days, after which he hoped to be at liberty to give him an answer. The necessity of this delay was referred to certain formalities attendant on the report of the Commission, and the Sultan's sanction.

The French Envoy consented, with apparent reluctance, to this delay, but only on condition that it should not be extended beyond the 24th instant, the day previous to the departure of the next French steam-packet.

His acquiescence was accompanied with complaints of the Porte's unnecessary dilatoriness from the commencement of the proceedings. Aali Pasha, on the other hand, excused his Government by a natural reference to the difficulties of the negotiation, which had led to inquiries likely to terminate, now that the whole question was simplified by them, in an easy solution.

It appears that the French Minister gave in nothing in writing, and did not show any part of his instructions.

Aali Pasha, in stating this circumstance to M. Pisani, observed that he did not anticipate any serious opposition on the part of France to his intended proposal. He said that the sanctuaries claimed exclusively by the Latins, were only two, namely, the Church of Bethlehem and the Tomb of the Virgin, and that the firman and title-deeds on which the French grounded their claim, accorded to the Latins the right of possessing two keys of the church, and a joint occupation of both the church and the tomb.

It appears that the Porte builds its hope of an amicable adjustment on this foundation, though the pretension of the Latins, as explained to me formerly by M. de Lavalette, extends to the exclusive possession of a larger number of the sanctuaries.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

## No. 31.

*Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 1, 1852.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, December 30, 1851.*

THE French Envoy has not relaxed in his efforts to obtain a satisfactory arrangement of the Sanctuary Question. He has had several interviews with Aali Pasha since I last wrote to your Lordship on that subject, and it does not appear that there has been any further intimation of a threatening character connected with the Toulon squadron. The last French steam-packet went away, as far as I am informed, without conveying to France any decisive answer

from the Porte. The Turkish Commission has, in the meantime, completed its report. Some proposition may come out of it, though hardly sufficient to satisfy France without offending Russia, which is naturally enough the object of the Porte.

M. de Lavalette has, however, concluded the year by announcing his intention to break off the negotiation, demanding, before he does so formally, an audience of the Sultan, which will probably be granted with reluctance. He pleads the commands of his Government, and takes credit for having delayed their execution in the hope of a more satisfactory conclusion.

The interference of Russia continues to be cautiously managed by M. de Titoff. His Government appears to apprehend that even a slight departure from the *status quo* would, instead of settling the question permanently, open a door to further pretensions in future.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

### No. 32.

*Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 23.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, January 7, 1852.*

THE French Envoy's audience of the Sultan with reference to the pending question of the Sanctuaries appears to be put off; and perhaps even relinquished altogether. His Majesty has directed his Council to reconsider a point by means of which the Turkish Ministers conceive that some facility may be obtained for bringing the whole question at issue to a fair conclusion. It would seem that the Greeks, Armenians, and other Christian sects, and even the Mahomedans, have an equal right of visiting the shrine of the Holy Virgin, and officiating there. It is affirmed that Mussulmans themselves have an altar in that place of worship, while the Latins, notwithstanding the right accorded to them of old by an Imperial Firman, are excluded. The Porte proposes to remove this exclusion, in so far as visiting the shrine is concerned, and M. de Titoff has been requested to accede to the proposal, with an assurance that the Porte would thereupon issue new firmans, explaining and fixing the extent of the rights on both sides, with a due regard to the *status quo*.

The Russian Envoy, after some reflection, has declared his inability to comply, not feeling himself at liberty to make any concession which would have the effect of changing in any degree the existing order of things.

Under these circumstances, there is little prospect of the Sultan's reference to his Council resulting in any arrangement satisfactory to the French Legation, whose members are seriously irritated, and complain loudly.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

### No. 33.

*Sir Stratford Canning to Earl Granville.—(Received February 1.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, January 17, 1852.*

ALTHOUGH no decision has yet been officially announced to M. de Lavalette in the affair of the Sanctuaries, I have reason to believe that an answer in writing, calculated to arrange the question, is now in preparation at the Porte.

The terms of it will probably be a concession to the Latins of the right of officiating in the shrine of the Virgin near Jerusalem, together with keys to the Church of the Nativity at Bethlehem.

This intended departure from the *status quo* has induced the Russian Envoy to look out for some concession in favour of the Greeks; and I am informed that an equivalent is to be given to them, in the shape of an admission to the right of officiating, on certain occasions, in the Mosque of Mount Olivet.

The Turkish Ministers appear to be persuaded that an arrangement of this kind will satisfy both parties, and terminate for the present a question which is at once vexatious and uninteresting to the Porte.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

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## No. 34.

*Sir Stratford Canning to Earl Granville.—(Received February 10.)*

My Lord,

Constantinople, January 25, 1852.

I HAVE learnt this morning by a message from Aali Pasha that the Council has decided on settling the affair of the Sanctuaries in the manner which I described to your Lordship in my last despatch on that subject. The formal sanction of the Sultan is expected. A communication to this effect was made to M. de Lavalette yesterday at a visit he made to the Ottoman Secretary of State, and I understand that he appeared to be satisfied. The Russian Envoy is to have an interview with Aali Pasha to-morrow. It would seem that the Porte does not apprehend any serious objection on his part.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

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## No. 35.

*Sir Stratford Canning to Earl Granville.—(Received February 19.)*

My Lord,

Constantinople, February 4, 1852.

IT would appear that the Porte is still under some embarrassment concerning the question of the Sanctuaries. The decision of the Council has received the Sultan's confirmation, and the official note prepared in consequence for communication to the French and Russian Legations will be finally considered in Council to-day. But the Russian Envoy has offered a stronger opposition to the proposed arrangement than he had previously given reason to expect; and it is difficult to foresee how far the Council may be swayed even now by that circumstance. I am assured, however, by Aali Pasha, that his own opinion has undergone no change, and there seems to be no longer question of a protest on M. de Titoff's side. It may be presumed that M. de Lavalette, though appearing to be more satisfied, will only accept the note under reserve of the President's approval.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

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## No. 36.

*Sir Stratford Canning to Earl Granville.—(Received March 7.)*

My Lord,

Constantinople, February 18, 1852. <sup>٢٨</sup>

THE question of the Sanctuaries in Judea has quite unexpectedly assumed, in so far as Russia is concerned, an angry and almost a threatening aspect. I have already informed your Lordship of the terms on which the difference was settled by a decision of the Porte.\* No change has taken place in that respect. That part of the arrangement which is favourable to the view of France has been communicated officially to the French Minister. The Russian Envoy was to have received a written communication of the corresponding concession intended for the Greeks. He had been previously apprised by Aali Pasha of the whole proposal, as founded on the report of the Turkish Commission, and there was nothing in his language, or in the tenour of his communications to the Porte, if I am correctly informed, to warrant an apprehension of any serious dissatisfaction on his part. Whatever may have

\* See No. 33.

caused the change in his mind, he sought an interview with Aali Pasha on the 11th instant, and expressed himself with unusual vehemence and no small degree of irritation against the proposed arrangement. I should conjecture, from what has reached me on the subject, that he had not expected the Porte to commit itself to the French Minister before the sentiments of his Court were ascertained. His disappointment in that respect may have gathered some additional annoyance from the satisfaction of the French party, and also from indications of a contrary feeling among the Greeks.

To judge from present appearances, the French President will accept the concessions made to him, keeping open a door for the remainder of his claims, but practically abstaining for the present, perhaps even for a long time to come, from any further prosecution of them. The latitude thus given to France is naturally distasteful to Russia, who, to prevent its occurrence, had constantly insisted on the *status quo*. I am assured by Aali Pasha that the Firman prepared for giving effect to the Porte's decision is so worded as to preclude any reasonable apprehension on that score, and, moreover, that the pretensions of the Greek Church will be more completely secured than heretofore.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

P.S.—I have omitted two circumstances worthy of notice: first, that Aali Pasha reminded M. de Titoff that he had never authorised him to expect that he would wish to ascertain the sentiments of the Russian Cabinet; secondly, that M. de Titoff has refused to receive any communication of the pending arrangement in peremptory terms.

S. C.

No. 37.

*Sir Stratford Canning to Earl Granville.—(Received March 7.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, February 18, 1852.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of the Porte's official note to the French Minister respecting the Sanctuaries at Bethlehem and Jerusalem. The copy of the Firman prepared for giving effect to the Porte's decision concerning the Sanctuaries will also be sent to me. I have not felt myself at liberty to risk a misinterpretation of my conduct, by offering any suggestion which might be construed into a departure from the neutral line enjoined by the instructions of your Lordship's predecessor. The Ottoman Ministers appear, indeed, to have afforded themselves the best chance of escaping from a position of most unprofitable embarrassment, by forming a Commission of their own, and founding an equitable decision upon its report.

Inclosure in No. 37.

*Aali Pasha to M. de Lavalette.*

(Traduction.)

18 Rebiul Akbir, 1268.  
9 February, 1852.

LA Sublime Porte a médité de la manière la plus minutieuse, et avec la plus sérieuse attention elle a approfondi, la question que le Gouvernement Français a soulevée relativement à certains Lieux Saints situés tant dans la ville que hors de la ville de Jérusalem.

La Sublime Porte, tout en mettant ses soins à maintenir inviolablement ses Traités avec les Puissances amies, elle tache aussi naturellement de conserver dans toute leur intégrité les droits et les concessions que les anciens Sultans ont octroyés aux sujets de l'Empire; et c'est pour cela que, comme résultat de la conciliation de l'un de ces deux points essentiels avec l'autre, le

tombeau qui se trouve dans l'Eglise dite du Saint Sépulcre, la Hadjir el Moughtesil,\* et les voûtes, sont visités, à l'heure qu'il est, sans obstacle, et que les deux jardins attenants au Couvent Franc se trouvent, ainsi qu'il est établi depuis un ancien tems, sous l'inspection des deux parties. Mais on n'a pu trouver la moindre indication dans les Firmans de telles choses qu'une place dans le circuit de la Hadjir el Moughtesil, d'une place dite Tahomel-atique, ni des magasins qui se trouveraient là, et par conséquent, il n'y a pas lieu de contester là-dessus.

La grotte qui est la Sainte Crèche est aujourd'hui un lieu visité par les diverses nations Chrétiennes, et il est établi depuis un très-ancien tems qu'une clef de la porte du côté du nord de la grande église à Bethléem, une clef de la porte du côté du midi de cette église, et une clef de la porte de la grotte susmentionnée, doivent se trouver entre les mains des prêtres Latins aussi. En cas donc que ces clefs ne se trouvent point en la possession des Latins, il faut qu'on leur donne une clef de chacune de ces trois portes, pour qu'ils les aient comme par le passé.

Quant à la question du Tombeau de la Bienheureuse Marie, l'impossibilité de former un jugement à cet égard, d'après les vérifications faites jusqu'ici, est devenue claire et patente. Toutefois il n'est pas permis de priver une multitude de sujets Ottomans, qui professent la religion Catholique, de la faculté de faire leurs dévotions dans un lieu tel que celui-là, qui est considéré par tous les Chrétiens comme un lieu saint et vénérable; et par conséquent, la Sublime Porte a décidé que les prêtres Latins et les sujets Ottomans de la religion Catholique auront aussi la faculté de pratiquer les cérémonies de leur culte, dans les tems établis, au Saint Sépulcre, comme ceux qui professent les religions Grecque, Arménienne, Syriaque et Copte y exercent aujourd'hui les leurs; mais à condition qu'il ne sera fait aucun changement ni à l'administration ni à l'état des choses actuel; et je m'empresse de porter tout ce que ci-dessus à la connaissance de votre Excellence, d'après les ordres de Sa Majesté Impériale.

Il est superflu de dire à votre Excellence, qui est douée de sagacité, que la Sublime Porte a l'espoir fondé que le Gouvernement Français appréciera et agréera une décision qui est le résultat du désir de la Sublime Porte de consolider ses relations amicales avec la France, et de toute attention que demandait cette grave question.

Je saisis, &c.

(Translation.)

*February 9, 1852.*

THE Sublime Porte has considered with the utmost care and with the most serious attention, the question which the French Government has raised relative to certain Holy Places situated both within and without the city of Jerusalem.

The Sublime Porte, whilst carefully maintaining her Treaties with friendly Powers inviolate, naturally endeavours also to preserve in their full integrity the rights and the concessions which former Sultans have granted to the subjects of the Empire; and it is thus that, as the result of balancing these two essential points one with the other, the tomb which is in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, as it is called, the Hadjir el Moughtesil,\* and the arches, are at the present day visited, without any obstacle, and that the two gardens attached to the Frank Convent are, as it has been long arranged, under the superintendence of both parties. But not the smallest indication can be found in the Firmans of such things as a locality within the circuit of the Hadjir el Moughtesil, of a locality called Tahomel-atique, or of the magazines which are stated to be there, and, consequently, there is no ground for dispute thereupon.

The Grotto of the Holy Manger is at present a place visited by the various Christian nations; and it has been ordained from a very early period that a key of the north gate of the Great Church at Bethlehem, a key of the south gate of that church, and a key of the gate of the Grotto above-mentioned, should be in the custody of the Latin priests also. In case, then, these keys

\* The stone upon which the body of our Lord was washed and embalmed.—*Translator's note.*

are not in the possession of the Latins, a key of each of these three gates must be given them, in order that they may have them as of old.

As regards the question of the Tomb of the Blessed Mary, the impossibility of forming any judgment in this respect from the investigations which have hitherto taken place, has become clear and manifest. Nevertheless, a multitude of Ottoman subjects, who profess the Catholic religion, must not be deprived of the power of performing their devotions in a spot like that, which is considered by all Christians as a holy and venerable place; and the Sublime Porte has in consequence decided that the Latin priests and the Ottoman subjects of the Catholic religion shall also have the power of performing the ceremonies of their religion, at stated times, in the Holy Sepulchre, in the same manner as those who profess the Greek, Armenian, Syriac, and Copt religions perform theirs at the present time in that place; but upon condition that no change shall be made either in the administration, or in the existing state of things; and I hasten to bring the foregoing to the knowledge of your Excellency, in obedience to the orders of His Imperial Majesty.

It is superfluous to observe to your Excellency, who is endowed with sagacity, that the Sublime Porte entertains the confident hope that the French Government will appreciate and accept a decision which is the result of the desire of the Sublime Porte to strengthen its friendly relations with France, and of all the attention required by this important question.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) AALI PASHA.

No. 38.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received March 9.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, March 8, 1852.*

YOUR Lordship will have learnt, before this despatch reaches you, that the question respecting the Sacred Places at Jerusalem has been settled. M. de Turgot told me that when he took his present office, he found this question the source of great irritation.

He had more than once been urged to make a demonstration to back the claims of the French Legation at Constantinople, by ordering a French fleet to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles; but he had always resisted having recourse to anything like a threat, because he felt the peril of provoking a collision in that part of the world.

I congratulated M. de Turgot on having got rid of this question, and said that I was sure that Her Majesty's Government would hear with great satisfaction the moderation which he had displayed.

No. 39.

*Sir Stratford Canning to Earl Granville.—(Received April 1.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, March 5, 1852.*

THE long pending affair of the Syrian Sanctuaries may be at last considered as finally, though not, I believe, yet formally settled. There is no material change in the arrangement, such as I have already had the honour to describe it to your Lordship, and I hope that the Firman prepared for transmission to the Greek Patriarch will be found couched in such terms as to preclude a return, at any future period, to so embarrassing a subject of discussion. It was by turning M. de Titoff's attention to the importance of that instrument, as a safeguard against further change, that I hope to have contributed in some degree to his acquiescence in the Porte's decision.

No. 40.

*Sir Stratford Canning to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received April 1.)*

My Lord,

Constantinople, March 19, 1852.

ONCE more, and it may be hoped for the last time, I have the honour to announce the termination of the long pending question of the Syrian Sanctuaries.

A report, inclosed herewith in copy, from Mr. Stephen Pisani to me, and a Firman inclosed in translation, will afford your Lordship ample information on this subject.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 40.

*M. Pisani to Sir Stratford Canning.*

Sir,

Pera, March 18, 1852.

I HAVE the honour to report that I am informed by Aali Pasha, that the long pending question of the Sanctuaries has finally been settled in the following manner :

Three of the keys of the Church of Bethlehem are given to the Latins, who are also admitted to officiate in the Holy Virgin's shrine ;—and, on the other hand, the Greeks are allowed to officiate in the Mosque situated on the Mount of Olives in common with the other Christian sects.

This arrangement, which appears to satisfy the parties concerned, has been sanctioned by an Imperial Firman invested with a Hatti-scheriff, delivered to the Greeks, and a legalised copy of the same to the Latins. This document is addressed to the Governor, the Cadi, and Members of the Council of Jerusalem, with an injunction to attend scrupulously to the execution of its contents, and to have it duly registered in the records of the Mehkemé, or Court of Justice.

A copy of the above-mentioned Firman has been communicated by Aali Pasha for your Excellency's information, and a translation of it will immediately be sent to you.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) E. PISANI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 40.

(Traduction.)

ATTENDU que les dispositions de mon présent commandement Impérial sont le résultat réel et définitif de l'examen approfondi qui vient d'être fait des vieux documens contradictoires qui se trouvent en la possession de mes sujets Grecs et des moines Francs, concernant les Lieux Saints de Jérusalem, qui ont été un objet de discussion jusqu'ici ; et attendu que les susdites dispositions confirment les Firmans qui ont été donnés par mes nobles aïeux et surtout par mon auguste père, et confirmés et renouvelés précédemment par moi-même, que l'on se donne bien de garde d'y jamais contrevenir.

*Firman.*

A toi, mon Vizir, Hafiz Ahmed Pacha, Gouverneur de Jérusalem ; à toi, Cadi de Jérusalem ; et à vous, Membres du Medjliss.

Les disputes qui naissent de tems à autre entre la nation Grecque et la nation Latine, au sujet de quelques Lieux Saints qui existent tant dans la ville que hors de la ville de Jérusalem, viennent cette fois encore d'être mises en avant. En conséquence, une Commission a été formée, Commission composée de quelques Muchirs, et quelques hommes de loi de distinction, et d'autres personnes, pour examiner cette question à fond, et voici ce qui résulte des recherches et des vérifications de cette Commission et de celles des Conseils de Cabinet tenus

après la Commission. Les Lieux en contestation entre les deux religions sont :—

La grande coupole de l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre ; la petite coupole qui est sur l'endroit appelé le Tombeau de Jésus—sur qui soit la bénédiction de Dieu !—et qui existe dans la susdite église ; la Hadjir el Moughtésil ; le Golgotha, lequel se trouve également dans l'enceinte de l'Eglise du St. Sépulcre ; les voûtes de Ste. Marie, la grande Eglise qui est dans le village de Bethléem, ainsi que la Grotte qui est le véritable endroit où Jésus—que la bénédiction de Dieu soit sur lui !—est né, et qui se trouve sous cette église, et le Tombeau de la Bienheureuse Marie, que Dieu la bénisse.

Vu que la grande coupole susmentionnée concerne l'Eglise entière, les Latins n'ont pas raison de prétendre à la possession exclusive ni de cette coupole, ni de la petite coupole, ni de la Hadjir Moughtésil, ni du Golgotha, ni des voûtes de Ste. Marie, ni de la grande Eglise de Bethléem, ni de la Sainte Crèche ; il faut laisser tous ces endroits dans leur état actuel. Dans les tems passés on a donné une clef de deux portes de la grande Eglise de Bethléem et de la Sainte Crèche à chacune des nations Grecque, Latine et Arménienne : mesure confirmée aussi par le Firman délivré à la nation Grecque l'année de l'Hégire 1170, et cette disposition restera la même. Mais comme il ne suit pas de là qu'il est permis de porter atteinte à l'état actuel des choses dans cette église, ou d'empêcher aux Latins d'y officier, ou enfin de faire quelque chose de nouveau capable de gêner les autres, soit dans le passage de l'Eglise pour aller à la Sainte Crèche, soit sous d'autres rapports, on ne souffrira, on n'acceptera en aucun tems la moindre prétention à ces égards de la part de qui que ce soit.

On ne fera aucun changement à l'état actuel des portes de l'Eglise de Bethléem.

Considérant que, d'après les anciens et les nouveaux documens, les deux jardins appartenants au Couvent Franc à Bethléem, sur lesquels les Latins ont aussi élevé des prétentions, sont sous la surveillance des deux parties, ils resteront tels quels.

Les Latins, se basant sur quelques Firmans dont ils sont en possession, ont élevé la prétention que le Tombeau de la Bienheureuse Marie leur appartient exclusivement, mais ils n'ont pas raison en cela non plus. Seulement, comme actuellement les Grecs, les Arméniens, les Syriaques, et les Coptes exercent leur culte dans ce saint tombeau, c'est-à-dire, comme l'exercice du culte n'est pas restreint à une seule religion, il a été déclaré être juste de maintenir et de confirmer aux Chrétiens Catholiques la permission qu'ils ont *ab antiquo*, d'exercer, eux aussi, leur culte dans un endroit où plusieurs nations exercent les leurs, mais à condition qu'ils ne feront aucun changement ni dans l'administration, ni dans l'état actuel de ce monument.

Comme cette décision confirme et consolide les droits qui ont été octroyés aux sujets Grecs de mon Empire par mes augustes ancêtres, et confirmés par des Firmans, ornés par des hattî-shérifs émanés de mon trône Impérial, aussi, comme j'ai beaucoup à cœur de maintenir leurs susdits droits, elle a obtenu mon adhésion souveraine. Aucune des parties ne se permettra pas de contrevenir à cette décision.

Les Latins actuellement encore officient une fois par an, le jour de l'Ascension, dans un oratoire appelé Coubet el Mess-ad, qui existe au Mont Olivette, à Jérusalem ; et les Grecs font leurs prières hors de cet oratoire. Or, cet oratoire c'est un temple Mahometan, et il n'appartient, par conséquent, exclusivement à aucune secte Chrétienne, et je ne trouve pas à propos que les sujets de mon Empire qui professent la religion Grecque, soient privés de la faculté de pratiquer leur religion dans l'intérieur de l'oratoire susmentionné. Ainsi on n'empêchera pas aux Grecs d'exercer leur culte dans l'intérieur du Coubet el Mess-ad (la Coupole de l'Ascension), à condition qu'ils ne feront aucun changement à l'état actuel de cet oratoire, et qu'il y aura un portier Mahometan à la porte, comme par le passé.

Cette mesure sera enregistrée en haut de la copie du Firman Impérial en date du mois Sheval 1254 (Décembre, 1838).

Telle est ma volonté catégorique et souveraine, et conformément aux ordres que j'ai donnés en conséquence, le présent Firman, qui est orné d'un hattî-shérif et émané de mon Divan Impérial, a été remis entre les mains de la nation Grecque.

Lorsque mes ordres souverains vous seront connus, vous mettrez tous vos

soins afin que désormais il ne soit en aucune manière contrevenu à la décision et à mes ordres susmentionnés, ni de la part de ceux qui professent les religions Grecque, Arménienne, Syriacque et Copte, ni de la part des Latins.

Vous aurez soin de faire enregistrer le présent commandement Impérial aux archives du Mahkémé, et de le faire constamment et toujours servir de règle permanente. Ayez-le pour entendre, et ajoutez foi au noble chiffre dont il est orné.

Donné vers la fin du mois de Djemadi ul evel, 1268 (Février, 1852).

(Translation.)

SEEING that the provisions contained in my present Imperial edict are the real and definitive result of the searching examination which has just been made into the ancient and contradictory documents which are in the possession of my Greek subjects and of the Frank monks, concerning the Holy Places of Jerusalem, which have hitherto been a subject of discussion; and seeing that the aforesaid provisions are confirmatory of the Firmans which have been granted by my noble ancestors, and especially by my august father, and heretofore confirmed and renewed by myself,—let all take heed not to act in opposition to them.

*Firman.*

To thee, my Vizier, Ahmed Pacha, Governor of Jerusalem; to thee, Cadi of Jerusalem; and to you, members of the Medjliss.

The disputes which from time to time arise between the Greek and Latin nations, respecting certain Holy Places which exist both within and without the City of Jerusalem, have now been again revived.

A Commission has in consequence been formed, composed of certain Muchirs and distinguished men of the law, and of other persons, to examine this question thoroughly; and this is the result of the researches and of the investigations of that Commission, and of those of the Cabinet Councils held after the Commission. The places in dispute between the two rites are—the great cupola of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre; the little cupola, which is above the spot called the Tomb of Jesus, on whom may the blessing of God rest, and which is in the church before-mentioned; the Hadjir el Moughtesil; Golgotha, which is also within the inclosure of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre; the Arches of the Holy Mary; the Great Church which is in the village of Bethlehem; as well as the Grotto, which is the true spot where Jesus—may the blessing of God be upon him!—was born, and which is situated below that church; and the tomb of the Blessed Mary, whom may God bless.

Seeing that the great cupola above-mentioned applies to the entire church, the Latins have no right to claim exclusive possession either of that cupola, or of the lesser cupola, or of the Hadjir el Moughtesil, or of Golgotha, or of the Arches of the Holy Mary, or of the Great Church of Bethlehem, or of the Holy Manger; all these places must be left in their present state. In former times, a key of the two gates of the Great Church of Bethlehem and of the Holy Manger was given to each of the Greek, Latin, and Armenian nations,—a measure which was also confirmed by the Firman delivered to the Greek nation in the year of the Hegira 1170; and that arrangement shall still continue. But as it does not follow from this that it is permitted to alter the existing state of things in that church or to prevent the Latins from officiating there, or in short, to make any new arrangement calculated to incommode other sects, either in the passage from the church to the Holy Manger, or in other respects; the smallest pretension in regard to this shall not be allowed or entertained, on the part of any one whatsoever.

No change shall be made in the present state of the gates of the Church of Bethlehem.

As, according to ancient and modern documents, the two gardens belonging to the Frank Convent at Bethlehem, to which the Latins have also laid claim, are under the superintendence of both parties; they shall remain as at present.

The Latins, on the ground of certain Firmans of which they are in posses-

sion, have advanced the pretension that the Tomb of the Blessed Mary belongs exclusively to them; but they are not right in this either. Only since the Greeks, the Armenians, the Syrians, and the Copts at present exercise their worship within this holy tomb; that is to say, as the exercise of worship is not confined to a single rite, it has been declared just to uphold and to confirm on behalf of the Roman Catholic Christians the permission which they possess *ab antiquo*, of exercising their worship in a spot where various nations exercise theirs, but upon condition that they shall make no alteration either in the administration or in the present condition of that monument.

As this decision confirms and consolidates the rights which have been granted to the Greek subjects of my Empire by my august ancestors, and confirmed by Firmans invested with Hatti-Scheriffs issued from my Imperial throne,—it has accordingly obtained my sovereign assent, as I have much at heart to maintain the above-mentioned rights. None of the parties shall allow themselves to contravene this decision.

Furthermore, the Latins at the present day perform service once a year, on Ascension-day, in an oratory at Jerusalem, called Coubet-el-Messad, which is situated on Mount Olivet; and the Greeks perform their devotions outside that oratory. Now this oratory is a Mahometan temple, and it consequently does not belong exclusively to any Christian sect; and I do not consider it right that the subjects of my Empire who profess the Greek faith should be deprived of the power of worshipping in the interior of the above-named oratory. The Greeks shall therefore not be prevented from exercising their worship in the interior of the Coubet-el-Messad (the Cupola of the Ascension), on condition that they make no alteration in the present condition of that oratory, and that there shall be a Mahometan porter at the door, as heretofore. This measure shall be recorded at the head of the copy of the Imperial Firman dated the month of Sheval, 1254 (December, 1838).

Such is my decided and sovereign will; and, in conformity with the orders which I have in consequence given, the present Firman, which is furnished with a Hatti-Scherif and issued from my Imperial Divan, has been delivered to the Greek nation.

As soon as my sovereign orders shall become known to you, you will take every care that henceforward my decision and my commands above mentioned shall not in any way be contravened, either by those who profess the Greek, Armenian, Syriac and Copt religions, or by the Latins.

You will take care to have the present Imperial edict recorded in the archives of the Mehkémé, to serve constantly and for ever as a permanent rule. Understand this; and give heed to the noble signature with which it is decorated.

Issued about the end of the month of Djemadi-ul-evel, 1268  
(February, 1852).

#### No. 41.

*Colonel Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received August 31.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, August 14, 1852.*

THE question of the Holy Places will probably ere long again become the subject of discussion between the Porte and the French Ambassador.

His Excellency says, that even allowing that the Firman does not state that the claims of the Latins are “*injustes et mal fondées*,” the whole purport of it goes to deny the right of the Latins, that is, France, to the Holy Places.

M. de Lavalette states that he accepted, last February, the tenth part only of the Sanctuaries to which France has a positive right by the Treaty of 1740; that he was obliged, at the same time, to give in a nominal protest in favour of the Treaty, but assured the Porte that all appeal to the Treaty should be waived for five, ten years, perhaps for ever; that the Porte gave, the day after he left Constantinople on leave, a Firman to the Greeks, which made out the Treaty to be valueless.

*Colonel Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received August 31.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, August 18, 1852.*

M. DE LAVALETTE has not as yet taken any steps at the Porte respecting the holy places.

My Russian colleague has spoken to me about the Holy Places as M. de Lavalette has done. He is evidently very uneasy about the matter. He does not talk so much of the rights of the Greeks as of the great impolicy of giving them any cause of discontent in Turkey. He says positively that M. de Lavalette knew the tenour of the Firman from the Porte before it was issued. But I think in this respect M. d'Ozéroff is mistaken.

I have told both the French Ambassador and M. d'Ozéroff that, acting on the instructions given to Her Majesty's Ambassador, I must remain perfectly neutral in the matter in dispute.

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*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received September 14.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, September 12, 1852.*

IN referring lately to the affairs of Turkey, M. Drouyn de Lhuys observed that he was very anxious to put the question of the Holy Buildings at Jerusalem in a state which would permit him to consider it as terminated. What he desired was, that without embarrassing the Porte, this question should be settled honourably for France.

I asked M. Drouyn de Lhuys whether he would be satisfied with a declaration on the part of the Ottoman Government that, by the Firman given in respect of the Holy Buildings to the Greeks, there was no intention of departing from the promises made to France. M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied, that a declaration in these terms would be sufficient.

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*Colonel Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received September 19.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, August 30, 1852.*

THE Grand Vizier tells me that M. de Lavalette has not yet made any written communication or demand respecting the Holy Places; that he told M. de Lavalette, when he remonstrated with him lately respecting the Firman to the Greeks, that he should not object to address a note to him, saying that the Porte had not intended to say anything in the Firman which would be at variance with the understanding which the Porte had come to with the French Embassy on that question; that M. de Lavalette has made no reply to this communication.

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*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received September 27.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, September 17, 1852.*

I THINK it my duty to express to your Lordship my conviction that very serious consequences would be likely to follow any successful attempt on the part of the French Government to have explained away or modified the Firman regarding the Holy Places which has lately been issued.

M. de Séniavine's language upon this point appears to be very significant.

He says that the Firman has been officially notified to the Imperial Cabinet, though it has not been published, because the Government are always desirous of avoiding causes of offence and altercation; but that the Government are prepared to uphold provisions which they consider to be only such as the

Greeks are justly entitled to—that the Emperor is always ready to make allowance for the interests and the feelings of others—but that unquestionably upon a subject to which he attaches so much importance, His Majesty is little disposed to permit his rights to be encroached upon.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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## No. 46.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received October 4.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, September 23, 1852.*

I AM desirous of again stating to your Lordship my belief that a revival by the French Government of the Latin claims upon the Holy Places, or the successful demand for explanation which would affect the character of the Firman lately issued by the Sultan, would be likely to involve very serious consequences.

Such has for some time been my opinion, and it is confirmed by learning that the Russian Government have reason for believing that M. de Lavalette was perfectly well acquainted with the provisions of the forthcoming Firman, if, indeed, the text of the instrument were not brought confidentially to his knowledge.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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## No. 47.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received October 5.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, October 3, 1852.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS stated to me yesterday that he had received intelligence from Constantinople of the arrangement of the question of the Sacred Places. Satisfactory assurances had been given to the French Ambassador by the Porte of its intention to abide by the engagements into which it had entered in favour of the Latins, and the matter might now be considered as terminated.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

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## No. 48.

*Colonel Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received October 28.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, October 1, 1852.*

AFIF BEY, who conveyed to Abbas Pasha the Firman, has gone from Egypt to Jerusalem, in order to superintend the execution of the arrangement made by the Porte as to the Holy Places.

M. de Lavalette now states that his complaint as to the Firman to the Greeks is satisfied.

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## No. 49.

*Consul Finn to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received November 15.)*

(Extract.)

*Jerusalem, October 27, 1852.*

ON the 18th ultimo I had the honour to report the arrival of Afif Bey four days previously on a special mission from the Sultan on matters pertaining to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem, and other sanctuaries.

On the 21st, arrived M. Basily, the Russian Consul-General, with M. Marabutti, the Vice-Consul, and Prince Garari, an Attaché of the Russian Embassy. They were received with extraordinary honours: refreshments awaited them at three different stations between Jaffa and Jerusalem; the Greek Patriarch went out to meet them, and they entered the city with an escort of one hundred irregular Cavalry, drums beating, and muskets fired for joy.

M. Botta, the French Consul, and Count Pizzamano, the Austrian Consul, had arrived at Jaffa, from Beyrout, in the same steamer with M. Basily: the former rode on, and arrived here alone some hours before him; the latter, with his lady, came on more slowly afterwards.

But on Sunday, the 24th instant, M. Basily and the Vice-Consul left Jerusalem in great disappointment.

The interval of the month had been employed in the following manner:—

After the Corban Beiram festivals were over, and ceremonial visits fully exchanged, the Commissioner, Afif Bey, with a suite of the local Effendis, met the three Patriarchs, Greek, Latin, and Armenian, in the Church of the Resurrection, just in front of the Holy Sepulchre itself, and under the great dome;—there they were regaled with sherbets, confectionary, and pipes, at the expense of the three Convents, who vied with each other in making luxurious display on the occasion. M. Botta was the only Consular person present.

Afif Bey made an oration upon the desire of His Majesty the Sultan to gratify all classes of his subjects, and his particular concern for the dilapidated state of the great dome above them, which His Majesty offered to repair at his own expense.

The Bey then introduced to notice the architect sent for that task, and invited the three communities to appoint a person each to assist him in the work.

Up to that time the only topics of business discussed by the parties commissioned on all sides, had been the repair of the dome, and such matters of detail. But M. Basily, with the Greek Patriarch (arrived not long before), and the Russian Archimandrite, were becoming impatient for the business which had brought them here, namely, the public reading of a Firman, which was to give to their interest the whole of the Christian Sanctuaries of Jerusalem and Bethlechem.

Afif Bey then invited all the parties concerned to meet him in the Church of the Virgin, near Gethsemane. There he read an order of the Sultan for permitting the Latins to celebrate mass once a-year, but requiring the altar and its ornaments to remain undisturbed. No sooner were these words uttered than the Latins, who had come to receive their triumph over the Orientals, broke out into loud exclamations of the impossibility of celebrating mass upon a schismatic slab of marble, with a covering of silk and gold instead of plain linen, among schismatic vases, and before a crucifix which has the feet separated, instead of one nailed over the other.

There, however, were the words of the Firman, and so that proceeding ended in nothing.

M. Basily afterwards called on the Commissioner at his house, and insisted upon the great Firman being read. The latter inquired, "What Firman?" "That which you yourself drew up, and wrote with your own hand, as Second Secretary in Constantinople, declaring that the Latin claims to the Sanctuaries are null and void."

The Bey explained that he had no directions to read it; that he had no copy of it with him, and could not go beyond his special instructions.

Thereupon M. Basily sent off Prince Garari to Jaffa, to convey these tidings to Constantinople in any Arab vessel that could be found.

At Jaffa the latter stayed six days, detained by contrary winds.

M. Basily then went to the Pasha of Jerusalem, and demanded to have a Special Council assembled, with himself and the Greek Patriarch in attendance, to receive a final declaration whether the important Firman had been sent here or not.

At that meeting Hafiz Pasha made a smooth speech on the well-known benevolence of His Majesty towards all classes of his subjects, and that was all that could be said.

And so ended for the present the business upon which so much excitement had been raised.

The architect is proceeding with his task of surveying the Dome.

There remains the comparative easy question of Bethlehem Sanctuaries.

The silver star which was stolen in 1847, and which, by the Firman in question, was to be replaced at the Latin expense, was supposed to be brought on this occasion, having been approved of in Constantinople: but on inquiry it was found that no one had brought it, or knew where it had been left behind.

No. 50.

*Colonel Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received December 11.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, November 20, 1852.*

THE question of the Holy Places has become graver, and causes the Porte much anxiety.

All the evils resulting from the contradictory nature of the concessions made in February last by the Porte, in the note of the 9th of February and the Firman to the Greeks, to the two rival interests engaged in this ill-omened difference, are coming into evidence, and striking contrast, as the time approaches when Afif Bey, the Porte's Commissioner at Jerusalem, is to perform the difficult task of executing the Porte's conflicting decisions as to the Sanctuaries.

A graver cause of difference than the great door of the Church of Bethlehem has appeared, and taken precedence of it.

The Porte, under the influence of French and Russian menaces, conceded to the French Embassy the note of the 9th February, and the Firman of *mi-Février* to the Greeks.

The Russian Government considers the Firman the charter of rights of the Greek Church. The President, and M. de Lavalette, consider it an affront to France, because it describes her claims grounded on the Treaty of 1740, as "*haksig*," unjust, and establishes a *status quo* which wholly invalidates that Treaty. M. de Lavalette tells me that the Porte promised to M. Sabatier that it should not be read at Jerusalem.

M. d'Ozeroff tells the Porte that the Firman must be read at Jerusalem; he declares that if it be not read, according to usage, in the *Medgliss* at Jerusalem, before the Pasha, Cadi, Members of the Council, Patriarchs of the different sects, it will be valueless and a dead letter, and that consequently faith will have been broken with Russia.

The Latin clergy laid claim to a lamp, and means of saying mass, and keeping the priestly robes and sacred vessels in the Tomb of the Virgin, where, by the note of the 9th February they are now allowed to perform their devotions, "*dans les tems établis*." But M. de Lavalette tells me that he disapproves these pretensions, because they are not sanctioned by the note, and that a "*maisonnette*" is to be erected in Gethsemane, where what is requisite for the church service in the tomb is to be kept.

Your Lordship is aware, that the cupola of the Holy Sepulchre has for a length of time been in decay, and that the violent disputes of the Greeks and Latins, as to who shall repair it, are the cause that nothing has been done to it.

It has now been decided that the Sultan is to repair it, and in consequence, M. de Lavalette apprehends no dissension on this score. But Fuad Effendi foresees that embarrassments will arise from the pretensions of the rival sects, as to whether the inscriptions round the cupola are to be in Greek or Latin; whether the sacred images in it are to be made and habited according to Greek or Latin fashions.

*Colonel Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received December 11.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, November 20, 1852.*

THE question of the Holy Places is becoming more serious. France and Russia, with the view to coerce the Porte to execute her contradictory concessions of February last to them, have taken the same menacing position towards her which they did twelve months ago, only with this difference, that M. de Lavalette menaces to defend the advantages he has gained since his return from leave, whilst M. d'Ozeroff menaces to regain what he has lost.

M. de Lavalette has induced the Porte to address him a note, which nullifies the *status quo* established by the Firman to the Greeks, and states that nothing can be done by the Porte, affecting the Treaty of 1740, without the consent of France. The French Government have expressed their approbation of this note.

M. de Lavalette has also addressed instructions to M. Botta at Jerusalem, in which he enjoins him to watch vigilantly over the strict execution of the note of the 9th of February, and particularly of the provision in it which he says allows the Latins to pass through the great door of the church at Bethlehem, without however interfering with the Greeks when they are at their devotions. These instructions M. de Lavalette has shown to the Porte, who, he says, has expressed her approval of them. With these advantages, and the Porte's promise to M. Sabatier that the Firman to the Greeks is not to be read, M. de Lavalette is satisfied, and only protects his position by announcing the extreme measures he would take, should the Porte leave any engagements to him unfulfilled. He has, more than once, talked of the appearance, in that case, of a French fleet off Jaffa; and once he alluded to a French occupation of Jerusalem, "when," he said, "we shall have all the Sanctuaries."

M. de Lavalette has obtained these advantages, because he gained a hold on the Porte by making her responsible to France for having issued the Firman to the Greeks, which, his Excellency says, "is a denial of the rights conceded to France by Treaty, and the note of the 9th of February."

Such is the French position.

The Russian Legation has heard of the note to M. de Lavalette; and Russian policy now endeavours, as a set-off to it, to give validity and dignity to the Firman.

M. d'Ozeroff, a few days since, in a formal interview with the Grand Vizier, demanded that the Firman should be formally and publicly read at Jerusalem.

The Porte, under the influence of this communication, has instructed Afif Bey to cause the Firman to be read at Jerusalem.

I now learn that besides the Firman, the Porte gave, in February last, a vizirial letter, confidentially, to M. de Titoff, promising that the Latins should not pass through the great door of the Church of Bethlehem.

Such is the Russian position.

The Porte's position is most disadvantageous. Against all her wishes and interests she has been dragged into a most dangerous and difficult dispute between the great Powers, who found their respective claims on contradictory documents, which date from remote and dark ages. The Porte, a Mahomedan Power, is called on to decide a quarrel which involves, ostensibly, sectarian Christian religious feeling, but which, in reality, is a vital struggle between France and Russia for political influence, at the Porte's cost, in her dominions.

The Sultan is required to be a judge, and to decide this dispute; but, so far from having judicial independence and immunity, His Majesty is coerced, and humiliated before his subjects by menaces, forced to give contradictory and dishonouring decisions, and then accused of perfidy by those who have driven him into it.

In this dilemma Fuad Effendi requested to see me on what he called "the rather serious turn which the affair of the Holy Places had taken."

His Excellency went at length into all the disadvantages of the Porte's position. He said:—

“France, with her Treaty with the Porte in her hand, demanded the rights as to the Holy Places granted by it to the Latins; that is, a total change of the *status quo*. The Porte was on the point of making concessions to her, when the Emperor of Russia, last year, in a letter to the Sultan, required the Porte's strict adherence to the *status quo*, saying that the question of the Holy Places was ‘clairement et positivement résolue par des ordonnances solennelles et des Hatti-Shérifs souverains.’ M. de Titoff declared also to the Porte that he would leave Constantinople with all his Legation, if she permitted the slightest departure from the *status quo*. M. de Lavalette threatened to blockade the Dardanelles with a French fleet, if the Porte adhered to the *status quo*.

“The *status quo* is protected by Russian, and attacked by French menaces.

“These two Powers, at that time and since, have coerced the Porte into a series of deceptions, to the prejudice of her free agency and credit, and she is now threatened with their vengeance if she does not effect a settlement of a dispute which they themselves, by their mutual antagonism, render impossible. If France and Russia persist in this course, our only chance of safety will be an appeal to England to intervene, in our behalf, with those Powers, and induce them to agree to some practicable arrangement of their difference.”

I asked Fuad Effendi how he thought I could assist the Porte in her difficulties, observing, that without leaving my position of neutrality, I had already pointed out to the French and Russian Representatives the evils which might result to the policy which protected the peace of the world, from a continuance of their difference, and that I had used my friendly endeavours to remove causes of irritation and misunderstanding, and to induce them to settle a quarrel of Christians in a Christian spirit.

Fuad Effendi said that he was aware of my peaceful wishes, and that the Porte would be very much obliged to me if I would avail myself of my good relations with M. de Lavalette and M. d'Ozeroff, and see if there was a possibility of a reconciliation.

With the view, therefore, of obtaining exact information on this point, I visited these two gentlemen, disclaiming the part of a mediator, and only taking the unofficial one of a mutual friend, anxious to explain possible misapprehensions as to details, trifling in themselves, but involving the most important interests. And this mode of proceeding was the more advantageous, because M. de Lavalette and M. d'Ozeroff see each other but seldom, and when they do, never mention the Holy Places. They both received me in the best spirit; and although I effected no reconciliation, I at least removed two causes of misapprehension. M. d'Ozeroff said that he had not considered the great door of the Church of Bethlehem as so serious a cause of difference as M. de Lavalette had done, even adding, that that matter might have been arranged if M. de Lavalette had not opposed the reading of the Firman at Jerusalem.

On the other hand, M. d'Ozeroff thought that M. de Lavalette had supported the claim of the Latins to have a cupboard and a lamp in the Tomb of the Virgin. I assured him that he, on the contrary, had disallowed it.

M. d'Ozeroff said that he could not deviate in the slightest degree from the positive orders of the Emperor; that Russia would not go to war; she would only, should the Porte not fulfil her engagements as to the Holy Places, withdraw her Legation from Constantinople; that there are other Courts at which Russia had no Representative.

M. de Lavalette said that he could not deviate in the slightest degree from the note of the 9th February last, but that he was perfectly ready to reopen the examination of France's rights as to the Holy Places, taking as the basis of them the Treaty of 1740; that the Latins would seldom pass through the great door; perhaps, for what he knew, never at all.

I said all that I thought most likely to produce a good effect on the French and Russian Representatives, and concluded by assuring them that having visited the Holy Places, and made myself thoroughly acquainted with all the bearings of that matter, I should always be happy to remove, as I had done in the present instance, misapprehensions which might prevent a favourable solution of this unfortunate difference.

Both the French and Russian Representatives returned me their thanks.

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No. 52.

*The Earl of Malmesbury to Colonel Rose.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, December 14, 1852.*

I HAVE received your despatches of the 20th of November, respecting the fresh difficulties which have occurred to impede a settlement of the conflicting claims of the Greek and Latin Churches to various portions of the Holy Buildings at Jerusalem; and while I acquaint you that I entirely approve of the language which you have held to Fuad Effendi, and to the Representatives of France and Russia, with the view of bringing all parties to a more reasonable and more practical view of the matters in dispute, I have, at the same time, to instruct you to abstain from any direct or official interference in a question with which, in itself, Her Majesty's Government have nothing to do, and which can only interest them in so far as it may appear likely to interrupt the amicable relations of the parties immediately concerned in it.

As it seems, from your despatches, doubtful whether Mr. Consul Finn has transmitted to you a copy of his report to me, on the subject of Afif Pasha's proceedings at Jerusalem respecting the Firman, I inclose a copy of it for your information.\* You will observe that allusion is made to two Firmans, namely, one touching the Shrine of the Virgin, which corresponds so far with the Firman of February last, of which a copy was sent to this office by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, in his despatch of the 19th of March, the other called by M. Basily, the Great Firman. Her Majesty's Government have no knowledge of the existence of any other Firman than the one first mentioned; and if there should be any other, you will procure a copy of it, and send it home.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) MALMESBURY.

No. 53.

*Colonel Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received December 19.)*

My Lord,

*Pera, December 4, 1852.*

THE question of the Holy Places wears, on the whole, a more favourable appearance than it did when I last had the honour to address your Lordship.

The subjects of discussion, the publication or reading of the Firman, and the key of the great door of the Church of Bethlehem, are the same; but the French and Russian Representatives have modified their tone in their communications with the Porte on the matter.

I ascribe this favourable result a good deal to the advice which I gave to Fuad Effendi, on his consulting me what he should do when the Porte was accused by the two Representatives of having acted with perfidy.

Both M. de Lavalette and M. d'Ozeroff did not scruple to bring the same serious charge, couched in the strongest terms, against the Porte.

I saw that their accusations were not only most prejudicial to the credit and influence of the Porte, but that the tenacity and asperity with which they were repeated, looked ominous, and indicated the possibility of a coming demand for satisfaction for continued "perfidy and treachery."

I therefore, courteously but frankly, told both M. de Lavalette and M. d'Ozeroff, that I could not admit the justice of these accusations, because the coercive nature of French and Russian demands had forced the Porte to give conflicting decisions, against her will, her interest, and her conviction; that the Porte had been compelled to act as a judge in a most difficult and, to her, distasteful matter, and then deprived of the immunity and independence of a judge.

Fuad Effendi has spoken, in a similar sense, to the two Representatives.

These unanswerable arguments have produced a favourable effect by placing matters in their true light. M. de Lavalette now says that nothing can be "plus doux et plus aimable" than he is with the Porte. "Je demande

humblement et respectueusement mon droit." M. d'Ozeroff also says, that although he admitted that last year there had been a declaration that the Russian Legation would, under certain circumstances, leave Constantinople, yet that he could not bring to his recollection having talked of the Legation leaving it on account of present causes of difference with the Porte.

I have the honour to inclose a copy of a report from Mr. Stephen Pisani, which shows the nature of the coercion used last year, and which forced the Porte to give contradictory decisions. M. de Titoff threatened the Porte with immediate rupture of relations if the Porte infringed, in the least, the *status quo* as to the Holy Places; and M. de Lavalette threatened her with the appearance of a French fleet at the Dardanelles if she adhered to it.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

Inclosure in No. 53.

*Statement by M. E. Pisani.*

December 4, 1852.

M. DE TITOFF said, in November last, to Aali Pasha, that if a single thing was changed in the *status quo* as to the Holy Places, it would be considered as an offence by the Emperor; and that he (M. de Titoff) would, in that case, leave Constantinople, with all the members of his Mission, in twenty-four hours.

M. de Lavalette said, about the same time, that the question of the Holy Places would not have a fair solution without the presence of the fleet at the Dardanelles.

(Signed) E. PISANI.

No. 54.

*Colonel Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received December 19.)*

(Extract.)

*Pera, December 5, 1852.*

M. D'OZEROFF has prejudiced much his position, at this important moment, by making a formal declaration to the French Ambassador, that Russia, by virtue of the Treaty of Kainardji, protects the orthodox, that is, the Greek religion, in Turkey. M. de Lavalette takes this the more to heart, because he has lately formally declared that France makes no claim to protect the Turkish Roman Catholics. He has made known M. d'Ozeroff's declaration to his colleagues and the Porte. The Porte has heard this assertion of Russian protection of the religious interests of ten or eleven millions of her subjects with unmingled dissatisfaction.

I have the honour to inclose a copy of the two articles of the Treaty of Koutchouk-Kainardji which relate to Russia in connection with the Greek Turkish Christians.

M. d'Ozeroff founds his claim on Article VII; but I venture to think, that your Lordship will agree with me that a promise of the Porte to protect the Christian religion and churches, does not bear out the Russian Representative in saying that Russia has a right to protect the Greek Turkish Church, more especially as the 14th Article expressly limits the right of Russian protection of the Greek Church to that of the chapel of the Russian Legation, and of a new Greek church which the Court of Russia was about to build in Galata.

## Inclosure in No. 54.

*Treaty of Koutchouk-Kainardji.*

(Extrait.)

ARTICLE VII.—LA Porte promet de protéger la religion Chrétienne et ses églises: et il sera libre aux Ministres de Russie de faire des représentations en faveur de la nouvelle église dont il est parlé dans l'Article XIV.

Article VIII.—Il sera permis aux sujets de l'Empire Russe de visiter la ville de Jérusalem et les Lieux Saints; et il ne sera exigé d'eux, ni à Jérusalem ni ailleurs, aucun droit ni contribution.

Article XIV.—Il est permis à la Cour de Russie, outre la chapelle bâtie dans la maison du Ministre, de construire dans un quartier de Galata, dans la rue nommée Bey Oglou, une église publique du rit Grec, qui sera toujours sous la protection du Ministre Russe, et à l'abri de toute gêne et avanie.

(Translation.)

(Extract.)

ARTICLE VII. THE Porte promises to protect the Christian religion and its churches, and the Ministers of Russia shall be allowed to make representations in favour of the new church of which mention is made in the 14th Article.

Article VIII. The subjects of the Russian Empire shall be permitted to visit the city of Jerusalem and the holy places; and no duty or contribution shall be exacted from them either at Jerusalem or elsewhere.

Article XIV. The Court of Russia is permitted, besides the chapel built in the Minister's house, to build in the quarter of Galata, in the street named Bey Oglou, a public church of the Greek rite, which shall always be under the protection of the Russian Minister, and secure from all vexation and exaction.

## No. 55.

*Colonel Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received December 19.)*

My Lord,

Pera, December 5, 1852.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship the copy of an instruction to M. Pisani respecting the question of the Holy Places.

I have always told the Turkish Ministers that my instructions did not permit me to interfere in that question, and that even if they did I could not safely have given an opinion as to decisions of one day, contradicted by those of the next, not knowing besides whether other counter-engagements may not have been given secretly, or unknown to me.

On the other hand, I told Fuad Effendi that it would be my duty to support the Sultan when His Majesty claimed the right to give, in enjoyment of his independence and free agency, a conscientious opinion on any matter which he was bound to examine and decide on.

Fuad Effendi has now volunteered telling me, at three different interviews, that having again, with some of his colleagues, gone over the documents and treaties relating to the Holy Places, he has come to the conviction that France's claim to the key of the great door of the Church of Bethlehem is just; and that if her Treaty of 1740 were examined "d'une manière juridique," France might claim many more Sanctuaries than the two given her by the note of the 9th February.

The Grand Vizier, whom I saw to-day, volunteered also a declaration in a similar sense.

Both his Highness and Fuad Effendi stated that they were resolved to extricate the Porte from the critical position in which she had been involved

by the contradictory promises of the last Ministry respecting the question of Jerusalem; that the longer the question lasted, the more critical and embarrassed would be the position of the Porte; and that in this sense the Sultan intended, without further delay, to decide and settle the question of the Holy Places, which had been most thoroughly discussed and examined, according to the strictest rules of justice and impartiality; and that if any party complained of the decision, the Porte would reply, that she had decided according to the best of her ability and her conscientious conviction.

It is due to the Grand Vizier to say, that he has acted with as much prudence and consistency as was possible in the difficult circumstances in which he was placed.

The Grand Vizier informed me that the French Ambassador was now satisfied with the manner in which the Firman to the Greeks was to be read.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

Inclosure in No. 55.

*Colonel Rose to M. E. Pisani.*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, November 28, 1852.*

AFTER thinking duly over Fuad Effendi's question of yesterday, as to whether the Porte would do well to give the key of the Church of Bethlehem to the Latins, that is, the French, I cannot—pray tell his Excellency, with my best compliments—answer the question, as by my instructions I am bound to be neutral in this matter of the difference between the French and Russians.

No. 56.

*The Earl of Malmesbury to Colonel Rose.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, December 21, 1852.*

I HAVE to acquaint you that I approve of the endeavours which you have made, as reported in your despatch of the 4th instant, to moderate the vehemence of the several parties engaged in the discussion respecting the Greek and Latin claims at Jerusalem.

I am, &c.

(Signed) MALMESBURY.

No. 57.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received December 24.)*

(Extract.)

*Compiègne, December 19, 1852.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS, who arrived here from Paris this afternoon, mentioned to me that the question of the Sacred Places was not settled, and, he was afraid, would give rise to further difficulties. He was, he said, most anxious to see it terminated.

No. 58.

*Consul Finn to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received December 29.)*

(Extract.)

*Jerusalem, December 9, 1852.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Firman which confirms the property of the Sanctuaries to the Greek community here, as alluded to in my despatch of 27th October, was read in public Divan on the 29th November, in presence of the three Patriarchs and the French Consul.

## No. 59.

*Lord Cowley to Lord John Russell.—(Received December 31.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, December 30, 1852.*

YOUR Lordship's attention has no doubt been already called to a question of serious importance in the East, namely, the difference which has arisen between the French Embassy and the Russian Legation at Constantinople respecting the rights claimed by the former over the Holy Places at Jerusalem.

As your Lordship has at hand the means of obtaining a full statement of all the proceedings which appertain to this complicated affair, it is not necessary that I should say more than that your Lordship's predecessor, in a private letter which he wrote me a few days before he left office, desired me to press earnestly on the French Government the necessity of its being terminated as promptly as possible. I had, consequently, a long conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys upon the subject at Compiègne.

He repeated his former assurances, and added that the difference must and should be settled. I asked him why he did not desire the French Ambassador at Constantinople to put himself in direct communication with the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, instead of leaving to a Mussulman Potentate the settlement of a Christian dispute. I suggested that M. de Lavalette should state to M. d'Ozeroff that France had Treaties with the Porte which secured to the Latins certain privileges in the Holy Places, but that she had no wish to make those Treaties a handle for preventing facilities being afforded to other Christian sects to worship in the same places, each according to the form required by their particular dogma; and that he should then enter into friendly arrangement with M. d'Ozeroff for preventing any future scandal between the Latin and Greek worshippers.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys appeared to approve of the suggestion. He said that he would turn it in his mind, and speak to me again upon it on my return to Paris.

Yesterday he renewed the subject with me. He said that he had adopted my suggestion, and had written in that sense to M. de Lavalette, and he proposed instructing M. de Castelbajac to make similar overtures at St. Petersburg. He was quite determined that the question should be amicably settled.

## No. 60.

*Colonel Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received January 5, 1853.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, December 16, 1852.*

THE Porte has given her decision, the same as that of the 25th January last, as to the Holy Places, and communicated it to the French and Russian Representatives. Inclosed is M. Etienne Pisani's report on the subject.

In order to give your Lordship a correct idea of this decision and of the grounds on which the Porte bases it, I shall recapitulate shortly the circumstances relating to it.

In 1850 General Aupick first addressed a note to the Porte, demanding the settlement of France's claim as to the Sanctuaries by virtue of Treaty.

In 1851 the Porte named a mixed Commission, composed of French and Turkish-Greek members, with Emin Effendi as president, to examine the French claims.

This Commission showed too much French tendency, by rejecting as evidence "*le Traité du Khalif Omar*," which is the groundwork of Greek claims as to the Sanctuaries. It had held several sittings when the letter of the Emperor of Russia arrived and caused its dissolution.

The Porte then named, in opposition to the wishes of the French, a purely Turkish Commission of Inquiry. This Commission, after examining "*le Traité du Khalif Omar*," the two French Treaties, and all the Firmans and documents relating to the Holy Places, gave a decision as to them, on which was founded the Porte's decision of the 25th January, which is described as "*equitable*" by the valuable testimony of Her Majesty's Ambassador, as appears from his

Excellency's despatch of February 18 of this year. The decision now taken by the Porte is the same.

M. de Titoff, disapproving the infraction of the *status quo*, resulting from the Porte's decision of the 25th of January last and the Porte's note to the French Envoy of the 9th of February, lost no time in endeavouring to re-establish the *status quo*, by persuading the Porte to issue to the Greeks the much talked-of Firman. So much was M. de Titoff concerned in the framing of it, that, as M. Pisani informs me, he was allowed by Aali Pasha to make such alterations in the draft of it as he thought proper.

The complaints of the Russian Legation here against the Porte in the Jerusalem question are two, an ostensible one and an undefined one.

The first is, that the Firman to the Greeks has not been read at Jerusalem in full Council, and in presence of the patriarchs and clergy of all the Christian sects.

The second one is, as to the delivery of the key of the great door of the Church at Bethlehem to the Latins.

As regards the first complaint, the Porte has ordered the Firman to be read in presence of the Pasha, Mufti, Cadi, and Greek Patriarch of Jerusalem, and then registered. By so doing, the Porte made a great concession to Russia, and offended much the French Ambassador, who had insisted that the Firman should not be read in any way, but merely registered. However, Fuad Effendi assures me that M. de Lavalette, in a conciliatory spirit, will shut his eyes to the reading, in the manner I now state, of the Firman, and will not make it a cause of quarrel with the Porte.

The Firman is to be read, although the Firman itself only prescribes that it shall be registered: the registration being all that is necessary for its legalization.

Under these circumstances, the Porte's decision that the Firman should be read, was more than could justly be required of her.

With respect to the second cause of Russian complaint, the key for the great door of the Church of Bethlehem, it is so vague and undefined that neither the Porte nor any Representative here can comprehend it.

The Porte's note of the 9th of February, and even the Firman, states that the Latins are to have three keys, two for the doors of the Church, of which the great door is one, and a key of the Grotto.

It is clear that the Envoy felt that the Firman gave, by its real meaning, the key in question to the Latins, because he afterwards obtained a vizirial letter to Afif Effendi, instructing him to do all he could to withhold the key from them, and if he could not succeed, to refer to Constantinople.

Therefore, as the note of the 9th of February, to the French Envoy, and the Firman obtained and altered by the Russian Envoy, concede the key of the great door of the Church of Bethlehem to the Latins, the Porte did wisely and right in confirming the concession.

Inclosure in No. 60.

*M. E. Pisani to Colonel Rose.*

(Extract.)

*Pera, December 7, 1852.*

FUAD EFFENDI told me that instructions were last night transmitted to Afif Bey to settle the long-pending question of the Holy Places at once, and according to the Porte's decision and the declaration of the 25th January last.

## No. 61.

*Lord Cowley to Lord John Russell.—(Received January 7.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, January 6, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has already expressed to M. de Kisséleff his desire to see the question of the Sacred Buildings at Jerusalem terminated in a manner that may be satisfactory and honourable to both Governments. The French Government has no wish, he says, to stand out on extreme rights; and if the Russian Government will meet them in the same conciliatory spirit, he sees no reason why the matter should not be amicably arranged between them.

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## No. 62.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received January 11, 1853.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, December 31, 1852.*

I HAVE held a conversation with the Chancellor, which I commenced by observing that I could not help feeling great anxiety about the continued disputes respecting the rights of the Greek and Latin Churches in Turkey. "Et vous avez bien raison," Count Nesselrode replied, "d'en être inquiet, car je ne vous cacherai pas que c'est une très-mauvaise affaire."

His Excellency proceeded to say, that the position of the Russian Government was simply this:—That after two years of laborious negotiation, an arrangement had been effected, fair to all parties, and by which certain concessions had been made to the Latins; that this arrangement was notified not only by a Firman written in February last, but by a formal letter from the Sultan to the Emperor; that the business was suddenly unsettled by the French Ambassador, who, under threats of violence, had suspended the reading of the Firman; that certainly this was a state of things which His Imperial Majesty could not tolerate, and the less as the interests of the Porte, as well as those of Russia, were compromised, the Sultan being very directly interested in attending to the feelings of those large bodies of his subjects who profess the Greek religion, while nothing was to be gained by consulting the wishes of some occasional Roman Catholic tourists.

I begged his Excellency to believe that Her Majesty's Government had no further interest in the question than that of preventing misunderstandings between friendly Governments and injury to an ancient ally, itself no way concerned in the matters in dispute.

Upon my remarking afterwards that I thought it highly desirable that the question should be approached in the most conciliatory spirit, and that the difficult position of the Porte should not be aggravated by differences growing, as Count Nesselrode had stated, out of the conduct of the French Ambassador, his Excellency replied that he really did not see what middle course ("terme moyen") could be adopted, but that he was ready to examine the business under the influence of such conciliatory feeling.

I read to Count Nesselrode your Lordship's despatch to Colonel Rose of the 14th instant, which satisfied him as to the impartial feeling manifested in this affair by Her Majesty's Government.

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## No. 63.

*Consul Finn to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received January 17, 1853.)*

(Extract.)

*Jerusalem, December 28, 1852.*

I HAVE to report that on Wednesday last, the 22nd instant, the silver star for the sanctuary of Bethlehem was deposited in place of the long-missed one, by the Latin Patriarch, with great ceremony.

It had been brought up a few days before, with much pomp, from Jaffa.

Some of the Moslem Effendis went down to Jaffa to escort it, and the rest rode out a considerable distance on the road to bring it into Jerusalem with triumph.

At the time of depositing the star, the Latin authorities received the keys into possession, not only of the inner, but of the outer church at Bethlehem, which were taken from the Greeks to be given to them.

## No. 64.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received January 19.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, January 6, 1853.*

I BELIEVE that I may state to your Lordship, that measures have been taken by the Russian Government to ensure the 5th Corps d'Armée being placed in a state of preparation for active service.

I purpose taking an early opportunity of speaking to the Chancellor upon the subject of the information which I now feel authorised in submitting to your Lordship, with the observation that I cannot help connecting these military preparations with the threat partly made by the French Government of sending an expedition to Syria in the event of satisfaction not being obtained for the claims of the Latin Church.

## No. 65.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received January 19.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, January 7, 1853.*

ORDERS have been despatched to the 5th Corps d'Armée to advance to the frontiers of the Danubian Provinces, without waiting for their reserves; and the 4th Corps, under the command of General Count Dannenberg, and now stationed in Volhynia, will be ordered to hold itself in readiness to march if necessary.

Each of these Corps consists of twenty-four regiments, and, as your Lordship is aware, each Russian regiment is composed of three battalions (each of about 1000 men), of which one battalion forms the reserve.

General Lüder's Corps d'Armée, accordingly, being now 48,000 strong, will receive a reinforcement of 24,000 men soon after its arrival at its destination, and supposing the 4th Corps to follow, the whole force will amount, at least according to official returns, to 144,000 men.

## No. 66.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received January 19.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, January 8, 1853.*

THE departure of the Austrian messenger, about to be despatched to the Prussian frontier, having been deferred till to-day, I am enabled to offer your Lordship in a few lines the *précis* of a long conversation which I have held this afternoon with the Chancellor upon the subject of the armed preparations of Russia.

Of the extent of these armaments his Excellency is not prepared to speak with certainty; he believes that marching orders have only been given to the 5th Corps, and is not aware of the 4th Corps having received directions to hold itself in readiness.

Count Nesselrode treats as exaggerated the apprehensions which I expressed as likely to arise in Turkey and elsewhere from the appearance of a Russian army on the frontiers of the Sultan's dominions. The nature of these apprehensions was fully explained in a sort of memorandum which I had drawn up hastily, and which I read to the Chancellor. Some of the expressions of

this paper, a copy of which will of course be transmitted to your Lordship, Count Nesselrode thought too strong for the occasion.

His Excellency entered into long explanations and assurances tending to prove that the Emperor deprecated the fall of Turkey, and had, under critical circumstances, rendered those services to the Porte by which alone such a catastrophe could have been averted.

As regards the present crisis, his Excellency expressed the hope and the belief that it would be brought to a conclusion by negotiation, but observed that it was necessary that the diplomacy of Russia should be supported (appuyé) by a demonstration of force. It would be required that the Porte should strictly fulfil its engagements towards the Greek Church and the Emperor; it would further be exacted that a corresponding compensation should be made to the Greek for any new concession made (I believe his Excellency said, at the expense of the Emperor's co-religionists) to the Latin Church. Finally, his Excellency expressed his firm belief that this alarming question would be brought to a satisfactory conclusion, if exertions were made by Her Majesty's Government at Paris and at Constantinople to advocate the rights which the Russian Government are entitled to claim, and to discountenance the pretensions of the French Cabinet.

I beg to apologise to your Lordship for the extreme haste in which this despatch is necessarily written. On Thursday next I propose despatching the messenger in attendance upon the Mission.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

#### No. 67.

*Lord Cowley to Lord John Russell.—(Received January 21.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, January 20, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS informed me yesterday that he had received advices from St. Petersburg, announcing that the Emperor of Russia had ordered a large concentration of troops on the frontiers bordering on Turkey.

This display of force will not prevent the French Government, according to M. Drouyn de Lhuys' assurances, from terminating the question of the Sacred Places.

Your Lordship has probably been informed that M. de Lavalette is to leave Constantinople immediately. He is to be succeeded by Baron Brennier, late Secretary-General at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

#### No. 68.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received January 23.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, January 9, 1853.*

WITH reference to my despatch of yesterday's date, I have the honour of transmitting to your Lordship a copy of the paper which I mentioned as having read to Count Nesselrode.

Before doing so I remarked to his Excellency that this memorandum had been hastily prepared, but that the reflections which it contained were the result of my anxious consideration of a subject of great importance, and that in such a crisis as the present I had been desirous that no doubt should exist as to the expressions which I employed in treating the subject.

The Chancellor was of opinion that the views set forth in the inclosed paper were too decided, and that they had been expressed in language more forcible than was necessary.

To this I replied that I should have been quite ready to admit of any verbal corrections, but that it had been my wish to convey to his Excellency correctly the impression produced on my mind by the intelligence of the Russian preparations, as well as the result by which I conceived they might be

followed. Any observation, I added, which his Excellency might think proper to make, which would have the effect of allaying these impressions and anticipations, would, he might be assured, be most acceptable to me.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 68.

*Memorandum.*

*St. Petersburg, January 8, 1853.*

IT is hardly necessary to state that there is no object upon which Her Majesty's Government are so intent as upon the preservation of peace in Europe, and (as closely connected with this object) upon preventing the downfall of the Turkish Empire.

It is not to be doubted, that the same importance is attached to these objects by the Imperial Cabinet.

The question then presents itself, will these great ends be promoted by the advance of a large Russian force upon the Turkish frontier? and it should appear that the inquiry admits of only one reply. At a moment when an unfortunate dispute is carried on at Constantinople,—a dispute in which the Porte itself has no interest, one which should never have been originated, and which, without great difficulty, might be arranged,—the appearance near the frontier of Turkey of a large Russian army can hardly fail to alarm the jealousy of the French Government, and is likely to produce counter-demonstrations on their part. What the consequence would be of the simultaneous presence of a Russian and French force in the East, it would be impossible to foresee; thus much, however, is certain, that it must tend to injure, most materially, the independence of Turkey, and to strike, perhaps, a fatal blow to the authority of the Sultan.

But if the presence of a Russian army on the borders of the Principalities is likely to arouse the apprehensions of foreign Governments, what effect is it calculated to produce upon the subjects of the Porte?

The inquiry may be readily answered. It cannot fail of inspiring the Mussulman population with the deepest apprehensions, and is equally calculated to induce the Christian subjects of the Sultan to rise in rebellion against their Sovereign; this, too, at a moment when, besides suffering from severe financial embarrassments, the Porte finds its resources severely taxed by the efforts which it is compelled to make for putting down the movements which have broken out in Syria and in the neighbourhood of Montenegro.

It cannot be that the Russian Cabinet would willingly incur the responsibility of a crisis brought about by a demonstration not called for by any great military or political emergency. But it may be said, that France has uttered the threat of making a naval or military demonstration in the East, and that this menace demands a corresponding demonstration on the part of the Imperial forces.

To this it may be replied, that the threat, even if seriously made, will, according to all appearances, not be acted upon, and that one military act, from which the Porte would suffer the greatest inconvenience, could hardly be alleged in justification of a similar act, proceeding from another quarter, and which would be to the full as detrimental to the Sultan's interests.

It has been, by some, assumed that the object of France in re-opening the question relating to the Holy Places, has been to produce confusion, and to introduce discord into the councils of the allied Governments.

Now this suspicion is correct or it is unfounded; if unfounded, a resolution, the carrying out of which may have the most serious consequences, will have been taken upon false grounds; if correct, it may be asked, whether it would be politic to resort to measures by which the conflict, which it is assumed to be the desire of France to promote, may be brought about.

To this may be added the observation that there is considerable reason for believing that the dispute respecting the Latin rights at Jerusalem originated not so much in the decisions of the Cabinet, as in the personal

views of a diplomatic agent; and further, that grounds are not wanting for imagining that the French Government may not be reluctant to withdraw, if enabled to do so with dignity, from a diplomatic contest entered upon without sufficient reflection. To these observations one other might be added,—it would be unusual that so strong a measure as that of the gathering of an imposing military force upon the frontiers of a friendly country, should be adopted without notice or warning; whereas so little notice has been given at the Porte of the resolutions which there are appearances of having been carried into execution, that it may be remarked that the threat, hitherto made to the Porte, has never gone beyond that (of itself sufficiently alarming) of the Imperial Mission being withdrawn from Constantinople, in the event of the non-execution of the Sultan's engagements with regard to the Holy Places.

It cannot be desired by the allies of Russia that the Emperor should be asked to forego any of those rights to which he is justly entitled; but it may properly be submitted that those rights should not be sought under a demonstration of military force, when, according to all probability, they might be attained by the usual course of negotiation.

The above reflections are submitted respectfully to the consideration of Count Nesselrode, with the expression of a hope that they may be found worthy of his attention, and that they may possibly lead to a fresh proof of that regard to the interests of his allies, and of that desire to promote a good understanding among the European Governments, of which the Emperor's conduct has offered so many and such striking examples.

No. 69.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received January 23.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, January 13, 1853.*

I CALLED yesterday, by his desire, upon the Chancellor, who had the kindness to read to me the long and very important instruction upon the present position of affairs, which is about to be addressed to Baron de Brunnow. The draft bore marks of having been already sanctioned by the Emperor, and the despatch will be sent off by messenger to London to-morrow or the next day. This interesting paper, of which I should be able to give but an imperfect sketch, will be communicated to you by the Russian Mission, and will, I am willing to believe, be left in your Lordship's hands.

The chief points touched upon appeared to me the following:—

That since the question of the Holy Places had been noticed by the Russian Minister to the Earl of Malmesbury it had assumed a new character; that the acts of injustice towards the Greek Church, which it had been desired to prevent, had been perpetrated, and, consequently, that now the object must be to find a remedy for those wrongs; that the success of the French negotiations at Constantinople was to be ascribed solely to intrigue and violence,—violence, which had been supposed to be the *ultima ratio* of kings, being, it had been seen, the means which the present ruler of France was in the habit of employing in the first instance; that the Emperor was as solicitous as he ever had been to prevent the overthrow of Turkey, the state of that country being, indeed, very precarious, but the maintenance of Turkey as it now exists being, perhaps, more suited to the interests of Russia, and, at all events, more favourable to the maintenance of peace, than exposure to those chances of disagreement among the Powers, which might ensue upon the downfall of the Turkish Empire. Nevertheless, that his Imperial Majesty's rights, secured to him and to the Greek Church, could not be withheld with impunity; but that he was prepared to seek satisfaction through diplomatic means.

At the same time, as force had been employed in extorting concessions from the Porte, and as a moral influence, which may still prevail, had thus been created in her favour by France, it is necessary that the same means should be prepared by the Imperial Government, and the rather as there was danger of the Turks continuing to act, as they had been seen lately to do, under fear and compulsion.

The Emperor, it is further stated, has nearly settled, in his own mind,

what demands it will become his duty to make of the Porte,—when his Majesty's resolution is finally taken it will be notified to the Porte, and their nature will be made known to Baron Brunnow, who is desired to communicate with your Lordship, and to obtain the approbation of Her Majesty's Government in the steps about to be taken by the Emperor for securing his acknowledged rights.

I will only observe, that judging from this paper, of which I have given an imperfect abstract, and as well from the language held to me by the Chancellor, some change has taken place in the explanations offered as to the military demonstration contemplated by the Emperor.

Very little is now said of the injustice of the Porte's decisions, and great stress is laid upon the necessity of taking such precautions as may prevent the French from interfering in such a manner as to prevent the Sultan from fulfilling his engagements.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 70.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received January 23.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, January 13, 1853.*

THE accounts which I have heard of the amount of warlike preparation in the South have been so conflicting, that even now I am unable to state with certainty whether the first orders sent off by the Emperor have been modified by those subsequently despatched.

When I questioned Count Nesselrode yesterday upon the subject, he assured me that he was himself unacquainted with the details which I sought, but that as far as he knew, the only Corps under orders was the 5th, which was filling up its ranks by the recall of the "Simestricks," but which had not been directed to move towards the frontier.

This version agrees with an account which I have received that the 5th Corps is to be completed, but not upon the footing of war; that orders for its march are suspended; and that no orders of any kind have yet been sent to the 4th Corps, which, nevertheless, is already complete and ready for immediate service.

When I saw Count Nesselrode yesterday, his tone about the affairs of Turkey was considerably more cheerful and reassuring than when we last spoke upon those questions. He did not hesitate to express his confident hope that all difficulties would be settled by negotiation.

On the preceding occasion, his Excellency had commented with some severity upon the conduct of the Turkish Government, and more especially on that of Fuad Effendi. Yesterday any strong expressions made use of by his Excellency were applied to the French Government.

Count Nesselrode has been informed, that salutary advice with regard to the Turkish question has been given at Paris by Her Majesty's Government, and expresses his hope that these conciliatory efforts will be continued both at Paris and Constantinople.

To the advice given by your Lordship, Count Nesselrode is disposed to ascribe an overture which he is led to expect from the French Mission, the nature of which, although he believes it to be conciliatory, he is as yet unacquainted with.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

## No. 71.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received January 23.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, January 13, 1853.*

JUST as the messenger Ball is about to start for Berlin, I have learned upon good authority, that the head-quarters of the 4th Corps d'Armée had been moved, before the late disputes with the Porte had reached their actual stage, from Kieff to Kamenetz, situated close to the southernmost point of Gallicia.

The 4th Corps likewise is, I should observe, already in a state fitted for efficient service ("sur pied de guerre").

As to the 5th Corps, of which I have spoken in various despatches, although its head-quarters are Odessa, several regiments forming the right wing of the army are scattered throughout Bessarabia; so that, as your Lordship will at once perceive upon looking at the map, a very slight advance either of the 4th or 5th Corps would bring the Russian forces within the Moldavian frontier.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—General Lüders, who commands the 5th Corps, is still here; his departure is fixed for the 1<sup>st</sup> instant.

G. H. S.

## No. 72.

*Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow.—(Communicated to Lord John Russell by Baron Brunnow, January 24.)*

*St. Pétersbourg, le 14 Janvier, 1853.*

JE profite du courrier que j'expédie aujourd'hui à votre Excellence pour lui accuser la réception de son expédition du 17<sup>er</sup> Décembre, et l'assurer du vif intérêt avec lequel nous en avons pris lecture. L'Empereur a été surtout très satisfait des premières explications que vous avez échangées avec le Chef de la nouvelle Administration Britannique, et des soins que vous avez pris pour bien établir dans son esprit, comme dans celui de Lord John Russell, avec lequel nous aurons désormais à traiter plus particulièrement, les points principaux sur lesquels vont s'engager nos relations avec le nouveau Ministère. Parmi ceux que vous avez touchés, nous avons surtout remarqué ce qui concerne notre situation actuelle en Turquie, et le compte que vous avez rendu à Lord Aberdeen et à Lord John Russell du véritable caractère de la grave question des Lieux Saints. Vous aviez déjà abordé ce sujet avec Lord Malmesbury au moment où il se retirait des affaires, et vos efforts pour le lui faire envisager sous son vrai jour n'avaient pu que rencontrer l'approbation de notre auguste Maître. Malheureusement les démarches que votre Excellence avait cherché à obtenir de lui, tant à Paris qu'à Constantinople, se rapportaient à une situation qui n'est plus la même aujourd'hui. A cette époque les démarches de l'Ambassadeur de France en Turquie, et ses menaces pour forcer les Ministres Ottomans à éluder l'exécution du Firman, n'avaient pas encore définitivement réussi. On pouvait conserver l'espoir que les représentations de l'Angleterre au Cabinet Français auraient pour effet d'arrêter M. de Lavalette dans sa marche. Cet espoir a été frustré. Depuis lors, les efforts de l'Ambassade Française ont triomphé à Constantinople. Non seulement le Firman revêtu du hattî-schérif du Sultan n'a pas été exécuté à Jérusalem, mais il a été traité avec dérision par les Ministres de Sa Hautesse. A l'indignation de toute la population du

rit Grec, la clef du Temple de Bethléem a été livrée aux Latins de façon à constater publiquement leur suprématie religieuse en Orient.

Le mal est donc fait, M. le Baron, et ce n'est plus de le prévenir qu'il s'agit. Il faut maintenant y porter remède. Les immunités du rit orthodoxe lésées, la parole que le Sultan avait donnée solennellement à l'Empereur violée, exigent un acte de réparation quelconque. C'est à l'obtenir qu'il faut travailler. Voilà l'état actuel de la question. Si nous prenions pour exemple les procédés impérieux et violents qui ont conduit la France à ce résultat,—si nous étions, comme elle, indifférents à la dignité de la Porte, aux conséquences qu'un remède héroïque peut exercer sur une constitution déjà aussi fortement délabrée que celle de l'Empire Ottoman,—notre marche serait toute tracée, et nous n'aurions pas de longues réflexions à faire. La menace, et l'emploi de la force, seraient nos moyens immédiats. On a appelé le canon la dernière raison des rois. Le Gouvernement Français en a fait sa raison première. C'est l'argument par lequel il a déclaré de prime abord vouloir débiter à Tripoli, comme à Constantinople. Malgré nos griefs légitimes, et au risque d'en attendre quelque tems de plus le redressement, nous chercherons à adopter une méthode moins expéditive. Nous voulons encore, de même que nous l'avons toujours voulu, la conservation de l'Empire Ottoman, comme étant à tout prendre la combinaison la moins mauvaise à interposer entre tous les intérêts Européens, qui ne manqueraient pas de se heurter violemment en Orient, si le vide venait à s'y faire. Nous nous efforcerons conséquemment d'éviter jusqu'au bout, autant qu'il peut dépendre de nous, sans compromettre notre honneur, tout ce qui serait de nature à ébranler encore davantage ce corps si faible et si chancelant, au risque de le faire tomber en poudre. Quoique nous ayons vainement tâché jusqu'ici de rendre la Porte accessible aux conseils de la raison, nous allons faire encore dans ce but une dernière tentative conciliante. Nous sommes donc en ce moment à la recherche d'un arrangement qui puisse rendre au Firman la validité qu'on lui a ôtée ; rétablir à Jérusalem les deux rits sur un pied de l'égalité ; et concilier leurs prétentions sans léser les droits de l'un et de l'autre. Les conseils pacifiques, mais fermes, dont ces propositions seraient accompagnées, auront pour but d'éclairer la Porte sur la conséquence des torts qu'elle s'est donnés, par faiblesse, envers nous, et en même temps de la rassurer contre les éventualités qui la préoccupent et l'effrayent du côté de la France. Les bases principales de cet arrangement sont déjà arrêtées dans la pensée de l'Empereur, et dès que Sa Majesté les aura fixées définitivement, je ne manquerai pas, M. le Baron, de les faire connaître à votre Excellence.

Mais tout en désirant et voulant fermement n'employer que des moyens pacifiques, il est toutefois une considération que nous n'avons pu entièrement perdre de vue. C'est que l'ascendant moral de la France a pris de telles proportions à Constantinople, qu'il devient fort à appréhender que toutes nos démarches ne finissent par échouer contre l'idée que les conseillers du Sultan se sont faite de la force irrésistible du Gouvernement Français. Il peut arriver que la France, en voyant balancer la Porte, ait recours encore une fois à son système comminatoire, et pèse sur elle de manière à l'empêcher de prêter l'oreille à nos justes réclamations. La partie devient trop inégale entre nous et le Gouvernement Français, si tandis que celui-ci fait mouvoir sans opposition son escadre sur tous les points de la Méditerranée, et présente la moindre de ses demandes à la bouche du canon, nous laissons indéfiniment s'enraciner dans l'esprit des Turcs l'idée de notre impuissance à les défendre, comme à protéger nos propres intérêts. L'Empereur a donc cru devoir aviser d'avance à quelques mesures de précaution, pour appuyer nos négociations, neutraliser l'effet des menaces de M. de Lavalette, et se prémunir, en tout état de cause, contre les entreprises d'un Gouvernement habitué à procéder par surprises. Nos mesures n'ont point le but de mettre en question d'aucune manière l'indépendance de la Porte Ottomane. Elles ont, au contraire, celui de maintenir cette indépendance contre une dictature étrangère, en assurant le repos du Sultan, en relevant son autorité compromise par l'Ambassadeur de France aux yeux de ses sujets du rit Grec, qui forment en Europe la majorité de la population de ses Etats. C'est vous dire, M. le Baron, que dans la pensée de l'Empereur, la destination de nos préparatifs est d'avoir un effet plus moral que matériel.

Comme les bruits exagérés qui se sont déjà répandus à ce sujet pourraient inspirer des alarmes, il nous importait d'établir le véritable esprit de nos inten-

tions. Nous espérons que le Gouvernement Anglais ne se méprendra pas sur leur nature. Les preuves de modération qu'a données l'Empereur dans sa conduite envers la Turquie, en tant d'occasions antérieurs, sont un gage que dans celle-ci il ne se départira pas des mêmes principes. Un intérêt commun appelle l'Angleterre, comme la Russie, à veiller à la conservation de la paix en Orient. Cet intérêt nous l'invoquons, en nous adressant franchement aujourd'hui à l'impartialité du Gouvernement Britannique. Si, comme nous n'en doutons pas, il tient aussi fortement que nous au maintien du *status quo* Oriental, c'est à lui qu'il appartient d'élever à présent la voix. Nous aider à Constantinople à dissiper l'aveuglement ou la peur panique des Turcs,—ramener, à Paris, le Cabinet Français aux conseils de la prudence,—telle doit être, selon nous, la double tâche des Ministres Anglais; et s'ils veulent bien la prendre sur eux, les négociations que nous allons ouvrir, se résoudront, nous l'espérons, sans danger pour la paix Orientale.

C'est à agir auprès d'eux en ce sens que l'Empereur vous charge, M. le Baron, de consacrer tout vos efforts et votre zèle.

Recevez, &c.  
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)

*St. Petersburg, January 14, 1853.*

I TAKE advantage of the messenger whom I am sending to your Excellency to-day, to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the  $\frac{17}{29}$ th December, and to assure you of the lively interest with which we have perused it. The Emperor especially has been very much satisfied with the explanations which have passed between you and the chief of the new British Ministry, and with the care which you have taken fully to explain to him, as well as to Lord John Russell, with whom we shall henceforth have more particularly to deal, the principal points on which our intercourse with the new Ministry will turn. Among those to which you have alluded, we have particularly noticed what relates to our present position in Turkey, and the account which you have given to Lord Aberdeen and to Lord John Russell of the serious question of the Holy Places. You had already touched upon the subject with Lord Malmesbury when he was going out of office, and your endeavours to make him see it in its true light could not but be approved by our august master. Unhappily the steps which your Excellency had sought to induce him to take, as well at Paris as at Constantinople, had reference to a state of things which is now no longer the same. At that time the proceedings of the French Ambassador in Turkey, and his menaces to compel the Ottoman Minister to evade the execution of the Firman, had not as yet finally succeeded. A hope might still be entertained that the representations of England to the French Cabinet might have the effect of arresting M. de Lavalette in his course. That hope has been disappointed. Since that time the efforts of the French Embassy have triumphed at Constantinople. Not only has the Firman, sanctioned by the Sultan's Hatti Scherif, not been executed at Jerusalem, but it has been treated with derision by His Highness's Ministers. To the indignation of the whole Greek population, the key of the Church of Bethlehem has been made over to the Latins, so as publicly to demonstrate their religious supremacy in the East.

The mischief then is done, M. le Baron, and there is no longer any question of preventing it. It is now necessary to remedy it. The immunities of the orthodox religion which have been injured, the promise which the Sultan had solemnly given to the Emperor, and which has been violated, require some reparation. We must labour to obtain it. Such is the present state of the question. If we took for our example the imperious and violent proceedings which have brought France to this result, if, like her, we were indifferent to the dignity of the Porte, to the consequences which an heroic remedy may have on a constitution already so shattered as that of the Ottoman Empire, our course would be already marked out for us, and we should not have long to reflect upon it. Menace, recourse to force, would be our immediate means. The cannon has

been called the last argument of kings. The French Government has made it its first. It is the argument with which, in the outset, it declared its intention to commence its proceedings at Tripoli as well as at Constantinople. Notwithstanding our legitimate causes of complaint, and at the risk of waiting some time longer for redress, we shall seek to take a less expeditious course. We still desire, as we have always desired, the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, as being, take it all in all, the least mischievous arrangement for all European interests, which would not fail to come into violent collision in the East if the gap existed. We will accordingly use our utmost efforts to avoid to the last, as far as depends on us, without prejudice to our honour, whatever may be calculated still further to shake this body, at once so feeble and so tottering, at the risk of causing it to fall into powder. Although we have in vain attempted, up to the present time, to make the Porte accessible to reason, we are about to make one further and last conciliatory endeavour. We are, consequently, seeking at the present time for an arrangement which may restore to the Firman the force of which it has been deprived; may replace at Jerusalem the two creeds on an equal footing, and reconcile their pretensions without prejudice to the rights of either. The object of the pacific but firm advice with which this proposal might be accompanied, will be to enlighten the Porte as to the consequences of the fault which, out of weakness, it has committed towards us, and at the same time reassure it against the contingencies which disturb and alarm it on the side of France. The Emperor has already made up his mind to the principal bases of this arrangement, and as soon as His Majesty shall have finally decided upon them, I will not fail, M. le Baron, to communicate them to your Excellency.

But while firmly desiring and wishing to employ only pacific means, there is one consideration of which we have not been able altogether to lose sight. It is that the moral ascendancy of France at Constantinople has acquired such dimensions, that it is much to be feared that all our endeavours may fail before the impression entertained by the Sultan's counsellors of the irresistible force of the French Government. It may happen that France, perceiving that the Porte hesitates, may again have recourse to her system of menace, and press upon it so as to prevent it from listening to our just demands. The match is too unequal between us and the French Government if, while the latter moves its squadron about without opposition in all parts of the Mediterranean, and presents its least demand at the cannon's mouth, we allow the notion of our inability to defend them, and likewise to protect our own interests, indefinitely to take root in the mind of the Turks. The Emperor has, therefore, considered it necessary to adopt in the outset some precautionary measures, in order to support our negotiations, to neutralize the effect of M. de Lavalette's threats, and to guard himself in any contingency which may arise against the attempts of a Government accustomed to act by surprises. The object of our measures is not in any way to throw doubt on the independence of the Ottoman Empire. On the contrary, they are designed to maintain that independence against foreign dictation, by securing the tranquillity of the Sultan, and re-establishing his authority, which the French Ambassador has impaired in the estimation of his subjects of the Greek faith, who in Europe form the majority of the population of his dominions. Thus, M. le Baron, in the view of the Emperor, the purport of our preparations is to produce a moral rather than a material effect.

As the exaggerated reports which are already in circulation on this subject might give rise to alarm, it was important for us to explain clearly the true character of our intentions. We trust that the English Government will not misunderstand their nature. The proofs of moderation which the Emperor has given in his conduct towards Turkey on so many former occasions, are a pledge that on the present he will not deviate from the same principles. A common interest requires England as well as Russia to watch over the maintenance of peace in the East. We appeal to this interest, while addressing ourselves with frankness at the present time to the impartiality of the British Government. If, as we do not doubt, it attaches as much importance as we do to the maintenance of the *status quo* in the East, it becomes it now to raise its voice to assist us at Constantinople in dispelling the blindness or panic fear of the Turks,—at Paris, to bring back the French Cabinet to prudent counsels,

such, in our opinion, should be the twofold task of the English Ministers; and if they will be pleased to undertake it, the negotiations which we are about to commence will, we trust, be brought to a close without danger for the peace of the East.

The Emperor enjoins you, M. le Baron, to employ all your efforts and zeal in acting upon the British Government in this sense.

Receive, &c.

(Signed) NESSELRODE.

No. 73.

*Lord John Russell to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

(Extract.)

*Foreign Office, January 25, 1853.*

I WAITED for the receipt of further despatches before I replied to your notification of the movement of the 5th corps of the Russian army towards the Turkish frontier.

I felt a sanguine hope that the wisdom of the Emperor would induce him to refrain from so warlike a step. This hope appears to have been well founded.

Her Majesty has directed me to express her gracious approbation of the language you have used to the Chancellor on this occasion.

No. 74.

*Lord Cowley to Lord John Russell.—(Received January 25.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, January 24, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has informed me that he received a few days ago a despatch from the French Minister at St. Petersburg, acknowledging the receipt of the instructions which I informed your Lordship had been addressed to him, desiring him to put himself into immediate communication with Count Nesselrode for the purpose of terminating the question of the Holy Places. M. de Castelbajac adds that these instructions had reached him very opportunely, as the question on which they touched threatened to take a serious turn. M. Drouyn de Lhuys hopes to hear in a few days the result of this overture to the Russian Government.

I asked M. Drouyn de Lhuys to state to me what the French Government now wished to obtain at Constantinople. He replied, that all that he desired was that the instructions sent by the Porte to Jerusalem should be fairly carried out. He added that he was quite ready to listen to any advice that might be offered him with the view of setting this question at rest.

It appears to me that as the French Government has now manifested at St. Petersburg the desire of terminating this question by a common understanding, nothing further can be done until the result of that step is known.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 75.

*Lord Cowley to Lord John Russell.—(Received January 28.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, January 26, 1853.*

YESTERDAY evening M. Drouyn de Lhuys informed me that he had received despatches from St. Petersburg, which he considered to be of a satisfactory nature, and he invited me to call upon him this afternoon, in order

that he might communicate to me their contents. I had not time after seeing him to write to your Lordship by this day's mail.

M. Castelbajac's latest despatch is dated the 16th instant, after the Emperor Nicholas had received his credentials. He gives an account of the conversation which he had with His Majesty on that occasion. The Emperor expressed an anxious desire to see peace preserved. He alluded to the question of the Holy Buildings, and said that he had heard with pleasure from Count Nesselrode that the French Government was desirous of entering into direct communication with the Russian Cabinet for the settlement of the misunderstanding which had arisen between the two Governments with regard to it. The Emperor approved highly of this step, observing that it was far better that such differences between Christian sects should be settled betwixt the parties interested, than that they should be referred to the arbitration of a Mussulman Potentate, who could hardly be said to have a free will on such a question. M. Castelbajac replied, that he was not yet in possession of his instructions, but that he had been induced to inform Count Nesselrode that those instructions were promised, in order that it might not be supposed that France had been influenced in taking this conciliatory course by the warlike preparations which were making in Russia. It would be seen now by a reference to dates, that the offer of the French Government was spontaneous, and dictated by no other desire than that of preventing religious differences fermenting into a serious quarrel. The Emperor replied, that the accounts of his military preparations were much exaggerated; that they were not caused by the question of the Holy Buildings, though he avowed the intention of inspiring awe at Constantinople, in consequence of some insult which had been offered to the Russian flag. (No details respecting this insult were given.) Nothing, however, was further from the Emperor's intention than to attack Turkey. He had more interest than any other sovereign in the maintenance of the Turkish Empire. Its dissolution, of which he was apprehensive, would give greater embarrassment to Russia than to any other Power; and his wish was to uphold, not to destroy, the Sultan's authority. He, on his part, hoped that France was not trying to create difficulties for him in the East, in order to mask her own schemes in the West; a tortuous policy, which M. de Castelbajac of course repudiated.

After communicating to me the substance of M. de Castelbajac's despatches, M. Drouyn de Lhuys read to me the instructions of which that Minister stated himself to be in expectation, and which were sent from Paris on the 15th instant. As M. Drouyn de Lhuys affirms that he is ready to make concessions, if the Cabinet of St. Petersburg will meet him half way, I am willing to hope that a settlement, which, if not altogether satisfactory, can at all events be accepted by both parties, may yet be effected.

One objection to the final settlement at St. Petersburg of these differences has struck me latterly, namely, that the Porte might take umbrage that a question which, in fact, regards a large portion of her subjects, should be taken out of her hands. I said, therefore, to-day, to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that it would hardly be prudent to set Russia the example of settling any question in which Turkey was concerned, without a final reference to the Porte, and that he probably would agree with me, that whatever arrangement the two Powers might make, ought to be submitted for the sanction of the Sultan. M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that such was his intention. He proposed that the two Powers should come to an understanding as to the demands which each should make of the Porte; that no written documents should be exchanged, but that they should agree verbally that neither would oppose the other at Constantinople in certain points to be settled between them at St. Petersburg. The independence and dignity of the Porte would thus be amply guaranteed.

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## No. 76.

*Lord John Russell to Colonel Rose.*

(Extract.)

*Foreign Office, January 28, 1853.*

THE discussions respecting the Holy Places at Jerusalem, which at first appeared to be of no great consequence, have, at the moment when they were supposed to be closed, acquired a degree of importance, in itself sufficiently alarming, but rendered still more so by the pretext which they are affording to a neighbouring Power deeply interested in their solution, to assume a menacing attitude on the Turkish frontier.

The British Government has studiously abstained from pronouncing any opinion on the conflicting claims of the Greek and Latin Churches in regard to the Holy Buildings at Jerusalem. It has no desire to advance any pretension to possess, either exclusively or in common with other nations, any part of those Sanctuaries which the traditions of ages have pointed out as objects of respect and veneration for all Christian people. The Turks, as professing the creed of Mahomet, cannot regard these Holy Places with the same feelings as Christian nations, in whose view they are indissolubly associated with the most solemn and affecting passages of Christian history; and the real interest which the Porte must have in the appropriation of any portion of these Holy Places to any particular Christian sect, must be limited by the consideration of what is due to the feelings of its own Christian subjects, of whom the great proportion are members of the Greek Church.

It appears, therefore, to Her Majesty's Government that the Porte might with honour extricate itself from the difficult and embarrassing position to which the discussions on this subject have reduced it, by expressing its willingness to sanction any arrangement in regard to these Holy Places, not inconsistent with the rights of the Sultan as territorial Sovereign, which might be recommended for its adoption conjointly by the French and Russian Governments, which, as advocates of the respective claims of the Latin and Greek Churches, have taken the prominent part in the late discussions.

## No. 77.

*Lord John Russell to Lord Cowley.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, January 28, 1853.*

A FEW days ago M. Baudin, the Chargé d'Affaires of France, read to me a despatch which he had received from his Government, addressed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys to General Casteljajac, the Minister of France at St. Petersburg.

Some days later Baron Brunnow read to me a despatch addressed to him by Count Nesselrode.

Both these despatches relate to the question of the Holy Places.

It is with great regret that Her Majesty's Government have perceived that this question is not yet settled, although the instructions given to General Casteljajac may lead to a favourable termination of this unfortunate dispute. As, however, this happy result may not be attained, it is desirable that you should be made aware of the view which is taken of this matter by Her Majesty's Government.

In the first place, Her Majesty's Government desire to abstain altogether from giving any opinion on the merits of the question. Treaties, Conventions, and Firmans are quoted with equal confidence on both sides.

But Her Majesty's Government cannot avoid perceiving that the Ambassador of France at Constantinople was the first to disturb the *status quo* in which the matter rested. Not that the disputes of the Latin and Greek Churches were not very active, but that without some political action on the part of France those quarrels would never have troubled the relations of friendly Powers.

In the next place, if report is to be believed, the French Ambassador was

the first to speak of having recourse to force, and to threaten the intervention of a French fleet to enforce the demands of his country.

I regret to say that this evil example has been partly followed by Russia ; and although the report of the march of 50,000 Russian troops to the Turkish frontier appears to have been unfounded or premature, yet it is but too certain that if the quarrel is prolonged, the Emperor means to support his negotiations by arms.

To a Government taking an impartial view of these affairs, an attitude so threatening on both sides appears very lamentable. We should deeply regret any dispute that might lead to conflict between two of the great Powers of Europe ; but when we reflect that the quarrel is for exclusive privileges in a spot near which the heavenly host proclaimed peace on earth and goodwill towards men,—when we see rival Churches contending for mastery in the very place where Christ died for mankind,—the thought of such a spectacle is melancholy indeed.

Your Excellency will understand therefore, 1st, that into the merits of this dispute Her Majesty's Government will not enter ; 2ndly, that Her Majesty's Government disapprove of every threat, and still more of the actual employment of force ; 3rdly, that both parties should be told, that if they are sincere in their professions of a desire to maintain the independence of the Porte, they ought to abstain from the employment of any means calculated to display the weakness of the Ottoman Empire. Above all, they ought to refrain from putting armies and fleets in motion for the purpose of making the Tomb of Christ a cause of quarrel among Christians.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

#### No. 78.

*Lord Cowley to Lord John Russell.—(Received January 29.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, January 28, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS having requested to see me, I called upon him this afternoon. He said he could not contemplate without anxiety the assembling of Russian and Austrian forces on the Turkish frontier. He thought that the time was fully arrived when Her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor should prepare for such eventualities as the occupation of Bosnia by Austria, and of the Danubian Principalities by Russia. He thought that the two Governments should endeavour to arrive at a thorough understanding as to what their common policy should be under every contingency which might happen to Turkey. The first object should be to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

#### No. 79.

*Lord John Russell to Lord Cowley.*

(Extract.)

*Foreign Office, January 29, 1853.*

I HAVE received your despatch, dated yesterday, and containing matters of very serious import.

The Chargé d'Affaires of France, M. Baudin, spoke to me yesterday in the same sense in which M. Drouyn de Lhuys has spoken to you.

The anxiety felt by the French Government is very natural, and M. Baudin observed very justly, that Powers who professed themselves so anxious to preserve the *status quo* in Europe, ought to be the last to meditate so great a disturbance of the balance of power as the overthrow of the Turkish Empire must produce.

Her Majesty's Government think it desirable that some understanding should be arrived at between the great Powers on this important subject, and I will immediately take into consideration the steps that may be necessary for this purpose.

No. 80.

*Colonel Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received January 31.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, January 4, 1853.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 14th of December, I have the honour to say, that in speaking of the great Firman Mr. Finn means the Greek Firman, the same sent to your Lordship by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe in his despatch of the 19th of March of last year. That was the only Firman given with reference to the present discussion as to the Sanctuaries.

Mr. Finn is mistaken in saying in his despatch of December 9 to your Lordship, that the Firman was read in presence of the three Patriarchs and the French Consul. Of course neither the Latin Patriarch nor the French Consul were present at the reading of the Firman.

I hear that the Porte, besides the order for the delivery of the key of the great door of the Church of Bethlehem to the Latins, has instructed Afif Bey that the Latins may make use of the altar of the Greeks in the Tomb of the Virgin for the celebration of mass.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys instructed M. de Lavalette that to allow the Latins to "officier" in the tomb, and then not to let them have the means of doing so, was "dérisoire," and not to be thought of. M. de Lavalette says that he has received very strong instructions as to the Holy Places from his Government; that they express great displeasure at the public reading of the Firman, and insist on a literal execution of all the provisions in favour of the Latins contained in the note of the 9th February last. It appears that the Firman was read with more publicity than Fuad Effendi had promised M. de Lavalette that it should be. But he has resigned himself to this result with much moderation, and accepts it, he says, as a "fait accompli."

The repair of the great cupola, which would have afforded such endless scope for ill-omened discussion, will, I trust, be put off. His Excellency says that it will hold together for four or five years longer, and that as far as he is concerned, he will consent to the question of its repair being adjourned till such time as it becomes necessary.

If the Greeks do not resist the Porte's decision as to the key and the altar of the tomb, the only remaining matter of discussion is the replacing of the silver star mentioned in Mr. Consul Finn's despatch of December 28 to your Lordship: but the Latin right to replace at their own expense a star stolen from them is so legitimate, that I trust no opposition could be made.

No. 81.

*Lord Cowley to Lord John Russell.—(Received February 1.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, January 31, 1853.*

I HAVE read to M. Drouyn de Lhuys those parts of your Lordship's despatch of January 29 which are in answer to the observations reported in my despatch of January 28 to have been made by him with reference to the attitude taken by Austria and Russia on the Turkish frontiers, and to the desire which he evinced to establish with Her Majesty's Government some common line of action in face of the complications which appear to him to be daily increasing in the Ottoman Empire. M. Drouyn de Lhuys expressed himself to be perfectly satisfied with your Lordship's intentions.

## No. 82.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received February 6.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, January 27, 1853.*

COUNT NESSELRODE, in reply to an inquiry which I addressed to him yesterday, informed me that his last intelligence from Constantinople was not of a more satisfactory nature; that if, on the one hand, the Firman of last February had been publicly read, on the other, fresh concessions, at the expense of the Greek Church, had been made to the Latins.

As is usually to be observed, these Church grievances were rather alluded to than enumerated.

We spoke again of the critical posture of affairs in Turkey, and I must observe that the opinions which I had expressed in the written paper, a copy of which was inclosed in my despatch of the 9th of January, opinions at the time considered by Count Nesselrode to be exaggerated, appear now to be precisely those which he himself entertains.

He did not hesitate to speak of the inflammatory spirit of the Christian population of Turkey, remarking that any excesses committed against the Christian population might cause that spirit to break out in extensive flames.

## No. 83.

*Count Nesselrode to M. de Kisseleff.—(Communicated to Lord John Russell by Baron Brunnow, February 1853.)*

*St. Pétersbourg, le 27 Janvier  
8 Février, 1853.*

LE Marquis de Castelbajac nous a communiqué dernièrement une dépêche de son Gouvernement, ayant trait à la question des Lieux Saints de Jérusalem.

Nous en avons pris connaissance avec d'autant plus d'intérêt que M. Drouyn de Lhuys y dit, dès les premières lignes, qu'au point où est arrivée cette question, elle lui paraît devoir faire l'objet d'une explication amicale et confiante avec nous.

Cette pensée nous l'avions eue et exprimée de notre côté, il y a plus d'un an, à l'époque où ce déplorable conflit venait à peine d'être soulevé par l'Ambassade de France à Constantinople, et où une commune et préalable entente, soit à St. Pétersbourg, soit entre nos Représentants respectifs en Turquie, eût prévenu sans doute les embarras dans lesquels le Gouvernement Ottoman se trouve placé aujourd'hui, et les regrets que nous éprouvons nous-mêmes de devoir tenir à la Porte un langage en opposition à celui que le Gouvernement Français lui adresse.

Vous vous rappelez sans doute, Monsieur, de la communication que nous vous avons chargé de faire au Ministère Français en Novembre 1851, et la réponse que le Ministre des Relations Extérieures d'alors, M. le Comte de Turgot, y fit, en vous donnant l'assurance la plus positive que nous pouvions envisager cette affaire comme assoupie à Constantinople, et qu'il était désormais inutile de la discuter à Paris.

Les mêmes assurances, et en termes plus explicites encore, avaient été données vers la même époque à M. le Baron de Brunnow, à Londres, par le Comte Walewski, de la part du Président.

Nous avons dû, dès alors, considérer cette contestation comme ne devant plus se reproduire, du moins dans les termes dans lesquels l'avait posée à Constantinople le General Aupick, et plus tard M. de Lavalette.

Le Gouvernement Ottoman, de son côté, avait si bien compris qu'en annulant tous les édits souverains des Sultans émanés depuis 1756, et en reculant de plus de cent ans pour faire revivre des droits contestés et contes-

tables au profit d'une communion qui n'est pas celle de la presque totalité de ses sujets Chrétiens, il jeterait parmi ses populations le germe d'un violent mécontentement, qu'il se décida, après mûre délibération, et après avoir soumis la question et les documents y relatifs à l'examen d'un comité spécial des principaux Oulémas de l'Empire, à y donner une solution définitive, formulée dans un Firman et un Hatti-Shérif autographe du Sultan, qui furent solennellement remis au Patriarche de Jérusalem, et dont on communiqua officiellement les copies à notre Légation à Constantinople. Cette solution était équitable, selon nous ; car, loin d'enlever au culte Catholique et à ses desservans à Jérusalem les établissemens et les oratoires dont ils étaient en possession, elle leur accordait, au contraire, l'accès de quelques sanctuaires réservés jusqu'ici aux autres communions. Loin de placer la religion Catholique Romaine dans une position inférieure ou humiliante en Palestine, elle en établissait mieux la parité avec les autres professions. Il nous semble qu'on ne pouvait pas exiger davantage d'un prince Musulman qui compte dans ses états plus de dix millions de sujets appartenant au culte orthodoxe Grec. Aucune des Puissances Catholiques représentées à Constantinople, et intéressées dans la question, sous le rapport religieux et moral, autant que la France elle-même, n'a réclamé ni porté plainte, que nous sachions, contre ces dispositions du Souverain de la Turquie. Nous devons penser enfin que le Cabinet de Paris, qui venait de nous exprimer son intention d'assoupir cette affaire et de modérer le zèle exagéré de son Ambassadeur, donnerait du moins tacitement son adhésion au mode de conciliation adopté par la Porte.

Nous laisserons le Ministère Français juge de la pénible surprise que nous avons éprouvée en apprenant qu'à son retour à Constantinople, après un court séjour en France, M. de Lavalette avait soulevé de nouveau la question, en exigeant de la Porte, en termes péremptoires, et sous menace d'une rupture avec la France, la suppression du dernier Firman ; l'envoi à Jérusalem d'un Commissaire Turc, avec de nouvelles instructions ; la remise au clergé Latin de la clef et de la garde de la grande Eglise à Bethléem ; le placement sur l'autel de la Grotte de la Nativité d'une étoile aux armes de la France, qui s'y trouvait, dit-on, jadis, et qui en avait été enlevée ; l'adjonction au Couvent Latin de Jérusalem d'une bâtisse attenante à la coupole du Saint Sépulcre ; d'autres concessions enfin, qui de loin peuvent paraître des minuties, mais qui, sur les lieux, et aux yeux des populations indigènes, y compris même les Musulmans, sont autant de passe-droits et d'empiètemens sur les autres communautés Chrétiennes, autant de motifs de dissensions et de haine entre elle et l'Eglise Romaine, dont on prétend soutenir par ces moyens les intérêts.

Il nous répugne de faire mention ici des scènes scandaleuses qui ont déjà eu lieu à Jérusalem par suite de ces mesures, auxquelles la Porte a eu la faiblesse de prêter la main, et qui ont déjà recue en partie leur exécution contrairement à la teneur du dernier Firman, dont, par une autre contradiction étrange, on donnait lecture aux autorités locales au moment même où l'on chargeait celles-ci d'en violer les dispositions principales.

D'après les derniers rapports que nous avons de la Syrie et de Constantinople, les choses en étaient venues à Jérusalem à ce point de confusion et de désordre que, tandis qu'un prélat Catholique, assisté du Consul de France, appelait à son aide les serruriers de la ville pour se faire ouvrir la grande porte de l'Eglise de Bethléem, bien que l'accès lui fût ouvert par deux autres portes latérales, le Patriarche de Jérusalem, Cyrille, viellard vénérable, et généralement connu par son esprit conciliant et la modération de son caractère, se voyait obligé de protester par écrit contre ces actes de violence, et de partir pour Constantinople, afin de porter ses plaintes et celles de sa nation au Sultan. En rappelant ici, comme nous venons de le faire, les événemens de l'année dernière et les faits récents qu'on vient de nous signaler des lieux mêmes, il est loin de notre pensée de récriminer contre qui que ce soit, ou de vouloir en conclure qu'une entente directe entre nous et le Gouvernement Français, sur cette question, serait aujourd'hui impossible ou tardive ; mais désirant répondre avec une entière franchise à l'ouverture qu'on vient de nous faire, il nous importait de constater la situation actuelle des choses, et les causes qui, selon nous, ont amené les complications que nous devons tous également regretter.

Le principal obstacle à un arrangement équitable du différend actuel, quel

que soit le lieu où l'on veuille le discuter, serait, nous le craignons, l'insistance que voudrait mettre encore le Gouvernement Français à rétablir en Palestine l'ordre des choses que la Capitulation obtenue de la Porte en 1740 est censée avoir consacré, bien qu'il soit connu, cependant, que cet Acte n'a jamais reçu son exécution, vu les termes vagues dans lesquels il est écrit, sans désignation des lieux et des sanctuaires adjugés au clergé Latin, dans la ville de Jérusalem et au dehors. On sait d'ailleurs que, peu d'années plus tard, et nommément en 1757, le Gouvernement Ottoman se vit obligé d'expliquer et de commenter l'Article XXXIII de la Capitulation susdite par un nouvel édit souverain, dont les dispositions beaucoup plus explicites, à l'égard des différents établissemens religieux de Jérusalem, avaient été confirmées sous tous les règnes suivans, et restent en vigueur jusqu'à ce jour, nonobstant les réclamations partielles que les Pères Franciscains de la Terre Sainte adressaient de temps à autre à Constantinople par l'entremise de l'Ambassade de France.

Nous citerons enfin un événement assez récent pour être dans la mémoire de tout le monde, et qui, sur une question et dans un pays où tout précédent fait autorité, peut constituer en faveur de l'Eglise orthodoxe, et des nations qui en professent les dogmes, un droit difficile à contester. Lorsqu'en 1808 une violente incendie consuma le Temple du Saint Sépulcre, le Patriarche de Jérusalem réclama et obtint du Sultan l'autorisation de reconstruire le temple dans ses anciennes formes et dimensions, sans aucune intervention étrangère, et moyennant les seules offrandes des populations Greco-Slaves.

On peut se rappeler aussi qu'à cette époque nous étions en pleine guerre avec la Turquie ; qu'aucune pression ou intervention diplomatique de notre part n'a pu influencer les déterminations de la Porte, ni contrarier les réclamations que les Puissances Catholiques et la France elle-même, gouvernée alors par l'Empereur Napoléon, se seraient cru en droit de former.

Ce précédent nous semble de nature à être plus particulièrement cité au Gouvernement actuel de la France, à l'appui des intentions qu'il vient de nous manifester et de l'assurance qu'il nous donne de n'avoir pas songé à retirer aux Chrétiens du rit Grec le droit de jouir des avantages que le tems a consacrés entre leurs mains.

Sur cette base, qui est parfaitement conforme à nos vœux, et qui s'accorde également avec le texte du dernier Firman de la Porte dont nous réclamons la fidèle exécution, l'entente sur le principe se trouverait tout établie. Les seules difficultés qu'il resterait à aplanir seraient pour son application, et pour les questions de détail qui doivent nécessairement être régularisées sur les lieux dans le sens du dernier Firman, et qui l'auraient déjà été peut-être si les ordres contradictoires de la Porte, la duplicité de ses agens, et les prétentions exagérées du clergé Catholique, n'avaient essentiellement nui à cette œuvre de conciliation et de paix, et laissé toute chose indécise jusqu'à cette heure.

Le Cabinet Impérial ne négligera aucun moyen pour hâter une conclusion désirable sous tant de rapports, et à laquelle la Russie entière prend le plus sérieux et le plus légitime intérêt. Il se plaît à compter sur les dispositions et le concours de la France. Il ne doute pas de la co-opération efficace que la Cour Impériale d'Autriche, appelée par ses Traités avec la Turquie à intervenir dans la question, y apportera de son côté.

C'est dans ce sens que nous allons faire à Constantinople de nouvelles et énergiques démarches, qui, tout en rappelant à la Porte ses engagemens vis-à-vis de nous, la convaincront, il faut l'espérer, qu'il n'y a, en réalité, ni conflit ni antagonisme entre nous et la France aujourd'hui, pas plus qu'à d'autres époques, pour ce qui concerne l'ordre des choses établi depuis des siècles dans les lieux vénérés de Palestine ; que toutes les grandes Puissances de l'Europe désirent également la conservation de l'Empire Ottoman, sa tranquillité intérieure, et l'indépendance de son Gouvernement dans ses actes, lorsque la justice et ses propres intérêts les lui commandent.

Nous sommes convaincus, d'après les termes de la dernière communication dont le Général Castelbajac a été chargé, que les instructions dont l'Ambassade de la France à Constantinople est peut-être déjà munie à cette heure, s'accordent parfaitement avec les vues que nous venons de développer ici avec autant de franchise que de confiance. Dans ce cas l'entente, qui n'a pu jusqu'ici s'établir entre nos Représentants à Constantinople, autant que nous l'avions désiré,

pourra avoir incessamment les plus heureux résultats dans la question qui nous préoccupe.

Vous voudrez bien, Monsieur, donner lecture de la présente à M. Drouyn de Lhuys, et lui en laisser même copie s'il la demande.

Recevez, &c.  
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)

*St. Petersburg,* JANUARY 27  
FEBRUARY 5, 1853.

THE Marquis de Castelbajac has lately communicated to us a despatch having reference to the question of the Holy Places of Jerusalem.

We took cognizance of it with the greater interest, inasmuch as M. Drouyn de Lhuys says in the beginning of it, that at the point which that question had reached, he conceived that it ought to form the subject of an amicable and frank explanation with us.

On our side we had entertained and expressed this idea more than a year ago, at the time when this deplorable contest had just been set on foot by the French Ambassador at Constantinople, and when a common and previous understanding, either at St. Petersburg or between our respective Representatives in Turkey, would doubtless have prevented the embarrassments in which the Ottoman Government is now placed, and the regret which we ourselves feel at being obliged to hold to the Porte a language opposed to that addressed to it by the French Government.

You doubtless, Sir, recollect the communication which, in November 1851, we instructed you to make to the French Ministry, and the reply which Count Turgot, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, made to it, giving you the most positive assurance that we might consider this affair as set at rest in Constantinople, and that it was consequently useless to discuss it in Paris.

The same assurances, and in still more explicit terms, were given to Baron Brunnow in London by Count Walewski, on the part of the President.

From that time we were justified in looking upon this discussion as not to be again revived, at all events in the terms in which General Aupick, and subsequently M. de Lavalette, had put it forward at Constantinople.

The Ottoman Government, for its part, had so well understood that by annulling all the edicts of the Sultan issued since 1756, and in going back more than one hundred years in order to revive disputed and disputable rights, for the benefit of a creed which is not that of nearly the whole of its Christian subjects, it would give occasion for the most violent discontent among its people, that it determined, on mature deliberation, and after having submitted the question and the documents bearing upon it to the scrutiny of a special Commission of the chief Ulemas of the Empire, to pronounce a final decision on the matter, expressed in a Firman and autograph Hatti Scherif of the Sultan which were formally delivered to the Patriarch of Jerusalem, and copies whereof were officially communicated to our Mission at Constantinople. This solution was, in our estimation, equitable; for, far from depriving the Catholic religion and its ministers at Jerusalem of the establishments and oratories possessed by them, it granted to them, on the contrary, access to certain sanctuaries reserved up to this time to other creeds. Far from placing the Roman Catholic religion in Palestine in an inferior or humiliating position, it placed it more on an equality with the other sects. It appears to us that it was not possible to demand more from a Mussulman Prince who reckons in his dominions more than ten million subjects belonging to the orthodox Greek Church. None of the Catholic Powers represented at Constantinople, and as much interested in the question on moral and religious grounds as France herself, remonstrated or complained, as far as we know, against these arrangements made by the Sovereign of Turkey. In a word, we were entitled to suppose that the Cabinet of Paris, which had just expressed to us its intention of letting this matter rest, and of restraining the excessive zeal of its Ambassador, would at least have tacitly acquiesced in the conciliatory course adopted by the Porte.

We will leave the French Ministry to judge of the painful surprise which we have experienced on learning that upon his return to Constantinople, after a short stay in France, M. de Lavalette had again mooted the question,

requiring the Porte in peremptory terms, and under a threat of a rupture with France, to suppress the last Firman; to send a Turkish Commissioner to Jerusalem with fresh instructions; to make over to the Latin clergy the key and the guardianship of the Great Church at Bethlehem; to place on the altar of the Grotto of the Nativity a star with the French arms, which it was said was formerly there, and which had been removed; to attach to the Latin Convent at Jerusalem a building belonging to the Cupola of the Holy Sepulchre; to make, in fine, other concessions which at a distance may appear trifling, but which on the spot, and in the estimation of the native population, including even the Mussulmans, are so many acts of injustice and wrong done to the other Christian communities, so many grounds for dissension and animosity between them and the Church of Rome, whose interests it is sought to uphold by these means.

We are reluctant to recapitulate the scandalous scenes which have already occurred at Jerusalem in consequence of these measures, to which the Porte has had the weakness to lend itself, and which have already been partly carried into execution contrary to the tenour of the recent Firman, which, by another strange contradiction, it caused to be read to the local authorities at the very time that it directed them to violate its principal conditions.

According to the last reports which we have received from Syria and Constantinople, matters at Jerusalem had got into such a state of confusion and disorder, that whilst a Catholic prelate supported by the French Consul called in the assistance of the locksmiths of the town to open for him the great gate of the Church of Bethlehem, although he could have entered by the two other side gates, Cyril, the Patriarch of Jerusalem, a venerable old man and generally remarkable for his conciliatory disposition and for the moderation of his character, was compelled to protest, in writing, against these acts of violence, and to set out for Constantinople in order to lay his complaints and those of his nation before the Sultan. In reciting, as we have done, the events of the past year and the recent transactions which have been reported to us from the spot, it is far from our intention to recriminate against any party, or to deduce from them that a direct understanding on this matter between us and the French Government would now be impossible or too late; but being desirous of replying with perfect frankness to the overture which has been made to us, it was of consequence to us to set forth the exact state of affairs, and the causes which, in our opinion, have led to the complications which we must all equally regret.

The chief obstacle to an equitable settlement of the existing difference, in whatever place it may be discussed, would, we fear, be the perseverance with which the French Government would seek to restore in Palestine the order of things which the Capitulation obtained from the Porte in 1740 is held to have established, although it is well known that that Act was never executed by reason of the vague terms in which it is written, without any designation of the places and sanctuaries assigned to the Latin clergy within and without the city of Jerusalem. It is known besides, that a few years later, and specifically in 1757, the Ottoman Government found itself compelled to explain and construe the 33rd Article of the abovementioned Capitulation by a new edict of the Sovereign, whose provisions, far more explicit as regards the different religious establishments at Jerusalem, were confirmed under all the subsequent reigns, and remain in force until this time, notwithstanding the partial representations which the Franciscan Fathers of the Holy Land addressed from time to time to Constantinople through the channel of the French Embassy.

We will mention, in the last place, a circumstance sufficiently recent to be within the memory of all persons, and which upon a question and in a country where precedent carries weight, may establish in favour of the Orthodox Church, and of the nations who hold its dogmas, a right difficult to be contested. When, in 1808, a violent fire consumed the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, the Patriarch of Jerusalem claimed and obtained from the Sultan authority to rebuild the Church according to its ancient form and dimensions, without any foreign intervention whatever, and by the sole means of offerings made by the Greco-Slave population.

It may be remembered too, that at that time we were at open war with Turkey; that no diplomatic pressure or intervention on our part could have influenced the determinations of the Porte, or counteract the representations which the Catholic Powers and France herself, at that time governed by the Emperor Napoleon, might have considered themselves authorised to prefer.

This precedent appears to us to be more particularly adapted to be put before the present Government of France, in support of the intentions which it has evinced, and of the assurance which it gives us of not having contemplated withdrawing from the Christians of the Greek Church the right to enjoy the advantages which length of time has secured to them.

On this basis, which is exactly what we desire, and which equally agrees with the text of the late Firman of the Porte of which we demand the faithful execution, an understanding on the principle would be at once established. The only difficulties which would then have to be removed would relate to its application, and to the questions of detail, which would necessarily have to be regulated on the spot in the sense of the late Firman, and which would probably have been so already if the contradictory orders of the Porte, the duplicity of its agents, and the exaggerated pretensions of the Catholic clergy, had not essentially prejudiced this work of conciliation and of peace, and left everything undecided up to the present time.

The Imperial Cabinet will neglect no means for hastening a conclusion on so many grounds desirable, and in which the whole of Russia takes the most serious and most legitimate interest. It has pleasure in reckoning upon the disposition and concurrence of France. It entertains no doubt of the efficacious co-operation of the Imperial Court of Austria, which is called upon by its treaties with Turkey to take part in the question.

It is in this sense that we are about to take at Constantinople further and energetic steps, which, while reminding the Porte of its engagements towards us, will, it is to be hoped, convince it that there is in fact neither contest nor antagonism between us and France at the present more than at any other time, as regards the state of things established for ages in the venerated spots of Palestine; that all the Great Powers of Europe equally desire the preservation of the Ottoman Empire, its internal tranquillity, and the independence of its Government in the actions which may be prescribed to it by justice and by its own interests.

We are satisfied, from the terms of the last communication with which General Castelbajac was charged, that the instructions with which the French Embassy at Constantinople is perhaps at this time furnished, are in perfect keeping with the views which we have now set forth with as much frankness as confidence. In this case the understanding, which up to the present time could not be established as much as we wished between our Representatives at Constantinople, may have at once the happiest effect on the question in which we are engaged.

You will have the goodness, Sir, to read this despatch to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and even to give him a copy of it, if he should desire one.

Receive, &c.

(Signed) NESSELRODE.

No. 84.

*Lord John Russell to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, February 9, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint you that in a despatch, dated Odessa, January 24, Mr. Consul-General Yeames reports that orders have reached Sevastopol for the equipment of the fleet, so that it may be ready for sea at a short notice.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 85.

*Lord John Russell to Colonel Rose.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, February 10, 1853.*

AS Baron Brennier is detained by illness in France, I have to instruct you to abstain from giving any advice or opinion in the matter of the Holy Places, and to confine yourself to recommending moderation and caution in any step taken on that subject by any of the Foreign Ministers at Constantinople.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 86.

*Lord Cowley to Lord John Russell.—(Received February 12.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, February 11, 1853.*

THE messenger whom the French Government has been for some days expecting from St. Petersburg is arrived, but has brought nothing conclusive respecting the question of the Holy Places at Jerusalem. Count Nesselrode had received the French despatch upon the subject *ad referendum*, and General Casteljajac did not expect an answer for some days.

No. 87.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received February 14.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, February 5, 1853.*

I WAITED yesterday, by appointment, upon the Chancellor, and held a conversation with him upon Turkish affairs.

It commenced by my expressing my satisfaction at the conciliatory attitude of the French Cabinet, remarking that, with such amicable dispositions on their part, it was impossible but that the question of the Holy Places should be speedily disposed of.

His Excellency replied, that the conduct of the French Government was becoming more conciliatory; that a communication had been received from the Marquis de Castelbajac upon the subject of the religious question, and that he proposed soon to reply to this overture; the reply, when made, would be communicated to me.

Count Nesselrode then said, that he desired to acquaint me that Prince Menchikoff had received orders to prepare for departure for Constantinople, where the affairs of the Russian Mission had been for some time conducted by a Chargé d'Affaires, whose rank did not give him the weight which was required in affairs of such gravity as those now pending.

His Excellency wished to assure me that the instructions with which Prince Menchikoff would be provided were of a conciliatory nature, and that although bred to arms, the Prince himself was animated by intentions the most pacific.

I inquired whether Prince Menchikoff would be instructed to occupy himself with the affairs of Montenegro, as well as with that of the "Lieux Saints;" and was acquainted that that would be the case. As I left the room I said, "It will be satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government to learn that, in your Excellency's opinion, there is a fair prospect of existing difficulties being settled, and I think you may authorise me to convey that assurance."

Count Nesselrode replied that he certainly felt more sanguine than he had lately been as to the amicable adjustment of the questions pending with the Porte.

No. 88.

*Mr. Jerningham to Lord John Russell.—(Received February 18.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, February 17, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS informs me that his last accounts from St. Petersburg respecting the Holy Places, received a day or two since, state that Prince Menchikoff was about to be despatched to Constantinople, for the purpose of coming to a joint understanding on the subject with the French Embassy and the Porte.

His Excellency expressed an expectation that a settlement would be arrived at, provided Russia did not ask too much, while France was disposed to moderation.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys said it was uncertain if M. de Lavalette would be at Constantinople when Prince Menchikoff should arrive.

His Excellency said, also, that he could not tell if Baron Brennier would go or not, as he complained of illness; but that either he or another would be sent as soon as possible.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

No. 89.

*Lord John Russell to Colonel Rose.*

(Extract.)

*Foreign Office, February 19, 1853.*

THE Russian Minister at this Court has read to me a despatch from Count Nesselrode to M. Kisseleff, giving an account of the result of General Castelbajac's explanations of the views of the French Government in reference to the Holy Places.

The open and conciliatory language of the French Government appears to have produced a favourable impression on the Emperor of Russia. Yet there is no disposition to recede from the terms of the Firman of February 1852; and it appears that Prince Menchikoff is about to proceed to Constantinople, to express the firm resolution of the Russian Government not to rest satisfied with the departures from the terms then proclaimed by the Sultan, and assented to both by France and Russia.

You are, therefore, instructed to hold to the Sultan's Minister, to Prince Menchikoff, and to the French Minister, language calculated to bring back the state of this question to its position of February in the last year. This should be effected in the manner most consistent with the dignity of the French Government, which has been somewhat compromised by the language of M. Lavalette.

It is said that the Emperor of Russia will demand the dismissal of Fuad Effendi. On this question, you will take no part, one way or the other.

If the Russian troops should advance to the frontier, you must give immediate information to Her Majesty's Government.

I trust I need not suppose the case of their advancing beyond the frontier to the attack of the capital. In such a case, Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe will be upon the spot, furnished with the requisite instructions.

## No. 90.

*Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(Received February 19.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, January 21, 1853.*

AFIF BEY, the Porte's Commissioner for the settlement of the question of the Holy Places, returned here on the 16th instant from Jerusalem, having concluded his mission by giving up the key of the Church of Bethlehem to the Latins, and settled the matter of the Tomb of the Virgin. I have the honour to inclose a copy of a report from M. E. Pisani on this subject.

The position of the Porte with respect to the cession of the key is a safe one. That act was in accordance with the written decision of a Commission of Ulemas which the Porte, in consequence of Russian representations, named last year for the purpose of examining and reporting on all the documents, Greek and Latin, relating to the Holy Places.

The inclosed copy of a report from M. Pisani shows that only a few days ago, Fuad Effendi asserted to the first Russian Interpreter, without being contradicted by him, the justice of the Porte's mode of proceeding with respect to the key.

The cession of the key is in fact nothing; it gives the Latins no right to hold divine service in the church; it merely allows them to pass through it to the Grotto of the Nativity, a vault under the church, where the Latins have two Sanctuaries, "la Crèche" and "la Grotte des Mages."

M. de Lavalette has declared to me that the question of the Holy Places is not again to be revived by France, and if the French Government would confirm this assurance, Russia would have a still further inducement for considering the ill-omened question of Jerusalem as finally settled.

Inclosure in No. 90.

*M. E. Pisani to Colonel Rose.*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, January 18, 1853.*

M. ARGYROPULO told Fuad Effendi that, "la Mission Impériale venait de recevoir de son Consul à Jérusalem l'avis que la clef de l'Eglise de Bethléem avait été donnée par Afif Bey aux Latins; que la bienséance ne permettait pas à la Mission Impériale de qualifier cette conduite du Gouvernement Turc, mais que M. d'Ozeroff se fera un devoir de faire son rapport à l'Empereur, qui saura apprécier cette conduite. Il s'étonnait, pourtant, que dans une affaire aussi grave, Fuad Effendi n'avait pas donné dans le tems aucune communication à ce sujet." \*

To this Fuad Effendi replied, that Afif Bey, in delivering the key to the Latins, acted in conformity with the Porte's instructions, and begged to observe to M. Argyropulo, that more than once, both through him (M. Argyropulo) and through M. Logotheti, his Excellency made several communications on the subject to M. d'Ozeroff, who refused to enter into any discussion or explanation.

With respect to the Shrine of the Holy Virgin, Fuad Effendi says, that the matter is arranged in the following manner. The Latins are to bring with them, when they are to officiate, their sacred vase and garments, and remove them, after they officiate, into a room which they are going to build next to the Sacred Shrine, in a garden belonging to the Latins themselves.

\* "The Imperial Mission had just received from its Consul at Jerusalem intelligence that the key of the Church at Bethlehem had been given by Afif Bey to the Latins; that decency did not allow the Imperial Mission to characterize that conduct of the Turkish Government, but that M. d'Ozeroff will make it his duty to report to the Emperor, who will know how to appreciate that conduct. He was astonished, however, that in so serious a matter Fuad Effendi had not made any communication to him at the time respecting it."

## No. 91.

*Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(Received February 21.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, January 28, 1853.*

I HAVE very great satisfaction in informing your Lordship that I have every reason for believing that the dangerous and very difficult question of the Holy Places of Jerusalem is terminated. The French Ambassador declares to me that, as far as he is concerned, it is settled, and that France will not again revive it.

The Russian Chargé d’Affaires, also, told me on the 26th instant, that the settlement of the question, as already announced by me to your Lordship, was a “chose faite;” only, he added, that he feared that further discussions must be opened respecting it, because there were one or two details as to the settlement, which were interpreted very disadvantageously to the Greeks; that the Latins claimed to have the Tomb of the Virgin, one day, exclusively for themselves; that such an arrangement would be very disagreeable, and produce much discontent amongst the Greek pilgrims. Finding that M. d’Ozeroff’s observations were well-founded, I told M. de Lavalette of the observations of my Russian colleague. His Excellency instantly, and in the most conciliatory manner, declared that with the view of preventing any collision between the sects, he merely wished that the Latins, and other sects, should have possession of the Tomb for the time that was necessary for the performance of their devotions; but that for the rest of the day, the Sanctuary should of course be open to the Greeks and other sects. M. de Lavalette assured me further that, although if he had strained the meaning of the note of the 9th February, he might have demanded that the Latins should have lamps and images in the Tomb, he, from a feeling of moderation, had forborne to do so, and had thus consented that the Latins should not have the privileges in the Tomb which all the other Christian sects, even the Copts and Blacks, had.

I communicated to M. d’Ozeroff M. de Lavalette’s explanations, and he seemed quite satisfied with them.

Both the French and Russian Representatives exhibit now most laudable moderation in the matter of the Holy Places.

## No. 92.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received February 21.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, February 10, 1853.*

IN speaking to me yesterday of Prince Menchikoff’s instructions, which were again represented to be moderate in their character, the Chancellor observed that there was necessarily some vagueness in his orders, as on one side it was hardly ascertained to what extent the rights, secured last year to the Greeks, had been infringed; and, on the other, there could be no question of attempting to regain from the Latins any of the privileges which they might subsequently have acquired at Jerusalem. The object to be sought for was therefore an equivalent for any privilege lost by the Greeks. “Thus,” Count Nesselrode observed, “we have no wish to demand the restoration of the key of the Bethlehem Church.”

As it is always desirable to guard against misapprehensions, I ventured to inquire whether, in this case, a key meant an instrument for opening a door, only not to be employed in closing that door against Christians of other sects; or whether it was simply a key—an emblem.

Count Nesselrode replied, unhesitatingly, that his meaning was that the key was to be used in giving the Latins access to the church, but not to be used for securing the door against Greeks and other Christians.

## No. 93.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received February 21.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, February 10, 1853.*

IN reply to an inquiry which I addressed to Count Nesselrode yesterday, as to whether he proposed that the question of the Holy Places should be settled at St. Petersburg or at Constantinople, his Excellency stated that for various reasons he thought it better that the negotiation should be conducted at the latter of these places.

Count Nesselrode proceeded to say that he should do well to let me read a despatch dated <sup>27 January</sup><sub>7 February</sub> which had just been addressed to M. de Kisseleff, which was intended as a reply to the overture made to the Russian Cabinet through General Castelbajac.

This despatch, written in conciliatory language and (as far as a hasty perusal enabled me to judge) moderate in substance, will be forwarded from Paris to Baron Brunnow, with directions for its communication to your Lordship.

It begins by reminding M. de Kisseleff that the desire felt by the Government of Russia to come to an amicable understanding with that of France upon the question of the Holy Places, had been expressed a year ago, and that if it had been acted upon it might have led to the avoidance of great difficulties. M. de Turgot, however, had represented the affair as put to rest (*assoupie*), whereas it had, on the contrary, been brought forward with great violence,

After stating that the rights promised to France by the Convention of 1740 were vague and undefined, whilst the privileges accorded to the Greeks, some millions of whom are subjects of the Porte, have been uninterruptedly enjoyed since 1756, Count Nesselrode's despatch refers more particularly to the events of 1808 as showing that the rights of the Greek Church were then uncontested.

This part of the despatch proves that when, in the year in question, the Church of the Holy Sepulchre was destroyed by fire, its restoration was left exclusively to the Greeks, although the French throne was then occupied by the Emperor Napoleon, and although the existence of a war with Turkey prevented Russia from exercising any diplomatic influence at Constantinople; this, too, without any objection to the arrangement being raised by any of the Roman Catholic or other Governments.

In conclusion the despatch, after announcing in courteous language the fixed resolution of the Emperor to insist upon the *status quo* as guaranteed by the Firman, and by the Sultan's letter of last year, expresses the hope that instructions to acquiesce in these views may be sent to the French negotiator at Constantinople.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

## No. 94.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.)

*Foreign Office, February 25, 1853.*

THE Queen has been pleased to direct that at this critical period of the fate of the Ottoman Empire your Excellency should return to your Embassy for a special purpose, and charged with special instructions.

Your Excellency is aware that the preservation of the independence and integrity of Turkey enters into the general and established system of European policy; that the principle is solemnly declared and sanctioned by the Convention of 1841, and is acknowledged by all the great Powers of Europe.

The object of your Excellency's mission at this time is to counsel prudence to the Porte, and forbearance to those Powers who are urging her compliance with their demands. You are instructed to use every effort to ward off a

Turkish war, and to persuade the Powers interested to look to an amicable termination of existing disputes.

The question of the Holy Places in Syria offers danger to the peace of Turkey. However indifferent to their respective merits, the Porte is now unavoidably exposed to the rival pretensions of Russia and France, each animated by a political interest as well as by religious zeal, and both appealing to engagements alleged to have been contracted towards each of them by the Porte. Threatened from both sides, and unable to satisfy one party without displeasing the other, the Sultan is placed in a position of embarrassment and danger, rendered more critical by the internal weakness of the Empire, and the special character of the points at issue.

It is, therefore, to be feared that if the two Governments do not modify their demands, and should continue to maintain towards the Porte the dictatorial, if not menacing, attitude they have lately assumed, they may, without any deliberate intention of departing from those principles of European policy to which I have above alluded, accelerate the dissolution of the Turkish Empire, and produce the catastrophe that all are concerned in averting.

England, however, is in a position to neutralize, by her moral influence, these alarming contingencies; and the Porte will learn with satisfaction that, even before your arrival at Constantinople, the best efforts of Her Majesty's Government have been directed to restrain encroachment, and to obtain every fair concession calculated to settle the existing differences.

With this object your Excellency is instructed to proceed to Constantinople, by way of Paris and Vienna.

You will inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that Her Majesty's Government have great satisfaction in believing that the interests of France and England in the East are identical, and that nothing, therefore, need prevent their cordial co-operation in maintaining the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire. In communicating with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, respecting the Holy Places in Syria, your Excellency will govern yourself by the language of the despatches of Lord John Russell to Lord Cowley and Colonel Rose, copies of which are herewith inclosed;\* and you will explain to him the fatal embarrassment to which the Sultan may be exposed, if unduly pressed by France upon a question of such vital importance to the Power from which Turkey has most to apprehend.

At Vienna, your Excellency will state to Count Buol, that Her Majesty's Government have received with sincere pleasure the assurances that the friendly disposition of Austria towards the Porte was unchanged, and that her conservative policy in the East would be rigidly adhered to; that the increasing tendency to disorder and weakness in the Turkish Empire calls for moderation and forbearance on the part of the Sultan's Allies, and in such a policy the cordial cooperation of Her Majesty's Government may be relied upon by Austria.

To the Sultan you will say, that Her Majesty, in directing your Excellency to proceed forthwith to Constantinople, manifests the feelings of friendship by which she is animated towards his Highness, and, at the same time, her opinion of the gravity of the circumstances in which Her Majesty has reason to fear the Ottoman Empire is now placed.

As regards the Holy Places, Her Majesty's Government are unwilling to give you any special instructions, and prefer to leave your Excellency unfettered in the exercise of your judgment and discretion, as much may depend on your communications with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and upon the state in which you find the negotiation between Russia and the Porte on your arrival at Constantinople.

Your Excellency will, with all the frankness and unreserve that may be consistent with prudence and the dignity of the Sultan, explain the reasons which lead Her Majesty's Government to fear that the Ottoman Empire is now in a position of peculiar danger. The accumulated grievances of foreign nations which the Porte is unable or unwilling to redress, the mal-administration of its own affairs and the increasing weakness of executive power in Turkey, have caused the allies of the Porte latterly to assume a tone alike novel and alarming, and which, if persevered in, may lead to a general revolt among the Christian subjects of the Porte, and prove fatal to the independence and integrity of the Empire,—a catastrophe that would be deeply deplored by

\* Nos. 77 and 76.

Her Majesty's Government, but which it is their duty to represent to the Porte is considered probable and impending by some of the great European Powers.

Your Excellency will explain to the Sultan, that it is with the object of pointing out these dangers and with the hope of averting them, that Her Majesty's Government have now directed you to proceed to Constantinople. You will endeavour to convince the Sultan and his Ministers that the crisis is one which requires the utmost prudence on their part, and confidence in the sincerity and soundness of the advice they will receive from you, to resolve it favourably for their future peace and independence.

Your Excellency's long residence at the Porte, and intimate knowledge of the affairs of Turkey, will enable you to point out those reforms and improvements which the Sultan, under his present difficulties, may have the means of carrying into effect, and in what manner the Porte may best establish a system of administration calculated to afford reasonable security for the development of its commercial measures and the maintenance of its independence, recognized by the great Christian Powers on the presumption of its proving a reality and a stable bond of peace in their respective relations with the Porte, and generally throughout the Levant. Nor will you disguise from the Sultan and his Ministers that perseverance in their present course must end in alienating the sympathies of the British nation, and making it impossible for Her Majesty's Government to shelter them from the impending danger, or to overlook the exigencies of Christendom, exposed to the natural consequences of their unwise policy and reckless mal-administration.

It remains only for me to say, that in the event, which Her Majesty's Government earnestly hope may not arise, of imminent danger to the existence of the Turkish Government, your Excellency will in such case despatch a messenger at once to Malta, requesting the Admiral to hold himself in readiness, but you will not direct him to approach the Dardanelles without positive instructions from Her Majesty's Government.

No. 95.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 28.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, February 26, 1853.*

M. DE LA COUR, French Minister at Vienna, has been named Ambassador to Constantinople, and is succeeded at Vienna by the Baron de Bourqueney, himself formerly Ambassador at the Ottoman Porte.

No. 96.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 11.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, March 10, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS having sent this morning to express a desire to see me, I waited upon him this afternoon. He read to me extracts of a despatch and private letter, dated the 1st instant, which he had received this morning from St. Petersburg.

The contents of them are very satisfactory. It appears that M. Drouyn de Lhuys had not been pleased with the answer of the Russian Cabinet to the conciliatory overtures which he had made some time back for the settlement of the question of the Holy Places; and that he had, on the 17th of last month (while I was in England), addressed a despatch to M. Castelbajac, in which he had stated, that if the Russian Government replied to the conciliatory overtures of France by recriminations, there would be no hope of establishing an understanding between the two Governments. M. Castelbajac reports, that Count Nesselrode had been much distressed at finding that which he had intended to be a simple statement of facts, looked upon by the French Government in the light of a recrimination. The Count had assured him that the Emperor had received with a lively satisfaction the conciliatory declarations of France, and desired to respond to them in the same terms, and that he had every hope that the question of the Sacred Places would now be settled without any disturbance of the peace of the East. The recall of M. de Lavalette

and the appointments of MM. de la Cour and Bourqueney were looked upon as an earnest of the good intentions of the Emperor of the French.

The Emperor, Count Nesselrode assured M. Castelbajac, would be too happy to act with France to prevent a dissolution of the Turkish Empire. It was the last thing which His Imperial Majesty desired. The movements of troops towards the Turkish frontier were not made with any intention of attacking the Turkish Empire, but were, on the contrary, intended to prevent its dissolution, by acting on the fears of the Turkish Ministers to force them to give way on points, a persistence in which would bring about the catastrophe all wanted to avoid.

## No. 97.

*Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(Received March 12.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, February 15, 1853.*

YOUR Lordship will be glad to learn that the Russian Chargé d'Affaires called on me yesterday, and gave me satisfactory assurances respecting the pacific intentions of the Emperor of Russia towards Turkey.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

## No. 98.

*Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(Received March 14.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, February 22, 1853.*

IN compliance with the instructions in your Lordship's despatch of January 28, I brought, at the earliest moment, the important considerations which it contains before Fuad Effendi.

I endeavoured to induce his Excellency to come into the views of Her Majesty's Government respecting the advantage of the Porte's sanctioning any arrangement about the Holy Places, which might be recommended for its adoption conjointly by the French and Russian Governments.

Fuad Effendi did not seem to approve the plan, alleging that it would be an acknowledgment of the right of Russia to interfere in and protect the Greek interest in Turkey; and he put off further conversation on the subject by saying that it would be better to await the arrival of M. Brennier.

Your Lordship will be glad, however, to hear that Fuad Effendi ultimately yielded, and said that he would recommend the Council to adopt the suggestions of Her Majesty's Government.

## No. 99.

*Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(Received March 14.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, February 25, 1853.*

ON the evening of the 23rd instant, M. d'Ozerooff told me at his house that he had heard, by a Russian war-steamer which had arrived that morning, that there was a report at Odessa that a Russian Ambassador would shortly embark at Odessa for Constantinople, but that he had no information whatever on this subject except this report.

Yesterday the usual Russian post-steamer arrived, bringing a Colonel Kohlkoff, who, it was understood, was an aide-de-camp preceding the arrival of a Russian personage, coming here on a mission.

This morning M. d'Ozerooff sent M. Balabine to me to inform me, with his compliments, that Prince Menchikoff would arrive here in the beginning of next week, in a Russian war-steamer, with the rank and title of an Ambassador; he added, that Prince Menchikoff has the title of "Altesse Sérénissime," is an Admiral, Governor-General of Finland, and of the same category as Count Nesselrode, Prince Paskevitch, Prince Woronzoff, and Count Orloff.

M. de Balabine could give me no information respecting the object of Prince Menchikoff's mission, of which he stated M. d'Ozerooff was wholly ignorant.

## No. 100.

*Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(Received March 14.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, February 26, 1853.*

THE Porte, that is the Sultan, is the territorial Sovereign of the Holy Places, and, consequently, the Sultans of Turkey, from the time that Jerusalem fell under their rule, have always acted as sole judges of the differences which have arisen for ages between the Greeks and Latins.

And the Sultan cannot be regarded as the violator of promises, because the decision which His Majesty gave, as to the key of the great door of the Church of Bethlehem, to the Latins, is in strict conformity with the written promises which the Porte gave to the Latins in her note of the 9th of February 1852, promises which were confirmed by the Firman to the Greeks, *mi-Février*, as appears from the inclosed copy of a report from the first interpreter of Her Majesty's Embassy. The Russian Legation knew perfectly well, for the reasons stated by M. Pisani, that the Firman to the Greeks granted the key of the great door of the Church of Bethlehem to the Latins; and it was because they knew this, that M. d'Ozeroff endeavoured, by means of a vizirial letter, to nullify the Porte's promise as to the key, formally recorded in an official note to the French Embassy, as well as in the very Firman obtained by M. de Titoff.

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Inclosure in No. 100.

*Memorandum by Mr. E. Pisani.*

*Constantinople, February 26, 1853.*

IT is essential to be remembered that the Russian Envoy, M. de Titoff, was duly informed, through his first interpreter, of the intention, and subsequently of the decision, of the Porte to yield and accede to the arrangement contained in the note which was sent in to the French Embassy on the 9th of February, 1852, touching the Sanctuaries of Jerusalem. When the Porte communicated the contents of the said note to M. de Titoff, and also offered to give him some explanation on the subject, he refused to receive any oral or written declaration, explaining the motives and grounds upon which the Porte was compelled to concede to the Latins the right of officiating at the Holy Virgin's Shrine, and to grant them the key of the principal door of the Church of Bethlehem, and also one of the keys of each of the two doors of the Manger. M. de Titoff's fears that the concessions made to the Latins would increase the pretensions of the French, and embolden them to seek for more advantages, induced him to protest against any arrangement which would have for effect to change the *status quo* of actual possession.

In order to dissipate the apprehensions entertained by the Russian Envoy, the Porte proposed to grant a Firman to the Greek community, explaining the arrangement entered into, and giving guarantees for the future. In that Firman it is clearly stated, that the three keys (the grant of which was so long resisted by the Russians) were to be given to the Latins.

Before concluding, I think myself called upon to observe that M. de Titoff was duly apprised of the Porte's intention to give the note, which was presented to M. de Lavalette on the 9th of February last; and that the Firman, which was subsequently given to the Greek Patriarchs of Jerusalem and Constantinople, and in which the three keys are distinctly mentioned, was for several days under the consideration of the Russian Envoy, who amended it according to his wish.

When Afif Bey was sent to Jerusalem to carry into execution the arrangement as contained in the note given to M. de Lavalette, M. d'Ozeroff, who succeeded M. de Titoff, applied to, and obtained from, the Porte a vizirial letter, instructing Afif Bey to endeavour to avoid giving the keys in question to the Latins. But this could not in fairness be executed, and Afif Bey thought it his duty to carry into effect his former instructions.

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## No. 101.

*Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(Received March 14.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, February 26, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship the copy of a report which I have just received from M. Pisani at the Porte.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

Inclosure in No. 101.

*M. E. Pisani to Colonel Rose.*

(Extract.)

*Sublime Porte, February 26, 1853.*

M. ARGYROPULO waited this morning on Fuad Effendi, to acquaint him with the expected arrival of Prince Menchikoff, as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Czar, and to request him to issue the necessary orders for the ceremonial to be performed on this occasion.

M. Argyropulo said nothing touching the object of the Prince's mission ; but only stated that his Highness was of a very conciliatory character.

## No. 102.

*Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(Received March 19.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, March 3, 1853.*

A PAINFUL sensation was caused here by the following incident, which occurred yesterday.

Prince Menchikoff paid his official visit to the Grand Vizier at the Porte, but purposely omitted to pay it to Fuad Effendi, who was ready to receive him.

I have entered into communication on the subject with the Russian Embassy ; my representations were received, I am bound in justice to say, in the most friendly manner, and I have hopes that this inauspicious commencement of the Russian Ambassador's mission may not lead to the untoward results which were at first anticipated.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

## No. 103.

*Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(Received March 19.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, March 6, 1853.*

M. D'OZEROFF said to me last night, that the meaning of the Firman to the Greeks, of mi-Février, 1852, being rather doubtful as to the key, the Russian Legation had obtained a secret order to the Pasha of Jerusalem, instructing him that the key of the great door of the Church of Bethlehem had been given to the Latins with the view to content them ; but that he was to endeavour to avoid giving them the key.

Your Lordship is aware that the cession of this key is the main cause of the alleged grievances of the Russian Government as to the question of the Sanctuaries. I beg your Lordship to observe that the Firman of the "mi-Février" was given to the Greeks, at the demand of the Russian Legation, as a sort of set-off against the note of the 9th of February, 1852, given by the Porte to the French Embassy. That note gave the key in question to the Latins.

The Porte gave the Firman of the "mi-Février" to M. de Titoff, in order

that he might alter and correct it to his liking : he had it in his possession for a fortnight. M. de Titoff felt that he could not take so strong a step as to alter the passage in the Firman which gave the key in question to the Latins, in conformity with the Treaty of 1740, and the finding of the decision of the Ulema ; he therefore merely inserted in the Firman passages which contradicted, as it were, or threw in doubt the concession to the Latins recorded in the Firman with respect to the key and the Tomb of the Virgin, by inserting that the *status quo* as to the Holy Places was maintained—that nothing as to them was changed.

From the time that France revived her Treaty of 1740, and demanded dormant or neglected rights as to the Holy Places, the Porte, in her weakness, has been coerced by France and Russia to give contradictory decisions.

The French Capitulations of 1740, on which France grounds her claims as to the Jerusalem Sanctuaries, and the validity of which the Russian Government attack, are exactly the same as our Capitulations with the Porte.

No. 104.

*Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.— (Received March 19.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, March 7, 1853.*

CIRCUMSTANCES connected with the mission of Prince Menchikoff have gradually come to light, and cause grave apprehensions for the independence, if not the destiny, of Turkey.

No expense or efforts have been spared for the purpose of imparting to the Russian Embassy all the advantages which accrue from personal influence, display, and entertainment.

Prince Menchikoff is an Admiral and Minister of the Marine, and he is accompanied by the Chancellor's son, Prince Galitzin, the Emperor's Aide-de-Camp, and a large suite.

Whilst then the Russian Government have neglected no means for rendering this Embassy influential, and agreeable to Orientals, they have been equally careful to impart to it the most powerful of influences amongst Turks, intimidation.

A day or two after the arrival of Prince Menchikoff, another man-of-war steamer arrived here, conveying Vice-Admiral Korniloff, of the Black Sea fleet, Aide-de-Camp and Adjutant-General of the Emperor ; and General Nikapotchinski, Chief of the Staff of General Rudiger's two corps d'armée, with other military officers. The presence of these superior officers of the naval and military forces, which are to act against the Porte should she not comply with Russian demands, had its due effect, particularly as it is known that the 5th and 7th corps have been concentrated, and placed on the war footing under the command of General Rudiger, whose head-quarters are at Kisheneff, in Bessarabia. I also had further information that General Dannenberg, commanding the cavalry of the 5th corps, had pushed his advance-guard as far as Skuleny and Areny, up to the very Moldavian frontier, within two hours of Jassy ; that large funds had been transmitted to Russian merchants in Wallachia and Moldavia, for the purchase of provisions for the Russian troops ; finally, that the fleet at Sebastopool was getting ready to sail at the shortest notice.

Unfortunately Prince Menchikoff's first public act evinced entire disregard on his part of the Sultan's dignity and rights, which, combined with the hostile attitude of Russia, created the impression that coercion, rather than conciliatory negotiation, would distinguish his Excellency's mission.

His Excellency transmitted his credentials to Fuad Effendi, and the next day, with his whole Embassy, waited on the Grand Vizier at the Porte ; it is an invariable rule that a new Ambassador makes the second visit of ceremony to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. But Prince Menchikoff, after leaving the Grand Vizier, although invited by Kiamil Bey, the " *Introdacteur des Ambassadeurs*," to visit Fuad Effendi, whose apartment adjoins those of the Grand Vizier declined to do so : and Prince Menchikoff, passing by the line of troops

and Kavasses, and the very door of Fuad Effendi, which had been opened to receive him, left the Porte.

The affront was the more galling, because great preparations had been made for the purpose of receiving the Russian Ambassador with marked honours, and a great concourse of people, particularly Greeks, had assembled for the purpose of witnessing the ceremony.

The incident made a great and most painful sensation. The Grand Vizier expressed to me his indignation at the premeditated affront which had been offered to his Sovereign; and the Sultan's irritation was excessive.

M. Benedetti and myself at once saw all the bearing and intention of the affront. Prince Menchikoff wished, at his first start, to create an intimidating and commanding influence, to show that any man, even a Cabinet Minister, who had offended Russia, would be humiliated and punished even in the midst of the Sultan's Court, and without previous communication to His Majesty. Prince Menchikoff wished to take the cleverest man out of the Ministry, humiliate it, upset it, and establish in its place a Ministry favourable to his views. If this manœuvre had succeeded, a second Treaty like that of Unkiar Skelessi, or something worse, would probably have been the result.

Prince Menchikoff had not yet announced his mission to the diplomatic body; I, therefore, sought an explanation respecting the incident with M. d'Ozeroff, who endeavoured to avoid it by saying that he was no longer Chargé d'Affaires, and that Prince Menchikoff was not yet officially Ambassador.

I have the honour to report the explanation and the matter connected with it in a further despatch.

#### No. 105.

*Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(Received March 19.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, March 7, 1853.*

M. D'OZEROFF made a second attempt to avoid an explanation with me respecting the affront to Fuad Effendi.

I said that I had been as much pained as surprised by the first act of Prince Menchikoff's mission, which being an affront to the Ottoman Sovereign in the presence of his people, would be a subject of deep regret to Her Majesty's Government, and give rise to painful apprehensions as to the result of a mission so inauspiciously begun.

M. d'Ozeroff said that Fuad Effendi had acted in a manner which rendered it impossible that the Russian Embassy should have anything to do with him.

I replied that if Fuad Effendi had offended the Russian Embassy, it had a perfect right to complain of that offence to the Porte in the usual diplomatic form and obtain a prompt and just reparation; but that to send Fuad Effendi Prince Menchikoff's credentials, allow him to come the next day to the Porte, according to invariable usage, to receive the Ambassador's visit, and then to condemn him unheard at the seat of Government in presence of the Sultan's Ministers and a numerous public, was an act condemned not only by myself, but by an universal public opinion; that all felt for the Sultan, who had not received one word of warning from the Russian Embassy as to its intention to humiliate publicly one of his confidential advisers, which would at least have enabled his Majesty to ward off the affront, and to demand that his Minister should be accused and judged according to the usages of independent Powers; that certainly the Ottoman Minister had been to blame in the matter of the Holy Places, but that he had been coerced; that from the time M. de Lavalette threatened to bring up a French fleet to the Dardanelles, and M. de Titoff menaced to quit instantly Constantinople with every member of his Mission, if their respective and entirely divergent demands were not complied with, the Porte had, under the pressure of that and subsequent coercions, committed a series of lamentable contradictions; but that as a question of abstract morality I would ask M. de Ozeroff whether he would blame most a weak man who erred because he was forced to do so, or the strong man who forced the weak man to do so. M. de Ozeroff would say nothing, except

that if the Porte would ask for explanations, the Russian Embassy would make the most satisfactory declarations as to their having had no intention whatever to infringe the Sultan's rights, or hurt his dignity or feelings; that they had not demanded Fuad's dismissal, that he might be present at Prince Menchikoff's audience of the Sultan, but that the Embassy would not negotiate certain questions with him. I am glad to say that next morning Prince Menchikoff sent his first interpreter to express to the Grand Vizier what I have just stated as to the wish of Prince Menchikoff not in any way to offend the Sultan.

The treatment of Fuad Effendi, the unfavourable, I may say the disaffected, feeling which Prince Menchikoff's mission had caused amongst the Greek population, who had hitherto shown no feeling of that nature, the concentration and advance of Russian troops to the Turkish frontier, had greatly discouraged the Grand Vizier, his Ministry, and the Turkish party in general.

The Grand Vizier said that the Russian Government evidently intended to win some important right from Turkey which would destroy her independence, and asked me to request the British Admiral to bring up his squadron to Vourla Bay from Malta.

Feeling the intimate conviction that if the Sultan were not supported on this occasion he would call to his councils a Ministry selected under Russian influence, I informed his Highness that I would tell your Lordship that I felt convinced that the safety of Turkey required the presence of the British squadron in those waters. M. Benedetti said the same as regards the French squadron.

But these assurances did not tranquillize the Grand Vizier's mind; he thought that Turkey would be lost before an answer could arrive from England and France.

The Russian Government had not kept faith with Her Majesty's Government; instead of withdrawing or allowing her troops to be stationary, she had advanced them up to the Turkish territory, ordering provisions for those troops in the Turkish provinces, without having ever declared or stated her cause of complaint against the Porte to the Porte—a thing unheard of amongst, and contrary to the rights of civilized nations; she was taking other warlike measures, maritime as well as military, on a very great scale, unmistakeably with the view of overcoming Turkey's independence, or making war on her.

I learnt from Lord John Hay that Admiral Dundas proposed to leave Malta on the 20th instant, on a cruize to Corfu, Athens, and Smyrna. By asking his Excellency to bring his squadron to Vourla immediately, I felt that I only asked him to leave Malta a week earlier than he had intended to do, going first to Vourla, instead of Corfu.

Under these circumstances I acquainted the Grand Vizier, that I would request the Admiral commanding at Malta to bring up his squadron to Vourla Bay. I have the honour to inclose a copy of his Highness's reply.

Inclosure in No. 105.

*Mr. E. Pisani to Colonel Rose.*

Sir,

*Pera, March 6, 1853.*

I LOSE no time in informing you that the Grand Vizier received your message about your intention, in compliance with his Highness's request, to write to the Admiral that the state of affairs here in your opinion requires the presence of the squadron at Vourla, with heartfelt gratitude, and requested me to express to you his sincere thanks, and to apprise you that he will not fail to acquaint His Majesty the Sultan with this good disposition on the part of a Representative of a faithful and friendly Power. His Highness entertains strong apprehensions that the mission of Prince Menchikoff, far from being of a conciliatory character as pretended, is on the contrary intended to involve the Porte in serious difficulties, and that the Emperor's object appears to be to trample under foot the rights of the Porte and the dignity and the independence of the Sovereign.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) E. PISANI.

## No. 106.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 19.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, March 6, 1853.*

THE French Minister acquaints me that he has questioned Count Nesselrode both as to the naval armaments which he believes to be making at Sevastopol, and as to the orders which he believes to have been sent to the 4th corps d'armée to advance to the frontiers of Turkey. To these inquiries, as he states, Count Nesselrode replied evasively; not going the length of contradicting the reports, but observing that he had no information which led him to admit their correctness.

From what I learn, I believe the truth to be that orders have been sent to the 4th corps d'armée to complete its reserves, and, further, to purchase the requisite number of horses. This last order I am all but confident has subsequently been recalled, upon the success of Count Leiningen's mission being known here.

The 5th corps I believe to be already complete in numbers, and, according to the best information which I can obtain, neither the 4th or 5th corps d'armée have received orders for marching upon the Turkish frontier.

## No. 107.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 19.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, March 9, 1853.*

WHEN calling upon Count Nesselrode on the 7th instant, I stated that it was highly desirable that I should be informed what credit was to be attached to the rumours which reached me from so many quarters as to military preparations in the course of being made.

Count Nesselrode said, that he believed he might state that I had not been correctly informed.

"Does your Excellency," I inquired, "authorize me to assert that you are not arming, or am I only to report that you believe you are not arming?"

After some hesitation, the Chancellor said that he would not assert, but that he believed (*croire*), that he had reason for believing (*lieu de croire*), that the tendency was to slacken (*ralentir*), rather than to urge on, military preparation, since the successful termination of Count Leiningen's mission had been learned.

I apprehend this relaxation of preparation to allude to the order for the purchase of horses, which has been rescinded.

A somewhat desultory conversation ensued. We spoke of General Leiningen's mission, and I took an opportunity of observing that the pressure lately applied to the Porte was such as, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, could not be safely carried on.

The Chancellor replied, that, to use my own expression, great part of the pressure would now cease; that, as regarded Montenegro, hours were of importance when Christians were being massacred,—when there was question of the extermination of whole Christian populations! But this was not the case with the question of the Holy Places, about this there was no immediate hurry; that Prince Menchikoff had been provided with very extensive powers.

Count Nesselrode remarked, that he had heard with real pleasure from Baron Brunnow of the excellent instruction addressed by Lord John Russell to Lord Cowley upon the Holy Places question.

With respect to the Emperor's views, Count Nesselrode again observed, that it was impossible that His Imperial Majesty should recede from the position secured to the Greeks by the Firman of last February, confirmed as it had been by the Sultan's letter. That this very Firman was, in fact, a concession to the Latins, who in virtue thereof, obtained two favours in lieu of the one granted to the Greek Church.

This was subsequently explained to me by M. de Sényavine as alluding to the Grotto of Gethsemane, an admission to which, as well as the right to officiate in the Church of Bethlehem, was secured to the Roman Catholics by last year's Firman, while the only new favour conferred upon the Greeks by that instrument was the right to celebrate service, and that once a year, in the Church of the Ascension upon the Mount of Olives.

Count Nesselrode also stated that the French complained without just cause of the despatch of Prince Menchikoff to Constantinople, after the overtures made by them at direct negotiation with the Russian Government, inasmuch as Prince Menchikoff's mission had long before been determined upon, and had been deferred only in consequence of the infirm state of his health.

No. 108.

*Colonel Rose to the Foreign Office.—(Received March 20.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, March 8, 1853.*

I INCLOSE a copy of a report which M. Pisani has just brought.

Inclosure in No. 108.

*Mr. E. Pisani to Colonel Rose.*

Sir,

*Pera, March 8, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Prince Menchikoff, accompanied by all the persons attached to his Embassy, was received in audience to-day by the Sultan. After he had presented his credentials, he said that he had been particularly desired by his august master, the Emperor, to present his friendly compliments to His Majesty the Sultan, and to assure him how anxious he (the Emperor) was to see the coolness which had latterly existed between the two Governments give place to more friendly relations.

Subsequently, all the attachés, and M. d'Ozeroff himself, withdrew, and the Prince remained alone with M. Argyropulo, in private converse with the Sultan, in the presence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the first Interpreter of the Divan.

He did not enter into any details touching the object of his mission; but only spoke in general terms of several matters that required settlement, without specifying their nature, and added, that it was his intention to communicate thereon with His Majesty's Ministers.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) E. PISANI.

No. 109.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 21.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, March 19, 1853.*

THE despatches addressed to the French Government from Constantinople, on the 5th and 6th instant, conveyed by the regular packet to Marseilles, and those transmitted on the 8th, brought by an English steamer to the same port, reached Paris—the former yesterday, the latter this morning. The telegraphic notice already received, respecting the nature of the intelligence contained in them, had created considerable anxiety in the Government, an anxiety which had been shared by the public at large.

M. Benedetti's despatches give an account of the arrival of Prince Menchikoff at Constantinople, of his visit to the Porte, and of the change in the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Your Lordship will have received ample intelligence on these matters, and I do not pursue them further. Beyond this, the statement of the French Chargé d'Affaires is confined to surmises as to the nature and scope of Prince Menchikoff's mission; for it appears that, up to the 8th instant, nothing was distinctly known as to the demands which he was to make upon the Porte. Colonel Rose had thought that matters had taken so serious a turn, that he had requested Admiral Dundas to approach the Dardanelles with the fleet under his command.

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No. 110.

*Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(Received March 21.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, March 7, 1853.*

I REGRET to state to your Lordship that all the circumstances connected with the mission of Prince Menchikoff, which I shall transmit to-morrow by Her Majesty's steam-ship "Wasp" to Malta to be forwarded to your Lordship without any delay, have assumed a serious and threatening appearance. It is true that the declarations of the Russian Ambassador are pacific; but facts, unfortunately, do not bear out those declarations.

I have used all the exertions in my power to protect the rights and independence of the Porte; but it is my duty to submit my conviction, unfortunately a general one, that if the Porte do not receive prompt and energetic assistance from Her Majesty's Government, her independence and rights, and with them the balance of power, will be dangerously compromised by the mission of Prince Menchikoff.

I inclose copies of three reports respecting the threatening attitude of the Russian troops towards Turkey; another which I have received states that General Dannenberg has advanced his cavalry outposts to within six miles of the Moldavian frontier.

The Sultan has accepted Fuad Effendi's resignation, and appointed Rifaat Pasha in his place. Fuad Effendi persisted in refusing to return to office. I have the honour to inclose a copy of the Sultan's Hatti-Sheriff; it is very remarkable, because, for the first time in the annals of Turkey, the Sultan declares that he accepts a Minister's resignation: an exception to the invariable rule was made on this occasion, for the purpose of showing that Fuad Effendi's own will, and not foreign intervention, was the cause of his resignation. Hitherto, it was not supposed possible that any Turkish Minister could possess a will in any matter connected with the Sovereign's prerogative.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 110.

*Vice-Consul Cunningham to Colonel Rose.*

Sir,

*Galatz, February 25, 1853.*

FOR some months past, there have been rumours that a large Russian force was to be collected in Bessarabia, and even that these provinces were to be occupied. From the information I have obtained, I consider it certain that the inhabitants of Bessarabia, in the districts around Ismail and Reni, have received orders to prepare quarters for 60,000 troops.

I will be attentive to obtain any authentic information, and communicate it to you.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) CHARLES CUNNINGHAM.

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## Inclosure 2 in No. 110.

*Extract from a Report of the French Consul at Jassy to M. Benedetti.**Le 14 Février, 1853.*

TOUTES les personnes et toutes les lettres qui arrivent de Bessarabie s'accordent à dire qu'il s'y fait de très-sérieux préparatifs de guerre. D'immenses approvisionnement de biscuits sont déjà faits, et les troupes ont reçu l'ordre de se tenir prêtes à marcher au premier signal.

(Translation.)

*February 14, 1853.*

ALL persons and letters coming from Bessarabia, concur in saying that very serious preparations for war are there making. Vast supplies of biscuit are already prepared, and the troops have received orders to hold themselves in readiness to march at the first signal.

## Inclosure 3 in No. 110.

*Consul Yeames to Colonel Rose.*

Sir,

*Odessa, March 4, 1853.*

I SHOULD fail in my duty were I not to inform you of the arrival of a courier from the capital on Tuesday night, bringing very unexpected orders for the immediate concentration of the troops; the 15th Division of Infantry at Leovo on the Pruth, the 14th at Odessa, and the 13th at Sevastopol, to be ready for embarkation. The Artillery of the 5th Corps d'Armée, always stationed on the left bank of the Dnieper, is without delay to join the respective divisions. Rye biscuits, a war provision, has been baked, and a large quantity is stored in Kicheneff, likewise a great supply of boots. Considerable delay will be caused by the state of the roads, which, in consequence of a rainy season, are scarcely passable.

No judgment can be formed here by the natives for these precipitate measures, excepting it be the question of the Holy Places, supposed generally to be the object of Prince Menchikoff's embassy. No other grievance is here known to exist since the success of Count Leiningen's negotiation.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) JAMES YEAMES.

## Inclosure 4 in No. 110.

*Hatti-Sheriff.*

(Traduction.)

Mon Illustre Vizir,

*25 Djemadi-ul-evel, 1269. (Le 6 Mars, 1853.)*

ETANT devenu nécessaire de remplacer Fuad Effendi, qui vient de nous prier d'accepter sa démission du poste de Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de notre Sublime Porte, et Rifaat Pacha, qui a la connaissance des affaires qui sont du ressort de ce Ministère, ayant des talents et de la capacité, il a été mandé auprès de nous, et après avoir été revêtu du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, il a été envoyé à notre Sublime Porte.

Que notre Dieu, le Très-Saint, soit propice à tous par le mérites du coryphée des Prophètes, ainsi soit-il.

(Translation.)

My Illustrious Vizier,

*25 Djemadi-ul-evel, 1269. (March 6, 1853.)*

IT having become necessary to replace Fuad Effendi, who has requested us to accept his resignation of the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs of our

Sublime Porte, and Rifaat Pasha, who is acquainted with the affairs of that office, possessing talents and capacity, he has been summoned to our presence, and having been invested with the office of Minister for Foreign Affairs, he has been sent to our Sublime Porte.

May our God, the Most Holy, be merciful to all, for the sake of the merits of the chief of the Prophets ; so be it.

No. 111.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

(Extract.)

*Foreign Office, March 22, 1853.*

I HAD yesterday a long interview with Count Walewski upon the events that have recently taken place at Constantinople. The information received by the French Government appears to correspond precisely with that which has reached Her Majesty's Government.

I told his Excellency that when the intelligence from Constantinople was analysed, and divested of the colouring imparted to it by local excitement, there was but one fact to deal with, viz., that General Menchikoff, in pursuance of the orders of the Emperor of Russia, announced nearly two months ago, had declined to hold official intercourse with Fuad Effendi, because that Minister, in the opinion of His Imperial Majesty, had acted with bad faith to Russia. Fuad Effendi had accordingly resigned ; but Prince Menchikoff had not required this, and he had declared that no disrespect was intended to the Sultan by the omission of the customary visit to his Minister.

Under these circumstances, I said Her Majesty's Government had not thought Colonel Rose justified in requesting that the British fleet should come to Vourla, and they had learnt, with much satisfaction, that Admiral Dundas had considered it his duty to remain at Malta until he received instructions from England.

For similar reasons, I told Count Walewski that Her Majesty's Government regretted the order given to the French fleet to sail for the Greek waters, as the delay of a few hours would have put the French Government in possession of information that might have led to the same conclusions that Her Majesty's Government have arrived at on the subject ; and I ventured to remark to His Excellency, that a policy of suspicion was neither wise nor safe, and often led to hasty determinations.

Her Majesty's Government, I added, were disposed to place reliance on the Emperor of Russia, from whom they had often received the most solemn assurances that it was both his interest and his intention to uphold the Turkish Empire, and that if any change in this policy were contemplated by His Imperial Majesty, the intention should be communicated without hesitation or reserve.

No such communication having been made, Her Majesty's Government were bound to believe, until they had proofs to the contrary, that the mission of Prince Menchikoff was not of a character menacing to the independence and integrity of Turkey.

I further informed Count Walewski that I had just had a conversation with Baron Brunnow, to whom I had unreservedly communicated the reports that had reached us from Constantinople respecting the objects of General Menchikoff's mission, and that Baron Brunnow had assured me, of his own knowledge, that no frontier question would be mooted ; that no change in the mode of appointing the Greek Patriarch would be proposed ; and that there was no intention of depriving the Latins of advantages they possessed in the Holy Places, though the Emperor would insist upon the promises made to him in favour of the Greek Church being fulfilled.

Baron Brunnow likewise showed to me, confidentially, the letter of the Emperor to the Sultan, which was written in a most friendly spirit, and exhibited much respect for the authority of his Highness.

Count Walewski appeared to be satisfied with this communication, and to agree with me, that if Prince Menchikoff's mission was of a friendly nature, the arrival of a fleet at Constantinople or the neighbourhood would be useless, or, possibly, worse than useless, as it might give a hostile character to the Russian policy ; and that if, contrary to our expectations, the independence of Turkey

were really in danger, the blow would be struck long before the fleet could arrive, and no instructions, as to the mode in which it should act, could be given beforehand with the precision which the gravity of such an event would demand, or the concert with other Powers which its European importance would render necessary.

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No. 112.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Colonel Rose.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, March 23, 1853.*

YOUR despatches up to the 8th instant have been received, and laid before the Queen.

The circumstances reported in those despatches did not, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, render it necessary for you to request that the British fleet should come to Vourla, and they have entirely approved of the conduct of Admiral Dundas in not complying with your request, and not leaving Malta without specific instructions from Her Majesty's Government.

Admiral Dundas has been ordered to remain at Malta.

I do not think it necessary to send you further instructions at present, as you will of course have governed your conduct by those contained in Lord John Russell's despatch of the 19th ultimo, which will have reached your hands a few days after the date of your last despatches.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 113.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, March 23, 1853.*

THE copies of Colonel Rose's despatches which are this day forwarded to you, will place you in possession of the latest intelligence received by Her Majesty's Government from Constantinople.

I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government do not think that Colonel Rose was justified in requesting that the British fleet should be brought to Vourla, and they have entirely approved the conduct of Admiral Dundas, who, in the exercise of a sound discretion, declined to comply with the request of Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, or to leave Malta without instructions to that effect from Her Majesty's Government.

The reports current in Constantinople with respect to the real objects of Prince Menchikoff's mission, the alarm of the Divan and the resignation of Fuad Effendi, the rumoured advance of a large Russian force to the Turkish frontier, the request made for the approach of the British fleet, and the orders given for the sailing of the French fleet, have naturally excited great alarm, both in England and France, with respect to the fate of Turkey, and the events of European importance that might, at any moment, occur in the East.

Her Majesty's Government have felt no alarm, and have not shared the apprehensions which the rumours and facts above alluded to might appear to justify; for, on more than one occasion, they have received the personal assurances of the Emperor of Russia that it was his determination to maintain the independence of the Turkish Empire, and that should the views of His Imperial Majesty undergo any change upon that important question, they should frankly be made known to Her Majesty's Government. No such communication having been received, Her Majesty's Government felt secure that, whatever might be the objects of Prince Menchikoff's mission, neither the

authority of the Sultan, nor the integrity of his dominions, were exposed to danger.

I communicated, without reserve, to Baron Brunnow all the reports that had reached Her Majesty's Government respecting the approach of the Russian army to within one day's march of Jassy; the vast naval preparations at Sevastopol; the excitement of the Greek population at Constantinople on the arrival of Prince Menchikoff; the language, hostile to the Porte, attributed to the Russian Embassy; the changes to be made in the frontier; and the future appointment of the Greek Patriarch by the Emperor of Russia, which would reduce the Sultan to a mere nominal possessor of his throne.

Upon all these points the assurances of Baron Brunnow were satisfactory and conclusive, and they served to confirm the judgment respecting them which had already been formed by Her Majesty's Government.

Her Majesty's Government regret that the alarm and irritation which prevail at Paris should have induced the French Government to order their fleet to sail for the waters of Greece; but the position in which the French Government stands, in many respects is different from that of Her Majesty's Government. They have not, to the knowledge of Her Majesty's Government, received assurances from the Emperor as to the policy he was determined to pursue towards Turkey; the zeal of their late Ambassador at Constantinople is still the cause of much embarrassment to the French Government; and the national honour of France is concerned in not losing all the advantages obtained for the Latins at the Holy Places. Under these circumstances, therefore, and believing that the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire was at hand, it is not very surprising that a hasty determination should have been taken.

Indeed, the position for some time past occupied by France with respect to the Holy Places, and the interest as well as political feeling embarked in the question, are the only grounds for now apprehending embarrassment in the East; but Her Majesty's Government entertain a hope that the Emperor, animated by a desire for the peaceful solution of all difficult questions, will direct Prince Menchikoff to take care, in his negotiations with the Porte for securing the rights of the Greek Church, that no conditions are imposed on the Latins which would be hurtful to the honour or to the interests of France.

You will read this despatch to the Chancellor, and give him a copy of it should he desire it.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 114.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 25.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, March 24, 1853.*

I REPORTED to your Lordship on Saturday afternoon last, the 19th instant, the resolution to which a Council, over which the Emperor had presided in the morning, had come, of ordering the fleet at Toulon to proceed to the coast of Greece.

On asking why it had been judged necessary to take this serious step, I was told that it had not been done with any hostile intention; that it was evident from Colonel Rose having sent for the English fleet, that he considered the crisis at Constantinople as one of great gravity, and that the French Government had resolved to be prepared for any eventuality. But we were, at this time, without any information as to the reasons which had induced Colonel Rose to take the step in question. It appeared to me, therefore, that however necessary and advisable the presence of the French fleet in the Archipelago might eventually become, the decision to send it had been taken prematurely. The French Government had no precise knowledge of the nature and extent of the demands to be made by Prince Menchikoff on the Porte; Her Majesty's Government had not yet received their despatches from Colonel Rose; and it was most desirable that no false move should be made, which might prove a source of future embarrassment. I took, therefore, such steps as I thought

might induce the Emperor to pause, until His Majesty had a thorough knowledge of all that had occurred at Constantinople. It seemed to me that no disadvantage could ensue from a short delay, for one of two things would probably have happened at Constantinople: either Prince Menchikoff would have insisted upon the acceptance of his demands, with an energy which would have accomplished his ends before an English or French fleet could have been near Constantinople, or he would have entered into a course of negotiation with the Porte, which would allow time for England and France to interfere, if the two Governments judged it necessary.

I called the next day on M. Drouyn de Lhuys. A Council had been held in the morning, and I was informed that it was too late to make any alteration in the destination of the fleet. It was impossible, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said, to recall orders which had been published in the "Moniteur."

I will not weary your Lordship with a more detailed report of the arguments which I employed on this and other occasions, first, to prevent the departure of the fleet, and finding that impossible, to prevail on the French Government to give a less hostile and menacing appearance to its arrival at Salamis, whither it is bound, by sending orders that it should anchor for a few days at Naples and other ports between Toulon and the coast of Greece. M. Drouyn de Lhuys could do no more than promise to submit my observations to the Emperor. He repeated at the same time, that there was no hostile meaning in the movement of the fleet; it was a simple measure of precaution.

No. 115.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 25.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, March 24, 1853.*

I HAVE the satisfaction to acquaint your Lordship that the tone of the French Government in regard to its relations with Russia is more conciliatory.

M. de Kisseleff received despatches yesterday from St. Petersburg, dated the 15th instant, which he communicated to M. Drouyn de Lhuys in the course of the day.

In them Count Nesselrode reiterates the sincere desire of the Emperor to terminate the question of the Holy Buildings amicably. In reply to an observation made by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, through M. de Castelbajac, that he sees no reason why the Porte's note of the 9th of February, 1852, to M. de Lavalette, together with the instructions given to Afif Bey, the Porte's Commissioner at Jerusalem, in which documents are contained the concessions granted to the Latins, are not reconcileable with the Firman obtained by M. de Titoff for the Greeks, Count Nesselrode says that he has no knowledge of the two former documents; that they have never been communicated either by the Porte or by the French Government to him, and that he can consequently give no opinion about them; that if they are communicated to him now, he will take them into consideration, and instruct Prince Menchikoff accordingly. The Count remarks, "That if the communication had been made frankly at the time, all that has since taken place might have been avoided." To a proposition which appears to have been made by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that a conference of French, Russian, and Turkish Commissioners should be established at Constantinople, for the purpose of regulating the claims of the contending parties, Count Nesselrode answers, "That it would be better that the French and Russian Representatives should understand each other before addressing themselves to the Porte." Assurances are given that there is no intention on the part of Russia to disturb any arrangements made between France and the Porte in regard to the Sacred Buildings; but it is laid down, that if concessions have been made to the Latins, an equivalent will be required for the Greeks. The whole tenour of the correspondence shows further, that the Emperor of Russia has no hostile feeling towards Turkey, and is anxious for the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

Prince Menchikoff, Count Nesselrode says, will meet whoever may be the French Representative at Constantinople with the utmost frankness and cordiality.

M. de Kisseleff's interview with M. Drouyn de Lhuys terminated very amicably.

I found M. Drouyn de Lhuys much reassured this afternoon. He had received letters from M. de Castelbajac by M. de Kisseleff's courier, which confirmed all M. de Kisseleff's statement. Indeed, General Castelbajac had gone so far as to ask Count Nesselrode, whether he considered the settlement of the question of the Sacred Buildings a *casus belli*, and had been assured by the Russian Chancellor, that the Emperor only looked to its amicable settlement.

In order to lose no time, M. Drouyn de Lhuys sent the substance of these communications to M. Benedetti by an Ottoman courier just starting for Constantinople. He read me his letter to M. Benedetti; but I have not time to say more than that M. Benedetti is enjoined to meet Prince Menchikoff with the same spirit of frankness and cordiality that is offered from the other side.

M. de la Cour left Paris on Monday last for Constantinople.

No. 116.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 25.)*

My Lord,

Paris, March 24, 1853.

THE French Government has received a telegraphic despatch from Vienna, with news from Constantinople up to the 10th instant. Prince Menchikoff had been received by the Sultan on the 8th, and had assured his Highness of the friendly sentiments entertained for him by the Emperor of Russia. The Prince had not touched upon the objects of his mission, except by saying that he had come to Constantinople with the hopes of arranging certain claims which Russia had on the Porte.

Negotiations were opened between the Prince and the Porte on the 10th instant, but on what subject is not said.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 117.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 26.)*

(Extract.)

St. Petersburg, March 13, 1853.

I HAVE at length had the pleasure of holding a highly satisfactory conversation with Count Nesselrode upon the matters in dispute between Russia and France, as represented by the Latin and Greek Churches at Jerusalem.

It commenced by the Chancellor stating that the French Envoy had sent him M. Drouyn de Lhuys' last despatch (I believe that of the 23rd ultimo) and that he had read it with pleasure, as its language and tone were very conciliatory.

In reply, I observed that all the late acts of the French Government appeared to me to be dictated by a spirit of conciliation, and that Her Majesty's Government were extremely desirous that the French overtures should be met in a friendly spirit, and that a door should be opened by Russia for the arrangement of all points of difference.

Count Nesselrode stated that the door was provided by the ample instructions given to Prince Menchikoff; that far from desiring him to push matters to extremity, it had been made clear to the Prince that the Emperor did not desire to deprive the French of any of the advantages of which they had lately possessed themselves; and all that was sought was that some small compensation, in the shape, for instance, of the right to officiate in some church or chapel hitherto closed against them, should be granted to the Greeks.

His Excellency then spoke of Lord John Russell's speech upon Lord Dudley Stuart's motion, a report of which had just reached him from Baron Brunnow.

He professed his entire approval of his Lordship's statements, and observed that they were the more satisfactory as they fully confirmed what I had stated respecting the conduct of Her Majesty's Government in the affairs of the holy places.

No. 118.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

(Extract.)

*Foreign Office, March 29, 1853.*

ON the 25th instant Count Walewski informed me, by the direction of his Government, that the French fleet had orders to proceed to Salamis, and that communications of a satisfactory nature (as reported in your Excellency's despatch of the 24th instant) had been received from Russia with respect to the instructions given to Prince Menchikoff concerning the Holy Places.

Count Walewski said that the French Admiral was directed not to proceed further than Salamis, and that the fleet was sent there not as a menace to Russia, but as a measure of precaution; that serious events might arise in the East, for which it was incumbent on France to be prepared, and that it was thought necessary to send the French fleet to Salamis in order that it might be on the same line as the English fleet at Malta, which, otherwise, would have been nearer to the theatre of events; but that, should the necessity for it arise, the French Government hoped the two fleets would act together in support of the common interests of both countries in the East.

I told Count Walewski that I saw no reason for altering the opinion I had more than once expressed to him, and that I still thought the orders for the sailing of the fleet were given hastily and without sufficient reason; and that, although I hoped the two Governments would always act together when their policy and their interests were identical, yet I must frankly say that the recent proceedings of the French Government were not the best calculated to secure that desirable result; for the fleet had been ordered to sail without consultation or communication with us, at a moment, too, when the French Government were either in possession of their despatches from Constantinople, or were hourly expecting their arrival, and when, moreover, they knew from him (Count Walewski) that Her Majesty's Government hoped and believed that the Admiral at Malta would not comply with the request addressed to him by Colonel Rose; and that, notwithstanding the earnest request of your Excellency, no delay in the departure of the fleet nor change of its destination could be procured.

I added further, that the French Government must know that we had acted with perfect sincerity towards them; that in their differences with Russia we had endeavoured, without expressing any opinion upon the claims of either party, to bring about an amicable arrangement; that we had stated our reasons for thinking the Emperor of Russia entitled to confidence, and that I had informed him (Count Walewski) of the assurances which had been given to me by Baron Brunnow, and which had been fully confirmed by the communications made by M. Kisseleff to M. Drouyn de Lhuys; and, lastly, that the French Government were well aware that it always had been and would be the policy of this country to maintain the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire.

I assured Count Walewski, however, that I had not adverted to these points of difference by way of remonstrance or complaint; but that with Governments as with individuals I thought it best, when any disagreement arose, frankly to seek and to give explanations, and that I was sure such a course would tend to promote those friendly relations between the two countries to which Her Majesty's Government attached so much value.

Count Walewski received these remarks in the same spirit of cordiality and good humour with which they were offered.

## No. 119.

*Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(Received March 30.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, March 10, 1853.*

I MADE inquiries of Prince Menchikoff, respecting the military movements of the Russian troops, which have caused so much apprehension to the Porte ; and I read to his Excellency Mr. Consul Yeames's letter to me on that subject.

Prince Menchikoff said to me in reply, that the Russian force had been advanced to the Turkish frontier, because the first report at St. Petersburg of the result of Count Leiningen's mission was not satisfactory ; but that he did not know of any intention to embark troops at Sevastopol.

I then asked Prince Menchikoff whether the Russian troops could not return to their original quarters, since Count Leiningen's mission had received a satisfactory solution, adding, that I was certain that so peaceful a demonstration would afford the greatest satisfaction to Her Majesty's Government and the Porte. Prince Menchikoff said that the troops would remain in their present quarters, which were their usual cantonments.

I observed, that General Dannenberg's force had advanced from its usual quarters up to the Moldavian frontier ; that the 5th and 7th corps had been united, and placed on the war establishment under General Rudiger. I detailed also other unusual military Russian movements.

Prince Menchikoff then took up another ground of argument, and said that the military movements of Omar Pasha had caused suspicion to the Russian Government, who thought that he might carry war and Mazzini's doctrines into the Austrian territory and the Danubian Provinces.

I told Prince Menchikoff that I could safely give his Excellency the most positive assurances that the Porte had never even had an idea of carrying into execution so great a project of conquest and revolutionary propagandism, which would be ruinous to her interests and incompatible with her means ; that Omar Pasha had the most stringent orders to keep quite clear of the Austrian frontier. And I asked his Excellency how it was possible that that General, with his small, imperfect force, could move, through hostile Slave populations, against the armies of Russia in his front, those of Austria on his left flank, and the war-like Montenegrins in his rear.

Of all the excuses given by Russia for her threatening military demonstrations, this last one is certainly the least valid.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

## No. 120.

*Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(Received March 30.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, March 10, 1853.*

PRINCE MENCHIKOFF has informed me that the Russian Government intend to require from the Porte the execution of the terms of the Firman to the Greeks, and a reparation to the Emperor of Russia ; but his Excellency says, that the retirement of Fuad Effendi formed a part of that reparation ; and I think from his manner and what he let drop, that if France would not further disturb the actual *status quo*, including of course the important matter of the Cupola, which he says is Russian, the Russian Government would not ask for any further reparation.

No. 121.

*Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(Received March 30.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, March 11, 1853.*

THE Servian agent called on me yesterday and told me, in some agitation, that Prince Menchikoff had told him, a few days ago, that he must acquaint the Prince of Servia that he demanded that his Highness should dismiss M. Garaschanin, whom he accused of being a disciple of Messrs. Kossuth and Mazzini, without any delay. He added that a member of the Russian Embassy had told him directly afterwards that if the Prince did not give effect to this demand, Russia would effect a revolt or some great catastrophe in Servia.

M. Nicolaievitch declared that M. Garaschanin was entirely innocent of the charge.

No. 122.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 1.*

My Lord,

*Paris, March 31, 1853.*

THE French mail from Constantinople, due on the 28th instant, only reached Paris last night.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys has had the goodness to communicate to me the substance of M. Benedetti's despatches dated the 14th and 15th instant. They may be summed up as follows :

Prince Menchikoff had not broken the silence which he had observed from his first arrival at Constantinople with respect to the object of his mission, but he was to have an interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 16th, at which he intended stating some of the points which he wished to see arranged. He had, in the meantime, demanded in his quality of Ambassador to be admitted to a private audience of the Sultan, whensoever he might require it. No answer had been returned to this demand.

In an interview which the Prince had had with M. Benedetti, the latter had at once commenced on the question of the holy buildings. The Prince, though he listened with urbanity to all the observations made by the French Chargé d'Affaires, into which I have not time to enter, but which refer to the generalities rather than to the details of the question, replied that the settlement of that question was but a secondary object of his mission; that he had been sent in consequence of the affair of Montenegro, and he did not wish to conceal that, if he had not found it settled, he should have employed all the means at his disposal to force the Porte to desist from its invasion of that country; that, as to the question of the Sacred Places, he did not yet understand it; that no doubt he should in a short time be master of it, and that he hoped it might be settled satisfactorily, but that he must at once state that his instructions did not permit him to negotiate with the French Embassy on that question.

M. Benedetti appears to have used the same arguments as Colonel Rose reports himself, in his despatch of March 10, to have employed to induce Prince Menchikoff to cause the Russian troops to retire now that the affair of Montenegro was terminated, but with no better result.

M. Benedetti continues to draw conclusions adverse to the good faith of Russia from what is passing at Constantinople, but he cites no facts to prove his case.

I was glad to find that neither the doubts evinced by M. Benedetti, nor the language of Prince Menchikoff respecting the question of the holy buildings, which is so completely at variance with that held at St. Petersburg, had had any bad effect upon M. Drouyn de Lhuys' mind. He said that after the positive assurances given by the Russian Government that there was no intention on their part to procure any retractation of the concessions made to France, the French Government was perfectly satisfied. The latter, moreover, had no pretension to interfere with any concessions which the Porte might think fit to accord in compensation to the Greeks, unless the independence of Turkey should

thereby be threatened ; and even then it would be a case for the consideration of the great Powers of Europe collectively, and not of France individually.

Nothing could be more explicit than M. Drouyn de Lhuys' declaration upon this very important point.

In a postscript of the 15th instant, M. Benedetti states that Colonel Rose had sought an interview with the Grand Vizier, for the purpose of asking whether that functionary still thought the presence of the English fleet desirable; and upon being informed that the fears of the Porte of any immediate danger had passed by, he had written by the French steamer to Admiral Dundas to inform him of the altered tone of the Turkish Government.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 123.

*Colonel Rose to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 1.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, March 15, 1853.*

M. BENEDETTI had a long and pacific conversation with Prince Menchikoff yesterday respecting the holy places ; the Ambassador told him that he considered that question secondary, that he was now studying it. M. Benedetti says that Prince Menchikoff may speak of the question lightly with a view not to alarm him.

Neither M. Benedetti nor myself consider the explanations of his Excellency respecting the concentration of Russian troops or their presence on the Turkish frontier satisfactory, although they are more so than M. d'Ozéroff made me ; but, everything considered, we do not think that Russia will now make any violent or categorical demand of the Porte, or support it by a *coup de main* against Constantinople.

Prince Menchikoff assured both M. Benedetti and myself of Russia's wish to support the Porte ; he told me that " he was a negotiator and not, like Count Leiningen, the bearer of a peremptory demand ;" he also said that if Omar Pasha had attacked the Austrians, Russia would have made war on the Porte.

The Grand Vizier and his Ministry feel stronger, and not so apprehensive as they were of Russian aggression. Under these circumstances I have addressed a letter to Vice-Admiral Dundas, of which a copy is inclosed.

Inclosure in No. 123.

*Colonel Rose to Vice-Admiral Dundas.*

Sir,

*Constantinople, March 15, 1853.*

THE aspect of affairs here having become more peaceful, I consulted the Grand Vizier and the Seraskier whether it would not be advisable that I should suggest to your Excellency that it would be better that you should not visit Smyrna at present, but proceed, as Lord John Hay informed me that you originally intended to do, to Corfu and Athens, visiting Smyrna on your return to Malta.

The Grand Vizier and the Seraskier concurring in this suggestion, I have the honour to submit to your Excellency the propriety of your adopting it.

The immediate departure of the French steamer prevents my entering into further details.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

## No. 124.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 4.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, March 24, 1853.*

ACCORDING to the reports received from Constantinople, Prince Menchikoff, after his more formal audience, was admitted to a private interview of the Sultan, at which he had the honour of presenting the letter of which he was the bearer from the Emperor.

At this meeting considerable agitation was manifested by the Sultan, whilst Prince Menchikoff said all that was necessary to quiet his Highness's apprehensions. At a previous conference with the Grand Vizier, Prince Menchikoff had requested that some Commissioner might be named to negotiate with him, and that the person selected might not be Fuad Effendi.

Fuad Effendi, upon learning this demand, had immediately sent in his resignation.

Such has been the account given me by Count Nesselrode. I inquired whether Prince Menchikoff had made a specific demand for Fuad Effendi's dismissal; his Excellency replied that he had not, but that his withdrawal from office was considered by the Emperor's Government as an acceptable concession (*réparation*).

Count Nesselrode having expressed himself very hopefully as to the turn which affairs would now take at Constantinople, I observed that I took for granted the course which was to be followed, would be that the Russian and French Plenipotentiaries would meet and concert a settlement of differences.

His Excellency replied that he did not know how that might be, that he was not even aware whether M. de la Cour had reached Constantinople; but that at all events the settlement of the questions afloat could not be displeasing to the French Government, as there was (as I had been made aware) no intention on the part of the Emperor of demanding a relinquishment of the favours obtained by France. The meaning of this appears to me to be this—that as France obtained certain privileges without the sanction of Russia, Russia in her turn is to obtain a certain favour or favours without French concurrence.

I told Count Nesselrode that I should be very anxious to know whether an adjustment of the difficulties respecting the holy places would settle all matters in dispute between Russia and the Porte; or whether Prince Menchikoff had any other grievances to bring forward. The Chancellor was not aware that any such existed; there might be, he said, some outstanding private claims, but that he knew of no other demands.

In short, no other, I replied (inquiringly, and with a view to prevent misapprehension), than may exist between any two friendly Governments? Precisely so, his Excellency answered; the demands which form part of the current business of every Chancellerie.

This admission appears to me very satisfactory, and equally so is the Chancellor's impression of the late differences being in a train of amicable adjustment.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

## No. 125.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 4.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, March 26, 1853.*

THE French and German newspapers which arrived here yesterday afternoon contain the alarming intelligence from Constantinople which is stated to have been brought to Marseilles by the "Caradoc" steamer, and to have been sent on to Paris by telegraph.

Long before this despatch reaches your Lordship, the truth or falsehood of these sinister rumours will be established, but in the meantime I am desirous of stating my firm conviction of their proving to be incorrect.

It is impossible that I should arrive at any other conclusion, after having received the amicable explanations which it has been my duty to transmit to Her Majesty's Government, and having witnessed the disposition so plainly manifested by the French Cabinet to compensate, by conciliatory measures, for the former hastiness and imprudence of the conduct of a diplomatic agent.

The reports to which I am alluding appear to me to bear upon their very face proofs of their want of foundation. It may be assumed that, if any member of the Turkish Cabinet was more particularly obnoxious to the Imperial Government it was Fuad Effendi, and yet, as your Lordship will have learned from one of my late despatches, the dismissal even of this Minister was not demanded by Prince Menchikoff.

The Prince asked that a Plenipotentiary might be named with whom he might treat, and that this Plenipotentiary should not be Fuad Effendi. His demands, however, in this respect did not go further; and whilst the resignation of Fuad was considered by the Imperial Government (as evidently it was intended to be) in the light of a reparation, everything appears to denote that the other demands which it may have been considered necessary to make of the Porte are not of a nature to excite much opposition on the part of the Turkish Government, or to call in any way for the employment of a naval demonstration on the part of the Russian negotiator.

In a word then, my Lord (always supposing that no unforeseen and serious complication should have arisen at Constantinople), when I weigh the calm and conciliatory assurances given to me here, by authorities so worthy of confidence, against the words of a telegraphic message transmitted from Marseilles, I am bound to infer that the reports which have given me momentary uneasiness are to be entirely mistrusted.

We know, upon certain authority, that the Russian Government are as desirous as the Government of Her Majesty can be that no serious misfortune should befall the Turkish Empire; we are therefore fully warranted in assuming that no measures of force will be employed by which the danger of such a crisis would be unnecessarily incurred.

I will only add that, since the foregoing sentences have been written, I am enabled to state, as I do with great satisfaction, that the opinion which I have expressed to your Lordship respecting the accounts from Constantinople is fully shared by the Imperial Government.

The last despatches received by this Government from Constantinople are under date the 9th instant.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 126.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, April 5, 1853.*

BARON BRUNNOW yesterday communicated to me a despatch in which Count Nesselrode expresses his satisfaction at the confidence placed by Her Majesty's Government in the policy and intentions of the Emperor with respect to Turkey.

I assured Baron Brunnow, and you will repeat the assurance to Count Nesselrode, that that confidence remains unabated.

I at the same time informed Baron Brunnow that, from various quarters, reports reached Her Majesty's Government of military armaments and preparations in the Southern Provinces of Russia, which, if true, hardly appeared consistent with the pacific determinations of the Emperor; and I asked him if he could give me an explanation of those statements, which, being published in the newspapers, had, as he was aware, created considerable uneasiness.

Baron Brunnow was unable to give me any information on that subject, or upon the mission of Admiral Korniloff to Athens, where his presence had caused some excitement.

You will therefore ask for information on these points from the Chancellor, and you will at the same time make known to him that Prince Menchikoff appears to have told M. Benedetti that Montenegro was the real object of his

mission, and that the holy places were a secondary question upon which he was about to inform himself.

With respect to the latter part of Count Nesselrode's despatch, which complains of the conduct of Colonel Rose, I have to inform you that, as there was no opportunity for forwarding the instructions of Lord John Russell before the 24th of February, they could not have reached Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires on the 9th ultimo; but you will long since have been aware that the conduct of Colonel Rose, in requesting that the British fleet should come to Vourla, was not approved by Her Majesty's Government. He appears to have participated in the alarm of the Turkish Government, and the great excitement of the Greek population, caused by the arrival and first proceedings of Prince Menchikoff, together with the rumours that obtained general credit at Constantinople of the advancing army and fleet of Russia; but Her Majesty's Government are unwilling to believe that, on the part of Colonel Rose, there existed any design to thwart the objects of Prince Menchikoff's mission, or to encourage the Turkish Government in opposition to the just demands of the Emperor.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 127.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 9.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, April 8, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS is much pleased with the assurances which M. de Bourqueney has received since he has been at Vienna, of the desire of the Austrian Government to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Empire; Count Buol having declared to M. de Bourqueney that Turkey must live, and that Austria would neither act alone, nor with one or two, but always with the five Powers, on all questions relating to the existence of the Turkish Empire.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 128.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 11.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, March 29, 1853.*

I WAITED yesterday at his desire upon the Chancellor, who was desirous of learning, if possible, the truth of the intelligence reported from Paris as to Colonel Rose having sent for the English squadron.

It was of course out of my power to give any information upon the subject.

Count Nesselrode inquired what degree of responsibility an English Chargé d'Affaires was at liberty to incur? To which I replied, that when only private risk was to be weighed against public advantage, I thought it difficult to assign any limits to the responsibility of an English diplomatic agent of whatever rank.

Count Nesselrode placed in my hands a despatch dated the 1<sup>st</sup>/<sub>28</sub>th of February, which he had received a fortnight since from Baron Brunnow, and to which I only allude in consequence of the honourable testimony which the Russian Envoy bears to the conciliatory conduct of Her Majesty's Government.

Baron Brunnow, however, did not attempt to conceal the anxiety which was still felt by Her Majesty's Government as to the course which affairs might take at Constantinople, and, as appeared to me, rather left it to be inferred that this very confidence afforded an additional motive for a peaceable solution of difficulties being that which ought to be adopted.

Count Nesselrode remarked that the only moment during the late transactions at which he had felt apprehension was that at which the urgency of affairs at Montenegro had called for the mission of Count Leiningen; that he had never contemplated the chances of the Holy Places' question leading to a war;

and that his anticipation of a speedy conclusion of all matters in dispute had been confirmed by his last despatches from Prince Menchikoff: these, of as late a date as the 17th, represented affairs as going on satisfactorily, and made no allusion either to the summons now said to have been given to the English squadron, or to any circumstance of a nature to render such a summons probable.

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## No. 129.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 11.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, March 31, 1853.*

I HAVE received from Mr. Consul Yeames the letter of which I have the honour of inclosing to your Lordship the accompanying extract.

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## Inclosure in No. 129.

*Consul Yeames to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

(Extract.)

*March 20, 1853.*

YESTERDAY a steamer arrived from Constantinople with letters of the 16th instant.

On the preceding day Prince Menchikoff had his first interview with the new Reis Effendi.

Nothing had transpired respecting the course of pending negotiations.

In the meantime the military movements here have of late been precipitated, and before the end of the present month (old style) the three divisions of the 5th corps are to be concentrated; the 15th division of infantry at Leovo on the Pruth, the 14th at Odessa, and the 13th at Sevastopol.

The troops of the two last are to be lightly equipped for embarkation and a descent.

The movements in the rear are less precisely known, and it was said that the 4th corps was to be soon in motion in order to concentrate in Upper Bessarabia, with its advanced division (the 10th) at Lipthani on the Pruth.

Under such circumstances it is natural for the trade of these ports, now embarrassed by great engagements abroad, to be in consternation.

There is, nevertheless, much hope entertained for a peaceable adjustment, founded on confidence in the wisdom and magnanimity of the Emperor, and on the present disposition of the Turks to concede to all just claims.

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## No. 130.

*Colonel Rose to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 15.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, March 19, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Lord John Russell's despatch of the 19th ultimo, and to say that I have executed the instructions which it contains.

Rifaat Pasha, Prince Menchikoff, and M. Benedetti, received the communications which I made to them, in obedience to those instructions, in the following manner.

Rifaat Pasha said, that Prince Menchikoff had told him that I had received instructions from my Government respecting the holy places, and asked him whether I had communicated them to him. His Excellency then asked my opinion as to the cupola, saying, that according to his information, which he considered correct, it would last without repair for four or five years more, and that his intention was, if the question was mooted by the Russians, to let it remain for the present in the *status quo*. I replied that I could not express an opinion on the subject, as I had no instructions respecting the cupola.

Prince Menchikoff approved the communication of my instructions, but dwelt upon the firman to the Greeks as the basis of the solution of the question of the holy places, saying, however, that the Emperor, in a concessional spirit, would not come back on the past, that is, would not demand back the key of the Church of Bethlehem.

M. Benedetti said, on my holding language to him in the sense of Lord John Russell's instructions, "that he desired nothing better than to adhere to the position of the holy places of February in the last year."

Prince Menchikoff told me on a previous occasion, that the cupola, and the right to repair it, belonged to Russia.

No. 131.

*Colonel Rose to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 15.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, March 21, 1853.*

IN execution of the instructions in Lord John Russell's despatch of February 10, I abstained from giving my advice or opinion in the matter of the Holy Places till I received his Lordship's despatch of February 19, and I confined myself to recommending moderation and caution in any step taken as to that matter by any of the Foreign Ministers here.

No. 132.

*Colonel Rose to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 11.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, March 23, 1853.*

WITH reference to Mr. Consul Finn's despatch of December 28 of last year to your Lordship, I have the honour to inclose a report from M. E. Pisani rectifying some errors in that despatch respecting the question of the sanctuaries.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HUGH ROSE

Inclosure in No. 132.

*Report of M. E. Pisani.*

IT would appear that Mr. Finn is under a mistake when he asserts that the Silver Star arrived from Jaffa with much pomp, and that some of the Effendis went down to Jaffa to escort it, &c. Afif Bey, who at that time was at Jerusalem, assures me that the Star was sent to him by the Pasha of Saida in a box sealed up with the seal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and that it was accompanied by only one officer of the Pasha's household. The Star remained sealed as it was, for upwards of twenty days in Afif Bey's room, and nobody knew of its arrival until the moment it was brought into the Church of Bethlehem to be fixed in the place of the stolen one, in the presence of the Pasha of Jerusalem, the Patriarch of the Latins, and the Members of the Municipal Council.

The keys, as Mr. Finn states, were not taken from the Greeks to be given to the Latins, but three new keys were made by the Pasha's orders, and delivered to the Latins, the day the Star was fixed.

*Pera, March 18, 1853.*

(Signed) ET. PISANI.

No. 133.

*Colonel Rose to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 11.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, March 24, 1853.*

ON the 17th instant Prince Menchikoff, accompanied by his Embassy, made an official visit to Rifaat Pasha. This Minister assured me that the visit was more a formal opening of negotiations than anything else; that Prince Menchikoff had confined himself to stating, in general terms that the object of his mission was to settle, not to embarrass matters, and to do away with the coldness existing between the two Governments; he added also, that he hoped to find the Sultan animated by the same sentiments as his father, alluding, it was supposed, to the Treaty of Hunkiar Skelesi.

Shortly afterwards I learnt that Prince Menchikoff had left, on the 17th instant, a "note verbale" with Rifaat Pasha, containing the Russian demand of the Porte; this Rifaat Pasha denied. More urgent inquiries on my part extracted from the Grand Vizier the suspicious statements in the inclosed report. The Turkish authorities were still less communicative to my French colleague.

Prince Menchikoff had another interview with Rifaat Pasha on the 22nd instant.

The important revelations made to me by Rifaat Pasha and the Grand Vizier, form the subject of a further despatch.

Inclosure in No. 133.

*M. E. Pisani to Colonel Rose.*

(Extract.)

*Pera, March 19, 1853.*

I COMMUNICATED respectively to the Grand Vizier, and Rifaat Pasha, your instruction of this day's date, respecting the report universally talked of that the Russians are endeavouring to enter into a secret treaty or arrangement with the Porte. His Highness requested me to say in reply, that so long as he continues to be at the head of the Ministry, you can reckon upon the non-accomplishment of the wishes of Russia; but if he is dismissed from office, of course he does not know what line of policy might be adopted by his successor.

His Highness told me that the language now held by Prince Menchikoff is exceedingly mild and very friendly, and gives to understand that the Emperor entertains no intention to recede from what was done in the question of the holy places. But, on the other hand, he got information from good authority that this moderate behaviour on the part of the Russian Ambassador is calculated to induce the Porte to assent to the conclusion of a secret compact.

Rifaat Pasha seems to be unacquainted with the true intention of Prince Menchikoff to propose a secret Treaty, yet he suspects it, and gave me the most formal and unequivocal assurances that were such a proposal to be made to him, he would lose no time in informing Her Majesty's Embassy of it.

No. 134.

*Colonel Rose to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 11.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, March 25, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship the copy of a report of what passed at my interview yesterday with the Grand Vizier and Rifaat Pasha.

Your Lordship will see that in spite of Prince Menchikoff's denunciations against the Turkish authorities, should they reveal his secret demands, they, in consideration of the danger which would ensue from a compliance with them, determined to make them known to Her Majesty's Government.

The Grand Vizier informs me also that in the projected Treaty there is a

clause which could be interpreted into protection by Russia of the Turkish Greek Church.

I inclose a report which I have received from Her Majesty's Consul at Odessa.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 134.

*Memorandum by M. E. Pisani.*

*Constantinople, March 25, 1853.*

RIFAAT PASHA, in the interview which we had yesterday with him, stated that Prince Menchikoff had left him on the 17th instant a "note verbale." The note began by stating that the Emperor was very angry about what the Porte had done respecting the holy places, and that he would have receded from that arrangement, but that desirous not to involve the Porte in new difficulties with another Power, he would have no objection to accept the arrangement of February last, provided the Porte would give unequivocal assurances that she would maintain the *status quo* of the sanctuaries in future; that as the Emperor could not rely upon verbal assurances after all the contradictions which had taken place in the question at issue, he was very anxious that a Treaty should be entered into between the Porte and Russia respecting that matter. Rifaat Pasha observed that he suspects that the object of the Treaty would be the exclusive protectorate by Russia of the Greeks and the Armenians throughout the Sultan's dominions; that Prince Menchikoff does not make any objection to the cupola being repaired by the Sultan at His Majesty's expense, on condition that it will be so repaired under the superintendence of the Greek Patriarch of Jerusalem. Prince Menchikoff demands permission to build a hospital and a church for the Russian priests at Jerusalem; he demands that the two houses next to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, which are Tékés, or Turkish convents, should be pulled down. They give to understand that the Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople should be entirely independent of the Porte. Rifaat Pasha said that the Treaty proposed by Prince Menchikoff is more than the Treaty of Hunkiar Skelessi. The Grand Vizier, whom we subsequently saw, was more frank and communicative than Rifaat Pasha. His Excellency said that, in the "note verbale" presented by Prince Menchikoff, it is stated that since some time, the Porte was misled by the advice of ill-disposed Powers; that in the end of the note France was mentioned, separately, as being one of these Powers; that Prince Menchikoff does not at all approve the interference of Foreign Embassies concerning the Patriarchate, and highly disapproves Lord Ponsonby's behaviour in the matter of the dismissal of the Patriarch Gregorius, whom they wish to have reinstated; and he expresses a wish that the Patriarch should be appointed for life. With respect to the Treaty, the Grand Vizier repeated again what he said to me on the 19th instant,—that as long as he was at the head of the Ministry, no such Treaty shall be signed, as he considers it ruinous to the country.

(Signed) ET. PISANI.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 134.

*Consul-General Yeames to Colonel Rose.*

Sir,

*Odessa, March 22, 1853.*

I BEG leave to refer to my letter of the 4th instant; and I have now to inform you that the movements of the 5th Corps have of late been hastened, so that the three divisions of infantry are to be assembled in the positions described before the end of the present month (old style). It is in particular to be observed that the 14th Division, as well as the 13th, is prepared for an expedition by sea. The troops, including the officers, are to carry rations for four days, and knapsacks for the officers are now made for that purpose. I hear there is to be no baggage further than can be thus carried, and no horses will be embarked. I can

say nothing respecting artillery, for as yet only half a battery is arrived here. Considering the very light equipment, I am at a loss to imagine the place intended for a descent, as far as regards the 14th Division, if not the mouth of the Danube, for the purpose of cooperating with the 15th Division in the occupation merely of the two Principalities.

The same precipitation is not apparent in the movements of the 4th corps d'armée, the head-quarters of which are still in Kremenetz. This corps was to be concentrated in Upper Bessarabia, with its advanced division at Lipthani on the Pruth. The heavy roads of Volhynia and Podolia are at this season almost impassable, and these troops cannot possibly be in position before the middle of May.

Great exertions continue to be made by the Admiralty at Nicolayeff and Sevastopol to have everything that can swim ready for sea.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) JAMES YEAMES.

No. 135.

*Colonel Rose to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 15.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, March 31, 1853.*

SINCE the date of my late despatches to your Lordship, I have had interviews on the state of affairs here with the Grand Vizier, the Seraskier, Rifaat and Namik Pashas.

It results from the confidential statements made to me on these occasions by the Turkish Ministers, that Prince Menchikoff has not as yet made any distinct demand with respect to Russian complaints, except as to the question of the holy places. The same remarkable vagueness or indecision marks his Excellency's negotiations as has been the case from the first.

Prince Menchikoff, as I learnt yesterday from the Grand Vizier, has tried to exact a promise from Rifaat Pasha, before he makes known to him the nature of his mission and of his demands, that the Porte shall make a formal promise that she will not reveal them to the British or French Representatives. Rifaat Pasha declined, and Prince Menchikoff declared that if the object of his mission were not promptly settled, he must leave Constantinople; but he modified this declaration by declaring that he did not mean thereby to imply that his retirement would be the signal for war.

Rifaat Pasha asked Prince Menchikoff for explanations respecting the menacing movements and attitude of the military and naval forces of Russia.

The inclosed copy of a report of M. Chabert will give your Lordship full information as to the explanations which took place between Rifaat Pasha and Prince Menchikoff on the subject.

I also inclose the copy of a previous report of the Grand Vizier's conversation with me on the 28th instant.

These documents will give your Lordship full information as to the latest proceedings of Prince Menchikoff.

Inclosure 1 in No. 135.

*M. R. Chabert to Colonel Rose.*

M. le Colonel,

*Péra, le 30 Mars, 1853.*

J'AI l'honneur de vous rapporter ci-après ce que Rifaat Pasha vous a dit ce matin au sujet des troupes Russes que se trouvent près des frontières Turques.

"J'ai demandé," a dit son Excellence, "au Prince Menchikoff, pourquoi l'armée Russe se trouvait près de nos frontières; et il m'a répondu que comme il y avait une armée Autrichienne pour 'l'affaire de Montenegro, le Gouvernement Russe avait jugé à propos d'y envoyer aussi une force armée pour toute éventualité.'

"J'ai observé au Prince que cette affaire ayant eu une solution, les troupes devraient par conséquent se retirer, mais il a répliqué qu'elles doivent y rester

encore. Alors je lui ai dit que si la Russie a l'intention de les faire marcher contre la Turquie, il devrait nous le dire afin que nous prenions nos mesures en conséquence et que nous fassions aussi nos préparatifs de défense. A cela le Prince a répondu que la Russie n'a pas l'intention de faire la guerre, et que la Porte pouvait être tranquille."

J'ai, &c.  
(Signé) ROBERT CHABERT.

(Translation.)

M. le Colonel,

*Pera, Murch 30, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to report to you below what Rifaat Pasha said to me this morning on the subject of the Russian troops on the Turkish frontiers.

"I asked Prince Menchikoff," said his Excellency, "why the Russian army was on our frontiers; and he replied, that as there was an Austrian army for the Montenegro affair, the Russian Government had judged it right also to send to the frontiers an armed force for any contingency.

"I remarked to the Prince, that that matter having been settled, the troops ought consequently to withdraw; but he replied, that they must still remain there. I then said to him, that if Russia intended to march them against Turkey, he ought to tell us so, in order that we might take our measures accordingly, and make our preparations for defence. To this the Prince rejoined, that Russia did not intend making war, and that the Porte might be at ease."

I have, &c.  
(Signed) ROBERT CHABERT.

Inclosure 2 in No. 135.

*Report of a Conversation between Colonel Rose and the Grand Vizier.*

LE Prince Menchikoff ne nous a pas encore déclaré quelles sont les demandes de son Gouvernement, ni les a-t-il spécifiées. Il parle toujours dans des termes généraux et vagues de la question des lieux saints, de l'affaire des réfugiés, mais il n'a encore rien précisé. Nous savons cependant que la mission est de faire avec nous un Traité secret d'alliance. Il ne l'a pas demandé officiellement, mais il a dit à quelques personnes de sa confiance et qu'il sait qu'ils communiquent avec nous, que nous avons tort de nous fier aux Gouvernements Anglais et Français, car l'expérience devrait enfin nous prouver que nous avons beaucoup perdu et rien gagné en suivant leur politique et leur conseils. C'est par ce langage qu'il cherche à gagner leur appui, et s'assurer de leur concours dans l'œuvre de Traité secret qu'il cherche à faire. Sa politique est très confuse. Tantôt il veut nous faire aller vers la Russie par la douceur en faisant répandre le bruit que les intentions de son Gouvernement sont pacifiques. Tantôt il cherche à nous attirer en signalant les désavantages et l'inutilité de notre confiance en l'Angleterre et la France, et combien nous avons eu tort de suivre les conseils de ces deux Puissances, auxquelles nous ne devrions pas être attachés, surtout si nous considérons que la nature de leur Constitution diffère de la nature de la notre, qui est au contraire comme celle de la Russie et de l'Autriche.

Le Prince Menchikoff a eu une conférence avec Rifaat Pasha il y a deux jours. Dans cette conférence il lui a dit qu'avant de faire connaître à la Sublime Porte la nature de sa mission et les demandes de son Gouvernement, et avant de s'expliquer, il demandait à Rifaat Pasha la promesse formelle de la Porte qu'elle ne communiquera ni au Représentant de l'Angleterre ni à celui de la France absolument rien de ce qu'il a à lui demander ou à lui proposer; qu'il voulait que cela eût à se passer sous le sceau du plus grand secret, sans quoi il ne voulait pas entrer en matière. Rifaat Pasha lui a répondu qu'il lui est impossible de garder le secret vis-à-vis les Représentants de ces deux Puissances, les plus amies de la Porte, dans une question si importante. Qu'au contraire, il considère comme un devoir de la Porte de tenir ces deux Puissances au courant de ce qui intéresse la Turquie—cet Empire auquel ces Puissances se sont toujours intéressées,

et qu'elles ont toujours protégé. Cette réponse de Rifaat Pasha a beaucoup fâché le Prince Menchikoff, qui le quitta sans lui rien dire. Mais cet état de choses, cette mystification, cette politique confuse, ne peuvent pas continuer. Le Prince Menchikoff aura dans le courant de cette semaine une autre conférence avec Rifaat Pasha, et je crois que les véritables prétensions de la Russie y seront déclarées et mises au jour.

— Dans une note verbale qu'il a donnée à Rifaat Pasha, le Prince Menchikoff s'exprime dans les termes très vagues et en faisant rouler toutes ses phrases sur la question des lieux saints ; et dans une partie de cette note il dit en parlant de l'Angleterre et de la France, les Puissances " *bed hah*," c'est-à-dire, mal-disposées.

*Le 28 Mars, 1853.*

(Signé)

ROBERT CHABERT.

(Translation.)

*March 28, 1853.*

PRINCE MENCHIKOFF has not yet told us what are the demands of his Government, nor has he specified them. He continues to speak in general and vague terms of the question of the Holy Places, of the affair of the refugees ; but as yet he has said nothing definite. We are aware, however, that the object of his mission is to make a secret Treaty of Alliance with us. He has not demanded it officially, but he has told some persons in his confidence, and who he knows are in communication with us, that we do wrong to rely on the English and French Governments, for experience should at length have proved to us that we have lost much and gained nothing by following their policy and advice. By this language he seeks to gain their support, and to insure their concurrence in the work of the secret treaty which he is seeking to conclude. His policy is most confused. At one time he would attract us to Russia by mildness, spreading abroad the report that the intentions of his Government are pacific. At another time he seeks to gain us over by pointing out the disadvantages and inutility of our reliance upon England and France, and how wrong we are in following the advice of those two Powers, to whom we ought not to be attached, especially if we consider that the nature of their Constitution differs from that of ours, which, on the contrary, resembles that of Russia and Austria.

Prince Menchikoff had a conference with Rifaat Pasha two days ago. In this conference he told him that before communicating to the Sublime Porte the nature of his mission and the demands of his Government, and before giving any explanation, he required from Rifaat Pasha the formal promise of the Porte that it would not communicate to the Representative either of England or of France anything whatever as to what he demanded or proposed ; that it was his wish that it should be treated with the greatest secrecy, otherwise he would not enter upon the subject. Rifaat Pasha replied that it is impossible for him to observe secrecy in so important a question towards the Representatives of those two Powers, who were the most friendly to the Porte. That on the contrary, he considered it to be the duty of the Porte to keep those two Powers informed of what concerns Turkey, for which Empire those Powers have always shown an interest, and which they have constantly protected. This reply of Rifaat Pasha greatly vexed Prince Menchikoff, who went away without saying anything to him. But this state of things, this mystification, this confused policy, cannot continue. Prince Menchikoff will in the course of this week have another conference with Rifaat Pasha, and I think that the real pretensions of Russia will then be declared and developed.

In a note verbale which he has given to Rifaat Pasha, Prince Menchikoff expresses himself in the vaguest terms, making all his periods turn on the question of the Holy Places, and in a part of that note he says, in speaking of England and France, the Powers " *bed hah*," that is to say, ill-disposed.

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No. 136.

*Colonel Rose to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 15.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, April 1, 1853.*

THIS morning early I despatched M. Chabert with an instruction to the Foreign Minister; Mr. Hughes with one to the Seraskier; I myself, accompanied by M. Doria, proceeded to the Grand Vizier at his country-house on the Bosphorus. The result of this combined movement has been satisfactory. Inclosed are copies of M. Doria's and M. Chabert's reports.

Inclosure 1 in No. 136.

*M. Doria to Colonel Rose.*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, April 1, 1853.*

YOUR conversation this morning with the Grand Vizier, elicited the following information :—

With regard to the cupola of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem, Prince Menchikoff was satisfied that it should be repaired by the Sultan, with the proviso that it should be restored to its present state, that of the Greek rite, and not to the state it was in previous to its being burnt fifty years ago, that is, the Latin rite, which point, however, the French Chargé d'Affaires still insists on; that the question was still undecided, and under the consideration of the Grand Council; Prince Menchikoff had also expressed his satisfaction that this point should be submitted for the approval of the French Government, but remarked England had nothing whatever to do with it; this his Highness stated was the subject of Prince Menchikoff's, Rifaat Pasha's, and Hajee Arif Effendi's meeting yesterday, and not as you had been informed, for the nomination of three Turkish Plenipotentiaries, for the purpose of conferring with Prince Menchikoff relative to the secret Treaty.

Prince Menchikoff had verbally expressed the Emperor's wish to enter into a secret Treaty with Turkey, putting a fleet and 400,000 men at her disposal, if she ever needed aid against any Western Power whatever. That Russia further secretly demanded an addition to the Treaty of Kainardji, whereby the Greek Church should be placed entirely under Russian protection, without reference to Turkey, which was to be the equivalent for the proffered aid above mentioned. Prince Menchikoff had stated the greatest secrecy must be maintained relative to this proposition, and that should Turkey allow it to be made known to England, he and his mission would instantly quit Constantinople.

His Highness gave his repeated assurances that nothing whatever should be added to the Treaty of Kainardji; that he would ask to retire from office rather than agree to either of the two propositions made by Prince Menchikoff, which would be fatal to Turkey.

The Grand Vizier particularly requested you to inform Her Majesty's Government, with as little delay as possible, of the secret object of Prince Menchikoff's mission.

Inclosure 2 in No. 136.

*M. Chabert to Colonel Rose.*

M. le Colonel,

*Péra, le 1 Avril, 1853.*

J'AI l'honneur de vous informer que je me suis dûment acquitté ce matin de vos instructions auprès de Rifaat Pasha, et je vous transmets ci-après le résultat de mon entrevue avec son Excellence.

Rifaat Pasha m'a dit qu'il a eu hier avec le Prince Menchikoff une conférence qui a duré environ cinq heures, et à laquelle ont assistés M. d'Ozeroff, le premier drogman de Russie, M. Argyropulo, Arif Effendi, Mufti du Conseil Suprême, et M. Aristarchi, Logothète.

Qu'il n'y avait à cette conférence ni Reshid Pasha ni le Seraskier. et que

l'information qui nous a été donnée que le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse a nommé trois Plénipotentiaires pour conférer avec le Prince Russe, est aussi gratuite que la supposition que l'objet de leur réunion était de faire un Traité secret à l'instar de celui de Unkiar Skelessi. Rifaat Pasha m'a dit que le Prince Menchikoff avait annoncé que le sujet de son entrevue serait la question des lieux saints ; et que comme cette question est très bien connue à Arif Effendi, parcequ'il était au Conseil Suprême toutes les fois qu'elle y avait été débattue, c'est lui (Rifaat) qui a désiré qu'Arif Effendi fût présent à la conférence, et qu'il l'y a fait assister après en avoir obtenu le consentement du Grand Vizier.

Rifaat Pasha m'a assuré que toute l'entrevue du Prince n'a, en effet, eu trait qu'à la question des lieux saints ; qu'il a demandé que l'arrangement de cette question soit fait par écrit en forme de Convention, afin qu'il puisse être considérée définitivement terminée et pour que l'on n'ait plus à revenir par la suite ; mais qu'il n'a pas du tout parlé d'un Traité secret qu'il voudrait faire entre son Gouvernement et la Porte. Son Excellence m'a donné en même temps les assurances les plus formelles qu'il ne fera jamais avec le Prince aucun accord, aucun Traité, aucune concession qui puissent toucher directement ou indirectement aux Traités et aux rapports qu'existent entre la Sublime Porte et l'Angleterre et la France, sans en informer leur Représentants au préalable et sans leur pleine adhésion.

" Il est possible," a-t-il ajouté, " que la circonstance de la destitution de Fuad Effendi et de ma nomination au poste de Ministre des Affaires Etrangères peu de jours après l'arrivée du Prince Menchikoff, ait fait penser à M. Colonel Rose, que je suis Russe ; mais je vous prie de déclarer formellement de ma part que je ne suis ni Russe, ni Anglais, ni Français, mais que je suis Turc ; que je n'ai en vue que l'intérêt de mon Gouvernement et ses devoirs envers les Gouvernements qui le soutiennent et qui le protègent. Je ne suis pas un enfant—je suis un vieux Ministre, connaissant très bien les Traités qui lient la Sublime Porte avec les Puissances amies, et je comprends, Dieu en soit loué, trop bien toute l'importance de nos bons rapports avec l'Angleterre et la France, tout le poids de l'obligation à maintenir les Traités, toute l'étendue du mal qui résulterait pour mon Gouvernement s'il s'en écarte ou s'il les enfreint, pour hésiter un seul instant d'informer leurs Représentants respectifs de toute demande ou proposition que voudrait nous imposer la Russie et qui ne serait pas en harmonie avec les droits consacrés par ces Traités. Vous pouvez donner toutes ces assurances de ma part à M. le Chargé d'Affaires, et dites-lui, je vous prie, que comme j'aurai le plaisir de le voir demain au soir au diner du Prince Menchikoff, je les lui donnerai aussi en personne au palais même de la Russie."

J'ai l'honneur, &c.

(Signé) ROBERT CHABERT.

(Translation.)

M. le Colonel,

*Pera, April 1, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I this morning duly executed your instructions, and I transmit to you herewith the result of my interview with Rifaat Pasha.

Rifaat Pasha told me that he had yesterday a conference with Prince Menchikoff which lasted about five hours, and at which M. d'Ozeroff, the Russian First Dragoman M. Argyropulo, Arif Effendi, Mufti of the Supreme Council, and M. Aristarchi, Logothete, were present.

That neither Reshid Pasha nor the Seraskier were at that conference ; and that the information which had been given to us that his Highness's Government had named three Plenipotentiaries to confer with the Russian Prince, is as gratuitous as the supposition that the object of their meeting was to make a secret Treaty similar to that of Unkiar Skelessi. Rifaat Pasha told me that Prince Menchikoff had announced that the subject of his interview would be the question of the Holy Places ; and that as Arif Effendi is well acquainted with that question, because he was at the Supreme Council on all occasions on which it had been discussed there, he (Rifaat Pasha) desired that Arif Effendi should be present at the conference, and that he caused him to attend there after having obtained the consent of the Grand Vizir to that effect.

Rifaat Pasha assured me that the Prince's entire interview had reference, in fact, only to the question of the Holy Places; that he had required that that question should be settled in writing in the form of a Convention, in order that it might be considered as definitively settled, and that no further reference should hereafter have to be made to it; but he did not speak at all of a secret treaty which he was desirous of making between his Government and the Porte. His Excellency at the same time gave me the most formal assurances that he will never make with the Prince any agreement, any treaty, any concession, which could, directly or indirectly, affect the treaties and relations existing between the Sublime Porte and England and France, without in the first instance informing their Representatives, and without their full concurrence.

"It is possible," he added, "that the circumstance of the dismissal of Fuad Effendi, and of my appointment to the office of Minister for Foreign Affairs, a few days after the arrival of Prince Menchikoff, may have caused Colonel Rose to think that I am Russian; but I request you formally to declare, on my part, that I am neither Russian, nor English, nor French, but that I am Turkish; that my only object is the interest of my Government and its duties towards the Governments which support and protect it. I am not a child; I am an old Minister, very well acquainted with the Treaties which unite the Sublime Porte with the friendly Powers; and I understand, God be praised, too well the whole importance of our good relations with England and France, the full weight of the obligation to maintain treaties, the whole extent of the evil which would result to my Government if it departs from or infringes them, to hesitate a single instant to inform their respective Representatives of every demand or proposal which Russia might be desirous of imposing upon us, and which might not be in accordance with the rights recorded in those treaties. You may give these assurances on my behalf to the Chargé d'Affaires, and tell him, I beg you, that, as I shall have the pleasure of seeing him to-morrow at Prince Menchikoff's dinner, I will give them to him also in person, even at the Russian Embassy."

I have, &c.  
(Signed) ROBERT CHABERT.

No. 137.

*Colonel Rose to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 15.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, April 2, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship a copy of Mr. Vice-Consul Cunningham's report of the 28th ultimo.

The tenor of this report, taken in consideration with that of Mr. Consul Yeames' last report from Odessa, can leave, I think, no doubt as to the hostile nature of the intentions of the Russian Government.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 137.

*Vice-Consul Cunningham to Colonel Rose.*

Sir,

*Galatz, March 28, 1853.*

IN my despatch of the 25th ultimo, I mentioned that orders had been given in Bessarabia to prepare quarters for a large number of troops; I now beg to wait on you with the inclosed copy of my letter to the Earl of Clarendon of this day, on the same subject.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) C. CUNNINGHAM.

## Inclosure 2 in No. 137.

*Vice-Consul Cunningham to the Earl of Clarendon.*

My Lord,

*Galatz, March 28, 1853.*

I HAVE to inform your Lordship that fresh orders have been received in Bessarabia to prepare for the passage of troops, and to get waggons ready for the transport of baggage.

It is said, and such appears to be the case from the amount of preparation ordered, that two corps d'armée, upwards of 120,000 men, will pass, and waggons are ordered to be ready for the 10th of May, o. s.

Whenever orders are given to make preparations, the greatest secrecy is enjoined.

Hitherto no troops, in addition to the five battalions mentioned in my last, have entered Bessarabia, but it is understood they are marching forward from all directions.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) C. CUNNINGHAM.

## No. 138.

*Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Baron Brunnow, April 15).*

M. le Baron,

*St. Pétersbourg, le <sup>26 Mars</sup><sub>7 Avril</sub>, 1853.*

JE m'acquitte avec empressement du devoir de faire connaître à votre Excellence la vive satisfaction avec laquelle l'Empereur a pris lecture de vos dépêches du  $\frac{11}{3}$  courant. Elles nous annoncent que le Gouvernement Britannique a non seulement approuvé le refus de l'Amiral Dundas de déférer, sans un ordre exprès de Londres, à l'invitation que lui avait faite le Chargé d'Affaires d'Angleterre à Constantinople, de se rendre avec la flotte Anglaise à Vourla, mais a pris la résolution de laisser cette flotte à Malte et d'attendre avec confiance le développement des négociations entamées par le Prince Menchikoff avec la Porte Ottomane, sans les compliquer en s'associant à la démonstration hâtive qu'a cru devoir prescrire à son escadre le Gouvernement Français.

De son côté Sir H. Seymour est venu ces jours-ci me communiquer la dépêche que lui a adressée sur le même sujet le nouveau Principal Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires Etrangères, Lord Clarendon. Elle confirme de tout point des nouvelles que vous nous donnez.

Il nous a été bien agréable, M. le Baron, de voir par cette pièce comme par le résumé de vos entretiens avec les Ministres Britanniques, que tous les faux bruits répandus à Constantinople à l'égard de nos intentions n'avaient causé aucune alarme ou appréhension au Cabinet de Londres, convaincu par les assurances personnelles qu'il a reçues à ce sujet de l'Empereur, que le désir et la résolution de Sa Majesté sont de respecter l'indépendance et l'intégrité de l'Empire Turc, et que si ses vues à cet égard venaient à subir un changement quelconque, notre Auguste Maître serait le premier à en avertir le Gouvernement Anglais.

Veillez assurer les Ministres de la Reine, dans les termes les plus positifs, que les intentions de l'Empereur sont toujours les mêmes, et que toutes les vaines rumeurs auxquelles a donné lieu dans la capitale Ottomane l'arrivée du Prince Menchikoff—occupation des Principautés, agrandissement de territoire du côté de nos frontières Asiatiques, prétention de nous assurer la nomination du Patriarche Grec de Constantinople, langage hostile et comminatoire tenu à la Porte par notre Ambassadeur, sont non seulement exagérées, mais dénuées même de toute espèce de fondement; qu'en un mot la mission du Prince Menchikoff n'a jamais eu, et n'a encore, d'autre but que celui dont votre Excellence a été chargé de faire part au Gouvernement Britannique.

Quant à la recommandation qui nous est faite de ménager autant que possible l'amour propre de la France dans la question délicate des lieux saints, et, tout en revendiquant les droits de l'Eglise Grecque, de chercher à ne rien

imposer aux Latins qui pût blesser trop directement l'honneur et les intérêts de cette Puissance, vous pouvez assurer également les Ministres Anglais que dans l'arrangement à négocier il n'est point question de faire révoquer ou ôter aux Latins les dernières concessions qu'ils ont obtenues par la note Ottomane du 9 Février de l'an passé, mais simplement de faire concorder ces concessions avec les dispositions du hatti-chérif, en les dépouillant de ce qu'elles peuvent avoir d'exclusif, d'obtenir aux Grecs quelques compensations pour le tort qui leur a été fait, et surtout de les mettre à l'abri contre le retour de nouveaux préjudices.

En général, nous ne demandons pas mieux que de nous entendre à l'amiable avec le Gouvernement Français, en ayant égard à la position où il s'est lui-même placé, quoique toutes les concessions qu'on peut faire à sa susceptibilité n'aient presque toujours pour effet que de le rendre plus exigeant, en ce qu'il en prend acte comme d'un succès qui l'autorise à en chercher d'autres. Mais il faut qu'il se prête lui-même à nous en faciliter les moyens au lieu d'agir en sens contraire, comme il vient de le faire si précipitamment par une démonstration dont les conséquences peuvent mettre en opposition nos desirs de conciliation et le soin de notre dignité. Le Gouvernement Anglais doit voir lui-même que la France n'est pas toujours accessible aux conseils de la modération, puisque les sages représentations qu'il lui a fait faire par Lord Cowley, n'ont pu empêcher le départ de l'escadre Française.

L'Empereur vous charge, M. le Baron, de remercier très particulièrement, en son nom, Lord Aberdeen et Lord Clarendon, de la salutaire impulsion qu'ils viennent de donner aux résolutions du Cabinet Britannique. Le premier nous a offert en cette occasion un nouveau témoignage de confiance, auquel notre Auguste Maître est infiniment sensible. Le second, avec lequel nos relations viennent à peine de se nouer, les ouvre ainsi sous des auspices qui nous autorisent à espérer qu'elles seront des plus satisfaisantes. En se fiant à nos assurances, en refusant de suivre la France dans une mesure, si non hostile, au moins empreinte de défiance envers nous, l'Angleterre dans les circonstances actuelles a fait œuvre de bonne politique. Rien n'eût été plus à regretter que de voir les deux Puissances maritimes s'associer, ne fût-ce qu'un moment, et d'apparence plutôt que de fait, sur la question d'Orient, telle qu'elle est posée à cette heure. Quoique leurs vues à cet égard diffèrent au fond *toto cælo*, cependant comme le public Européen n'est guère en état d'en faire la distinction, leur identité ostensible n'aurait pu manquer de les présenter sous l'aspect d'une alliance intime. L'ardeur Française se fût hâtée d'exagérer, en les exploitant dans son intérêt, ces nouveaux semblans d'entente cordiale, et toutes les situations en Europe en auraient été à l'instant faussées. L'apparition simultanée des deux flottes rendait la question insoluble à Constantinople. Elle nous plaçait dans une position que nous n'aurions pu accepter, et qui n'eût plus permis à l'Empereur, se trouvant ainsi sous le coup d'une démonstration comminatoire, de suivre librement ses inspirations conservatrices et pacifiques.

De la part de la France isolée, le mesure perd beaucoup de ses inconvénients, quoiqu'elle soit encore loin d'en être exempte. Aussi l'Empereur ne s'en préoccupe-t-il que peu, et Sa Majesté n'y voit point de raison pour rien changer pour le moment à ses dispositions et vues antérieures. L'attitude de l'Angleterre suffira pour neutraliser celles qui, de la part des Français ou des Turcs—si ceux-ci se sentaient encouragés par la présence de la flotte Française—pourraient entraver ou reculer trop longtemps la solution favorable du litige. Sous ce rapport Lord Aberdeen nous semble avoir parfaitement compris le beau rôle qu'avait à y jouer l'Angleterre, et nous aimons à l'en féliciter, persuadés d'avance de l'impartialité qu'il mettra à le remplir.

Pour ce qui est de vous, M. le Baron, vous avez su en cette occasion ne rien négliger pour servir les grands intérêts que vous a confiés notre Auguste Maître. Son plein suffrage a honoré les efforts que vous avez faits et les raisonnements que vous avez employés pour confirmer et fixer les Ministres Anglais dans la juste opinion qu'ils se sont formée de nos intentions politiques.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)

M. le Baron,

*St. Petersburg, <sup>March 26</sup><sub>April 7</sub>, 1853.*

I HASTEN to acquaint your Excellency with the sincere satisfaction with which the Emperor has read your despatches of the  $\frac{11}{23}$  instant. They inform us that the British Government has not only approved of the refusal of Admiral Dundas to comply, without express orders from London, with the summons which the English Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople had sent him to repair with the English fleet to Vourla, but has come to the determination of leaving this fleet at Malta, and of awaiting with confidence the development of the negotiations commenced by Prince Menchikoff with the Ottoman Porte, and not complicating them by joining in the hasty demonstration which the French Government has thought fit to prescribe to its squadron.

Sir H. Seymour, on his part, has lately communicated to me the despatch which Lord Clarendon, the new Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had addressed to him upon the same subject. It confirms, in all points, the intelligence which you send us.

It has given us much satisfaction, M. le Baron, to perceive, as well by this despatch as by the summary of your communications with the British Ministers, that all the false reports spread at Constantinople in regard to our intentions had caused no alarm or apprehension to the Cabinet of London, satisfied by the personal assurances which it has received on this matter from the Emperor, that His Majesty's desire and determination are to respect the independence and the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and that, if his views in this respect should undergo any change, our august master would be the first to apprise the English Government of it.

You will assure the Ministers of the Queen, in the most positive terms, that the intentions of the Emperor are still the same, and that all the idle rumours to which the arrival of Prince Menchikoff in the Ottoman capital has given rise—the occupation of the Principalities, territorial aggrandisement on our Asiatic frontier, the pretension to secure to ourselves the nomination of the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople, hostile and threatening language held to the Porte by our Ambassador—are not only exaggerated, but even destitute of any sort of foundation; that, in a word, the mission of Prince Menchikoff never has had, nor has now, any object but that which your Excellency has been instructed to communicate to the British Government.

As regards the recommendation which is given us to humour as much as possible the susceptibilities of France in the delicate question of the Holy Places, and whilst insisting upon the rights of the Greek Church, to endeavour to impose nothing upon the Latins which might too directly wound the honour and the interests of that Power, you may equally assure the English Ministers that in the arrangement to be negotiated, it is not a question of withdrawing or of taking from the Latins the late concessions which they have obtained by the Ottoman note of the 9th of February of last year, but merely of adapting those concessions to the stipulations of the Hatti Scherif, by removing from them anything they may contain of an exclusive character; of obtaining for the Greeks some recompense for the wrong which has been done them; and above all of securing them from further injury.

In general we ask nothing better than to come to a friendly understanding with the French Government, taking into account the position in which it has placed itself, although all the concessions that can be made to its susceptibility have almost invariably the effect of rendering it more exacting, inasmuch as it looks upon them in the light of a success which justifies it in seeking to obtain more. But it must itself contribute to facilitate for us the means of doing so, instead of acting in a contrary sense, as it has just now done with so much precipitation by a demonstration, the consequences of which may place in antagonism our desire for conciliation and the protection of our own dignity. The English Government must themselves see that France is not always accessible to counsels of moderation, since the wise representations which they made to her through Lord Cowley have not availed to prevent the departure of the French squadron.

The Emperor desires you, M. le Baron, to thank Lord Aberdeen and Lord

Clarendon very particularly in his name, for the salutary impulse which they have recently given to the decisions of the British Cabinet. The former has on this occasion shown us a new proof of confidence, of which our august master is highly sensible. The latter, with whom our relations have hardly yet commenced, thus enters upon them under auspices which justify us in hoping that they will be of the most satisfactory nature. In relying upon our assurances, in refusing to follow France in a step, if not hostile, at least marked with distrust towards us, England, under present circumstances, has performed an act of wise policy. Nothing would have been more to be regretted than to see the two great maritime Powers combining together, were it but for the moment, and in appearance rather than in fact, upon the Eastern question as it now stands. Although their views in this respect differ in reality *toto cœlo*, nevertheless as the European public is by no means competent to draw the distinction, their ostensible identity would not have failed to represent them under the aspect of an intimate alliance. The ardent spirit of France would eagerly have exaggerated, for the advancement of her own interest, these fresh evidences of cordial understanding, and everything in Europe might at once have been placed in a false position. The simultaneous appearance of the two fleets would have prevented the possibility of the question being solved at Constantinople. It would have placed us in a position in which we could not have acquiesced, and which would no longer have allowed the Emperor, thus exposed to a demonstration of a threatening nature, freely to follow his own pacific and conservative impulses.

France acting alone, the measure is attended with less inconvenience, although it is still far from being free from it. The Emperor accordingly attaches but little importance to it, and His Majesty sees in it no reason for changing, at the present time, his previous views and intentions. The attitude of England will suffice to neutralize what, on the part of the French or the Turks, if the latter should feel encouraged by the presence of the French fleet, might embarrass or retard too long the favourable solution of the question in dispute. In this point of view Lord Aberdeen appears to us to have fully understood the important part which England had to play, and we are happy to congratulate him upon it, persuaded beforehand of the impartiality which he will display in carrying it out.

As regards yourself, M. le Baron, you have on this occasion left nothing undone to promote the vast interests which our august master has entrusted to you. His entire approbation has honoured the efforts which you have made, and the arguments which you have employed, to strengthen and confirm the English Ministers in the just opinion which they have formed of our political intentions.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) NESSELRODE.

No. 139.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 15.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, April 14, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS read me this afternoon a despatch, dated the 31st ultimo, which he had this morning received from the French Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople.

The intelligence supplied by it coincides very much with that contained in Colonel Rose's despatches of the 24th, with copies of which your Lordship has been good enough to furnish me. The Grand Vizier and the Minister for Foreign Affairs appear both of them to have promised M. Benedetti that no decision in regard to the sacred places should be taken before the arrival of M. de la Cour. On Prince Menchikoff pressing the Porte for an early solution of the question (in what sense or in what terms M. Benedetti does not say), an answer was returned to the effect that the Porte could decide nothing before the arrival of the French Ambassador, which answer had caused considerable vexation to Prince Menchikoff, and elicited from him a threat, that if the negotiations met with unnecessary delay, he should return with his Embassy to Odessa. M. Benedetti appears to think that the pressure

upon the Sultan may be so great that, if his present Ministers are not inclined to come into the views of Russia, whatever they may be, his Highness may be inclined to change.

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No. 140.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 16.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, April 5, 1853.*

IN obedience to your Lordship's orders I have placed in the Chancellor's hands a copy of your Lordship's despatch of the 23rd ultimo, which has given him the warmest satisfaction. His Imperial Majesty, he observed, would not be less well pleased with the additional proof thus afforded of the confidence in his intentions entertained by Her Majesty's Government.

Her Majesty's Government had, his Excellency said, come to a very wise resolution, in not allowing the English fleet to sail for the Levant; and although he regretted the departure of the French squadron, it was a decision to which he had no desire of attaching an over-due importance.

I will here observe that the Chancellor had been apprized by Baron Brunnow of the purport of the despatch which was about to be addressed to me by your Lordship, but if I am not mistaken the despatch proved to be even more satisfactory than had been anticipated; before its arrival I had heard of the warm approbation expressed by the Emperor of the feelings and attitude of Her Majesty's Government.

The Chancellor spoke (as I found casually that Baron Brunnow had done) with kindness of Colonel Rose. It was, he said, certain that Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires had acted upon incorrect impressions; but it was certain that a very practised diplomatist might have been misled by the false statements so constantly current at Pera, and doubly so at moments of great excitement.

He begged however to state that there had been no sort of demand for the dismissal of Fuad Effendi, no ultimatum, no demand for extension of territory, no attempt at procuring for Russia the nomination of the Greek Patriarch.

I then spoke of the question of the holy places, and expressed the ardent wish felt by Her Majesty's Government, that all matters relating to this affair should be settled speedily, and in a manner calculated to make the arrangement durable. Her Majesty's Government were not, I observed, less desirous that the honour and susceptibility of the French Government should be carefully attended to, that attention being in fact requisite to the settlement of difficulties.

Count Nesselrode would only again observe that no wish was entertained to call upon France for the restitution of any rights which she had obtained; that it had never been in contemplation to ask for the key of the church, or to object to the star in the cupola.

I stated to Count Nesselrode that one point remained: that I would not conceal from him that I received from various quarters accounts of military preparation, which appeared a little inconsistent with the pacific declarations which had been made to me, and with the tranquillizing aspect of affairs at Constantinople.

The Chancellor replied that he thought he might assure me that the Emperor was only waiting for a confirmation of the peaceful intelligence which he had received from the south, when orders would be issued for the discontinuance of all warlike preparations.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 16.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, April 7, 1853.*

THE Chancellor, when I called upon him yesterday, observed that he could not do better than to place in my hands a despatch, not yet dated, which he had just addressed to Baron Brunnow, and which is to be forwarded by a Russian courier who will set off this day for London.

The whole language and purport of this paper gave me very great pleasure.

Count Nesselrode expresses the warmest satisfaction at the despatch of the 23rd ultimo which I had been ordered to communicate to him, and in general at the confiding, noble, and at the same time politic attitude taken by Her Majesty's Government at a moment of unnecessary alarm.

The departure of the English and French fleets for the Levant would, it is observed, have been a demonstration so closely resembling a menace that it would have rendered it impossible for the Emperor to act as he desired to do in Turkish affairs: the presence of a French fleet in the Levant had its inconveniences, but such as the attitude of Her Majesty's Government was sufficient to neutralize; it would be the same with regard to any unforeseen difficulties which might arise at Constantinople.

With regard to the objects sought by Russia, they were precisely those which had from the outset been professed; all the ambitious schemes imputed to her were not exaggerated rumours, but rumours devoid of all foundation.

The Emperor was desirous of attending to your Lordship's recommendations, and was prepared to "ménager" even the susceptibility of the French, although he had learned that concessions in that quarter led only to further demands; but that to these attempts at settling affairs amicably the Cabinet of Paris must lend its assistance.

There was no question of taking back from the Latins any one advantage which had been granted to them. "Il s'agissait simplement de faire concorder ces concessions [to the Latins] avec les dispositions du hatti-chérif, en les dépouillant de ce qu'elles peuvent avoir d'exclusif, d'obtenir aux Grecs quelques compensations pour le tort qui leur a été fait, et surtout de les mettre à l'abri contre le retour de nouveaux préjudices."

A preceding passage of the despatch, and one which makes it very desirable that Her Majesty's Government should be placed in possession of the document from which I was permitted to copy the above lines, is that in which the Emperor is made to declare his constant desire for the maintenance of the independence of Turkey, and to renew his promise of duly apprizing Her Majesty's Government, should his intention in this respect undergo any change.

At the close of the despatch, Baron Brunnow is informed that his conduct has been highly approved of by the Emperor.

The three points which appear to me to be established by the paper of which I have offered your Lordship a summary, are: first, the satisfaction felt by the Emperor at the proof of confidence in his word manifested by Her Majesty's Government—this is expressed in plain words; second, which is plainly to be seen, the apprehensions entertained by the Russian Cabinet of an alliance, having for its object a joint action upon the affairs of Turkey, between England and France; and third, the almost equally evident desire of proving that such an alliance must, from the opposing interests of the two parties, exist more in appearance than in reality.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

## No. 142.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 16.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, April 7, 1853.*

I FOUND the Chancellor yesterday very much pleased with the accounts which had reached him under date of the 24th ultimo, from Constantinople, and with those of different dates which he had received from Vienna and Paris.

We spoke of the differences which required settlement between the nominally conflicting pretensions of the Greek and Latin Churches, and Count Nesselrode was eager to admit that they were very slight. He had, he said, now had an opportunity of comparing the Porte's note to the French Ambassador dated the 9th February of last year, with the firman communicated to Russia on the 10th of the same month, and the difference was so inconsiderable as to render it extraordinary how the French Cabinet should have raised a question upon a point so little deserving of serious notice.

I observed that with the peaceful prospects which were now opening on us, I flattered myself his Excellency could now give me the assurance that military preparations were laid aside; at all events, that there was some commencement of discontinuance of military preparation.

Count Nesselrode replied that he did not feel at liberty to give me that assurance, but that he did not hesitate to express to me his conviction that the negotiation at Constantinople would be brought, and speedily, to a happy conclusion.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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## No. 143.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 16.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, April 7, 1853.*

THE French Minister has questioned Count Nesselrode as to the policy which the Russian Cabinet is pursuing at Constantinople, his inquiries being directed principally to these two points.

Do the Russian Government, after the negotiation opened with the French Mission here, contemplate conducting the arrangements respecting the Holy Shrines at Constantinople without the concurrence and approbation of the French Ambassador?

Can the Russian Government, after all the pacific assurances which have been so repeatedly given, offer any reasonable explanation of these continued military armaments and preparations, for which there exists such slight ostensible reason?

Upon neither of these points does General Castelbajac appear to have received such explanations as he would be warranted in considering as perfectly satisfactory.

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## No. 144.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, April 18, 1853.*

IT appears that the Prince of Servia has dismissed M. Garaschanin from his service, on the peremptory demand of Prince Menchikoff, and that the Russian Consul at Belgrade has subsequently, in threatening terms, required the removal of several other official persons.

This interference with the internal government of the province, has excited much discontent among the Servian people; and your Excellency is instructed to state to Prince Menchikoff, that in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government a perseverance in this course will be productive of mischievous results.

R

The French Ambassador informs me that M. de la Cour has been instructed to use his best efforts to prevent the extension of Russian influence in Servia; and your Excellency will take such steps in furtherance of that object as may appear to you expedient.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 145.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

(Extract.)

*Foreign Office, April 18, 1853.*

COUNT WALEWSKI has read to me a despatch from M. de Benedetti, which appears to have given some uneasiness to the French Government, and particularly as regards a secret Treaty, similar to that of the 8th July, 1833, which is said to have been pressed upon the acceptance of the Porte by Prince Menchikoff.

I told Count Walewski that the same information had been communicated to Her Majesty's Government by Colonel Rose, but I had reason to believe that the Treaty in question would be a written agreement with respect to the holy places, and the mode of conducting divine worship and religious ceremonies there by the Greek and Latin communities.

I then read to Count Walewski some extracts from the last despatches of Sir H. Seymour, which fully confirmed the assurances given by Baron Brunnow of the pacific intentions of the Emperor of Russia towards Turkey.

These extracts seemed to be quite satisfactory to Count Walewski.

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No. 146.

*Colonel Rose to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 19.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, April 3, 1853.*

I THOUGHT it my duty again to ask explanations of Prince Menchikoff respecting the late warlike movements of Russia. I commenced the conversation by reading to his Excellency Mr. Vice-Consul Cunningham's report to your Lordship of the 28th of March, as well as the substance of Mr. Consul Yeames' last report. I read also, as I had done before to M. d'Ozéroff, the memorandum in Sir H. Seymour's despatch of January 9 to Lord John Russell. On a previous occasion, I had read to his Highness Mr. Consul Yeames's report to me of the 4th of March.

On all these occasions I have dwelt on the difference of the assurances made at St. Petersburg and London respecting the pacific intentions of Russia in the East, and the unceasing warlike movements and preparations made by her in all parts of her territory from which an attack could be directed against Turkey. I thought also that I could not do better than use on these occasions the arguments employed by Sir Hamilton Seymour in his memorandum of the 8th of January last.

I have urged also, that if Russia had cause to complain of the language of M. de Lavalette, the sympathy shown for her in that matter by her allies, by the recall of M. de Lavalette, and the retirement of Fuad Effendi, must be considered a satisfactory reparation; that Montenegro had been evacuated; that in short, none of the causes alleged by Russia as causes for a hostile attitude existed any longer; but, that notwithstanding this, Russia increased her warlike preparations, and that with a mystery which only increased their very serious gravity; that yesterday one of the British merchants expressed a just alarm at the menacing aspect of affairs; that the hostile and unexplained attitude of Russia had placed a responsibility on the British Representative here which he had no right to bear; that if he told his countrymen of his suspicions, and his ignorance as to the objects of Russia's armament, he might, perhaps, needlessly create alarm, and check or stop enterprizes in which

they were engaging ; that if he did not tell them, they considered his silence as a guarantee that they had no cause of apprehension, and might safely embark their capital in peaceful commerce ; that for these and other reasons, agents had a right to ask for explanations from the Representatives of a Power who assumed, without assigning a valid cause, a hostile position ; that his Excellency had stated that the reports of the Consuls were exaggerated ; that they had made a fuss because a few troops had been embarked, and a little biscuit baked ; that waggons could not have been pressed for the troops, because they had their own waggons ; that he had told me before that the troops were only in their cantonments ; that only a few troops could be embarked on board ten sail-of-the-line, which constituted the whole effective Russian navy in the Black Sea ; that General Rüdiger had not been placed in command of two corps, that only one corps had been put in a state of preparation, and that he really knew very little about the number or position of the Russian troops.

I replied, that I had good information that large and very unusual quantities of biscuit had been ordered to be got ready for large bodies of troops, and what was remarkable, to be consumed by Russian troops in Turkish provinces ; that besides the ten sail-of-the-line, there were other numerous transports at Nicolaieff and Sevastopol, all of which had been ordered to be ready for sea ; that two divisions, that is, a whole corps d'armée, had embarked or was about to do so ; that the fact that only one corps had been put on a war footing, was different from the accounts I had seen from Petersburg and elsewhere ; that I concluded that his Excellency would be able to give me information as to the troops, because I had heard that he was commander-in-chief of the naval and military forces which supported his Excellency's negotiations.

Prince Menchikoff made a reply to this last observation, which I could not understand.

I have also urged that the Porte's independence, guaranteed by all the Powers, required that she should negotiate, uninfluenced by a formidable military demonstration, more especially as Russia had never even given her notice of it.

I concluded by telling Prince Menchikoff that I trusted that he would be able to give me pacific assurances. He replied, "I cannot promise you that we will disarm." I said, "But if the Russian troops could retire ;" he reflected and said, "All I can tell you is, that I have the most pacific intentions."

No. 147.

*Colonel Rose to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 19.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, April 4, 1853.*

I HAVE very great satisfaction in stating to your Lordship that I have just received a letter from a British merchant here, of which I inclose a copy, giving the most gratifying intelligence that in consequence of orders from St. Petersburg the Russian naval and military preparations have been suspended.

I have equal pleasure in stating that yesterday and to-day I had very satisfactory conversations with Prince Menchikoff and M. Benedetti respecting the holy places, and that all three of us anticipate a favourable result of that important question.

Neither time nor the mode of conveyance permit me to enter into further details. I trust that your Lordship will agree with me that such good news makes up for scanty details.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

P.S.—I have since writing this despatch received from Rifaat Pasha so unfavourable a report as to a renewed demand of Prince Menchikoff respecting protection of the Greek interest, that I have serious doubts whether the peaceful news from Odessa may not have been fabricated.

H. R.

## Inclosure in No. 147.

*Mr. ——— to Colonel Rose.*

Sir,

*Galata, April 4, 1853.*

THE pacific news from Odessa has been received by four or five very respectable Greek houses, some as postscripts to their letters, and others in private communications, to the following effect :

That advice had just been received from St. Petersburg, to the effect that the negotiations at Constantinople were proceeding so satisfactorily as to induce the Government to intimate to the public, in order to tranquillize their fears, that there was no longer any cause of apprehension as to the state of affairs, and that the military and naval preparations would be suspended.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) \_\_\_\_\_

## No. 148.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 19.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, April 5, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I arrived here this morning in Her Majesty's steam-ship "Fury."

The day has necessarily passed in messages and visits of courtesy ; but I have found time to ascertain that according to all appearance nothing is yet definitively settled between the Porte and Prince Menchikoff respecting the holy places in Palestine. I have only to add, that while the Turkish Ministers intimate a strong sense of anxiety and alarm as to the eventual intentions of Russia, the impressions of the Austrian Legation, founded on the language of the Russian Ambassador, are favourable to the existence of moderate views on the part of that Power, and to a friendly solution of the pending question. The latest advices received from Odessa by the channel of commercial houses are said to be in harmony with this expectation.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

## No. 149.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 22.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, April 21, 1853.*

DURING a conversation which I had yesterday with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, he stated that he had accounts from Constantinople up to the 5th instant, which showed a greater desire on the part of Prince Menchikoff to treat the question of the holy places in a way which would lead to its termination, but he still expressed apprehensions of endeavours on the part of Russia to obtain a Treaty from Turkey, which should resemble that of Hunkiar Skelessi.

M. de Kisseleff has also by order of his Government given further assurances to M. Drouyn de Lhuys of the conciliatory disposition of Russia. Count Nesselrode, now that he has knowledge of the note addressed on the 9th of February, 1852, by the Porte to the French Ambassador, conveying the concessions made to the Latins in regard to the holy places, sees, as Sir Hamilton Seymour's reports have already informed your Lordship, but little difficulty in reconciling its provisions with those contained in the firman given in favour of the Greeks.

No. 150.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 26.)*

(Extract.)

Constantinople, April 6, 1853.

I HAD an interview at the Porte to-day with the Grand Vizier and Rifaat Pasha, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

After some complimentary expressions, they entered at once on the subject of the pending discussions with Russia. They informed me that since the arrival of Prince Menchikoff, the language held by the Russian Embassy to them had been a mixture of angry complaints and friendly assurances, accompanied with positive requisitions as to the holy places in Palestine, indications of some ulterior views, and a general tone of insistence bordering at times on intimidation.

The points of complaint were, that the Sultan had not responded like his father to the Emperor's offers and acts of friendship, that he was too much influenced by Governments and individuals ill-disposed towards Russia, and that he had more particularly of late displayed a marked disregard of the consideration due to that Power.

The assurances were those of a willingness to promote the continued existence of the Turkish Empire, and to renew those cordial relations which had been attended on former occasions with so much benefit to the Porte.

The requisitions as to the holy places were that the Porte, after giving satisfaction for a vacillation of conduct offensive to Russia, should adhere with steadiness to the arrangement proclaimed by the Sultan's firman, and pledge itself to a complete and undisturbed maintenance of the *status quo* in future by some form of written engagement. A disposition was at the same time expressed to acquiesce in the privileges already obtained for the Latins, and also a determination to have the cupola of the Church of the Nativity at Jerusalem repaired according to the actual, that is, the Greek forms.

With respect to indications of ulterior views, there was still some uncertainty in the language of Prince Menchikoff. In the beginning he had sounded the sentiments of the Porte as to a defensive alliance with Russia, but, receiving no encouragement, had desisted from the overture. His intimations were now rather directed to a remodelling of the Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople, so as to make the election of the Patriarch henceforward an appointment for life, independent of the Porte; to a more clear and comprehensive definition of Russian right under Treaty to protect the Greek and Armenian subjects of the Porte in religious matters; and to the conclusion of a formal agreement, comprising those points between the two Governments.

The tone of intimidation adopted by the Russian Embassy was explained to consist in a peremptory demand of reparation for an alleged offence, in an unrelaxing insistence on the Porte's coming to an early and almost immediate decision, in repeated intimations of the Emperor's displeasure, in the menace of interrupting diplomatic relations should any part of the pending negotiations transpire, and of retiring to Odessa should the Porte continue much longer to protract its hesitation. All this might justly be said to take a deeper colouring from the advanced positions taken up by considerable portions of the Russian army, and from Prince Menchikoff's official connection as well with them as with the Russian fleet at Sevastopol.

The Ottoman Ministers informed me that nothing had yet been settled between the Porte and the Russian Embassy; that the *note verbale* containing Prince Menchikoff's propositions respecting the holy places, and modified at their suggestion, would probably be laid before the Council in three days, or, it might be, on the following day; that they had insisted on being at liberty to communicate its contents to the French Embassy, whose opinions must necessarily depend on the Ambassador newly arrived from the seat of Government. Their impressions seemed to be favourable to the probability of a friendly solution, and their anxiety was principally directed to the remaining proposals expected from Prince Menchikoff, and to the difficulty of dealing with them so as not to compromise either the independence or the tranquillity of the Empire.

Their anxiety took the form of numerous conjectural inquiries as to what was to be done in certain cases, whether supposed altogether or founded on communications more positive than they chose to avow, did not exactly appear.

The sum of what I said in reply is this: Endeavour to keep the affair of the holy places separate from the ulterior proposals, whatever they may be, of Russia. The course which you appear to have taken under the former head was probably the best; and I am glad to find that there is a fair prospect of its success to the satisfaction of France, as well as of Russia. Whenever Prince Menchikoff comes forward with further propositions, you are at perfect liberty to decline entering into negotiation without a full statement of their nature, extent, and reasons. Should he ground them on any existing Treaty, it would be equally incumbent on him to afford a full explanatory statement in the first instance. Should they be found, on examination, to carry with them that degree of influence over the Christian subjects of the Porte in favour of a foreign Power, which might eventually prove dangerous or seriously inconvenient to the exercise of the Sultan's legitimate authority, His Majesty's Ministers cannot be denied the right of declining them, which would not prevent the removal, by direct sovereign authority, of any existing abuse, or the more strict execution, by the Porte itself, of any treaty engagement, affording to Russia a fair ground of remonstrance.

The personal character of the Emperor Nicholas, his obligations, in common with the other great Powers of Christendom, and his frequent declarations of respect for the independence of the Turkish Empire, exclude the suspicion of any attempt to carry his point by mere arbitrary force. He lies under the restraint of moral as well as political considerations. He could not throw off the mask and compel the Porte to accept, on no distinct grounds of Treaty, propositions materially affecting the Sultan's relations with a large portion of his subjects, and, consequently, to a certain degree, his position in the general scale of power, without exposing himself to severe censure, and risking interests of the most important description. Were it, however, to turn out, contrary to all reasonable calculation, that his Ambassador was authorized to proceed to extremities, the Porte would still have the resource of reserving its compliance until it had consulted with those of its allies who, together with Russia, were parties to the Treaty of 1841.

In making these remarks, I took care to give them the same hypothetical colour which characterized the inquiries of the Turkish Ministers; and I expressed an opinion that it would not be reasonable or prudent for them to disoblige the Emperor of Russia in matters which might be conceded without any serious objection, especially as the latest advices from Odessa gave reason to hope that milder counsels were prevailing in His Majesty's Cabinet.

In the course of our interview I took occasion to explain the grounds on which it had been deemed advisable, under present circumstances, to keep Her Majesty's squadron at Malta; and the Grand Vizier had every appearance of understanding that the interests of the Porte had been more judiciously consulted by its detention than by its appearance in the waters of the Archipelago.

No. 151.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 26.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, April 7, 1853.*

I HAD my first audience of the Sultan this morning. Nothing could be more gracious and flattering than His Majesty's reception of me. His language expressed a cordial desire to maintain the most friendly relations between the two Empires and their respective Governments, together with a full reliance on British sympathy and support. He noticed with much affability the officers and other gentlemen who accompanied me into the presence-chamber. He declared his satisfaction with Colonel Rose; he recognized Mr. Alison with an expression of kindness; and he complimented Mr. Layard on the services which he had rendered to archæology and the arts.

After the formal audience, I had the honour of a private interview with the Sultan. Rifaat Pasha alone remained in the room with Mr. Stephen Pisani, who acted as interpreter. I delivered the Queen's letter. His Majesty, who was already apprized of its contents, appeared to be deeply sensible of the kind and cordial feelings of which it was significant both in its terms and in its form. He

charged me particularly to convey to Her Majesty the expression of his pleasure on receiving it, and his affectionate acknowledgments.

In the conversation which ensued I expressed the gratification which I had derived from learning that the question of the holy places bid fair to be settled in a manner satisfactory to all parties. I assured His Majesty that we took no interest in the affair except in so far as it was a cause of embarrassment and eventual danger to him; that language calculated to moderate the pretensions of France and Russia had been employed by the Queen's Representatives at Paris and St. Petersburg; and that without presuming to volunteer any interference, I was prepared to afford my good offices whenever they were deemed available for purposes of conciliation and friendly arrangement. His Majesty said that he placed the fullest confidence in me.

Alluding to the secret demands as brought forward by Prince Menchikoff, I expressed my conviction that the Sultan, in making every reasonable concession for the sake of peace and good neighbourhood, would be careful to admit no innovation dangerous to his independence.

These questions, I added, if properly managed, would soon in all likelihood pass away, or be amicably settled.

No. 152.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 26.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, April 9, 1853.*

I HAVE already stated that I arrived here on the 5th instant. My embarkation at Trieste was preceded by more detention than I had expected on my way thither, owing partly to obstructions from weather, the trains and the post having been unable at times to pass on; and partly to the desire of making myself thoroughly acquainted with the views of the French and Austrian Governments. The exertion of travelling day and night was counteracted by the state of the roads and railway incidents. Fortunately the voyage by sea was more favourable, and, by giving up my previous intention of communicating with Corfu and Athens for objects of public interest, I was able to complete the passage from port to port in less than six days. On reaching my destination, I learned that the French Ambassador had not yet arrived, and that the Russian negotiations were still pending.

On the day after my arrival I visited the Turkish Ministers, and on the following day I had my first audience of the Sultan. The substance of what passed on each of those occasions is reported to your Lordship in other despatches. Yesterday and to-day I have had further communications with the Grand Vizier and Secretary of State. I have also had some conversation, reported elsewhere, with the Russian, French, and Austrian Representatives.

I now proceed to offer your Lordship a succinct and, I hope, a clear view of the present state of the discussions concerning the holy places, and certain ulterior questions raised by Russia, premising, with respect to military or naval movements relating thereto, that the French squadron is supposed to be at Salamis, that the advance of the Russian forces in Bessarabia appears to have been suspended, and that such defensive preparations as were ordered by the Porte in its first alarm continue without excitement or augmentation.

The question of the holy places, as between Rifaat Pasha and Prince Menchikoff, is so far brought towards a mutual understanding that terms of arrangement desired by Russia have, with certain modifications and reserves, been favourably received by the Porte and communicated to the French Embassy. Inclosed herewith is an authentic statement of these terms, separated into Articles, accompanied with the Porte's amendments, and exhibiting the reserved passages.

Your Lordship will perceive that the Russian Ambassador does not object, by his demands, to such privileges as are known to have been obtained latterly by France in favour of the Latins, and that his principal aim is to fix and secure the present state of possession and usage by that kind of formal and explicit agreement which may preclude all further pretensions on the side of France, and make

the Porte directly responsible to Russia for any future innovation respecting the holy places.

This is fair and reasonable enough in the view of an impartial observer. It is even desirable in the interest of the Porte that the pending arrangement should be final. The difficulty lies in reconciling France to a virtual abandonment of its claims under the Treaty of 1740, accompanied, as it would be, with a permanent acquiescence in some striking practices of the Greek rite extremely distasteful to the Latin clergy in Palestine.

Comparing the amended with the original Articles, it would seem that the former are fairly calculated to satisfy the claims of Russia. What relates to the porter of the church at Bethlehem, and to the repairs of the cupola of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem, is the part most likely to meet with serious opposition from France. The Article relating to this matter, and two others, are still reserved for consideration by the Porte.

But the anxiety of the Turkish Government is not confined to the one ostensible object for which Prince Menchikoff was understood to have been sent to Constantinople. His Excellency has addressed secretly to Rifaat Pasha a new set of propositions, far more important and comprehensive than those which are already known to your Lordship. Although the Turkish Ministers were the first to speak to me on this subject, and to solicit my opinion respecting it, I have found much difficulty in obtaining an unreserved statement of the particulars. This combination, of alarm seeking for advice, and of reluctance to entrust me frankly with the whole case, is attributable to the threatening language of Prince Menchikoff, and to the character of his proposals. Rifaat Pasha has been emphatically warned of the danger which he would be sure to incur if any of those proposals were to transpire; and the earnestness with which the Russian Ambassador insists on an early reply, increases the embarrassment and apprehension of the Porte.

All the proposals or demands in question, with two or three exceptions, refer to the Greek clergy and churches in Turkey. They amount, in substance, to the conclusion of a Treaty, stipulating that Russia shall enjoy the exclusive right of intervening for the effectual protection of all members of the Greek Church and of the interests of the churches themselves; that the privileges of the four Greek patriarchs shall be effectually confirmed, and the patriarchs shall hold their preferment for life, independently of the Porte's approval.

The exceptions are, the protection of Greek pilgrims in Palestine, the construction of a Russian church at Jerusalem, and the confirmation, with due enforcement, of all Imperial rescripts granted to Russia from time to time. The whole is put forward as an explanation of the Treaty of Kainardji, necessary for its complete execution.

As the Treaty thus evoked to serve as the basis of another more stringent and comprehensive one is doubtless within your Lordship's reach, I will only observe with reference to it that, of the four Articles, which alone, as I am assured, have any bearing upon this subject, the VIIth allows of a limited Russian interference only for one particular church and its ministers, and of no direct protection at all; the VIIIth relates exclusively to pilgrims; the XIVth accords to Russia the right of protecting one specified church in this neighbourhood; and the XVIth applies exclusively to Wallachia and other provinces restored to Turkey by the Treaty.

The advice which I have given to the Turkish Ministers, at their repeated solicitation, is to endeavour to keep the terms of arrangement touching the holy places separate from the propositions which relate to the Greek clergy and churches in general, and to avoid, if possible, entering upon the merits of the latter until the former are disposed of by a suitable understanding.

The Russian Government would, in all probability, be more or less discontented, if not offended, by the Porte's rejection of the proposed Treaty; but they would not find it easy to justify any overt act of resentment on that account; and the repeated declarations of the Emperor Nicholas are so many guarantees of his adherence to the principles of justice and moderation in his present transactions with the Porte.

It may be presumed that the immediate objects of the Court of St. Petersburg are to acquire a broader and more effective influence over the Greek population in this Empire, and to throw a heavier yoke of responsibility on the Sultan's Government when seeking to evade the natural consequences of such a

Protectorate. There are also, no doubt, the less questionable motives of wishing to simplify relations of delicacy subsisting between two Empires which border upon each other, and to afford a more efficient protection to those who naturally claim the sympathy of Russia on grounds of humanity and religion.

Regarding the question from an European point of view, I venture to think that your Lordship will not be surprised at the Porte's repugnance to proposals of such a nature, when coming from such a quarter. I have reason to believe that all parties agree in viewing them with suspicion and alarm. The opinion expressed by one Turkish Minister, to the effect that an acceptance of the proffered Treaty would be a virtual partition of the Empire, may be exaggerated, but it must, nevertheless, be taken as representing a very prevalent impression, and showing a degree of foresight which it might be dangerous to disregard.

In communicating with the Turkish Government or with any of my colleagues on so delicate a subject, I shall not lose sight of the important interests which may be affected by it; nor, while sensibly alive to the objections involved in its principle, be unprepared for the eventual introduction of amendments calculated to disarm it of evil in the application.

The prospect in this direction would be more promising if Russia were to show signs of being disposed to act on Christian rather than on sectarian principles. But it appears that the protection which her Government wish to exercise with so little control or limitation, is of a strictly exclusive character; and it has reached me, from more quarters than one, that, among the motives for increasing their influence in this country, is the desire of repressing Protestantism wherever it appears.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 152.

*Russian Proposals and Turkish Modifications respecting the Holy Places.*

(Traduction.)

*Demandes faites par le Prince Menchikoff.*

*Modifications faites par Rifaat Pasha.*

#### ARTICLE I.

COMME le sens et la teneur de l'Article qui concerne l'Eglise de Bethléem, et qui se trouve inséré dans le firman Impérial émané dernièrement, relativement aux lieux saints, ont donné et pourraient, à l'avenir aussi, donner lieu à de fausses interprétations, la Sublime Porte fournira des explications claires et précises à cet égard, dans un Acte formel qui devra servir également pour les Chrétiens de toutes les religions, dont l'entrée dans la susdite église est admise.

Il sera déclaré et publié par l'Acte dont il s'agit, que la remise de la clef qui a été donnée dernièrement aux prêtres Catholiques aussi, ne suppose aucune espèce de droit de propriété et de possession sur le maître-autel de cette église, et qu'il ne sera fait aucun changement au système et à la règle qui existent quant à l'exercice des cérémonies religieuses, aux heures des fonctions, et à la garde de la grande

#### ARTICLE I.

SI une clef de la grande porte de l'Eglise de Bethléem a été donné aux Latins, on leur a donné par là le droit du passage de cette église comme par le passé. On ne leur a pas donné le droit d'y officier ni d'en avoir l'administration conjointement avec les Grecs; on ne leur a pas donné par là l'autorisation de changer le *status quo* actuel de l'église; on n'a pas autorisé les Latins à exercer leurs rites, ni enfin à changer le système qui a toujours été et qui est présentement encore en vigueur, en faisant quelque innovation, soit par rapport au passage pour aller à la grotte, soit sous quelque autre rapport. Et comme le portier de cette église a été de tout temps un prêtre Grec, sujet de la Sublime Porte, et qu'il n'a pas le droit de défendre l'entrée aux nations qui ont *ab antiquo* le droit du passage, désormais aussi les choses iront comme par le passé.

porte, garde qui, conformément à l'ancien usage, sera toujours confiée à un prêtre Grec.

## ARTICLE II.

Quand-même il serait affirmé et confirmé dans l'Acte formel dont il est question que l'étoile nouvelle qui a été placée à l'Eglise de Bethléem est tout-à-fait pareille à celle qui s'est perdue l'année 1847, il sera déclaré que cette étoile sera regardée comme un don provenant de la munificence de Sa Majesté de Sultan, don qui ne confère aucune espèce de droits nouveaux.

## ARTICLE III.

Les droits de prééminence des Grecs au Tombeau de la Sainte Vierge Marie seront maintenus et respectés. Un arrangement dont copie est ci-jointe, sur les cérémonies religieuses qui doivent se faire, d'après les règles renfermant les conseils conciliants du ci-devant Patriarche de Jérusalem, sera maintenu et respecté dans toutes ces dispositions.

## ARTICLE IV.

Les jardins de l'Eglise de Bethléem resteront, en vertu de firmans qui sont basés sur d'anciens et de nouveaux documents authentiques, sous la garde des deux parties, tout-à-fait conformément aux dispositions contenues dans ces documents; et il ne sera conféré aux Latins aucune espèce de prérogative.

## ARTICLE V.

Si, indépendamment de tout cela, il y a encore d'autres choses que nous ignorons, ou s'il y a des concessions faites aux Latins, on les retirera sans délai.

## ARTICLE VI.

Les promesses qui ont été faites par la Porte de faire abattre certains édifices profanes qui gênent les terraces de l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre, doivent être mises à exécution. Et il sera déclaré que leur site ne pouvant pas devenir la propriété d'aucune nation, on bâtera un mur tout à l'entour, ou bien on le fermera par un grillage, devant être regardé comme un endroit neutre.

## ARTICLE II.

L'étoile placée dans la grotte qui est située dans l'Eglise de Bethléem, est conforme à celle qui s'est perdue l'année 1847. Cette étoile, faite à neuf, a été offerte par Sa Majesté le Sultan à la nation Chrétienne pour mettre fin aux disputes et comme une marque publique de sa bienveillance souveraine. L'étoile ne confère aucune espèce de nouveaux droits particuliers à aucune des nations Chrétiennes.

## ARTICLE III.

On délibérera là-dessus.

## ARTICLE IV.

Les deux jardins contigus au couvent Franc seront, comme par le passé, sous l'inspection des nations Grecque et Latine sans aucune prérogative pour qui que ce soit; il en sera fait usage comme autrefois.

## ARTICLE V.

On en délibérera.

## ARTICLE VI.

Il n'est pas convenable de prendre et de détruire les maisons de l'hospice et de l'oratoire (Musulmanes) qui sont attenantes à l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre. Mais on fermera celles de leurs fenêtres qui donnent sur l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre par un mur.

S'il y a des égouts ou autres choses nuisibles de ce genre, on les ôtera de là.

## ARTICLE VII.

Attendu que les droits anciens des Grecs de réparer la grande coupole et l'Eglise de Jérusalem n'ont pas été abolis par quelque Acte postérieur au firman Impérial daté des premiers jours de Shaban de l'année de l'Hégire 1257, c'est-à-dire, du mois de Septembre de l'année 1841; attendu, au contraire, qu'ils ont été confirmés aussi par le khatti-chérif de la mi-Rebiul-akhir 1268, c'est-à-dire, des derniers jours de <sup>Janvier</sup> <sup>Février</sup> de l'année 1852, il faut les reconnaître et les confirmer formellement. Et comme un don généreux de la part de sa Hautesse pour servir de secours à ses sujets Grecs pour la réparation dont il s'agit, sanctionnera et confirmera de plus en plus leurs privilèges sus-énoncés, il faut absolument que le Patriarche de Jérusalem ou ses agents soit chargé de la réparation de la coupole susmentionnée.

## ARTICLE VIII.

La Sublime Porte a fait preuve d'une sage prévoyance dans le dernier firman qui a été donné en énumérant les principaux lieux saints, au mode d'administration desquels il ne faut pas toucher. Maintenant il faut que dans l'Acte formel qui va être donné, cette énumération soit encore plus complète. Et afin que cet Acte serve de pièce fondamentale et décisive dans les différens qui pourront surgir, à l'avenir, entre les différentes nations, et à laquelle on doive avoir recours pour les aplanir, il faut qu'il renferme généralement par rapport à l'état actuel de ces lieux saints tous les détails et toutes les explications nécessaires.

## ARTICLE VII.

Considérant que la grande coupole de l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre a besoin de réparation, et que cette réparation a essuyé de retards à cause de quelques dissensions, Sa Majesté le Sultan, pour faire une attention aux nations Chrétiennes, nommera un Commissaire pour bâtir la coupole, aux frais du Gouvernement, sur le même modèle sur lequel elle se trouve actuellement. Le Patriarche Grec sera autorisé à donner ses conseils sur la réparation de la coupole dans ses formes actuelles.

## ARTICLE VIII.

On délibérera sur cela :  
Ceux des lieux saints qui sont dans ce moment-ci en la possession des Grecs, resteront en leur possession.

(Translation.)

*Demands of Prince Menchikoff.*

*Modifications introduced by Rifaat Pasha.*

## ARTICLE I.

AS the sense and tenor of the Article respecting the Church at Bethlehem, and which is inserted in the Imperial firman concerning the Holy Places, lately issued, have given, and may in future also give rise to false inter-

## ARTICLE I.

IF a key of the great gate of the Church of Bethlehem has been given to the Latins, a right of passage through the church has thereby been given to them as in former times. A right to officiate there, or to have the

pretations, the Sublime Porte shall furnish clear and precise explanations on this point in a formal Act which shall apply equally to Christians of all sects, to whom entrance into the above-mentioned church is permitted.

It shall be declared and published in the Act in question that the delivery of the key, which has lately been given to the Catholic priests also, does not imply any sort of right of proprietorship and of possession over the principal altar of that church; and that no change shall be made in the system and regulations at present in existence respecting the exercise of religious ceremonies, the hours of the services, and the guardianship of the great gate which, conformably with the ancient custom, shall always be entrusted to a Greek priest.

#### ARTICLE II.

Even though it should be stated in, and confirmed by, the formal Act in question, that the new star which has been placed in the Church at Bethlehem in all respects resembles that which was lost in the year 1847, it shall be declared that that star shall be considered as a gift coming from the generosity of His Majesty the Sultan, a gift which confers no sort of new rights.

#### ARTICLE III.

The rights of precedence appertaining to the Greeks at the tomb of the Blessed Virgin Mary shall be maintained and respected. An arrangement, of which a copy is annexed, as to the religious ceremonies which are to be performed in conformity with the rules which embody the conciliatory advice of the late Patriarch of Jerusalem, shall be maintained and respected in all its provisions.

#### ARTICLE IV.

The gardens of the Church at Bethlehem shall remain, in virtue of firmans founded on ancient and modern authentic documents, under the guardianship of the two Parties, entirely in conformity with the provisions contained in those documents; and no sort of prerogative shall be conferred on the Latins.

management thereof in conjunction with the Greeks has not been given to them: authority is not thereby given to them to change the existing *status quo* in the church: the Latins are not authorized to exercise their religious rights, or to change the system which has always been, and which still is, in force, by making any innovation either with respect to the passage leading to the grotto, or in any other respect. And inasmuch as the porter of that church has in all times been a Greek priest, a subject of the Sublime Porte, and as he has not the right to forbid the entrance to nations which have *ab antiquo* the right of passage, for the future, also, matters shall go on as in times past.

#### ARTICLE II.

The star placed in the grotto of the Church at Bethlehem is similar to that which was lost in the year 1847. That star, newly made, has been offered by His Majesty the Sultan to the Christian nation in order to put an end to disputes, and as a public token of his sovereign benevolence.

The star confers no sort of new peculiar privileges on any one of the Christian nations.

#### ARTICLE III.

This point shall be taken into consideration.

#### ARTICLE IV.

The two gardens adjoining to the Frank Convent shall be, as in times past, under the inspection of the Greek and Latin nations without any prerogative for any party whatever; the same use shall be made of them as heretofore.

## ARTICLE V.

If, independently of all this, there are other matters of which we are ignorant, or if any concessions have been made to the Latins, they shall be withdrawn without delay.

## ARTICLE V.

This point shall be taken into consideration.

## ARTICLE VI.

The promises made by the Porte to cause the removal of certain profane buildings which incommode the terraces of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, shall be carried into execution. And it shall be declared that as their site is not to become the property of any nation, a wall shall be built entirely round it, or else it shall be inclosed by a railing, inasmuch as it is looked upon as a neutral spot.

## ARTICLE VI.

It is not proper to take and destroy the houses of the (Mussulman) hospital and oratory which abut on the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. But such of their windows as overlook the Church of the Holy Sepulchre shall be walled up.

If there are any sewers, or other offensive things of the sort, they shall be removed from thence.

## ARTICLE VII.

Inasmuch as the ancient rights of the Greeks to repair the great cupola and Church at Jerusalem have not been abolished by any Act of a later date than the Imperial firman dated in the first days of Shaban in the year of the Hegira 1257, that is to say, in the month of September in the year 1841; inasmuch as, on the contrary, they have been confirmed by the hatti-shefir of the Mi-Rebiul-Akhir 1268, that is to say, of the last days of <sup>January</sup> ~~February~~ of the year 1852, they must be recognized and formally confirmed. And as a generous gift on the part of his Highness for the assistance of his Greek subjects in effecting the repairs in question, will sanction and confirm still more their above-mentioned privileges, it is absolutely necessary that the Patriarch of Jerusalem or his agents should be entrusted with the repairs of the aforesaid cupola.

## ARTICLE VII.

Considering that the grand cupola of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre stands in need of repairs, and that those repairs have met with delay in consequence of some disputes, His Majesty the Sultan, in order to show an attention to the Christian nations, will name a Commissioner to build the cupola, at the expense of the Government, on the same plan as that on which it is at present built. The Greek Patriarch will be authorized to give his advice as to the repair of the cupola according to its present design.

## ARTICLE VIII.

The Sublime Porte, in the last firman which has been granted, has given a proof of wise foresight by enumerating the principal holy places, in the character of the management of which no change is to be made. At present it is necessary that in the formal Act which is to be granted, that enumeration shall be still more complete. And in order that that Act may serve

## ARTICLE VIII.

This point shall be taken into consideration.

Such of the holy places as are at the present time in the possession of the Greeks, shall remain in their possession.

as a fundamental and decisive document in the disputes which may hereafter arise between the different nations, and to which recourse is to be had in order to settle such disputes, it is necessary that it should contain generally, with reference to the existing state of those holy places, all details and necessary explanations.

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No. 153.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 26.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, April 11, 1853.*

THE day before yesterday M. de la Cour paid his first visit to the Ministers of the Porte, and Prince Menchikoff had subsequently a conference with Rifaat Pasha.

I understand that the French Ambassador made some strong objections to the proposed arrangement of the question of the holy places, reserving a fuller explanation of his views till after his audience of the Sultan; and Prince Menchikoff confining himself to the same question, and observing, *en passant*, that he hoped the other questions would soon be attended to, urged those points respecting which, as I have explained elsewhere, opposition is most to be expected from France.

I have learnt that the Council of Ministers has resolved on rejecting the Russian proposals respecting the Greek Patriarchs and the protection of the Greek churches, that there was every disposition to concede the minor points, and that the question whether it would be preferable to reject the proposed Treaty by a simple refusal, or by a refusal grounded on its not being required by the existing Treaties, was still under consideration.

I avail myself of this opportunity to inclose for your Lordship's information, a copy, at least in substance, of the "Projet" given in by Prince Menchikoff, and translated from the Turkish received at the Porte from him.

I have to add in few words that the several conversations which I have held since my arrival here with Prince Menchikoff, M. de la Cour, and M. de Kiczl, have left on my mind the following impressions with regard to the instructions under which they are now respectively acting.

First as to the Russian Ambassador. His tone is considerably softened; his object is to reinstate Russian influence in Turkey on an exclusive basis, and in a commanding and stringent form; there is no question of a defensive Treaty, and, unless as a consequence of the late naval movement from Toulon, no thought of military intimidation for the present, but at the same time a fixed intention as to carrying certain points of his plan for settling the question of the holy places.

The French Ambassador is prepared, I conceive, for concession, provided matters are arranged for the satisfaction of French feelings of honour.

The Austrian Chargé d'Affaires is evidently instructed to communicate confidentially with me on the subject of the pending discussions. He tells me that his Government was pleased with the language which I held at Vienna, and although there is still a leaning towards Russia, I am under an impression that he will not support Prince Menchikoff in any proposals tending to increase the influence of that Power at the expense of Turkish independence.

Upon the whole there is reason to hope that the clouds which have hung over Turkey of late, will finally disperse without a storm, though not, perhaps, without some further causes for anxiety, and the interference of friendly counsels.

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## Inclosure in No. 153.

*Project of Secret Treaty proposed to the Porte by Prince Menchikoff.*

(Traduction.)

SA Majesté le Sultan et Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies désirant sincèrement maintenir et conserver la paix et la bonne intelligence qui existent heureusement entre les deux Empires, ont résolu de conclure une Convention particulière, qui doit avoir la force et l'effet d'un Traité destiné à resserrer de plus en plus les liens de l'amitié parfaite et à augmenter la confiance et la sécurité qui existent entre eux, et à mieux expliquer le Traité conclu l'année de l'ère Chrétienne 1777, et les Traités postérieurs, ainsi que les Articles 7, 8, 14, et 16 du Traité de Kainardji, lequel a été confirmé par celui de Andrinople :

En conséquence, Sa Majesté le Sultan et Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie ayant fait choix de \_\_\_\_\_ pour leurs Plénipotentiaires, ceux-ci après avoir exhibé et s'être communiqué réciproquement leurs pleins-pouvoirs et après l'échange de ces pleins-pouvoirs, qu'ils ont trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des Articles suivants :

## ARTICLE I.

Dans le but désiré de faire cesser à jamais toutes les causes de dissensions, tous les doutes et tous les différends relativement aux immunités, aux droits, et aux privilèges qui ont été accordés et assurés par les anciens Empereurs Ottomans aux habitans de la Moldavie, de la Valachie, et de la Serbie, qui de même que différentes autres nations Chrétiennes dans l'Empire Turc, professent la religion Greco-Russe, on est convenu par la présente Convention des conditions suivantes ; savoir, la religion Grecque sera toujours protégée dans toutes les églises ; les Représentants de la Cour Impériale auront le droit, comme par le passé, de donner des ordres aux églises tant à Constantinople que dans d'autres endroits et villes, ainsi qu'aux ecclésiastiques ; et comme ces conseils viennent de la part d'un Gouvernement ami et voisin, ils seront bien accueillis.

## ARTICLE II.

Comme les quatre vénérables Patriarches, savoir, celui de Constantinople, celui d'Antioche, celui d'Alexandrie, et celui de Jérusalem, ainsi que les archevêques, les évêques, et autres prélats, doivent être élus librement, et conformément aux lois, aux règles, et aux usages de l'Eglise Orientale, et confirmés et honorablement traités suivant leur rang, ils auront à jouir complètement des privilèges et des avantages temporels que la Sublime Porte a toujours eu l'usage et pour principe de leur accorder et de leur assurer par les Bérats qu'elle leur délivre lors de leur nomination. Leurs attributions spirituelles leur seront assignées séparément, et ils les exerceront sans empêchement.

## ARTICLE III.

Attendu que le Patriarche de Constantinople, ainsi que les trois autres Patriarches, c'est-à-dire, celui d'Antioche, celui d'Alexandrie, et celui de Jérusalem, qui sont élus par le synode librement, sont, conformément aux lois et aux commandements de l'Eglise, nommés à vie ; et attendu que la Sublime Porte reconnaît et confirme par les firmans d'investiture qu'elle leur donne, d'après l'ancien usage, leur nomination à vie, il n'y aura aucun changement à cet égard ; et tant que les cas prévus par les firmans d'investiture n'arrivent pas, dorénavant aucun Patriarche ne pourra être déposé et changé. Et même dans les firmans d'investiture il est dit que tant qu'il n'y a pas de preuve que le Patriarche opprime les Rayas, qu'il viole les lois de l'Eglise, ou qu'il est traître au Padishah, il ne doit pas être déposé, mais rester dans son poste pendant toute sa vie.

## ARTICLE IV.

L'histoire atteste, et plusieurs actes aussi attestent et prouvent que l'Eglise de Jérusalem, le Patriarche de Jérusalem, et les évêques ses suffragants, ont depuis les temps des Califs, et pendant le règne successif de tous les Sultans, été singulièrement protégés et honorés dans tous les temps; et que leurs droits et leurs privilèges ont toujours été confirmés.

La Sublime Porte s'engage conséquemment envers la Cour Impériale de Russie de maintenir ces droits et ces privilèges tant dans la ville de Jérusalem que hors de-là, sans porter la moindre atteinte aux droits des autres nations Chrétiennes, composées de Rayas indigènes et d'étrangers qui ont été admises à faire leurs dévotions dans l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre, et dans d'autres lieux saints, soit dans les oratoires qu'elles ont en commun avec les Grecs, soit dans les oratoires qu'elles ont en propre.

## ARTICLE V.

Il a été jugé nécessaire et juste de confirmer pleinement, par un nouveau firman orné d'un khatti-chérif, portant la date de , tous les firmans qui ont été donnés par les prédécesseurs de Sa Majesté le Sultan heureusement régnant, en faveur du Patriarcat de Jérusalem, et qui énumèrent et expliquent les lieux saints que ceux qui professent la religion Grecque ont en propre en vertu de leurs anciens droits, et les autres lieux saints qui viennent d'être ouverts aux prêtres Catholiques pour y exercer leur culte. Par conséquent, la Sublime Porte promet et prend l'engagement que le firman et le khatti-chérif susmentionnés, lesquels ont été remis formellement à la Cour Impériale, resteront tels quels, qu'ils seront mis à exécution à la lettre, et qu'ils seront maintenus à l'avenir avec bonne foi.

## ARTICLE VI.

Etant nécessaire que les sujets Russes, prêtres ou autres, qui ont, conformément aux Traités existants, la permission et la faculté d'aller visiter la ville de Jérusalem et les lieux saints de cette ville, soient traités sur un pied égal avec les nations les plus favorisées, et, attendu que les Catholiques et les Protestants ont des prélats particuliers à eux, et des endroits respectés et affectés aux affaires religieuses, si la Cour Impériale de Russie en fait la demande, la Sublime Porte dans ce cas s'engage à désigner un site convenable dans la ville de Jérusalem ou aux environs, pour la construction d'une église à l'exercice du culte par des prêtres Russes, et d'un hôpital destiné aux pèlerins malades ou pauvres. Cette église et cet hôpital seront sous l'inspection spéciale du Consul-Général de Russie en Palestine et en Syrie.

## ARTICLE VII.

Comme cette Convention doit être ratifiée par les deux Hautes Cours Contractantes, dans un délai de six semaines, ou plutôt si faire se peut, les ratifications seront échangées à

C'est pourquoi les Plénipotentiaires des deux Parties ont mis leurs signatures à la présente Convention, et ils y ont apposé leurs cachets.

(Translation.)

HIS Majesty the Sultan and His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, being sincerely desirous of maintaining and preserving the peace and good understanding which happily exist between the two Empires, have determined to conclude a special Convention, which is to have the force and effect of a Treaty, intended to draw still more closely the bonds of perfect friendship, and to increase the confidence and security existing between them, and more fully to explain the Treaty concluded in the year 1777 of the Christian era, and the subsequent Treaties, as well as Articles VII, VIII, XIV, and XVI of

the Treaty of Kainardji, which Treaty was confirmed by the Treaty of Adrianople.

In consequence, His Majesty the Sultan and His Majesty the Emperor of Russia having selected \_\_\_\_\_ as their Plenipotentiaries, they having exhibited and reciprocally communicated to each other their full powers, and after the exchange of those full powers, which have been found in good and proper form, have agreed on the following Articles :—

#### ARTICLE I.

For the desired object of putting an end for ever to all causes of dispute, to all doubts and differences as to the immunities, rights, and privileges which have been granted and secured by the former Ottoman Emperors to the inhabitants of Moldavia, of Wallachia, and of Servia, who, equally with various other Christian nations in the Turkish Empire, profess the Greco-Russian religion, the following points have been agreed upon by the present Convention : that is to say, the Greek religion shall always be protected in all the churches ; the Representatives of the Imperial Court shall have the right, as in times past, to give orders to the churches both in Constantinople and in other places and towns, as well as to the ecclesiastics ; and as those recommendations proceed from a friendly and neighbouring Government, they shall be well received.

#### ARTICLE II.

As the four venerable Patriarchs, that is to say, the Patriarchs of Constantinople, Antioch, Alexandria, and Jerusalem, as well as the Archbishops, Bishops, and other Prelates, are to be elected freely and in conformity with the laws, regulations, and usages of the Oriental Church, and confirmed and honourably treated according to their rank, they shall enjoy completely the privileges and temporal advantages which the Sublime Porte has always made it a custom and a principle to grant to them, and to secure to them by the Berats which it delivers to them on their nomination. Their spiritual functions shall be separately assigned to them, and they shall exercise them without impediment.

#### ARTICLE III.

Inasmuch as the Patriarch of Constantinople, as well as the three other Patriarchs, that is to say, the Patriarchs of Antioch, of Alexandria, and of Jerusalem, who are freely elected by the Synod, are, in conformity with the laws and enactments of the Church, nominated for life, and inasmuch as the Sublime Porte acknowledges and confirms, by the Firman of Investiture which it grants them in accordance with ancient usage, their nomination for life, no change shall take place in this respect ; and so long as the cases provided for by the Firmans of Investiture do not occur, no Patriarch shall for the future be deposed or changed. And it is stated, even in the Firmans of Investiture, that so long as there is no proof that the Patriarch oppresses the Rayas, that he violates the laws of the Church, or that he is a traitor to the Padishah, he is not to be deposed, but is to remain in office during his whole life.

#### ARTICLE IV.

History attests, and many Acts also attest and prove, that the Church of Jerusalem, the Patriarch of Jerusalem, and the Bishops his suffragans, have, since the time of the Caliphs, and during the successive reigns of all the Sultans, been particularly protected and honoured at all times, and that their rights and their privileges have always been confirmed.

The Sublime Porte consequently enters into an engagement with the Imperial Court of Russia, to maintain those rights and privileges both within and without the city of Jerusalem, without any prejudice to the rights of other Christian nations, composed of native Rayas and of foreigners, who have been admitted to pay their devotions in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and in other Holy Places, whether in the oratories which they hold in common with the Greeks, or in the oratories which peculiarly belong to them.

## ARTICLE V.

It has been considered necessary and just to confirm fully, by a new Firman bearing a Hatti-Scherif, dated \_\_\_\_\_, all the Firmans granted by the predecessors of His Majesty the Sultan now happily reigning, in favour of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem, and which enumerate and explain the Holy Places which those who profess the Greek religion possess exclusively in virtue of their ancient rights, and the other Holy Places which have lately been opened to Catholic priests for the exercise of their worship. Accordingly, the Sublime Porte promises and engages that the Firman and Hatti-Scherif above mentioned, which have been formally communicated to the Imperial Court, shall remain unaltered, that they shall be literally executed, and that they shall be maintained for the future with good faith.

## ARTICLE VI.

It being necessary that Russian subjects—whether priests or others,—who in conformity with existing Treaties are permitted and entitled to go and visit the city of Jerusalem and the Holy Places in that city—should be treated on the same footing as the most favoured nations; and seeing that Catholics and Protestants have Prelates of their respective religions, and places respected and appropriated to religious purposes; if the Imperial Court of Russia should make the demand, the Sublime Porte in that case engages to appoint a suitable site in the city of Jerusalem, or its neighbourhood, for the erection of a church for the performance of worship by Russian priests, as well as of a hospital for the use of sick or indigent pilgrims. That church and that hospital shall be under the special inspection of the Consul-General of Russia in Palestine and Syria.

## ARTICLE VII.

As this Convention is to be ratified by the two high Contracting Courts within an interval of six weeks, or sooner if practicable, the ratifications shall be exchanged at \_\_\_\_\_

For which purpose the Plenipotentiaries of the two Parties have affixed their signatures to the present Convention, and have attached their seals thereto.

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No. 154.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 26.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, April 25, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS received advices from St. Petersburg of the 14th instant, from which it would appear that M. de Castelbajac, alarmed at the news received from Constantinople, had put a *note verbale* into Count Nesselrode's hands, recapitulating what had passed between the Russian Chancellor and himself respecting the question of the Holy Places, and intended therefore to show that Prince Menchikoff's conduct was not in unison with the language held at St. Petersburg.

M. de Castelbajac at the above date had received no answer to this note, and he describes Count Nesselrode as being embarrassed in his demeanour towards him.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 155.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 30.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, April 16, 1853.*

I HAVE had some further conversation with Prince Menchikoff this morning on the subject of his discussions with the Porte. I have not time, nor is it necessary for me, to go into the particulars of what passed between us ; but two or three of the leading points may be found not altogether unworthy of your Lordship's attention.

The Russian Ambassador, though he spoke favourably of our French colleague's personal qualities and character, complained a little of the manner in which he had met the concessions spontaneously made by the Prince himself. He saw in M. de la Cour's insistance a proof of the encroaching spirit of that Church which proclaims itself universal, and looked for its real cause in the unceasing desire of the same Church to extend the sphere of its action and influence at every favourable opportunity. On that account alone it had become necessary for Russia to fix some limit to so objectionable a tendency, and also to obtain a positive security in some conventional form, no matter which, provided it had the force of Treaty, against the vacillations and bad faith of the Porte.

In addition to this essential point, he described the same difficulties as those presented to M. de la Cour, observing that he did not despair of coming to an understanding with the French Ambassador on a portion of them.

He quoted several instances of bad faith on the part of the Turkish Ministers, whether correctly or not I can hardly presume to say, and enforced thereby the justice of his claim to a precise and durable guarantee.

According to his statement, the much-talked-of cupola is of wood, unmarked with religious symbols of any kind ; and it would seem that the masonry beneath, which bears the figures of the four Evangelists, is not in want of repair. The difficulty made by the French Ambassador relates to the introduction of the Greek Patriarch as charged with superintending the repairs ; and there is reason to think that M. de la Cour, at all events, will not abstain from reserving the rights of his Government on that point.

I sounded Prince Menchikoff as to his being disposed to wait for a reference to Paris, but, without refusing categorically, he showed no willingness to extend his patience so far.

We did not close our conversation without touching upon the ulterior demands of Russia relative to the whole Greek Church and priesthood in Turkey. He again sought to attenuate their extent and effect ; but I drew a clear line of distinction between the confirmation of special points already stipulated by Treaty, and an extension of influence having the virtual force of a protectorate to be exercised exclusively by a single foreign Power over the most important and numerous class of the Sultan's tributary subjects. We both avoided entering into a discussion, which might have proved irritating, on this question ; and I was glad to learn from Prince Menchikoff, that notwithstanding the great importance attached to it by his Government, there was no danger of any hostile aggression as the result of its failure, but at most, an estrangement between the two Courts, and perhaps, though it was not so said, an interruption of diplomatic relations.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 156.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 2.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, April 19, 1853.*

WITH reference to the orders contained in your Lordship's despatch of the 5th instant, I have made inquiries of the Chancellor respecting the object of Admiral Korniloff's visit to Greece, and with regard to the continued armaments of Russia.

As to the first point the Chancellor replied, without hesitation, that Admiral Korniloff had not been charged with any mission; that he had proceeded to Greece upon an ordinary excursion; and that he must have returned to Constantinople before the intelligence of his departure had reached Her Majesty's Government.

With respect to the armaments, the subject was one upon which it was manifest that the Chancellor was unwilling to be questioned, and that, as I really believe, because he was unable to return a satisfactory answer.

He replied, that he believed that the armaments were not in progress, but that certainly he could not take upon himself to say that orders had been given for their abandonment. Such orders as he had before stated, would not be issued until a certainty should be obtained of a pacific solution of the question of the holy places pending at Constantinople.

With reference to the conversation of Prince Menchikoff with M. Benedetti, Count Nesselrode observed that the Prince had stated correctly that Montenegro was the chief object of his mission; that the question was, as it happened, decided before his arrival, but that it must be in my recollection (which is perfectly true), that he, the Chancellor, had on more than one occasion remarked to me, that Montenegro alone had caused him serious anxieties; that he had ever been of opinion that the question of the holy places was one which would be settled without much danger of war.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 157.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 2.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, April 20, 1853.*

I HAVE taken an opportunity of stating to the Chancellor that one of my private correspondents, usually very well informed as to passing events, had written me word that he could affirm that a Treaty of Alliance, offensive and defensive, was in course of being negotiated, if it had not been already, between Russia and Turkey.

Count Nesselrode denied the correctness of the statement, and after some little hesitation said, that he did not know what objects could be derived from an offensive alliance with Turkey. Having then changed the form of my inquiry, the Chancellor replied, that he would again state that the report was incorrect, but that it was true that the Emperor had caused it to be intimated to the Sultan, that he might count upon the protection and aid of Russia in case an attack should be made against Turkey by France, in consequence of any concession made in favour of the Greek Church by his Highness in the affair of the Holy Places.

This overture probably explains much of what has appeared so little intelligible in the warlike attitude assumed by the Imperial Government.

No. 158.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 2.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, April 21, 1853.*

A COPY of the *note verbale*, dated the 4<sup>th</sup> of March, which has been presented by Prince Menchikoff to the Porte, will be forwarded to Baron Brunnow by the messenger who conveys these despatches to Berlin, for the purpose of being communicated to Her Majesty's Government.

As far as a hasty perusal enables me to form an opinion, no exception, I should say, can be taken to the language of this document. It is written in language of remonstrance, rather than of menace, and contains a temperate, although serious enunciation of the grievances of which the Emperor has to complain, in consequence of the concessions made to the Latin Church at the expense of those interests which the Emperor is especially bound to protect.

The only passage in the paper which appeared to me to require explanation is that in one of the concluding paragraphs, in which Prince Menchikoff calls upon the Porte for an atonement for the offence which has been given to the Emperor of Russia, and which he demands should be offered by an "acte de confiance." As the term appeared to me a little ambiguous, I begged the Chancellor to be good enough to explain to me the precise sense which it was intended to bear.

His Excellency replied, that it was intended that the Porte should redress the grievances which had been set forth in the preceding passages of the note, and that it was desired that the recognition of the rights to be secured to the Greek Church should be sanctioned by such formalities as would give it the character of an international engagement between Russia and Turkey; that the old Capitulations which were quoted by the French in support of various pretensions were represented as having the value of Treaties; that it was therefore desired that an arrangement, which it was intended should be permanent, should possess an unquestionable character of this description.

Count Nesselrode proceeded to remark upon the proofs of moderation which the Russian demands upon the Porte, as explained by Prince Menchikoff's note, exhibited, and contrasted them with the threatening messages and formidable ultimatum of which the Prince had been represented to be the bearer.

As regards the two parties with whom the Porte has to deal,—one, his Excellency observed, represented a very exclusive, the other a very tolerant religion. On one side was a solitary convent, and some eighty travellers, attracted chiefly by motives of curiosity; on the other ten millions of subjects of the Sultan, and great crowds of foreign pilgrims, animated by fervid religious feelings.

Count Nesselrode proceeded to speak of the last accounts which he had received from Constantinople, and which, although inconclusive, were, as far as they went, satisfactory.

Prince Menchikoff's interview with Rifaat Effendi led to the belief that the dispositions of the Porte were conciliatory: the same report had been made of the language held by the English and French Ambassadors.

The greatest difficulties apprehended by the Chancellor are those connected with the repairs of the Church of Bethlehem; and these, his Excellency conceived, might be the more readily avoided as, if necessary, the repairs might be deferred for a few years.

I was careful to remark that this suggestion had been made originally by Colonel Rose, whose conduct had nevertheless been on some occasions considered as unconciliatory. Count Nesselrode's language gave me to understand that if the rights of the Greek Church were once solemnly recognized and secured, every disposition would exist on the part of that church to enter into such arrangements as would be found acceptable to the Sultan.

On the whole, I collect that Count Nesselrode anticipates a satisfactory solution of church difficulties; and supposing such an adjustment to be made, I cannot doubt that few weeks will elapse before reasonable men of all creeds will look back with astonishment upon the stir which has been made about objects of such trifling importance.

My conversation with his Excellency took place on the 19th instant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 159.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 3.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, April 29, 1853.*

THE French Mail of the 15th instant from Constantinople reached Paris this morning, and M. Drouyn de Lhuys was good enough to send for me this afternoon, in order to communicate to me the substance of the reports which he had received from M. de la Cour. The intelligence which they afford is not satisfactory to the French Government.

Of the reception given to him by the Sultan and the Turkish Ministers, M. de la Cour had nothing to complain, but his attempts to enter into confidential communication with Prince Menchikoff respecting the question of the holy places had, up to the moment when he wrote, been met with a decided, though a polite reserve.

Prince Menchikoff however had assured M. de la Cour that he had no intention of inducing the Porte to retract anything which had been conceded to the Latins, but that he was come to complain of the bad faith displayed by the Sultan and his Government in the affair of the holy places, and to endeavour to place the Greek religion upon a surer basis for the future.

M. de la Cour appears immediately on his arrival at Constantinople to have been furnished by the Ottoman Ministers with a project of Convention put forward by Russia for this purpose, and it seems to have been his aim, during the first interview which he had with Prince Menchikoff, to bring this project under discussion, and to state the objections he entertained, and consequently the opposition he must make to parts of it.

It may be convenient that I should detail the principal points of the Convention, specifying more particularly those to which M. de la Cour demurs.

The Convention contains eight Articles.

The first relates to the key of the Church of Bethlehem, lately given to the Latins, and is intended to prevent the use of that key leading to further innovations.

M. de la Cour does not appear to object to this Article.

The second asserts that the silver star, lately restored by the Sultan, confers no particular right on any Christian nation. This Article is not objected to.

The third is intended to settle the question of precedence between the Greek and Latin worshippers, and refers to an arrangement, which does not seem to have been definitively concluded, as no copy of it has been sent to Paris.

I infer however from M. de la Cour's remarks, that precedence is given to the Greeks, as he insists on keeping precedence for the Latins in those places where they have always enjoyed it; and in those places where Greeks and Latins meet for the first time, or I should rather say from which the Latins have until now been excluded, he wishes, in order to avoid the discussion of the question, that the buildings or altars should be made over on alternate days for the service of the different communities.

The fourth Article maintaining the *status quo* in the gardens of the sacred buildings is not objected to.

The fifth, reserving the rights of the Greeks in case any further concessions than are now known have been made to the Latins, does not appear to have excited opposition.

The sixth Article is introduced in order to prevent the Latins building on the ground in the vicinity of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, now occupied by Turkish houses, which the Porte had promised the French Embassy to pull down, giving the ground on which they stood to the Latins. M. de la Cour objects to this Article.

The seventh will cause the greatest difficulty. It relates to the repairs of the Cupola of the Holy Sepulchre, and provides that it shall be repaired at the Sultan's expense, but under consultation with the Greek Patriarch. On this point M. de la Cour appears determined not to yield.

Although he maintains the right of France under Treaty to effect the necessary repairs, he is willing that they should be carried into execution by the Sultan, as Sovereign; but he will not hear of the intervention of the Greek Patriarch, and he wishes to stipulate that in carrying out the internal decorations, either the images and inscriptions shall be mixed, or that there shall be none at all.

The eighth and last Article declares that those places which are now in possession of the Greeks shall remain in their possession. M. de la Cour remarks that this Article is too vague, and may give rise to future disputes.

In the interview which M. de la Cour had with Prince Menchikoff, these observations were brought forward, but all discussion of them was prevented by the Prince's declaration that his instructions were peremptory on the points most objected to by the French Ambassador.

In giving me this information, M. Drouyn de Lhuys added that he partici-

pated in the objections raised by M. de la Cour. He again contrasted the conduct and language of Prince Menchikoff with the conciliatory assurances given to the French Minister at St. Petersburg.

As the discussion of these matters at Paris could now be of little use, and as it may be hoped that the good offices of Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople have already reconciled the differences existing between his French and Russian colleagues, I confined my observations to M. Drouyn de Lhuys to exhortations to forbearance and moderation, expressing my conviction that Lord Stratford, if met by both parties with loyalty and good faith, would have found means to conciliate their conflicting claims.

I have only to add, that M. de la Cour mentions in his despatches that Lord Stratford was not without suspicions that Russia had secretly asked of the Porte the protectorate of the Greek religion, and a Treaty in the sense of that of Unkiar Skelessi. Lord Stratford had therefore strongly urged on M. de la Cour the policy of making concessions in order to get rid of the question of the sacred places, and enable the two Embassies to act more positively in concert should the Porte in consequence of the exigencies of Russia require their joint support.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys assented to the prudence of this policy.

M. de la Cour reports also that the Russian armaments in preparation and at Odessa were continuing.

No. 160.

*Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Baron Brunnow, May 4.)*

M. le Baron,

*St. Pétersbourg, le  $\frac{9}{21}$  Avril, 1853.*

AYANT reçu depuis peu de la part du Prince Menchikoff la note verbale qu'il a remise au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Porte le  $\frac{4}{16}$  Mars passé, et qui contient l'exposé des griefs dont nous demandons le redressement, ce n'est qu'aujourd'hui que je me trouve à même de la transmettre en copie à votre Excellence. Elle jugera sans doute utile d'en donner confidentiellement connaissance au Principal Secrétaire d'Etat Britannique. Mieux que toute chose, cet exposé pourra servir à constater la sincérité des sentiments conciliants qui animent le Cabinet Impérial. Il prouvera aussi combien étaient peu fondées les nouvelles parvenues de Constantinople sur le caractère impérieux des demandes que notre Ambassadeur aurait adressées à la Porte Ottomane.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)

M. le Baron,

*St. Petersburg, April  $\frac{9}{21}$ , 1853.*

HAVING lately received from Prince Menchikoff the verbal note which he sent in to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Porte on the  $\frac{4}{16}$ th of March last, and which contains a statement of the grievances for which we require redress, I have not until now been able to forward a copy of it to your Excellency. You will doubtless consider it advisable to communicate it confidentially to the Principal Secretary of State of Great Britain.

This document will serve better than anything else to demonstrate the sincerity of the conciliatory sentiments which animate the Imperial Cabinet; and it will also show how little foundation there was for the reports which have emanated from Constantinople of the imperious character of the demands which our Ambassador had addressed to the Ottoman Porte.

Accept, &c.

(Signed) NESSELRODE.

Inclosure in No. 160.

*Note Verbale addressed by Prince Menchikoff to the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated March 1<sup>4</sup>, 1853.*

LE Prince Menchikoff, Ambassadeur de Russie, a l'honneur d'exposer à la Sublime Porte ce qui suit.

Sa Majesté le Sultan, par sa lettre du <sup>29 Janvier</sup>~~10 Février~~, 1853, a annoncé à l'Empereur la solution définitive de la question des saints lieux, soulevée par l'Ambassade de France à Constantinople. Cette lettre renfermait les promesses les plus solennelles sur le maintien des anciens droits octroyés de la part de la Sublime Porte aux communautés Grecques. Elle établissait, comme seul changement au *statu quo*, l'admission des Latins à Gethsémanie, et comme compensation, l'accès des Grecs à Koublet-ul-Messad.

Un firman fut promulgué à la même époque pour confirmer cet arrangement. Un khatti-chérif mis en tête du firman reconnaissait et consacrait de la manière la plus positive les actes antérieurs accordés aux Grecs à différentes époques, renouvelés par le Sultan Mahmoud de glorieuse mémoire, et confirmés par Sa Majesté le Sultan actuel.

Nous en prîmes acte de manière à leur donner la valeur d'une transaction solennelle et définitive. Quoique conçues dans un esprit et dans des termes qui s'écartaient du *statu quo*, que nous nous étions toujours attachés à maintenir, ces pièces nous ont paru satisfaire jusqu'à un certain point à la juste sollicitude du Gouvernement Impérial, pour les intérêts de la religion orthodoxe et les immunités de l'Eglise Patriarcale de Jérusalem.

Il a été, il est vrai, inséré dans le dernier firman un seul Article qui, en dehors de l'arrangement convenu, s'y trouvait ajouté en faveur des Latins. Il leur confirmait, ainsi qu'aux Grecs et aux Arméniens, la possession d'une clef des portes sud, est, et nord de la grotte, et de l'une des portes de la Grande Eglise de Bethléem, dont la porte principale est exclusivement confiée à la garde des Grecs. Mais notre Représentant à Constantinople eut soin d'apporter à la rédaction de cet Article toutes les précautions nécessaires pour qu'il ne portât aucune atteinte au *statu quo* existant. Et non seulement la Porte s'était prêtée à ces réserves et les avait confirmées dans un projet d'instruction au Pacha de Jérusalem, mais encore dans une lettre Vizirielle secrète à ce fonctionnaire, et qui nous avait été également communiquée officiellement, elle lui avait enjoint de ne pas donner aux Latins la clef dont il s'agit.

En conclusion, le nouvel arrangement reçut l'adhésion du Gouvernement Impérial, sous réserve formelle des conditions que la Porte s'était elle-même engagée à observer.

Nous basant de plus sur les promesses de maintenir intacts les privilèges séculaires accordés aux Grecs dès les premiers temps de la domination Musulmane et consacrés par les khatti-chérifs des successeurs des premiers Califes, nous exigeons, comme condition *sine quâ non* de l'exécution du dernier firman :

1. Une entente préalable du Gouvernement Ottoman avec le Patriarche sur tous les arrangements de détail nécessaires pour régulariser et préciser l'admission du clergé Grec dans le sanctuaire de l'Ascension et celle du clergé Latin dans la grotte de Gethsémanie.

2. L'autorisation aux Grecs de reconstruire la coupole et l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre, faveur qui leur avait été accordée dès 1841, et que le nouveau khatti-chérif confirmait avec tous leurs autres droits. Nous invoquons la communication officielle qui nous avait été dans le temps faite à ce sujet par le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Porte.

Nous tombâmes entièrement d'accord sur le premier point, et l'envoi du Patriarche de Jérusalem sur les lieux, pour veiller à la mise à exécution du firman selon ses prérogatives, fut convenu entre la Porte et la Légation Impériale.

Le second point dut subir des modifications pour éviter de nouvelles complications. Sa Majesté le Sultan décida que la coupole serait réparée à ses frais. La Cour Impériale y donna son adhésion, mais obtint, qu'en conformité aux précédents et à la justice, toutes les dispositions locales et la direction immédiate des travaux de réparation fussent confiées au Patriarche de Jérusalem et à ses délégués.

Ces conditions furent exposées dans une note officielle, remise à la Porte au mois de Mai 1852, par la Légation Impériale. Elles rencontrèrent les dispositions les plus empressées du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, et furent scellées par les engagements les plus formels.

Pendant les délais que subit l'envoi du Patriarche et d'un Commissaire exécuteur du firman, les promesses les plus explicites furent réitérées par les Ministres de la Porte, sur la stricte application du khatti-chérif.

Un projet d'instruction dérogatoire à cet Acte fut même annulé à la suite des représentations du notre Légation. A ces interpellations itératives au sujet des différents bruits qui lui parvenaient sur de nouvelles concessions accordées aux Latins, on répondait par les dénégations les plus absolues. Dans le cours de ces pourparlers, les exhortations bienveillantes du Gouvernement Impériale vinrent constamment en aide à la faiblesse de la Porte ; ses avertissements la prémunissaient contre les fatales conséquences qui pourraient en résulter.

Les réticences et les délais de la Porte, son embarras à nous communiquer avec toute la sincérité qu'elle nous devait les instructions expédiées à son Commissaire à Jérusalem, nous inspiraient, il est vrai, de justes soupçons. Mais l'Empereur mettait une entière confiance en la loyauté de Sa Majesté le Sultan. Des renseignements positifs de Jérusalem ne tardèrent pas à prouver jusqu'à quel point les conseillers de son Auguste Allié avaient réussi à surprendre sa religion, tant au détriment de ses propres sujets qu'en contravention aux égards auxquels il avait le droit de prétendre.

Bientôt, réellement les faits vinrent confirmer nos prévisions, et nous pûmes constater que l'auguste parole donnée à l'Empereur avait été méconnue ; qu'un acte émané de la volonté souveraine du Sultan avait été traité d'illusoire.

Au lieu de procéder à la réparation immédiate de la coupole avec le concours exclusif des Grecs, les autorités Ottomanes de Jérusalem se livrèrent à des délibérations insolites avec les délégués des différents cultes, pour les tenter par une participation à cette œuvre, et éveiller ainsi des haines, des rivalités invétérées. Le Patriarche Grec fut écarté des conciliabules qu'on tint dans ces circonstances. On saisit cette occasion pour avantager les moines Catholiques d'une possession sur les terrasses du temple jusqu'ici domaine exclusif des Grecs, malgré la promesse donnée à la Légation Impériale de convertir les bâtisses extérieures du dôme en terrain neutre, inaccessible à tous les cultes.

Chargé spécialement de promulguer et d'exécuter le dernier khatti-chérif, le Commissaire Ottoman déclara hautement qu'il n'avait aucune connaissance de cet Acte, et qu'il se renfermerait strictement dans les limites de ses instructions.

Dans le sens de ces dernières, il insista sur la non-lecture et le non-enregistrement du firman. Quoique obtenus plus tard, ils ne se firent qu'avec des restrictions blessantes pour le culte orthodoxe, et qui constituaient un acte de désobéissance à la volonté souveraine. Immédiatement après l'accomplissement de ces formalités, et pendant que la Légation Impériale recevait de la part des Ministres Ottomans les assurances les plus formelles sur la stricte exécution du firman, les principales dispositions de cet Acte furent ouvertement transgressées à Jérusalem.

La Porte, cédant à de malveillantes suggestions, a cru pouvoir prendre des décisions sur une affaire d'une grande gravité, sans attendre ni consulter l'avis de l'Auguste Allié qui s'est épanché là-dessus en toute sincérité et confiance envers Sa Majesté le Sultan. On portait ainsi atteinte à la dignité de deux Souverains. C'est ainsi qu'on accordait aux Latins, contrairement au sens précis du firman, la clef de la grande porte de l'Eglise de Bethléem, sans tenir aucun compte de la protestation du Patriarche de Jérusalem et des rapports du Commissaire Ottoman lui-même, qui considérait la nouvelle concession comme superflue et inopportune. Les moines Latins ne tardèrent point à user de cette clef pour entrer avec pompe et ostentation dans le Temple de Bethléem. Y ayant eu libre accès jusqu'alors, ils s'empressaient ainsi d'établir un nouveau droit, un nouvel empiètement sur les privilèges des Grecs.

Aucune mention n'a été faite dans le firman de l'Etoile qui avait disparu de l'Eglise de Bethléem en 1846. Le Commissaire Ottoman, sans que le clergé Grec en fût prévenu, remit aux moines Latins une autre Etoile, qui fut arbitrairement replacée dans la Grotte de Bethléem. Les préposés Ottomans eux-mêmes ne purent s'empêcher d'y voir un subterfuge honteux, qui devait amener de vives contestations de la part du culte Grec.

On attaquait le droit de préséance des Grecs en établissant qu'à Gethsémanie les orthodoxes et les Latins se succèderaient jour par jour dans l'exercice du culte. Une injuste disproportion était ainsi établie entre les droits de 15,000,000 de sujets du Sultan, et une communauté de religieux étrangers.

On remettait, en opposition au firman, la garde des deux jardins de Bethléem aux moines Catholiques.

On s'opposait à ce qu'à Koublet-el-Messad les Grecs pussent officier selon les exigences de leur culte—ce qui annullait la nouvelle faveur qui leur était accordée.

On n'a voulu donner aucun cours à la protestation du Patriarche, et l'on empêchait d'aller déposer aux pieds de son Souverain les plaintes de ses ouailles et de toute la nation.

Enfin, comme, pendant que la Légation Impériale restait écartée de toute discussion sur la question des saints lieux, la Porte entretenait sur ce sujet une correspondance officielle avec l'Ambassade de France, qui nous restait complètement inconnue, d'autres avantages et concessions ont pu être accordées contrairement aux engagements pris envers la Cour Impériale.

L'Ambassadeur se flatte de l'espoir que la Porte prendra en sérieuse considération les faits ci-dessus exposés, qui constituent une atteinte flagrante aux convictions religieuses que professe Sa Majesté l'Empereur, en même temps qu'un manque d'égards et de procédés envers sa personne. Sa Majesté le Sultan, dans l'audience dont elle a bien voulu honorer l'Ambassadeur, a daigné lui témoigner de la manière la plus gracieuse ses intentions de maintenir et de resserrer les liens d'amitié qui l'unissent à son auguste allié et voisin.

L'Ambassadeur, par l'entremise des Ministres de sa Hautesse, fait appel à ces sentiments, et demande avec confiance le prompt redressement des torts qui ont été cause d'une fâcheuse mésintelligence entre les deux Gouvernements.

Animé des intentions les plus conciliantes, le Prince Menchikoff, dans les réparations qu'il est chargé d'obtenir pour le passé, se montrera disposé à aider la Sublime Porte dans les difficultés qu'elle pourrait rencontrer en revenant sur des faits accomplis; et le projet d'un arrangement stable et définitif pour la visitation des sanctuaires de la Palestine devra être dans tous ses détails arrêté avec la Sublime Porte, tant pour calmer le mécontentement des Grecs que pour leur accorder une garantie sûre et inviolable pour l'avenir.

Autant que le côté pratique de la question le permet, cet arrangement sera conçu dans un esprit de tolérance et de bonne entente, mais ne pourra plus se borner à des assurances stériles et incomplètes, qui pourraient être invalidées dans l'avenir. Un engagement solennel doit désormais attester de l'accord sincère qu'il devient si urgent d'établir à ce sujet entre les deux Gouvernements.

Il suffit réellement de jeter un regard retrospectif sur l'histoire de ces pays pour s'assurer que tout l'apanage actuel des religieux Latins en Palestine est le fruit d'empiètements pareils à ceux d'aujourd'hui, qui poursuivis pas à pas, à l'aide de l'appui politique venant de l'Occident, ont avancé au point de menacer l'Eglise Grecque d'un envahissement général, qui serait en même temps un coup fatal porté aux droits souverains de la Turquie.

Mais tout en nourrissant les meilleurs espérances pour cet accord, l'Ambassadeur ne peut se dispenser d'exprimer ici la pénible impression qu'ont laissée au Gouvernement Impérial la méfiance et le mauvais vouloir dont les Ministres de la Porte ont depuis quelque temps fait preuve à l'égard du pieux et magnanime intérêt que l'Empereur professe pour les Chrétiens d'Orient. Ses avis les plus bienveillants, ses avertissements les plus désintéressés, ont été réjeté par les Ministres de la Sublime Porte, qui prêtaient volontiers l'oreille à des insinuations insidieuses pour méconnaître et dénaturer les meilleures intentions de Sa Majesté l'Empereur en y cherchant des arrières pensées incompatibles avec sa puissance et les dispositions généreuses qu'il a toujours témoignées pour l'Empire Ottoman. Il suffit ici, à l'appui de ces assertions, de citer sommairement la manière dont la Porte accueillait les conseils du Gouvernement Impérial dans les questions du Monténégro, du Patriarcat de Constantinople, des injustices commises contre les Rayas Chrétiens, &c. L'Ambassadeur a la mission d'en porter plainte à Sa Majesté le Sultan, en lui représentant, avec tous les égards dûs à sa personne, la nécessité de faire disparaître le profond et juste mécontentement qu'en éprouve son ancien et meilleur Allié, par un Acte de confiance qui écarte pour l'avenir toute nuance de désaccord entre les deux Souverains.

Les Ministres actuels de la Sublime Porte voudront bien, je l'espère,

apprécier toute l'importance du vœu que l'Ambassadeur est chargé d'exprimer à ce sujet à Sa Majesté le Sultan, et qu'il a cru devoir faire pressentir à ses conseillers pour s'assurer de leur part un concours intelligent et sincère dans l'intérêt des deux pays, dont la désunion pourrait amener les plus graves conséquences, tant pour le bien-être de la Turquie que pour la paix de l'Europe entière.

(Translation.)

PRINCE MENCHIKOFF, Ambassador from Russia, has the honour to state to the Sublime Porte as follows :

His Majesty the Sultan, by his letter of <sup>January 29</sup><sub>February 10,</sub> 1852, announced to the Emperor the definitive settlement of the question concerning the Holy Places, which had been raised by the French Embassy at Constantinople. That letter contained the most solemn promises as to the maintenance of the ancient rights granted by the Sublime Porte to the Greek communities. It established, as the only alteration in the *status quo*, the admission of the Latins to Gethsemane, and, by way of compensation, the admission of the Greeks to Koublet ul Messad.

A Firman was at the same time promulgated for the confirmation of this arrangement. A Hatti Scherif, at the commencement of the Firman, recognised and established, in the most positive manner, the former privileges which had been accorded to the Greeks at different periods, and which were renewed by Sultan Mahmoud, of glorious memory, and confirmed by His Majesty the present Sultan.

We accepted those instruments, and attached to them the character of a solemn and definitive transaction. Although differing both in spirit and in letter from the *status quo*, which we were always anxious to maintain, they still appeared in some degree to satisfy the just solicitude of the Imperial Government for the interests of the orthodox religion and the immunities of the Patriarchal Church of Jerusalem.

There was, it is true, one article inserted in the last Firman, which, going beyond the arrangement agreed to, was added in favour of the Latins. It granted to them, as well as to the Greeks and the Armenians, the possession of a key of the southern, eastern, and northern gates of the Grotto, and of one of the doors of the Great Church of Bethlehem, of which the principal door is confided exclusively to the guardianship of the Greeks. But our Representative at Constantinople took care that in drawing up this article, every necessary precaution should be used to prevent any detriment to the existing *status quo*. And not only did the Porte agree to the adoption of these precautions, and confirm them in a Draft of Instructions to the Pasha of Egypt, but likewise, in a secret Vizirial letter to that functionary, and which was also communicated to us officially, it enjoined him not to give to the Latins the key in question.

In conclusion, the Imperial Government acquiesced in the new arrangement, under a formal reservation of the conditions which the Porte itself had engaged to observe.

Taking our stand, moreover, on the promises made to us of maintaining intact the secular privileges granted to the Greeks from the earliest times of Mussulman domination, and recorded in the Hatti Scherifs of the successors of the first Caliphs, we required, as a *sine quâ non* of the execution of the last Firman :

1st. A previous agreement between the Ottoman Government and the Greek Patriarch as to all the arrangements of detail necessary to regulate and determine the admission of the Greek clergy into the sanctuary of the Ascension, and that of the Latin clergy into the Grotto of Gethsemane.

2nd. Permission to the Greeks to rebuild the cupola of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, a favour which was granted to them in 1841, and which the new Hatti Scherif confirmed, together with all their other rights. We appealed to the official communication made to us at the time on this subject by the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs.

We were perfectly agreed upon the first point; and the mission of the Patriarch to the Holy Places, to superintend, in virtue of his prerogatives, the carrying the Firman into effect, was settled between the Porte and the Imperial Legation.

It was necessary that the second point should undergo some modification, in order to avoid further complications. His Majesty the Sultan decided that the cupola should be rebuilt at his own expense. The Imperial Court acquiesced in this, but obtained that, in conformity with precedents and with justice, all the local arrangements and the immediate direction of the repairs should be confided to the Patriarch of Jerusalem and to his delegates.

These conditions were stated in an official note given in to the Porte by the Imperial Legation in the month of May 1852. They were most warmly adopted by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and were confirmed by the most formal engagements.

During the delay which took place in sending out the Patriarch and a Commissioner to carry out the Firman, the most explicit promises as to the strict application of the Hatti Scherif were reiterated by the Ministers of the Porte.

A draft of instructions weakening the effect of that Act was even annulled in consequence of the representations of our Legation. To its repeated inquiries on the subject of various reports which reached it of further concessions having been accorded to the Latins, the most positive denials were returned. In the course of these discussions the friendly exhortations of the Imperial Government constantly sustained the weakness of the Porte, its warnings cautioned it against the fatal consequences which might result from it.

The concealments and the delays of the Porte, its unwillingness to communicate to us with all the sincerity which was our due, the instructions sent out to its Commissioner in Jerusalem, inspired us, it is true, with just suspicions. But the Emperor placed the fullest confidence in the honour of His Majesty the Sultan. Positive information from Jerusalem soon proved to him how far the counsellors of his august Ally had succeeded in abusing his good faith, to the detriment of his own subjects as well as in disregard of the consideration which he had a right to expect.

Our suspicions were very soon confirmed by facts, and we were able to prove that the august word pledged to the Emperor had been disregarded; that an Act emanating from the sovereign will of the Sultan had been treated as illusory.

Instead of proceeding to the immediate repair of the cupola with the exclusive concurrence of the Greeks, the Ottoman authorities of Jerusalem in an unprecedented manner took counsel with the delegates of the different sects, tempting them with a share in that undertaking, and thus awakening inveterate hatreds and jealousies. The Greek Patriarch was excluded from the councils which were held under these circumstances. This opportunity was taken to endow the Catholic monks with property on the terraces of the Temple, which up to the present time belonged exclusively to the Greeks, in spite of the promises made to the Russian Legation that the buildings outside the dome should be made neutral ground inaccessible to all the sects.

Although specially charged to promulgate and to carry into effect the last Hatti Scherif, the Ottoman Commissioner loudly declared that he knew nothing of that document, and that he would confine himself strictly within the limits of his instructions.

In the sense of those instructions he insisted that the Firman should neither be read nor registered. Though it was read and registered afterwards, it was so with restrictions derogatory to the orthodox faith, and which amounted to an act of disobedience to the sovereign will. Immediately after the accomplishment of these formalities, and while the Imperial Legation was receiving from the Ottoman Ministers the most solemn assurances of the strict execution of the Firman, the principal provisions of that Act were openly transgressed in Jerusalem.

The Porte, yielding to malicious suggestions, thought fit to decide upon a matter of great importance without waiting for or taking the opinion of the august Ally who had expressed himself with entire frankness and confidence on the subject to His Majesty the Sultan. Thus the dignity of both Sovereigns was wounded. And thus, in opposition to the strict meaning of the Firman, the key of the great door of the Church of Bethlehem was granted to the Latins, without heed to the protest of the Patriarch of Jerusalem and of the reports of the Ottoman Commissioner himself, who considered this new con-

cession as superfluous and unseasonable. The Latin monks were not slow in using this key to enter the Church of Bethlehem with pomp and with ostentation. Having had free access to it hitherto, they were eager thus to establish a new right, a fresh encroachment upon the privileges of the Greeks.

No mention was made in the Firman of the star which had disappeared from the Church of Bethlehem in 1846. The Ottoman Commissioner, without acquainting the Greeks of his intention, gave to the Latin monks another star which was arbitrarily replaced in the Grotto of Bethlehem. The Ottoman officers themselves could not but see in this a shameful subterfuge which must call forth strong remonstrances on the part of the Greek Church.

The right of precedency of the Greeks was assailed by the regulation that at Gethsemane the orthodox clergy and the Latins should perform the service there on alternate days. An unjust disproportion was thereby established between 15,000,000 of the Sultan's subjects and a community of foreign priests.

The wardenship of the two Gardens of Bethlehem was, in opposition to the Firman, entrusted to the Catholic monks.

Obstacles were offered to the Greeks being allowed to officiate according to the rites of their own Church at Koublet el Messad, and thus the new concession which had been granted to them was rendered null.

No attention was paid to the Patriarch's protest, and he was prevented from going and laying at the feet of his Sovereign the complaints of his flock and of the whole nation.

Finally, as, while the Imperial Mission kept aloof from all discussion on the subject of the Holy Places, the Porte was carrying on an official correspondence on the subject with the French Embassy, of which we were utterly ignorant, other advantages and concessions may have been granted, contrary to the engagements entered into with the Imperial Court.

The Ambassador indulges the hope that the Porte will take into serious consideration the facts here stated, which constitute a flagrant attack upon the religious convictions professed by His Majesty the Emperor, and also a neglect of courtesy and respect towards his person. His Majesty the Sultan, in the audience with which he was pleased to honour the Ambassador, deigned to express to him in the most gracious manner his intention of maintaining and strengthening the bonds of friendship which unite him with his august ally and neighbour.

The Ambassador, through the channel of His Highness' Ministers, appeals to these sentiments, and confidently demands the prompt redress of the wrongs which have caused an unhappy misunderstanding between the two Governments.

Animated by the most conciliatory intentions, Prince Menchikoff, in the reparation which he is instructed to claim for the past, will show himself disposed to assist the Porte in the difficulties which it may encounter in retracing the steps it has already taken; and the draft of a permanent and definitive arrangement in regard to the right of visiting the sanctuaries of Palestine, must in all its details be settled with the Sublime Porte, with the view both to appease the dissatisfaction of the Greeks, and to confer upon them a certain and inviolable guarantee for the future.

As far as a practical view of the question will admit, that arrangement will be framed in a spirit of toleration and good understanding, but it can no longer be confined to barren and unsatisfactory promises which may be broken at a future period. A solemn engagement must henceforward attest the sincerity of the understanding which it has become so important to establish in this matter between the two Governments.

A review of the history of those countries sufficiently proves that the whole of the existing property of the Latin monks in Palestine results from encroachments similar to those now committed, which, followed up step by step, with the assistance of the political support proceeding from the West, have reached such a pitch as to threaten the Greek Church with a general assault, which would be at the same time a fatal blow to the sovereign rights of Turkey.

But while indulging the most sanguine hopes that this good understanding may be brought about, the Ambassador cannot refrain from here expressing the painful impression which has been left upon the Imperial Government by the mistrust and ill-will which the Ministers of the Porte have for some time

past manifested with regard to the pious and magnanimous interest professed by the Emperor for the Christians of the East. His most friendly counsels, his most disinterested warnings have been rejected by the Ministers of the Sublime Porte, who have lent a willing ear to insidious insinuations in order to misapprehend and to misconstrue the best intentions of His Majesty the Emperor, by seeking to discover in them mental reservations inconsistent with his power and with the generous feelings which he has always manifested for the Ottoman Empire. It is sufficient in this place briefly to mention, in support of these assertions, the manner in which the Porte received the counsels of the Imperial Government in the questions of Montenegro, of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, of the acts of injustice committed against the Christian Rayahs.

The Ambassador is instructed to bring these complaints before His Majesty the Sultan, and to represent to him, with all the respect due to his person, the necessity of appeasing the deep and well-grounded discontent felt on this account by his ancient and best ally, by an act of confidence which shall obviate for the future every shadow of disagreement between the two Sovereigns.

The present Ministers of the Sublime Porte will, I trust, be pleased to appreciate the full importance of the wish which the Ambassador is instructed to express to His Majesty the Sultan, and of which he has thought it right, in the first instance, to apprise his counsellors, in order to secure their intelligent and sincere concurrence for the interest of both countries, whose disunion might entail the most serious consequences upon the well-being of Turkey, as well as upon the peace of the whole of Europe.

## No. 161.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 6.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, April 12, 1853.*

I OBSERVE with much satisfaction the conciliatory assurances given by Count Nesselrode to Sir Hamilton Seymour, as stated by the latter in his despatch of March 13 to your Lordship, and the more so as a corresponding improvement has been remarked of late in the tone and demeanour of Prince Menchikoff. It is remarkable at the same time that Count Nesselrode appears to have made no mention whatever of the ulterior and very important propositions brought forward here by the Russian Ambassador. This reserve corresponds with the endeavours made by Prince Menchikoff to insulate the Porte in its eventual negotiation respecting them, and his endeavours for that purpose are the more significant, as the principal interpreter of the Russian Embassy is alleged to have said in conversation within the last few days, that if the Prince failed in carrying his points, he would simply embark the Embassy, and retire altogether from Constantinople.

Prince Menchikoff has been with the Grand Vizier this morning. M. de la Cour is to have his audience of the Sultan to-morrow. I hope to see both these Ambassadors in a day or two, with some prospect of being able to assist in removing the obstacles to their agreement.

## No. 162.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 6.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, April 15, 1853.*

SINCE I had the honour of addressing your Lordship on the subject of the holy places and other matters of discussion pending between Russia and Turkey, but little or rather no progress has been made towards a satisfactory arrangement, and certain appearances of a doubtful, if not a threatening, character have in some degree revived the anxiety of the public and increased the apprehensions of the Porte.

M. de la Cour had his first audience of the Sultan the day before yesterday. He called upon me in the evening and expressed the satisfaction which he has

derived from His Majesty's gracious reception of him. He seemed to have taken an agreeable impression of the Sultan's manners and character. According to his statement, it does not appear that anything had passed on the occasion beyond the usual generalities of mutual good-will and desire to maintain and improve the existing relations between the two Empires. Rifaat Pasha's account of the audience agrees with the Ambassador's, and his Excellency sent me word that the friendly assurances given to the Sultan on the part of France, were extremely satisfactory. In his conversation with me the French Ambassador went over some of the points of difference respecting the holy places, and although his language was not that of determined resistance, it showed a most decided unwillingness to accept some of the Russian propositions. He is to see Rifaat Pasha to-morrow, for the purpose of stating his deliberate opinions respecting them.

Prince Menchikoff received despatches from his Government the same day. They are understood to express dissatisfaction at the slow progress of his negotiations, and to direct him to require an early decision from the Porte. He waited in consequence on the Ottoman Secretary of State yesterday, and his language appears to have agreed with the alleged tenor of the instructions. He pressed the Pasha for an answer; he declared his determination to abate nothing of his principal demands as to the holy places; he showed, if I am rightly informed, much impatience, and a readiness to terminate the negotiations abruptly on learning from Rifaat Pasha that the Council was unanimously of opinion that his ulterior proposals could not be accepted; and referring to the arrival of the French squadron at Salamis, and to the advanced positions of the Russian army in Bessarabia, he gave it to be distinctly understood that his Court would neither be restrained by that demonstration, nor induced to abandon its own while the discussions continued.

Happening to see the Prince immediately after receiving his instructions, I had some further conversation with him on the questions at issue. He read me parts of a despatch addressed by your Lordship to Sir Hamilton Seymour after the decision taken by Her Majesty's Government respecting the proposed movements of the squadron at Malta, and endeavoured to impress me with an idea that he could not recede from his demands, or at least from the essential parts of them, in so far as the holy places were immediately concerned. I tried to pave the way for an eventual effort to procure some modification of them by admitting the fairness of his claims where I could do so with justice, and at the same time I did not conceal from him my knowledge of his ulterior propositions, and my conviction that they would meet with serious opposition from the Porte, and be regarded with little favour by Powers even the most friendly to Russia.

Without taking my observations amiss, he endeavoured to make out that his demands were by no means of that insidious or dangerous nature which might be attributed to them elsewhere, and that their acceptance was called for by the vagueness of existing Treaties, which required some additional explanations and a more precise form of expression to render them capable of execution, and by the necessity imposed upon Russia of obtaining some effectual security for more respect and good faith in future on the part of the Turkish Government towards his Court.

In the course of the same day I called upon the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires, and learned from him, in confirmation of what I had previously heard, that Prince Menchikoff was ordered to press for a speedy decision from the Porte. I found at the same time, in conversing with M. de Klezl, that however disposed to communicate confidentially with me in a conciliatory sense on the pending subjects of discussion, he was not prepared, in case of the Russian Ambassador's threatening to withdraw, to advise any other course for the Porte to pursue but that of unqualified compliance with his Excellency's demands. I told him that with every wish to avert such an extremity, and to recommend every reasonable concession, I was not prepared to take part in placing the last remains of Turkish independence at the feet of any foreign Power, and that I had ventured to infer from the language of Count Buol at Vienna, that I should find him on the same ground with myself in that respect.

Adverting to those appearances which have again disturbed the minds of reflecting people, I have to state that they consist principally of the attitude still maintained by the Russian army in Bessarabia, of the contradiction given

to the report of its advance having been suspended, and of the supposed continuance of defensive preparations on the side of Turkey. No doubt the arrival of so powerful a French squadron in the Archipelago has also contributed to produce this impression.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 163.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 6.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, April 15, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith in copy two reports addressed to me on the 13th and 15th instant respectively by Mr. Stephen Pisani.

They both relate to the pending discussions, and contain a statement of circumstances not unworthy of your Lordship's attention.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 163.

*M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.)

*Pera, April 13, 1853.*

RIFAAT PASHA requests me to inform your Lordship that M. Argyropulo brought him a message on behalf of Prince Menchikoff, to the effect that a messenger, coming this morning from St. Petersburg, brought despatches in which the Emperor complains of the long delay evinced by the Porte in bringing to a satisfactory solution the demands of the Russian Cabinet, and the Prince demanded an interview, for the purpose of communicating their contents to Rifaat Pasha. The interview is fixed for to-morrow, at Rifaat Pasha's house.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 163.

*M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.)

*Pera, April, 14, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to report that Prince Menchikoff had this day a long interview with Rifaat Pasha on the subject of the pending questions of the holy places, and the supremacy claimed by Russia over the clergy and the Rayahs who profess the Greek religion.

Rifaat Pasha began by telling the Prince that he was aware that the object of his visit was to complain of the delay used by the Porte in the settlement of his demands; but that he ought to take into consideration that the Porte was not to be blamed, because she had it not in her power to come to a conclusion respecting the question of the holy places without previously being in possession of the answer of the French Embassy.

The reply returned by Prince Menchikoff was, that he conceived the Porte's position in this affair, but at the same time he thought it his duty to apprise the Minister for Foreign Affairs that Russia was decided to make no concessions respecting the repair of the cupola of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, and that the hours for officiating at the Holy Virgin's shrine must be regulated in the way already proposed, and that at all events the right of precedence must be conceded to the Greeks. This must be clearly understood, said he, and Russia will not desist from it. He finally urged Rifaat Pasha for the speedy settlement of the question at issue.

In reply, Rifaat Pasha said that the French Ambassador was to have an interview with him on Saturday next, and that he (Rifaat Pasha) would not fail to let the Prince know, without delay, the result of the conference.

Subsequently the Russian Ambassador wished to be informed whether Rifaat Pasha was entrusted with full powers for the conclusion of the proposed Treaty. The latter replied in the negative, but added that the draft of the said Treaty,

as presented by the Prince, was submitted to the mature consideration of the Council of Ministers, and that it was unanimously rejected, as most of the demands therein contained were detrimental to the rights and independence of the Porte; and he (Rifaat Pasha) was most certain that, were another Power to put forward similar propositions, Russia herself, as a good neighbouring Power and ancient ally of the Porte, would advise them to avoid carefully entering into such an agreement.

Is this an official answer? inquired the Prince; and at the same time got up to take his leave. To this Rifaat Pasha said, that he was not yet authorized to make any official communication on the subject, but only stated the view taken by the Council. The matter, proceeded he, was before the Sultan for his consideration, and as the Iradé had not yet been issued he could not enter into further details respecting that matter. The Articles concerning the holy places, said Rifaat Pasha to the Prince, may be specified in another way than in a Treaty. As to those concerning exclusively the patriarchs and the churches, you observed several times that what you demand is already stipulated in the Treaty of Kainardji, and consequently you could not imagine why the Porte is making difficulties in giving a more extensive meaning to the Articles of a Treaty in full force between the two Governments. To this I beg leave to observe, said Rifaat Pasha, that the Article stipulated in the Treaty you mention does not contain any provisions for the churches in general and the four patriarchs, but only bears upon particular points; whereas what you now propose is a general and exclusive protection over the whole Greek population, their clergy, and their churches.

Why does the Porte, said the Prince, object to grant to Russia what it had already conceded to Austria by the Treaty of Belgrade?

Rifaat Pasha said to M. Argyropulo, Tell the Prince that the protectorate of the Austrians extends solely to the clergy of their own nation, and not to the priests of the Fanal.

The Prince abstained from replying, but said to Rifaat Pasha that the object of Russia in all this were positive and unequivocal assurances for the future, and how could she rely upon them if they are not in writing and put in a proper shape? To-morrow the present Ministry may be changed and superseded by men like those lately in office. What guarantee will she have then that things will not take another turn again, and that the Emperor will not be treated in the same disrespectful manner? Rifaat Pasha replied that there were different ways of giving formal and official assurances besides a Treaty.

The Prince then spoke about the hospital and the proposed church at Jerusalem, and endeavoured to ascertain whether the Porte would comply with the request. Rifaat Pasha said that he did not anticipate any opposition on the part of his colleagues, and thought that the Sultan would not refuse his sanction.

The Prince afterwards said that the late behaviour of the Porte, and the state of political affairs in Turkey, were the motive of the military preparations in Russia, and that he urgently requested Rifaat Pasha to induce the Porte to remove all causes which render necessary the keeping up of so large a force, which occasions an immense expense to Russia.

No. 164.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 6.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, April 15, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith an extract of a letter addressed to me by Mr. Yeames, Her Majesty's Consul at Odessa.

Your Lordship will remark that Mr. Yeames contradicts the report which had prevailed very generally before, that the preparations for advancing the Russian forces in Bessarabia had been suspended. The statement of Mr. Yeames is confirmed by letters received here from other quarters.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 164.

*Consul Yeames to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.)

*Odessa, April 11, 1853.*

THE concentration of each of the three divisions of the 5th corps d'armée is at the present day completed, namely, the 13th division of infantry at Sevastopol; the 14th at Odessa; and the 15th at Leovo, on the Pruth. The artillery of the corps, usually kept in the rear on the left bank of the Dnieper, has already joined the divisions; and the 5th division of cavalry, composed of four regiments, is in march from Wonozensk to the Pruth. Such is the front of the demonstration; of the actual movements in the rear, necessary for its support, I have great doubt. It is certain that the 4th corps d'armée was from the first ordered to take a part in these operations, and that the reserves were called together for both the 4th and 5th corps. The cantonments of the 4th lay facing the frontier of Galicia, extending from the kingdom of Poland to the Dneister, with its centre and head-quarters at Kremenetz. It was by a flank movement to concentrate in Upper Bessarabia, with its advanced division at Lipkani, on the Pruth; but I believe that no such movement has commenced, and that it is utterly impossible in the present state of the roads of Volhynia and Podolia. These troops, therefore, cannot be in the positions designed within, at the least, six weeks; and so long will the 5th corps be entirely unsupported.

The division at Sevastopol is of course prepared for an expedition by sea; and we are told of the troops being exercised in the operation of embarking and landing.

The division here is destined for the same kind of service. Every man, including officers, is to carry rations for four days. No baggage will be taken, but it will be otherwise conveyed, and no horses are to be shipped.

With regard to the object of these embarkations, I have no information whatever. The fleet at Sevastopol may, it is said, take on board a complete division of infantry for a short voyage. No transports have been assembled, nor have any merchant ships been engaged. A division is composed of sixteen battalions, and its field artillery of eight batteries. The present effective strength of the battalion cannot exceed 800 men; so that at each of the three points, Sevastopol, Odessa, and Leovo, the force assembled is under 13,000 men. The reserves called to their standards in January, were to muster at Toula, Oval, and Woronije. They compose four battalions for each division, and they are still very far in the rear.

Preparations in front continue in great activity; of those in the rear I have doubts; and it is still whispered that the reserves are not advancing. The fleet has not moved, and the ships have not yet left their winter berths. I need scarcely say that the newspaper reports of reviews by Prince Menchikoff of armies and fleets, before proceeding on his mission, are entirely unfounded.

The commercial communities in these ports are, under the present circumstances, greatly disquieted, having immense engagements in suspense, though in general it is believed peace will be maintained, and great reliance is placed in the wisdom and moderation of the Emperor.

No. 165.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 6.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, April 16, 1853.*

I SAW the French Ambassador this morning, before he went to have his appointed conference with Rifaat Pasha. The principal object of my visit was to let M. de la Cour know on what points it might be expected that Russia would make no concession, and to dissuade him from committing himself on those points towards Rifaat Pasha. I explained that the points in question were those of the cupola, of a Greek porter in the church at Bethlehem, and of Greek precedence as to the time to be fixed for the performance

of certain religious functions, not only there, but also in the Chapel of the Virgin at Gethsemane. I gave him to understand that I thought the Greek pretension stood on strong ground in these respects; and I urged him to bear in mind the great European interests at stake; the declared moderation of his Government; the satisfaction already given by Russia to France as to the "key" and the "star;" and the importance of regulating all that concerns the holy places, without further delay, in order that the ulterior propositions of Russia might rest upon their own merits, and be dealt with accordingly; not for the extension of a single influence, nor for the benefit of a single class of Christians, but on true principles of European policy, and, if possible, for the advantage of all the Sultan's tributary subjects.

I must do M. de la Cour the justice to state that he appeared to enter into the spirit of my suggestions, at the same time that he did not give up his objections to the Russian plan of settlement.

No. 166.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 9.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, April 20, 1853.*

I AM now able to report that the discussions between Rifaat Pasha and the Ambassadors of France and Russia, respecting the holy places, have every appearance of drawing to an amicable and satisfactory conclusion. The points of difference which remain have very little importance in the sight of an impartial observer. They are matters rather of form than of substance, and in number they do not exceed two or three.

I had some conversation upon the subject this morning with Prince Menchikoff, and subsequently with M. de la Cour. I endeavoured, as I had done before, to bring them to a more complete understanding, without putting myself forward beyond what they appeared themselves to desire. I had hoped, indeed, that the result of their direct communications with each other would have rendered my interference superfluous.

In communicating with Rifaat Pasha, I have suggested whatever appeared to me best calculated to conciliate the existing differences. I have urged him most earnestly to settle all that relates to the holy places before he enters upon the ulterior demands of Russia, conceiving it to be highly desirable that the two questions should be kept separate; and I have expressed my opinion that it was daily becoming more urgent for the Porte to terminate the discussion by the promulgation of a firman incorporating the terms agreed upon, and deciding equitably the still-disputed points, respecting which it seems to me that the Porte might in fairness almost entirely side with Russia.

The real difficulties and just causes of anxiety to the Porte remain to be considered. They are already known to your Lordship, and they are formidable, though I am happy to say that Prince Menchikoff, after a second conversation between us on the subject of his demands concerning the Greek Church, has informed me that he no longer means to press that part of them which regards the Greek Patriarchs and their patents of privilege. He explained this important change of plan by stating that he recognized the impossibility of separating the political from the spiritual character of the Patriarch, and that his Government disclaimed all intention of interfering with the Sultan's subjects in any political sense. He has since read over to me his amended draft of a Convention framed with the view of repeating and confirming the privileges secured to the Greek religion and its places of worship in Turkey by former Treaties, and particularly by that of Kainardji.

This agreement, whatever may be its name or its form, is to have the force of a Treaty, and the preamble is in the customary solemn style of that kind of instrument. As far as my memory serves, the terms are such as to give to the Russian Representative here a virtual right of protection over the Greek Church and clergy throughout the Sultan's dominions, and by a necessary, though underhand consequence, a vast exercise of influence on the Greek population at large. This advantage would result from taking Article VII of the Treaty of Kainardji with some modification of its terms, from extending the provisions

of Article XVI, which concerns the Danubian provinces alone, to the whole empire, and from adding in substance, with a slight management of the terms, that Article of the Treaty of Carlowitz which gives to Austria the right, not indeed of protecting the religion of Roman Catholic subjects in Turkey, but of calling the Porte's attention to any just matter of complaint in that respect.

As Prince Menchikoff assured me, at the same time, that the proposed Convention was limited to an explanatory confirmation of existing Treaties, necessary as a guarantee to Russia, and only granting to its coreligionists what Austria already possessed with regard to hers, I am willing to hope that the impressions retained by me would disappear on a closer and more leisurely examination of its terms. I did not, however, leave him without remarking that the Sultan's promise to protect his Christian subjects in the free exercise of their religion differed extremely from a right conferred on any foreign Power to enforce that protection, and also that the same degree of interference might be dangerous to the Porte when exercised by so powerful an empire as Russia on behalf of 10,000,000 of Greeks, and innocent in the case of Austria, whose influence, derivable from religious sympathy, was confined to a small number of Catholics, including her own subjects.

The other Articles of Prince Menchikoff's draft were not of a nature to involve any objectionable or ulterior consequences; but an enumeration by name of the holy places respectively possessed by the Greeks and Latins in Palestine would probably meet with serious opposition from the French Ambassador.

Looking to both the pending questions, I have directed my attention, and occasionally my efforts, to the following successive objects: namely, to relieve the Porte from all embarrassment about the holy places by an arrangement satisfactory to France and Russia; to keep the question of the holy places distinct from that of the Russian protectorate; to support the Sultan's Government in withholding any concessions dangerous to its independence; to favour the wishes of Russia in all matters, not only of strict justice to her, but such as are reasonable and free from danger in their consequences; and, lastly, to place the religious and, if possible, the civil privileges of all classes of the Sultan's tributary subjects on a solid and permanent footing by means of His Majesty's own authority.

I venture to consider the first of these objects as virtually accomplished. The second has been hitherto kept successfully in view. The third is guarded by the assurances which I have received from the Turkish Ministry, and by an unanimous decision of the Council, liable, however, to change under the pressure of intimidation. The fourth is my constant guide in communicating with Prince Menchikoff on one side, and with the Turkish Ministers on the other. The fifth presents great difficulties; but my first overture on the subject has been well received: the French Ambassador will co-operate with me, and the party of Reshid Pasha, though now in abeyance, will probably exert its private influence to promote my views.

Sensible how important it is for political as well as for commercial reasons that the excitement attendant upon Prince Menchikoff's embassy should be allayed as much as possible, I have sounded that Ambassador as to the expediency of withdrawing the Russian troops in Bessarabia from their advanced positions, now that the question which brought him to Constantinople approaches to a satisfactory conclusion, and I have also spoken to M. de la Cour, in the same sense with respect to the French squadron at Salamis. In neither case have I much reason to flatter myself with any prospect of success. Prince Menchikoff asserted that the Russian divisions were not advanced beyond their customary stations, one of which was habitually within a few hours of Jassy, and the French Ambassador showed no inclination to contribute towards an earlier departure of the squadron from Salamis than what would take place in the ordinary course of its proceedings as an evolutionary squadron.

In connection with these causes of excitement is a prevailing notion that the Turks are secretly buying fire-arms and gunpowder with a view to some act of violence against the Christians. My inquiries have not led to the discovery of any fact in support of this rumour; but I have drawn the Porte's attention to what is whispered about, and I have requested that measures of precaution may be discreetly adopted in time.

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No. 167.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 9.)*

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 22, 1853.

AFTER I had addressed your Lordship the day before yesterday, the difficulty of settling the question of the holy places threatened to increase. The French and Russian Ambassadors insisted on their respective pretensions, while the Porte inclined but hesitated to assume the responsibility of deciding between them. I thought it was time for me to adopt a more prominent part in reconciling the adverse parties. Having, therefore, ascertained that Rifaat Pasha did not object to my pursuing this course, I availed myself of a convenient opportunity this morning to address the two Ambassadors in presence of each other, and to express an earnest hope that they would no longer allow the remaining differences, which were matters rather of form than of substance, to retard the conclusion of an adjustment acceptable to the Porte. The brief and amicable discussion which ensued between them was followed, after a few remarks from me, by a mutual adoption of terms which leave no ground for further dissent. It appeared to me that the view taken by Prince Menchikoff on one of the points was far from unreasonable, and M. de la Cour, in finally acceding to it, consulted, as I conceive, the justice of the case no less than the honour of his Government. It cannot after this be necessary to trouble your Lordship with details. I trust that the Sultan will now promulgate his firman, and close for years to come a question which it would have been better for all parties never to have opened. It is not impossible that M. de la Cour will "reserve his rights," but he has assured me that, if he finds it is his duty to do so, he will perform that duty in no public or ostensible manner.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 168.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 9.)*

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 23, 1853.

I SUBMIT to your Lordship, inclosed herewith, a *note verbale* left with Rifaat Pasha, or rather sent to him, by the Russian Ambassador on the 19th instant.

Your Lordship will observe that the paper bears no signature, but it was given in soon after the arrival of fresh and pressing instructions from St. Petersburg, nor is there much difference between the strongest of its expressions and the language which occasionally drops from the Ambassador himself or from those who may be supposed to know his sentiments.

In more respects than one a mystery hangs over the intentions of Russia, and the military demonstrations and movements of Russian partizans are such, that were it not for the moderate dispositions manifested on the whole by Prince Menchikoff in his intercourse with me, and the declarations of the Emperor himself, I should despair of a satisfactory issue to the remaining discussions.

The Russian Secretary of Embassy was with me yesterday on the part of his chief, who had caught cold and was in bed. He came to request my good offices for the removal of some new difficulty which had sprung up in connection with the adjusted question of the holy places, and entered confidentially with me on the subject of the remaining demands in a tone of the most moderate description. I took the opportunity to explain to him frankly my impressions upon the whole question, manifesting every wish to contribute towards a friendly termination of the business on safe and fair grounds, but not concealing, at the same time, the objections which every friend to the independence of Turkey must entertain to an increase of Russian influence over the churches and clergy of Greece.

I have only to add that M. Pisani has my instructions to divert Rifaat Pasha if possible from adhering to any additions, however insignificant in themselves, which may re-open the discussions, or give further discontent to Russia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S.—I have just received official intelligence from the Porte that Rifaat Pasha, influenced I presume by my urgent representations of this morning, has sent the firmans to the two Ambassadors, after modifying the points which still involved some degree of objection.

S. DE R.

Inclosure in No. 168.

*Prince Menchikoff to Rifaat Pasha.*

*Pera, le 1<sup>er</sup> Avril, 1853.*

SON Excellence le Ministre des Relations Extérieures, en prenant connaissance, à son entrée aux affaires, des négociations qui ont eu lieu, a vu la duplicité de ses prédécesseurs ; il doit s'être persuadé combien on a manqué aux égards dûs à l'Empereur de Russie, et combien est grande sa magnanimité en offrant à la Porte les moyens de sortir des embarras que lui a créés la mauvaise foi de ses Ministres. Ils ont abusé de la religion de leur Souverain en le mettant en opposition à ses propres paroles, et le plaçant envers son allié et son ami dans une de ces positions qui ne peuvent admettre ni de hautes convenances, ni la dignité souveraine.

Tout en voulant être oublieux du passé, et n'exigeant pour réparation que le renvoi d'un Ministre fallacieux et l'exécution patente de promesses solennelles, l'Empereur se trouvait obligé de demander des garanties solides pour l'avenir.

Il les veut formelles, positives, et assurant l'inviolabilité du culte professé par la majorité des sujets Chrétiens tant de la Sublime Porte que de la Russie, et enfin par l'Empereur lui-même.

Il ne peut en vouloir d'autres que celles qu'il trouvera désormais dans un Acte équivalent à un Traité, et à l'abri des interprétations d'un mandataire mal-avisé et peu consciencieux.

Les délais qu'on a apporté jusqu'ici à prendre une décision finale sur les propositions de l'Ambassadeur de Russie, l'obligent à demander à la Porte une réponse catégorique, et qu'il ne pourrait attendre plus longtemps. Il demande conséquemment :

1. Un firman explicatif et dont la rédaction serait convenue concernant la clef de l'Eglise de Bethléem ; l'étoile en argent placée sur l'autel de la Nativité, dans le souterrain de ce même sanctuaire ; la possession de la grotte de Gethsémanie par les Grecs, avec l'admission des Latins à y exercer leur culte, mais tout en conservant la préséance des orthodoxes et leur priorité pour la célébration du service divin dans ce sanctuaire ; et enfin, concernant la possession commune des Grecs avec les Latins des jardins de Bethléem : le tout d'après les bases discutées entre son Excellence Rifaat Pasha et l'Ambassadeur.

2. Un ordre suprême pour la réparation immédiate par le Gouvernement Ottoman de la coupole du Temple du Saint Sépulcre avec la participation du Patriarche Grec, sans l'ingérence d'un délégué d'un autre culte ; pour la clôture murée des lucarnes ayant vue dans ce sanctuaire ; et pour la démolition des harems attenants à la coupole, si la possibilité de cette démolition était prouvée.

L'Ambassadeur est chargé d'obtenir sur ces points une assurance et une notification formelles.

3. Un Sened ou Convention pour la garantie du *statu quo* strict des privilèges du culte Catholique Greco-Russe de l'Eglise de l'Orient, et des sanctuaires qui se trouvent en possession de ce culte exclusivement ou en participation avec d'autres rites à Jérusalem.

L'Ambassadeur doit répéter ici à M. le Ministre des Relations Extérieures ce qu'il a déjà été dans le cas de lui exprimer plusieurs fois, que la Russie ne demande pas à la Porte des concessions politiques. Son désir est de calmer les consciences religieuses par la certitude du maintien de ce qui est et de ce qui a toujours été pratiqué jusqu'à nos temps.

C'est donc à la suite des tendances hostiles qui se sont manifestées depuis quelques années envers tout ce qui touche à la Russie, qu'elle requiert dans l'intérêt des immunités religieuses du culte orthodoxe un Acte explicatif et positif de garanties ; Acte qui n'affecterait en rien ni les autres cultes ni les relations de la Porte avec d'autres Puissances.

Le Cabinet Ottoman voudra bien aussi peser dans sa sagesse la gravité de l'offense commise, en la comparant à la modération des demandes de réparation et de garantie, que le sentiment de légitime défense aurait pu poser dans un sens plus étendu et plus péremptoire.

La réponse de M. le Ministre des Relations Extérieures indiquera à l'Ambassadeur les devoirs ultérieurs qu'il aura à remplir, et qui ne pourront être que conformes au maintien de la dignité du Gouvernement qu'il représente, et de la religion que professe son Souverain.

(Translation.)

*Pera, April 7<sup>th</sup>, 1853.*

HIS Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in becoming acquainted, on his entrance into office, with the negotiations which have taken place, has seen the duplicity of his predecessor. He must have been convinced to what extent the respect due to the Emperor of Russia has been disregarded, and how great is his magnanimity in offering to the Porte the means of escaping from the embarrassments occasioned to it by the bad faith of its Ministers. They have set at nought the good faith of their Sovereign by placing him in contradiction with his own words, and putting him, in regard to his ally and his friend, in one of those positions which are incompatible with propriety and with the dignity of a Sovereign.

While desiring to overlook the past, and requiring as reparation merely the dismissal of a deceitful Minister and the public execution of solemn promises, the Emperor was compelled to demand sure guarantees for the future.

He requires that they shall be formal, positive, and that they shall afford security for the inviolability of the religion professed by the great majority of the Christian subjects, as well of the Sublime Porte as of the Emperor, and in fine, by the Emperor himself.

He can desire no other than such as he will henceforth find in an Act equivalent to a Treaty, and secure from the interpretation of a functionary ill-advised and little conscientious.

The delay which has hitherto occurred in coming to a definitive decision on the propositions of the Russian Ambassador compels him to demand from the Porte a categorical answer, for which he can no longer wait. He accordingly demands:

1. An explanatory Firman, the terms of which shall be agreed on, concerning the key of the Church of Bethlehem ; the silver star placed on the Altar of the Nativity in the vault of the same sanctuary ; the possession by the Greeks of the Grotto of Gethsemane, the Latins being admitted to worship there, but maintaining at the same time the precedency of the orthodox and their priority in celebrating divine worship in that sanctuary ; and finally, in regard to the possession in common by the Greeks and Latins of the Gardens of Bethlehem ; the whole in conformity with the basis discussed between his Excellency Rifaat Pasha and the Ambassador.

2. An order from the Sultan for the immediate repair by the Ottoman Government of the cupola of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre with the concurrence of the Greek Patriarch, without the interference of a delegate of another sect ; for walling up the windows which look upon that sanctuary ; and for the demolition of the harems abutting on the cupola, if it should be proved that they can be demolished.

The Ambassador is instructed to obtain on these points a formal assurance and notification.

3. A Sened or Convention for the guarantee of the strict *status quo* of the privileges of the Catholic Greco-Russian rite of the Eastern Church, and of the sanctuaries which are possessed by that rite, either exclusively or in common with other rites at Jerusalem.

The Ambassador must here repeat to the Minister for Foreign Affairs

what he has already had occasion more than once to state to him, that Russia does not require of the Porte political concessions. She desires to set at ease religious scruples by the certainty of the maintenance of what is and what has always been the practice up to the present time.

In consequence of the hostile tendencies manifested for some years past in regard to whatever relates to Russia, she requires in behalf of the religious immunities of the Orthodox Church an explanatory and positive Act of guarantee; an Act which would in nowise affect either the other sects or the relations of the Porte with other Powers.

The Ottoman Cabinet will accordingly be pleased in its wisdom to weigh the serious nature of the offence which it has committed, and compare it with the moderation of the demands made for reparation and guarantee, which a consideration of legitimate defence might have put forward at greater length and in more peremptory terms.

The reply of the Minister for Foreign Affairs will indicate to the Ambassador the ulterior duties which he will have to discharge, and which cannot be other than such as may be consistent with the dignity of the Government which he represents and of the religion professed by his Sovereign.

No. 169.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 9.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, April 25, 1853.*

I HAD an interview yesterday with the Grand Vizier and Rifaat Pasha, at their request, at the country-house of the former.

They confirmed to me the final settlement of the question concerning the holy places, and expressed warmly their thanks for the part which I had taken in bringing it about.

They next informed me that the Government was determined neither to enter into a Convention with Russia on that subject, nor to accept Prince Menchikoff's proposals respecting the protection of the Greek Church in Turkey.

The line of conduct to be otherwise pursued by the Porte in dealing with Prince Menchikoff was an object of anxious inquiry to both of them. After presenting the matter in various lights, they agreed with me in thinking that if the Russian Ambassador were to offer an amended draft of his Convention, the best course would be to receive it for examination, and on finding it inadmissible as to any essential points, to decline negotiating without a previous distinct withdrawal of the objectionable parts, and to intimate at the same time a doubt whether the remainder would be worth the trouble of a negotiation. Were his Excellency to express a different opinion, preferring a simple confirmation of the Articles of existing Treaties concerning the Greek religion to no Convention at all, it might, we thought, be more advisable, on the whole, to meet his wishes in that respect than to hazard the consequences, whatever they might be, of his retiring in disgust.

I urged them strongly to complete the firmans relating to the holy places with all practicable speed, and to invest the official note, which is to accompany the communication of them to the two Ambassadors, as much as possible with that character of guarantee to which the Emperor of Russia appears to attach the highest importance.

In the course of discussion I learnt from Rifaat Pasha that the French Ambassador had warned him not to admit any contradiction between the firmans and the note delivered by Aali Pasha to the French Embassy in February of last year, and I presume that his Excellency would, in the contrary case, make a special reservation of his rights. The two Ministers assured me that no such contradiction existed. The Council is to meet the day after to-morrow, and whatever remains to be done as to these matters will be taken into formal consideration.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 9.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, May 8, 1853.*

THE Constantinople mail of the 25th ultimo reached Paris this morning, and I have seen M. Drouyn de Lhuys this afternoon. I am happy to be able to state to your Lordship that it brings intelligence of a nature similar to that which had already reached Her Majesty's Government by telegraph, and that the question of the Sacred Places may be considered as settled.

It would appear from M. de la Cour's reports, that Prince Menchikoff had at length lent himself to enter into amicable conferences, and that the result had been an amicable arrangement.

The question of the repairs of the cupola of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre had been solved in the manner indicated in one of Lord Stratford's first despatches to your Lordship; that is, the wood-work surmounting the whole, on which no images or inscriptions could be placed, was alone to be repaired. The under part was to remain *in statu quo*. Instead of giving the Greek Patriarch the superintendence of the repairs, as required by Russia, it is said that he may make observations respecting them if he pleases.

The question of precedence is arranged thus. The Greeks will possess it virtually, but it is not to be given them as a right. Something is to be said about Greek hours of divine service being earlier than those of the Latins, and consequently that they are to have possession of the altars first in the morning. As a compensation, the Latins are to be in possession a somewhat longer time than the Greeks.

The other demands contained in the eight articles submitted by Prince Menchikoff to the Porte, appear to be assented to by M. de la Cour, in the modified form proposed by the Ottoman Government.

M. de la Cour seems, however, to have raised objections to the Porte's confirming this arrangement by a Convention with the Russian Government; and it has been settled that it should be made known by an Imperial firman, of which a copy is to be given to the Russian Embassy.

I asked M. Drouyn de Lhuys very particularly whether he understood Prince Menchikoff to have assented to this last stipulation. He answered in the affirmative.

I then inquired whether he considered M. de la Cour to have acquiesced positively, or whether that Ambassador had referred to Paris for final instructions. He replied that he had every hope that the question was already terminated, though certainly M. de la Cour had reserved the right of the French Government to dissent if they thought proper. He had, however, no intention of so doing, and had written to M. de la Cour to say that he considered the arrangement might be accepted, or rather that the French Government had no objection to raise against it.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 9.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, April 30, 1853.*

THE Chancellor, upon whom I called yesterday by appointment, had the kindness to read to me several passages from a despatch and a private letter from Prince Menchikoff, of the date of the 16th instant, which produced a favourable impression upon my mind.

Not only was the manner in which the Prince speaks of his English and French colleagues such as to indicate his being upon terms of friendly intercourse with them, but in the account which he gives of his official interviews with M. de la Cour, it appears that in so far as any latitude has been left to him it has been his wish to conciliate the rights of the Greek with the demands of the Latin Church.

One great point is, at all events, established by these reports.

It has been proved that there is no intention on the part of the Russian

Embassy of concluding the arrangements respecting the holy places without attempting to secure the cooperation of a French negotiator.

With regard to the objects of Prince Menchikoff's mission, again Count Nesselrode assured me that they were no other than have been made known to Her Majesty's Government and Her Majesty's Legation, and he once more repeated that the wish, the intention I should rather say, of causing the forthcoming arrangement to be embodied in an Act, was dictated solely by the urgency of making the arrangement final, of giving it a more binding character than could be derived from a firman, and of placing it at the least upon a footing of equality with those Capitulations to which the French are apt to ascribe the force of Treaties.

No. 172.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, May 10, 1853.*

WITH reference to your despatch of the 20th April, I have to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the objects which you have in view, as reported in that despatch, in regard to the questions under discussion at Constantinople, and also the means by which you have endeavoured to give effect to those objects.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 173.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, May 10, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve of your timely and successful interference, as reported in your despatch of the 25th of April, with a view to promote the adjustment of the questions respecting the holy places.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 174.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, May 10, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve of the advice which, as reported in your despatch of the 25th of April, you have given to the Porte, with regard to the manner in which it should deal with Prince Menchikoff's proposals respecting the protection of the Greek Church in Turkey.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 175.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 13.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, May 5, 1853.*

REVERTING to the affair of the holy places, Count Nesselrode said :  
" My only remaining fear is that of our not coming to a good understanding with France. As regards the Turks we have no longer any apprehensions, but we believe the French Ambassador not to be provided with sufficiently extensive powers, and fear that the business will hardly be settled without his referring to his Government, or sheltering himself behind a reserve or a protest."

No. 176.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, May 16, 1853.*

BARON BRUNNOW has read to me a despatch to himself from Prince Menchikoff, stating that, in the settlement of the question of the Holy Places, he had received important assistance from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, but that with respect to the further demands that he had to make upon the Porte, he had met with opposition from Lord Stratford.

I said, that in not advising the Turkish Ministers to accede to demands that must be prejudicial to the independence of Turkey, Lord Stratford had acted not only according to what he knew must be the policy of Her Majesty's Government, but also in conformity with what he had every reason to believe were the intentions of the Emperor of Russia.

You will learn the nature of these demands from Lord Stratford's despatches, copies of which are forwarded to you.

I also told Baron Brunnow that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, Prince Menchikoff could not have authority for seeking to extend the religious influence, and by that means the political power of Russia in Turkey; because Count Nesselrode had informed you, that when once the question of the Holy Places was settled, there would remain nothing but ordinary business for Prince Menchikoff to transact; and moreover, we were in possession of the Emperor's views as to the necessity of upholding the Sultan's independence.

Her Majesty's Government were, therefore, compelled either to think that Prince Menchikoff had exceeded his instructions, or to doubt the assurances they had received; but that the latter alternative had not been entertained. Her Majesty's Government, on the contrary, have felt the advantage of the frank and friendly explanations offered by the Emperor of Russia, which had enabled them to disregard, instead of sharing in, the apprehensions which the proceedings of Prince Menchikoff, coupled with the military preparations in the south of Russia, had not unnaturally produced throughout Europe.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 177.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 17.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, May 8, 1853.*

IT is with infinite satisfaction that I beg to acquaint your Lordship that despatches under date of the  $\frac{14}{26}$ th ultimo, which arrived here this morning, bring intelligence of the details of an arrangement respecting the holy places having been agreed upon between Prince Menchikoff and M. de la Cour.

I am indebted to the Chancellor for the power of making this agreeable communication to your Lordship.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 178.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 18.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, May 17, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS received last night the despatches brought by the "Chaptal," which boat left Constantinople on the 7th instant: but he is not yet in possession of M. de la Cour's previous despatches of the 5th. He is consequently still without accurate information of all the circumstances which have occurred at Constantinople since the 25th ultimo, and which have led to Prince Menchikoff's note of the 5th instant.

A copy of this note was brought by the "Chaptal," and M. Drouyn de Lhuys read it to me this morning. It must already be in your Lordship's hands, and I need not allude to its contents except for the purpose of stating the impression produced on the French Government by its contents.

If it shall be found, on the arrival of M. de la Cour's despatches of the 5th, that the question of the holy places has been settled by the two firmans to which reference is made in Prince Menchikoff's note, the French Government has no objection to offer. There is nothing in those firmans, in M. Drouyn de Lhuys' opinion, at variance with the concessions made to the Latins in the note addressed by the Porte to M. de Lavalette on the 9th of February, 1852, and France consequently is perfectly satisfied. But, observed M. Drouyn de Lhuys, these concessions are far less than France has a right to ask under her Capitulations with the Porte; and the aspect of the question becomes changed when the Porte is required, as appears by Prince Menchikoff's note and annex, to engage by a Convention that this state of things shall never be altered. We have no wish or intention to insist on a more literal fulfilment of the rights conferred on France by the Capitulations of 1740, but at the same time we cannot admit that a Convention, signed at the present day between the Porte and Russia, can override prior Treaties signed between the Porte and us.

I observed to M. Drouyn de Lhuys that it would be better not to raise that question now; that there was no use in putting such an axiom upon paper; that as a general proposition it was one in which every one must concur, and that whatever the Porte might sign with Russia could not invalidate the previous engagements of the Porte towards other Powers.

The question of the holy places settled, continued M. Drouyn de Lhuys, there remains the general one of the protectorate demanded by Russia over the Greek Church and religion. Upon this France has no pretension to act alone. Whatever may be the conduct of the Porte, whether she yields the point or not, we have no more interest at stake than have the other great Powers, and we shall be quite ready to consult and act with them.

#### No. 179.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 18.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, May 6, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for the immediate information of Her Majesty's Government, the copies of an official note and Project of Convention which have been communicated to me this morning by the Ottoman Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, as having been addressed to him the evening before by Prince Menchikoff.

Those papers are so important that I have called upon the commander of Her Majesty's steam-ship "Wasp" to convey them with all possible speed to Syra, where he hopes to overtake the messenger who started yesterday in the French steam-vessel with despatches for London, or, should he fail in that object, to Malta, whence, in some way or other, they will doubtless be forwarded to England.

Prince Menchikoff's decisive communication must appear the more alarming to the Porte, as it has followed close upon the arrival of fresh instructions from Petersburg, and closer still upon his Excellency's receipt of the firmans and official note which but yesterday terminated with his assent the question of the holy places. That communication is moreover peremptory in fixing a very brief delay for the Porte's definitive reply, and it comprises the Russian *note verbale* of the 19th ultimo in its more formal expression of Russia's demands. It insists on certain unexplained additions to the settlement of the Jerusalem question, but little palatable to France; and, although in some degree moderated in comparison with its original extent, requires, under the name of "guarantee," a concession, the dangerous character of which will not escape your Lordship's observation.

Rifaat Pasha sent for M. Pisani to-day, and placed the accompanying papers in his hands for consideration, observing that they had been sent to him late last night by a cavass or common Turkish attendant on the Russian Embassy. His

Excellency was much affected by the peremptory form and manner of Prince Menchikoff's communication at a time when the Sultan was labouring under a severe affliction, and the more so as it was accompanied with a continuance of intimidating appearances on the Danube frontier.

The Sultan's Ministers will meet to-morrow in order to take cognizance of the Russian ultimatum, and a more formal Council will be assembled on the following day with the view of coming to a final decision respecting the answer to be given.

I must confine myself for the present to this short statement of what has occurred, as any additional delay in the departure of the "Wasp" will make it difficult, if not impossible, for Lord John Hay to overtake the messenger at Syra.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 179.

*Prince Menchikoff to Rifaat Pasha.*

*Péra, le <sup>23 Avril</sup><sub>5 Mai</sub>, 1853.*

LE Soussigné, Ambassadeur de Russie, a eu l'honneur de remettre à son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Sublime Porte, le  $\frac{1}{2}$  Mars, une communication confidentielle qui accompagnait le Projet d'un Acte devant offrir au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des garanties solides et inviolables pour l'avenir, dans l'intérêt de l'Eglise Orthodoxe d'Orient.

L'Ambassadeur croyait pouvoir s'attendre à rencontrer de la part du Gouvernement de la Sublime Porte, un désir empressé à renouer sur cette base des relations de bonne et franche amitié avec la Russie. Il doit l'avouer avec un profond regret, il a été ébranlé dans cette conviction qui, dès son début, lui avait été inspirée par l'accueil gracieux de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

Animé néanmoins de cet esprit de conciliation et de bienveillance qui forme le fond de la politique de son auguste maître, l'Ambassadeur ne rejette point les observations préalables qui lui furent faites par son Excellence Rifaat Pasha, tant sur la forme de l'Acte précité, que sur la teneur de quelques-uns des Articles qui devaient en faire partie.

Quant à la forme, l'Ambassadeur maintient la déclaration qu'une longue et pénible expérience du passé exige, pour prévenir toute froideur et méfiance entre les deux Gouvernements dans l'avenir, un engagement solennel ayant force de Traité.

Pour le contenu et la rédaction des Articles de cet Acte, il demandait une entente préalable ; et voyant avec une peine profonde les retards qu'y apportait le Cabinet Ottoman et son désir évident d'éluder la discussion, il se vit obligé par sa note verbale du  $\frac{7}{19}$  Avril, de récapituler ses demandes et de les formuler de la manière la plus pressante.

Ce n'est qu'aujourd'hui que la note de son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères en date du 26 Redjib (<sup>23 Avril</sup><sub>Mai</sub>), accompagnant les copies vidimées des deux ordres souverains sur les sanctuaires de Jérusalem et la coupole du Saint Sépulcré, est parvenue à l'Ambassadeur. Il considère cette communication comme une suite donnée aux deux premières demandes contenues dans sa note du  $\frac{7}{19}$  Avril, et se fera un devoir de placer ces documents sous les yeux de son Gouvernement.

Mais n'ayant obtenu jusqu'ici aucune réponse au troisième et plus important point qui réclame des garanties pour l'avenir, et ayant tout récemment reçu l'ordre de redoubler d'insistance pour arriver à la solution immédiate de la question qui forme le principal objet de la sollicitude de Sa Majesté l'Empereur, l'Ambassadeur se voit dans l'obligation de s'adresser aujourd'hui à son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères en renfermant cette fois-ci ses réclamations dans les dernières limites des directions supérieures.

Les bases de l'arrangement qu'il est chargé d'obtenir, restent dans leur fond les mêmes.

Le culte orthodoxe d'Orient, son clergé, et ses possessions, jouiront dans l'avenir, sans aucune atteinte, sous l'égide de Sa Majesté le Sultan, des privilèges et immunités qui leur sont assurés *ab antiquo*, et, dans un principe de haute équité, participeront aux avantages accordés aux autres rits Chrétiens.

Le nouveau firman explicatif sur les lieux saints de Jérusalem, aura la valeur d'un engagement formel envers le Gouvernement Impérial.

A Jérusalem, les religieux et les pèlerins Russes sont assimilés aux prérogatives des autres nations étrangères.

Ces points indiqués ici sommairement, formeront l'objet d'un Séned qui attestera de la confiance réciproque des deux Gouvernements.

Dans cet Acte les objections et difficultés exprimées à plusieurs reprises par son Excellence Rifaat Pasha, et quelques-uns de ses collègues, ont été prises en considération, comme son Excellence le verra par la minute d'un Séned que l'Ambassadeur a l'honneur de joindre à la présente note.

L'Ambassadeur se flatte de l'espoir que désormais la juste attente de son auguste maître ne sera pas trompée, et que mettant de côté toute hésitation et toute méfiance dont sa dignité et ses sentiments généreux auraient à souffrir, la Sublime Porte ne tardera plus à transmettre à l'Ambassadeur Impérial les décisions souveraines de Sa Majesté le Sultan, en réponse à la présente notification.

C'est dans cette espérance que l'Ambassadeur prie son Excellence Rifaat Pasha de vouloir bien lui faire parvenir cette réponse jusqu'à Mardi prochain, le <sup>28 Avril</sup><sub>10 Mai</sub>. Il ne pourrait considérer un plus long délai que comme un manque de procédés envers son Gouvernement, ce qui lui imposerait les plus pénibles obligations.

L'Ambassadeur offre à son Excellence l'assurance, &c.

(Signé) MENCHIKOFF.

(Translation.)

*Pera, <sup>April 23</sup><sub>May 5</sub>, 1853.*

THE Undersigned, Ambassador of Russia, had the honour of forwarding to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sublime Porte, on March  $\frac{10}{22}$ , a confidential communication which accompanied the draft of an Act, purporting to afford to the Government of His Majesty the Emperor solid and inviolable pledges for the future in favour of the orthodox Eastern Church.

The Ambassador considered that he might rely on meeting with an earnest desire on the part of the Sublime Porte to re-establish upon that basis relations of frank and cordial amity with Russia. He is obliged to confess, with deep regret, that he has been disappointed in this conviction, which the gracious reception of His Majesty the Sultan had, from the very first, led him to indulge.

Animated, nevertheless, by the spirit of conciliation and of goodwill which forms the basis of his august master's policy, the Ambassador does not reject the preliminary observations which were made to him by his Excellency Rifaat Pasha, both as regards the form of the above-mentioned Act, and as regards the tenour of some of the articles which were to form part of it.

As regards the form, the Ambassador abides by his declaration that a long and painful experience of the past requires, in order to avoid all coldness or mistrust between the two Governments for the future, a solemn engagement having the force of a treaty.

In order to settle the contents and the terms of that Act, he required that there should be a previous understanding; and seeing, with great pain, the delays of the Ottoman Government in the matter, and its evident wish to evade the discussion, he found himself compelled in his verbal note of April  $\frac{7}{19}$  to recapitulate his demands, and to put them forward with the utmost urgency.

The note of His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated the 26th Redjib (<sup>April 23</sup><sub>May 5</sub>), accompanying the certified copies of the two sovereign orders as to the sanctuaries and the cupola of the Holy Sepulchre, only reached the Ambassador to-day. He considers that communication as a compliance with the first two demands made in his note of April  $\frac{7}{19}$ , and he will make it his duty to place those documents before his Government.

But not having, up to the present time, obtained any answer upon the third and most important point, which requires guarantees for the future, and having very recently received orders to redouble his exertions for the immediate settlement of the question which forms the principal object of the solicitude of

His Majesty the Emperor, the Ambassador finds himself constrained now to address His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, strictly confining his demands on this occasion to the orders which he has received from his superiors.

The bases of the arrangement which he is instructed to obtain, are substantially the same.

The orthodox Eastern religion, its clergy and its possessions, shall enjoy for the future, without any prejudice, under the protection of His Majesty the Sultan, the privileges and immunities which are assured to them *ab antiquo*, and, upon a principle of perfect equity, shall participate in the advantages accorded to the other Christian sects.

The new explanatory Firman respecting the Holy Places of Jerusalem, shall have the force of a formal engagement made with the Imperial Government.

At Jerusalem, Russian monks and pilgrims shall enjoy similar privileges to those enjoyed by other foreign nations.

These points, here briefly stated, shall be the object of a Sened, which shall attest the reciprocal confidence of the two Governments.

In this Act, the objections and difficulties expressed on different occasions by his Excellency Rifaat Pasha and some of his colleagues, have been taken into consideration, as his Excellency will see by the draft of a Sened which the Ambassador has the honour to annex to the present note.

The Ambassador flatters himself with the hope that the just expectations of his august master will not be disappointed, and that, laying aside all hesitation and all mistrust, by which his dignity and his generous sentiments would be aggrieved, the Sublime Porte will no longer delay to communicate to the Imperial Ambassador the sovereign decision of His Majesty the Sultan in reply to the present notification.

In the hope that this will be the case, the Ambassador begs his Excellency Rifaat Pasha to be good enough to let him have that answer by Tuesday next, <sup>April 28</sup><sub>May 10</sub>. He cannot consider a longer delay in any other light than as a want of respect towards his Government, which would impose upon him the most painful duty.

The Ambassador offers to his Excellency the assurance, &c.

Inclosure 2 in No. 179.

*Project of Convention.*

SA Majesté l'Empereur et Padishah des Ottomans et Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, dans le désir commun de maintenir la stabilité du culte orthodoxe Greco-Russe professé par la majorité de leurs sujets Chrétiens, et de garantir ce culte de tout empiètement à l'avenir, ont désigné :

Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Ottomans  
et Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies  
lesquels, après s'être expliqués, sont convenus de ce qui suit.

ARTICLE I.

Il ne sera apporté aucun changement aux droits, privilèges, et immunités dont ont joui, ou sont en possession *ab antiquo*, les églises, les institutions pieuses, et le clergé orthodoxe dans les Etats de la Sublime Porte Ottomane, qui se plait à les leur assurer à tout jamais sur la base du *status quo* strict existant aujourd'hui.

ARTICLE II.

Les droits et avantages concédés par le Gouvernement Ottoman, ou qui le seront à l'avenir, aux autres cultes Chrétiens par Traités, Conventions, ou dispositions particulières, seront considérés comme appartenant aussi au culte orthodoxe.

## ARTICLE III.

Etant reconnu et constaté par les traditions historiques et par de nombreux documents que l'Eglise Grecque orthodoxe de Jérusalem, que son patriarcat, et les évêques qui sont subordonnés, ont été de tout temps depuis l'époque des Califs et sous les règnes successifs de tous les Empereurs Ottomans, particulièrement protégés, honorés, et confirmés dans leurs anciens droits et leurs immunités, la Sublime Porte, dans sa sollicitude pour la conscience et les convictions religieuses de ses sujets de ce culte, ainsi que de tous les Chrétiens qui la professent et dont la piété a été alarmée par divers événements, promet de maintenir et de faire respecter ces droits et ces immunités tant dans la ville de Jérusalem qu'au-dehors, sans préjudice aucun pour les autres communautés Chrétiennes d'indigènes, rayas, ou étrangers, admises à l'adoration du Saint Sépulcre et des autres sanctuaires, soit en commun avec les Grecs, soit dans leurs oratoires séparés.

## ARTICLE IV.

Sa Majesté le Sultan aujourd'hui glorieusement régnant, ayant jugé nécessaire et équitable de corroborer et d'expliquer son firman souverain revêtu du hatty-humayoun au milieu de la lune de Rebi-ul-Akhir, 1268 (fin de Janvier, v. s. 1852), par son firman souverain du , et d'ordonner en sus par un autre firman en date , la réparation de la grande coupole du Temple du Saint Sépulcre, ces deux firmans seront textuellement exécutés et fidèlement observés pour maintenir à jamais le *status quo* strict des sanctuaires possédés par les Grecs exclusivement ou en commun avec d'autres cultes.

Il est convenu que l'on s'entendra ultérieurement sur la régularisation de quelques points de détail qui n'ont pas trouvé place dans les firmans précités.

## ARTICLE V.

Les sujets de l'Empire de Russie tant séculiers qu'ecclésiastiques, auxquels il est permis suivant les Traités de visiter la sainte ville de Jérusalem et autres lieux de dévotion, devant être traités et considérés à l'égal des sujets des nations les plus favorisés, et celles-ci tant Catholiques que Protestantes ayant leurs prélats et leurs établissements ecclésiastiques particuliers, la Sublime Porte s'engage, pour le cas où la Cour Impériale de Russie lui en fera la demande, d'assigner une localité convenable dans la ville de Jérusalem ou dans les environs, pour la construction d'une église consacrée à la célébration du service divin par des ecclésiastiques Russes, et d'un hospice pour les pèlerins indigents ou malades, lesquelles fondations seront sous la surveillance du Consulat-Général de Russie en Syrie et en Palestine.

## ARTICLE VI.

Il est entendu que par le présent Acte, motivé par des circonstances exceptionnelles, il n'est dérogé à aucune des stipulations existantes entre les deux Cours, et que tous les Traités antérieurs, corroborés par l'Acte séparé du Traité d'Andrinople, conservent toute leur force et valeur.

Les six Articles qui précèdent ayant été arrêtés et conclus, notre signature et le cachet de nos armes ont été apposés au présent Acte, qui est remis à la Sublime Porte Ottomane en échange de celui qui nous est remis par précités.

Fait à  
trois, et de l'Hégire

le

mil huit cent cinquante

(Signé)

*Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté  
l'Empereur de toutes les Russies près la Sublime Porte  
Ottomane.*

(Translation.)

HIS Majesty the Emperor and Padishah of the Ottomans, and His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, being mutually desirous of maintaining the stability of the orthodox Greco-Russian religion professed by the majority of their Christian subjects, and of guaranteeing that religion against all molestations for the future, have named :

His Majesty the Emperor and Padishah of the Ottomans,  
and His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias,  
who, after having communicated together,  
have agreed upon what follows :

## ARTICLE I.

No change shall be made as regards the rights, privileges, and immunities which have been enjoyed by, or are possessed *ab antiquo* by, the orthodox churches, pious institutions, and clergy in the dominions of the Sublime Ottoman Porte, which is pleased to secure the same to them in perpetuity, on the strict basis of the *status quo* now existing.

## ARTICLE II.

The rights and advantages conceded by the Ottoman Government, or which shall hereafter be conceded, to the other Christian rites by Treaties, Conventions, or special arrangements, shall be considered as belonging also to the orthodox Church.

## ARTICLE III.

It being acknowledged and proved by historical tradition, and by numerous documents, that the orthodox Greek Church of Jerusalem, its Patriarchate, and the bishops subject to it, have been since the time of the Caliphs, and under the successive reigns of all the Ottoman Emperors, particularly protected, honoured, and confirmed in their ancient rights and immunities, the Sublime Porte, in its solicitude for the conscience and religious convictions of its subjects of that faith, as well as of all other Christians who profess it, and whose piety has been alarmed by several occurrences, promises to maintain and to cause to be respected those rights and those immunities, both within and without the city of Jerusalem, without any prejudice to the other Christian communities of natives, rayas, or foreigners, who are admitted to the adoration of the Holy Sepulchre and of the other sanctuaries, either in common with the Greeks or in their own separate oratories.

## ARTICLE IV.

His Majesty the Sultan, now gloriously reigning, having judged it necessary and equitable to corroborate and to explain his sovereign Firman, adorned with the Hatti-houmayoun, of the middle of the moon of Rebi-ul-Akhir (the end of January (o.s.) 1852), by his sovereign Firman of \_\_\_\_\_, and to order, besides, by another Firman dated \_\_\_\_\_, the repair of the great cupola of the Temple of the Holy Sepulchre, those two Firmans shall be literally carried out and faithfully observed, so as to maintain for ever the strict *status quo* of the sanctuaries possessed by the Greeks exclusively, or in common with other rites.

It is agreed that an ulterior understanding shall be come to with respect to the regulation of certain matters of detail which are not mentioned in the above-named Firmans.

## ARTICLE V.

As the subjects of the Empire of Russia, secular as well as ecclesiastic, who are permitted by the treaties to visit the Holy City of Jerusalem, and other places of devotion, are to be treated and considered on an equality with the

It is understood that by the present Act, called for by exceptional circumstances, none of the stipulations existing between the two Courts are impaired, and that all the previous Treaties, corroborated by the separate Act of the Treaty of Adrianople, retain their full force and value.

The six preceding Articles having been settled and concluded, our signature and the seal of our arms have been set to the present Act, which is delivered to the Sublime Porte in exchange for that which is delivered to us by aforesaid.

Done at                      on the                      1853, and of the  
Hegira,

*Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the  
Emperor of all the Russias to the Sublime Ottoman Porte.*

*Note Verbale by Prince Menchikoff, April 7<sub>19</sub>, 1853.*

[See Inclosure in No. 168.]

*Lord Stra'ford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 19.)*

*Constantinople, May 3, 1853.*

THOUGH more than a week has elapsed since I was entitled to consider the question of the holy places as virtually settled, I am still unable to report its formal and definitive conclusion. Two firmans, embodying the terms of the arrangement, have been prepared and communicated to the Embassies of France and Russia. These firmans, being accepted by both parties, are to be invested with the usual forms and again communicated to the two Embassies, with an official note addressed respectively to each. Of the firmans and note, as intended for communication, I have now the honour to inclose copies.

Your Lordship may rest assured that I have spared no pains to hasten the conclusion of this delicate and protracted question.

*Draft of Firman.*

A TOI, mon Vizir, Hafiz Ahmed Pasha, Gouverneur du Sandjak de Jérusalem et dépendances, et à toi, Cadi de Jérusalem, j'ordonne :

Comme la grande coupole de l'Eglise de la Résurrection (le Saint Sépulcre) a besoin d'être réparée, que les réparations ont été différées à cause de quelques contestations qui sont survenues, et que maintenant toute contestation à cet égard a cessé, mon Conseil des Ministres, après avoir délibéré sur cette question, a pris les résolutions suivantes :

Pour donner une preuve de ma munificence Souveraine, ma Sublime Porte nommera et expédiera exprès un Commissaire chargé de réparer la coupole susmentionnée, sous mes auspices, en mon nom, et sur le même plan. Si l'on fait quelque chose qui n'est pas conforme au plan sur lequel la coupole se trouve actuellement bâtie, le Patriarche Grec sera autorisé à faire des représentations à cet égard. Et attendu qu'il ne convient pas de démolir les maisons attenantes à l'Eglise de la Résurrection parcequ'elles sont un hospice et un oratoire, si ces maisons ont des fenêtres qui donnent sur l'église, on les murera.

Mes ordres étant que les dispositions ci-dessus soient mises à exécution, le présent firman Impérial qui renferme ces dispositions est émané de mon Divan Impérial et expédié.

Vous donc, Gouverneur et Cadi susmentionnés, informés que vous serez qu'il a été résolu que la coupole susdite sera réparée sur le même plan dans lequel elle se trouve actuellement par l'entremise du commissaire *ad hoc* et de la part de ma Sublime Porte, vous vous empresserez de porter cela à la connaissance du public.

Ayez-le pour entendu et ayez confiance dans le noble signe qui décore le présent firman Impérial.

(Translation.)

TO thee, my Vizier, Hafiz Ahmed Pasha, Governor of the Sandjak of Jerusalem and its dependencies, and to the Cadi of Jerusalem, I give this order :

As the Grand Cupola of the Church of the Resurrection (the Holy Sepulchre) requires to be repaired, as the repairs of it have been delayed from various discussions which have occurred, and as all discussion on this point has come to a close, my Council of Ministers, after having deliberated on this matter, has adopted the following resolutions.

In order to give a proof of my sovereign munificence, my Sublime Porte will send expressly a Commissioner with directions to repair the above-mentioned cupola, under my auspices, in my name, and on the same plan. If anything is done inconsistent with the plan on which the cupola is at present built, the Greek Patriarch will be authorized to make representations on that subject. And seeing that it is not proper to pull down the houses abutting on the Church of the Resurrection, inasmuch as they consist of a hospital and an oratory, if those houses have windows looking on the church they shall be walled up.

My orders being that the above stated arrangements shall be carried into execution, the present Imperial firman comprising those arrangements is issued from my Imperial Divan and dispatched.

You then, the aforesaid Governor and Cadi, being apprized that it has been determined that the above-mentioned cupola shall be repaired on the same plan as that on which it now exists by the intervention of a Commissioner for this purpose and on the part of my Sublime Porte, you will hasten to give public notice thereof.

Take heed thereof, and place confidence in the illustrious signature by which the present Imperial firman is adorned.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 180.

*Draft of Firman.*

(Traduction.)

A TOI, Hafiz Ahmed Pasha, mon Vizir, Gouverneur du Sandjak de Jérusalem et dépendances, et à mon Cadi, Muftis, et Lieutenant Naquib-el-Eshref de Jérusalem, j'ordonne :

Il est superflu de dire que la Commission établie, il y a quelque temps, pour l'aplanissement des différends survenus entre les nations Grecque et Latine, et le Conseil des Ministres, ayant à plusieurs reprises discuté cette question, il a été arrêté ce qui suit.

La clef de la porte de la Grande Eglise qu'il y a dans le village de Bethléem.

et une clef de chacune des deux portes qu'il y a du côté du nord et du côté du sud de la grotte où naquit Jésus (que la paix de Dieu soit sur lui!), resteront comme *ab antiquo* entre les mains des Latins.

Les deux jardins attenant au Couvent Franc resteront comme par le passé sous la surveillance des deux parties.

L'autorisation que les Catholiques ont depuis un ancien temps d'exercer aussi leur culte dans la Chapelle du Tombeau de Sainte Marie, comme les autres nations, leur est confirmée.

Désormais la nation Grecque aussi officiera et priera comme les Latins dans l'intérieur de la coupole de l'Ascension au Mont Olivette.

Les susdites dispositions ont été mises à exécution sur les lieux mêmes en vertu d'un firman émané et orné de mon rescrit Impérial.

Les autres points qui restaient ont aussi été discutés afin qu'ils servent de complément aux dispositions susmentionnées, et ayant été modifiés de commun accord ils ont été inscrits dans un mémoire qui renferme plusieurs Articles que voici.

Si une clef de la grande porte de l'Eglise de Bethléem a été donné aux Latins, c'est pour qu'ils aient, comme ils l'avaient anciennement, le droit de passage dans cette église : on ne leur a pas donné par là le droit d'y officier ou le droit de possession en commun avec les Grecs ; on ne leur a pas donné le droit de changer le *status quo* de cette église ou d'y officier ; on n'a donné à aucune des parties la faculté d'introduire quelque nouveauté, soit par rapport au passage de cette église pour se rendre à la grotte, soit à d'autres égards, et de changer ainsi la règle suivie tant anciennement qu'à présent.

Attendu que le portier de l'église susmentionnée a été un prêtre Grec, sujet de ma Sublime Porte, depuis un très ancien temps, et que ce portier n'est nullement autorisé à empêcher les nations qui ont droit d'entrée d'y entrer, le même système sera suivi à cet égard comme par le passé.

Sa Majesté le Sultan a fait mettre dans la Grotte de l'Eglise de Bethléem comme un souvenir public qu'il laisse à la nation Chrétienne, à la place de l'Etoile qui s'est perdue l'année 1847, une autre Etoile tout-à-fait pareille, et cela afin de mettre fin aux contestations qui s'étaient élevées à cet égard ; mais cette Etoile ne confère à aucune des nations Chrétiennes un droit nouveau quelconque, et il n'y aura aucun changement à ce sujet.

Les nations qui ont le droit d'exercer leur culte dans la Chapelle du Tombeau de la Bienheureuse Marie et de visiter cette chapelle, la visiteront et exerceront leur culte tous les jours, et à condition de n'être pas un obstacle à ce que d'autres nations aussi visitent cette chapelle et y exercent leur culte.

Les Grecs y exerceront leur culte chaque matin depuis le lever du soleil jusqu'à une heure-et-demie après le lever du soleil ; après eux les Arméniens y exerceront leur culte pendant une heure-et-demie ; et après les Arméniens, les Latins y exerceront leur culte pendant deux heures : dispositions arrêtées et qui seront mises à exécution sous l'autorité et avec la permission de ma Sublime Porte.

Les deux jardins qui sont contigus au Couvent Franc continueront d'être sous l'inspection des nations Grecque et Latine, et l'on en usera comme on en a usé jusqu'à présent sans aucun droit privilégié pour aucune des deux parties.

Toutes ces dispositions resteront telles qu'elles sont, attendu qu'il n'y a pas des nouvelles concessions faites à une nation quelconque par des documents formels.

Tous les lieux saints que les nations Grecque, Latine, et Arménienne possèdent actuellement à Jérusalem, soit en commun, soit exclusivement, resteront tels quels en leur possession pour toujours.

Voilà ce qui est écrit dans le rapport de la Commission ; et comme tous ces points ont été discutés et approuvés dans les Conseils tenus par mes Ministres et soumis à ma sanction souveraine, j'ai ordonné et ordonne qu'ils les mettent à exécution tels qu'ils sont écrits ; et en conséquence le présent firman Impérial, émané du Divan Impérial et orné de mon khatti-chérif, a été expédié.

Vous donc, Gouverneur, Cadi, Muftis, et autres susmentionnés, informés que vous serez de tout ce que ci-dessus, vous ferez enregistrer ce commandement Impérial au mahkémé, et vous agirez toujours et à tout jamais conformément à son noble contenu. Ayez-le pour entendu, et ayez confiance dans l'auguste signe qui le décore.

(Translation.)

TO thee, Hafiz Ahmed Pasha, my Vizier, Governor of the Sandjak of Jerusalem and its dependencies; and to my Cadi, Muftis, and Lieutenant Naquib-el-Eshref of Jerusalem, I give this order :

It is superfluous to mention that the Commission which was appointed some time ago for the arrangement of the differences which had arisen between the Greek and Latin nations, and the Council of Ministers, having on various occasions discussed that question, the following settlement was made :

The key of the gate of the Great Church in the village of Bethlehem, and a key of each of the two gates which are on the north and south sides of the grotto where Jesus (may the peace of God be on him !) was born, shall remain, as of old, in the hands of the Latins.

The two gardens belonging to the Frank convent shall remain, as heretofore, under the superintendence of the two parties.

The liberty which the Catholics of old enjoy of also performing, like other nations, their religious rites in the Chapel of the Tomb of the Holy Mary, is confirmed to them.

Henceforth the Greek nation also shall, like the Latins, officiate and pray within the interior of the cupola of the Ascension on Mount Olivet.

The above-mentioned arrangements have been carried into effect on the spot, in virtue of a firman issued and decorated with my Imperial signature.

The remaining points have likewise been discussed, in order to complete the aforesaid arrangements, and having been modified by common consent, they have been recorded in a memorandum containing the following Articles :

If a key of the great gate of the Church of Bethlehem has been given to the Latins, it is in order that, as heretofore, they may possess a right of passage in that church; no right to officiate there, or to hold possession in common with the Greeks, has thereby been given to them; no right to change the *status quo* of that church, or to officiate therein, has been given to them; the power of introducing any novelty, either in regard to the passage through that church on the way to the grotto, or in other respects, and thus altering the regulation observed as well formerly as at present, has not been given to either party.

The door-keeper of the above-mentioned church having for a very long time been a Greek priest, subject of my Sublime Porte, and that door-keeper having no authority to prevent the entrance of other nations who have a right to enter therein, the same system shall be followed in this respect as heretofore.

His Majesty the Sultan has caused to be placed in the grotto of the Church of Bethlehem, as a public token of his regard which he bestows on the Christian nation, in the place of the star which was lost in the year 1847, another star altogether similar; and he has done so in order to put an end to the disputes which had arisen in this respect; but this star does not confer upon any of the Christian nations any new right whatever, and no change shall be made in this respect.

The nations which are entitled to exercise their religious rites in the Chapel of the Tomb of the Blessed Mary, and to visit that chapel, shall visit it and exercise their religious rites every day, on condition that they offer no obstacle to other nations also visiting that chapel, and there exercising their religious rites.

The Greeks shall exercise their religious rites there every morning from sunrise to one hour and a-half after sunrise; after them, the Armenians shall exercise their religious rites there for an hour and a-half; and after the Armenians, the Latins shall exercise their religious rites there for two hours; which arrangements are settled and shall be carried into effect under the authority and with the permission of my Sublime Porte.

The two gardens adjoining to the Frank convent shall remain under the superintendence of the Greek and Latin nations, who shall make use of them as they have heretofore done, without any privileged right for either of the two parties.

All these arrangements shall remain as they are, inasmuch as no new concessions are made to any nation whatever by formal documents.

All the holy places which the Greek, Latin, and Armenian nations already possess at Jerusalem, either in common or exclusively, shall remain as now in their possession for ever.

This is what is written in the report of the Commission ; and as all these points have been discussed and approved in the Councils held by my Ministers and submitted to my sovereign sanction, I have ordered and do order that they be carried into effect as they are written ; and the present Imperial firman, issued from the Imperial Divan, and decorated with my hattî-sheriff, has accordingly been issued.

You then, Governor, Cadi, Muftis, and others above mentioned, being apprized of the foregoing, you will cause this Imperial mandate to be registered in the Mehkémé, and you will always and for ever act in accordance with its contents. Take heed thereof, and place confidence in the illustrious signature by which it is adorned.

Inclosure 3 in No. 180.

*Draft of Note to be addressed to the Ambassadors of Russia and France.*

COPIE est transmise à votre Excellence du firman, orné d'un khattî-chérif, qui est destiné à servir de conclusion et de complément aux différends qui existaient entre les nations Grecque et Latine au sujet des lieux saints à Jérusalem, et qui renferme la décision prise dernièrement en définitive, soit par rapport à ces lieux saints, soit par rapport à la réparation de la grande coupole de l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre.

Et comme c'est la volonté de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan que les dispositions de ce firman soient invariablement et pour toujours mises à exécution complètement, je m'empresse d'en informer votre Excellence par cette note officielle, en saisissant, &c:

(Translation.)

A COPY is transmitted to your Excellency of the firman decorated with a hattî-sherif which is designed to terminate and set at rest the differences which existed between the Greek and Latin nations on the subject of the holy places at Jerusalem, and which contains the definitive decision recently taken, as well with regard to those holy places as with regard to the repairs of the great cupola of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.

And as it is the will of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan that the arrangements of this firman shall be invariably and for ever carried into complete effect, I hasten to inform your Excellency of it by this note, taking, &c.

No. 181.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 19.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, May 5, 1853.*

SINCE I addressed your Lordship on the 3rd instant, I have had some further conversation with M. de la Cour, M. de Klezl, and M. d'Ozeroff, Principal Secretary of the Russian Embassy. I called on Prince Menchikoff, but did not find him at home. He has had a return of his previous indisposition, and is now confined to his bed.

It results from these several communications that the two firmans and official note prepared at the Porte with reference to the holy places, would suffice to terminate that portion of the pending questions in a manner satisfactory to the respective Parties ; but that a certain degree of doubt and uneasiness is still kept up by the variable language and procrastination of the Turkish Ministers. It is more than time for this vacillation to cease, and my opinion has been strongly and repeatedly expressed, not only to the Grand Vizier and Rifaat Pasha, but even to the Sultan himself. The Grand Vizier was to see His Majesty this morning, for the express purpose of engaging him to declare his final decision without further delay.

I had scarcely finished the preceding sentence, when I was interrupted by

a report from M. Pisani, whom I had sent to obtain intelligence from Rifaat Pasha before the departure of the messenger. He writes me word that the Sultan has sanctioned the firmans and the note, and that they have been immediately forwarded to the Russian Embassy with the date of this day, and, as I understand from M. Pisani's letter, in the terms already made known to your Lordship.

The difficulties which unfortunately remain to be overcome before the relations of the Porte with Russia can be settled on a stable and friendly basis, appear, from my last communications with the Russian Embassy, to be still of a very serious character. I hope, nevertheless, that it will not be impossible for me to contribute towards so desirable a result, by persevering in that line of conciliation and firmness of which I have hitherto found no reason to repent.

No. 182.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 20.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, May 19, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS mentioned to me to-day that he had despatches of the 9th from St. Petersburg, stating that Count Nesselrode had congratulated General Castelbajac on the settlement of the question of the holy places, calling the General to bear witness to the moderate and conciliatory conduct of the Russian Government, and to the loyalty with which he (Count Nesselrode) had adhered to his word.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 183.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 20.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, May 19, 1853.*

SINCE I addressed your Lordship the day before yesterday, M. Drouyn de Lhuys has received M. de la Cour's despatches of the 5th instant. On that day M. de la Cour had received the assurances of the Turkish Government, that the question of the sacred places was settled by the two firmans, of which your Lordship has knowledge. His despatches contain nothing else of importance.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys informed me this morning that he had yesterday sent instructions to M. de la Cour respecting the attitude he was to take under the new phase which Eastern affairs had assumed. Not, he said, that these instructions could reach that Ambassador in time, but that he wished to put on record the opinions of the French Government.

With regard to the question of the holy places, M. de la Cour is authorized to state that the French Government is satisfied. The present arrangement is the arrangement made by M. de Lavalette, and France has consequently nothing to say against it. M. de la Cour is enjoined neither to protest nor to make reserves.

But with respect to the question of a Convention which is to guarantee to Russia the *status quo* at Jerusalem for ever, M. de la Cour is told that France cannot recognize the principle that any third Power may use her greater influence to invalidate Treaties existing between two other Powers, but he is not desired to make any declaration on the subject. Indeed, M. Drouyn de Lhuys observes that an assurance of the continuation of the *status quo* is more valuable to France than Russia, as modern history proves that the Latins have much more to apprehend from the encroachment of the Greeks, than the Greeks have to fear from the encroachments of the Latins.

Finally, M. de la Cour is instructed to give his opinion freely as to the fatal results which, in the opinion of the French Government, must attend a Russian protectorate of the Greek subjects of the Porte; but he is not to take upon himself the responsibility of exciting the Ottoman Government to refuse the demands of Russia.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 22.)*

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 9, 1853.

SINCE I transmitted to you on the 6th instant what may be called Prince Menchikoff's ultimatum, though he has prudently, and I hope with intention, avoided the use of that word, my time has been entirely occupied with communications relating to it. Your Lordship may easily conceive that so abrupt and peremptory a step could not be taken in secret, and that the public would not be slow in catching the excitement, and sharing the apprehensions of the Porte.

The Russian note and accompanying projet were conveyed to me with a request from the Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that I would acquaint him with my impressions respecting them at an early hour next morning, preparatory to a meeting of the Council.

In reply to this message, I suggested what follows :

1. To make the communication of the Russian papers common to the British and French Embassies in a strictly confidential form.

2. To prepare a written answer to the Russian declaration as exhibited in the official note, the *Projet de Sened*, and the *note verbale* of April the 19th.

3. To frame the answer in a spirit of conciliation and firmness, giving every assurance of a cordial intention on the side of the Porte to act towards Russia on principles of strict good faith and friendly consideration ; to place in their proper light, clearly but temperately, the proceedings and requisitions of Russia in connection with Prince Menchikoff's embassy ; and to declare, notwithstanding, an unalterable readiness to entertain his Excellency's propositions, in so far as they were free from objections bearing on the sovereign dignity and independence of the Sultan, however superfluous they might be as to the question of the Holy Places in Palestine already settled to the satisfaction of all parties ; to redress any grievances fairly made out on behalf of the Greek Church, and to confirm and carry into effect all the established rights and privileges secured already by Imperial favour to the Christian religion, and its ecclesiastical property throughout the Empire.

4. To communicate the note containing an answer of this kind, together with the three abovementioned documents, to the Representatives of the four great Powers who, in common with Russia, were parties to the Treaty of 1841.

The Secretary of State conferred with the Grand Vizier, and expressed his satisfaction with the advice which I had tendered ; authorizing me at the same time to place the Russian papers in the hands of the French Ambassador.

My next step was to see M. de la Cour. I found his Excellency at home, and after reading the documents in our possession, we talked over their contents and the general features of the crisis, with a total absence of reserve, equally on his part as on my own. I left him with the impression that we were both on the same ground ; that he, no more than myself, contemplated an appeal to the squadrons without express orders from home ; that he disapproved of the proposed *Sened*, even in point of form ; that he fully appreciated the dangers involved in the terms of its first and second Articles, and deprecated the peremptory attitude assumed by the Russian Ambassador ; at the same time that he entered into all those considerations which naturally result from the weakness of the Ottoman Empire, and the occasional imprudence of its Government.

We separated with an understanding that each of us would see the Turkish Ministers and Prince Menchikoff, holding to both parties the same kind of language, and meeting again afterwards for our mutual information.

The Russian Ambassador called upon me and also upon M. de la Cour in the course of the day. His visit to me had the air of a private attention, irrespective of politics. I took occasion, however, to bring up the topic nearest to my thoughts, and also, in all probability, to his also. Avoiding with care any warmth of expression which might lead to an unpleasant discussion, I intimated a strong impression that the Porte was not more likely to accept his new than his original projet, and added such remarks as I thought best calculated to incline him, if it were still possible, to a reconsideration of the most exceptionable part of his demands. My endeavours were to no purpose. He would not

admit that his propositions lay open to any unfavourable construction. He gave me to understand that having run out the whole line of his moderation, he could go no further; and that his Government could no longer submit to the state of inferiority in which he pretended that Russia was held with respect to those who in this country profess the same religious tenets as the Emperor Nicholas himself. It was to no purpose that I reminded him of the unexpected length to which he had carried his pretensions, and the immense difference which exists between the position of Russia, with respect to its millions of co-religionists in Turkey, and that of France or of Austria, with respect to the small number of Catholics placed by Treaty, to a certain degree, under their protection.

Late at night I saw the Grand Vizier at his country-house on the Bosphorus. Rifaat Pasha and the Seraskier were present at our interview. We went at once into the subject of Prince Menchikoff's ultimatum, and before I declared any opinion of my own, I found them unanimous in regarding the Convention proposed by him as inadmissible. The only question between us was by what means the impending danger might be warded off without any essential sacrifice, and the Porte justified towards Europe in exposing itself to the hazard of a rupture with Russia. I advised them to open a door for negotiation in the note to be prepared, and to withhold no concession compatible with the real welfare and independence of the Empire. I could not in conscience urge them to accept the Russian demands as now presented to them, but I reminded them of the guarantee required by Prince Menchikoff, and strongly recommended that, if the guarantee he required was inadmissible, a substitute for it should be found in a frank and comprehensive exercise of the Sultan's authority, in the promulgation of a firman securing both the spiritual and temporal privileges of all the Porte's tributary subjects, and by way of further security communicated officially to the five great Powers of Christendom.

In rising to take leave, I was asked by the Grand Vizier whether any reliance could be placed on the eventual approach of Her Majesty's squadron in the Mediterranean. I replied that I considered the position in its present stage to be one of a moral character, and consequently that its difficulties or hazards, whatever they might be, should be rather met by acts of a similar description than by demonstrations calculated to increase alarm and provoke resentment.

On comparing notes the next day with M. de la Cour, I found him under an impression that the Turkish Ministers were disposed to shrink from encountering the consequences of Prince Menchikoff's retirement in displeasure, and that the Prince himself showed no inclination whatever to abate a particle of his pretensions in so far as their essential points were concerned. It appeared to me that M. de la Cour was quite as anxious as I could be for an amicable settlement of the questions at issue, but he was no more prepared than myself, as I understood him, to counsel the Porte to accept Prince Menchikoff's project.

The day before yesterday Prince Menchikoff went into the country, with the intention, as I am informed, of not returning till to-night. He has, however, returned to town this morning, and the general expectation is that he will retire with the whole Embassy unless the Porte should signify its acceptance of his ultimatum to-morrow.

Meanwhile, I have determined to offer one more chance for the preservation of friendly relations between Turkey and Russia. Not being able to see Prince Menchikoff in time, I have addressed him in writing, adopting a confidential form to avoid offence, but stating the general opinions with the frankness which the interests at stake and my official character alike require under circumstances of such critical urgency.

The hurry in which I was compelled to draw up my letter entitles me to your Lordship's indulgence, and should it appear to Her Majesty's Government that my zeal in the cause of peace and national independence has carried me in any degree beyond the bounds of diplomatic discretion, I am content to bear the reproach and its accompanying regret.

The Porte, on its side, has made a further attempt at conciliation by proposing an interview between Prince Menchikoff and the Grand Vizier.

I grieve to say that the former has declined this overture, and that the Porte, having expressed its regret, while inferring that Russia intended to close the door of negotiation, received for answer that the Prince could only consent to enter into further discussion on learning that the bases of his ultimatum were accepted.

Informed that the steam-packet is preparing to start, I have no choice but to bring my despatch to an immediate conclusion, with this addition, that I cannot conceal from your Lordship my impression that in all probability the Russian Embassy will withdraw to Odessa under circumstances which give ample room for the worst conjectures and even for the most painful apprehensions.

The Council is sitting at this moment, but the final result of its deliberations cannot be known for two or three hours to come.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S.—I forward herewith a copy of my confidential despatch to Prince Menchikoff.

Inclosure in No. 184.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Prince Menchikoff.*

(Confidentielle.)

M. l'Ambassadeur,

*Péra, le 8 Mai, 1853.*

VOTRE départ pour la campagne m'oblige d'avoir recours à la plume pour vous entretenir des affaires qui dans ce moment occupent péniblement tous les esprits capables de réflexion. Si je devais me justifier d'une démarche qui a pour motif le désir de contribuer à la solution amicale d'un état de choses compliqué, pour ne pas dire menaçant, je me rapporterais aux grands principes déclarés par le Cinq Puissances en faveur de l'indépendance et de l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman dans l'année 1841. Mais il m'est plus agréable de citer les communications franches et confidentielles qui ont eu lieu à St. Pétersbourg et à Londres entre nos Gouvernements respectifs au sujet de votre Ambassade, et de tirer quelque espoir rassurant de celles qui, marquées au même coin, se sont passées ici entre votre Altesse et moi.

Il résulte des premières que la Cour de Russie, non moins que celle que j'ai l'honneur de représenter, continuerait à respecter l'indépendance de la Porte et désirerait la voir à l'abri de toute secousse qui pourrait ébranler les bases de sa tranquillité. Nous étions fondés à croire que les demandes de la Russie, adressées au Gouvernement Ottoman par votre intermédiaire, seraient bornées aux strictes exigences de l'affaire des Saints Lieux de la Palestine, et qu'il n'entrerait pas dans les vues de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie de chercher aucune extension de droit ou de pouvoir dans ce pays-ci au-delà de ce que lui assurent les Traités existants.

Malgré que les propositions soumises par votre Altesse aux Ministres de la Porte avaient pris de proportions qui, à mon avis, n'étaient pas exactement conformes à ces impressions, les déclarations que vous avez bien voulu me faire de temps à autre, dans nos entretiens, me laissaient dans l'assurance que les mêmes sentiments de modération et de respect pour l'autorité souveraine de la Porte qui se manifestaient à St. Pétersbourg ne manqueraient pas en dernière analyse, de votre côté, aux négociations ici. Je me plaisais dans cette conviction à employer mes bons offices dans les limites d'une stricte discrétion diplomatique, pour écarter les incertitudes qui pesaient encore sur la question des lieux saints, et je me flattais de l'espoir que la conclusion satisfaisante de cette affaire amènerait une heureuse entente par rapport à ce que les parties en litige pourraient avoir encore à régler entr'elles.

J'ai besoin de toute votre indulgence, M. l'Ambassadeur, quand je vous avoue la difficulté que j'éprouve en cherchant à concilier le ton et la portée de vos dernières démarches avec les dispositions que je me croyais, pour ainsi dire, en droit de vous attribuer. Usant de la franchise qui convient dans ce moment de crise à ceux qui professent d'être guidés par les mêmes principes, je ne saurais vous cacher combien me semblent insurmontables les objections qui s'opposent à ce que la Porte accepte volontairement les premiers Articles de votre projet de Sened. Permettez que je sollicite en termes généraux votre attention au caractère et à l'étendue des propositions qu'ils renferment.

J'ai présentes à l'esprit les modifications que votre Altesse y avait préalablement introduites par rapport aux Patriarches et au Protectorat; mais qu'il me soit permis de douter si, à côté de cette modération, la rédaction actuelle

n'aurait pour effet de transférer virtuellement de l'une à l'autre des deux parties—c'est à dire, du plus faible au plus fort—par le moyen d'un Acte ayant force de Traité, des pouvoirs réservés ailleurs à l'autorité suprême de l'état, et d'entraver ainsi au bénéfice d'une influence étrangère la haute surveillance du Souverain par rapport à des objets qui, dans cet Empire, malgré leurs dénominations spirituelles, touchent les ressorts intimes du Gouvernement et affectent les intérêts et spécialement les sympathies d'une population de plus de dix millions de sujets dépendants en grande partie de leur clergé. Je n'ai pas besoin de vous rappeler, M. l'Ambassadeur, qu'une telle extension des Traités existants courrait risque d'être regardée, ailleurs, comme une innovation hors de toute proportion avec la question, cause principale de votre Ambassade, et peu en harmonie avec l'esprit de légalité consacré de commun accord par le Traité de 1841.

J'aime à vous supposer de toutes autres intentions, et, comptant sur la justesse de mon appréciation, je vous supplie au nom de tous les grands intérêts qu'un mouvement précipité de votre part pourrait exposer aux plus sérieux hasards, de peser dans votre sagesse les moyens qui sans le moindre doute vous restent encore de mener vos négociations à une issue amicale pour peu que la dignité et l'indépendance d'action inséparables de la souveraineté en temps de paix soient mutuellement ménagées, et que les heureux résultats déjà obtenus dans l'intérêt de la conciliation fassent foi des dispositions nécessaires pour les couronner d'un succès complet.

Soyez persuadé, M. l'Ambassadeur, que de mon personnel, ainsi que dans l'esprit de mes instructions, je m'estimerai heureux de pouvoir contribuer encore dans cette circonstance décisive à un dénouement ayant pour but d'asseoir les relations amicales de la Russie et de la Porte sur une base solide et permanente, sans déroger à des principes qui doivent être aussi chers à votre Cour qu'à la mienne et à leurs Hautes Alliées de la Chrétienté.

Je prie, &c.

(Signé) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

(Translation.)

(Confidential.)

M. l'Ambassadeur,

*Pera, May 8, 1853.*

YOUR departure for the country obliges me to have recourse to my pen to communicate with you on matters which at this time painfully occupy all minds that are capable of reflection. If I had occasion to justify myself for taking a step originating in my desire to contribute to the amicable solution of a complicated—not to say menacing—state of things, I would refer to the great principles declared by the Five Powers in the year 1841, in behalf of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. But it is more agreeable to me to refer to the frank and confidential communications which have passed at St. Petersburg and at London between our respective Governments on the subject of your Embassy, and to deduce some encouraging hope from those which, bearing the same stamp, have passed here between your Highness and myself.

It results from the former that the Court of Russia, not less than that which I have the honour to represent, would continue to respect the independence of the Porte, and would desire to see it secure from any agitation which might shake the foundations of its tranquillity.

We were authorised to suppose that the demands of Russia, addressed through you to the Ottoman Government, would be limited to the strict requirements of the affair of the Holy Places of Palestine, and that it did not enter into the views of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia to seek any extension of right or of power in this country beyond what was assured to him by the existing Treaties.

Notwithstanding that the proposals submitted by your Highness to the Ministers of the Porte had assumed proportions which, in my opinion, were not exactly in accordance with these impressions, the declarations which you have had the goodness to make to me from time to time in the course of our communications afforded me the assurance that the same sentiments of moderation and respect for the sovereign authority of the Porte which were exhibited at St. Petersburg, would not in the last instance be wanting on your part as

regards the negotiations carried on here. In this persuasion I was glad to exert my good offices within the limits of strict diplomatic discretion, in order to remove the uncertainties which still prevailed in regard to the question of the Holy Places, and I flattered myself with the hope that the satisfactory conclusion of that matter would lead to a happy understanding in regard to what the parties engaged in discussion might still have to settle between them.

I have need of all your indulgence, M. l'Ambassadeur, when I admit to you the difficulty which I experience in seeking to reconcile the tone and bearing of your last proceedings with the disposition which I thought myself entitled, as it were, to attribute to you. With the frankness which at this critical period becomes those who profess to be guided by the same principles, I cannot conceal from you how insurmountable the objections to the voluntary acceptance by the Porte of the first Articles of your Project of Sened appear to me to be. Allow me, in general terms, to request your attention to the character and extent of the propositions contained in them.

I bear in mind the modifications which your Highness had previously inserted in them with regard to the Patriarchs and the Protectorate ; but may I be allowed to doubt whether, notwithstanding this moderation, the present wording would not have the effect of virtually transferring from one to the other of the two Parties—that is, from the weaker to the stronger—by means of an Act having the force of a Treaty, powers elsewhere reserved to the supreme authority of the State, and thus fetter, for the benefit of a foreign influence, the paramount superintendence of the Sovereign in regard to objects which, in this Empire, notwithstanding their spiritual denominations, bear upon the internal jurisdiction of the Government, and affect the interests—and especially the sympathies—of a population of more than ten millions of subjects depending in a great measure on their clergy. I have no occasion to remind you, M. l'Ambassadeur, that such an extension of the existing Treaties would, moreover, run the risk of being looked upon as an innovation altogether disproportionate to the question which is the chief cause of your Embassy, and as being little in accordance with the spirit of legality recorded by common consent in the Treaty of 1841.

I would fain attribute to you intentions altogether different, and, reckoning on the correctness of the opinion which I have formed, I beseech you, in the name of the great interests which a precipitate measure on your part might expose to the most serious risks, to weigh in your wisdom the means which doubtless are still at your disposal for bringing your negotiations to an amicable termination, provided that the dignity and independence of action which are inseparable from Sovereignty in time of peace are mutually cared for, and that the happy results already obtained in the way of conciliation be taken as an evidence of the dispositions requisite for crowning them with entire success.

Be assured, M. l'Ambassadeur, that personally, as well as in accordance with the spirit of my instructions, I should look upon myself as fortunate if, in this decisive crisis, I should still be able to contribute to a settlement having for its object to place the friendly relations between Russia and the Porte on a solid and durable basis, without prejudice to the principles which must be as dear to your Court as they are to mine, and to their exalted allies in Christendom.

I request, &c.

(Signed)

STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 185.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 23.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, May 14, 1853.*

WHEN I called upon the Chancellor yesterday, his Excellency acquainted me that the questions which have been agitated at Constantinople might be considered as virtually settled.

That as regards the holy places, an arrangement had been made which was satisfactory both to Prince Menchikoff and to M. de la Cour ; and that with

respect to the sanction to be given to the arrangement, as the form of a Treaty had been considered objectionable both by the Queen's Ambassador and by the Porte, some other would be devised. What it would be, he was unable to say; but full latitude had been given to the Russian negotiator, and the point was one which was sure to be speedily adjusted.

The proposed Convention had been, Count Nesselrode observed, sent to London a fortnight ago for the purpose of being communicated to your Lordship; but since the original sketch had been delivered to [by?] Prince Menchikoff, it had been greatly modified.

The modification applied particularly to the Article III. It had been found that the Patriarch of Constantinople exercised certain administrative powers (*pouvoirs administratifs*), and permanency of tenure would accordingly be secured by the corrected Article only to the Patriarch of Jerusalem.

Count Nesselrode was unable to communicate to me the draft of the Convention or agreement as it now stands, this paper not having been returned by the Emperor; but he read to me the original Article.

No. 186.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 24.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, May 23, 1853.*

THE Turkish Ambassador received a messenger last night from Constantinople with despatches of the 9th instant. He called this morning on M. Drouyn de Lhuys and communicated to him the substance of them. They mention the demand made by Prince Menchikoff on the Porte, and state that the Sultan, while determined to respect the religious privileges and rights of his Greek subjects, and to extend them if possible, is firmly resolved not to sign any Convention which would give Russia the right of interfering in their favour. The despatch states the reasons which have induced the Sultan to take this resolution, the principal being that to sign such a Convention would be to sign away his sovereign rights, by admitting a foreign Power to interfere between himself and his subjects. It adds, moreover, that Prince Menchikoff's demand is in contradiction with the assurances which he had solemnly given on his arrival at Constantinople, in the name of his Imperial master, that he was not come to attack the independence of the Ottoman Empire. Several friendly Powers, the despatch says, had approved these reasons, and the Porte hoped that they would be appreciated by France, and that if the consequence of the Sultan's refusal was to be a rupture with Russia, the French Government would admit that it would not be the fault of the Porte.

Such is the account given me by M. Drouyn de Lhuys of the communication made to him by Vely Pasha. He had, he said, in reply recommended prudence and conciliation. While admitting the validity and force of the objections taken by the Ottoman Ministers to Prince Menchikoff's demands, he could not assume the responsibility of advising the Porte to reject them. He had recommended that those objections should be carefully stated, and laid before the great Powers of Europe.

I asked M. Drouyn de Lhuys whether Vely Pasha had appealed to the French Government for protection? He answered, not exactly; but that he had received despatches of the same date from M. de la Cour, by which it would appear that in conversation the Turkish Ministers had been more urgent in their expressions, and had indicated a hope of the kind. This hope had not been encouraged by M. de la Cour, who appears to have abstained from doing more than recognizing that the Porte would be perfectly justified in refusing the demands of Prince Menchikoff, without however advising her to adopt that line of conduct.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 187.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, May 24, 1853.*

COUNT WALEWSKI has read to me a despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, stating at great length the views of the French Government upon the Convention presented by Prince Menchikoff to the Porte, and its practical operation in Turkey. The despatch concluded by an assurance that France was ready to fulfil every obligation imposed upon her by Treaty, and was desirous to cooperate with England in upholding the Turkish Empire.

I informed Count Walewski that the Cabinet was about to meet; and that I should immediately make known to my colleagues the contents of this important despatch; and that in the meanwhile I must express my concurrence in the views of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, which appeared to me both just and comprehensive, and conveyed in terms remarkable for their moderation and perspicuity.

I added that any determination now taken by our respective Governments must be hypothetical, and dependent on events over which we could exercise no control, and that the proper course seemed to be to wait for the definitive information from Constantinople that must arrive in a few days.

I also assured Count Walewski that it was the desire of Her Majesty's Government to act in cordial concert with the French Government; and that it was a satisfaction to us to think that upon the Eastern question, and the serious contingencies that might arise out of it, the interests of England and France were entirely identical.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 188.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 25.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, May 24, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS read to me this afternoon a despatch dated the 20th instant, which he had this morning received from the French Minister at Vienna. M. de Bourquency gives a short account of a conversation he had just had with Count Buol upon the Eastern question, promising details by the messenger. It is to the effect that Count Buol will not give any opinion upon what is passing at Constantinople until he knows whether Prince Menchikoff's conduct is approved by the Russian Government; but it is clear that he considers that conduct to be in contradiction to the solemn assurances given by the Emperor Nicholas to the Cabinet of Vienna, and he remarked that an ultimatum was never proposed but where there was a violation of a Treaty.

The Turkish Chargé d'Affaires had asked Count Buol for advice in the strait in which his Government was placed. Count Buol had recommended that the Porte should scrupulously fulfil its engagements towards Russia, and in general should conciliate that Power by all the means at the Sultan's command. As to the question immediately at issue, Count Buol said it was one in which the Sultan must take counsel of his own interests and dignity.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 189.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, May 26, 1853.*

THE repeated and explicit assurances received by Her Majesty's Government from Sir Hamilton Seymour and from Baron Brunnow, rendered it impossible to doubt that the sole object of Prince Menchikoff's mission was to

obtain a final and satisfactory settlement of the question of the holy places, and that no other matter remained behind, and that no demands were contemplated that could lead to difference between Russia and the Porte.

Her Majesty's Government have accordingly thought themselves not alone authorized, but called upon, to discredit the many rumours inconsistent with the above assurances that circulated since the arrival of Prince Menchikoff at Constantinople; and for the same reason, when it recently became clear that he was about to make demands with which the Porte could not comply, Her Majesty's Government were induced to believe that Prince Menchikoff was acting on his own responsibility, and not upon instructions from his Court, of which Her Majesty's Government had no knowledge.

It was therefore with extreme surprise and regret that they received the note in the form of an ultimatum (inclosed in your Excellency's despatch of the 6th instant), and Project of Convention, which had been presented on the 5th by Prince Menchikoff to the Porte, and to which a definitive answer was demanded in the space of five days.

Your Excellency was not furnished with instructions to meet a course of proceeding that Her Majesty's Government had such abundant reason for not contemplating: to have sent instructions upon a question that must have been determined before it came to the knowledge of Her Majesty's Government would have been useless; but upon that point they felt no uneasiness, because their general views and policy were well known to your Excellency, and, in carrying them out, they relied upon the ability and experience, as well as the local knowledge and well-earned influence of your Excellency with the Porte.

That confidence has been fully justified; and I have the pleasure to convey to you the entire approval of Her Majesty's Government of all your proceedings, as stated in your despatch of the 9th instant.

Her Majesty's Government view the proposed Convention and the practical operation that it would have in Turkey, in the same light as your Excellency appears to do: they consider that its acceptance by the Porte in its present form would have been incompatible with the honour and independence of the Sultan; and that the advice given by your Excellency to the Turkish Ministers as to the mode of meeting this demand, was alike prudent and dignified; and Her Majesty's Government most especially approve of your answer to the Grand Vizier, advising him that demonstrations calculated to increase alarm and provoke resentment, should be avoided so long as the question retained what your Excellency considered to be its moral character.

Her Majesty's Government observe with satisfaction, that M. de la Cour appears to have adopted the views of your Excellency, and to have held the same language as yourself to the Porte. The co-operation of the Ambassadors of England and France at this important crisis of Eastern affairs cannot fail to give confidence to the Porte, and is in conformity with the desire of their respective Governments.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 190.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 27.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, May 19, 1853.*

WHEN I waited yesterday upon the Chancellor I found him in momentary expectation of a messenger from Constantinople, who will in all probability be the bearer of the Convention which it may be assumed has been concluded between Russia and the Porte for the sanction of the two firmans which have lately been signed by the Sultan for the regulation of the rights of the Greek and Latin Churches at Jerusalem.

Count Nesselrode allowed me to read a copy of the *Projet de Traité* as latterly modified with the consent of Prince Menchikoff. He acquainted me that in the course of a few days this paper will be known to your Lordship, a copy of it having been forwarded to Baron Brunnow by the steamer which left St. Petersburg on the 15th instant.

I requested the Chancellor to inform me whether I was at liberty to acquaint your Lordship that orders had been given for a discontinuance of the Russian armaments in the south ; his Excellency was unable to give me an assurance to that effect, but stated that the orders to which I alluded would be issued upon the receipt of the Treaty which is looked for from day to day.

## No. 191.

*Memorandum of communications between Baron Brunnow and Her Majesty's Government, drawn up by Baron Brunnow and communicated to the Earl of Clarendon, May 26, 1853.*

DES la formation du Cabinet actuel, je me suis fait un devoir de signaler à l'attention des Ministres de Sa Majesté Britannique, la gravité des difficultés survenues alors à Constantinople par suite de la violation des engagements que la Porte avait contractés envers nous, relativement à la question des Saints Lieux.

Dans mon premier entretien confidentiel avec Lord John Russell, je lui ai exposé avec la plus entière franchise les considérations qui ne permettaient point au Cabinet Impérial de transiger sur une affaire à laquelle se rattachaient des intérêts de dignité, unis au sentiment religieux et national de la Russie.

J'ai eu l'honneur de prévenir dès lors le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat qu'il fallait s'attendre à voir le Cabinet Impérial renforcer son attitude à Constantinople par une démarche vigoureuse, pour ramener le Divan à une appréciation sérieuse d'une situation que son manque de parole venait de compliquer si gravement envers nous.

Lord John Russell m'a exprimé l'espoir que cette démarche serait conçue dans un esprit de conciliation et de paix.

Cette attente n'a pas été déçue.

En effet, l'Empereur, loin de rechercher aussitôt le redressement de ses griefs par l'emploi de la force, a préféré d'abord recourir aux moyens de persuasion, dans les voies d'une négociation pacifique.

Sa Majesté a daigné en confier le soin à M. le Prince Menchikoff, accrédité en qualité d'Ambassadeur Extraordinaire près Sa Hautesse le Sultan.

Le désir sincère qu'a éprouvé le Cabinet Impérial de conduire cette négociation à un résultat conforme aux grands intérêts de la paix, lui a inspiré la pensée de s'ouvrir au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, afin que l'influence morale de l'Angleterre contribuât d'une part à éclairer le Divan, et de l'autre à disposer le Cabinet Français à faire disparaître les obstacles que l'attitude prise à cette époque par M. de Lavalette semblait opposer à un arrangement à l'amiable.

Les vœux que j'ai été chargé d'énoncer à ce sujet ont rencontré auprès des Ministres de Sa Majesté Britannique l'accueil le plus amical. Ils ont reconnu que la complication survenue à Constantinople avait pris son origine dans les embarras suscités par les demandes de l'Ambassadeur de France ; ils ont compris de plus qu'il fallait tenir compte du sentiment national de la Russie qui ne pouvait point rester indifférent à ce que les immunités de l'Eglise d'Orient fussent lésées par les concessions faites au clergé Latin.

Ces vérités, je me fais un devoir de le constater, ont été sérieusement appréciées par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique. Sans entrer dans l'examen des questions de détail d'un litige auquel l'Angleterre elle-même était étrangère, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté a jugé que ses conseils pouvaient être utilement employés à aplanir les difficultés dont je ne lui avais point laissé ignorer les conséquences extrêmes.

Dans un esprit de conciliation, auquel je rends la plus entière justice, Lord John Russell m'a exprimé le désir de recueillir des informations ultérieures sur les griefs dont nous avions à demander le redressement, afin que le Cabinet de Sa Majesté Britannique fût mieux à même de contribuer, s'il était en son pouvoir, à arriver à une solution à l'amiable.

En réponse à ce désir, le Cabinet Impérial m'a autorisé à offrir au Principal Secrétaire d'Etat les éclaircissements dont je vais résumer la substance.

Je lui ai exposé d'abord les raisons qui empêcheraient le Prince Menchikoff d'entrer en négociation avec Fuad Effendi. Ce Ministre ayant occasionné la rupture des engagements formels pris par le Sultan envers l'Empereur quant

au maintien du *status quo* légalement établi par les hattî-chérifs souverains, ne pouvait assurément pas servir utilement d'intermédiaire à une négociation destinée à réparer une offense dont il avait été l'auteur. Cette considération a dû nécessairement inspirer au Sultan lui-même la conviction qu'il importait de placer entre d'autres mains le soin d'une négociation à laquelle se rattachaient de si grands intérêts. La Russie n'a point demandé, comme on l'a faussement allégué, la destitution de ce Ministre. Elle a attendu de la sagesse du Sultan la désignation d'un Plénipotentiaire plus impartial, plus capable de conduire la négociation à bonne fin. La retraite de Fuad Effendi a été volontaire.

J'ai indiqué ensuite l'altération apportée au *statu quo* des droits anciennement acquis à l'Eglise Orthodoxe d'Orient, et j'ai fait ressortir, comme je le devais, le désir du Cabinet Impérial d'arriver à l'aplanissement de ce différend de manière à garder de justes ménagements envers la France, afin que la Porte, dans ses relations directes envers cette Puissance, ne se trouvât point exposée à de nouveaux embarras.

En troisième lieu, j'ai dit que le manque de parole dont la Porte s'était rendue coupable envers l'Empereur, constituait une offense dont Sa Majesté demandait réparation ; que d'ailleurs l'infraction du dernier firman, annulé par la Porte presque en même temps qu'il avait été rendu, ne nous permettait plus d'accorder à un pareil document une pleine croyance ; qu'en conséquence le Cabinet Impérial devrait insister sur un Acte explicatif plus solennel, dont le caractère fût obligatoire, pour prévenir le retour de nouvelles causes de mésintelligence entre la Russie et la Porte.

Cet exposé, verbalement fait dans une entrevue que j'ai eue avec Lord John Russell, peu de jours avant qu'il quittât la gestion des Affaires Etrangères, a précédé les négociations qui allaient s'ouvrir à Constantinople.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique a accueilli ces explications sans entrer dans un examen spécial du litige en question. Il a gardé son attitude de bienveillante observation, sans offrir et sans promettre à la Russie un appui que celle-ci ne demandait point. Il ne s'est engagé à rien. Je constate ce fait parcequ'il importe de l'établir pour apprécier dans son exacte vérité la relation des circonstances qui vont suivre. Si l'Angleterre, dès l'ouverture de la négociation, avait pris sur elle le soin de faire accepter nos demandes par le Divan, elle aurait été indubitablement en droit de s'enquérir en détail de nos propositions auxquelles elle aurait accordé son appui. Elle ne l'a point fait. Elle est restée libre de ses conseils, comme la Russie à son tour est restée libre de son action dans la poursuite d'une négociation qui allait s'ouvrir directement entre le Cabinet Impérial et la Porte, sans médiation, sans intervention aucune.

Dans cet état des choses l'Angleterre, comme je viens de le dire, est restée libre de ses conseils. Si cette assertion avait besoin de preuve, on en trouverait la confirmation la plus évidente dans la liberté pleine et entière avec laquelle M. l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Britannique à Constantinople a interposé ses conseils et émis son avis sur les propositions dont le Prince Menchikoff a été le premier à lui faire connaître l'ensemble.

Ces réflexions m'ont paru nécessaires d'une part pour rendre aux intentions du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique la justice qui leur est due, de l'autre pour placer dans son vrai jour la marche que le Cabinet de Russie a suivie durant le cours des explications confidentielles dont j'ai eu l'honneur d'être l'organe.

Le siège de la négociation étant à Constantinople, un Ambassadeur de l'Empereur, muni de pleins pouvoirs à cet effet, avait été chargé de la conduire à bonne fin. Il ne m'appartenait en rien d'anticiper sur une délibération qui ne se traitait pas à Londres entre l'Angleterre et la Russie, mais à Constantinople entre la Russie et la Porte.

Mon devoir, dans les limites de mes attributions, se bornait à communiquer au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, à mesure qu'elles parvenaient à ma connaissance, les informations qui pouvaient lui paraître désirables pour compléter et au besoin pour rectifier les données qu'il recevait par la voie de ses agents directs.

Je me suis trouvé appelé à remplir ce devoir au milieu des circonstances critiques qui se sont présentées au moment même où le Prince Menchikoff venait d'arriver à sa destination.

Je n'ai pas besoin de m'appesantir ici sur les nouvelles alarmantes répandues

alors à Péra, accréditées à Paris et à Londres, quant aux intentions de la Russie—arrivée de l'escadre de Sévastopol dans le Bosphore; occupation des Principautés; agrandissement de nos frontières Asiatiques; prétention de nous assurer la nomination du Patriarche Grec de Constantinople; soulèvement prémédité de la population Grecque dans l'Empire Ottoman; renouvellement du Traité d'Unkiar-Skélessi—toutes ces assertions sur lesquelles je ne m'étendrais point ici, doivent encore être présentes à la mémoire des Ministres de Sa Majesté Britannique.

Ils se souviendront aussi, j'en suis certain, du calme que j'ai opposé à ces rumeurs—de la fermeté avec lesquelles je n'ai point hésité à les démentir.

De mon côté, je garderai toujours un souvenir plein de reconnaissance de la franchise qui a présidé aux explications intimes que j'ai échangées avec les Ministres de Sa Majesté dans ce moment de crise.

Lord Clarendon venait de prendre alors la direction des Affaires Etrangères. Je m'en remets à son témoignage pour attester le langage que je lui ai tenu afin de rétablir les faits dans leur exacte vérité. Dès notre première entrevue, j'ai placé entre ses mains la lettre de Cabinet dont l'Empereur avait muni le Prince Menchikoff, en l'accréditant son Ambassadeur auprès du Sultan. Elle renferme ce passage: " Dans la question actuelle je ne puis que vous conseiller le maintien des droits consacrés par des siècles, reconnus par tous vos illustres prédécesseurs et confirmés par vous-même, en faveur de l'Eglise Orthodoxe, dont les dogmes sont professés par les populations Chrétiennes qui vous sont soumises, aussi que par la grande majorité de mes sujets."

Tel était le langage, tel était le conseil de l'Empereur au Sultan: le maintien des droits consacrés, reconnus, confirmés en faveur de l'Eglise d'Orient.

Je cite ces paroles parcequ'elles caractérisent la pensée et qu'elles déterminent la politique de l'Empereur. Il sait que le repos de la Turquie n'est possible qu'à condition que l'immense majorité de la population du rit Grec Orthodoxe de l'Empire Ottoman soit mise à l'abri de toute lésion. Il sait aussi que les relations de bonne intelligence entre la Russie et la Turquie ne sont solides et durables qu'à condition que la Porte, fidèle à ses engagements, qui datent du Traité de Kainardji, accorde à l'Eglise Orthodoxe cette liberté de culte, ce repos de conscience, et cette possession paisible de droits acquis, à l'inviolabilité desquels la Russie ne cessera jamais de veiller, avec toute la force de ses convictions nationales et religieuses.

Il faudrait peu connaître l'histoire des deux Empires, il faudrait surtout perdre de vue le grand intérêt de la conservation de la paix entre tous deux, pour qu'on oubliât que l'Empereur, lorsqu'il conseille et qu'il demande le maintien de l'Eglise d'Orient dans ses droits, parle et agit en ami qui veut le repos de l'Empire Ottoman et qui veille à l'existence de la Turquie dans son indépendance et dans son intégrité.

Si j'avais mal compris ou mal rendu à ce sujet les intentions de l'Empereur, dans mes entretiens confidentiels avec les Ministres de Sa Majesté Britannique, ils en auraient trouvé l'expression plus fidèle dans une dépêche du 26 Mars que M. le Chancelier de l'Empire m'a autorisé à placer sous les yeux du Cabinet de Sa Majesté.

Je me permettrai de transcrire ici trois passages de ce document :

" Il nous a été bien agréable de voir par le résumé de vos entretiens avec les Ministres Britanniques, que tous les faux bruits répandus à Constantinople à l'égard de nos intentions n'avaient causé aucune alarme ou appréhension au Cabinet de Londres, convaincu par les assurances personnelles qu'il a reçues à ce sujet de l'Empereur, que le désir et la résolution de Sa Majesté sont de respecter l'indépendance et l'intégrité de l'Empire Turc, et que si ses vues à cet égard venaient à subir un changement quelconque, notre Auguste Maître serait le premier à en avertir le Gouvernement Anglais."

Le second passage est conçu en ces termes :

" Vous pouvez assurer également les Ministres Anglais que dans l'arrangement à négocier il n'est pas question de faire révoquer ou ôter aux Latins les dernières concessions qu'ils ont obtenues par la note Ottomane du 9 Février de l'an passé, mais simplement de faire concorder ces concessions avec les dispositions du hatti-shérif en les dépouillant de ce qu'elles peuvent avoir d'exclusif, d'obtenir aux Grecs quelques compensations pour le tort qui leur a été fait, et surtout de les mettre à l'abri contre le retour de nouveaux préjudices."

Le troisième passage est ainsi conçu :

“ L'apparition simultanée des deux flottes rendait la question insoluble à Constantinople. Elle nous plaçait dans une position que nous n'aurions pu accepter, et qui n'eût plus permis à l'Empereur, se trouvant ainsi sous le coup d'une démonstration comminatoire, de suivre librement ses inspirations conservatrices et pacifiques.”

En jetant un coup d'œil sur ce résumé des explications échangées entre les deux Cabinets, on se persuadera que, jusqu'à ce jour, leur bonne foi mutuelle a servi à empêcher le mal qu'un système de méfiance réciproque aurait causé inévitablement aux intérêts communs de la conservation de la paix dans le Levant.

Grâces à cette réciprocité de confiance, la flotte de Sévastopol, dont on prévoyait l'arrivée dans le Bosphore, est restée à l'ancre ; les troupes Russes, dont on annonçait l'entrée dans les Principautés, n'ont point passé la frontière ; les populations Chrétiennes, dont on prédisait le soulèvement, sont demeurées dans l'obéissance ; et une négociation pacifique a suivi sa marche régulière entre les Plénipotentiaires chargés du soin de la conduire à son terme par un accommodement à l'amiable.

A mesure qu'elle avançait, j'ai mis successivement sous les yeux du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté les communications que le Prince Menchikoff a adressées au Divan d'abord pour exposer les griefs dont nous avions à porter plainte ; ensuite les propositions qu'il a faites pour en obtenir le redressement quant au passé, ainsi que les garanties jugées nécessaires afin de prévenir le retour des mêmes torts et des mêmes causes de mésintelligence entre les deux Empires voisins.

Si l'on se souvient, comme je l'ai dit, que cette négociation se poursuivait à Constantinople, et si l'on prend en considération que, selon l'usage consacré dans toute délibération diplomatique, on ne saurait rendre compte d'une proposition qu'après qu'elle a été faite par le négociateur qui en est l'organe, on ne sera point surpris de voir que les communications dont j'ai été chargé de m'acquitter à Londres, au lieu de précéder les démarches du Prince Menchikoff, aient dû les suivre, dans l'ordre naturel des dates, à de si longues distances.

Je m'en rapporte encore, à ce sujet, au témoignage du Principal Secrétaire d'Etat. Il a pu juger, jour par jour, de l'empressement et de l'exactitude que j'ai mis à le tenir au courant des informations qui me sont parvenues durant cette longue négociation.

Elles ont été devancées plus d'une fois par les confidences personnelles que le Prince Menchikoff a faites sur les lieux à Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. C'est ainsi que cet Ambassadeur a obtenu, avant moi, la connaissance du premier Projet de Convention dont le Prince Menchikoff lui a donné lecture.

Lorsque ce document m'est parvenu de St. Pétersbourg, je me suis fait un devoir aussitôt de le communiquer textuellement au Principal Secrétaire d'Etat.

Ce projet a été modifié depuis par le Prince Menchikoff et remplacé par une rédaction dans laquelle cet Ambassadeur s'est attaché à se conformer, autant que possible, aux vœux qui lui avaient été exprimés par les négociateurs Ottomans, profitant à cet effet des avis qu'il avait recueillis de Lord Redcliffe lui-même.

Ce second document se trouve également sous les yeux du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique.

En rapprochant le texte de l'un et de l'autre, on se persuadera facilement des dispositions conciliantes dans lesquelles l'Ambassadeur de Russie a usé de la latitude des pouvoirs dont il avait été muni, pour aller au-devant des observations qui lui avaient été faites, dans le but d'écarter de l'Acte projeté, jusqu'aux moindres expressions qui auraient pu donner lieu à une fausse interprétation des vues du Cabinet Impérial.

S'il pouvait s'élever à cet égard un doute dans quelque esprit prévenu, si l'on essayait d'attribuer à la Russie la pensée d'étendre son intervention sur les intérêts locaux ou sur la situation politique des populations Chrétiennes en Turquie, il me suffirait de rappeler ici un fait qui servirait à démentir cette assertion.

Le Prince Menchikoff, en me transmettant le Projet de Sened présenté le 5 Mai, a bien voulu l'accompagner d'une dépêche dont je vais transcrire les termes suivants :

“ Nous ne demandons pas le droit de protéger les Chrétiens du rit Orthodoxe, sujets de la Porte ; mais le maintien du *status quo* religieux de ce rits dont l'existence a été gravement menacée par la tendance manifestée par la Porte à protéger les empiètements du rit Latin sur celui qui est professé par la majorité des sujets Chrétiens du Sultan.”

Afin de prévenir tout malentendu et de rétablir les faits dans leur exacte vérité, je n'ai point hésité à placer entre les mains du Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique un extrait de cette dépêche, par laquelle M. le Prince Menchikoff définit si clairement les propositions qu'il venait d'émettre sur une question d'intérêt religieux, à l'exclusion de toute arrière-pensée et de toute ingérence politique.

Je ne suis pas appelé à entrer en discussion sur le mérite de l'œuvre de réconciliation qui a fait l'objet des négociations directement établies à Constantinople entre les Plénipotentiaires des deux Souverains amis et voisins.

Dans l'accomplissement strict de mon devoir, je n'ai qu'une seule réflexion à y ajouter :

Quelle que soit l'opinion que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique puisse former sur la teneur de l'Acte projeté, les Ministres de Sa Majesté, avec lesquels j'ai eu l'honneur d'entrer depuis cinq mois dans un échange constant des communications les plus intimes, voudront bien garder présents à leur mémoire les éclaircissements qu'il m'a été prescrit de leur offrir sur la pensée de mon Cabinet qui a présidé à cette transaction. Je vais les résumer ici en peu de mots :

Le Sultan a commencé par manquer de parole envers l'Empereur.

Sa Majesté s'est trouvée dans la nécessité de demander réparation de cette offense, faite à sa dignité.

Pour obtenir cette réparation l'Empereur a choisi la voie d'une négociation pacifique, de préférence à l'emploi immédiat de la force.

En demandant cette satisfaction à la Porte, par la persuasion et non par des mesures d'hostilité, il a tenu uniquement en vue de sauvegarder l'Eglise Orthodoxe en Turquie contre les empiètements et les lésions dont elle venait d'éprouver l'injuste et flagrante atteinte.

Dans ce but il a reconnu qu'un simple firman serait insuffisant pour réparer le tort commis quant au passé, ni pour prévenir le renouvellement de pareils griefs à l'avenir.

D'après cela, il a résolu de demander et d'obtenir de la Porte un Acte formel—un Acte explicatif, comme je l'ai nommé.

Cet Acte, dans la pensée de Sa Majesté, ne doit servir qu'à confirmer l'Eglise Orthodoxe dans la possession des droits dont elle jouit en Orient.

L'Empereur ne demande ni plus ni moins. Il veut que ce qui existe, reste intact ; que le culte professé par la Russie demeure libre, respecté, inviolable sous la domination Ottomane.

Sa Majesté demande cette garantie : il la conseille à la Porte, dans le double intérêt de rendre la tranquillité intérieure de l'Empire Ottoman mieux assurée et sa paix avec la Russie plus durable.

Les Puissances qui désirent la conservation de la Turquie, pourraient-elles se montrer jalouses de voir cette œuvre de paix accomplie par les conseils de la Russie ? Aimeraient-elles mieux que l'Eglise Grecque Orthodoxe, sans garantie, en lutte constante contre l'Eglise Latine, devint une cause permanente de troubles, d'inquiétude, et peut-être de dissolution au sein de l'Empire Ottoman ? Cette pensée, je me permets de la dire, ne serait pas conforme à la prévoyance des Grandes Puissances amies de la Turquie.

Pour preuve de leur sollicitude j'ai souvent entendu citer le texte du Traité des Dardanelles, conclu à Londres le  $\frac{1}{13}$  Juillet, 1841. Comme j'ai eu l'honneur de concourir à la signature de cet Acte, me serait-il permis de terminer le présent mémoire par une considération que me suggère le souvenir de cette transaction.

Le préambule qui précède les stipulations qu'elle renferme quant à la fermeture des deux détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore, indique une pensée qu'on devrait ne point méconnaître dans son application à la crise du moment.

Les Puissances Contractantes y expriment la volonté de donner à Sa Hautesse le Sultan une preuve manifeste du respect qu'elles portent à l'inviolabilité de ses droits souverains, ainsi que de leur désir de voir se consolider le repos de son Empire.

Or, la plus grande preuve de respect qu'on puisse donner à un Souverain indépendant, c'est de ne pas mettre obstacle à ce qu'il remplisse ses promesses

envers une Puissance amie et voisine. S'il n'est plus libre de tenir sa parole ni de réparer les torts qu'il a commis, il cesse d'être indépendant.

La seconde conclusion à laquelle la lecture du Traité de 1841 m'amène, c'est que les Puissances animées du désir sincère de voir se consolider le repos de l'Empire Ottoman, devraient être les premières à conseiller au Sultan de ne point refuser à l'Eglise Grecque, comme la Russie l'a demandé, un gage de sécurité qui tend à retenir l'immense majorité de la population Chrétienne de l'Empire Ottoman dans les bornes de la soumission et dans le repos des consciences.

L'Empereur, pour sa part, a rempli un sérieux devoir en donnant ce conseil au Sultan. S'il n'est point apprécié comme il mérite de l'être, je pense que le Cabinet Impérial aura la satisfaction de se dire qu'il ne sera pas responsable des conséquences qui pourront résulter de ce refus.

*Londres, le  $\frac{1}{2}$ <sup>3</sup> Mai, 1853.*

(Translation.)

*London, May  $\frac{1}{2}$ <sup>3</sup>, 1853.*

UPON the formation of the present Cabinet, I considered it my duty to point out to the attention of Her Britannic Majesty's Ministers the serious nature of the difficulties which had then arisen at Constantinople, consequent upon the violation of the engagements which the Porte had contracted with us relative to the question of the Holy Places.

In my first confidential conversation with Lord John Russell, I laid before him, with the most perfect frankness, the considerations which prevented the Imperial Cabinet from entering into a compromise in regard to a matter in which considerations of dignity, coupled with the religious and national feelings of Russia, were deeply involved.

I had the honour at that time to forewarn the Principal Secretary of State that the Imperial Cabinet must be expected to be seen strengthening its position at Constantinople by a vigorous step, in order to bring the Divan to a serious appreciation of a state of affairs which its breach of faith had so seriously complicated as regarded us.

Lord John Russell expressed the hope that this step would be conceived in a spirit of conciliation and of peace.

This expectation has not been disappointed. The Emperor, indeed, far from immediately seeking the redress of his grievances by the employment of force, preferred, in the first instance, to have recourse to means of persuasion through the medium of a pacific negotiation.

His Majesty was pleased to entrust the charge of it to Prince Menchikoff, accredited to His Highness the Sultan as Ambassador Extraordinary.

The sincere desire which the Imperial Cabinet felt to conduct this negotiation to an issue in conformity with the great interest of peace, suggested to it the idea of opening itself to the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, in order that the moral influence of England might, on the one hand, conduce to enlighten the Divan, and, on the other, might dispose the French Cabinet to remove the obstacles which the attitude assumed at that juncture by M. de Lavalette appeared to oppose to an amicable arrangement.

The desire which I was instructed to express on this subject met with the most friendly reception on the part of Her Britannic Majesty's Ministers. They admitted that the difficulties which had arisen at Constantinople had originated in the embarrassments created by the demands of the French Ambassador; they understood, moreover, that the national feeling of Russia, which could never remain indifferent to the infringement of the immunities of the Eastern Church by concessions made to the Latin clergy, must be taken into account.

I consider it my duty to record that these truths were seriously appreciated by Her Britannic Majesty's Government. Without entering into an examination of the details of a dispute to which England herself was not a party, the Government of Her Majesty considered that its counsels might be usefully employed in smoothing away the difficulties, with the extreme consequences of which I did not leave them unacquainted.

In a spirit of conciliation, to which I do the most ample justice, Lord

John Russell expressed to me the desire of obtaining further information as to the grievances for which we had to demand redress, in order that the Cabinet of Her Britannic Majesty might be better enabled to assist, if it could do so, in arriving at an amicable solution.

In reply to this wish, the Imperial Cabinet authorized me to offer to the Principal Secretary of State the explanations of which I now proceed to give the substance.

I first explained to him the reasons which would prevent Prince Menchikoff from entering into negotiation with Fuad Effendi. The latter Minister, having caused the breach of the formal engagements entered into by the Sultan towards the Emperor in regard to the maintenance of the *status quo* legally established by the imperial Hatti-Scherifs, assuredly could not with any advantage be employed as the medium of a negotiation intended to secure a reparation for an offence of which he had been the author. This consideration must of necessity have convinced the Sultan himself that it was of consequence to place in other hands the conduct of a negotiation in which such vast interests were involved. Russia never required, as has been falsely alleged, the dismissal of this Minister. She expected of the wisdom of the Sultan the nomination of a more impartial Plenipotentiary, of one more capable of conducting the negotiation to a happy result. The resignation of Fuad Effendi was voluntary.

I then pointed out the alteration which had taken place in the *status quo* as regarded the rights acquired of old by the orthodox Eastern Church, and I put prominently forward, as was my duty, the desire of the Imperial Cabinet that the removal of this misunderstanding should be effected with due consideration towards France, in order that the Porte in its direct relations with the former Power might not be subjected to fresh embarrassments.

In the third place, I said that the breach of faith of which the Porte had been guilty towards the Emperor, constituted an offence for which His Majesty demanded redress: that, besides, the infraction of the last Firman, which had been annulled by the Porte almost at the very moment when it was issued, no longer permitted us to give full credence to a similar document; that consequently the Imperial Cabinet must insist upon an explanatory and more solemn Act, obligatory in its character, in order to prevent the recurrence of fresh causes of misunderstanding between Russia and the Porte.

This statement, verbally made during an interview which I had with Lord John Russell a few days before he gave up the direction of Foreign Affairs, preceded the negotiations which were about to be commenced at Constantinople.

Her Britannic Majesty's Government received these explanations without entering into any particular examination of the matter in dispute. They preserved their attitude of friendly observation, without offering and without promising to Russia a support which the latter did not solicit. They pledged themselves to nothing. I mention this fact, since it is of importance to establish it, in order duly to estimate the history of the succeeding events. If England, at the commencement of the negotiation, had undertaken the charge of inducing the Porte to accept our demands, she would undoubtedly have been justified in minutely inquiring into our proposals, to which she had granted her support. She did not do so. She kept herself free as regarded her counsels, as Russia on her side kept herself free to act, in the prosecution of a negotiation which was about to be opened directly between the Imperial Cabinet and the Porte, without any mediation, without any intervention.

In this state of things England, as I have just said, kept herself free as regarded her counsels. If this assertion stood in need of proof, it would be most clearly established by the full and entire freedom with which Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople interposed his counsels and expressed his opinion upon the proposals of which Prince Menchikoff was the first to communicate to him the sum.

These observations have appeared to me necessary in order, on the one hand, to render to the intentions of Her Britannic Majesty's Government that justice which is due to them, and on the other to place in its true light the course which the Russian Cabinet has followed during the progress of the confidential explanations of which I have had the honour to be the medium.

The seat of the negotiations being at Constantinople, an Ambassador

from the Emperor, furnished with full powers for this purpose, was charged with bringing it to a proper termination. It formed no part of my duty to forestall a negotiation which was not carried on at London between England and Russia, but at Constantinople between Russia and the Porte.

My duty, as prescribed by my functions, was limited to communicating to Her Britannic Majesty's Government, as it came to my knowledge, any intelligence which might appear to them desirable, in order to complete, and in case of need to correct, the information which they might receive through their direct agents.

I found myself called upon to fulfil this duty in the midst of the critical circumstances which presented themselves at the very moment when Prince Menchikoff had just reached his destination.

It is not necessary for me here to dwell upon the alarming intelligence then circulated at Pera, which found credence at Paris and in London, as to the intentions of Russia:—the arrival of the Sebastopol squadron in the Bosphorus; the occupation of the Principalities; the extension of our Asiatic frontier; the pretension to secure to ourselves the nomination of the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople; the premeditated insurrection of the Greek population in the Ottoman Empire; the renewal of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi;—all these assertions, upon which I will not here enlarge, must still be present to the memory of Her Britannic Majesty's Ministers.

They will, I am sure, likewise recollect the calmness with which I met these reports, and the firmness with which I did not hesitate to deny their truth.

For my part, I shall always retain a most grateful recollection of the frankness with which the intimate explanations which I exchanged with Her Majesty's Ministers at this critical moment were characterized.

Lord Clarendon had just then assumed the direction of Foreign Affairs. I appeal to his testimony to bear witness to the language which I held to him in order to place the facts in their true light. At our first interview, I placed in his hands the *lettre de Cabinet* with which the Emperor had furnished Prince Menchikoff, on accrediting him as his Ambassador to the Sultan. It contains this passage: "In the present question I can only recommend to you to maintain the rights which have existed for ages, and which have been recognized by all your illustrious predecessors, and confirmed by yourself, in favour of the orthodox Church, whose doctrines are professed by the Christian populations who are under your rule, as well as by the great majority of my own subjects."

Such was the language, such was the advice of the Emperor to the Sultan; the maintenance of rights long established, recognized and confirmed in favour of the Eastern Church.

I quote these words because they characterise the intentions and mark the policy of the Emperor. He is aware that the tranquillity of Turkey is wholly dependent on the immense majority of the population of the orthodox Greek religion in the Ottoman Empire being protected from any molestation. He is aware also that the permanence of relations of good understanding between Russia and Turkey is wholly dependent on the Porte, faithful to its engagements which date from the Treaty of Kainardji, granting to the orthodox Church that freedom of worship, that tranquillity of conscience, and that peaceable possession of rights, the inviolability of which Russia will never cease to watch over with the whole force of her national and religious convictions.

The history of the two Empires must indeed be little known, and, above all, the great interests involved in the preservation of peace between both must be lost sight of, for it to be forgotten that the Emperor, when counselling and requiring the preservation of the Eastern Church in its rights, speaks and acts as a friend who is desirous of the tranquillity of the Ottoman Empire, and who watches over the existence of Turkey in its independence and its integrity.

If in my confidential communications with Her Britannic Majesty's Ministers I had misunderstood or misinterpreted the intentions of the Emperor in this respect, they would have found them more faithfully set forth in a despatch of the 26th of March, which the Chancellor of the Empire authorized me to place before Her Majesty's Ministers.

I will venture to quote here three passages of this document:—"It has given us much satisfaction, M. le Baron, to perceive, as well by this despatch as

by the summary of your communications with the British Ministers, that all the false reports spread at Constantinople in regard to our intentions had caused no alarm or apprehension to the Cabinet of London, satisfied by the personal assurances which it has received on this matter from the Emperor, that His Majesty's desire and determination are to respect the independence and the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and that, if his views in this respect should undergo any change, our august master would be the first to apprise the English Government of it."

The second passage is couched in these terms:—"You may equally assure the English Ministers that in the arrangement to be negotiated, it is not a question of withdrawing or of taking from the Latins the late concessions which they have obtained by the Ottoman note of the 9th of February of last year, but merely of adapting those concessions to the stipulations of the Hatti Scherif, by removing from them anything they may contain of an exclusive character; of obtaining for the Greeks some recompense for the wrong which has been done them; and above all of securing them from further injury."

The third passage stands thus:—"The simultaneous appearance of the two fleets would have prevented the possibility of the question being solved at Constantinople. It would have placed us in a position in which we could not have acquiesced, and which would no longer have allowed the Emperor, thus exposed to a demonstration of a threatening nature, freely to follow his own pacific and conservative impulses."

On considering this summary of the explanations interchanged between the two Cabinets, it is evident that up to the present time their mutual good faith has served to ward off the evil which a system of reciprocal distrust would inevitably have brought upon their common interest in the maintenance of peace in the Levant.

Thanks to this reciprocal confidence, the Sebastopol fleet, the arrival of which in the Bosphorus had been foretold, has remained at anchor; the Russian troops, whose entrance into the Principalities had been announced, have never passed the frontier; the Christian populations, an insurrection amongst whom was predicted, have remained in obedience; and a pacific negotiation has followed its natural course between the Plenipotentiaries intrusted with the charge of bringing it to a conclusion by a friendly arrangement.

During its progress, I placed successively before Her Majesty's Government the communications which Prince Menchikoff addressed to the Divan, setting forth in the first instance the grievances of which we had to complain; then the propositions made by him in order to obtain redress as regarded the past, as well as the guarantees considered necessary in order to prevent the recurrence of the same wrongs and the same causes of misunderstanding between the two neighbouring States.

If it be borne in mind that this negotiation was, as I have already said, carried on at Constantinople, and if it be taken into consideration that, according to established usage in all diplomatic deliberations, cognizance cannot be had of a proposal before it has been made by the negotiator who is the medium of it, it will not be a matter of surprise that the communications which I was instructed to make at London, instead of anticipating Prince Menchikoff's proceedings, have of necessity followed them at such long intervals in the natural order of their dates.

On this subject I again appeal to the testimony of the Principal Secretary of State. He has had the means of judging, day by day, of the promptitude and of the regularity with which I kept him acquainted with the intelligence which reached me during this long negotiation.

Such information has more than once been anticipated by the confidential communications which Prince Menchikoff has made on the spot to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe personally. It was thus that this Ambassador acquired, before I did, the knowledge of the first Project of Convention, which Prince Menchikoff read to him.

As soon as this document reached me from St. Petersburg, I made it my duty immediately to communicate it, literally, to the Principal Secretary of State.

This Project was subsequently modified by Prince Menchikoff, and replaced by a version in which this Ambassador has sought to meet, as much as possible, the wishes which had been expressed him by the Ottoman nego-

tiators, availing himself for this purpose of the information which he had received from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe himself.

This document is likewise before Her Majesty's Government.

On comparing the text of one with that of the other, the conciliatory disposition will be manifest in which the Russian Ambassador has acted upon the latitude allowed by his instructions, in order to meet the observations which had been made to him, with the view of excluding from the projected Act even the most trivial expressions which might have given rise to a false interpretation of the views of the Imperial Cabinet.

If there could arise a doubt in this respect in any prejudiced mind; if it should be endeavoured to attribute to Russia the intention of extending her intervention to the local interests or to the political condition of the Christian populations in Turkey, it would be sufficient for me here to cite a fact which would serve to disprove that assertion.

Prince Menchikoff, in transmitting to me the Project of Sened (presented the 5th of May), was good enough to accompany it with a despatch, of which I will transcribe the following words:—

“We do not demand the right of protecting Christians of the orthodox rite, subjects of the Porte, but the maintenance of the religious *status quo* of that rite, the existence of which has been seriously threatened by the inclination manifested by the Porte to countenance the encroachments of the Latin rite upon that which is professed by the majority of the Christian subjects of the Sultan.”

In order to prevent all misunderstanding, and to place the facts in their true light, I did not hesitate to deliver to Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State an extract from this despatch, in which Prince Menchikoff so clearly defines the propositions which he had just put forward upon a question of religious interest, without any mental reservation and without aiming at any political interference.

I am not called upon to discuss the merits of the work of reconciliation which has formed the object of the negotiations carried on at Constantinople between the Plenipotentiaries of two friendly and neighbouring Sovereigns.

In the strict fulfilment of my duty I have only one more reflection to add.

Whatever may be the opinion which Her Britannic Majesty's Government may form as to the tenour of the projected Act, the Ministers of Her Majesty, with whom I have for these five months had the honour of constantly exchanging the most intimate communications, will be good enough to keep present to their memory the explanations which it has been my duty to offer them as to the views of my Government in this transaction. I will here sum them up in a few words:

The Sultan began by a breach of faith towards the Emperor.

His Majesty found himself under the necessity of demanding reparation for this offence, committed against his dignity.

In order to obtain this reparation, the Emperor made choice of the means of a pacific negotiation, in preference to the immediate employment of force.

In demanding this satisfaction from the Porte by persuasion, and not by measures of hostility, he kept solely in view the protection of the orthodox Church in Turkey against the encroachments and the wrongs by which it had lately been unjustly and flagrantly assailed.

With this object in view he considered that a simple Firman would be insufficient to atone for the wrong committed as regarded the past, or to prevent the recurrence of similar causes of complaint for the future.

Thereupon he determined on requiring and obtaining from the Porte a formal Act—an explanatory Act—such as I have mentioned.

The sole purpose of this Act, in His Majesty's opinion, should be the confirmation of the orthodox Church in the possession of those rights which it enjoys in the East.

The Emperor requires neither more nor less. He desires that what now exists should remain intact. That the religion professed by Russia should remain unrestricted, respected, and inviolable under the Ottoman rule:

His Majesty requires this guarantee; he has recommended the Porte to

give it, in the twofold interest of rendering the internal tranquillity of the Turkish Empire more secure, and its peace with Russia more lasting.

Could those Powers who desire the preservation of Turkey entertain any jealousy at witnessing the accomplishment of this act of peace through the counsels of Russia? Would they prefer that the Greek orthodox Church, without any security, and engaged in a perpetual struggle with the Latin Church, should become a lasting cause of disorder, of disquietude, and possibly of dissolution in the heart of the Ottoman Empire? This view, I venture to remark, would not be in character with the foresight of the Great Powers, friends of Turkey.

I have often heard quoted in proof of their solicitude, the text of the Treaty concerning the Dardanelles, concluded at London on July 13, 1841. As I had the honour of being a party to the signature of that Act, may I be allowed to conclude the present memorandum by a reflection which is suggested to me by the recollection of that transaction.

The preamble which precedes the stipulations which it contains as to the closing of the two Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus, indicates an intention which should not be overlooked in its application at the present crisis.

The Contracting Powers express in it their willingness to give His Majesty the Sultan a manifest proof of the respect which they entertain for the inviolability of his sovereign rights, as well as of their desire to see the tranquillity of his Empire firmly established.

Now, the greatest proof of respect that can be shown to an independent Sovereign, is to place no impediment in the way of his fulfilling his engagements towards a friendly and neighbouring State. If he is no longer free to keep his word, or to make reparation for the wrongs which he has committed, he ceases to be independent.

The second conclusion to which the perusal of the Treaty of 1841 leads me, is that the Powers who are animated by a sincere desire to witness the consolidation of the tranquillity of the Ottoman Empire, should be the first to counsel the Sultan not to refuse to the Greek Church a pledge of security such as Russia has required, which should tend to keep the immense majority of the Christian population of the Ottoman Empire within the limits of submission, and in tranquillity as to their religious belief.

The Emperor, on his part, has fulfilled a serious duty in giving this advice to the Sultan. If it is not appreciated as it deserves to be, I conceive that the Imperial Cabinet will have the satisfaction of declaring itself to be free from responsibility for the consequences which may result from its rejection.

No. 192.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 30.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, May 14, 1853.*

I PREPARE a few lines on the presumption that M. de Klezl will send off an estafette to Vienna in the course of the day.

A partial and sudden change of Ministry took place yesterday. It remains to be seen in what sense the Sultan has acted. My communications with the old, as well with the new Ministers, lead me to suppose that His Majesty has not changed his mind as to the character of Prince Menchikoff's demands. Some of my colleagues appear to be under an impression somewhat different. The only things certain are the composition of the new Ministry, the principal circumstances which attended the change, and the continuance of the Russian Embassy here at this moment.

The new Grand Vizier is Mustapha Pasha, formerly Governor of Candia, and lately President of the Council. He is succeeded in the latter office by Rifaat Pasha, who is himself succeeded by Reshid, the ex-Grand Vizier. Mehemet Ali, the late Grand Vizier, takes the post of the late Seraskier, who himself is placed at the head of the Sultan's guard. All these Ministers are already pledged, as members of the Council, to opinions adverse to the extreme demands of Russia.

It was agreed that Prince Menchikoff, who had deferred his departure to this day, should have a conference with the Grand Vizier at half-past one P.M. yesterday. At ten his Excellency went unexpectedly, so far, I believe, as the Ministers were concerned, to the Sultan's palace, and had a private audience of His Majesty, who, as I am authentically informed, referred him to the Ministers for an answer. The Grand Vizier was at the same time sent for to the Palace, and on learning the facts of the case, his Highness demanded permission to stay at home, and at the same time gave up his seals of office.

It was in consequence of this resignation that the new Ministers were appointed, and the Sultan showed that he had not taken offence at Mehemet Ali's independent behaviour by including him in their number; though his acceptance of the resignation shows at the same time that he meant at least to convince the Russians that the rejection of their demands did not rest with that Minister.

## No. 193.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 30.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, May 15, 1853.*

THE Austrian estafette having been detained till to-day, I take advantage of the delay to add a few sentences to my despatch of yesterday's date.

Prince Menchikoff began his official communications with Reshid Pasha by insisting on an immediate final reply to his note of the 11th instant. This demand has not been complied with. The Pasha has written to urge the necessity of a further delay in virtue of the recent change of Ministry, and his very imperfect acquaintance with the anterior proceedings and correspondence. He limits his request to a term of five or six days, promising to curtail it if possible.

While the French Ambassador was in conference this morning with Reshid Pasha, Prince Menchikoff waited on the Grand Vizier, in order to learn what kind of answer he was to expect to his last note, accounting for his importunity by a reference to the tenor of his freshest instructions from St. Petersburg.

The Grand Vizier finding that Prince Menchikoff had left his house before he had heard from Reshid Pasha, owing to the necessity of taking the Sultan's sanction before the note was transmitted to its destination, stated to him the substance of its contents, upon which the Ambassador expressed his regret at being obliged to break off his relations with the Porte, and to hasten his departure. The Grand Vizier replied by echoing his expressions of regret, and added that it was not in his power to prevent him from carrying his intention into effect. His Highness remained under an impression that the Prince had made up his mind to leave.

We have still, however, to learn what may have since passed between the Russian Embassy and Reshid Pasha.

I have the honour to inclose a paper which I left yesterday with Reshid Pasha, as exhibiting in substance the extent to which concession might be carried without any serious danger. Your Lordship will perceive that it gives everything required by Russia but a form of guarantee, which in principle, if not in practice, and probably in both, would eventually prove fatal to the Porte's independence.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S.—I inclose duplicates of the note addressed on the 10th instant to Prince Menchikoff by Rifaat Pasha, and of the Russian Ambassador's reply.

S. DE R.

## Inclosure 1 in No. 193.

*Paper presented by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Reshid Pasha.*

LE culte orthodoxe d'Orient et son clergé, de même que ceux des autres dénominations Chrétiennes, continueront, en ce qui regarde le spirituel, à jouir sous la protection souveraine de Sa Majesté le Sultan, des privilèges et immunités qui leur ont été accordés à différentes reprises par la faveur Impériale.

Leurs églises et leurs autres possessions légalement acquises leur seront respectivement conservées.

A Jérusalem les religieux et les pèlerins Russes seront assimilés en fait de protection et de prérogatives à ceux des autres nations étrangères.

Les nouveaux firmans explicatifs concernant les lieux saints de Jérusalem doivent être regardés comme ayant la valeur d'un engagement formel.

On accorderait aux Russes une église et un hôpital à Jérusalem.

Ces divers objets auraient la garantie d'une déclaration Impériale revêtue des formes les plus solennelles, promulguée au public et communiquée à la Cour de Russie et aux autres grandes Puissances de la Chrétienté.

(Translation.)

THE orthodox religion of the East and its clergy, as well as those of the other Christian denominations, shall continue, as regards spiritual matters, to enjoy under the sovereign protection of His Majesty the Sultan, the privileges and immunities which have been granted to them at different times by the Imperial favour.

Their churches and their other possessions legally acquired shall be respectively preserved to them.

At Jerusalem the Russian clergy and pilgrims shall be placed on the same footing in regard to protection and rights as those of other foreign nations.

The new explanatory Firmans respecting the Holy Places at Jerusalem shall be considered to have the force of a formal engagement.

A church and hospital at Jerusalem shall be granted to the Russians.

These different points should be guaranteed by an Imperial declaration, in the most solemn form, publicly promulgated and communicated to the Court of Russia, and to the other Great Powers of Christendom.

## Inclosure 2 in No. 193.

*Rifaat Pasha to Prince Menchikoff.*

(Translation.)

*Shaban 2, 1269. (May 10, 1853.)*

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Excellency's note dated the 5th of May, N. S. The contents of the other papers having reference to it, have been taken into due consideration.

It has been His Imperial Majesty the Sultan's earnest and constant desire to maintain and increase by every means the strong relations of sincere friendship and concord between the Sublime Porte and the illustrious Government of Russia, and more especially to confirm and consolidate those same relations which for a long time have been happily established on a firm basis between His Imperial Majesty the Sultan and His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia. It is therefore the sincere desire of the Porte in pursuance of the relations of good neighbourhood and a sincere and generous friendship, to settle any Russian claims which do not in any way injure or affect the independence, the special interests, or the rights of the Porte. The Sublime Porte in reserving to itself the power of giving a decisive reply, if it should be expedient, to the matters contained in the paper inclosed in your Excellency's note, desires earnestly that your Excellency should take into your friendly consideration the following points.

The Sublime Porte will not decline to negotiate on the demands made by Russia concerning a church and a hospital at Jerusalem, and relative to Russian subjects, monks, and pilgrims, in so far as they do not militate against the rights

of the Porte, and to give a written assurance in harmony with the decision which may be come to.

The Sublime Porte, and more especially His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, in his royal solicitude on behalf of his subjects, has been ever desirous that the religious privileges enjoyed by his Christian and other subjects should be fully preserved, while the Imperial Government of Russia, having conceived certain doubts concerning the religious privileges of the Greek subjects of the Porte, demands assurances in that respect.

Now, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan being extremely desirous that the ancient privileges of his Greek as well as his other subjects should be perpetually preserved, it is not only His Majesty's intention that these religious privileges should be by no means destroyed, but constant care and attention is given for confirming and preserving them in perpetuity. However friendly may be the reciprocal sentiments of the Sublime Porte and the Government of Russia, it is contrary to international rights that one Government should conclude a Treaty with another on a dangerous matter, affecting not only those things on which her independence is grounded, but, as it is well known, her independence itself in its very foundations.

The great and valid objections entertained by the Porte on this subject, will be generally acknowledged, and more especially so by His Majesty the Emperor, whose sense of justice is so widely known.

In like manner as the Porte has hitherto fully preserved the many religious privileges which she has, of her own free will and from a very remote period, conceded and granted to her Christian subjects, and more especially to the Greek subjects and monks, she will likewise henceforward, in harmony again with her own rights, be careful to continue and duly preserve them.

It is the decided intention of the Porte by again specially proclaiming His Imperial Majesty's resolution and unalterable views in this respect to the world at large, to afford a decisive proof of His Royal solicitude on behalf of his people; and there can be no doubt whatever that this measure will serve as a real and full security to all.

In making this communication to your Excellency by order of His Imperial Majesty, I avail myself, &c.

Inclosure 3 in No. 193.

*Prince Menchikoff to Rifaat Pasha.*

*Buyukderé, le <sup>29 Avril</sup><sub>11 Mai</sub>, 1853.*

LE Soussigné, Ambassadeur de Russie, a eu l'honneur de recevoir la note de Son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Sublime Porte en date du <sup>28 Avril</sup><sub>10 Mai</sub>. C'est avec un contentement profond qu'il s'est plu à y trouver l'expression des sentiments d'amitié qui animent Sa Majesté le Sultan pour l'Empereur son Auguste Allié, ainsi que des assurances sur le désir sincère du Cabinet Ottoman de resserrer les anciens liens qui l'unissent au Gouvernement Impérial.

Mais l'étonnement que le Soussigné a ressenti n'en a été que plus pénible, lorsqu'il a dû en même temps relever dans cette communication la méfiance avec laquelle le Gouvernement de la Sublime Porte recueillait des démarches franches et loyales qu'il avait à formuler au nom de l'Empereur. Cette méfiance se fait jour dans l'interprétation que la Sublime Porte veut donner aux intentions de Sa Majesté Impériale en y cherchant la pensée inadmissible et contraire à sa politique généreuse et conservatrice, de vouloir obtenir un droit nouveau au détriment de l'indépendance et de la souveraineté de la Sublime Porte. Le Soussigné se croit en devoir de faire observer à son Excellence que ce doute est émis lorsque, avec un épanchement affectueux, l'Empereur fait un appel à l'amitié de son Auguste Allié, et ne lui demande, sans préjudice aucun au pouvoir sacré et inviolable de Sa Majesté le Sultan, qu'une preuve ostensible de sa sollicitude pour le culte orthodoxe Grec, qui est celui de la Russie, et dont l'Empereur est le défenseur naturel.

Le Soussigné croit inutile de rappeler ici les faits regrettables qui ont éveillé les appréhensions si justes de son Auguste Maître pour l'avenir du culte

Chrétien d'Orient. Ce n'est qu'un Acte émanant de la volonté souveraine du Sultan, un engagement libre mais solennel, qui peut effacer le souvenir pénible des fautes commises par quelque conseiller inhabile et malveillant de Sa Majesté le Sultan. Le Soussigné est chargé de négocier ce témoignage d'égards pour les convictions religieuses de l'Empereur, mais si les principes qui en forment la base sont rejetés ainsi qu'il ressort de la note de son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères du <sup>28 Avril</sup><sub>10 Mai</sub>, si par une opposition systématique la Sublime Porte persiste à lui fermer jusqu'aux voies d'une entente intime et directe, comme elle doit l'être dans un différend à régler entre deux Puissances amies, le Soussigné le déclare avec peine, il devra considérer sa mission comme terminée, interrompre les relations avec le Cabinet de Sa Majesté le Sultan, et rejeter sur la responsabilité de ses Ministres toutes les conséquences qui pourraient en résulter.

Le Soussigné se flatte de l'espoir que ces considérations fixeront l'attention la plus sérieuse de la Sublime Porte, et que son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, pénétré de leur haute importance ainsi que de l'esprit de conciliation que les dicte, voudra bien apprécier en même temps les motifs qui ne permettent point à l'Ambassadeur d'accepter la note du <sup>28 Avril</sup><sub>10 Mai</sub>, comme une réponse conforme à la dignité de son Souverain.

Il ne reste au Soussigné qu'à prier son Excellence de vouloir bien lui répondre à la présente communication jusqu'à <sup>2</sup><sub>14</sub> Mai. Il croit ainsi donner le temps nécessaire à la réflexion que demande la gravité même de la question.

L'Ambassadeur saisit, &c.

(Signé)

MENCHIKOFF.

(Translation.)

*Buyukdéré*, <sup>April 29</sup><sub>May 11</sub>, 1853.

THE Undersigned, Ambassador of Russia, has had the honour to receive the note of his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sublime Porte, dated <sup>April 28</sup><sub>May 10</sub>. It is with the utmost satisfaction that he has found in it the expression of the friendly sentiments by which His Majesty the Sultan is animated towards the Emperor, his august ally, as well as of the assurances of the sincere desire of the Ottoman Cabinet to draw closer the ancient bonds which unite it with the Imperial Government.

But the astonishment of the Undersigned was only the more painful when he observed in this communication the distrust with which the Government of the Sublime Porte received the frank and cordial proposals which he had to put forward in the Emperor's name. That distrust appears in the interpretation which the Sublime Porte attaches to His Imperial Majesty's intentions, by seeking to discover in them the idea, at once inadmissible and opposed to his generous and conservative policy, of being desirous of obtaining a new right, to the prejudice of the independence and sovereignty of the Sublime Porte. The Undersigned deems it his duty to observe to his Excellency that this doubt is put forward at a moment when, with an affectionate cordiality, the Emperor appeals to the friendship of his august ally, and only requires of him, without any prejudice to the sacred and inviolable power of His Majesty the Sultan, a manifest proof of his solicitude for the orthodox Greek religion, which is the religion of Russia, and whereof the Emperor is the natural defender.

The Undersigned considers it useless in this place to recapitulate the lamentable circumstances which have so justly excited the apprehensions of his august master in regard to the future condition of the Eastern Christian religion. An Act emanating from the sovereign will of the Sultan, an engagement free, but solemn, can alone efface the painful recollection of the faults committed by some clumsy and ill-disposed counsellor of His Majesty the Sultan. The Undersigned was commissioned to negotiate for this mark of respect for the religious convictions of the Emperor, but if the principles which form the basis of it are rejected, as appears from the note of his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the <sup>28th April</sup><sub>10th May</sub>,—if, by a systematic opposition, the Sublime Porte persists in closing the very approaches to an intimate and direct understanding, such as should prevail in regard to a difference to be settled between two friendly Powers,—the Undersigned declares with pain that he must consider his mission at an end, must break off relations with the Cabinet

of His Majesty the Sultan, and throw upon the responsibility of his Ministers all the consequences which may ensue.

The Undersigned trusts that these considerations will attract the most serious attention of the Sublime Porte, and that his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, impressed with their vast importance, as well as with the spirit of conciliation which dictates them, will be pleased at the same time to appreciate the motives which do not allow the Ambassador to accept of the note of <sup>April 28</sup><sub>May 10</sub> as a reply consistent with his Sovereign's dignity.

It only remains for the Undersigned to request his Excellency to have the goodness to answer the present communication by the <sup>2</sup>/<sub>4</sub> May. He conceives that he is thus affording the time necessary for the deliberation which the very important nature of the question demands.

The Ambassador takes, &c.

(Signed) MENCHIKOFF.

No. 194.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, May 31, 1853.*

THE latest despatch received at this office from your Excellency is dated the 15th instant, and Her Majesty's Government are therefore uninformed respecting the negotiations which took place between the 15th and the 22nd, on which day Prince Menchikoff quitted Constantinople, nor do they yet know whether the rupture between the Russian Ambassador and the Porte was of a character to preclude all hope that negotiations might be resumed.

Nevertheless the departure of Prince Menchikoff, followed by the entire Russian Mission, is a fact in itself of such grave importance, the military preparations of Russia on the Turkish frontier are upon a scale of such vast magnitude, and the danger which threatens the Porte may be so imminent, that it appears indispensable to take measures for the protection of the Sultan, and to aid his Highness in repelling any attack that may be made upon his territory.

I have accordingly to inform your Excellency that by Her Majesty's commands the fleet now stationed at Malta is placed at the disposal of your Excellency, and that orders will be sent to Admiral Dundas to conform to the requisitions he may receive from you, and to repair to such place as you may direct in the event of your considering the presence of a British force absolutely essential to the safety of the Turkish Empire. Her Majesty's Government, however, are desirous that your Excellency should distinctly understand that in coming to this determination they by no means intend to depart from the moderate and conciliatory course which they have always adopted between the Porte and its allies; but in the use of the power now confided you, involving as it may do the momentous question of peace or war, Her Majesty's Government place the fullest reliance on the discretion of your Excellency.

A declaration of war by Russia against Turkey, the embarkation of troops at Sevastopol, or any other well-established fact denoting intentions of unmistakeable hostility, would in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government entirely justify your Excellency in sending for the fleet, which however would not pass the Dardanelles except on the express demand of the Sultan; but the use of force should only be resorted to as a last and unavoidable resource for the protection of Turkey against an unprovoked attack, and in defence of her independence, which England is bound to maintain.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, May 31, 1853.*

YOU will have learned by my despatch of the 16th instant, that great anxiety prevailed here with respect to the negotiations then pending between the Russian Ambassador and the Porte. Subsequent intelligence tended to increase that anxiety, and a state of painful excitement was created on Saturday last, when the news arrived that diplomatic relations between Russia and the Porte were broken off; that Prince Menchikoff had quitted Constantinople on the 22nd instant, and that the remainder of his Embassy was to follow him in three days.

Her Majesty's Government are at present uninformed of the immediate cause that led to this rupture; but the undoubted fact of Prince Menchikoff's departure is to them a source of deep regret; nor can they view without the utmost alarm, an event that may lead to war between two Powers in close alliance with England, and which must consequently endanger the peace of Europe. But in a state of affairs so critical and so full of peril to the best interests of society, it is indispensable that between England and Russia no misunderstanding should exist, and Her Majesty's Government feel that they should be wanting in that perfect confidence which has hitherto prevailed, and which they trust will always continue to exist between the two Cabinets, if they did not at once seek from the Russian Government the most frank and unreserved explanations.

For this purpose it becomes necessary to revert to your correspondence during the present year, which conveyed the assurances given to you respecting the policy and intentions of Russia towards Turkey, that, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, were received, as they were entitled to be, with unreserved confidence.

It appears then by your despatch of the 8th of January, that on the 8th of January, in a conversation which you held with Count Nesselrode respecting the reported armaments in the South of Russia, the Chancellor assured you that the Emperor deprecated the fall of Turkey, and that as regarded the present crisis, Count Nesselrode hoped it would be brought to a conclusion by negotiation, but that the diplomacy of Russia must be supported by a demonstration of force, and that the Porte would be required strictly to fulfil its engagements towards the Greek Church and the Emperor, and that a corresponding compensation must be made to the Greek, for any new concession to the Latin Church.

By a despatch from Count Nesselrode dated January 14, it clearly appears that the sole object of Russia at that time was "*un arrangement qui puisse rendre au firman la validité qu'on lui a ôtée; rétablir à Jérusalem les deux rits sur un pied d'égalité; et concilier leurs prétentions sans léser les droits de l'un ou de l'autre.*"

On the 5th February you stated that Count Nesselrode told you that Prince Menchikoff was going to Constantinople, where a person of greater weight than a Chargé d'Affaires was required; that his instructions would be of a conciliatory character; and that the Prince was himself animated by the most pacific intentions. Count Nesselrode also added that Prince Menchikoff would be instructed to occupy himself with the affairs of Montenegro, as well as with the question of the Holy Places.

On a subsequent occasion (despatch of 10th February), Count Nesselrode still represented Prince Menchikoff's instructions as moderate, observed there was necessarily some vagueness in his orders, as it was hardly ascertained to what extent the rights secured to the Greeks last year had been infringed; but there would be no question of attempting to regain from the Latins any of the privileges which they might subsequently have acquired at Jerusalem—the object to be sought for was an equivalent for any privileges lost by the Greeks.

Count Nesselrode said (despatch of March 9), there was no such hurry in settling the question of the Holy Places as that of Montenegro; that Prince Menchikoff had been provided with very ample powers; that it was impossible for the Emperor to recede from the position secured to the Greeks by the firman of February 1852, and the Sultan's letter; that Prince Menchikoff's mission had long been determined upon, and only delayed on account of his health.

In reply to your inquiry (despatch of March 24), whether an adjustment of the difficulties respecting the holy places would settle all matters in dispute between Russia and the Porte, or whether Prince Menchikoff had other grievances to bring forward, Count Nesselrode said he was not aware that any such existed ; there might be some outstanding private claims, but he knew of no other demands ; in short, of none except such as might exist between any two friendly Governments, and form part of the current business of every Chancery.

Count Nesselrode remarked (despatch of March 29), that the only moment during the late transactions when he had felt apprehension was that at which the urgency of affairs at Montenegro had called for the mission of Count Leiningen ; that he had never contemplated the chance of the question of the Holy Places leading to war ; and that his anticipation of a speedy conclusion of all matters in dispute, had been confirmed by Prince Menchikoff's despatches of the 17th, which represented affairs as going on satisfactorily.

Count Nesselrode said (despatch of April 5), that there had been no sort of demand for the dismissal of Fuad Effendi ; no ultimatum ; no demand for extension of territory ; no attempt at procuring for Russia the nomination of the Greek Patriarch ; no wish was entertained of calling upon France for the restitution of any rights in regard to the holy places which she had obtained ; and that the Emperor was only waiting for a confirmation of the peaceful intelligence which he had received from the South, when orders would be issued for discontinuing all warlike preparations.

Count Nesselrode's language on a subsequent occasion (despatch of April 7), still alluded to the question of the Holy Places as the only one under discussion, and the speedy arrangement of which he looked forward to with confidence.

In a despatch to Baron Brunnow (April 7), Count Nesselrode repeats that it is the desire and resolution of the Emperor to respect the independence and integrity of Turkey, and if his views in that respect should change, he would be the first to apprise the British Government of the alteration ; that the reports which followed the arrival of Prince Menchikoff at Constantinople—of the occupation of the Principalities ; of the aggrandizement of territory in Asia ; of the demand for the nomination of the Greek Patriarch ; of the hostile and threatening language of Prince Menchikoff—were altogether unfounded ; that in a word Prince Menchikoff's mission never had and has not any other object than that stated by Baron Brunnow to the British Government.

Count Nesselrode denied (despatch of April 20) the truth of the report of a Treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with Turkey, but admitted that the Sultan had been told he might count upon the protection of Russia against an attack of France in consequence of concessions made to the Greek Church in regard to the holy places.

Count Nesselrode, in conversing with you (despatch of April 21) on the note presented to the Porte by Prince Menchikoff on the 16th of March, said with reference to the expression "Acte de confiance," that it was intended that the Porte should redress the grievances set forth in the note, and that it was desired that the recognition of the rights secured to the Greek Church should be sanctioned by such formalities as would give it the character of an international engagement between Russia and Turkey ; that the old Capitulations were represented by France as having the force of Treaties, and that it was desired that an arrangement intended to be permanent should possess an unquestionable character of this description. The Chancellor in the rest of the conversation continued to apply his remarks wholly to the question of the holy places.

With regard to the objects of Prince Menchikoff's mission, Count Nesselrode assured you (despatch of April 30) that they were no others than have been made known to Her Majesty's Government, and that the intention of causing the forthcoming arrangement to be embodied in an Act, was dictated solely by the urgency of making the arrangement final, and placing it on the same footing as the French Capitulations.

Count Nesselrode said (despatch of May 5) his only remaining fear was that of not coming to a good understanding with France in regard to the holy places ; he had no longer any apprehensions as regarded the Porte.

In your despatch of May 14 you say, "When I called upon the Chancellor yesterday, his Excellency acquainted me that the questions which have been agitated at Constantinople might be considered as virtually settled. That as regards the holy places, an arrangement had been made which was

satisfactory both to Prince Menchikoff and to M. de la Cour; and that with respect to the sanction to be given to the arrangement, as the form of a Treaty had been considered objectionable both by the Queen's Ambassador and by the Porte, some other would be devised; what it would be he was unable to say, but full latitude had been given to the Russian negotiator, and the point was one which was sure to be speedily adjusted. The proposed Convention had been, Count Nesselrode observed, sent to London a fortnight ago, for the purpose of being communicated to your Lordship, but since the original sketch had been delivered to [by] Prince Menchikoff, it had been greatly modified. The modification applied particularly to the Article III. It had been found that the Patriarch of Constantinople exercised certain administrative powers (*pouvoirs administratifs*), and permanency of tenure would accordingly be secured by the corrected Article only to the Patriarch of Jerusalem."

Lastly, in your despatch of May 19, you report that having on the day before waited on the Chancellor, you found him "in momentary expectation of a messenger from Constantinople, who will in all probability be the bearer of the Convention which it may be assumed has been concluded between Russia and the Porte for the sanction of the two firmans which have lately been signed by the Sultan for the regulation of the rights of the Greek and Latin Churches at Jerusalem."

These explicit, precise, and satisfactory assurances given to you by Count Nesselrode have been repeated to me by Baron Brunnow in the strongest terms at the numerous interviews which I have had with him, and by written or verbal communications that he was instructed to make to Her Majesty's Government; and on the 21st instant he informed me that he had received a letter from Count Nesselrode, stating that if it became necessary to resort to other measures with respect to Turkey, none should be undertaken without previous communication to Her Majesty's Government.

It now becomes necessary to advert to the proceedings of Prince Menchikoff so far as they are within the official cognizance of Her Majesty's Government, and in so doing I shall confine myself to the period subsequent to the arrival of Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe at Constantinople.

Prince Menchikoff, in his note of the 5th of May, recapitulated the proposals he had previously made to the Porte on the 22nd March and 19th April; but in addition to those of the 22nd March relating to the holy places, Prince Menchikoff simultaneously made other proposals far more important and comprehensive in their character, accompanied with warnings of the danger which Rifaat Pasha would incur if any of those proposals were permitted to transpire.

These last proposals amounted in substance to the conclusion of a Treaty stipulating that Russia should enjoy the exclusive right of intervening for the effectual protection of all the members of the Greek Church, and of the interests of the churches themselves; that the privileges of the Patriarchs should be effectually confirmed, and that the Patriarchs should hold their preferment for life independently of the Porte's approval; the protection of Greek pilgrims in Palestine; the construction of a Russian church at Jerusalem; and the confirmation and enforcement of all Imperial rescripts granted from time to time to Russia. These demands were put forward as an explanation of the Treaty of Kainardji, and necessary for its complete execution.

On the 19th of April, soon after the arrival of fresh and pressing instructions from St. Petersburg, Prince Menchikoff sent to the Porte a *note verbale*, in which, after specifying the demands of Russia in regard to the holy places, he says that he demands "*un Séned ou Convention pour la garantie du *status quo* strict des privilèges du culte Catholique Greco-Russe de l'Eglise de l'Orient, et des sanctuaires qui se trouvent en possession de ce culte exclusivement, ou en participation avec d'autres, à Jérusalem. La Russie ne demande pas à la Porte des concessions politiques; son désir est de calmer les consciences religieuses par la certitude du maintien de ce qui a toujours été pratiqué jusqu'à nos temps. Elle requiert dans l'intérêt des immunités religieuses du culte orthodoxe un Acte explicatif et positif de garanties—Acte qui n'affecterait en rien ni les autres cultes ni les relations de la Porte avec d'autres Puissances.*"

Finally, on the 5th of May, shortly after the arrival of fresh instructions from St. Petersburg, and the day after the delivery of the firmans respecting the holy places, Prince Menchikoff addressed a further note to the Porte, in which, while he acknowledges the firmans as a compliance with his demands in

regard to the holy places, he says that "n'ayant obtenu jusqu'ici aucune réponse au troisième et plus important point qui réclame des garanties pour l'avenir, et ayant tout récemment reçu l'ordre de redoubler d'insistance pour arriver à la solution immédiate de la question qui forme le principal objet de la sollicitude de Sa Majesté l'Empereur, l'Ambassadeur se voit dans l'obligation de s'adresser aujourd'hui à son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères en renfermant cette fois ses réclamations dans les dernières limites des directions supérieures."

Prince Menchikoff then goes on to say that his demands are substantially the same as they were at the outset, viz., that "le culte orthodoxe d'Orient, son clergé, et ses possessions, jouiront dans l'avenir sans aucune atteinte, sous l'égide de Sa Majesté le Sultan, des privilèges et immunités qui leur sont assurés *ab antiquo*, et dans un principe de haute équité participeront aux avantages accordés aux autres rits Chrétiens.

"Le nouveau firman explicatif sur les lieux saints de Jérusalem aura la valeur d'un engagement formel envers le Gouvernement Impérial.

"A Jérusalem les religieux et les pèlerins Russes seront assimilés aux prérogatives des autres nations Etrangères."

Prince Menchikoff incloses the project of a *Sened* "qui attestera la confiance réciproque des deux Gouvernements," couched in more moderate terms than the first draft, and differing from it by the omission of specific reference to any other patriarch than that of Jerusalem; but it contains a further stipulation for the future arrangement of certain details respecting the holy places not specified in the firmans; and Prince Menchikoff ends by requiring an answer by the 10th of May, any delay beyond which he could only consider as "un manque de procédés envers son Gouvernement, ce qui lui imposerait les plus pénibles obligations."

To comment upon the discrepancy that exists between the assurances given to Her Majesty's Government by the Government of the Emperor, and the language and acts of the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, would be superfluous. But in my despatch of the 16th instant, I expressed to you the conviction of Her Majesty's Government that Prince Menchikoff must have been acting on his own responsibility; because the Emperor has declared his resolution to maintain the independence of the Porte; and no Sovereign having a proper regard for his own dignity and independence, could admit proposals so undefined as those of Prince Menchikoff, and by Treaty confer upon another and a more powerful Sovereign a right of protection over a large portion of his own subjects. However well disguised it may be, yet the fact is, that under the vague language of the proposed *Sened*, a perpetual right to interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey would be conferred upon Russia; for governed as the Greek subjects of the Porte are by their ecclesiastical authorities, and looking as these latter would in all things do for protection to Russia, it follows that 14,000,000 of Greeks would henceforward regard the Emperor as their supreme protector, and their allegiance to the Sultan would be little more than nominal, while his own independence would dwindle into vassalage.

Nor can it be said that the proposed *Sened* in any respects resembles the Capitulations of 1740, to which it is compared. For by that engagement the French only acquired a right to protect a few religious establishments served by foreigners, whereas Prince Menchikoff proposes to extend the protection of Russia to millions of subjects of the Porte who are under their own ecclesiastical Government, with respect to whom no engagement has been violated, nor on whose behalf has any complaint been made save that respecting the holy places, which, according to the admission of Prince Menchikoff, has been satisfactorily arranged.

But the most striking as well as the most serious part of these proceedings remains still to be noticed. The negotiations at Constantinople have been supported by great demonstrations of force, and every preparation for war has been made in the southern provinces of Russia. Great Britain has long been a quiet spectator of those armaments; but now that the relations between Russia and Turkey are broken off, it becomes our duty to ascertain what is the object in view, and in what manner and to what extent the dominions of the Sultan and the tranquillity of Europe are now threatened.

It is upon all these points that you are instructed earnestly but in the most friendly spirit to seek for explanations from the Russian Government, and at the same time to express the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that the Turkish

Ministers, however well disposed they appear to have been to meet every just demand of Russia, could not and ought not, with any regard for the dignity of their Sovereign or the future security of his dominions, to have advised the Sultan to accept the proposals of Prince Menchikoff.

Count Nesselrode will, I am sure, readily admit that the confidence exhibited by Her Majesty's Government in the policy and intentions of Russia towards Turkey has been unlimited, and his Excellency has been made aware, by more than one recent communication, of the grounds upon which we consider that the maintenance of the Turkish Empire is an European necessity, and that its dismemberment, whether arising from foreign aggression or internal convulsion, would be an European catastrophe entailing disasters of incalculable magnitude and extent; and Count Nesselrode therefore cannot doubt that these views, which Her Majesty's Government have had every reason to believe are shared in by the Russian Government, remain in full force.

The same spirit now animates Her Majesty's Government which in 1840 impelled them to sign a Treaty, in conjunction with Russia, Austria, and Prussia, to aid the Porte under difficulties "qui menacent de porter atteinte à l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, et à l'indépendance du trône du Sultan. Leurs dites Majestés, mues par le sentiment d'amitié sincère qui subsiste entr'elles et le Sultan; animées du désir de veiller au maintien de l'intégrité et de l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman, dans l'intérêt de l'affermissement de la paix de l'Europe; fidèles à l'engagement qu'elles ont contracté par la note collective remise à la Porte le 27 Juillet, 1839, &c."

And again, when in July 1841 the five Powers signed a Treaty, "persuadées que leur union et leur accord offrent à l'Europe le gage le plus certain de la conservation de la paix générale—objet constant de leur sollicitude; et leurs dites Majestés voulant attester cet accord en donnant à Sa Hautesse le Sultan une preuve manifeste du respect qu'elles portent à l'inviolabilité de ses droits souverains, ainsi que de leur désir sincère de voir se consolider le repos de son Empire, &c."

To the solemn engagements thus entered into by the preambles of these Treaties, to the sound principles they lay down, and the great objects they seek to secure, Her Majesty's Government will faithfully adhere, and they rely with confidence that recent events at Constantinople will be powerless to induce the Emperor to depart even for a moment from that wise and generous policy towards Turkey, in which Her Majesty's Government have hitherto had the happiness of being united with that of His Imperial Majesty.

You will read this despatch to the Chancellor, and furnish him with a copy should he desire it.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 196.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 1.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, May 19, 1853.*

PRINCE MENCHIKOFF and the Russian Legation are still here; and it is not easy to divine why they are so, after what has occurred. The fact, however, still affords a chance of their being induced to postpone their departure indefinitely without any improper sacrifice on the part of the Turkish Government. With the view of improving that chance, if possible, I proposed a meeting of the four Representatives, which accordingly took place this morning at the French Ambassadors.

Before I mention the substance of what passed at this meeting, I must apprise your Lordship of the state of things as now existing between the Porte and Prince Menchikoff. It may be described in a single sentence. The Russian Ambassador has declared his mission to be terminated, the whole of his Legation to be on the point of leaving Constantinople, and the interests of Russian trade and shipping to be consigned to the Director of the Chancery, who is to remain here with the persons employed in his department.

A copy of the note by which his Excellency has made this declaration to

the Porte, is inclosed herewith. I received it last night from Reshid Pasha, and at his request communicated it to the French Ambassador, the Prussian Envoy, and the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires.

Prince Menchikoff sent in this decisive note after he had received a visit the same day from Reshid Pasha, who, passing over considerations of etiquette suggested by the previous interruption of the Ambassador's personal relations with the Porte, as signified officially by himself, called upon his Excellency in the hope of disposing him favourably to the reception of the Porte's definitive communication, prepared, but not yet delivered.

The Porte was thus prevented from making any official communication of its last intentions, and the Russian Ambassador's all but hostile declaration arrived when the Ottoman Council, composed of unusual numbers, had decided on maintaining its previous resolution by a majority of forty-two members out of forty-five.

To make the course of this unhappy business still more clear to your Lordship and Her Majesty's Government, I have the honour to inclose herewith in copy a short correspondence which had taken place between Reshid Pasha and Prince Menchikoff two or three days before.

Of the Porte's intended note, it is but justice to say, that it declared a readiness to concede every point demanded by Russia with the single exception of that form of guarantee, I mean an engagement with the force of Treaty, which the Porte conceives to be inconsistent with its independence and sovereign dignity, and which opinion is more or less entertained by every one who may be supposed to have acquired a competent knowledge of the subject.

I now return to the meeting which I held this morning with my colleagues of Austria, France, and Prussia. It afforded me sincere satisfaction to find that there was no essential difference of opinion in our judgment of the emergency and of its bearings. We could not question the soundness of the Porte's views in resisting the extreme demands of Russia; we could not but acknowledge the spirit of conciliation displayed by the Sultan's Ministers; we agreed in our anxiety to find some means of averting the rupture which was all but carried into effect; and unfortunately we could not but agree in the difficulty, not to say impossibility of reconciling, after all that had passed, the requirements of the adverse parties. We finally determined on making an overture to Prince Menchikoff in the form least calculated to give umbrage. On the one hand we had some cause to hope that his Excellency would not be sorry to find a reasonable excuse for improving his position towards the Porte. On the other, we saw no reason to doubt that he would hesitate to avail himself of any proposal coming in an ostensible shape from an union of four Representatives. We thought to secure the advantage, and to avoid the danger, by requesting M. de Klezl, who had thoughts of paying a farewell visit to Prince Menchikoff the following day, to apprise him of the sorrow with which, individually, we all contemplated the rupture of his relations with the Porte, to express the lively gratification which a friendly solution of the present difference, if that were still possible, would afford us, and to ascertain whether he was disposed to receive through a private channel the Porte's intended note, and to give it a calm consideration, notwithstanding the measures which he had officially declared.

The prospect of success to be expected from this step is far from encouraging; but your Lordship will probably agree with me that the motives for making so doubtful an experiment overbalance the objections to incurring the risk of failure.

M. de Klezl is not at liberty to make this communication to Prince Menchikoff without having previously obtained the assent of Reshid Pasha. Whatever may be its result, there is room for consolation in the limited extent of Prince Menchikoff's admonitions.

Their tone is harsh, and their aspect is threatening; but there is at least no threat of immediate war, no hint of an approaching occupation of the Principalities. Whatever perils may be involved in the rupture of diplomatic relations between Russia and Turkey, they do not appear to be immediate; and I cherish a sanguine hope that the exertions of European influence will check the ebullitions of resentment, and ultimately ward off those contingent evils which it is now the business of Prince Menchikoff to paint in imposing colours.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 196.

*Prince Menchikoff to Reshid Pasha.*

*Buyukderé, le  $\frac{6}{18}$  Mai, 1853.*

LE Soussigné, Ambassadeur Extraordinaire de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, a eu l'honneur de recevoir la notification de la Sublime Porte en date du  $\frac{3}{15}$  Mai. Elle est loin de répondre aux espérances que lui avait fait concevoir l'accueil bienveillant et les gracieuses paroles de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

En réponse à trois notes consécutives que le Soussigné a eu l'honneur de remettre au Cabinet Ottoman, et qui, appuyées de ses explications verbales avec les Ministres de la Sublime Porte, n'ont pu laisser aucun doute sur les intentions désintéressées de son Auguste Maître, il n'a reçu que des assurances évasives et illusoires.

Les deux firmans destinés à clore le débat sur les saints lieux de Jérusalem ne sauraient, vu les précédents, offrir la garantie que désire l'Empereur. La promesse isolée d'étendre à nos sujets les privilèges dont jouissent à Jérusalem les pèlerins et les établissements des autres nations, ne confirment qu'un droit incontestable dont l'exercice seul réclamait la sanction souveraine.

La Sublime Porte en repoussant avec méfiance les vœux de l'Empereur en faveur du culte orthodoxe Greco-Russe, a manqué aux égards dûs à un auguste et ancien allié. Elle n'a fait qu'ajouter ainsi un nouveau grief à ceux dont le Soussigné avait l'ordre de réclamer le redressement, et justifier les sérieuses appréhensions du Gouvernement Impérial pour la sécurité et le maintien des droits antiques de l'Eglise d'Orient. L'identité du culte, ce lien séculaire cimenté par les besoins et les intérêts réciproques des deux pays autant que par leur position géographique, au lieu d'être le gage d'une amitié solide, devient de la sorte, par une erreur déplorable dans la pensée du Gouvernement Ottoman, la cause permanente d'une attitude blessante pour la Russie.

Son Altesse le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères vient encore de se rendre auprès du Soussigné l'organe de propositions qu'il est d'autant moins à son pouvoir d'accepter avec les réserves qui s'y attachent, qu'elles ne font que reproduire celles qu'il a dû rejeter antérieurement, et que le projet de séparer et de graduer dans leur forme les Actes qui les contiendront, impliquerait évidemment l'idée de ne rendre strictement obligatoire que celui qui concerne l'établissement d'un hospice Russe à Jérusalem. Son Altesse Reshid Pasha en faisant pressentir qu'une note responsive devait encore être discutée au conseil sur la bases de ces mêmes propositions, et n'ayant pas en outre voulu en préciser les termes, le Soussigné n'y voit qu'un nouveau moyen dilatoire qui ne peut changer en rien ces déterminations.

L'ensemble de communications de la Sublime Porte ayant ainsi convaincu le Soussigné de l'inutilité de ses efforts pour amener sur l'objet de ses réclamations une entente satisfaisante et conforme à la dignité de son Auguste Maître, il se voit dans l'obligation de déclarer—

Qu'il considère sa mission comme terminée ;

Que la Cour Impériale ne saurait, sans déroger à sa dignité et sans s'exposer à de nouvelles offenses, continuer d'avoir une Légation à Constantinople et entretenir sur l'ancien pied ses relations politiques avec le Gouvernement Ottoman ; qu'en conséquence et en vertu des pleins pouvoirs dont le Soussigné est muni, il quittera Constantinople en emmenant avec lui tout le personnel de la Légation Impériale à l'exception du Directeur de la Chancellerie commerciale, qui, avec les employés qui lui sont adjoints, continuera à gérer des affaires de navigation et de commerce, et à protéger les intérêts des sujets Russes et l'expédition de leur batiments ;

Qu'il regrette profondément de devoir prendre cette détermination, mais qu'après avoir rempli fidèlement les ordres de l'Empereur en soumettant à la délibération de la Sublime Porte les propositions les plus conciliantes, les plus équitables, et les plus conformes aux véritables intérêts de l'Empire Ottoman, et avoir acquis la pénible certitude que le Cabinet de Sa Majesté le Sultan n'était point disposé à les accueillir et à y faire droit, il s'acquitte d'un dernier devoir en rejetant toute la responsabilité des conséquences qui pourraient surgir sur le

Cabinet Ottoman, qui semble avoir pris à tâche de faire naître une grave mésintelligence entre les deux Empires ;

Que le refus d'une garantie pour le culte orthodoxe Greco-Russe devra désormais imposer au Gouvernement Impérial la nécessité de la chercher dans sa propre puissance ;

Qu'ainsi toute atteinte portée au *status quo* de l'Eglise Orient et à son intégrité, sera considérée par l'Empereur comme l'équivalent d'une infraction à l'esprit et à la lettre des stipulations existantes, et comme une acte hostile à la Russie qui imposerait à Sa Majesté l'obligation de recourir à des moyens que dans sa constante sollicitude pour la stabilité de l'Empire Ottoman et par son amitié sincère pour Sa Majesté le Sultan, et celle qu'il a professé pour son auguste père, l'Empereur a toujours eu à cœur d'écarter.

Le Soussigné, &c.

(Signé)

MENCHIKOFF.

(Translation.)

*Buyukdéré, May 18, 1853.*

THE Undersigned has had the honour to receive the communication of the Sublime Porte, dated  $\frac{3}{15}$  May. It is far from answering the expectations which the kind reception and gracious language of His Majesty the Sultan had caused him to entertain.

In reply to three successive notes which the Undersigned has had the honour of delivering to the Ottoman Cabinet, and which, supported by the verbal explanations which he has had with the Ministers of the Sublime Porte, could not leave any doubt as to the disinterested intentions of his august master, he has received only evasive and illusory assurances.

The two Firmans designed to close the discussion in regard to the Holy Places at Jerusalem, cannot, considering what has occurred, offer the guarantee desired by the Emperor. The isolated promise to extend to our subjects the privileges enjoyed at Jerusalem by the pilgrims and establishments of other nations, merely confirms an indisputable right, for the exercise of which the Sovereign sanction was alone required.

The Sublime Porte, by rejecting with distrust the wishes of the Emperor in favour of the orthodox Greco-Russian religion, has failed in what was due to an august and ancient ally. It has thus only added a fresh injury to those for which the Undersigned was ordered to demand redress, and has justified the serious apprehensions of the Imperial Government for the security and maintenance of the ancient rights of the Eastern Church. The identity of religion, that secular bond cemented by the reciprocal wants and interests of the two countries as much as by their geographical position, instead of being a pledge of solid friendship, thus becomes, from a lamentable misapprehension in the minds of the Ottoman Government, the permanent cause of an attitude injurious to Russia.

His Highness the Minister for Foreign Affairs has again made himself the organ of proposals to the Undersigned, which it is the less in his power to accept, that they are merely a reproduction of those which it has before been his duty to reject, and that the plan of separating and distinguishing in their form the Acts in which they are to be contained, would evidently imply the notion of rendering strictly obligatory that only which relates to the establishment of a Russian hospital at Jerusalem. His Highness Reshid Pasha in intimating that a reply had still to be discussed in Council on the basis of these same proposals, and having been moreover unwilling accurately to state its terms, the Undersigned perceives in this only a fresh means of delay which can in no way alter his determination.

The communications of the Sublime Porte, taken altogether, having therefore convinced the Undersigned of the inutility of his efforts to effect in regard to his demands a satisfactory arrangement in conformity with the dignity of his august master, he finds himself compelled to declare—

That he considers his mission at an end :

That the Imperial Court cannot without prejudice to its dignity, and exposing itself to fresh insults, continue to maintain a mission at Constantinople, and to keep up on their ancient footing its political relations with the Ottoman Government ; that in consequence and in virtue of the full powers with

which the Undersigned is provided, he will quit Constantinople, taking with him the whole staff of the Imperial Legation, with the exception of the Director of the Commercial Chancery, who, with the officers attached to him, will continue to carry on the affairs of navigation and commerce, and to protect the interests of Russian subjects, and the despatch of their vessels:

That he deeply regrets that he must take this determination, but that, after having faithfully executed the Emperor's orders in submitting to the deliberation of the Sublime Porte proposals most conciliatory, most equitable, and most compatible with the true interests of the Ottoman Empire, and having acquired the painful conviction that the Cabinet of His Majesty the Sultan was not disposed to receive and to attend to them, he discharges a last duty by throwing all responsibility for the consequences which may ensue upon the Ottoman Cabinet, which appears to have striven to produce a serious misunderstanding between the two Empires:

That the refusal of a guarantee for the orthodox Greco-Russian religion will henceforth impose upon the Imperial Government the necessity of seeking one in its own power:

That, accordingly, any infringement of the *status quo* of the Eastern Church, and of its integrity, will be looked upon by the Emperor as tantamount to an infringement of the spirit and letter of existing stipulations, and as an act of hostility to Russia, which would impose upon His Imperial Majesty the necessity of having recourse to means which, in his constant anxiety for the stability of the Ottoman Empire, and his sincere friendship for His Majesty the Sultan, and that which he has professed for his august father, the Emperor has always had at heart to avoid.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed) MENCHIKOFF.

Inclosure 2 in No. 196.

*Reshid Pasha to Prince Menchikoff.*

(Translation.)

Shaban 7, 1269. (May 15, 1853.)

PRINCE MENCHIKOFF'S last note has been laid before the Sultan.

His Excellency the Prince has already been informed, both directly and indirectly, that owing to the change in the Department, it is impossible to give a precise answer on a matter of such delicacy as this of the religious privileges, without acquiring sufficient information thereon; but as His Imperial Majesty is most desirous that all manner of friendly relations should be maintained with the illustrious Government of Russia, the Prince is informed that the Sublime Porte is sincerely desirous that an arrangement, conveying assurances satisfactory to both parties, should be come to; that a delay of five or six days will be sufficient for this purpose, and that it will be endeavoured to settle the matter earlier if possible.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RESHID PASHA.

Inclosure 3 in No. 196.

*Prince Menchikoff to Reshid Pasha.*

M. le Ministre,

Buyukdéré, le  $\frac{3}{15}$  Mai, 1853, 11 heures du soir.

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la note de la Sublime Porte datée de ce matin.

Les paroles gracieuses et l'accueil bienveillant dont a daigné m'honorer Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan dans l'audience intime qu'elle a bien voulu m'accorder, m'avaient donné l'espoir de recevoir une réponse explicite à ma dernière note. Je ne puis considérer la communication préalable qui m'est faite ni comme satisfaisante ni comme conforme à la dignité de mon Auguste Maître.

Il m'impose la pénible obligation d'interrompre dès aujourd'hui mes relations officielles avec la Sublime Porte. Mais prenant en considération

l'entrée récente de votre Altesse aux affaires, et dans l'espérance que les lumières que vous y apportez contribueront à représenter sous leur véritable jour les intentions amicales et désintéressées du Gouvernement Impérial, je suis prêt à surseoir à la dernière demande qui décidera de l'attitude que la Russie devra prendre désormais vis-à-vis de la Turquie. J'exhorte votre Altesse à employer tous vos efforts afin que la décision de la Sublime Porte me parvienne dans le plus brief délai. Je me flatte de l'espoir, M. le Ministre, que vous voudrez bien en apprécier les motifs sérieux. Si l'hésitation du Gouvernement Ottoman devait continuer malgré les explications franches et cordiales que j'ai été à même d'offrir, elle ne pourrait être envisagée que comme un indice d'une méfiance et d'un éloignement blessants pour le Gouvernement que je représente. Mon départ, ainsi que celui de la Légation Impériale, en serait la conséquence inévitable et immédiate.

Il appartient à la sagacité de votre Altesse de peser les suites incalculables et les grandes calamités qui pourraient en résulter, et qui retomberaient de tout leur poids sur la responsabilité des Ministres de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

Veillez, &c.

(Signé) MENCHIKOFF.

(Translation.)

M. le Ministre,

*Buyukdéré, May 13, 1853, 11 P.M.*

I HAVE had the honour to receive the note from the Sublime Porte, dated this morning.

The gracious language and kind reception with which His Imperial Majesty the Sultan was pleased to honour me in the private audience which he had the goodness to grant me, had given me hopes of receiving an explicit answer to my last note. I cannot consider the previous communication which has been made to me as either satisfactory or consistent with the dignity of my august master.

It imposes upon me the painful obligation of breaking off, from the present time, my official relations with the Sublime Porte. But, taking into consideration your Highness' recent entrance into office, and in the expectation that the ability with which you will enter upon its duties, will contribute to placing in their real light the friendly and disinterested intentions of the Imperial Government, I am prepared to suspend the last demand which will determine the attitude that Russia will henceforth assume towards Turkey. I exhort your Highness to employ all your efforts in order that the decision of the Sublime Porte may reach me with the shortest delay. I flatter myself, M. le Ministre, with the hope that you will be pleased to appreciate the importance of it. If the hesitation of the Ottoman Government should continue, notwithstanding the frank and cordial explanations which it has been in my power to offer, it can only be looked upon as an indication of distrust and reserve offensive to the Government which I represent. My departure, as well as that of the Imperial Legation, would be the inevitable and immediate consequence.

It belongs to your Excellency's sagacity to weigh the incalculable consequences and the vast calamities which might result therefrom, and which would rest with their full weight on the responsibility of the Ministers of His Majesty the Sultan.

Be pleased, &c.

(Signed) MENCHIKOFF.

No. 197.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 2.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, May 31, 1853.*

IT may not be perhaps irrelevant to notice the very strong disclaimer on the part of the French Government which the late discussions at Constantinople have produced, of all right to protect any other Roman Catholics in Turkey than the Latins of the Holy Land. It was until lately supposed that the French claimed under their Capitulations with the Porte the title to protect every Roman

Catholic stranger within the Sultan's dominions. I must do them the justice to say, that I never heard the claim urged, as is now insinuated by Russia, over the few Roman Catholic subjects of the Porte, but over Roman Catholic strangers in general it was certainly put forward. This latter claim, however, is at present modified to the exercise of protection over the Latins of the Holy Land, and over the members of such religious establishments as are admitted to belong to France.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys tells me that he has had all the despatches of the time when the Capitulations were made looked into, and that he has examined several memoirs bearing upon the subject, and that nothing can be clearer than that the Ambassadors of France have always repudiated the religious protection of Turkish Roman Catholic subjects, as derogatory of the sovereign rights of the Sultan and of the independence of the Porte.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

## No. 198.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.*

My Lords,

*Foreign Office, June 2, 1853.*

I HAVE received the Queen's commands to acquaint your Lordships that, in the present critical state of Turkish affairs, it is Her Majesty's pleasure that Her Majesty's fleet, now stationed at Malta, should proceed forthwith to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, and that Vice-Admiral Dundas should be instructed to send a fast steamer to Constantinople to enable Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe to communicate with him without loss of time, and should further be instructed to comply with any requisition in regard to the movements and operations of the fleet under his orders which he may receive from Her Majesty's Ambassador.

I have at the same time the honour to transmit to your Lordships, for your information, a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe placing the fleet at his disposal.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

## No. 199.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, June 2, 1853.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith a copy of a letter\* which, by the Queen's commands, I have addressed to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, by which you will perceive that Vice-Admiral Dundas is instructed to proceed forthwith to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles with the fleet under his orders, and to comply with any requisition in regard to the movements and operations of the fleet which he may receive from your Excellency.

I need scarcely remind your Excellency of the necessity of taking care that proper firmans for the unmolested passage of the fleet through the Dardanelles are sent to the Pasha, in the event of your being requested by the Sultan to call up the fleet to Constantinople.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 200.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 3.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, June 2, 1853.*

I HAVE read to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the greater part of your Lordship's despatch of the 31st ultimo to Sir Hamilton Seymour, and I have moved the French Minister for Foreign Affairs to send a similar despatch to General Casteljajac. M. Drouyn de Lhuys agreed without hesitation to do so, observing that his catalogue of Russian promises and assurances would be quite as long as that of Her Majesty's Government. He expressed himself much pleased with your Lordship's despatch.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 201.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 3.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, June 2, 1853*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS informs me that he forwarded to Count Walewski, for communication to your Lordship, two important telegraphic despatches received yesterday by the French Government from Berlin, the one stating that Count Nesselrode had declared to the English and French Ministers at St. Petersburg that he had never given any assurances that the question of the holy places was the only one which Prince Menchikoff had to settle with the Porte, and that Russia intended to have the protectorate of the Greek religion in Turkey—and, moreover, would have it; the other giving intelligence that orders had been received at Warsaw to put the 4th Corps d'Armée in movement towards the Moldavian frontier, where it was to be assembled on the 10th of June.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 202.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 3.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, May 27, 1853.*

I HAVE held to-day a very long and by no means satisfactory conversation with Count Nesselrode upon the subject of your Lordship's despatch of the 16th instant, which paper, however, I refrained from communicating to his Excellency.

It is perhaps not necessary that I should detail to your Lordship all that passed upon this occasion, the object which I had in view having been to show that the Treaty, or rather Sened, which has been presented to the Turkish Government for their acceptance, is contrary to the declarations made over and over again both to your Lordship and to myself; and Count Nesselrode endeavoured to show that the utmost frankness had characterized the Russian negotiation; that I had been always informed by him that two points were sought by Russia—satisfaction for the past, and security for the future; that I had been acquainted that the Imperial Government would insist upon the firmans settling the state of Church-possession at Jerusalem and the disputes between the Greeks and Latins, being placed under the sanction of a Convention answering to the French Capitulations; and that this demand pointed clearly to an agreement of the nature contained in the Sened, against which such "unaccountable" objections had been raised by the late Turkish Ministry and the English Embassy.

I had taken with me four of my despatches, from all of which I had been desirous of reading extracts in proof of the English view of the question under discussion, but the length of the conversation prevented me from reading more

than that portion of my despatch of March 24, which begins with the words "I told Count Nesselrode," and ends with these,—“the current business of every Chancellerie.”

The Chancellor threw no doubts upon the correctness of my report, but maintained that an adjustment of Church difficulties was precisely the object all along given out, and the attainment of which was now sought by the Sened.

I admitted having, some considerable time since, learned from his Excellency that it was considered essential that the two firmans should be reinforced by, or, if he pleased, embodied in a Convention, but that there was entirely new matter in the “*Projet de Traité*” brought forward by Prince Menchikoff; that there was now question of granting to the Emperor a right of protection over 10,000,000 of Greeks, which would render him more powerful in Turkey than the Sultan himself, which would make them all look up to a foreign Sovereign, and not to their own master.

Have they looked, Count Nesselrode replied, for the last hundred years in any other direction? No: believe me, this Convention upon which we so strongly insist is perfectly inoffensive and anodyne (*sic*); it changes nothing in the state of affairs; it does not tend to weaken the Sultan’s authority; and it is in some measure calculated to strengthen it since it removes the possibility of such contestations as those which we have lately witnessed.

I rejoined that I could not admit that the proposed Act contained no innovation; that, beyond being a confirmation, it was a very great extension of the rights secured to the Russian Crown by the Treaty of Kainardji; that the old rights applied to the Danubian provinces, whilst those proposed were to range over the whole of Turkey.

The Chancellor could not give up his position, and testified his great regret at the view of the subject which has been taken by Her Majesty’s Ambassador at Constantinople, an expression which I met by assuring his Excellency that no difference upon the point existed between Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and Her Majesty’s Government.

Count Nesselrode hoped that this would yet prove not to be the case; the opinion of Her Majesty’s Government had been formed upon the original “*Projet de Traité*” presented by Prince Menchikoff, and would by this time be considerably modified by the amended draft which Baron Brunnow had been directed to communicate to your Lordship.

The last expressions employed by Count Nesselrode appeared to me to sound ominously.

The Emperor had, he said, shown the greatest consideration for Turkey in the demands which he had made upon her; great latitude had been left in Prince Menchikoff’s hands, of which a full use had been made by the Prince in attempting to meet the objections of the Turkish Government and of Her Majesty’s Embassy; and further alterations of form might be possibly admitted; but from the substance (*le fond*) of his demands, His Imperial Majesty could not recede, and “a dreadful responsibility would be assumed by any Government which by counselling the rejection of these demands might bring about the downfall of the Ottoman Empire.”

I have omitted to state that when the Chancellor remarked, as he did in the course of the conversation, that it was only asked that the Emperor of Russia should be put in possession of a right similar to that enjoyed by the Emperor of Austria, I replied that besides that the demand now made was a new feature in the transaction, there was this difference between the two Sovereigns, that one possessed a hold over some thousands of Catholics, and that the other would obtain the same influence over some millions of Greeks.

It may indeed be argued that this influence is already possessed by Russia, and that although the right to interfere generally on behalf of the Greek subjects of the Porte is not yet secured to her, the practice of so interfering has long prevailed; all this may be true, but it is not less certain that a long-cherished object is seen to have been sought by a tortuous path, and that if words be not intended to disguise rather than to manifest intentions, Her Majesty’s Government have good right to look with surprise upon the demands made upon the Sultan, in the name of his master, by Prince Menchikoff.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 3.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, May 10, 1853.*

IN one of my preceding numbers I mentioned that I had seen the Sultan in private. The interview took place yesterday morning. Rifaat Pasha accompanied me to the Sultan's apartment, and then withdrew.

Reminding the Sultan of the disposition he had shown to receive my counsels, I said that I had hitherto confided them to his Ministers, not wishing to trespass personally on His Majesty's indulgence without necessity. I added that in the present critical juncture of affairs the case might be different, and His Majesty might like to know what I thought from my own lips. I then endeavoured to give him a just idea of the degree of danger to which his Empire was exposed. The immediate danger had been arrested for the time, if not removed, and Her Majesty's Government had nothing more at heart than to assist in rescuing the Porte from everything which might threaten a return of it, while the Porte itself was careful to meet the demands of Russia in a spirit of conciliation, equity, and prudence, united when necessary with firmness and resolution. The success which had fortunately attended the negotiations relating exclusively to the holy places at Jerusalem, promised well for an eventual arrangement of the subsequent discussions, and I was happy to find that His Majesty's servants, both Ministers and Council, were not less inclined to gratify the Russian Ambassador with all that could be safely conceded to him, than determined to withhold their consent from every requisition calculated to inflict a serious injury on the independence and dignity of their Sovereign. I had waited to know their own unbiassed impressions respecting the kind of guarantee demanded by Prince Menchikoff, and I could not do otherwise than approve the decision which they appeared to have adopted with unanimity. My own impression was, that if His Majesty sanctioned that decision, the Ambassador would probably break off his relations with the Porte, and go away, together perhaps with his whole Embassy; nor was it quite impossible that even a temporary occupation, however unjust, of the Danubian Principalities by Russia might take place; but I felt certain that neither a declaration of war nor any other act of open hostility was to be apprehended for the present, as the Emperor Nicholas could not resort to such extremities on account of the pending differences, without contradicting his most solemn assurances, and exposing himself to the indignant censure of all Europe. I conceived that under such circumstances the true position to be maintained by the Porte was one of moral resistance to such demands as were really inadmissible on just and essential grounds, and that the principle should even be applied under protest to the occupation of the Principalities, not in weakness or despair, but in reliance on a good cause and on the sympathy of friendly and independent Governments. A firm adherence to this line of conduct, as long as it was possible to maintain it with honour, would in my judgment offer the best chances of ultimate success with the least practicable degree of provocation and present disturbance of commercial interests.

I concluded by apprizing His Majesty of what I had reserved for his private ear, in order that his Ministers might take their decision without any bias from without, namely, that in the event of imminent danger I was instructed to request the Commander of Her Majesty's forces in the Mediterranean to hold his squadron in readiness.

The whole of this language appeared to interest the Sultan deeply, and also to coincide with His Majesty's existing opinions. He said that he was well aware of the dangers to which I had alluded; that he was perfectly prepared in the exercise of his own free will to confirm and to render effective the protection promised to all classes of his tributary subjects in matters of religious worship, including the immunities and privileges granted to their respective clergy. He showed me the last communications in writing which had passed between his Ministers and the Russian Embassy; he thanked me for having helped to bring the question of the holy places to an arrangement; he professed his reliance on the friendly support of Great Britain, and finally dismissed me with gracious expressions of confidence and satisfaction.

I have since learned from the Grand Vizier, to whom the Sultan had mentioned his private reception of me, that His Majesty had been much gratified by the tenor of my communications.

No. 204.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 3.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, May 14, 1853.*

I ADDRESSED you last on the 10th instant. I have now to continue my statement of the principal incidents relating to Prince Menchikoff's ill-omened difference with the Porte.

The first object to which I have the honour of soliciting your Lordship's attention is an official note addressed to the Prince by Rifaat Pasha, on the 10th of this month. A copy of it is inclosed herewith; and, agreeably to my advice, it has been communicated to the French, Prussian, and Austrian Representatives.

On the following day Prince Menchikoff sent in a rejoinder, expressing dissatisfaction with the terms proposed by the Porte, and insisting, though with somewhat more of courtesy than before, on a more complete and immediate acceptance of his own. This note bears a date equivalent in our style to Wednesday, May 11; and Rifaat Pasha was given to understand that Saturday, the 14th, would be really the extreme goal of Russian forbearance. The interval was occupied with private or indirect endeavours to obtain a more liberal allowance of time, and to discover some mode of bringing the adverse parties within reach of an accommodation. I kept myself in communication with the French Ambassador and the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires; I put Rifaat Pasha in possession of whatever struck me as at all calculated to smooth down the existing obstacles without a surrender of the main point at issue, and I endeavoured even to dispose the Russian party to more accommodating terms, notwithstanding the positive manner in which Prince Menchikoff had closed every avenue to negotiation but that which required a ticket of surrender at its entrance.

Inclosure 1 in No. 204.

*Rifaat Pasha to Prince Menchikoff, May 10, 1853.*

[See Inclosure 2 in No. 193.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 204.

*Prince Menchikoff to Rifaat Pasha, <sup>April 29</sup><sub>May 11</sub>, 1853.*

[See Inclosure 3 in No. 193.]

No. 205.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 3.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, May 14, 1853.*

IN compliance with an official invitation from Reshid Pasha, now Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I waited on his Highness at the Porte this afternoon. He excused himself for the trouble he had given me, by saying that the pressure of the Russian requisitions had compelled him to seek an interview with

the least possible delay. He explained his meaning further by stating that Prince Menchikoff had called upon him in the morning, and insisted on an immediate final reply, setting entirely aside, as *non avenue*, Rifaat Pasha's official note of the 10th instant, and threatening, if not satisfied, to break off his relations with the Porte; that he was in consequence very desirous of knowing my opinion as to what it was best for him to do in such an emergency; that the Council was going to take the subject into deliberation immediately; and that he was the more embarrassed, because from his recent return to office he had not yet possessed the necessary time for reading papers, and making up his mind.

I replied, that I conceived the Porte to be fully entitled to a reasonable delay, in consequence of the change of Ministry; but I advised that the delay should not be extended beyond a few days at most, and that, if it were possible to shorten the term, it might be prudent to do so.

The Pasha then drew up a short note in Turkish to Prince Menchikoff, of which an exact translation is inclosed herewith. It has since received the unanimous approval of the Council. It will be sent to the Russian Ambassador as soon as the Sultan's sanction is obtained.

Not only does the Porte's request appear reasonable in itself, but there is something indelicate in the pressure of the Russian Embassy, considering the settlement of the original question, the Sultan's domestic affliction, and the unexpected change of Administration.

Inclosure in No. 205.

*Reshid Pasha to Prince Menchikoff, May 15, 1853.*

[See Inclosure 2 in No. 196.]

No. 206.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 3.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, May 14, 1853.*

THE confidential letter which I addressed to Prince Menchikoff on the 8th instant, as mentioned in one of my preceding despatches, did not remain unanswered, and a copy of his Excellency's reply is inclosed herewith for your Lordship's information.

As the Russian Ambassador showed no disposition whatever either to avail himself of my good offices, or to modify demands which no Turkish statesman was likely to accept without constraint, I abstained from prolonging a correspondence incapable, under such circumstances, of producing any good, and far more likely to degenerate into an irritating controversy. The remarks which some parts of it have suggested, find a natural and less inconvenient place of record in my correspondence with your Lordship. Though somewhat numerous, they may be expressed in few words. For the sake of clearness as well as brevity, I have numbered the passages to which they relate.

1. The Russian grievances alluded to by Prince Menchikoff, in so far as they are special or known to me, originate almost exclusively in the question of the Holy Shrines in Palestine.

2. Satisfaction was given by the forced retirement of Fuad Effendi.

3. The guarantee required by Russia is objectionable to the Porte, on grounds of real danger to its independence. A more legitimate guarantee, which can hardly be refused without offence, is given instead.

4. The guarantee required by Russia goes far beyond the Treaties existing between that Power and the Porte. It is founded on a principle admitted nowhere else, and which is less admissible here than elsewhere, when applied to the millions of Rayahs professing the Greek religion.

5. These are simple assertions which will not stand the test of even a slight examination.

6. The objection does not lie against the interest taken by the Emperor in

his religion and in that of his subjects, but in his attempt to extend to the Sultan's Greek subjects the same degree of protection which for his own he may fairly claim.

7. I do not complain of insincerity on Prince Menchikoff's part towards me. But what, to all appearance, may be justly complained of, is the utter want of agreement between his principal requisition and the assurances of his Court. Still less is he entitled to complain of me. I gave him freely my good offices with respect to the holy places, and he acknowledged their efficiency. I gave him distinctly to understand that I could not support his ulterior pretensions. I did so at an early period of our intercourse, at the risk of drawing down his resentment on the Minister from whom I derived my knowledge, and whom he had threatened with the fate of Garaschanin, if his communications with the Porte were in any way divulged.

8 An immense exaggeration is involved in these expressions. The influence of the Russian Embassy is more than equal to that of any other when exercised within its legitimate sphere. History, and the inequality of force between Russia and Turkey, explain sufficiently why the former should in other respects be an object of mistrust and apprehension to the Porte. That Russia had something to complain of in the question of the Holy Places at Jerusalem, is true enough ; but the Porte has paid the price of its error on that account ; and the claim of France to anything of a religious protectorate over other subjects than its own, and those not rayahs, is limited to a few religious establishments and their inmates or dependents.

Such, my Lord, are the cursory remarks which I have to offer on Prince Menchikoff's reply to my confidential letter. The resistance which he encounters at the Porte may be steadied by foreign sympathies, but it most assuredly originates in the Porte's own intuitive apprehension of future consequences, aided by traditions from the past.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 206.

*Prince Menchikoff to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Confidentielle.)

M. l'Ambassadeur,

*Péra, le <sup>27</sup> Avril,  
9 Mai, 1853.*

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre confidentielle de votre Excellence du 8 Mai, et je m'empresse d'y répondre avec une entière franchise.

(1.) J'ai eu l'occasion de vous exposer dans nos conversations les griefs de mon Gouvernement contre la Porte. Sa conduite avait porté atteinte à la dignité de l'Empereur.

(2.) J'avais la mission d'obtenir la réparation qui lui était dûe, ainsi (3) qu'une garantie solide pour l'avenir du culte que Sa Majesté professe. C'est sur ce point que portait surtout la méfiance et la mauvaise volonté du Gouvernement Ottoman à notre égard. Dans l'intérêt même des relations solides et amicales avec la Turquie, mon Auguste Maître me charge d'insister pour que la Porte (4) s'engage par un Acte formel à respecter sa sollicitude pour l'Eglise d'Orient. Des promesses et des assurances n'offraient point une garantie suffisante, vu la triste expérience du passé. Il m'est impossible, M. l'Ambassadeur, de convenir avec vous sur la portée que vous attribuez à nos demandes.

(5.) Les droits souverains du Sultan, et l'indépendance de son Gouvernement, y sont respectés ainsi que ses rapports avec ses alliés. Loin de toucher aux principes de l'accord qui s'est établi en 1841 entre les cinq Grandes Puissances pour la conservation de l'Empire Ottoman, le Gouvernement Impérial demande (6) le maintien de ce qui existe *ab antiquo*, et fait ainsi preuve d'une prévoyance désintéressée. La modération et la générosité de ses demandes nous donnent droit à une parfaite liberté d'action dans les questions que nous avons à régler avec la Porte, et qui prennent leur source uniquement dans l'intérêt de notre Souverain pour sa religion et celle de ses sujets.

(7.) Je n'ai pas la conscience d'avoir manqué aux assurances loyales données par le Ministère Impérial au Cabinet de la Reine sur nos vues concernant la Turquie.

J'ai usé de la plus grande sincérité envers votre Excellence, et je dois l'avouer je comptais sur une franche coopération de votre part.

(8.) La Légation de l'Empereur ne peut point rester à Constantinople dans les conditions qui lui sont faites. Elle ne saurait accepter la position secondaire à laquelle on voudrait la réduire. Loin de prétendre à un droit de supériorité quelconque, le Gouvernement Impérial ne cherche qu'à placer son cercle d'action en Orient au niveau de celui qu'exercent ici ses Alliés de l'Occident.

J'attendrai en conséquence la réponse de la Porte à ma dernière communication, pour prendre les déterminations qui me sont indiquées par les ordres supérieurs; et j'aime à espérer que le Cabinet Ottoman, ayant présent à son souvenir les anciennes et intimes relations de la Turquie avec la Russie, ne voudra point les compromettre en prenant un parti irréfléchi et inspiré par le même esprit de méfiance calculée à notre égard qui l'a jetée dans ses embarras actuels.

Je prie, &c.  
(Signé) MENCHIKOFF.

(Translation.)

(Confidential.)

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Pera, <sup>April 27</sup><sub>May 9</sub>, 1853.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Excellency's confidential letter of the 8th of May, and I hasten to reply to it with the utmost frankness.

(1) I have had occasion in our conversations to explain to you the complaints of my Government against the Porte. Its conduct had attacked the Emperor's dignity.

(2) I was commissioned to obtain the reparation due to him, as well as (3) a sure guarantee for the future condition of the religion professed by His Majesty. The mistrust and ill-disposition of the Ottoman Government in regard to us turned especially on this point. Even in the interest of stable and friendly relations with Turkey, my august master enjoins me to insist upon the Porte's (4) engaging, by a formal Act, to respect his solicitude for the Eastern Church. Looking to the sad experience of the past, promises and assurances did not offer a sufficient guarantee. It is impossible for me, M. l'Ambassadeur, to agree with you as to the bearing which you attach to our demands.

(5) The sovereign rights of the Sultan, and the independence of his Government, are respected in them, as well as his relations with his allies. Far from trenching on the principles of the understanding which was come to in 1841 between the Five Great Powers for the preservation of the Ottoman Empire, the Imperial Government requires (6) the maintenance of what exists *ab antiquo*, and thus evinces a disinterested foresight. The moderation and generosity of his demands entitle us to a perfect freedom of action in the questions which we have to settle with the Porte, and which take their rise solely in the interest felt by our Sovereign for his religion and that of his subjects.

(7) I am not conscious of having disregarded the frank assurances as to our views with respect to Turkey, given by the Imperial Ministry to the Queen's Cabinet.

I have shown the greatest sincerity towards your Excellency, and I must confess that I looked for frank co-operation on your side.

(8) The Emperor's Legation cannot remain at Constantinople under the circumstances in which it has been placed. It cannot submit to the secondary position to which it might be wished to reduce it.

Far from aiming at any right of superiority whatever, the Imperial Government only seeks to place its own sphere of action in the East on an equal footing with that which his allies of the West here occupy.

I shall accordingly await the reply of the Porte to my last communication, in order to take the decision pointed out to me by the orders of my superiors; and I would fain hope that the Ottoman Cabinet, bearing in mind the ancient and intimate relations of Turkey with Russia, will be unwilling to place them in

peril by adopting an inconsiderate course, suggested by the same spirit of distrust in regard to us which has placed it in its present embarrassing position.

I request, &c.

(Signed) MENCHIKOFF.

No. 207.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 3.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, May 15, 1853.*

A FEW days ago the chief interpreter of the Porte, Noureddeen Bey, called by order of the late Ministry, to pay me an official visit in acknowledgment of the good offices which I had successfully employed in contributing to a satisfactory solution of the question of the holy places.

As this unusual compliment belongs to me only as an agent of Her Majesty's Government, I make a point of recording it here for your Lordship's satisfaction.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 208.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 3.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, May 16, 1853.*

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship in copy an official note addressed by Prince Menchikoff to Reshid Pasha at a late hour yesterday. I have obtained it from the Porte.

Your Lordship will observe that the Russian Ambassador has declared his official relations with the Porte to be broken off, although he is willing to suspend the remaining steps, which he threatens to take, for two or three days, in the hope that his requisitions may still be complied with.

I understand that he means to stay till over Wednesday, and if the Porte does not come in to his terms by that time, that he will embark and go away with the whole of the Russian Embassy.

On the other hand there is no appearance of any disposition among the members of the Turkish Government to recede from the position already taken up, and a rupture seems therefore to be inevitable.

The terms of Prince Menchikoff's note, as your Lordship will perceive, are very menacing, and sufficient to imply a danger of immediate hostilities, if the want of reasonable grounds for going to war, and the pacific assurances repeatedly given by the Emperor Nicholas did not militate against such an idea.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 208.

*Prince Menchikoff to Reshid Pasha, May 15, 1853.*

[See Inclosure 3 in No. 196.]

No. 209.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 3.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, May 20, 1853.*

I AVAIL myself of an express which Reshid Pasha despatches this evening, to continue my narrative of what relates to Prince Menchikoff, and his untoward negotiations.

M. de Klezl has executed the commission which he kindly undertook yesterday, at the request of his three colleagues, as I had the honour of stating to your Lordship in my despatch of yesterday. I wish it were in my power to add that he had succeeded in making an effectual impression on Prince Menchikoff. On the contrary, he has just been here to inform me that although his Excellency listened with politeness to what he was authorized to state with suitable explanations on the part of his three colleagues and himself, he remained in substance steady to his former resolutions, and intimated his intention of going to sea to-night, unless the Porte gave in to his demands in full.

It appeared at the same time that some further communication of a private and indirect character had passed between the Prince and Reshid Pasha since yesterday morning. The former had in that way sent in a fresh note on trial with some modifications, but little to the taste of the Porte.

It was proposed to make one document of all the Turkish concessions, to give that document the form of an official note having the force of a Treaty, and to erase the limitation conveyed in the term spiritual, as applied to the privileges and immunities of the Greek Clergy. This note was shown to Reshid Pasha, but not left with him.

I have to add that Prince Menchikoff did not object to receive a copy of the Porte's definitive note, as prepared for official communication to him, but stifled by his persisting in declaring the rupture of his relations with the Porte and approaching departure. This paper is to be conveyed to him by one of Reshid Pasha's sons in the course of the day, and one more effort will thus be made to bring about an understanding, on grounds satisfactory to both parties.

M. de Klezl took leave of the Russian Ambassador under an impression that the chance of any such result was extremely slender, if it might be said to exist at all. The note prepared by Prince Menchikoff could not, at all events, be accepted by Reshid Pasha. It would have to undergo the same deliberation and the same formalities as the preceding one, with little or no prospect of success.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 210.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 3.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, May 22, 1853.*

THE Austrian Chargé d'Affaires has sent to inform me that he intends to send an estafette to Vienna at noon to-day. I therefore employ the few minutes at my disposal to apprise your Lordship of Prince Menchikoff's departure, and the withdrawal of the Imperial arms from the hotel of the Russian Embassy here. I understand that M. de Ozeroff stays behind for a few days, and that after his departure the Chief Secretary and First Interpreter of the Embassy will continue here, but in a private capacity. The Consuls, I am told, are not to be recalled.

Letters from Galatz and Trebizond allude to appearances of a military advance in the neighbourhood of both these places.

It remains to be seen whether the movements in question announce any hostile intention.

I inclose herewith a copy of the project of a note drawn up by Prince Menchikoff for presentation to him by Reshid Pacha, and sent privately the evening before last to that Minister, who immediately sent it to me for communication to the three other Representatives, with a request that we would give him an opinion as to the most advisable mode of proceeding.

Early next morning I sent Mr. Alison to ascertain more precisely the circumstances under which Prince Menchikoff had taken this last unofficial step, and the opinion entertained by Reshid Pasha himself of his Excellency's communication. At the same time, I proposed another meeting of the four Representatives.

The meeting took place, and we came unanimously to the resolution expressed

in the accompanying memorandum, which was transmitted to Reshid Pasha, by means of M. Pisani, without a moment's delay.

In reporting the execution of his commission, M. Pisani states that Reshid Pasha made no remark upon our memorandum, but informed him that the Porte had already adopted the resolution of resisting the objectionable parts of the Russian demands, even in this new form.

I had already ascertained through Mr. Alison, as well as through M. Pisani, that his Highness understood the Prince's project to be offered as a basis on which it was expected that a "yes" or "no" would be given in reply. The Pasha had also declared his opinion that the altered form of the Russian demands left them in reality as objectionable as ever, and I found that my colleagues agreed with me in adopting an opinion essentially identical with that of the Turkish Minister.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 210.

*Draft of Note proposed by Prince Menchikoff to be addressed to him by the Porte.*

LA Sublime Porte, après l'examen le plus attentif et le plus sérieux des demandes qui forment l'objet de la mission extraordinaire confiée à l'Ambassadeur de Russie, Prince Menchikoff, et après avoir soumis le résultat de cet examen à Sa Majesté le Sultan, se fait un devoir empressé de notifier par la présente à son Altesse l'Ambassadeur la décision Impériale émanée à ce sujet par un Irade suprême en date du (date Musulmane et Chrétienne).

Sa Majesté voulant donner à son auguste allié et ami l'Empereur de Russie un nouveau témoignage de son amitié la plus sincère, et de son désir intime de consolider les anciennes relations de bon voisinage et de parfaite entente qui existent entre les deux Etats, plaçant en même temps une entière confiance dans les intentions constamment bienveillantes de Sa Majesté Impériale pour le maintien de l'intégrité et de l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman, a daigné apprécier et prendre en sérieuse considération les représentations franches et cordiales dont l'Ambassadeur de Russie s'est rendu l'organe en faveur du culte orthodoxe Greco-Russe professé par son auguste allié ainsi que par la majorité de leurs sujets respectifs.

Le Soussigné a reçu en conséquence l'ordre de donner par la présente note l'assurance la plus solennelle au Gouvernement de Russie, que représente auprès de Sa Majesté le Sultan son Altesse le Prince Menchikoff, sur la sollicitude invariable et les sentiments généreux et tolérans qui animent Sa Majesté le Sultan pour la sécurité et la prospérité dans ses états du clergé, des églises, et des établissements religieux du culte Chrétien d'Orient.

Afin de rendre ces assurances plus explicites, préciser d'une manière formelle les objets principaux de cette haute sollicitude, corroborer par des éclaircissements supplémentaires que nécessite la marche du temps, le sens des Articles qui dans les Traités antérieurs conclus entre les deux Puissances ont trait aux questions religieuses, et prévenir enfin à jamais toute nuance de malentendu et de désaccord à ce sujet entre les deux Gouvernements, le Soussigné est autorisé par Sa Majesté le Sultan à faire les déclarations suivantes :

1. Le culte orthodoxe d'Orient, son clergé, ses églises, et ses possessions, ainsi que ses établissements religieux, jouiront dans l'avenir sans aucune atteinte, sous l'égide de Sa Majesté le Sultan, des privilèges et immunités qui leur sont assurés *ab antiquo*, ou qui leur ont été accordés à différentes reprises par la faveur Impérial, et dans un principe de haute équité participeront aux avantages accordés aux autres rites Chrétiens, ainsi qu'aux Légations Etrangères accréditées près la Sublime Porte par Convention ou disposition particulière.

2. Sa Majesté le Sultan ayant jugé nécessaire et équitable de corroborer et d'expliquer son firman souverain revêtu du hatti-houmayoum le 15 de la lune de Rebiul-Akhir 1268 (10 Février, 1852), par son firman souverain du et d'ordonner en sus par une autre firman en date du la réparation de la coupole du Temple du Saint Sépulcre, ces deux firmans

seront textuellement exécutés et fidèlement observés, pour maintenir à jamais le *status quo* actuel des sanctuaires possédés par les Grecs exclusivement ou en commun avec d'autres cultes.

Il est entendu que cette promesse s'étend également au maintien de tous les droits et immunités dont jouissent *ab antiquo* l'église orthodoxe et son clergé tant dans la ville de Jérusalem qu'au-déhors, sans préjudice aucun pour les autres communautés Chrétiennes.

3. Pour le cas où la Cour Impériale de Russie en ferait la demande, il sera assigné une localité convenable dans la ville de Jérusalem ou dans les environs pour la construction d'une église consacrée à la célébration du service divin par les ecclésiastiques Russes, et d'un hospice pour les pèlerins indigents ou malades, lesquelles fondations seront sous la surveillance spéciale du Consulat-Général de Russie en Syrie et en Palestine.

4. On donnera les firmans et les ordres nécessaires à qui de droit et aux Patriarches Grecs pour l'exécution de ces décisions souveraines, et on s'entendra ultérieurement sur la régularisation des points de détail qui n'auront pas trouvé place tant dans les firmans concernant les lieux saints de Jérusalem que dans la présente notification.

Le Soussigné, &c.

(Translation.)

THE Sublime Porte, after the most attentive and the most serious examination of the demands which form the object of the extraordinary mission entrusted to the Ambassador of Russia, Prince Menchikoff, and after having submitted the result of this examination to His Majesty the Sultan, makes it its duty to communicate by the present to his Highness the Ambassador the imperial decision in this respect promulgated by a supreme Iradé dated the

His Majesty the Sultan, being desirous of giving to his august friend and ally the Emperor of Russia, a fresh proof of his very sincere friendship, and of his earnest desire to strengthen the ancient relations of good neighbourhood and of perfect understanding which exist between the two States,—reposing at the same time entire confidence in the ever-benevolent intentions of His Imperial Majesty for the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire,—has vouchsafed to appreciate and to take into his serious consideration the frank and cordial representations of which the Russian Ambassador has been the medium in favour of the orthodox Greco-Russian religion, professed as well by his august ally as by the majority of their respective subjects.

The Undersigned has in consequence been desired to give, by means of the present note, the most solemn assurance to the Government of Russia, of which his Highness Prince Menchikoff is the Representative at the Court of His Majesty the Sultan, of the unalterable solicitude and of the generous and tolerant sentiments which animate His Majesty the Sultan for the security and the prosperity in his dominions of the clergy of the Churches and of the religious establishments of the Oriental Christian religion.

In order to render these assurances more explicit, and to lay down in a formal manner the principal objects of this deep solicitude,—to confirm by supplementary explanations, which the progress of time renders necessary, the meaning of the Articles which in the former Treaties concluded between the two Powers have reference to religious questions,—and lastly, to prevent for ever any shadow of misunderstanding and of disagreement in this respect between the two Governments,—the Undersigned is authorised by His Majesty the Sultan to make the following declarations :

1. The orthodox religion of the East, its clergy, its churches, and its possessions, as well as its religious establishments, shall enjoy for the future, without any detriment, under the protection of His Majesty the Sultan, the privileges and immunities which are secured to them *ab antiquo*, or which have been granted to them at various times by the Imperial favour, and, on a principle of high equity, shall participate in the advantages accorded to the other Christian sects, as well as to the foreign Legations accredited to the Sublime Porte, by convention or special arrangement.

2. His Majesty the Sultan having deemed it necessary and just to

corroborate and to explain his sovereign Firman, adorned with the Hattihoumayoun, of the 15th of the month of Rébi-ul-Akhir, 1268 (February 9, 1852), by his sovereign Firman of the \_\_\_\_\_ and to order, besides, by another Firman, dated \_\_\_\_\_ the repair of the cupola of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, these two Firmans shall be literally carried out and faithfully observed, so as to maintain for ever the present *status quo* of the sanctuaries possessed by the Greeks exclusively, or in common with other religious sects.

It is understood that this engagement extends equally to the maintenance of the rights and immunities which the orthodox Church and its clergy enjoy *ab antiquo*, as well within as without the city of Jerusalem, without any prejudice to the other Christian communities.

3. On the Imperial Court of Russia making the request, a suitable locality shall be assigned within the city of Jerusalem, or in its environs, for the construction of a church appropriated to the celebration of divine service by Russian ecclesiastics, and of a hospital for indigent or sick pilgrims, which foundations shall be under the special superintendence of the Russian Consulate-General in Syria and in Palestine.

4. The necessary Firmans and orders shall be given to those whom it may concern, and to the Greek Patriarchs, for the execution of these sovereign decisions; and the arrangement of the matters of detail which shall not have found place either in the Firmans concerning the Holy Places of Jerusalem, or in the present notification, shall form the subject of a subsequent understanding.

Inclosure 2 in No. 210.

*Memorandum by the Representatives of Austria, Great Britain, France, and Prussia.*

LES Représentants d'Autriche, de la Grande Bretagne, de France, et de Prusse, en réponse au désir exprimé par son Altesse Reshid Pasha, de connaître leur opinion sur un projet de note communiquée par le Prince Menchikoff par voie particulière, sont d'avis que sur une question qui touche de si près à la liberté d'action et à la souveraineté de Sa Majesté le Sultan, son Altesse Reshid Pasha est le meilleur juge du parti qu'il convient de prendre, et qu'ils ne se considèrent pas comme autorisés, dans la circonstance actuelle, à émettre une opinion à cet égard.

(Translation.)

THE Representatives of Austria, Great Britain, France and Russia, in reply to the desire expressed by his Highness Reshid Pasha to know their opinion on a draft of note communicated privately by Prince Menchikoff, conceive that upon a question which so closely affects the freedom of action and the sovereignty of His Majesty the Sultan, his Highness Reshid Pasha is the best judge of the course which it is fitting to take, and they do not feel themselves authorized under existing circumstances to pronounce an opinion in that respect.

No. 211.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, June 3, 1853.*

I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to express to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the great satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at learning from your despatch of June 2, that the French Minister at St. Petersburg will be instructed, in the matter of the Russian negotiations at Constantinople, in the sense of my despatch of May 31 to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 212.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, June 3, 1853.*

HER Majesty's Government have read with interest your Excellency's despatch of May 31, in which you state that M. Drouyn de Lhuys had searched the Treaties and records relative to the protection to be afforded by France to the Latin Church in Turkey, but had not found therein any rights reserved to France beyond that of protecting the Latins of the Holy Land, and the members of her own churches and religious establishments.

This is of importance at this moment; and I have to instruct your Excellency to express to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the hope of Her Majesty's Government that the French Minister at St. Petersburg will be directed to communicate these facts to the Russian Government, which pretends that the arrangement proposed by Prince Menchikoff is similar in its character to the Capitulations of 1740 between France and Turkey.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 213.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 3.)*

(Extract.)

*Berlin, May 30, 1853.*

I CALLED on Baron Manteuffel yesterday, his Excellency having previously informed me that he wished to see me on the subject of the late news from the East.

He began by observing that he had been desired by the King to make known to me the concern which His Majesty's felt at the departure of Prince Menchikoff from Constantinople, as reported by the telegraph, and the probable suspension of the diplomatic relations of Russia and Turkey, and then said that he wished to know whether I could communicate to him any intelligence that would guide him as to the policy of Her Majesty's Government at this juncture. I replied that I had no instructions relative to the turn which these affairs had taken, but that I was so far aware of the opinions of Her Majesty's Government that I could assure him they were unprepared for the "Sened" or Convention which had been proposed by Prince Menchikoff—a document having nominally for its object the better protection of the Greek subjects of the Porte in the exercise of their religion, but which would in reality give to Russia a right of interference in the internal affairs of Turkey incompatible with her independence. I then communicated to his Excellency, and I trust your Lordship will approve of my having done so, your despatch to Sir Hamilton Seymour of the 16th instant, for which he thanked me, saying the opinions which it contained quite coincided with those of the Prussian Government, and the knowledge of them would be of the greatest value to him. Baron Manteuffel went on to say that the impression which had been made on him by the intelligence received from St. Petersburg, and from other quarters, was the same as that stated by your Lordship, and that it appeared that the Cabinets of Berlin, London, and Paris, had been all led to believe that when once the question of the holy places was settled nothing else of importance remained to be done by Prince Menchikoff; consequently, as no intimation to the contrary had reach him from the Russian Government, he fain wished to be of opinion that Prince Menchikoff had overstepped his instructions and must be disavowed.

I replied that this would be the most satisfactory way of getting out of the difficulty, but that disavowals were not usual in Russian diplomacy.

The impression which has been made by the last reports from Turkey is most unfavourable to the Russian Government. Baron Manteuffel considers Prince Menchikoff to have gone far beyond everything that we were given to expect, and that the endeavours of the Great Powers must now be directed to discover some means by which a reconciliation of the differences can be effected

and a rupture avoided. I think that I may safely assure your Lordship that the conduct of the Russian Government is generally condemned, and that the opinion of the public and of the diplomatic body here is united in deprecating the proceedings of Prince Menchikoff; all agree that it is impossible for the Porte to sign this Treaty, without incurring the loss of her independence.

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## No. 214.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 3.)*

My Lord,

Vienna, May 30, 1853.

AT this late hour (half-past 4 o'clock, P.M.) I have received the despatches under flying seal from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe which I have the honour of forwarding.

I have only time to say that I saw Count Buol, at the time these despatches were delivered to me, at the Foreign Office, and that I read to him a private note detailing their contents which I received from Lord Stratford. Count Buol said he was quite sure he was acting in accordance with your Lordship's views in representing, first at St. Petersburg, the danger of the proceedings which had been adopted by Prince Menchikoff; next, to the Turkish Government, the propriety of a conciliatory policy in as far as, in their judgment, their essential interests were not comprised; and finally, in awaiting the explanations which the Cabinet of St. Petersburg would give of proceedings so little to be expected from the assurances they had previously given.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

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## No. 215.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 4, 1853.

YOUR Excellency's despatches up to that of the 22nd ultimo, and comprising within the series duplicates of your despatches of the 14th, 15th, and 19th ultimo, the receipt of which I have already acknowledged, were received at this office yesterday and will be laid before the Queen.

I have to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve of your proceedings as reported in your despatch of the 14th of May, with reference to the communications which passed between Prince Menchikoff and the Porte on the 10th and 11th of that month.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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## No. 216.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 4, 1853.

YOUR Excellency's despatch of the 10th of May, reporting what passed at an interview which you had with the Sultan on the previous day, did not reach this office until yesterday; and I have great satisfaction in acquainting your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the judicious advice which you offered to the Sultan on that occasion.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 217.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, June 4, 1853.*

WITH reference to your despatch of the 14th of May, giving an account of an interview which you had with Reshid Pasha on that day, I have to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve of the advice which on that occasion you gave to the Pasha in regard to the reply which he should return to Prince Menchikoff's demand for an immediate and final answer from the Porte.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 218.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, June 4, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government agree in the remarks which, in your despatch of the 14th of May, you make upon the reply returned by Prince Menchikoff to your letter of the 8th of that month.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 219.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, June 4, 1853.*

I HAVE to state to your Excellency, in reply to your despatches of the 19th and 20th of May, that Her Majesty's Government consider that the measure of sending M. de Klezl to Prince Menchikoff on the part of the Representatives of the Four Powers was very judicious.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 220.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 6.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, June 5, 1853*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has just informed me that he saw the Emperor yesterday, and that, after acquainting His Majesty with the resolution taken by Her Majesty's Government, in consequence of the intelligence lately received both from Constantinople and St. Petersburg, to order Admiral Dundas to approach the Dardanelles, and to place himself under the orders of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, he stated to His Majesty the strong desire which your Lordship had expressed, that the two Governments should act entirely in concert for the maintenance of the independence of the Porte, and of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

His Majesty inquired whether it was certain that Admiral Dundas had been actually ordered to leave Malta, and on being assured of the fact, acquiesced in telegraphic orders being sent to Marseilles, to order the "Chaptal" to get under weigh with despatches for Admiral de la Susse and M. de la Cour.

These despatches, being sent by telegraph, were naturally short, but as both the Admiral and M. de la Cour were provided with ample instructions at an earlier period, it is only necessary that they should now be informed of the movements of Her Majesty's fleet, and that the one should be enjoined to act in concert with Admiral Dundas to execute any orders which may be transmitted from Constantinople, and that the other should be instructed to consult and come to an understanding with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe as to the orders which the Admirals are to receive.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys was good enough to read me the instructions now sent by the "Chaptal," as also those with which M. de la Cour was furnished in March last, on taking his departure for the East. As these latter will be communicated to your Lordship by Count Walewski, I need only add that the most complete authority is given by them to M. de la Cour to bring the French fleet, under certain eventualities and at the demand of the Turkish Government, within the Dardanelles, and, should more be required in consequence of actual hostilities on the part of Russia, to dispose of the material force of the fleet for the Sultan's assistance.

Neither must I omit to record the satisfaction with which I read that M. de la Cour was enjoined, the case arising, to inform Her Majesty's Representative at Constantinople of any determination to which he might come; and that the French Admiral is to be desired, if the British fleet should arrive after the French fleet had taken a decided step, to enter into immediate relations with his British colleague, and offer to share with him whatever plan of action had been or might be agreed upon.

In the despatches transmitted by the "Chaptal," M. de la Cour is referred to these instructions; he is told that Her Majesty's fleet is placed under Lord Stratford's directions, and that the two fleets will rendezvous at Besika Bay, there to await orders from Constantinople.

Admiral de la Susse is desired to make for Besika Bay, where he is told he will find the English fleet.

#### No. 221.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 6.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, June 5, 1853.*

I HAVE expressed to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, as desired by your Lordship's despatch of the 3rd instant the great satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at learning that the French Minister at St. Petersburg will be instructed, in the matter of the Russian negotiations at Constantinople, in the sense of your Lordship's despatch of the 31st ultimo to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys read me this morning the memorandum which had been drawn up for transmission to St. Petersburg, of the assurances given at different times both by the Emperor of Russia and by Count Nesselrode to General Castelbajac, and they are quite as strong, if not stronger, than those given by the same high authorities to Sir Hamilton Seymour. At my request a copy of this memorandum will be sent to Count Walewski for communication to your Lordship.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

#### No. 222.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 6.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, June 5, 1853.*

I MENTIONED this morning to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the hope of Her Majesty's Government that the French Minister at St. Petersburg may be instructed to communicate to Count Nesselrode the disclaimer made by the

French Government of any rights being reserved to France by the Capitulations of 1740 to protect any of the Roman Catholic subjects of the Sultan, and he informed me that this step had already been taken.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

## No. 223.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon. —(Received June 6.)*

My Lord,

*Berlin, June 3, 1853.*

WHEN I was with Baron Manteuffel this evening, he received a telegraphic despatch from the Prussian Minister at Vienna, reporting that there was a probability of an Austrian mediation in the affairs of Turkey being accepted by Russia.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

## No. 224.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon. —(Received June 6.)*

(Extract.)

*Berlin, June 3, 1853.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL told me this evening, that he had just signed a despatch addressed to the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg.

His Excellency said that Count Henckel had been informed that the Prussian Government had learned with regret the rupture of the diplomatic relations of Russia with Turkey, observing, that they had not been prepared by communications from St. Petersburg for any demands such as that made by Prince Menchikoff on the Porte.

Count Henckel, as I understand, is directed to speak in this sense to Count Nesselrode.

## No. 225.

*M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Count Walewski. —(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Walewski, June 7.)*

M. le Comte,

*Paris, le 5 Juin, 1853.*

J'AI reçu les dépêches que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire jusqu'au No. 272, et j'ai placé sous les yeux de l'Empereur celle où vous m'annoncez que l'escadre commandée par M. l'Amiral Dundas est mise à l'entière disposition de Lord Stratford. Sa Majesté Impériale se félicite de l'identité de vues et d'action qui existent entre son propre Gouvernement et celui de Sa Majesté Britannique, et elle espère que son effet sera d'empêcher les complications qui pourraient surgir en Orient et menacer sérieusement la paix générale.

Dès le début de la mission de M. le Prince Menchikoff, nous avons conçu des inquiétudes sur son résultat; mais nous n'avions jamais douté que du moment où le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique partagerait nos appréhensions, des intérêts communs et un désir égal de maintenir l'intégrité et l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman dans leurs conditions actuelles ne dussent réunir vers le même but les efforts de la France et de l'Angleterre. C'est dans cette confiance si pleinement justifiée que j'avais, d'après les ordres de l'Empereur, rédigé les instructions de M. de la Cour, et qu'en lui donnant, à la date du 22 Mars, l'autorisation d'appeler l'escadre Française aux Dardanelles, je lui recommandais, si cette grave mesure lui paraissait nécessaire, de s'entendre avec Lord Stratford pour combiner autant que possible les mouvements de nos forces navales avec ceux de la flotte Anglaise.

L'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Impériale, M. le Comte, se trouve donc déjà muni de toutes les directions dont il a besoin pour prendre une attitude absolument semblable à celle de l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Britannique, et M. l'Amiral de la Susse recevra en même temps que M. l'Amiral Dundas, l'ordre de se rapprocher des Dardanelles et de mouiller dans la Baie de Besica. Le "Chaptal," qui lui porte cet ordre, a quitté Toulon hier, et de cette façon les deux escadres arriveront ensemble à leur destination. Nous ne pouvions mieux constater l'accord des deux Gouvernements, et nous espérons fermement qu'une telle démonstration, autorisée par les armements de la Russie elle-même, suffira pour donner à la diplomatie le temps de prévenir une rupture plus complète entre le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg et la Porte Ottomane. C'est dans le Traité de 1841 que nous puissions notre droit; il ne saurait dès-lors être dans nos intentions de ne pas l'observer fidèlement, tant qu'aucun acte agressif n'aura pas mis la Turquie dans le cas d'une légitime défense. Nous attendrons donc pour franchir les Dardanelles, que la Russie ait commencé les hostilités par terre ou par mer contre l'Empire Ottoman, et que la Porte, en nous adressant une demande d'appui, nous ait déclaré qu'elle se considère comme en état de guerre. Ce jour-là, M. le Comte, le Traité de 1841 sera méconnu par l'une de ces Parties Contractantes, et, en vertu de l'esprit qui l'a dicté, à raison des immenses intérêts qui font du maintien de la Turquie une nécessité d'équilibre Européen, nous prêterons à cette Puissance tout le concours qu'elle réclamera de nous. Il est bien entendu, d'ailleurs, M. le Comte, que non-obstant les circonstances qui peuvent survenir, nous ne cesserons de faire, à tout moment, de loyaux efforts pour concilier les prétentions de la Russie avec les droits de souveraineté de la Porte. A notre sens, le meilleur moyen d'y parvenir consiste, comme je vous le disais dernièrement, à encourager le Sultan à relever sans cesse la condition des Chrétiens soumis à son sceptre, et à fondre ensemble, autant que possible, toutes les populations de son Empire; et pour que cette œuvre soit efficace et durable, nous croyons qu'il faut que l'honneur en revienne au Gouvernement Ottoman lui-même, sans qu'une Puissance étrangère soit admise à stipuler seule au profit d'une classe des sujets du Grand Seigneur, à quelque intérêt que ces stipulations doivent se rapporter.

Si, comme je n'en doute pas, les intentions du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique sur les points que je viens d'indiquer, sont celles qui animent aussi le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale, je vous prie de transmettre officiellement à Lord Clarendon une copie de cette dépêche. Votre communication, et la réponse que le principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique vous adressera ou me fera remettre par Lord Cowley, constateront l'union de la France et de l'Angleterre dans un but qui ne saurait exciter les alarmes d'aucune Puissance, puisque les Gouvernements qui ont signé la Convention du 13 Juillet 1841 demeurent libres de s'associer à nous dans la forme et selon les moyens qu'il leur conviendra d'employer.

Agréé, &c.

(Signé) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

(Translation.)

M. le Comte,

*Paris, June 5, 1853.*

I HAVE received the despatches to No. 272 which you have done me the honour to write to me, and I have laid before the Emperor the one in which you announce to me that the fleet commanded by Admiral Dundas is placed entirely at Lord Stratford's disposal. His Imperial Majesty congratulates himself on the identity of views and of action which exist between his own Government and that of Her Britannic Majesty, and he hopes that the effect will be to prevent the complications which might arise in the East, and seriously threaten the general peace.

From the outset of Prince Menchikoff's mission we felt uneasiness as to its result; but we never doubted that from the moment when the Government of Her Britannic Majesty should share in our apprehensions, common interests, and an equal desire to maintain the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire in their present condition, would unite the efforts of France and of England for the attainment of the same object. It is in this confidence, which has been so

fully justified, that I drew up, by the Emperor's orders, M. de la Cour's instructions, and that in giving to him, under date of March 22, authority to call the French fleet to the Dardanelles, I recommended him, if so important a measure should appear to him to be necessary, to come to an understanding with Lord Stratford in order to combine as much as possible the movements of our naval forces with those of the English fleet.

His Imperial Majesty's Ambassador, M. le Comte, is therefore already provided with all the instructions which are requisite to enable him to take up an attitude absolutely similar to that of Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, and Admiral La Susse will receive at the same time as Admiral Dundas orders to approach the Dardanelles and to anchor in the Bay of Besica. The "Chaptal," which carries these orders to him, left Toulon yesterday, and by this means the two fleets will arrive together at their destination. We could give no better proof of the understanding subsisting between the two Governments, and we confidently hope that such a demonstration, which is authorized by the armaments of Russia herself, will suffice to give diplomacy time to prevent a more complete rupture between the Cabinets of St. Petersburg and the Ottoman Porte. It is on the Treaty of 1841 that we found our right, and it cannot therefore be our intention not to observe it faithfully so long as no aggressive act shall have put Turkey in a position of legitimate defence. We shall wait, therefore, before entering the Dardanelles until Russia shall have commenced hostilities by land or by sea against the Ottoman Empire, and until the Porte, while addressing to us a demand for support, shall have declared to us that she considers herself as being in a state of war. That day, M. le Comte, the Treaty of 1841 will have been disregarded by one of the Contracting Parties, and in virtue of the spirit which dictated that Treaty, and on account of the immense interests which make the maintenance of Turkey necessary for the equilibrium of Europe, we shall lend to that Power all the assistance which it shall ask of us. It is, moreover, well understood, M. le Comte, that notwithstanding the circumstances which may arise, we shall not cease to make at all times sincere efforts to reconcile the pretensions of Russia with the rights of sovereignty of the Porte. In our opinion, the best mode of arriving at this result is, as I lately said to you, to encourage the Sultan continually to improve the condition of the Christians subject to his rule, and to blend together as much as possible all the different populations of his Empire; and in order that this work may be effective and lasting, we consider that the credit thereof should attach to the Ottoman Government itself, without any foreign Power being permitted to stipulate by itself in favour of one class amongst the subjects of the Grand Seignior, on whatever interest such stipulations are intended to bear.

If, as I do not doubt, the intentions of the Government of Her Britannic Majesty on the points to which I have drawn your attention, are the same as those which actuate the Government of His Imperial Majesty, I request you to transmit a copy of this despatch officially to Lord Clarendon. This communication on your part, and the answer which the Principal Secretary of State of Her Britannic Majesty will address to you, or will cause to be returned to me by Lord Cowley, will establish the concurrence of France and England in an object which cannot excite the alarm of any Power, since the Governments which signed the Convention of the 13th July, 1841, are still at liberty to unite with us in such form and with such means as it may suit them to employ.

Receive, &c.

(Signed) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

No. 226.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, June 7, 1853.*

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatch of the 30th ultimo, reporting what passed between Baron Manteuffel and yourself on the subject of the departure of Prince Menchikoff from Constantinople. I have to inform you that I approve of your having communicated to Baron Manteuffel my

despatch to Sir Hamilton Seymour of the 16th ultimo; and I have to instruct you to express to Baron Manteuffel the sincere satisfaction with which Her Majesty's Government have learnt the views of the Prussian Government with respect to the conduct of Russia.

Her Majesty's Government cannot but approve of the rejection by Turkey of Prince Menchikoff's proposals, which were incompatible with Turkish independence; but the policy of Her Majesty's Government is a pacific policy, and they earnestly hope that the question may still be settled by negotiation; and their wish is to co-operate with the other three Powers for bringing about this desirable end.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 227.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, June 7, 1853.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 30th ultimo, reporting what passed between Count Buol and your Lordship on the receipt at Vienna of the despatches from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, which were forwarded by your Lordship, I have to instruct you to express to Count Buol the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at his views of the Russian proceedings, and at the course the Austrian Government intends to adopt.

Her Majesty's Government hope that the Government of Turkey will concede to every reasonable demand that Russia is entitled to make; but they cannot sanction, or be a party to, the arrangement which Prince Menchikoff proposed, the practical operation of which might be to confer upon the Emperor of Russia more power than would be possessed by the Sultan over the Greek subjects of the Porte; and it is quite unnecessary to point out to the discrimination of Count Buol what would be the result of this to Europe as respects the general balance of power, but more particularly to Austria.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 228.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, June 7, 1853.*

YOUR despatch of the 27th of May has been the cause of great surprise and regret to Her Majesty's Government.

We are indeed surprised that, after the numerous and explicit communications made to Her Majesty's Government during the last four months, and the assurances of a similar character which other Governments are said to have received, Count Nesselrode should state to you that you "had always been informed by him that two points were sought by Russia—satisfaction for the past, and security for the future; that you had been acquainted that the Imperial Government would insist upon the firmans settling the state of church-possession at Jerusalem and the disputes between the Greeks and the Latins being placed under the sanction of a Convention answering to the French Capitulations; and that this demand pointed clearly to an agreement of the nature of that contained in the Sened against which such 'unaccountable objections' had been raised by the late Turkish Ministry and the English Embassy."

It is a source of deep regret to Her Majesty's Government that, upon questions of such a nature, any misunderstanding should have arisen with the Government of His Imperial Majesty; but my despatch of the 31st ultimo will have placed you in possession of the views of Her Majesty's Government upon this subject, and further comments are unlikely to lead to any useful result, while they might produce feelings of irritation which it is the anxious desire of

Her Majesty's Government to avoid. They will not doubt that Count Nesselrode conscientiously thinks himself justified in making the statement reported by you ; but, on the other hand, Her Majesty's Government can solemnly affirm that, up to a late period, they could not hesitate in their belief, founded on the assurances which they had received from the Imperial Government, that the sole object of Prince Menchikoff's mission was to settle the question of the holy places in a manner consistent with the dignity of the Emperor, and to obtain such guarantees as should effectually guard against all future differences on this question.

Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople was accordingly instructed to afford all the assistance in his power towards bringing about this settlement, and he acted upon his instructions in a manner that procured for him the thanks both of the Russian Ambassador and the Porte ; but when Prince Menchikoff made proposals incompatible with the rights of the Sultan as an independent Sovereign, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe would have failed in his duty if, on being appealed to by the Turkish Ministers, he had advised their acceptance of such terms.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe having been made aware by Her Majesty's Government that it was the determination of the Emperor to uphold the independence of Turkey, he naturally thought that he was performing no disservice to His Imperial Majesty by endeavouring to point out to Prince Menchikoff in what manner and to what extent his proposals trench upon the independence and rights of the Sultan. In all other respects, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe throughout the negotiations exhibited an earnest desire that the Turkish Government should satisfy every claim of the Russian Ambassador ; and Her Majesty's Government are convinced that to attribute to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe the result of Prince Menchikoff's mission, rather than to the nature of the proposals which he made, would be an injustice for which the real facts of the case afford no foundation.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 229.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 7.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, May 31, 1853.*

HALF-AN-HOUR after the departure of the messenger who left St. Petersburg on the 28th instant, I received a note from Count Nesselrode who desired to see me on the following day.

On the 29th accordingly I waited upon the Chancellor, who gave me an account of the circumstances which had led to the departure of Prince Menchikoff from Constantinople, and read to me various documents in explanation of his withdrawal.

These papers were the letters addressed by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Prince Menchikoff, and the Prince's reply ; the "Projet de Note" which had been prepared by the Russian Embassy for the signature of the Sultan's Minister ; and the short despatch in which the Russian Ambassador relates the events which led to his embarkation for Odessa. Count Nesselrode, as before, laid great stress upon the moderation of the Russian demands : they were only for a confirmation of the Emperor's rights, and such as I had always been led to expect ; they bore upon no exclusive privilege, they should be received as a proof of the wish of removing all grounds of dissension between Russia and Turkey.

If the demands too were moderate, the manner in which they were urged was not less so. To meet the views of Her Majesty's Ambassador a Sened had been prepared in lieu of a Treaty, and subsequently an ordinary official note had been substituted for the Sened ; conciliation could hardly be pushed further, whilst, as I had heard, it was the Queen's Ambassador who had prevented the acceptance of those moderate terms which the most prudent of the Sultan's advisers had considered essential for the safety of Turkey.

To this I replied that I must repeat that I had been informed several times by his Excellency that it was intended that the *status quo* which had been

troubled at Jerusalem should be re-established by firmans, the force of which should be sanctioned by an international Act, but that I had never understood that there was question of any new rights being conferred by that Act upon the Crown of Russia.

At the close of our conversation, Count Nesselrode observed that it could not be denied that the state of affairs was very alarming; that the position of the Emperor was one from which it was impossible for His Majesty to recede, and that he would not conceal from me that a continued rejection of the terms offered to the Porte, would be followed by the issue of orders for the entrance of the Russian armies into the Principalities. His Excellency was desirous of remarking to me that war could hardly be undertaken by the Sultan under more disadvantageous circumstances than when it was brought about by a refusal of those conditions the acceptance of which was so warmly desired by the whole Greek population of Turkey, and which carried with them the sympathy of the co-religionists of this country.

No. 230.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, June 8, 1853.*

YOUR despatch of the 31st of May has been received.

I have the satisfaction to inform you that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the language held by you to Count Nesselrode.

You will see by my despatch of yesterday's date, written prior to the receipt of yours, that Her Majesty's Government were aware of the erroneous impressions which existed at St. Petersburg respecting the conduct of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and they now perceive with deep regret the effect which these misrepresentations have produced on the Emperor's mind.

Her Majesty's Government cannot doubt the correctness with which Lord Stratford de Redcliffe has reported all his proceedings, and as you will be in possession of every despatch he has written, it is hoped that you may be able to correct the unjust view that is taken of his conduct.

I cannot too often repeat that we distinctly understood, not alone from yourself, reporting the assurances you had received, but also from Baron Brunnow to more than one member of Her Majesty's Government, that the object of Prince Menchikoff's mission was the settlement of the question of the Holy Places, and some binding agreement which should prevent any future disturbance of that settlement by the Turkish Government; but that no fresh question was to be opened, no extended power was to be sought by Russia in Turkey, and that so far from infringing upon the rights of the Sultan, the Emperor was determined to respect both his dignity and his independence, because the necessity of upholding the Turkish Empire as a great principle of European policy and an absolute necessity for the maintenance of peace, were fully recognized by His Imperial Majesty.

That the question of the holy places was settled in accordance with the Emperor's wishes there can be no doubt, for it has been recorded by Prince Menchikoff, who also conveyed to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe his acknowledgments for the service he had rendered in bringing about that arrangement; and if the further proposals of the Russian Ambassador had been confined to a Treaty ratification of the firmans respecting the holy places, as Lord Stratford de Redcliffe equally with Her Majesty's Government had reason to expect they would be, or even if they had been limited to a re-statement or fresh confirmation of the provisions of the Treaty of Kainardji which regard the Christian religion, it is impossible to believe that the Turkish Government would have hesitated to comply with such demands; but, at all events, it is certain that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, on being appealed to by the Porte, would have tendered no advice contrary to the acceptance of those terms.

Before the receipt of this despatch you will doubtless have examined the Treaty of Kainardji with Count Nesselrode, and Her Majesty's Government rely upon the dispassionate judgment of the Chancellor to determine whether the original *Sened* or the final project of Prince Menchikoff does not so far exceed

any provision to be found in the Treaty of Kainardji as to lose all resemblance to the latter document by the increased power over the Greek subjects of the Sultan that a compliance with the demands of Prince Menchikoff would confer upon Russia.

It was upon these grounds, and because the demands were a departure from the principles which the Emperor has repeatedly insisted upon, and from the *status quo* which His Imperial Majesty was determined to maintain, that not Lord Stratford de Redcliffe alone, but the Sultan and his Ministers and the Representatives of France, Austria, and Prussia, were of opinion that the proposals would be fatally injurious to Turkey.

The Emperor cannot doubt the warm feelings of friendship towards himself entertained by our Gracious Sovereign, and His Imperial Majesty must be also aware that it is alike the duty and the desire of Her Majesty's Government to maintain the most cordial relations with Russia, feeling how essential such relations are to the peace of Europe, and viewing as they do with alarm and abhorrence whatever may tend to the interruption of that peace. His Imperial Majesty may therefore be well assured that it is upon no light grounds that they differ from him as to the demands he now makes upon Turkey; and Her Majesty's Government will not bring themselves to think that these demands do not still admit of settlement in a manner entirely consistent with the dignity of His Imperial Majesty without having recourse to those measures of coercion which, once undertaken, must soon have the most baneful effects throughout Europe, and which even now are looked to by the evil-minded with joyful expectation, while by every friend of order they are regarded with the deepest apprehension.

Her Majesty's Government, I repeat, do not believe that Europe can be in danger of the terrible calamity of war from a question such as that which is now pending at Constantinople; they do not believe that the door will be finally closed against an arrangement which to them appears to be still practicable; and they venture therefore to hope that the demands of Russia may be confined to the recapitulation of existing Treaties and their due fulfilment, but without seeking to extend that influence over the Greek subjects of the Porte that Russia must always and necessarily exercise. Her Majesty's Government are convinced that such a course would not be inconsistent with the dignity of the Emperor, and they are encouraged in the hope that it may still be adopted, with reference to the misunderstanding under which they have so long laboured with respect to the Emperor's intentions, with reference also to the most recent declaration of His Imperial Majesty of his own views as to the objects of Prince Menchikoff's demands, but, more than all, with reference to that pacific policy which has invariably and with most signal success been maintained by the Emperor of Russia.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 231.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 8.)*

(Extract.)

*Berlin, June 5, 1853.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL said, that he had heard from Warsaw that Prince Gortchakoff was to command the army collected on the Turkish frontier, and that his horses and baggage had already proceeded to the head-quarters.

No. 232.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 8.)*

My Lord,

Vienna, June 4, 1853.

AS Count Dimitri Nesselrode, in passing through Vienna on his route from Constantinople to London, had represented very generally, and particularly to Count Buol, that the consent of the Turkish Government to the mitigated demands of Prince Menchikoff had been prevented by the interference of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, I thought it advisable, towards counteracting any impression which might be produced, to place in the hands of Count Buol, for his perusal, the despatch of Lord Stratford addressed to Sir Hamilton Seymour, and dated 23rd ultimo, in which his Lordship's conduct is so clearly and so ably described.\*

Count Buol stated his concurrence with the sentiments expressed in this despatch, and that he considered the proceedings of Lord Stratford as he had described them, and as M. de Klezl had also represented them, as entirely satisfactory.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 233.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 8, 1853.

COUNT WALEWSKI has communicated to me a despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys stating that his Excellency's despatch announcing that the British fleet under the command of Admiral Dundas was placed at the disposal of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, had been laid before the Emperor, and that His Imperial Majesty rejoiced at the identity of views and action which existed between his own Government and that of Her Majesty, and hoped that the result would be to prevent the complications that might arise in the East, and seriously menace the general peace.

The despatch further states the reasons which induced the Emperor to direct that authority should be given to M. de la Cour on the 22nd March last to send for the French fleet to the Dardanelles, and that Admiral de la Susse will now receive orders, at the same time as Admiral Dundas, to proceed towards the Dardanelles, and to anchor in Besika Bay.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys then, after adverting to the circumstances which would render it expedient to afford assistance to Turkey, and to the advice which should be tendered to the Sultan, concludes by saying that if similar views and intentions are entertained by Her Majesty's Government, their answer will record the union of France and England for an object that can give no cause for alarm to other Powers, as the Governments which signed the Convention of the 13th of July, 1841, will be at liberty to associate themselves with us in the manner and according to the means that they may think proper to employ.

Your Excellency is accordingly instructed to inform M. Drouyn de Lhuys that his despatch has given much satisfaction to Her Majesty's Government, who entirely concur in the views and intentions which it sets forth.

It has hitherto been the earnest desire of Her Majesty's Government to avoid any demonstration that should wear the appearance of threat or even be thought to endanger an amicable settlement of the negotiations pending at Constantinople; but I have repeatedly informed the French Ambassador, and it has been announced in both Houses of Parliament, that a complete identity of opinion existed between the two Governments, and that both consequently were desirous to uphold the Turkish Empire.

The time has however now arrived when an understanding as to unity of action becomes necessary, and Her Majesty's Government cordially agree with the French Government that the main object of this must be to avoid complications dangerous to the peace of the world, and to afford time to the friendly

action of diplomacy to prevent a more complete rupture between the Cabinet of St. Petersburg and the Ottoman Porte.

They desire equally with the French Government to prove that they are animated by no hostile feeling towards Russia, by exerting their best efforts to reconcile the claims of that Power with the sovereign rights of the Porte. They intend, as does the French Government, scrupulously to observe the Treaty of 1841, and to excite no alarm on the part of other Governments; and finally, they hope that the Representatives of England and France at Constantinople will, in the exercise of the great powers now confided to them, observe the utmost moderation and discretion.

In the belief that the above is a faithful interpretation of the despatch of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and with the desire that unreserved confidence should exist between the two Governments upon this important question, your Excellency is instructed to give to M. Drouyn de Lhuys a copy of this despatch, together with copies of my despatch to Lord Stratford placing the British fleet at his disposal, and of the instructions that have in consequence been sent to Admiral Dundas.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 234.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 9.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, May 22, 1853.*

IT would be difficult to overrate the importance of Prince Menchikoff's departure, when taken in connection with the circumstances which have preceded and accompanied that event. The immediate menace which it implies to the peace of Turkey, both internally and externally, is, perhaps, the smallest part of the evil to be apprehended. There needs but a continuance of that spirit which has come out on the side of Russia in the recent negotiations, to endanger the very existence of the Ottoman Empire, and to bring into action all the dormant elements of conflict and confusion which are already repressed with difficulty throughout Europe. A heavy responsibility must weigh upon that Government which has unnecessarily brought matters to so dangerous a pass.

It is but justice to admit that Russia had something to complain of in the affair of the holy places; nor can it be denied that much remains to be done for the welfare and security of the Christian population in Turkey. But it is equally true that a fair measure of reparation has been given to the Russian Ambassador; that the question of Jerusalem has been settled to the apparent satisfaction of those concerned; and that the Porte has displayed its readiness to meet the ulterior demands of Russia, in so far as they do not manifestly trench on the sovereign rights and independence of its Empire. However benevolent and conciliatory the intentions of the Emperor Nicholas may be, there is but one opinion, among all who are not the partizans of Russia, as to the dangerous and inadmissible character of the powers which His Majesty's Ambassador has sought to obtain by intimidation at the Sultan's expense. The Turkish Ministers and their Sovereign required no advisers to persuade them that the direct influence of such a Power as Russia could never be entitled to bear, with all the force of mutual and solemn engagements, upon more than ten millions of their Christian dependents professing the religion of Russia, and not have the effect of disparaging the credit and undermining the authority of their Government to an alarming degree. Their resistance to a pretension as dangerous as it was unexpected, could hardly fail of gaining strength in proportion as they found a corresponding sentiment among the Representatives of Foreign Powers, and, what is more significant, symptoms of indifference among the Greeks themselves to an increase of Russian intervention. With every conciliatory disposition in other respects, they have stood to their refusal on the one essential point, notwithstanding the alternate menaces and seductions, the untiring manœuvres, of a skilful diplomacy, assisted by the smallest indications of other than moral support to be expected from any more friendly quarter.

The line taken and the language employed by me has been duly reported in my correspondence, and I have no reason to suppose that the French Ambassador has deviated from the course which, in concert with him, I originally adopted.

Now that the suspension of diplomatic relations between the Porte and Russia has unhappily taken place, it remains with your Lordship and Her Majesty's Government to judge how far the stronger of the two parties has been justified in pushing its pretensions to that extreme, and how far the weaker was compelled in self-defence to incur the hazards of a rupture. The peril braved by the latter is evidently so great that any sacrifices of a temporary nature might perhaps have been wisely made for the sake of avoiding it. But the Turkish Government has had no such choice to make. It was not the amputation of a limb, but the infusion of poison into the system that they were summoned to accept. Everything short of this, both in form and in substance, they declared their willingness to concede; and far from blaming the reservation, I cannot conceal from your Lordship that I approve and admire it, even while lamenting the necessity and deprecating its consequences. The independence of Turkey is still a recognized object of European, and most especially of British diplomacy. Russia no less than the other four parties to the Convention of 1841, professes an unabated adherence to this principle. But the legalized introduction of a dominant foreign influence may prove as fatal to the independence of a country as partial dismemberment or military occupation. Circumstances have brought this question to an issue. If the Porte be right in its apprehension and resistance, Her Majesty's Government will no doubt employ their available means for the purpose of rescuing it from an unmerited and imminent danger. Unsupported by such assistance, whether single or united, moral or material, the Turkish Empire will have to undergo either the risks of actual war with disproportioned means of defence, or a protracted state of tension and alarm, involving much expense, and liable to terminate at least in hostilities, or in a disastrous compromise.

The solemn assurances repeatedly given by the Emperor of Russia, the total absence of any just cause of war, and the terms in which Prince Menchikoff declared his final resolution, would seem to forbid a recourse to immediate hostilities. But some expressions which have occasionally escaped from His Majesty's lips, the signal want of harmony between certain statements of Count Nesselrode and certain proceedings of Prince Menchikoff, the unexplained continuance in Bessarabia of a strong Russian force occupying advanced positions, and the latest reports from Galatz and Trebizond, indicating preparations for a general movement, leave a painful doubt upon the mind.

In reliance rather on principles than appearances, I have hitherto advised the Turkish Ministers, not indeed to suspend altogether the defensive preparations which they had commenced before my arrival, but to continue them with as little excitement and outward demonstration as the nature of the service would allow. This method of proceeding they have hitherto observed with scrupulous attention, and nothing at all calculated either to express defiance or to provoke resentment has appeared in their operations. Now that the threatened rupture has actually occurred, more active and decided measures of preparation must in their judgment be adopted; nor could I, with any shadow of fairness, or indeed with much prospect of success, attempt to dissuade them from putting themselves without delay into a more effective posture of defence.

It is not necessary for this purpose to depart from the principle of a moral resistance, which, as your Lordships knows, I have recommended to the Porte, not only as the safest ground to occupy at present, but as the wisest with reference to future results. The possibility of maintaining this position hereafter must, of course, depend on the conduct of Russia, and the Sultan meanwhile has to guard his responsibility towards the nation, no less than his Ministers have to provide for their own towards the Sovereign.

On the supposition of its being found impossible to avoid hostilities, I need not suggest to your Lordship the probable issue of the struggle, if Turkey were left to sustain singlehanded all the weight and pressure of its formidable opponent. In that case—a case which I am unwilling to anticipate—the sooner the Porte were apprized of its helpless condition the better. Placed at the mercy of Russia, the Sultan would have no choice but to accept the terms of pardon, which a triumphant enemy, anxious to save appearances towards Europe, and

determined at the same time to accomplish his purpose, might be expected to grant.

I would not willingly exaggerate the character and drift of that purpose; but, judging from what little knowledge I possess of Russian policy in this country, and not losing sight of the lessons derived from experience, I cannot disguise my conviction that it involves the establishment of a predominant influence over the counsels of the Porte, tending, in the interest of absolute power, to exclude all other influences, and to secure the means, if not of hastening the downfall of this Empire, at least of obstructing its improvement, and settling its future destinies to the profit of Russia, whenever a propitious juncture shall arrive. Other and juster considerations—those in particular of religion and good neighbourhood—may have their place in the Emperor's mind; but the master-view is the one most likely to predominate under favourable circumstances, and thither, I humbly conceive, the forethought and energies of Western Europe cannot be too soon or too vigorously directed.

There is little room for supposing, that even the tranquillity of Turkey would be promoted by a compliance with the demands of Russia. The exercise of a protecting influence over the churches and clergy of the Greco-Russian religion, as it is ominously called by Russian statesmen, would ever be attended with the excitement of mistrustful and irritated feelings. The Russian Embassy would be provoked by interested individuals to wield its power with a high hand and to apply it with a searching spirit; nor would the Porte be so humiliated by concession, as not occasionally to struggle for the recovery of its lost ascendancy. The natural consequences of such antagonism are obvious enough, and the process of contention between force and weakness destitute of confidence or mutual sympathy, must terminate, sooner or later, in the hopeless subjection of the victim.

What Russia requires of the Porte would bear a strange appearance, if the principle involved in it were applied to other countries less anomalously situated. What would be thought in Europe, if France or Austria were to demand a guarantee from Great Britain for the protection and good treatment of the Roman Catholic priesthood in Ireland? What, if Her Majesty's Government were to interfere in a similar way in behalf of the Protestants in France? Is there a canton in Switzerland endowed with so little spirit and foresight as to submit without a struggle to France asserting her right to take part in the protection of all Roman Catholic churches and priests in that country?

In Turkey the dignitaries of the Greek or orthodox church exercise in some degree the powers of civil magistrates. Russia, overstepping the spiritual limit declared by herself, includes those powers in the sphere of privilege for the unalterable maintenance of which she seeks a treaty right.

The abuses of the Greek hierarchy, as well in the exercise of civil authority as in the management of temporalities, are notorious; but if the pretensions of Russia were placed under the sanction of international law, all prospect of improvement would be lost. Privilege and abuse would be bound up together in scandalous perpetuity; or if in the course of time the just complaints of the laity were to prevail, the Russian Embassy, and not the Sultan's Government, would be the object of their addresses for relief, and also of their gratitude when relieved.

These objections to the extension of a legalized Russian influence over the millions who profess the Greek religion in Turkey, by no means exempt the Ottoman Government from the duty of securing to the Greeks, and indeed to their tributary subjects in general, the full and free exercise of religious worship, together with the enjoyment of all that pertains to its maintenance and efficiency. The Turks are not indifferent to this claim. Their fears of Russia and consequent need of European support increase their sense of it; and the Porte is now going to proclaim with due formality a solemn confirmation and enforcement of all the religious privileges accorded of old or in later years to its Christian subjects. An additional pledge of sincerity is to be conveyed in this instance by the Sultan's firmans, in virtue of their official communication to the Representatives of the five Powers who concluded the Treaty of 1841.

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*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 9.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, May 25, 1853.*

YOU will not be surprised to learn that much anxiety prevails among the public in this capital, and more particularly at the Porte and on the Exchange, in consequence of the rupture of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Russia. The advanced positions maintained by the Russian forces in Bessarabia, and other circumstances, had caused uneasiness even while Prince Menchikoff was here. His departure has given birth to a thousand rumours, which might be dismissed without attention, were it not that advices from Varna, Galatz, Batoom, and Trebizond concur on different grounds in justifying an apprehension of some coercive, if not hostile operation on the part of Russia.

*Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Baron Brunnow, June 8.)*

M. le Baron,

*St. Pétersbourg, le <sup>20</sup> Mai  
1<sup>er</sup> Juin, 1853.*

AU moment où votre Excellence recevra le présente dépêche, le Comte Dimitri de Nesselrode vous aura déjà mis au fait du déplorable dénouement de la mission du Prince Menchikoff, et du départ définitif de cet Ambassadeur pour Odessa, à la suite du rejet successif de toutes nos dernières propositions. Toutes les pièces diplomatiques échangées de part et d'autre à cette occasion entre nous et la Porte Ottomane, ont été mises entre vos mains.

Antérieurement le Prince Menchikoff vous avait déjà envoyé les deux firmans plus spécialement relatifs à la question des lieux saints, communiqué les modifications apportées au premier Projet de Convention destinée à nous servir de garantie contre le retour des difficultés que viennent d'aplanir ces firmans, et fait part de la vive opposition que rencontraient nos demandes à ce sujet, principalement du côté de l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre.

Vous êtes dès lors en possession de toutes les pièces de conviction nécessaires, et nous ne doutons pas que votre zèle n'y ait déjà puisé les moyens de faire apprécier au Gouvernement Anglais jusqu'à quel point nous avons poussé l'esprit de conciliation, les efforts consciencieux que nous avons employés à prévenir la fatale rupture de nos relations avec la Porte, et toutes les facilités que notre Ambassadeur a offertes au Divan pour l'acceptation de nos dernières propositions, soit en modifiant celles-ci, soit en prolongeant à trois reprises différentes, moyennant de nouveaux sursis, le terme originairement fixé pour cette acceptation.

Notre premier Projet de Convention avait donné matière à de graves objections, la forme d'un Traité paraissant inacceptable aux conseillers de la Porte. Notre Ambassadeur a consenti à y substituer la forme plus simple et moins solennelle d'un Sened.

Plusieurs clauses de ce Sened, notamment celles qui avaient trait aux patriarches, métropolitains, et évêques de l'Eglise d'Orient, ayant également soulevé des difficultés, le Prince Menchikoff a pris sur lui de supprimer entièrement ces clauses. Enfin au dernier moment, et quand la négociation était déjà rompue officiellement, la Porte persistant à se refuser à tout Acte qui porterait une forme bilatérale quelconque, notre Ambassadeur en était venu jusqu'à déclarer qu'il se contenterait d'un engagement par note officielle, telle que celle dont il vous a transmis copie.

Toutes ces concessions ont été tour-à-tour inutiles. Une méfiance aussi injuste que blessante pour les sentiments de l'Empereur les a rejetées avec persistance, en sorte qu'après plusieurs mois de négociations infructueuses, bien que nos griefs les plus criants ait été redressés pour le moment, on nous refuse pour l'avenir, contre le retour d'éventualités pareilles, la garantie formelle et positive à laquelle nous avons attaché le caractère d'une réparation indispensable pour le manque de foi dont nous avons eu à nous plaindre—garantie sans

laquelle les nouveaux firmans n'ont pas plus de valeur réelle que celui dont, au mépris de la parole solennelle du Sultan, nous avons vu en dernier lieu annuler la teneur et l'exécution.

Le moment est donc arrivé où en dépit des intentions les plus pacifiques, l'Empereur dans l'intérêt de sa dignité, et dans l'accomplissement de ses devoirs envers la Russie, se voit obligé d'adopter à l'égard de la Turquie une politique autre que celle qu'il aurait voulu continuer à suivre.

Il se hâte d'exposer aujourd'hui sans détour au Ministère de Sa Majesté Britannique les nouvelles mesures qu'il va prendre au milieu de cette crise provoquée par une aveugle obstination.

Avant tout, et malgré tant d'inutiles sursis qu'il a déjà accordé à la Porte, il veut lui laisser encore un dernier moyen de revenir à de meilleurs conseils que ceux qu'elle a pris jusqu'à présent : Que le Sultan conformément à l'invitation qui lui en est faite par une lettre que j'adresse à Réchid Pasha, et que vous trouverez ci-annexée, se décide à accepter et à signer la note proposée par le Prince Menchikoff, et notre Auguste Maître ne se refusera pas d'accepter encore cette tardive réparation. Mais pour s'y décider, il ne peut accorder à la Porte qu'une semaine de réflexion. Ce terme écoulé, l'Empereur ne prendra plus conseil que de l'honneur et de la dignité de la Russie.

Il ordonnera à ses troupes d'occuper les Principautés, et les gardera en dépôt jusqu'à ce qu'il ait obtenu la satisfaction précitée.

Ce n'est pas sans un vif et profond regret que Sa Majesté se voit forcée de prendre une pareille mesure. Même en l'adoptant, son intention n'en est pas moins de rester fidèle au principe fondamental de sa politique—celui de ne point vouloir renverser l'Empire Ottoman. L'Empereur ne cherchera donc, tout en occupant momentanément une partie des possessions de la Porte, aucun agrandissement de territoire. Il évitera de favoriser sciemment et volontairement toute tentative de soulèvement parmi les populations Chrétiennes. Il ne veut qu'atteindre le but qu'on l'aura mis délibérément dans le cas d'obtenir par d'autres moyens que ceux qu'il a employés sans succès.

En agissant comme il l'a fait, et comme il se propose de le faire si on ne l'y oblige, l'Empereur croit être resté fidèle aux déclarations qu'il a faites au Gouvernement Anglais. Il avait promis de pousser la modération et la patience aussi loin qu'elles pourraient aller. Mais en portant à la connaissance du Cabinet de Londres les préparatifs militaires qui coïncidèrent avec l'ouverture des négociations, il ne lui avait pas dissimulé qu'il pourrait arriver un moment où il se verrait contraint d'y avoir recours. C'est pourquoi il pria l'Angleterre d'employer son influence à Constantinople pour y faire entendre les conseils de la prudence, et de s'efforcer de son côté d'y conjurer une crise imminente, en éclairant les Turcs sur les conséquences, au lieu de les encourager dans leur aveugle obstination par des espérances de secours. Le Cabinet Britannique,—c'est là une justice que nous nous plaçons à lui rendre,—a agi dans cet esprit. Il s'est montré persuadé de nos intentions conciliantes. Il nous a franchement aidé à Paris dans cette partie épineuse de la question des lieux saints qu'il s'agissait d'arranger avec la France. Quand celle-ci, sur la foi des bruits mensongers répandus à Constantinople, a envoyé sa flotte dans les mers de Grèce, l'escadre Anglaise de Malte n'a fait aucun mouvement. Malheureusement l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Constantinople était animé d'autres dispositions envers nous. Une incurable défiance, une activité passionnée, ont caractérisé toute sa conduite dans la dernière phase de la négociation. Même après la conversion du Projet de Convention en simple Séned, même après les modifications importantes apportées à ce dernier par la suppression de l'Article des Patriarches, il a continué à nous refuser pour l'avenir toute espèce de garantie quelconque. Nous connaissons les efforts qu'il a fait auprès du Sultan, comme auprès des membres de son Conseil, pour l'encourager à la résistance, en cherchant à lui persuader que nos menaces ne dépasseraient pas la portée d'une pression morale, en lui promettant l'appui et les sympathies de l'Europe, s'il accordait à ses sujets l'égalité devant la loi et des privilèges plus conformes aux mœurs libérales de l'Occident. Enfin au dernier moment, quand le Prince Menchikoff avait consenti à abandonner même le Séned modifié pour se contenter d'une note, quand Réchid Pasha-lui-même, frappé des dangers que le départ de notre Légation pouvait faire courir à la Porte, conjurait l'Ambassadeur Britannique avec instance de ne pas s'opposer à la remise de la note formulée par le Prince Menchikoff, Lord

Redcliffe l'en a empêché, en déclarant que la note avait la valeur d'un Traité, et qu'elle était inacceptable.

Nous en appelons de ce jugement passionné à la raison et à l'impartialité du Gouvernement Britannique lui-même. Qu'il veuille bien examiner froidement le contenu et les termes de cette note, et après l'avoir méditée, qu'il nous dise ce qu'elle offre véritablement de compromettant pour la dignité de la Porte, de dangereux pour sa sécurité intérieure, quel accroissement si grand d'influence elle nous donne, et si le prétendu risque qu'elle fait courir aux intérêts ultérieurs de la Porte pouvait un instant seulement entrer en balance avec les risques bien autrement graves auxquels son rejet—entraînant, comme il était devenu inévitable, le départ immédiat de la Légation Impériale—pouvait, et peut encore exposer la Porte Ottomane, l'Europe, et je dirai même, dans les circonstances actuelles, le monde social tout entier.

A dire vrai, M. le Baron, nous n'avons jamais pu comprendre pourquoi même le projet original de Convention, auquel le Prince Menchikoff a renoncé, suivant la latitude que nous lui en avons laissée, excitait de telles craintes, provoquait une opposition si grande. Nous ne concevons pas jusqu'ici ce qu'en principe il peut avoir de contraire aux droits de souveraineté du Sultan, ce qu'en fait il a de nouveau, et peut ajouter aux moyens que nous possédons déjà d'intervenir, au nom de la religion, dans les affaires intérieures du Gouvernement Ottoman, si telles étaient, comme on se plaît à le supposer d'une manière si gratuite, nos intentions et notre constante politique. S'agit-il du principe seulement ? Mais en principe une pareille transaction ne serait pas plus contraire aux droits d'autonomie du Souverain de la Turquie que ne sont jugés tels les Capitulations ou Traités que la Porte Ottomane a conclus avec la France et avec l'Autriche. En principe n'avons nous pas déjà nous-mêmes dans nos Traités de Kainardji et d'Andrinople obtenu le droit de veiller aux intérêts de nos coreligionnaires dans les provinces Turques ? Le règlement par Traité d'une ou plusieurs affaires ecclésiastiques, une garantie assurée, également par Traité, dans un autre Etat aux intérêts d'une communion étrangère, n'ont rien de nouveau, n'offrent au contraire rien que d'usuel dans les rapports de Puissance à Puissance. L'histoire en présente plus d'un exemple que nous pourrions citer à l'appui. C'est ainsi entr'autres qu'en Autriche—pour ne parler que d'un grand Etat dont nul certes ne contestera la force et la pleine indépendance—la position civile des Protestants découlait de Traités conclus en faveur de leurs immunités par les Princes d'Allemagne qui embrassèrent la réforme, et qui la prirent sous leur garantie, sans que pareilles stipulations aient jamais été envisagées comme attentant en principe aux droits de souveraineté de l'Empereur. Si de tels pactes ont pu se conclure sans la compromission pour leur dignité avec des Etats Chrétiens, à plus forte raison peuvent-ils l'être avec un Gouvernement Mussulman—un Gouvernement surtout où les Chrétiens ont vu tant de fois menacés, non seulement leur immunités religieuses, mais leurs biens et leurs vies mêmes.

Ce que nous disons du principe, nous pouvons le dire également du fait. Encore une fois, une nouvelle Convention destinée à nous fournir des prétextes d'intervention religieuse en Turquie, si nous en cherchions, ne nous offrirait rien de plus que nous ne puissions trouver à volonté dans nos Traités antérieurs, et n'ajouterait rien à la réalité de notre influence sur nos coreligionnaires, laquelle influence est dans les choses et non dans les mots. Mais alors, objectera-t-on, pourquoi l'avez vous demandée cette nouvelle Convention à propos de la question spéciale et locale des lieux saints ? Nous l'avons demandée, M. le Baron, parceque, à propos de cette question, soulevée si gratuitement et si inopinément pour nous, on nous a mis dans la nécessité d'aviser à combler les lacunes de nos transactions antérieures, afin de sauver des immunités que nous avons cru consacrées et à l'abri de tout danger par la possession et l'usage ; parceque lorsque nous avons réclamé contre la violation de firman (fin de Janvier, v. s., 1852), on nous a répondu que la France avait un Traité, et que nous n'en avions pas ; parcequ'enfin, après la manque de foi dont la Porte s'était rendu coupable envers nous dans cette circonstance, comme nous n'avions pas la prétention d'exiger qu'elle retirât pour nous à la France ce que celle-ci venait d'obtenir, il nous fallait néanmoins un acte de réparation quelconque, une garantie plus positive que tels manques de foi n'arriveraient plus. Sans cela, nous n'y aurions pas songé, et le peu d'importance que nous y mettons ressort assez de la facilité avec laquelle nous nous sommes montrés et nous montrons encore prêts à la

dernière heure à nous contenter d'une note, comme réparation du passé et garantie de l'avenir.

Que le Gouvernement Anglais nous permette de le lui dire en tout franchise. En se préoccupant à tel point des inconvénients d'une Convention, comme donnant à la Russie des droits d'ingérence qu'elle ne possédait pas, on se crée un monstre à plaisir, on se débat contre un fantôme. Pense-t-on sérieusement que nous ayons besoin d'un pareil Acte, pour intervenir en Turquie en faveur des Grecs orthodoxes, si leurs droits, leurs intérêts, leurs propriétés ou leurs vies venaient à être menacés ? Le possédions-nous quand nous avons, à l'époque de la révolution Grecque, rompu nos rapports avec la Turquie à la suite des persécutions exercées sur le culte orthodoxe ? L'absence d'une Convention semblable a-t-elle empêché l'Angleterre et la France elle-même d'intervenir en Turquie chaque fois que les principes de la tolérance religieuse leur ont paru méconnus par le Gouvernement Ottoman ? Il y a un fait que toutes les précautions et méfiances diplomatiques ne seront pas en état de déplacer. C'est celui de la sympathie et de la communauté d'intérêts qui attachent notre population de 50,000,000 d'orthodoxes aux 12,000,000 et plus qui composent la majorité des sujets du Sultan. Que cela puisse être fâcheux pour ceux qu'inquiète notre influence, le fait n'en existe pas moins. Apparemment on n'exigera pas de nous que nous renoncions à cette influence pour dissiper des alarmes exagérées. Nous le voudrions par impossible que nous ne le pourrions pas. En s'armant contre ce fait-là, en cherchant avec une affectation si marquée à se prémunir contre lui, en forçant la Porte Ottomane à nous braver pour en conjurer les conséquences éventuelles sur de vaines suppositions, on ne fait que le mettre davantage encore en lumière aux yeux des sujets Chrétiens de la Porte ; qu'affaiblir d'autant dans leur esprit l'autorité morale de celle-ci ; et au lieu de nous témoigner à cause de lui des défiances aussi peu méritées qu'injurieuses, il serait mieux de s'en fier à la modération de l'Empereur du soin de ne point en abuser.

Mais au reste ce n'est plus là qu'est la question. A l'heure qu'il est, il ne s'agit plus d'une Convention bilatérale ni d'un Sened même, mais d'une simple note. Le rejet de cette note, si nous le tolérions, constituerait pour nous un échec moral que nous ne pouvons accepter, et de concessions en concessions étant arrivés aux dernières limites que l'esprit de conciliation puisse atteindre, nous sommes obligés d'honneur à nous en tenir à ce dernier mot. A son acceptation pure et simple sont encore subordonnées les mesures que nous allons prendre.

Veuillez donc, M. le Baron, les porter à la connaissance du Gouvernement Anglais. Nous espérons encore qu'une appréciation plus mûre de sa situation véritable engagera la Porte Ottomane à entrer dans la voie de salut que nous lui ouvrons. S'il devait en être autrement, si, par suite des complications qu'une guerre entraînera nécessairement, l'Empire Ottoman voit s'ajouter de nouvelles causes d'affaiblissement au principe de dissolution qui le mine, la responsabilité en appartiendra à cette politique de défiance qui, en excitant la Porte contre nous, l'a déjà plus d'une fois poussée sur le bord d'une abîme où la modération de l'Empereur seul l'a empêchée de s'engloutir.

Recevez, &c.  
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)

M. le Baron,

*St. Petersburg, May 20  
June 12, 1853.*

BY the time your Excellency receives this despatch, you will have been informed by Count Dimitri de Nesselrode of the deplorable termination of Prince Menchikoff's mission, and of that Ambassador's final departure for Odessa, in consequence of the successive rejection of all our late proposals. All the diplomatic correspondence which has passed between ourselves and the Ottoman Porte upon this occasion has been placed in your hands.

Prince Menchikoff had previously sent to you the two Firmans more especially relating to the Holy Places, had communicated to you the modifications introduced into the first Draft of Convention, intended to guarantee us against a recurrence of the difficulties which those Firmans have just removed, and had acquainted you with the vehement opposition which our demands met with, principally on the part of the English Ambassador.

You are, therefore, in possession of all the necessary evidence, and we do not doubt but that your zeal has already found therein the means of making the English Government sensible of the extent to which we have carried our spirit of conciliation, of the conscientious exertions which we have made to prevent the fatal rupture of our relations with the Porte, and of the facilities which our Ambassador has afforded to the Divan for the acceptance of our proposals, both by modifying them, and by postponing three several times, by means of further delays, the period originally named for their acceptance.

Our first Draft of Convention had been strongly objected to, the form of a Treaty appearing to the Counsellors of the Porte to be inadmissible. Our Ambassador consented to substitute for it the more simple and less solemn form of a Sened.

Several clauses of that Sened, especially those which related to the Patriarchs, Metropolitans and Bishops of the Eastern Church, having also given rise to objections, Prince Menchikoff took upon himself to suppress those clauses entirely. Finally at the last moment, and when the negotiation was already broken off officially, the Porte persisting in refusing any bilateral Act whatever, our Ambassador went so far as to declare that he would be satisfied with an engagement in the form of an official note, such as that of which he forwarded a copy to your Excellency. All these concessions were in their turn found of no avail. A mistrust, as unjust as it was offensive to the Emperor's feelings, obstinately rejected them; so that after several months of fruitless negotiations, although our more urgent grievances may have been redressed for the time, they still refuse us the formal and positive guarantee against the recurrence of similar acts for the future, which we had considered as the indispensable reparation for the breach of faith of which we have had to complain, and without which guarantee the new Firmans have no more real value than the one, the tenour and execution of which we have lately seen disregarded, notwithstanding the solemn promises of the Sultan.

The time has therefore arrived when, in spite of the most pacific intentions, the Emperor out of regard for his own dignity, and in the fulfilment of his duty to Russia, finds himself obliged to adopt towards Turkey a line of policy different from that which he would willingly have continued to follow.

He now hastens to lay before Her Britannic Majesty's Ministers unreservedly the further measures which he is about to take in the present crisis, which has been brought about by a blind obstinacy.

In the first place, and notwithstanding the unavailing delays which he has already accorded to the Porte, he desires to afford it another opportunity of returning to better counsels than those which it has at present adopted. Let the Sultan, in conformity with the invitation to that effect contained in the letter which I am addressing to Reshid Pasha, decide upon accepting and signing the note proposed by Prince Menchikoff, and our august master will not even now refuse to accept that tardy reparation. But in order to make up its mind to do so, he can only allow the Porte a week for reflection. At the expiration of that period, the Emperor will consult only the honour and dignity of Russia.

He will order his troops to occupy the Principalities, which he will retain as a deposit until he has obtained the satisfaction above mentioned.

It is not without extreme and profound regret that the Emperor finds himself forced into adopting such a measure. Even whilst adopting it, he still intends to remain faithful to the fundamental principle of his policy, that of not wishing to subvert the Ottoman Empire. The Emperor then will not seek any aggrandisement of territory, although occupying for a time a portion of the Porte's possessions. He will avoid favouring, knowingly and voluntarily, any attempt at insurrection among the Christian populations. He only wishes to attain the end which he will have been deliberately forced into seeking by other means than those which he has employed without success.

In acting as he has done, and as he intends to do if he is not compelled, the Emperor considers that he has remained faithful to the declarations made by him to the English Government. He promised to carry his patience and moderation to the utmost extremity; but in communicating to the Cabinet of London the military preparations which coincided with the opening of the negotiations, he did not conceal from it that the moment might come when he would be obliged to have recourse to them. For that reason he besought

England to employ her influence at Constantinople to obtain a hearing for the counsels of prudence, and to endeavour on her part there to prevent a crisis which was imminent, by enlightening the Turks as to its consequences, instead of encouraging them by hopes of succour in their wilful obstinacy. The British Cabinet, and we have much pleasure in doing it this justice, acted in this spirit. It appeared satisfied with our conciliatory intentions. It frankly assisted us at Paris in that delicate part of the question of the Holy Places which was to be arranged with France. When the latter Power, on the strength of lying rumours current in Constantinople, sent her fleet into the Greek waters, the English squadron at Malta did not move. Unhappily, the Ambassador of England at Constantinople was animated by different feelings towards us. An incurable mistrust, a vehement activity have characterised the whole of his conduct during the latter part of the negotiation. Even after the conversion of the Project of Convention into a simple *Sened*, even after the important modifications introduced into the latter by the suppression of the Article referring to the Patriarchs, he persisted in refusing us any kind of guarantee whatever for the future. We are aware of the efforts which he employed with the Sultan, and also with the members of his Council, to encourage him to resistance, by seeking to persuade him that our menaces would not go beyond the limits of a moral pressure, by promising him the support and the sympathies of Europe, if he granted to his subjects equality in the eye of the law, and privileges more in accordance with the liberal habits of the West. Finally, at the last moment, when Prince Menchikoff had consented to abandon even the modified *Sened*, and to content himself with a note, when Reshid Pasha himself, struck with the dangers which the departure of our Legation might entail upon the Porte, earnestly conjured the British Ambassador not to oppose the acceptance of the note drawn up by Prince Menchikoff, Lord Redcliffe prevented its acceptance by declaring that the note was equivalent to a Treaty, and was inadmissible.

We appeal from this opinion originating in passion to the reason and impartiality of the British Government itself. Let it calmly examine the contents and the terms of that note, and, after having considered it well, let it tell us what it contains derogatory to the Porte's dignity, or dangerous to its internal security; what great increase of influence it bestows upon us; and whether the pretended risk to which it exposes the eventual interests of the Porte can for an instant be put in comparison with the still more serious risk to which the rejection of it, followed as that inevitably must be by the immediate departure of the Imperial Legation, might, and still may, expose the Ottoman Porte, Europe, and I will even say, under existing circumstances, the whole social world.

In truth, M. le Baron, we have never been able to understand why even the original Project of Convention, which was renounced by Prince Menchikoff in accordance with the latitude which we had allowed him in the matter, should have excited such apprehensions, and provoked so strong an opposition. We cannot, up to the present time, conceive what there was in its principle contrary to the Sultan's rights of sovereignty; what there is, in fact, new about it; or what it can add to the means which we already possess of interfering, on the plea of religion, in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Government, if such were, as has been so gratuitously supposed, our intentions and our constant policy. Is it merely a question of principle? But in principle such a transaction would be no more derogatory to the rights and independence of the Sovereign of Turkey, than the Capitulations or Treaties which the Ottoman Porte has concluded with France and Austria. In principle, have not we ourselves, by our Treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople, obtained the right of watching over the interests of our co-religionists in the Turkish provinces? The settlement by Treaty of one or more ecclesiastical affairs,—a guarantee, likewise secured by Treaty, in favour of the interests of a foreign communion, are no new things,—are in no respect unusual in the relations between one Power and another. History furnishes us with more than one instance which we might cite in support of this. Thus, among other instances, in Austria—we will only speak of a great State, whose power and full independence will certainly not be denied by any one—the civil position of the Protestants originated in Treaties concluded in their favour by the Princes of Germany, who

embraced the Reformation and took it under their guarantee, without such stipulations having ever been considered as derogatory in their principle to the Emperor's rights of sovereignty. If such covenants could be made with Christian States without compromising their dignity, *a fortiori* may they be entered into with a Mussulman Government,—with a Government especially under which the Christians have so often seen, not only their religious immunities, but their property, and even their lives, menaced.

What we say of the principle, we may say equally of the fact. Again, a new Convention, intended to furnish us with pretexts for religious intervention in Turkey, if we wished for any, would afford us nothing beyond what we could, if we wished it, find in our previous Treaties, and would add nothing to the reality of our influence over our co-religionists, which influence is to be found in facts, and not in words. But then, it will be objected, why have you required a new Convention on the special and local question of the Holy Places?

We have required it, M. le Baron, because in this question, which has been raised for us so gratuitously and so unexpectedly, we have been forced to consider how we might supply the deficiencies of our preceding transactions, so as to preserve the immunities which we had looked upon as sacred and placed beyond the reach of danger by possession and by long usage; because, when we complained of the violation of the Firman (of the end of January, o.s., 1852), we were answered that France had a Treaty, and that we had none; because, in fine, after the breach of faith of which the Porte was guilty towards us upon that occasion, as we did not pretend to expect that it should withdraw from France what the latter had just obtained, we still required an act of reparation of some kind, a more positive guarantee that such breaches of faith should not again occur. Otherwise we should never have thought of doing so; and the little stress we lay upon it, is sufficiently evident from the facility with which we have always shown, and still show, ourselves ready at the last hour to be satisfied with a note, as reparation for the past and guarantee for the future.

Let the English Government permit us to tell them with all frankness, that in thus troubling themselves so much about the inexpediency of a Convention, as giving to Russia rights of interference which she did not possess, they are creating a bugbear for themselves, and contending against a phantom. Is it seriously supposed that we stand in need of such an Act in order to interfere in Turkey in favour of the orthodox Greeks, if they should be threatened in their rights, their interests, their properties, or their lives? Did we possess such an Act when, at the period of the Greek Revolution, we broke off our relations with the Porte in consequence of the persecutions carried on against the orthodox faith? Has the absence of such a Convention prevented England, and France herself, from interfering in Turkey whenever the principles of religious toleration appeared to them to be disregarded by the Ottoman Government?

There is one fact which all the precautions and suspicions of diplomacy will never be able to gainsay. It is the fact of the sympathy and of the community of interests which attach our population of fifty millions of the orthodox to the twelve millions and more which compose the majority of the Sultan's subjects. However distressing this fact may be to those whom our influence alarms, it is still not the less a fact. In all likelihood we shall not be required to renounce that influence in order to dispel exaggerated alarms. Even in the impossible supposition that we should wish to do so, we could not. All the opposition arrayed against this fact, all the marked affectation of precautions against it, all the endeavours to force the Porte to brave us out in order to avert the eventual consequences of idle suppositions, only serve to place the matter in a still clearer light before the eyes of the Christian subjects of the Porte, and, proportionately, to weaken in their minds the moral authority of the latter; and instead of manifesting towards us, on that account, a distrust as unfounded as it is offensive, it would be better to trust to the Emperor's moderation the care of not abusing this influence.

But moreover that is no longer the question. At present there is no longer any question of a bilateral Convention, or even of a *Sened*, but of a simple note. The rejection of that note, if we were to tolerate it, would be for us a moral defeat to which we cannot submit; and having now, by con-

cession after concession, reached the extreme limits to which a spirit of conciliation can extend, we are bound in honour to abide by this last demand. Upon its unqualified acceptance depend the measures to be adopted by us.

Have the goodness therefore, M. le Baron, to make the English Government acquainted with them. We still hope that a more mature consideration of her true situation will induce the Ottoman Porte to enter the path of safety which we open for it. If it should be otherwise, if by reason of the complications which a war will necessarily bring with it, the Ottoman Empire shall find new sources of weakness added to the principle of dissolution which is undermining it, the responsibility of them will rest with that policy of mistrust, which, by exciting the Porte against us, has already more than once brought her to the very verge of an abyss in which the moderation of the Emperor has alone prevented her from being swallowed up.

Accept, &c.

(Signed)

NESSELRODE.

Inclosure in No. 236.

*Count Nesselrode to Reshid Pasha.*

*St. Pétersbourg, le  $\frac{1}{31}$  Mai, 1853.*

L'EMPEREUR mon Auguste Maître vient d'être informé que son Ambassadeur a dû quitter Constantinople à la suite du refus péremptoire de la Porte de prendre vis-à-vis de la Cour Impériale de Russie le moindre engagement propre à la rassurer sur les intentions protectrices du Gouvernement Ottoman à l'égard du culte et des églises orthodoxes en Turquie.

C'est après un séjour infructueux de trois mois, après avoir épuisé, de vive voix et par écrit, tout ce que la vérité, la bienveillance, l'esprit de conciliation pourraient lui dicter; c'est enfin après avoir cherché à ménager tous les scrupules malfondés et toutes les susceptibilités de la Porte par les modifications successives, auxquelles il avait consenti dans les termes et la forme des garanties qu'il était chargé de demander, que le Prince Menchikoff a dû prendre la détermination que l'Empereur apprend avec peine, mais que Sa Majesté n'a pu qu'approuver pleinement.

Votre Excellence est trop éclairée pour ne pas prévoir les conséquences de l'interruption de nos relations avec le Gouvernement de Son Altesse. Elle est trop dévouée aux intérêts véritables et permanents de son Souverain et de son Empire pour ne pas éprouver de profonds regrets en présence des événements qui peuvent éclater, et dont la responsabilité pesera tout entière sur ceux qui les provoquent.

Aussi en adressant aujourd'hui cette lettre à votre Excellence, je n'ai d'autre but que de la mettre à même, tant qu'elle le peut encore, de rendre un très important service à son Souverain. Mettez encore une fois, Monsieur, sous les yeux de Son Altesse la situation réelle des choses; la modération et la justice des demandes de la Russie; la très grave offense que l'on fait à l'Empereur en opposant à ses intentions si constamment amicales et généreuses une méfiance sans motif et de refus sans excuse.

La dignité de Sa Majesté, les intérêts de son Empire, la voix de la conscience, ne lui permettent pas d'accepter des procédés pareils, en retour de tous ceux qu'elle a eus et qu'elle désire encore avoir pour la Turquie. Elle doit chercher à en obtenir la réparation et à se prémunir contre leur renouvellement à l'avenir.

Dans quelques semaines ses troupes recevront l'ordre de passer les frontières de l'Empire, non pas pour faire la guerre au Sultan—guerre qu'il répugne à Sa Majesté d'entreprendre contre un Souverain qu'elle s'est toujours plu à considérer comme un allié sincère et un voisin bien intentionné,—mais pour avoir des garanties matérielles jusqu'au moment où, ramené à des sentiments plus équitables, le Gouvernement Ottoman donnera à la Russie les sûretés morales qu'elle a demandées en vain depuis deux ans par ses Représentants à Constantinople, et en dernier lieu par son Ambassadeur.

Le projet de note que le Prince Menchikoff a formulé avant son départ et qu'il vous a remis, se trouve entre vos mains. Que votre Excellence se hate,

après avoir obtenu l'assentiment de Sa Hautesse le Sultan, de signer cette note, sans variante, et de la transmettre au plus tard dans huit jours à notre Ambassadeur à Odessa, où il doit se trouver encore.

Je souhaite vivement que, dans ce moment décisif, le conseil que j'adresse à votre Excellence avec la confiance que ses lumières et son patriotisme m'inspirent soit apprécié par elle comme par ses collègues du Divan, et que dans l'intérêt de la paix, que nous devons être tous également désireux de conserver, il soit suivi sans hésitation ni retard.

(Signé) NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)

*St. Petersburg, May  $\frac{19}{31}$ , 1853.*

THE Emperor, my august master, has just been informed that his Ambassador has been obliged to leave Constantinople in consequence of the Porte's peremptory refusal to contract with the Imperial Court of Russia the slightest engagement calculated to re-assure her of the intentions of the Ottoman Government to protect the orthodox faith and churches in Turkey.

After a fruitless sojourn of three months, after having exhausted by word of mouth and by letter every plea which truth, benevolence and a spirit of conciliation could suggest to him,—in short, after having endeavoured to humour all the unfounded scruples and all the susceptibilities of the Porte, by successive modifications, to which he assented, in the terms and form of the guarantees which he was instructed to demand,—Prince Menchikoff was compelled to come to the determination which the Emperor learns with pain, but which His Majesty cannot do otherwise than entirely approve.

Your Excellency is too enlightened not to foresee the consequences of the interruption of our relations with his Highness's Government. Your Excellency is too devoted to the real and permanent interests of your Sovereign and of his Empire not to experience profound regret at the prospect of the occurrences which may ensue, and the whole responsibility of which will rest upon those who provoke them.

Therefore, in now addressing this letter to your Excellency, I have no other object than to enable you, while it is still in your power, to render your Sovereign a most important service. Lay once more, Sir, before his Highness the true situation of affairs; the moderation and the justice of the demands of Russia; the very serious offence offered to the Emperor by opposing to his intentions, always so friendly and so generous, a distrust for which there is no cause, and refusals for which there is no excuse.

His Majesty's dignity, the interest of his Empire, the voice of his conscience, will not allow him to tolerate such conduct in return for that which he has always shown and still desires to show to Turkey. He must endeavour to obtain redress for it, and to guard himself against a recurrence of it for the future.

Within a few weeks his troops will receive orders to pass the frontiers of the Empire, not in order to make war upon the Sultan,—a war which it is repugnant to His Majesty to undertake against a Sovereign whom he has always had pleasure in looking upon as a sincere ally and as a well-disposed neighbour,—but in order that he may possess material guarantees until such time as the Ottoman Government, returning to more just sentiments, shall give to Russia the moral securities which she has in vain demanded for two years by her Representatives at Constantinople, and latterly by her Ambassador.

The draft of note which Prince Menchikoff drew up before his departure, and which he submitted to you, is still in your hands. Let your Excellency, after having obtained the consent of his Highness the Sultan, forthwith sign that note, as it stands, and forward it within a week at the latest to our Ambassador at Odessa, where he will still be.

I earnestly hope that on this decisive occasion the counsel which I address to your Excellency, with the confidence inspired in me by your wisdom and your patriotism, may be appreciated by you and by your colleagues in the Divan, and that in the interest of peace, which we must all be equally desirous to maintain, it may be followed without hesitation and without delay.

(Signed) NESSELRODE.

No. 237.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 10.)*

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 25, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, copies of the Jerusalem firmans, of the accompanying note to the French and Russian Embassies, and of the memorandum by which they were communicated officially to the Representatives of Austria and Prussia, as well as to Her Majesty's Embassy.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 237.

*Memorandum of the Porte to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Traduction.)

26 Rejib, 1269. (5 Mai, 1853.)

J'AI l'honneur d'envoyer ci-joint à votre Excellence, pour qu'elle en prenne connaissance, copies de deux firmans qui viennent d'être écrits relativement à certains lieux saints à Jérusalem, et de la note officielle qui a été remise en conséquence aux Ambassadeurs de Russie et de France.

(Translation.)

26 Rejib, 1269. (May 5, 1853.)

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Excellency, for your information, copies of two Firmans which have just been written, relative to certain Holy Places at Jerusalem, and of the official note which has in consequence been addressed to the Ambassadors of Russia and France.

Inclosure 2 in No. 237.

*Note addressed by Rifaat Pasha to the Ambassadors of Russia and France.*

(Traduction.)

26 Rejib, 1269. (5 Mai, 1852.)

COPIE est transmise à votre Excellence du firman orné d'un hatti-shériff, émané vers la fin du mois de Rejib de l'année 1269, qui est destiné à servir de conclusion et de complément des différends qui existaient entre les nations Grecque et Latine au sujet de quelques sanctuaires à Jérusalem, qui renferme la décision prise dernièrement en définitif, soit par rapport à ces sanctuaires, soit par rapport à la réparation de la coupole de l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre. Et comme c'est la volonté du Sa Majesté le Sultan que les dispositions renfermées dans ce firman soient invariablement et pour toujours mises à exécution complètement, je m'empresse d'en informer votre Excellence.

Je saisis, &amp;c.

(Translation.)

26 Rejib, 1269. (May 5, 1853.)

A COPY is transmitted to your Excellency of the Firman, adorned with a Hatti Scherif, promulgated towards the end of the month Rejib, of the year 1269, which is intended to serve as the termination and conclusion of the differences which existed between the Greek and Latin nations relative to certain sanctuaries at Jerusalem, and which contains the definitive decision lately taken, both with regard to those sanctuaries and with regard to the repair of the cupola

of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. And as it is the will of His Majesty the Sultan that the regulations laid down in this Firman should be invariably and for ever carried into full effect, I hasten to inform your Excellency of it.

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Inclosure 3 in No. 237.

*Firman respecting the Holy Places.*

(Traduction.)

A TOI, mon Vizir, Hafiz Ahmed Pasha, Gouverneur de Jérusalem et dépendances ; à toi, Juge de Jérusalem, et à vous, Mufti, Caïmakam de Nakib ul Eshref, et autres Membres du Conseil, j'ordonne :

Il vient de m'être représenté que quelques-unes des dispositions du firman Impérial qui était daté des derniers jours du mois de Djemazi-ul-Evel, mil deux cent soixante huit (vers la mi Février, 1852), orné de mon hattî-sheriff, et adressé tant à toi, Gouverneur susmentionné, qu'à d'autres autorités, nécessaires pour la solution de l'aplanissement des différends survenus entre les nations Grecque et Latine, relativement à certains lieux saints qui existent dans la ville et hors de la ville de Jérusalem, n'ont pas encore été mises à exécution ; et comme ma volonté souveraine est que tout ce qui régarde cette affaire soit fait, le Conseil de mes illustres Ministres, après avoir discuté cette question, a rédigé un mémoire qui consiste en six Articles servant à expliquer, corroborer, et compléter mon firman Impérial susmentionné.

En consignait aux Latins une clef de la grande porte de l'Eglise de Bethléem, on leur a donné le droit de passer de cette église suivant l'ancienne pratique ; on ne leur a pas donné le droit d'y exercer leur culte, ou de posséder cette église en commun avec les Grecques ; on n'a autorisé par là ni la subversion, par aucune des parties, du *statu quo* de l'église ni l'exercice du culte Latin dans cette église, ni un changement du système qui a toujours existé et qui existe encore par l'introduction d'une nouveauté, soit par rapport au passage à travers cette église pour se rendre à la grotte, soit à d'autres égards.

Comme depuis un ancien temps le portier de l'Eglise de Bethléem a toujours été un prêtre Grec, sujet de ma Sublime Porte, et que ce portier n'a absolument aucune autorité d'empêcher de passer les nations qui ont *ab antiquo* le droit du passage, il en sera ainsi comme par le passé.

La nouvelle étoile que j'ai fait placer pour mettre fin aux contestations qui se sont élevées à cet égard dans la grotte qu'il y a dans l'enceinte de l'Eglise de Bethléem, étoile pareille à celle qui s'est perdue l'année 1847, et pour qu'elle serve de souvenir visible de ma part à la nation Chrétienne, ne confère à aucune nation en particulier un droit exclusif et nouveau, et, en aucun temps, il n'y aura le moindre changement à cet égard.

Les nations Chrétiennes qui ont le droit de visiter le Sépulcre de Sainte Marie et d'y exercer leur culte, visiteront ce lieu et y exerceront leur culte tous les jours, à condition de n'être pas un obstacle à ce que les autres nations aussi y exercent leur culte ; les Grecs y officieront tous les matins depuis le lever du soleil ; après eux les Arméniens ; et après ceux-ci les Latins—chacune de ces nations ayant pour cela une heure et demie de temps. C'est une règle établie avec la sanction et sous l'autorité de ma Sublime Porte.

Les deux jardins attenants au Couvent Franc dans le village de Bethléem, continueront d'être, comme auparavant, sous l'inspection des nations Grecque et Latine, et on en fera l'usage qu'on a fait jusqu'à présent, sans aucune prérogative en faveur de l'une ou de l'autre partie.

Comme il n'y a pas d'autre concessions faites nouvellement par des firmans formels à aucune nation, toutes celles qui existent seront maintenues telles qu'elles, et tous les lieux saints de Jérusalem qui sont actuellement au pouvoir des nations Grecque, Latine, et Arménienne, soit qu'ils leur appartiennent en commun ou en propre, devront rester en leur pouvoir pour toujours.

Le mémoire susmentionné m'ayant été soumis par le Conseil, qui a demandé mes ordres, j'ai ordonné que tout ce qui y est écrit fût mis à exécution.

En conséquence de mes ordres souverains, mon présent firman Impérial est émané de mon Divan Impérial, et, orné de mon hattî-sheriff, il vous est expédié.

Vous donc, Gouverneur susmentionné, Juge, Mufti et autres, informés que vous serez de tout ce que ci-dessus, vous ferez enregistrer mon présent firman Impérial dans les registres du Mahkémé, et vous aurez à agir invariablement et pour toujours conformément aux ordres souverains qu'il renferme. Ayez-le pour entendu, et ajoutez foi au noble chiffre dont est décoré mon présent firman Impérial, écrit dans les derniers jours du mois Rejib, l'an mil deux cent soixante neuf.

(Translation.)

TO thee, my Vizier, Hafiz Ahmed Pasha, Governor of Jerusalem and its dependencies; to the Judge of Jerusalem; and to you, Mufti, Caimakam of Nakib ul Eshref, and other Members of the Council, I give this order.

It has been represented to me that some of the provisions of the Imperial Firman dated in the last days of the month of Djemazi-ul-Evel, 1268 (about the middle of February, 1852), decorated with my Hatti-Scherif, and addressed as well to you, my above-mentioned Governor, as to other authorities, which were requisite for the solution and settlement of the differences which had arisen between the Greek and Latin nations in regard to certain Holy Places situated within and without the city of Jerusalem, have not yet been carried into execution; and as it is my sovereign will that everything regarding this matter should be done, the Council of my illustrious Ministers, after having discussed this question, has drawn up a Memorandum consisting of six Articles, which serve to explain, corroborate, and complete my Imperial Firman above-mentioned.

In granting to the Latins a key of the great gate of the Church of Bethlehem, the right of passing through that church as heretofore has been conferred upon them; but the right of exercising their religious worship in that place, or of possessing that church in common with the Greeks, has not been conferred upon them; there has not been authorized by this measure either the alteration, by any of the parties, of the *status quo* of the church, or the exercise of the Latin worship within that church, or a change in the system which has always existed, and which still exists, by the introduction of any novelty, whether as regards the passage through the church on the way to the grotto, or in other respects.

As the door-keeper of the Church of Bethlehem has for a long time been always a Greek priest, subject of my Sublime Porte, and as that door-keeper has absolutely no authority whatever to obstruct the passage of the nations which have a right of passage *ab antiquo*, matters shall remain as they have been.

The new star, which, in order to put an end to the contest which had arisen in that respect, and to serve as a visible token of my regard for the Christian nations, I have caused to be placed in the Grotto which is within the precincts of the Church at Bethlehem, a star resembling that which was lost in the year 1847, does not confer upon any nation in particular an exclusive and fresh right, and there shall not be at any time the least alteration in that respect.

The Christian nations which possess the right of visiting the Tomb of the Holy Mary, and of there exercising their religious rites, shall visit that place and exercise their rites there daily, on condition that they do not offer any opposition to the exercise by other nations also of their rites in that place. The Greeks shall officiate there every morning from sunrise; after them the Armenians; and after these the Latins; each of these nations having an hour and a half for that purpose. This is a rule established with the sanction and under the authority of my Sublime Porte.

The two gardens belonging to the Frank Convent in the village of Bethlehem shall continue as heretofore under the inspection of the Greek and Latin nations, and they shall be made use of as at present, without any exclusive privilege in favour of either party.

As no other concessions have been lately made by formal Firmans to any nation, all those which at present exist shall be maintained on their present footing, and all the Holy Places at Jerusalem which are at present under the control of the Greek, Latin, and Armenian nations, whether they belong to them in common or exclusively, shall remain under their control for ever.

The above-mentioned Memorandum having been submitted to me by the

Council, which has requested my commands, I have ordered that all that is written therein be carried into execution.

In consequence of my sovereign orders, my present Imperial Firman is issued from my Imperial Divan, and is sent to you decorated with my Hattis-Scherif.

You, then, the above-mentioned Governor, Judge, Mufti, and others, when you have been informed of what is above written, you will cause my present Imperial Firman to be enrolled in the registers of the Mehkémé, and you will act invariably and for ever in conformity with the sovereign orders which it contains. Take heed thereto, and give credence to the illustrious signature which decorates my present Imperial Firman, written in the last day of the month Rejib, 1269.

Inclosure 4 in No. 237.

*Firman respecting the Cupola of the Holy Sepulchre.*

(Traduction.)

A TOI, mon Vizir, Hafiz Ahmed Pacha, Gouverneur de Jérusalem et dépendances, et à toi, Juge de Jérusalem, j'ordonne :

J'ai donnée l'année 1257 (1841), un firman Impérial pour la réparation dont la grande coupole de l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre à Jérusalem a besoin. Mais comme cette réparation n'a pas été faite jusqu'à présent, on vient de me représenter cette fois-ci encore que la coupole tombant en ruine a besoin d'être réparée, ce qui a été avéré par l'intermédiaire de l'ingénieur expédié à Jérusalem.

Ma volonté et mes ordres souverains conséquemment sont : que cette coupole soit réparée sous mes augustes auspices, et dans la même forme qu'elle a actuellement, par ma Sublime Porte ; que le Patriarche Grec de Jérusalem soit autorisé, s'il se fait quelque chose qui diffère de la forme actuelle de la coupole, à faire des représentations là-dessus pour l'empêcher ; et que comme il ne convient pas de démolir les maisons attenantes à l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre, attendu que ces maisons sont un hospice et un oratoire, on ait à murer les fenêtres qui donnent sur l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre ; et mon présent firman Impérial, qui contient ces dispositions, est émané de ma Chancellerie Impériale et expédié.

Vous donc, Gouverneur et Juge susmentionnés, quand vous aurez appris qu'il a été décidé que la coupole susdite sera réparée sur le même plan sur lequel elle se trouve bâtie actuellement, par ma Sublime Porte, et par les soins d'un Commissaire *ad hoc*, vous vous empresserez de la publier, et de procéder, dès à présent, à murer les fenêtres en question pour obvier au mal qu'elles causent.

Ayez-le pour entendu, et ajoutez foi au noble chiffre dont est décoré mon présent firman Impérial, écrit dans les derniers jours du mois de Rejib, l'an mil deux cent soixante neuf (5 Mai, 1853).

(Translation.)

TO thee, my Vizier, Hafiz Ahmed Pacha, Governor of Jerusalem and its dependencies ; and to thee, Judge of Jerusalem, I give this order :

In the year 1257 (1841) I issued an Imperial Firman for the repairs of which the grand cupola of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre stands in need. But as those repairs have not up to the present time been executed, a further representation has now been addressed to me that the cupola, falling into ruin, requires repairs, which has been ascertained to be the case by the engineer sent to Jerusalem.

My sovereign will and orders consequently are, that that cupola be repaired by my Sublime Porte, under my august auspices, and in the same form which it has at present ; that the Greek Patriarch of Jerusalem be authorized, if anything is done differing from the present form of the cupola, to make representa-

tions thereupon, with a view to hinder it; and that, as it is not proper to pull down the houses abutting on the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, inasmuch as those houses are a hospital and an oratory, the windows which look upon the Church of the Holy Sepulchre be closed. And my present Imperial Firman, containing these arrangements, is issued from my Imperial Chancery and despatched.

You, then, Governor and Judge above mentioned, when you shall have learnt that it has been decided that the above-mentioned cupola shall be repaired by my Sublime Porte on the same plan as that on which it is at present built, and by a Commissioner appointed *ad hoc*, you will be careful to publish it, and to proceed forthwith to wall up the windows in question in order to prevent the mischief which they occasion.

Take heed to this, and give credence to the illustrious signature which decorates my present Imperial Firman, written in the last days of the month of Rejib, 1269 (May 5, 1853).

No. 238.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 10.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, May 25, 1853.*

A COPY of the circular by which Prince Menchikoff announced the rupture of his diplomatic relations with the Porte is inclosed herewith for your Lordship's information.

The Prince having sailed out of the Bosphorus before I received his note, it was impossible for me to send him a reply.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 238.

*Prince Menchikoff to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

M. l'Ambassadeur,

*Buyukdéré, le 9<sup>e</sup> Mai, 1853.*

LA Sublime Porte ne s'étant pas montré disposée à entrer dans les vues conciliantes du Gouvernement Impérial pour arriver à une entente et établir un accord sincère entre les deux Puissances, je me suis vu dans l'obligation de rompre mes relations diplomatiques avec le Cabinet Ottoman, et de quitter Constantinople. Mon départ sera suivi de près par celui du personnel de la Légation Impériale.

En ayant l'honneur, M. l'Ambassadeur, de vous faire part de cette détermination, je prie, &c.

(Signé)

MENCHIKOFF.

(Translation.)

M. l'Ambassadeur,

*Buyukdéré, May 9<sup>th</sup>, 1853.*

THE Sublime Porte not having shown itself disposed to enter into the conciliatory views of the Imperial Government in order to come to an understanding and to establish a sincere agreement between the two Powers, I find myself compelled to break off my diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Cabinet and to leave Constantinople. My departure will be speedily followed by that of the members of the Imperial Legation.

In doing myself the honour, M. l'Ambassadeur, of acquainting you with this determination, I beg, &c.

(Signed)

MENCHIKOFF.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 10.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, May 25, 1853.*

TWO papers of considerable interest are inclosed herewith for your Lordship's information. One of them is the Porte's ultimatum to Prince Menchikoff, explained to him in person by Reshid Pasha before delivery, and retained in consequence of the Prince's note dated the 18th instant having been delivered to Reshid Pasha before His Highness had time to issue his own. This paper, on being afterwards submitted in private by one of Reshid Pasha's sons to the Russian Ambassador, produced no effect in the way of accommodation.

The other inclosure is Prince Menchikoff's parting declaration to the Porte on hearing that a firman, repeating and confirming the privileges of the Greek church and clergy, was on the point of being issued in terms unsatisfactory to Russia.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 239.

*Reshid Pasha to Prince Menchikoff.*

(Translation.)

THE statement made by Prince Menchikoff, in his written and verbal communications, concerning the doubts and want of confidence entertained by the Porte with regard to His Majesty the Emperor's good intentions, has been seen with great regret. His Majesty the Sultan has perfect faith and confidence in His Majesty the Emperor, and highly appreciates the great qualities and spirit of justice which animate his august ally and neighbour, and it is a great honour for me to proclaim that it has always been His Majesty the Sultan's desire to consolidate and strengthen the friendly relations happily subsisting between the two countries.

With reference to the religious privileges of the Greek churches and clergy, the honour of the Porte requires that the exclusively spiritual privileges granted under the Sultan's predecessors, and confirmed by His Majesty, should be now and henceforward preserved unimpaired and in force; and the equitable system pursued by the Porte towards its subjects demands that any spiritual privilege whatever granted henceforward to one class of Christian subjects should not be refused to the Greek clergy. It would be a cause of much regret that the fixed intentions of His Majesty the Sultan in this respect should be called into question.

Nevertheless, the Imperial firman now granted to the Greek Patriarchate, confirming the religious privileges, is considered to afford a new proof of His Imperial Majesty's benevolent sentiments in this respect, and the general promulgation thereof must afford every security, and remove for ever from His Imperial Majesty's mind all doubts for the future respecting the religion which he professes, and it is with pleasure that I perform the duty of making this declaration.

In order that there should be no alteration respecting the Shrine at Jerusalem, it is formally promised that for security in the future thereon the Sublime Porte will take no step concerning them without the knowledge of the French and Russian Governments. An official note has been addressed to the French Embassy also to this purpose.

The Sultan consents that a church and hospital should be built at Jerusalem (for the Russians); and the Porte is ready and disposed to conclude a Sened, both on this subject and concerning the special privileges of the Russian monks at that place.

Inclosure 2 in No. 239.

*Prince Menchikoff to Reshid Pasha.*

*Buyukdéré, le 9<sup>e</sup> Mai, 1853.*

AU moment de quitter Constantinople, le Soussigné, Ambassadeur de Russie, a appris que la Sublime Porte manifestait l'intention de proclamer une garantie pour l'exercice des droits spirituels dont se trouve investi le clergé de l'Eglise d'Orient, ce qui de fait rendait douteux le maintien des autres privilèges dont il jouit.

Quel que puisse être le motif de cette détermination, le Soussigné se trouve dans l'obligation de faire connaître à son Altesse M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, qu'une déclaration ou tel autre acte qui tendrait, tout en maintenant l'intégrité des droits purement spirituels du culte orthodoxe d'Orient, à invalider les autres droits, privilèges, et immunités accordés au culte et à son clergé depuis les temps les plus anciens et dont ils jouissent aujourd'hui, serait considéré par le Cabinet Impérial comme un acte hostile à la Russie et à sa religion.

Le Soussigné, &c.

(Signé) MENCHIKOFF.

(Translation.)

*Buyukdéré, May 9<sup>th</sup>, 1853.*

AT the moment of his departure from Constantinople, the Undersigned, Ambassador of Russia, has learnt that the Sublime Porte has manifested the intention of proclaiming a guarantee for the exercise of the spiritual rights possessed by the clergy of the orthodox Eastern Church, a step which would seem to render doubtful the maintenance of the other privileges which it enjoys.

Whatever may be the motive of this determination, the Undersigned is under the necessity of acquainting his Highness the Minister for Foreign Affairs that a declaration or any other act of that kind which might tend, while maintaining unimpaired the purely spiritual rights of the orthodox Eastern religion, to invalidate the other rights, privileges, and immunities, granted to that religion and to its clergy from the most remote period, and which they now enjoy, would be considered by the Imperial Cabinet as an act of hostility towards Russia and her religion.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed) MENCHIKOFF.

No. 240.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 10.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, May 25, 1853.*

I FEAR it will prove a work of supererogation, but unwilling to lose any chance, however slender, of making an impression on the Court of St. Petersburg at this important juncture, I addressed an explanatory letter to Her Majesty's Envoy, and forwarded it by express through Vienna the day before yesterday. I have now the honour to inclose a copy of it for your Lordship's more complete information.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 240.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Constantinople, May 23, 1853.*

LONG before this letter can reach St. Petersburg you will probably have heard, from some other source, of Prince Menchikoff's departure from Constantinople, and of the suspension of diplomatic relations between Russia and the

Porte. I shall deem myself sufficiently fortunate if my letter arrives in time to give you a just notion of the causes of his failure, before any mistaken or hasty resolution be adopted by the Russian Cabinet in consequence of that disappointment. I am the more desirous of bringing the case to your knowledge in its true colours because it has come round to me that I am suspected of having mainly contributed to the Ambassador's discomfiture; not that I would take the trouble to remove any error of that kind from personal considerations, but simply because a false impression of our policy at home may follow from the imputation, and diminish for a time your means of exercising a salutary influence in Eastern matters.

When I left England, and indeed when I arrived here, after passing through Paris and Vienna, it was generally supposed that the only important object of Prince Menchikoff's embassy was to settle the question of the Holy Places. To all appearance no one, even at Vienna, dreamed of the far more important demands which Russia held in reserve, and which, when finally made known to the Turkish Ministers, were strictly confined to them, as matters not to be divulged with impunity to any third party. Though I was not long in obtaining access to the secret, I did not the less endeavour to promote an early and amicable adjustment of what belonged more particularly to the holy places; and I had the good fortune to receive an acknowledgment of my friendly offices from Prince Menchikoff himself. The confidential interviews which took place between us afforded me in due time an opportunity, of which I availed myself, to apprise his Excellency of the difficulties which I foresaw that he would encounter whenever he entered upon the ground of the Russian protection and Greek privileges.

I must do him the justice to say that he listened to me with courtesy, and subsequently gave me to understand that he had partially modified his demands with reference to the considerations which I had urged. Unfortunately the amendment was superficial; and when the Turkish Ministers, immediately upon the arrangement of the first question, were compelled by a peremptory requisition from the Prince to enter seriously into the remaining questions, they manifested a settled determination not to comply with that part of them which related to a guarantee in the shape of an engagement binding upon both parties with the force of a Treaty.

From this resolution of theirs I was not prepared to dissent, for the reasons which are stated in a confidential letter subsequently addressed by me to the Russian Ambassador, less with any hope of inducing him to alter his views, than for the purpose of undeceiving him as to the reliance which I was privately told that he persisted, however strangely, in placing on my cooperation.

Inclosed herewith are copies of this letter, of the Ambassador's answer, and also of my report thereon to Lord Clarendon.

All that has happened since, though covering much paper and extending over a number of days, may be briefly summed up as a succession of efforts on the one side, to obtain the Porte's consent to the same objectionable propositions, varied in form, but identical in substance, and a firm resistance, on the other, to anything which involved the surrender to Russia of a recognized right to interfere, in a spirit of protection, with the privileges of the Greek church and its clergy in Turkey.

Notwithstanding their perfect knowledge of the danger to which they exposed themselves by a continued refusal, and notwithstanding a partial change of Ministry, favourable, it was imagined, to the views of Russia, the Ottoman Cabinet stood to its first resolution, without a shadow of change, and finally acquiesced in the Prince's departure, although the Representatives of Austria, France, and Prussia joined with me in declining to give any advice as to Prince Menchikoff's last and conclusive ultimatum.

This resolution was not adopted unadvisedly. It was sanctioned not only by the Sultan, but also by a Council comprising unusual numbers, and voting in the proportion of 42 to 3 in its favour.

Allow me to add, that the opinions of my three colleagues, similar to my own, agree with the decision of the Porte, and find a general concurrence even among the public, whose fears are excited, and whose interests are compromised by the rejection of Prince Menchikoff's demands. There is even some reason to think that the Greek synod, and the more enlightened portion of the Greek laity, have less of sympathy than usual with their northern protectors, whose

pretensions in the present instance would tend in some measure, if accepted, to perpetuate ecclesiastical abuses, while they would encroach upon the sovereign rights and independence of the Porte.

A Government exposing itself courageously to peril on the strength of their own convictions, and supported by such a mass of concurrent opinion, is surely entitled to respect and forbearance, notwithstanding its numerous errors and prejudices.

The Porte has declared its readiness to comply with the wishes of Russia on all other points, and to respond with gratitude to the cordial assurances of that Court. A moral resistance is all that it opposes to a pressure which may overpower its strength, but cannot extort its consent.

It really appears to my humble judgment, that Russia is pursuing a course which can hardly terminate in any beneficial result. It is only by force that she can hope to succeed; and a triumph, so obtained, would probably be attended with no inconsiderable danger to herself in many important respects, with an increased estrangement here, and the risk of perilous disturbances from one end of Europe to the other.

I will not pursue this subject further. It would be a great consolation to me were I to learn that in thus opening myself to you, I had contributed to the removal of erroneous impressions, and promoted the cause of peace without prejudice to that of national independence.

Within you will find a copy of the Porte's ultimatum to Prince Menchikoff. The Prince would not receive it officially, but took private cognizance of it.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 241.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 10.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, May 25, 1853.*

THE Porte at my suggestion has addressed a circular instruction to the Provincial Governors, for the purpose of preventing unnecessary excitement and danger of collision under present circumstances, and I have now the honour to inclose a translation of it for the information of Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 241.

*Circular Instructions to the Provincial Governors.*

(Traduction.)

UNE parfaite entente sur quelques questions entre la Sublime Porte et la Cour de Russie n'ayant pas pu avoir lieu, les relations officielles entre les deux Gouvernements en sont venues à un point qu'elles ont été rompues. Nous espérons, toutefois de la faveur Divine, que l'affaire s'arrangera sans qu'il en résulte aucunes difficultés.

Seulement, comme chacun donnera à cette circonstance, lorsqu'elle sera parvenue à la connaissance du public dans le pays où vous êtes, différentes interprétations, et se livrera à son penchant naturel; et si de mauvais procédés, tels que changer de manière de traiter les négociants et les protégés de la Cour de Russie, et molester les sujets de la Sublime Porte ont lieu, on en ressentira—Dieu nous en préserve!—les mauvaises conséquences; c'est pourquoi il est devenu nécessaire de développer ici le système que les autorités de la Sublime Porte sont chargées et seront désormais obligées de suivre.

Il faut donc, en premier lieu, protéger, plus que jamais, les négociants et les sujets Russes; avoir des égards pour eux faciliter leurs affaires; avoir des attentions pour les Consuls et autres Agents de la Cour de Russie; et tâcher d'éviter de leur donner, en quoi que ce soit, le moindre juste sujet de plainte.

On mettra tous les soins possibles à protéger et défendre en chaque occasion tous les sujets de la Sublime Porte, et à éviter en même temps de s'ingérer en aucune manière dans l'exercice de leur culte, en vertu des privilèges religieux dont ils jouissent, et suivant leur système accoutumé. Ainsi qu'il est clairement prescrit par les ordres et les instructions envoyées par le passé et récemment encore, on mettra tous les soins possibles à ce que les sujets de la Sublime Porte n'aient à souffrir de rien absolument et qu'il ne soit porté aucune atteinte ni à leur vie, ni à leur honneur, ni à leurs biens. En un mot, comme la plus petite négligence, la moindre méprise sur les points précités, causeraient beaucoup de mal, et que par là les autorités assumeraient sur elles une très grande responsabilité, elles devront considérer comme le premier de leurs devoirs d'être très-vigilans dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions et de les remplir avec beaucoup de prudence et de sagesse.

Il faut aussi savoir qu'il ne s'agit pas de permettre, parcequ'on traite bien les Rayahs, que les Mussulmans nos frères de religion soient traités avec mépris et vexés. Le principal objet en vue est que tout en traitant parfaitement et en protégeant complètement les Mussulmans aussi, on prévienne une attaque, chose contraire à la volonté du Gouvernement, de la part d'un parti contre un autre.

Il ne faut pas que ces ordres, qui sont basés sur l'équité et la justice, ni que la pensée qu'ils pourraient alarmer les Chrétiens, servent de motif pour se ralentir sur le système du gouvernement et de la police du pays ; il faut, au contraire, le maintenir avec plus de vigueur et plus de vigilance encore. Il est très-important que l'on s'occupe, sans cesse, de prendre des renseignements et de se mettre au fait de ce qui se passe. Seulement, comme il n'est pas convenable d'armer, sans nécessité, le peuple, dans la pensée que cela contribuerait au maintien du bon ordre avec plus de vigueur, et d'alarmer les Rayas en s'enquérant sans circonspection de ce qui les regarde, il faudra faire tout cela avec beaucoup de prudence.

Si, par exemple, un rassemblement de Rayas venait à avoir lieu, il ne faudrait pas employer contre eux les armes tout-à-coup ; il faudra d'abord leur donner des conseils énergiques pour les engager à rentrer dans l'obéissance. Dans le cas qu'ils ne se soumettent pas et qu'ils voulussent grossir leur rassemblement, comme d'après les nouveaux ordres que le Seraskier a envoyés, il y a quelque temps, les commandants des troupes doivent envoyer une force militaire partout où il est nécessaire, il faut s'entendre avec eux pour cerner les séditeux et tâcher d'empêcher par là avec prudence et modération que la révolte ne fasse des progrès. Il faut aussi nous informer, sans aucun délai, de ce qui se sera passé ; tout cela est de la dernière importance.

Voilà les ordres qu'il a plu à Sa Majesté le Sultan de donner. Une conduite contraire à ces ordres serait incontestablement très-préjudiciable et à la Sublime Porte et à vous-mêmes ; et c'est pour vous en prévenir que cette lettre a été écrite et expédiée exprès.

(Translation.)

IT having been found impossible for the Sublime Porte and the Court of Russia to arrive at a perfect understanding upon certain questions, official relations between the two Governments have been broken off. We trust, however, in the Divine favour, that the matter will be arranged without any difficulties resulting from it.

Only as every one will give to this circumstance, when it shall become publicly known in the country where you reside, a different interpretation, and will act as he is naturally disposed to act ; and as evil consequences (from which God preserve us !) will ensue from any ill behaviour, such as any alteration in the manner of treating the merchants and dependents of the Court of Russia, and molesting the subjects of the Sublime Porte ; for this reason it has become necessary now to explain the system which the authorities of the Sublime Porte are directed and will henceforth be obliged to observe.

It is necessary then, in the first place, more than ever to protect Russian merchants and subjects ; to provide for facilitating their business ; to pay attention to the Consuls and other agents of the Court of Russia ; and to endeavour to avoid affording them in any way the least just cause of complaint. All pos-

sible care must be taken to protect and defend on all occasions all the subjects of the Sublime Porte, and at the same time to avoid any interference whatever with the exercise of their religion in virtue of the religious privileges which they enjoy, and according to their wonted practice. As it is clearly laid down in the orders and instructions heretofore and lately sent, all possible care must be taken that the subjects of the Sublime Porte shall not suffer in any respect whatever, and that no injury shall be inflicted on them as regards their life, their honour, or their property. In a word, as the least neglect, the slightest mistake in regard to the points abovementioned, might cause much mischief, and the authorities would thereby incur very great responsibility, they must consider it as their first duty to be very vigilant in the exercise of their functions, and to execute them with much prudence and sagacity.

It must moreover be known that there is no question, because the Rayahs are well treated, of allowing the Mussulmans, our brethren in religion, to be contemptuously treated and harassed. The principal object in view is, that while the Mussulmans are likewise perfectly well treated and protected, any attack of one party on the other, which would be an occurrence inconsistent with the wishes of the Government, should be prevented. These orders, which are founded on equity and justice, or the notion that they might cause alarm to the Christians, must not operate as a motive for relaxing the system of the Government and of the police of the country; which, on the contrary, must be maintained with still greater vigour and vigilance. It is most important that care be constantly taken to obtain information and to become acquainted with what is going on. Only, as it is not proper unnecessarily to arm the people, under the idea of thereby contributing with greater effect to the maintenance of order, and to alarm the Rayahs by inconsiderately prying into what concerns them, all that must be done with great prudence.

If, for instance, a meeting of Rayahs should take place, arms ought not to be employed against them all of a sudden: the most earnest advice must in the first instance be given them to induce them to return to obedience. In case they do not submit, and should seek to swell their numbers, as, according to the fresh orders some time since given by the Seraskier, commanders of troops must send a military force wherever it is required, an understanding must be had with them in order to surround the seditious, and thereby endeavour by prudence and moderation to prevent the progress of the revolt. Information must likewise be sent to us without delay of what shall have occurred; all this is of the utmost importance.

Such are the orders which His Majesty the Sultan has been pleased to give. Conduct opposed to these orders would unquestionably be very prejudicial both to the Sublime Porte and to yourselves; and this letter has been written and sent to you expressly for the purpose of apprizing you thereof.

No. 242.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, June 10, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve of the letter which you addressed to Sir Hamilton Seymour on the 23rd of May, and of which a copy is inclosed in your despatch of the 25th, explaining the progress of the discussions at Constantinople which terminated in Prince Menchikoff's departure.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 243.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 10, 1853.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency in reply to your despatch of the 25th of May, that Her Majesty's Government approve of your having advised the Porte to issue to the provincial authorities, with reference to the present crisis, the instruction of which a copy is inclosed in your despatch.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 244.

*Reshid Pasha to M. Musurus.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by M. Musurus, June 10.)*

(Traduction.)

18 Shaban, 1269. (Le 26 Mai, 1853.)

PAR ma dépêche du 12 Shaban, je vous informais que le Prince Menchikoff avait interrompu les relations diplomatiques, qu'il était sur le point de partir, que la Sublime Porte était dans l'impossibilité de modifier sa décision contenue dans la note officielle qu'elle avait préparée, qu'enfin les choses étaient à ce point.

Peu après que le Prince Menchikoff eut déclaré qu'il partirait, le Chargé d'Affaires d'Autriche vint me voir, et me dit que si j'envoyais chez le Prince Menchikoff un de mes fils pour lui faire entendre quelques paroles obligeantes, il était probable que cet Ambassadeur modifierait en quelque sorte sa résolution de partir. Il a ajouté qu'il l'avait vu lui-même que la personne qui lui serait envoyée serait bien reçue, et que les Représentants d'Angleterre, de France, et de Prusse avaient jugé convenable une semblable démarche.

Je dus donc envoyer ce jour-là même chez le Prince Menchikoff mon fils Salih Bey, qui, après avoir exprimé au Prince des regrets sur sa résolution violente, lui a montré une copie de la note officielle qu'il n'avait pas encore reçue. Le Prince garda cette copie, disant qu'il croyait faire preuve de modération en consentant que les demandes qu'il avait dès le commencement formulées fussent admises par une note dont il avait lui-même préparé le projet, et à laquelle ajouta-t-il, une seule lettre ne saurait être changée; et là-dessus il dit adieu à Salih Bey en lui déclarant qu'il partirait le lendemain, Samedi, dans l'après-midi, mais qu'il s'arrêterait s'il recevait quelque temps avant son départ une communication comme quoi le principe de ses demandes était admis.

Or, le projet de note susmentionné, quoique portant quant à la forme une autre dénomination, ne diffère nullement quant à ses dispositions de la Convention demandée dès le commencement par le Prince Menchikoff; et dès lors il était impossible d'y revenir. Ainsi comme la décision de la Porte à cet égard était invariable, et que vu le court délai fixé par le Prince, il était matériellement impossible de soumettre cette dernière proposition du Prince au Conseil des Ministres et de lui donner une réponse, le Prince Menchikoff s'embarqua pour la Mer Noire à l'heure indiquée.

Je juge inutile de vous dire que le Gouvernement Impérial, loin d'être animé d'aucun sentiment hostile à l'égard de la Russie, n'a au contraire en vue que de resserrer les liens d'amitié entre les deux Empires. Nous espérons que la Russie ne voudra pas faire la guerre sans aucun motif et contrairement aux assurances positives qu'elle a données aux Grandes Puissances de l'Europe.

Cependant comme le Prince a interrompu les relations diplomatiques et qu'il a quitté le pays où il était accrédité, la Sublime Porte, considérant que, dans des circonstances aussi graves, il ne lui a été donné aucune assurance qu'il n'y aura pas de la guerre, tandis que des armements considérables, par terre et par mer, se font par la Russie dans le voisinage de l'Empire Ottoman, se voit dans la nécessité impérieuse de prendre des mesures de précaution pour prémunir ses états et ses sujets contre toute attente pouvant être la conséquence probable des armements susmentionnés.

Bien que les Représentants des quatre Puissances aient exprimé à la Sublime Porte l'avis que ces mesures de précaution soient prises sans éclat, toutefois comme il est impossible de faire un mystère de mesures aussi étendues, et que des préparatifs faits sans déclaration préalable pourraient, au contraire, justifier les soupçons qu'on désire prévenir, la Sublime Porte a communiqué aux Représentants des quatre Grandes Puissances une note sous la date d'aujourd'hui pour leur déclarer que, tout en étant dans la nécessité de prendre des mesures de précaution, elle n'a nullement l'intention ni le désir de faire la guerre à moins qu'elle ne soit attaquée.

Je vous envoie ci-joint copie de cette note officielle, ainsi que celle du projet de note donné par le Prince Menchikoff. Voilà où en sont maintenant les choses.

Vous voudrez bien communiquer les faits qui précèdent au Gouvernement auprès duquel vous êtes accrédité, et nous faire parvenir au plutôt la réponse que vous en aurez reçue.

Veillez, &c.

(Translation.)

18 *Shaban*, 1269. (*May 26*, 1853.)

IN my despatch of the 12th *Shaban* I informed you that Prince Menchikoff had broken off diplomatic relations, that he was on the point of departing, that the Sublime Porte could not possibly modify the decision contained in the official note which it had drawn up; in fine, that things had arrived at that point.

Shortly after Prince Menchikoff had declared that he would take his departure, the Chargé d'Affaires of Austria came to see me, and told me that if I were to send one of my sons to Prince Menchikoff with some conciliatory expressions, it was probable that that Ambassador would modify in some degree his resolution to go away. He added that he had himself seen that the person who might be sent would be well received, and that the Representatives of England, France, and Russia had considered such a proceeding expedient.

I thought it right, therefore, to send that same day to Prince Menchikoff my son Salih Bey, who, after having expressed to the Prince regret at the violent resolution which he had adopted, showed him a copy of the official note which he had not yet received. The Prince kept that copy, saying that he thought he gave proofs of moderation in consenting that the demands which he had from the first put forward should be incorporated in a note of which he had himself prepared the draft, and in which, he added, not a single letter could possibly be altered; and, therefore, he bade farewell to Salih Bey, declaring that he would depart on the morrow, Saturday, at noon, but that he would remain if he should receive some time before his departure a communication to the effect that the principle of his demands was admitted.

Now the draft of note above mentioned, although bearing, as regards its form, another title, differs in no wise, as regards its requirements, from the Convention demanded from the first by Prince Menchikoff; and it was consequently impossible to fall back upon it. Wherefore, as the decision of the Porte upon this point was unchangeable, and as, on account of the short space of time allowed by the Prince, it was physically impossible to submit this latter proposal of the Prince to the Council of Ministers, and to return him an answer, Prince Menchikoff embarked for the Black Sea at the hour he mentioned.

I deem it useless to tell you that the Imperial Government, far from being animated by any hostile feeling towards Russia, has, on the contrary, no other object in view than that of strengthening the bonds of friendship between the two countries.

We hope that Russia will not make war upon us without any cause, and contrary to the positive assurances which she has given to the great Powers of Europe.

Nevertheless, as the Prince has broken off diplomatic relations, and as he has left the country to which he was accredited, the Sublime Porte, considering that in such serious circumstances no assurance has been given to it that there shall be no war, whilst considerable armaments, both by sea and land, are being made by Russia in the vicinity of the Ottoman Empire, is under the impera-

tive necessity of adopting measures of precaution to protect its dominions and its subjects against any attack which might result from the above-mentioned warlike preparations.

Although the Representatives of the Four Powers have expressed to the Sultan their opinion that these measures of precaution should be adopted without ostentation, nevertheless, as it is impossible to make a mystery of such extensive preparations, and as measures of precaution, adopted without previous declaration, might, on the contrary, justify the suspicion which it is desirable to prevent, the Sublime Porte has communicated to the Representatives of the Four Great Powers a note of this day's date, in order to assure them that, while obliged to adopt measures of precaution, it has no intention or desire to make war, unless it is attacked.

I herewith send you a copy of that official note, as well as of the draft of note presented by Prince Menchikoff. This is the state of affairs at present.

You will have the goodness to communicate the preceding facts to the Government to which you are accredited, and to forward to us as soon as possible the reply which you will have received from it.

Accept, &c.

Inclosure in No. 244.

*Note addressed by Reshid Pasha to the Representatives of England, France, Austria, and Prussia.*

18 Shaban, 1269. (Le 26 Mai, 1853.)

LA question des Lieux Saints, qui formait un des objets de la mission du Prince Menchikoff, Ambassadeur Extraordinaire de Russie, a été résolue à la satisfaction des deux Parties.

Quant aux propositions d'une portée extraordinaire, faites par le Prince au sujet des privilèges de la religion et du clergé Grecs, il est de l'honneur du Gouvernement Impérial de préserver de toute atteinte tant à présent qu'à l'avenir les privilèges religieux et les droits et immunités accordés aux sujets Grecs de l'Empire Ottoman, à leur clergé, à leurs églises, à leurs monastères, par les illustres ancêtres de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, et confirmés par Sa Majesté elle-même; et de même qu'il n'existe aucune intention ni aucune pensée de porter atteinte à ces privilèges, de même il n'y a aucun doute sur les intentions amicales et sincères de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie envers l'Empire Ottoman.

Toutefois, comme il est évident que si un Gouvernement prenait vis-à-vis d'un Gouvernement étranger, soit par Sénéd sous forme de Convention, soit par note ou déclaration, un engagement qui aurait pour objet les droits, immunités, et privilèges accordés à une communauté religieuse constituant une partie considérable de ses sujets, lors même que ces privilèges seraient considérés sous le point de vue purement religieux et clérical, un tel engagement porterait atteinte au droit d'indépendance et à l'autorité du Gouvernement qui le subirait; et comme de plus il est facile de démontrer qu'il n'y a aucune analogie entre une question de cette nature et quelques concessions stipulées dans les temps anciens, la Sublime Porte, en exposant d'une part au Prince Menchikoff le véritable état de choses dans un langage plein de sincérité et de loyauté, a témoigné, d'autre part, les meilleures dispositions pour donner des assurances propres à dissiper les doutes élevés au sujet des privilèges de la religion professée par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie. Malheureusement aucune entente n'a pu s'établir entre les deux Parties à cet égard; et le Gouvernement Impérial regrette infiniment que le Prince Menchikoff en soit venu au point de rompre les relations diplomatiques et de quitter le pays.

Loin d'être animé d'un sentiment hostile envers le Cabinet de la Russie, le Gouvernement Impérial ne désire, au contraire, rien si ardemment que de voir reprises les relations diplomatiques, et consolidés et raffermis plus que jamais les rapports d'amitié au maintien desquels il attache le plus haut prix; et il aime à se flatter que l'Empereur de Russie, conformément à ses sentiments de justice et de loyauté, ne voudra pas sans motif ouvrir les portes de la guerre, et qu'il n'agira pas en opposition avec la politique invariablement suivie par la Cour de

Russie, et reconnue de tout le monde, ni avec les assurances positives qu'il a données aux Cabinets des Grandes Puissances de l'Europe.

Cependant comme l'interruption des relations diplomatiques et le départ de l'Ambassadeur se sont accomplis sans que dans de semblables circonstances le Gouvernement Impérial ait reçu des assurances que la guerre ne s'en suivra pas, tandis que des armements considérables se font, par terre et par mer, dans le voisinage de l'Empire Ottoman, le Gouvernement Impérial, quoique éloigné de toute idée hostile, se voit dans la nécessité d'ordonner certains armements comme moyens de précaution et de conservation. Aussi a-t-il décidé de prendre des mesures pour mettre à partir de ce jour son armée sur le pied de guerre et ses forteresses en état de défense.

Dans la conviction que les Grandes Puissances signataires du Traité de 1841 rendront justice dans les circonstances actuelles au Gouvernement Impérial, le Soussigné, chargé par ordre de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan de vous communiquer par la présente ce qui précède, saisit, &c,

(Translation.)

18 *Shaban*, 1269. (*May 26*, 1853.)

THE question of the holy places which formed one of the objects of the mission of Prince Menchikoff, Ambassador Extraordinary from Russia, has been settled to the satisfaction of both parties.

As regards the proposals of an extraordinary character, made by the Prince on the subject of the privileges of the Greek religion and clergy, it is a point of honour with the Imperial Government to preserve from all molestation, as well now as hereafter, the religious privileges and the rights and immunities granted to the Greek subjects of the Ottoman Empire, to their clergy, their churches, and their monasteries, by the illustrious ancestors of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, and confirmed by His Majesty himself; and in the same manner as there is no intention of assailing those privileges, so is there no doubt in regard to the friendly and sincere intentions of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia towards the Ottoman Empire.

As it is evident, however, that if a Government, either by a Sened in the form of a Convention, or by note or declaration, were to enter into an engagement with a Foreign Government having for its object the rights, immunities, and privileges granted to a religious community constituting a considerable portion of his subjects, even if those privileges were looked at in a purely religious and clerical point of view, such an engagement would be derogatory to the right of independence and to the authority of the Government which should submit to it; and as, moreover, it is easy to show that there is no analogy between a question of this nature and certain concessions agreed upon in times past, the Sublime Porte while explaining, on the one hand, to Prince Menchikoff the real state of things in the most frank and sincere terms, has manifested, on the other hand, the most perfect willingness to give assurances calculated to dispel the doubts which have been raised as to the privileges of the religion professed by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia. Unhappily it has been impossible to establish any agreement between the two parties upon this matter; and the Imperial Government regrets beyond measure that Prince Menchikoff should have gone so far as to break off diplomatic relations and to leave the country.

Far from being animated by a hostile feeling towards the Cabinet of Russia, the Imperial Government on the contrary desires nothing so ardently as to see diplomatic intercourse resumed, and the friendly relations, to the maintenance of which it attaches the utmost importance, more than ever strengthened and confirmed; and it would fain hope that the Emperor of Russia, in conformity with his sentiments of justice and sincerity, will be unwilling without cause to throw open the gates of war, and that he will not act in opposition to the policy invariably pursued by the Court of Russia and recognized by the whole world, or to the positive assurances which he has given to the Cabinets of the Four Great Powers of Europe.

As however the interruption of diplomatic relations and the departure of the Ambassador have taken place without the Imperial Government having under such circumstances received any assurances that war will not thereupon ensue,

whilst considerable armaments are being made by land and sea in the vicinity of the Ottoman Empire, the Imperial Government, though far from entertaining any hostile idea, finds itself compelled to order certain military preparations as measures of precaution and preservation. Accordingly it has decided upon taking steps to place its army from henceforth upon a war footing, and its fortresses in a state of defence.

In the persuasion that the Great Powers who signed the Treaty of 1841, will render justice to the Imperial Government in its present circumstances, the Undersigned, charged by His Imperial Majesty the Sultan to communicate to you by the present note what is stated above, takes this, &c.

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## No. 245.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 12.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, June 4, 1853.*

THE Austrian Legation appears to have been as much taken by surprise by the pretensions of Prince Menchikoff as have been General Castelbajac and myself.

In consequence of apprehensions which had been felt at the Austrian Mission at Constantinople, Baron Lebzeltern had been instructed to wait upon the Chancellor and to request some information as to the demands which were about to be made upon the Porte. In reply to his inquiries the Chancellor acquainted Baron Lebzeltern, a fortnight or three weeks ago, that the Russian demands were of a very simple nature. That they went only to the point of obtaining a solemn confirmation of the rights already in the possession of Russia.

I learn that Count Henckel, like myself, had been informed by the Chancellor that Russia sought nothing from the Porte but confirmation of old rights. Like me he is still assured by his Excellency that this purpose has never varied, and that Prince Menchikoff's note demands nothing but the sanction of rights possessed by Russia in virtue of the Treaty of Kainardji.

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## No. 246.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 12.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, June 4, 1853.*

IN the course of a conversation which I held yesterday with Count Nesselrode, I remarked to him that I found myself in the painful position of having given to Her Majesty's Government very incorrect information as to the object of the Russian Embassy to Constantinople.

The Chancellor hoped that I would not deny that the demands made by Prince Menchikoff, and modified as they had been at last, were extremely moderate. That, I observed, was a point upon which I was not called upon to express an opinion. I would only keep in sight the fact of the object being perfectly different from that which had been stated to me to be sought by the Emperor's Cabinet.

In a later part of the conversation, after dwelling upon the most unacceptable part which had been assigned to myself in the late transaction, I observed to Count Nesselrode that whatever objections were entertained by Her Majesty's Government to the concessions which it was attempted to extort from the Porte, it could not be doubted that they were much increased by the concealment which had been practised; that many difficulties would have been avoided by a little more frankness as to intentions.

It is indeed remarkable that whereas the Russian Government professed constantly to have the double intention of not asking for any extension of rights, but of placing old ones under the sanction of an international Act of at least the same value as that possessed by the Capitulations with France, both points are now seen to be lost sight of; privileges of which very slight mention is made

in the Treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople are to be secured to the Crown of Russia, and the privileges supposed to be derived from existing Treaties are to receive the sanction of an official note.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 247.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 12.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, June 4, 1853.*

COUNT NESSELRODE when I waited upon him yesterday invited me to read the letter which he addressed on the  $\frac{19}{31}$  ultimo to Reshid Pasha recommending him to reconsider the rejection of Prince Menchikoff's note, together with the important despatch addressed to Baron Brunnow giving an explanation of the Emperor's views and intentions with regard to Turkey.

As these documents will be both communicated to your Lordship, it is not necessary that I should trouble you with any particulars concerning them. The most important point which I observe in the despatch is the specific announcement of the Emperor's intention, not indeed of making war upon Turkey, but of occupying and holding the Principalities, should the Porte fail of accepting the Russian "projet de note."

As regards the justification of the course lately pursued by the Imperial Government, it is attempted by confounding two questions which were perfectly distinct—the confirmation by an international Act of the settlement of the Greek and Latin disputes at Jerusalem, and the extension of the rights thus sanctioned to such a degree as to secure to the Emperor a right of protectorate.

I learned from Count Nesselrode that his letter to Reshid Pasha will be delivered by M. Balabine, the First Secretary of the Russian Legation, who, as well as M. Pisani, the head of the Commercial Chancellerie, has been left at Pera. I was further acquainted by his Excellency that whether the Russian terms are finally accepted or rejected by the Porte, equally Prince Menchikoff will not return to Constantinople.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 248.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 12.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, May 27, 1853.*

THE sudden departure of a Turkish messenger for Vienna enables me to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, the copy of a translated note addressed to me by Reshid Pasha, in explanation of the present state of affairs between Russia and the Porte.

Your Lordship will observe how earnestly the Turkish Government deprecates war, and also what friendly and respectful sentiments it expresses, though in no unbecoming language, towards the Court of St. Petersburg. It announces, at the same time, the necessity in which it is placed, by the military demonstrations in its neighbourhood, of preparing to resist any act of aggression to which, by possibility, the Emperor of Russia may resort.

A similar note is addressed to the Representatives of Austria, France, and Prussia.

Reshid Pasha sent to inform me yesterday that he intended to instruct the Sultan's Ambassadors at those Courts to express a hope that they would give the Porte their moral, and if necessary, their material assistance at the present alarming juncture. He wished to know whether I saw any objection to his making such a communication, and I replied that it was for the Porte to consider the necessities of its own position, and that I should not feel myself justified in discouraging a precautionary appeal suggested by its sense of them.

Inclosure in No. 248.

*Reshid Pasha to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, May 26, 1853.*

[See Inclosure in No. 244.]

No. 249.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 12.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, May 27, 1853.*

I THINK it my duty to record that the *note verbale* presented to the Porte by Prince Menchikoff on the  $\frac{4}{18}$ th of March, and inclosed with Count Nesselrode's despatch to Baron Brunnow of the  $\frac{9}{21}$  ultimo, was never communicated to this Embassy. I have questioned M. Pisani on the subject, and he assures me that Rifaat Pasha would never be brought to admit its existence. That Minister was probably restrained from disclosing it by the Russian Ambassador's intimidating language.

Your Lordship has too much discernment not to have noticed the deceptive manner in which the intended demand of a guarantee is vaguely associated with the Greeks at large, while limited in appearance to the Sanctuaries in Palestine.

No. 250.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 13.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, June 12, 1853.*

I HAVE not failed, in all my conversations with M. Drouyn de Lhuys and with his colleagues, to inculcate the duty which devolves upon the Great Powers of smoothing the way to a reconciliation between Russia and Turkey by all the honourable means at their disposal, a course which I feel no doubt your Lordship will approve.

No. 251.

*Circular addressed to Her Majesty's Ministers abroad.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, June 13, 1853.*

THE rupture of the diplomatic relations between Russia and the Porte has been the cause of great regret to Her Majesty's Government.

The repeated assurances of the Russian Government, given both to the Government of Her Majesty and to the French Government, that Prince Menchikoff's mission to Constantinople had reference solely to the Holy Places, had led Her Majesty's Government confidently to hope that the satisfactory arrangement of that long-pending question would have removed all grounds of difference between Russia and the Porte.

But, under the plea of confirming ancient Treaties, further demands were put forward by the Russian Ambassador, involving a protectorate of the Greek Church in Turkey, not only as regards the spiritual, but also the civil rights and immunities of its members.

Every concession which could be made was offered by the Turkish Government, who, throughout these trying negotiations, displayed a most moderate and conciliatory spirit; but it would have been impossible for them to have complied with these last demands without derogating from the sovereign rights of the Sultan, and virtually surrendering the independence of the Ottoman Empire; and Her Majesty's Government have, therefore, entirely approved the advice given by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Porte.

In these views and opinions there is a complete agreement between Her Majesty's Government and the French Government; and the English and French

fleets, which have been ordered to approach the Dardanelles, will act in concert under the orders of the respective Ambassadors of the two countries.

In taking this step Her Majesty's Government are actuated solely by the desire to uphold the independence of the Turkish Empire—an independence which the Great Powers are deeply interested in upholding, and which has been acknowledged by them as necessary to the balance of power in Europe. And although Her Majesty's Government cannot conceal from themselves the grave character of these occurrences, yet the moderation which has hitherto distinguished the policy of the Emperor of Russia; the repeated declarations which His Imperial Majesty has made of his desire to respect and maintain the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire; and the interest which all Europe possesses in preventing the disturbance of peace; induce them still to hope that an amicable solution of these difficulties may be found.

You will take every proper opportunity of urging the Government to which you are accredited to use all the influence they possess in favour of moderate and pacific counsels.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 252.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, June 14, 1853.*

ON the 12th instant I learnt from Count Colloredo, whom I had requested to call upon me, that he had heard nothing from his Government since the departure of Prince Menchikoff from Constantinople, and knew nothing of their opinions upon the present state of the Eastern question.

I expressed my regret at this, as the discussion which I desired to have with him upon the subject would be more useful if he had received instructions from Count Buol, but that I should nevertheless endeavour to put him in possession of the views entertained by Her Majesty's Government, with the object of their being transmitted by him to his Government.

In making this communication, I said that it was unnecessary to refer to the past, or to dwell upon the assurances we had received and the non-fulfilment of our expectations; but that we wished frankly to confer with Austria upon the present alarming state of things in the East, and the imminent danger to which the peace of Europe now appears to be exposed.

I added that the policy of England was essentially pacific, and that Her Majesty's Government, so far from entertaining any hostile feeling towards Russia, made every allowance for the difficulty in which the Emperor found himself placed, as the attention of Europe had been called to the vast military armaments that for the last four months have been in progress, to the protracted negotiations of Prince Menchikoff, to the demands which he had been instructed to make, and to the rejection of those demands by the Porte.

The position of the Emperor was therefore one of singular embarrassment, from which it would be difficult for him to recede with honour, or to advance without endangering the general peace which, in common with every other Sovereign of Europe, it was his duty and his interest to maintain; but that it now behoved the allies of His Imperial Majesty, in the same spirit and with the same motives that led to the Treaties of 1840 and 1841, to use their best efforts and to exert all the influence they can command, to bring this question to a satisfactory solution.

The moderation of our proceedings, the confidence reposed by us in Russia, and the grounds upon which the British fleet remained stationary at Malta when the French fleet sailed from Toulon, were, I said, well known to the Austrian Government, and had been acknowledged by Count Buol, who would readily therefore believe that it was with extreme regret, and only upon learning the departure of Prince Menchikoff from Constantinople and the menacing circumstances which attended it, that authority was given to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, under certain contingencies, to send for the British fleet, and that Admiral Dundas was instructed to proceed towards the Dardanelles, where it would be

joined by the French fleet. Her Majesty's Government hope, however, that nothing may occur to impose upon the English and French Ambassadors the necessity of using the power now confided to them, and that no act on the part of Russia may justify the Porte in suspending the Treaty of 1841. On the contrary, it is the earnest desire of Her Majesty's Government that, in the event of the Porte again refusing to comply with the demands of Russia, negotiation should again be resorted to, and the friendly intervention of other Powers should be accepted.

For this important object I assured Count Colloredo that Her Majesty's Government, and indeed every other Government, was disposed to rely upon the assistance of Austria. The personal friendship that existed between the two Emperors, the relations, political and geographical, that connect the two countries together, and the common danger in which both would be involved by war, gave to Austria a power of mediation not possessed by any other country, and, I must add, a greater interest also in that mediation being successful—for if the Russian army proceeded beyond the Principalities, and other provinces of Turkey were invaded, a general rising of the Christian population would probably ensue, not in favour of Russia, nor in support of the Sultan, but for their own independence; and it would be needless to add that such a revolt would not be long in extending itself to the Danubian Provinces of Austria; but it would be for the Austrian Government to judge of the effect it might produce in Hungary and in Italy, and the encouragement it must give to the promoters of disorder throughout Europe whom Austria has reason to fear, and who even now would appear to think the moment is at hand for the realization of their projects.

It was these considerations, I said, that rendered Her Majesty's Government most anxious to unite with Austria for an object so essential to the best interests of society, and to endeavour with her to discover some mode by which the just claims of Russia may be reconciled with the sovereign rights of the Sultan. Her Majesty's Government, I added, desire to know the views of, and will gladly receive any proposal from, the Austrian Government, and it was also their wish that Count Colloredo might receive instructions to take part in any conference that it may be considered useful to hold here, having for its object a solution of the existing difficulties in a manner both safe and honourable for Russia and for Turkey.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 253.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, June 14, 1853.*

I HAVE expressed to the Chevalier Bunsen, who called upon me yesterday at my request, the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at learning by your Lordship's despatches that their views upon the Eastern question were in perfect harmony with those of the Prussian Government.

In answer to an inquiry from me, the Chevalier Bunsen said that he had received no instructions from Baron Manteuffel beyond those by which he was directed to communicate to me a few days ago certain despatches from the Prussian Minister at Constantinople.

I requested the Chevalier Bunsen to convey the thanks of Her Majesty's Government to Baron Manteuffel for this friendly communication, and to state that they saw with pleasure that Baron Wildenbruch shared the opinions and justified the conduct of Lord Stratford, who has been charged by Prince Menchikoff with having, through motives of hostility to Russia, induced, or rather compelled, the Turkish Government to reject the proposals of Russia, to which, but for the intervention of Lord Stratford, they would have been prepared to accede.

I then held to the Chevalier Bunsen precisely the same language as I used in a conversation, on the preceding day, with Count Colloredo, and which you will find recorded in my despatch of this day to Lord Westmorland, herewith

inclosed.\* I impressed upon him that the policy of Her Majesty's Government was essentially pacific; that they desired that an honourable issue should be found for Russia from the embarrassing position in which she was now placed, and which was so full of danger to Europe; and that they did not think such an issue should be despaired of, if good faith and good will were manifested by Russia, and that she would really be contented with the *status quo* in Turkey, and the fulfilment of existing Treaties, without seeking to acquire more extended influence over the subjects of the Porte.

In furtherance of this object, I said that Her Majesty's Government were anxious to learn the opinions of the Prussian Government, and to cooperate with them in any course of proceeding that may be considered practicable. I also expressed to the Chevalier Bunsen the wish of Her Majesty's Government that he might have permission to attend any conference that may hereafter be held here, with a view of bringing the question again within the pale of negotiation, and solving it in a manner that should be satisfactory to the Emperor of Russia, without infringing on the sovereign rights of the Sultan.

Your Lordship is instructed to read this despatch and the inclosure to Baron Manteuffel.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 254.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, June 15, 1853.*

YOUR Lordship knows by my various despatches the opinion entertained by Her Majesty's Government of the conduct of Lord Stratford, and you will take every fitting opportunity to rebut the charges brought against him by the Russian Government.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 255.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, June 15, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint you in reply to your despatch of the 4th instant, that Her Majesty's Government approve of the observations which, as stated in that despatch, you addressed to Count Nesselrode respecting the concealment which had been practised by the Russian Government in regard to the demands to be made by Prince Menchikoff on the Porte.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 256.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, June 15, 1853.*

THE Russian Government have constantly professed that they sought no increase of influence or power over the subjects of the Porte professing the Greek religion, and that the fulfilment of existing Treaties, and the maintenance of the *status quo* in religious matters, were the sole objects of the demands made by Prince Menchikoff.

But it appears from the despatch of Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow, of <sup>30 May</sup><sub>1 June</sub>, which has been communicated to me, that in the event of these demands being again rejected by the Porte, a Russian force will immediately occupy the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia; and as this will be not alone a violation of the Turkish territory, but may also lead to a general revolt among the Christian subjects of the Porte, and to events of a character far more deplorable, the subject assumes an European importance, upon which, before a decided opinion is pronounced by Her Majesty's Government, it is essential that no misunderstanding should exist.

It must be quite unnecessary for me to observe that Her Majesty's Government pretend not to interfere with any just claim of Russia upon the Porte, nor to dispute her right rigidly to enforce the fulfilment of Treaties; but they desire that the independence of Turkey should be maintained, and that a right unduly to interfere in her internal affairs should not be conveyed by the Sultan to any other Power.

The Treaties relied upon by Russia, in justification of Prince Menchikoff's demands, are those of Kainardji and Adrianople; and it is with respect to them, and for the purpose of doing no injustice to the Russian Government, that Her Majesty's Government will feel themselves indebted to Count Nesselrode for such explanations as he may be disposed to afford to you.

By the Treaty of Kainardji the Christian religion and churches are protected, and some privileges and immunities are granted; but I look in vain for any sanction afforded by that Treaty to the demand of Prince Menchikoff that the orthodox churches and clergy throughout the Sultan's dominions are to be secured in the possession of all the rights, privileges, and immunities which they have enjoyed *ab antiquo*.

The term *ab antiquo* may refer to a period far antecedent to that of 1774, the date of the Treaty of Kainardji; but under this vague form of expression, Russia would acquire an unquestionable right to claim privileges granted in the earliest periods of the Mahometan rule—privileges which, conferring vast secular as well as spiritual power upon the Greek clergy, have, by the process of time and administrative changes, long since become obsolete, but which, being revived by Russia, with the right to enforce them, would enable her to exercise supreme control over fourteen millions of subjects of the Porte, and to render the Sultan a mere vassal of the Emperor.

Nor let it be supposed that this is a forced or unfounded construction of Prince Menchikoff's demand, for he himself, in his note, dated the 21st of May, which has caused a profound impression throughout Europe, has proclaimed that religious objects alone have not been aimed at by him. And can the refusal of the Sultan to part with his sovereign rights, be imputed to him as an offence? Can it be held to justify the forcible occupation of his territory? Can it be possible that for such a cause Europe should now stand exposed to the horrors of war by the Emperor of Russia, who throughout his whole reign, has laboured for the maintenance of peace?

But I repeat what I have on a former occasion written to you. Her Majesty's Government rely too firmly upon the justice and moderation of the Emperor, to believe in the possibility of war; and they are convinced, that if such should be the will of His Imperial Majesty, a solution of this embarrassing question might be found perfectly consistent with the dignity of the Emperor and the security of the Greek church, without infringing upon the rights of the Sultan, whose very weakness should be his protection, even if the maintenance of the Turkish Empire were not a fundamental principle of European policy.

I cannot conclude this despatch without expressing the regret with which Her Majesty's Government have learnt that to the different Courts of Europe the Russian Government has addressed unmeasured complaints of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and have attributed to him alone the failure of Prince Menchikoff's mission; but you will ask Count Nesselrode calmly to consider whether if the views taken by His Majesty's Government of Prince Menchikoff's demands be correct, it required the intervention or advice of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to secure their rejection; and if, on the other hand, these demands were as insignificant in themselves, and as acceptable to the Porte, as they are said to be, whether the British Ambassador would have had influence enough, even if there had been any conceivable object in his so doing, to control the Sultan, the Divan, and the Ministers, and induce them, against their own opinions, to brave the menaces

<sup>an</sup> Prince Menchikoff, and to bring down upon themselves the consequences of act which they must have considered to be uncalled for and impolitic.

You are instructed to read this despatch to Count Nesselrode.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 257.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 15.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, May 30, 1853.*

MY latest intelligence from the neighbourhood of the Danube is contained in a despatch from Lieutenant-Colonel Neale at Varna, dated the 28th instant. I inclose an extract of it herewith.

A private letter of the 24th from Odessa tends to establish that no hostilities will take place without fresh and special orders from the Emperor of Russia.

On the other hand, a despatch from Her Majesty's Consul at the Dardanelles announces that the Russian Vice-Consul there had received directions from Constantinople to advise the Russian merchants not to embark in any fresh commercial transactions, and to wind up their outstanding affairs.

The Porte, meanwhile, continues to prepare for the worst. The squadron, which was anchored before the Sultan's Palace, has gone to take up a new position towards the entrance of the Bosphorus. Omar Pasha has been ordered to Shumla, and his army will follow him. A flying camp is likely to be formed between the capital and Kilia, near which a Russian force might succeed in effecting a disembarkation. The danger of an attack from the side of Batoom and Trebizond has also attracted the attention of Reshid Pasha.

I am informed on good authority that the Porte will be able to collect a force of about 80,000 men for the defence of its dominions in European Turkey. A part of this force will have to be composed of Rediff, or Militia. I hope to obtain an authentic statement of the whole available force, whether naval or military, and I shall take the earliest opportunity of transmitting it to your Lordship.

Inclosure in No. 257.

*Colonel Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.)

*Varna, May 28, 1853.*

THE twenty-four Russian gun-boats which had arrived at Sulina, and which had gone from thence to Ismail, it was understood would be used as pontoons; and the bridges across the Danube, it was said, would be put up above Ismail to cross the Kilia branch, and the main branch at Toultscha.

All the most efficient men among the Russian sailors were to have left Sulina yesterday for Ismail; and 14 men in the guard-ship, and 25 Cossacks, were all that would then remain in the whole Island of Sulina. The quarantine in Bessarabia had been reduced to twenty-four hours for all persons in the employ of the Russian Government.

Immediately after the arrival of Prince Menchikoff at Odessa, an express steamer had been dispatched, which passed up the Danube on the 26th; and Russian steamers were passing up and down the river opposite Sulina daily.

In Varna, and throughout this district, the greatest anxiety and alarm prevail in consequence of the intelligence brought by each steamer. On the other hand, I have to state, that up to this hour, no preparation approaching even to the most common precaution has been adopted with respect to this fortress. The guns in all the batteries are dismantled; and the only troops here are in the shape of the local guards or Topjees, who do not amount to 200.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 15.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, May 30, 1853.*

INCLOSED herewith, in translation, is a draft of the Sultan's solemn renewal and confirmation of the privileges accorded by himself and his ancestors to the Greek church and clergy in his dominions. It is not likely to undergo any further alteration, and will probably be promulgated in three or four days.

Similar firmans will be addressed to the heads of the Armenian, Catholic, Protestant, and Israelite communities.

These documents are to be communicated to the Representatives of friendly Powers; and the several privileges and immunities, which are recorded more at length in ancient patents or commissions, will be repeated in connection with the firmans.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE

Inclosure in No. 258.

*Firman addressed to the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople.*

A TOI, Prélat Yermanos, Patriarche Grec actuel de Constantinople et dépendances—puisse ta dignité être permanente !—j'ordonne :

En m'élevant par sa grâce Divine et par sa sainte volonté à l'Empire et à la glorieuse dignité du Califat, l'Etre Suprême m'a confié, comme un dépôt tout particulier de sa part, un grand nombre de pays et de contrées, et des sujets composés de plusieurs nations et de plusieurs races.

C'est pourquoi j'ai depuis mon avènement au Trône Impérial, d'après mon devoir comme Souverain et comme Calife, et ainsi que l'honneur de l'Empire l'exige, constamment exercé, avec l'assistance et la faveur Divines, une surveillance active à l'effet de faire jouir, car telles sont réellement mes vues bienveillantes et ma volonté souveraine, chaque classe de mes sujets, d'une protection qui ne laisse rien à désirer et surtout d'une sécurité parfaite et sans exception, comme cela a toujours été, par rapport à l'exercice de son culte et dans les affaires qui concernent sa religion. Aussi mes efforts à ces égards ont-ils produit les plus heureux effets et des avantages qui ont toujours été remarqués, non-obstant quelques abus que le temps et la négligence ont pu introduire, et qu'il est l'objet spécial de mes soins de faire disparaître entièrement pour ne plus être renouvelés. Comme c'est ma volonté souveraine, comme je tiens à ce que les privilèges particuliers concernant le spirituel que mes augustes ancêtres ont octroyé aux prêtres, mes fidèles sujets, de la religion Grecque ; que les immunités et les privilèges accordés aux églises et aux couvents qui existent dans mes Etats, avec les terres et les propriétés foncières qui en dépendent ; à d'autres lieux consacrés à la religion et autres sortes d'oratoires ; et que les immunités et les droits qui appartiennent en propre aux prêtres Grecs, et qu'en un mot, les privilèges et les concessions de cette sorte qui sont insérés dans les Berats qui renferment les conditions des patriarches et des archévêques, soient toujours maintenus ; j'ai donné des ordres très-positifs à tous ces égards, pour publier de nouveau et confirmer mes vues souveraines ci-dessus énoncées, et afin qu'il ne soit porté aucune atteinte aux privilèges ni aux immunités et concessions susmentionnées, et que l'on sache que ceux qui les auraient enfreints se ressentiraient des effets de ma colère souveraine.

On a fait savoir aux autorités compétentes ce dont il s'agit, afin qu'elles ne puissent justifier la moindre négligence dont elles se rendraient coupables à quelqu'un de ces égards ; et c'est pour publier et pour faire donner plus de force à ces ordres, dont l'exécution selon ma volonté Impériale doit être réelle et constante, que mon présent firman Impérial est émané de mon Divan Impérial.

Toi donc, Patriarche susmentionné, lorsque tu auras eu connaissance de ce dont il s'agit, tu auras soin d'agir toujours d'une manière conforme au présent firman Impérial, et tu te garderas bien d'y contrevenir ; ayez-le pour entendu, et prêtez foi au noble chiffre dont est décoré le présent commandement Impérial, écrit le

(Translation.)

TO thee, Prelate Yermanos, at present Greek Patriarch of Constantinople and its dependencies—may thy dignity be permanent!—I give this order.

The Supreme Being, in elevating me by His Divine favour and holy will to the Empire, and to the glorious dignity of the Caliphate, has entrusted me, as a very especial deposit on His part, with a great number of lands and countries, and of subjects composed of many nations and races.

Wherefore, since my accession to the Imperial throne, in conformity with my duty as Sovereign and Caliph, and as the honour of the Empire requires, I have constantly, with the Divine favour and assistance, exercised an active superintendence, in order—for such are, in reality, my benevolent purposes and my sovereign will—to cause every class of my subjects, without any exception whatever, to enjoy perfect protection, and above all, entire security, as has always been the case, in regard to the exercise of their religious rites, and in the matters which concern their religion. Accordingly, my efforts in these respects have produced the most happy results and advantages, which have always been remarked, notwithstanding certain abuses which time and neglect have contributed to introduce, and which it is the special object of my care to cause to disappear entirely, so as not to recur.

As it is my sovereign will, as I steadily purpose that the special privileges concerning spiritual matters which my august ancestors have granted to the clergy of the Greek religion, my faithful subjects,—that the immunities and privileges granted to its churches and convents in my dominions, with the lands and real property dependent thereon, to other places consecrated for religious purposes and other kinds of oratories,—that the immunities and rights which peculiarly appertain to the Greek clergy,—and, in a word, that the privileges and concessions of that kind which are inserted in the *Berats* containing the conditions relating to the Patriarchs and Bishops,—be for ever maintained; I have given very positive orders in all these respects for the renewed publication and confirmation of my sovereign purposes above mentioned, so that no prejudice may be done to the above-mentioned privileges, immunities, and concessions, and that it may be known that those who should infringe them would suffer the effects of my sovereign resentment.

The competent authorities have been apprized of this state of things, in order that they might have no excuse for the least negligence of which they might be guilty in any one of these respects; and my present Imperial Firman is issued from my Imperial Divan in order to make public and to enforce these orders, the execution whereof, in accordance with my Imperial will, must be real and constant.

Thou, therefore, Patriarch above mentioned, when you shall have been made acquainted with this matter, will be careful to act in conformity with the present Imperial Firman, and you will be cautious not to infringe it. Take heed thereof, and give credence to the illustrious signature wherewith the present Imperial instrument is decorated. Written the

No. 259.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 15.)*

My Lord,

Vienna, June 11, 1853.

THE communications from St. Petersburg which Baron Meyendorff expected, have arrived, and have been brought before Count Buol, who still feels that he cannot approve the line taken by the Russian Cabinet in the affairs of Turkey. He much regrets that the Emperor Nicholas should have claimed the adoption by the Sultan, without any modification, of the last proposition of Prince Menchikoff, and that the Russian Government should have accompanied the demand with the threat of the immediate occupation of the Principalities by a Russian force, in case of refusal. In the hope of averting the calamities which must arise from such a measure, Count Buol has written to Petersburg to represent in the strongest manner the hostile feelings which such a step would

occasion, and to urge at least delay till the other Powers, parties to the Treaty of 1841, should have an opportunity of using their good offices with the Porte to obtain some arrangement which might be satisfactory to the Emperor, and avoid the dangers to which all Europe would be exposed by war. Count Buol has also written to Constantinople, pointing out to the Turkish Government how desirable it would be that they should seek by every means consistent with the honour and independence of the Sultan to meet the requisitions of the Emperor; and he expresses a hope that the last note which was proposed to Prince Menchikoff, and refused by him, may, by trifling alterations, be adapted to the exigency of the moment. Count Buol also recommends the Turkish Government to accept, for the moment, the Emperor's declaration, that he does not consider the occupation of the Principalities as the commencement of war, and that he will take no further measures of hostility, but await in that attitude the mediation of the friendly Powers. Count Buol strongly recommends that if the Russian troops cross the Pruth, the Turkish Government should not attack them: he advises this conduct, not upon any principle of right, but to avert a calamity; for not only does he dread the misfortunes which must be entailed by the commencement of hostilities, but he is persuaded the Turkish army is not in a state to cope with the Russian forces in the Principalities. He likewise believes that if general hostilities took place, the Christian population in many of the provinces would rise. The intelligence he has from Greece, as well as from other parts where the Greek population is numerous, leads him to this impression.

Count Buol earnestly hopes that, notwithstanding the present threatening aspect of affairs, a peaceable solution will be obtained; but if war was to be the consequence of what may take place, the policy of Austria would be to acknowledge the right of each of the Four Powers to act according to its own convictions; the Austrian Government will take no engagement either with Turkey to support her, or with Russia not to oppose her; it will remain free to act according to its own judgment.

Count Buol has not concealed from Baron Meyendorff the unfavourable impression which the Emperor's conduct has made upon all His Majesty's friends; and he hopes the Baron may, by representing it, assist in bringing about a more favourable decision. Count Buol has received despatches from Count Colloredo of the 7th instant, giving an account of his conversation with your Lordship and Lord Aberdeen upon the affairs of Turkey, and he is very much pleased with the moderation and desire of conciliation which were evinced in those conversations. He is particularly pleased with an assurance that the fleet would not for the present, in approaching the Dardanelles, violate any Treaty. An expression, also, that it was possible the Principalities might be occupied, and yet no state of war be declared by Turkey, was remarked upon by him as being satisfactory; for he thinks this essential, and will strongly recommend to England and the other Powers, that if Turkey does not declare the occupation of the Principalities an act of war, the other Powers should equally refrain from doing so.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 260.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, June 15, 1853.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 11th instant, reporting the opinion of Count Buol on the present aspect of the Turkish question, I have to inform your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government learn those opinions with great satisfaction.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 261.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 17.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, June 16, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has read to me two very important despatches which he has addressed to the French Ministers at Berlin and St. Petersburg in answer to the communications which have been made to him on the parts of the Cabinets of Prussia and Russia relative to the Oriental question.

In the first of these, the opportunity is taken to make the Prussian Government clearly understand the identity of feeling which unites the English and French Cabinets on this question; and while it declares in the strongest terms that, whatever may be the policy pursued at Berlin and Vienna, England and France will remain true to the cause of the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire, it expresses the sincere wish of the French Government to see the other parties to the Treaty of July 1841 join with them in defence of Treaty engagements, and the desire for a pacific solution of existing differences. At the same time France claims the right of being informed how far in all eventualities she can count on the support of Prussia.

The despatch to General Castelbajac contains an explanation of the reasons which have induced the Governments of Great Britain and France to send their fleets to the Dardanelles. It is stated to be a measure of precaution rendered necessary by existing circumstances. France counts upon the Emperor's previous conduct and character not to push his quarrel with the Porte to extremities, assures the Russian Cabinet of her desire to cooperate for the just settlement of any fair claims Russia may have upon the Porte, points out the danger to which Europe would be exposed by war, and repels the insinuation, which Count Nesselrode appears to have made, that the responsibility of war would rest with those who encouraged the Porte in her resistance to the demands of Russia.

As copies of these despatches will be communicated to your Lordship by Count Walewski, I need not add more.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys informed me further that he should in the course of the day address an appeal to the Austrian Government in the same sense as that addressed to Berlin.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 262.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 17.)*

(Telegraphic.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, June 10, 1853.*

RESHID PASHA received yesterday a letter, dated 19th May, v.s., from Count Nesselrode, offering him another opportunity to accept the last ultimatum of Prince Menchikoff, the project of a note inclosed in my despatch of May 22 to your Lordship.

The Porte is begged to send its simple acceptance in a delay of eight days, and in case it should not do so, the Russian army to cross the frontier within a few weeks, in order to obtain by force, and without a war, what the Porte would not give up spontaneously.

Reshid Pasha, my three colleagues, and myself, hold the same opinion respecting this letter. There is every appearance the Porte will not cede.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 263.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, June 18, 1853.*

I HAVE received by the telegraph from Vienna your Excellency's despatch dated the 10th instant, stating that on the previous day a note from Count Nesselrode had been received by Reshid Pasha, requiring that the Porte should accept the last proposal of Prince Menchikoff within the space of eight days, and that in the event of its being rejected, the Russian army would cross the frontier within a few weeks in order to obtain by force, and without a war, what the Porte would not give up spontaneously. Your Excellency further adds that this communication is viewed in the same light by Reshid Pasha, your three colleagues, and yourself, and that there is no appearance of a disposition to yield on the part of the Porte.

Her Majesty's Government see no reason to expect that the fact of the same demand having been made by Count Nesselrode instead of by Prince Menchikoff would produce any change in the decision taken by the Porte three weeks before; and they learn with much satisfaction that between your Excellency and the Representatives of France, Austria, and Prussia, there continues to exist a complete identity of opinion.

Russia has no more right to occupy the Principalities than she has any other portion of the Turkish territory: the pretext under which this aggression will be committed only renders such an abuse of power more flagrant; and Turkey would be quite justified in regarding it as an act of war, notwithstanding the announcement of the Emperor of Russia that war is not intended.

Her Majesty's Government are however of opinion that the Sultan should be strongly advised to refrain from acting upon his undoubted right, and declaring war against Russia; not alone because Turkey is unprepared for war, and that her naval and military and financial resources are feeble as compared with those of Russia, but because it is of the utmost importance to prove to the world that where such vast social interests are concerned, no step has been taken in haste; that every measure which a conciliatory spirit can devise has been exhausted; and that upon Russia alone will devolve the fearful responsibility of involving Turkey, and possibly Europe, in a war which no man will be found to justify, and the duration and disastrous consequences of which it is impossible to calculate.

In the event, then, of no other steps being taken than the occupation of the Principalities, Her Majesty's Government would recommend that a solemn protest be addressed to the Russian Government against such an invasion of the Turkish territory, which is rendered more unjustifiable by the reasons assigned in its defence by Count Nesselrode in his note to Reshid Pasha.

The Porte should then, in language more definite and intelligible than has hitherto been used, explain the real character and practical operation of the Russian demands, the extent to which a compliance with them would confer upon the Emperor of Russia new influence over the Greek subjects of the Porte, and the consequent impossibility that the Sultan should consent to such an infringement of his sovereign rights—the Sultan being at a loss to conceive how this should cause the resentment of Russia, or be made matter of complaint against the Porte, because the justice and moderation of the Emperor's character forbid the idea that he would knowingly advance a claim unsupported by reason or right, and because both to the Sultan himself and to the different Powers of Europe, the Emperor has recently given assurances of his desire to respect the dignity of the Sultan, and to maintain the independence of the Turkish Empire.

It might moreover be stated that the Sultan has given proofs of his earnest desire to meet every just claim on the part of Russia, and to redress any just grievance under which his Greek subjects may labour; that reparation has been made with respect to the holy places, and the question settled to the entire satisfaction of Russia; and that the Porte is now prepared to give more explicit assurances in order to confirm that settlement.

The Russian Government should further be informed that the Porte has issued a firman which confers upon its Greek subjects the most complete

toleration, and secures to them the fullest enjoyment of their religious rights, immunities, and privileges; and in connection with this firman it appears to Her Majesty's Government that an explanatory Act might be offered by the Porte in the words of the Treaty of Kainardji, or with such change of that form of words as the Turkish Government may consider safe and consistent with the dignity of the Sultan.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

## No. 264.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 20.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, June 3, 1853.*

I HAVE been asked by Reshid Pasha, in the name of his Government, whether I advise that resistance should be offered to a Russian army crossing the Danube and invading Turkey. I have replied, that in my opinion it is desirable to avoid collision as long as possible, that the line which cannot be passed by an enemy without danger to the capital, is the one where forbearance must necessarily cease, and that a professional opinion can alone with propriety decide that question, which must partly be solved with reference to the available means of resistance.

I am informed by M. Pisani that the Porte adopts the principle thus offered to its consideration, and intends, by addressing suitable instructions to Omar Pasha, to leave its application, in the supposed case, to his discretion.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

## No. 265.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 20.)*

(Extract.)

*Berlin, June 17, 1853.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL seems entirely to approve of the policy which has been pursued by Her Majesty's Government in the present crisis.

## No. 266.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 20.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, June 9, 1853.*

THE Chancellor has had the kindness to send me, this morning, Baron Brunnow's memorandum of the  $\frac{1}{2}$ <sup>3</sup>/<sub>5</sub>th ultimo.

I regret not being able to copy this document, which I am requested to take back to his Excellency in two hours' time, as it is one which requires attentive consideration.

It appears to me that Baron Brunnow's arguments in favour of the justness of the demands made by Russia upon the Porte are conclusive or inconclusive, according to the starting point of the discussion.

If the Russian Cabinet require only that the settlement of the Greek and Latin dispute at Jerusalem should be made permanent and binding, by means of an Act of as stringent a nature as the Capitulations between France and the Porte, I am bound in honesty to state that the demand corresponds closely with the intentions which had been repeatedly made known to me.

If, on the contrary, the whole relations of the Greek Church in Turkey towards the Sultan are to be changed, I can only say that the idea is not only new to me, but that it is opposed to the repeated explanations and assurances which I have received from the Chancellor.

But, remarks Baron Brunnow, if England had undertaken to procure the acceptance of the Russian demands, she would have had a right to ask for the detail of propositions.

She did not ; and she remained “ libre de ses conseils, comme la Russie, à son tour, est restée libre de son action.”

This passage suggests two observations. It may be that Russia (supposing her at least not to be bound by Treaty to respect the independence of the Sultan) would have been at liberty to follow her own free action towards Turkey, and to withhold a knowledge of her intentions from Her Majesty's Government ; but she did not use that right. Explanations very full—assurances very tranquillizing, were voluntarily given ; and the question now is, does the course of action pursued by the Russian Cabinet correspond with those, in fact, engagements ?

Again, Baron Brunnow speaks of “ propositions ;” but did the communications made by Prince Menchikoff to the Sultan's Government, contain propositions, or were they demands under menace in case of refusal ?

In a subsequent passage of his memorandum, Baron Brunnow quotes the following passage of a despatch of Prince Menchikoff, as explanatory of the Russian views :

“ Nous ne demandons pas le droit de protéger des Chrétiens du rit orthodoxe, sujets de la Porte, mais le maintien du *status quo* religieux de ce rit.”

If this is so, assuredly there can be no incompatibility between that which the Emperor has a claim to ask, and that which the Sultan would do well to grant—the demand for a confirmation of old rights, not the grant of new ones.


Further on, and speaking in the name of His Imperial Majesty, Baron Brunnow says : “ Il a tenu uniquement en vue de sauvegarder l'Eglise Orthodoxe en Turquie contre les empiètements et les lésions dont elle venait d'éprouver l'injuste et flagrante atteinte.”

With this view, continues M. de Brunnow, His Majesty insists upon obtaining from the Porte “ un Acte formel, un Acte explicatif.” “ Cet Acte dans la pensée de Sa Majesté ne doit servir qu'à confirmer l'Eglise Orthodoxe dans la possession des droits dont elle jouit en Orient ; l'Empereur ne demande ni plus ni moins.”

“ Un Acte formel, un Acte explicatif,” appears, however, to have been that which it would have been in Prince Menchikoff's power to obtain at Constantinople, but that which he did not consider worthy of acceptance.

At the close of his memorandum, Baron Brunnow lays down what is the greatest proof of respect for an independent Sovereign. “ It is,” he says, “ that of not preventing him from fulfilling his engagements towards a friendly and neighbouring Power.” The duty is certainly very imperative, and it is one in which Her Majesty's Government are little likely to be found wanting ; but in point of order of succession, it appears more proper to establish that the greatest proof of respect which can be shown to an independent Sovereign is, to refrain from encroaching upon his independence.

This, however, is mere verbal criticism. That which is of more importance, and which is deducible from Baron Brunnow's memorandum, is, that there is nothing in the demands which can fairly be made by Russia on the Porte which, under temperate negotiation or impartial arbitration, could not be obtained with honour to the Emperor, and without danger either to the independence of Turkey or to the peace of Europe.

I have, &c.   
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 267.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 20.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, June 10, 1853.*

THE Chancellor has read me a short memorandum respecting the French protectorate in Turkey.

The object is to prove that the right has been long exercised by the Sovereigns of France with regard to Roman Catholic subjects of the Sultan, as well as with respect to Frenchmen, Spaniards, and Italians.

In proof of the statement, the Protocol No. 3 of the 3rd February, 1830, is adduced; the dispositions of which assign to the King of Greece the protecting rights possessed up to that period by the Kings of France as regards the Catholics belonging to the provinces transferred from Turkey to Greece.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 268.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 20.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, June 10, 1853.*

I HAVE had the honour of receiving your Lordship's despatch of the 31st ultimo, upon which I am desirous of offering some observations before stating that the orders which it contains have been acted upon.

It has been, I can assure your Lordship, a great relief to me to learn that if my reports have been the means of misleading Her Majesty's Government with regard to the intentions of the Imperial Cabinet towards Turkey, the fault—if it is one—is not to be ascribed to the incorrectness of my statements. I might indeed have misapprehended Count Nesselrode's explanations and assurances if only once given, but it can hardly be imagined that I can have misunderstood their meaning when repeated over and over again; and the hypothesis of misapprehension becomes wholly inadmissible when it is seen that the successive statements of the Russian Cabinet to the English Envoy have been re-echoed seriatim to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs by the Emperor's Minister in London. I am, however, desirous of acknowledging to your Lordship, that such blame as may attach to a complete belief in solemn assurances, very justly belongs to me, and that it has been my misfortune, as I thought it my duty, to express to Her Majesty's Government the confidence with which those assurances inspired me. As matters of fact, I have often been called upon, it is true, to notice to your Lordship circumstances which appeared to be in contradiction with the moderate and conciliatory intentions professed by the Imperial Cabinet; but I could not prevail upon myself to allow appearances, however suspicious, to outweigh distinct explanations and assurances equally explicit.

I may now be permitted to state to your Lordship that the explanations which I have been ordered to seek of the Russian Government have been in some measure forestalled by the communications made to Her Majesty's Government, through the Russian Mission in London, and by my own despatches.

Before this despatch can leave St. Petersburg, your Lordship will have learned that, instead of explaining former declarations, the Russian Cabinet is only intent on making known its resolutions with regard to those events which are in preparation. It was, however, not the less my duty to endeavour to obtain from Count Nesselrode the explanations which are required by your Lordship's despatch, and with this view I waited upon his Excellency yesterday, having, on the preceding evening, placed the paper itself in his Excellency's hands.

The conversation which ensued was as little satisfactory as possible.

Her Majesty's Government, the Chancellor said, had expressed a desire to receive explanations from the Emperor's Cabinet. By this time they must be received: they would be found in the account of my audience of the Emperor, and in the long "travail" which had been addressed to Baron Brunnow.

Some discussion ensued as to the striking difference observable between the explanations given to your Lordship and to myself by Baron Brunnow and Count Nesselrode; when it was soon to be seen that it would be impossible to come to an understanding as to facts.

I begged leave to pass to a more practical part of the question—to suggest that it would be most desirable that time should be given for reflection and deliberation, and that resolutions which might lead to the most serious consequences, should not be acted upon hastily.

The Chancellor said the period for deliberation was known to me; that if at

the end of eight days Prince Menchikoff's note should not be accepted by the Porte, orders would be given for the immediate occupation of the Principalities.

When I remarked that another eight days would intervene before the news of a refusal could reach St. Petersburg, Count Nesselrode stated that this was not to be counted upon; that on the intelligence he referred to arriving at Odessa, orders for the advance of the troops would be given by the General in command there.

A fresh discussion then arose, in which I stated that although I could not give my word of honour that such was the case, a distinct impression had been upon my mind of twenty-four days being the probable term assigned—eight for the messenger's journey to Constantinople, eight days for his return, and an intermediate eight days for deliberation. That I had made this statement to Baron Meyendorff, who was just setting off for Vienna, some minutes after leaving the Emperor's presence. The Chancellor thought that His Imperial Majesty would hardly be brought to accord this delay.

I then spoke of some middle course which it would not be difficult to suggest for an adjustment of differences. The Chancellor had thought upon the point, but could not see any could be devised. "You have known me," he said, "two years; you have seen that I am not disposed to violent measures. Well, I declare to you that I could not advise the Emperor to recede: his dignity would be lowered, his position would be compromised—it would be a triumph for the Turks and a humiliation for Russia. The inevitable result would be a war with Turkey. The insolence of the Turks would become such, that friendly relations with them would become impossible."

I replied that assuredly nothing could be further from my wish than to lower the Emperor's position, but that I desired that all parties concerned should be spared humiliation, and that if according to his notion, Governments friendly to Turkey, and bound by Treaty to respect her independence, were to counsel her to accede to a demand which was held to involve the sacrifice of that independence, his Excellency must see that they would be called upon to act a part unworthy of their dignity.

The Chancellor would not admit that there was any compromise of independence in the assent to be given by Turkey to the demands made upon her. At least, I said, it may be taken to be the opinion of all impartial men who have given their attention to the subject.

Count Nesselrode then remarked upon the unfair and prejudiced manner in which the claims and the grievances of Russia were always received by Foreign Cabinets; on these occasions the eternal jealousy of Russia came to light. France had intended to bombard Tripoli,—not a word of blame was to be heard; Russia sought temperately for redress of a serious grievance, and exceptions were instantly raised—instantly Russia was charged with a wish to destroy the independence of Turkey.

I observed that I thought, as probably every one else would, that the reparation sought by Russia was wholly disproportioned to the offence given her by the Turkish Government, which had offended, not from unfriendly feelings, but from weakness; but that as regarded Her Majesty's Government, I could accept of no reproach; that every disposition had existed on their part that every just complaint of Russia should be attended to, and its repetition guarded against; and that in reply to an insinuation thrown out by his Excellency, I must state that a large mass of correspondence, of which I was in possession, established the fact of these friendly feelings having been worthily acted upon by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, who had throughout been intent on adopting a course which, if only not dangerous to Turkey, might be acceptable to His Imperial Majesty.

In reply to my observations as to the extreme confidence shown by Her Majesty's Government in the intentions of the Emperor, as proved by a fleet not having been sent to the Levant, Count Nesselrode replied, "And if you had sent a fleet there, how would that have altered the position of affairs? Would that deprive us of the means of marching our armies into Turkey?"

I replied, "I believe the Emperor to have the power of overrunning Turkey when he pleases, but it is clear that such a step would involve very serious consequences, and I can hardly believe that the feelings by which the Emperor is known to be animated, would allow him hastily to take a measure which might throw the whole of Europe into a state of war."

Count Nesselrode repeated his former declaration, that if at the close of the prescribed term, the Turks should not accede to the Emperor's conditions, His Majesty would be compelled, by a sense of his dignity, to occupy the Principalities; but that no violence would be employed, and that for the present His Majesty would content himself with this preparatory measure. There will, Count Nesselrode said, be no further advance into Turkey.

No. 269.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 20.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, June 11, 1853.*

YOUR Lordship will no doubt have received a copy of a despatch dated the 23rd, which reached me yesterday evening from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. It appeared to me desirable that this document should be communicated as soon as possible to Count Nesselrode, and I accordingly sent it immediately to his Excellency.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 270.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 21.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, June 12, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of this date, containing the "Projet de Note" submitted as an ultimatum, by Prince Menchikoff, to the acceptance of the Porte, as well as an instruction from Count Nesselrode to the Russian Legations covering the same, and embodying an apology for the policy of the Russian Government in the preceding negotiation.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 270.

*Extract from the "Journal de Saint Pétersbourg."*

*Circulaire.*

Monsieur,

*St. Pétersbourg, le <sup>30 Ma</sup><sub>11 Juin</sub>, 1853.*

LA mission de M. le Prince Menchikoff en Turquie ayant déjà donné lieu aux rumeurs les plus exagérées, rumeurs auxquelles son départ et l'interruption de rapports qui s'en est suivie ne feront sans doute qu'ajouter encore, je crois devoir vous transmettre à ce sujet quelques renseignements généraux pour vous servir à rectifier les fausses données qui pourraient s'être répandues dans le pays où vous résidez.

Je crois superflu de vous dire qu'il n'y a pas un mot de vrai dans la prétention que les journaux nous ont prêtée de réclamer, soit un nouvel agrandissement de territoire, soit un règlement plus avantageux de notre frontière Asiatique, soit le droit de nomination ou de révocation des Patriarches de Constantinople, soit enfin tout autre protectorat religieux tendant à dépasser celui que nous exerçons traditionnellement de fait et de droit en Turquie, en vertu de nos Traités antérieurs. Vous connaissez assez la politique de l'Empereur pour savoir que Sa Majesté ne veut pas la ruine et la destruction de l'Empire Ottoman, sauvé par elle-même à deux reprises; qu'au contraire elle a toujours regardé et regarde encore le *status quo* actuel, comme la meilleure combinaison possible à interposer entre tous les intérêts Européens qui ne manqueraient pas de se heurter de front en Orient, si le vide venait à s'y faire;—et que, quant à la protection du culte

Gréco-Russe en Turquie, nous n'avons pas besoin, pour en surveiller les intérêts, d'autres droits que ceux que nous assurent nos Traités, notre position, l'influence résultant de la sympathie religieuse qui existe entre 50 millions de Russes du rit Grec et la grande majorité des sujets Chrétiens du Sultan ; influence séculaire ; influence inévitable, parcequ'elle est dans les faits et non dans les mots, influence que l'Empereur a trouvée toute faite en montant sur le trône, et à laquelle, il ne saurait, par déférence pour les injustes soupçons qu'elle éveille, renoncer sans abandonner le glorieux héritage de ses augustes prédécesseurs.

C'est vous dire combien ont peu de fondement tous les bruits semés au sujet de la mission du Prince Menchikoff, laquelle n'a jamais eu d'autre objet que l'arrangement de l'affaire des lieux saints.

Il serait, Monsieur, trop long de vous retracer en détail l'histoire de toutes les phases par lesquelles elle a passé depuis l'année 1850. Cette question, nous avons la conscience de ne l'avoir point soulevée les premiers. Nous savions trop combien elle était grosse de conséquences pour la paix de l'Orient, peut-être même pour la paix du monde. Nous n'avons cessé, dès son origine, d'appeler l'attention sérieuse des grands Cabinets sur la position qu'elle nous ferait, sur les graves éventualités qui en devaient naître ; et le développement successif qu'elle a pris, en amenant enfin la crise actuelle, n'a que trop justifié nos tristes prévisions. Il suffira pour le moment de vous rappeler qu'à la suite des premières concessions obtenues par la France en faveur des Latins à Jérusalem, au détriment des privilèges séculaires accordés aux Grecs, l'Empereur, voyant chaque jour la partialité évidente de la Porte pour les Latins l'entraîner à des concessions de plus en plus graves pour les droits et intérêts du culte Oriental, se trouva dans l'obligation d'adresser sur ce sujet une lettre amicale mais sérieuse au Sultan. Les résultats de cette démarche furent, d'abord l'appel d'une Commission exclusivement composée d'Oulémas Turcs, qui s'occupa d'un arrangement propre à concilier les prétentions réciproques ; puis, après de longs pourparlers, une lettre responsive du Sultan à l'Empereur, annonçant la solution définitive de la question et renfermant les promesses les plus solennelles sur le maintien des anciens droits octroyés par la Porte aux communautés Grecques. Un firman qui renfermait les détails de cet arrangement nous fut en même temps communiqué. En tête de ce firman, un hatti-shérif autographe du Sultan reconnaissait et consacrait de la manière la plus formelle les Actes antérieurs accordés aux Grecs à différentes époques, renouvelés par le Sultan Mahmoud, et confirmés par le Souverain actuel.

Bien que cette lettre et ce firman fussent conçus dans un esprit et dans des termes qui s'écartaient quelque peu du strict *status quo* que nous nous étions toujours attachés à maintenir, cependant ces pièces ayant paru à l'Empereur satisfaire jusqu'à un certain point à sa juste sollicitude pour les intérêts et les immunités du culte Gréco-Russe à Jérusalem, un désir de conciliation porta Sa Majesté à les accepter. Elle en prit acte, de manière à leur donner la valeur d'une transaction solennelle et définitive.

En présence de ces documents catégoriques, officiellement communiqués à la suite d'une longue et pénible négociation, le Gouvernement Impérial était certes fondé à considérer comme à jamais clos un débat dont sa modération avait réussi à écarter les dangers, et qui laissait les Latins en possession de nouveaux avantages. Vous savez que malheureusement il n'en a point été ainsi.

Je serais entraîné trop loin, si je relatais ici tous les actes de faiblesse, de tergiversation, et de duplicité qui ont signalé la conduite des autorités Ottomanes, lorsqu'il s'est agi d'accomplir les engagements pris à notre égard, et de procéder à Jérusalem, suivant les formes d'usage, à la promulgation, à l'enregistrement et à l'exécution du firman. Envoyé à cet effet dans la Ville Sainte, selon l'assurance explicite qu'en avait reçue notre mission à Constantinople, le Commissaire Turc, une fois sur les lieux, osa déclarer à notre Consul, qui insistait sur la lecture et l'enregistrement du firman, qu'il n'avait point connaissance de cet Acte, et qu'il n'en était fait aucune mention dans ses instructions. Bien que plus tard, sur nos réclamations, le firman ait fini par être lu et enregistré à Jérusalem, il ne l'a été qu'avec des restrictions blessantes pour le culte Oriental. Mais pour ce qui est de l'Acte même, si l'on en excepte l'accomplissement de ces simples formalités, les dispositions principales en ont été ouvertement transgressées. L'infraction la plus flagrante en a été la remise aux mains du Patriarche Latin de la clef de la porte principale de l'Eglise de Bethléem. Cette remise était contraire aux termes précis du firman. Elle heurtait profondément le clergé et toute la popu-

lation du rite Gréco-Russe, parceque, suivant les idées accrédités en Palestine, la possession de la clef semble impliquer à elle seule celle du temple tout entier. Le Gouvernement Turc constatait ainsi aux yeux de tous, contre son propre intérêt même, la suprématie qu'il accorde à un autre rite que celui auquel est soumise la majorité de ses sujets.

Un pareil oubli des promesses les plus positives consignées dans la lettre du Sultan à l'Empereur ; un manque de foi aussi patent, aggravé encore par les procédés et par le langage dérisoire des Conseillers de Sa Hautesse ; étaient certes de nature à autoriser notre Auguste Maître, blessé dans sa dignité, dans sa confiance amicale, dans son culte, et dans les sentiments religieux qui lui sont communs avec ses peuples, à demander sur-le-champ une satisfaction éclatante. Sa Majesté l'aurait pu faire, si, comme l'en accuse sans cesse une opinion faussée dans ses sources, elle ne cherchait que des prétextes pour renverser l'Empire Ottoman. Mais elle ne l'a point voulu. Elle a préféré obtenir cette satisfaction par les voies d'une négociation pacifique. Elle s'est efforcée encore une fois d'éclairer le Souverain de la Turquie sur ses torts envers nous, comme envers ses propres intérêts, d'en appeler à sa sagesse des fautes de son Ministère ; et c'est dans ce but qu'elle a envoyé Prince Menchikoff à Constantinople.

Sa mission avait deux objets, toujours relatifs à l'affaire des Lieux Saints :

1. Négocier, à la place du firman que l'on avait mis à néant, un nouvel arrangement qui, sans enlever aux Latins ce qu'ils venaient d'obtenir en dernier lieu (car nous voulions éviter de placer, en exigeant ce retrait, la Porte Ottomane vis-à-vis de la France précisément dans la fausse position où elle était placée vis-à-vis de nous), expliquât au moins ces concessions de manière à leur ôter l'apparence d'une victoire remportée sur le culte Gréco-Russe, et rétablît, moyennant quelques compensations légitimes, l'équilibre rompu aux dépens de ce dernier.

2. Corroborer cet arrangement par un Acte authentique, qui pût nous servir à la fois de réparation pour le passé, de garantie pour l'avenir.

Cette première partie de la mission de notre Ambassadeur Extraordinaire, fort difficile et fort épineuse en elle-même, en ce qu'il s'agissait de mettre d'accord les droits et les intérêts réciproques mais contradictoires de la Russie et de la France, nous croyons y avoir apporté un extrême esprit de conciliation, dispositions auxquelles, nous aimons à le dire, le Gouvernement Français a répondu de son côté. Après de longues discussions, elle venait enfin de porter fruit, et le résultat en a été la rédaction de deux nouveaux firmans, obtenus sans opposition de la part de l'Ambassadeur de France.

Mais, comme je l'ai dit plus haut, la question à négocier présentait encore une autre face. Obtenir un arrangement n'était pas tout. Sans un Acte qui le validât, qui nous offrît la garantie que les nouveaux firmans seraient à l'avenir exécutés et religieusement observés dans leur principe et leurs conséquences, il est évident que ces documents, après la flagrante violation de celui qui les avait précédés, ne pouvaient avoir à nos yeux plus de valeur réelle que celui-ci. Cette garantie, l'Empereur y attachait d'autant plus d'importance, qu'elle constituait au fond la seule et unique réparation qu'il demandait après l'outrage fait à sa dignité par le manque de foi de la Porte Ottomane, après surtout les circonstances qui l'avaient rendu encore plus patent.

Le Prince Menchikoff fut chargé de chercher à l'obtenir, moyennant une Convention qu'il signerait avec le Gouvernement Turc. De Traité, proprement dit, il n'en a jamais été question.

On s'est récrié hautement contre la forme de cette Convention, comme portant atteinte en principe aux droits de souveraineté du Sultan ; comme nous conférant de fait, au nom de la religion, un droit d'ingérence perpétuelle dans les affaires intérieures de la Turquie. Nous croyons qu'on se crée là un fantôme, qu'on se préoccupe de craintes dont le fondement est plus spécieux que réel.

En principe, une Convention ou même un Traité pareil n'auraient rien d'insolite ; et nous ne comprenons pas en quoi ils seraient plus attentatoires aux droits d'autonomie souveraine du Sultan que les Capitulations ou autres Actes que possèdent déjà en Turquie la France et l'Autriche. Car, en principe seulement, c'est-à-dire, en ce qui concerne l'indépendance du Sultan, il importe peu qu'un Acte s'applique à tel ou tel nombre plus ou moins considérable de ses sujets en faveur desquels s'exercerait un droit de protection étrangère. La garantie par Traité assurée dans un autre Etat aux intérêts d'une communion étrangère a été usuelle de tout temps. A l'époque de la Réforme, par exemple,

des Etats, même de grands Etats Catholiques, ont conclu avec d'autres des Traités, ou Conventions, par lesquels ils garantissaient chez eux à la Communion Protestante certains privilèges, franchises, et immunités, en sorte que, même aujourd'hui, la position civile de cette Communion y repose encore sur ces bases, sans que pour cela les Etats, qui ont donné pareille garantie, se soient crus lésés dans leurs droits souverains ou dans leur indépendance politique. A plus forte raison, en principe, de tels Actes peuvent-ils être conclus avec un Etat Musulman, dont les sujets Chrétiens ont souffert et souffrent encore tant de fois, non-seulement dans leurs immunités, mais dans leurs propriétés et dans leur existence.

Quant au fait, en ce qui nous concerne, la chose existe déjà, et la forme d'une Convention que nous avons proposée n'offrirait rien de nouveau en matière de protection religieuse. Le Traité de Kainardji, par lequel la Porte s'engage à protéger constamment dans ses Etats la religion Chrétienne et ses églises, implique pour nous suffisamment un droit de surveillance et de remontrance. Ce droit se trouve établi derechef, et plus clairement encore spécifié dans le Traité d'Andrinople, qui a confirmé toutes nos transactions antérieures. Celle de Kainardji date de l'année 1774. Voilà donc, de fait, près de 80 ans que nous possédons par écrit le droit même que l'on nous conteste, et dont on regarde la mention qui en serait faite aujourd'hui comme devant apporter une révolution toute nouvelle dans nos rapports avec la Porte Ottomane, en nous conférant la souveraineté effective de l'immense majorité de ses sujets. Certes, durant ce laps de temps, si nous avions été disposés à en abuser, comme d'incurables défiances le supposent, les occasions ne nous auraient pas manqué, dans les derniers temps surtout, où l'Europe livrée à l'anarchie, où les Gouvernements impuissants contre la discorde intérieure, étaient absorbés ou distraits par les révolutions de l'Occident et laissaient en Orient libre carrière aux vucs ambitieuses qu'on nous prête. Si nous avions les intentions qu'on se plaît à nous supposer, aurions-nous attendu pour les mettre à exécution que la paix fût rétablie en Europe? Aurions-nous disposé nos forces de manière à en offrir à nos voisins le secours moral ou matériel? Aurions-nous travaillé avec zèle, comme nous l'avons fait, à réconcilier nos alliés, à écarter tout ce qui pouvait nuire à l'union intime des Puissances? Au contraire, nous aurions cherché à perpétuer leur désaccord. Nous aurions laissé les Gouvernements Européens se débattre entre eux ou avec leurs peuples en révolte, et, profitant de leurs embarras, nous aurions volé sans obstacle au but de ce qu'on persiste à nommer notre politique envahissante. Aujourd'hui que l'ordre social s'est heureusement raffermi partout, et que les Etats, rassés sur leurs bases, peuvent disposer plus librement de leur action comme de leurs forces, le moment serait étrangement choisi pour suivre une pareille politique.

Encore une fois, en principe et en fait, une Convention avec la Porte dans l'intérêt de nos coreligionnaires n'a rien de nouveau. Elle ne nous offrirait nul avantage que nous ne possédions, depuis longtemps, et dont nous n'eussions pu faire abus si nos intentions étaient telles qu'on le suppose. Si nous sommes forts, nous n'en avons pas besoin. Si nous sommes faibles, un pareil acte ne nous rendrait pas plus à craindre. Cela est si vrai, que nous n'aurions jamais songé à en faire la proposition à propos de la question spéciale des lieux saints, si la Porte ne nous avait obligés, par l'oubli de ses promesses antérieures, à tâcher de la lier plus étroitement au maintien du *status quo* des sanctuaires de la Palestine: si, quand nous avons réclamé contre les concessions faites à notre détriment, elle ne nous avait donné pour excuse qu'en ce qui concerne les lieux saints la France avait un Traité, et que la Russie n'en avait pas.

Au reste, Monsieur, nous n'avons jamais fait d'une Convention proprement dite la condition *sine quâ non* de notre accommodement avec la Porte. Tout en remettant sous cette forme au Prince Menchikoff, lors de son envoi à Constantinople, la minute des stipulations qu'il aurait à négocier, il lui avait été laissé pleine et entière latitude non-seulement de les modifier dans leurs termes, mais aussi de les obtenir sous telle autre forme quelconque à laquelle répugneraient moins les susceptibilités de la Porte ou de la Diplomatie Etrangère. C'est d'après cette autorisation que notre négociateur, arrivé sur les lieux et ayant pu se convaincre des obstacles que rencontrait notre Projet de Convention, s'est borné à demander, sous le nom de Sened, un Acte plus en rapport avec les usages Orientaux et moins conforme aux idées solennelles qu'implique d'ordinaire le mot de Convention dans le droit public Européen. Deux clauses étendues de

ce premier Projet de Sened par lesquelles nous demandions, non pas, comme on l'a prétendu, le droit de confirmer l'élection du Patriarche de Constantinople, mais simplement le maintien des immunités ecclésiastiques et des avantages temporels accordées *ab antiquo* par la Porte aux quatre Patriarches de Constantinople, d'Antioche, d'Alexandrie, et de Jérusalem, ainsi qu'aux métropolitains, évêques et autres chefs spirituels de l'Eglise Orientale, ayant soulevé de trop graves objections, le Prince Menchikoff n'a point refusé de supprimer entièrement ces deux clauses.

Il en est résulté un second Projet de Sened, sur l'acceptation duquel il a longtemps insisté. Enfin, au dernier moment, la Porte persistant à rejeter toute espèce d'engagement qui porterait une forme bilatérale et synallagmatique quelconque, notre Ambassadeur, dans l'esprit de ses instructions, avait été jusqu'à déclarer que si la Porte voulait accepter et signer immédiatement une note telle que celle dont vous trouverez ci-joint le Projet textuel, il consentirait lui-même à se contenter d'un pareil document, et à le considérer comme réparation et garantie suffisante.

Voilà donc quel était, au moment où le Prince Menchikoff a quitté Constantinople, le véritable ultimatum posé par le Cabinet Impérial ; et c'est sur le retard qu'a mis la Porte à accepter la pièce en question que notre négociateur a enfin levé l'ancre pour Odessa et interrompu nos rapports diplomatiques avec le Gouvernement Ottoman.

Ce qu'il a cédé successivement sur la forme et le fond de nos propositions même, il l'a cédé également sur le terme originairement fixé pour leur admission. Il lui avait été prescrit, après une longue et stérile attente, de demander à la Porte une réponse définitive dans la terme de trois jours ; et, quoique cette réponse conséquemment eut dû lui être donnée dès le 8 Mai n. s., ce n'est pourtant que le 21 qu'il a quitté Constantinople.

Après trois mois consécutifs de laborieuse négociation, ayant ainsi épuisé jusqu'aux dernières concessions possibles, l'Empereur se voit désormais forcé d'insister péremptoirement sur l'acceptation pure et simple du projet de note. Toujours mû néanmoins par les considérations de patience et de longanimité qui l'ont guidé jusqu'ici, il laisse à la Porte un nouveau sursis de huit jours pour se décider ; après quoi quelque effort qu'il en coûte à ses dispositions conciliantes, il se verra bien forcé d'aviser aux moyens de se procurer, par une attitude plus prononcée, la satisfaction qu'il a vainement essayé d'obtenir jusqu'ici par des voies pacifiques.

Ce n'est pas sans un vif et profond regret qu'il adoptera cette attitude. Mais à force d'aveuglement et d'obstination on aura voulu le pousser dans une situation où la Russie, acculée, pour ainsi dire, à l'extrême limite de la modération, ne pourrait plus céder d'un pas qu'au prix de sa considération politique.

Veillez, Monsieur, communiquer ces faits au Gouvernement auprès duquel vous êtes accrédité, en portant à sa connaissance la pièce importante qui sert d'annexe à cette dépêche. Nous le prions d'y vouer sa plus sérieuse attention ; car c'est elle qui forme en ce moment le nœud Gordien de la question ; le nœud que nous ne demandons encore qu'à délier pacifiquement, mais qu'on semble avoir pris à tâche de vouloir nous forcer à rompre. En soumettant notre ultimatum au jugement impartial des Cabinets, nous leur laissons à décider si, après les torts si graves dont la Porte s'est rendue coupable envers nous, après qu'elle nous a donné tant de causes de ressentiment légitime, il était possible de se contenter d'une moindre satisfaction. L'examen consciencieux de notre projet de note prouvera que, dépouillé de toute forme de Traité ou même de contrat synallagmatique, il n'a rien qui soit contraire aux droits de souveraineté du Sultan, rien qui implique de notre part les prétentions exagérées que nous prête une défiance aussi injurieuse pour nous qu'elle est peu justifiée par nos actes antérieurs. Cet examen suffira, nous l'espérons, pour faire évanouir les faux bruits répandus sur nos exigences hautaines, et pour montrer que, si le rejet des derniers moyens d'accommodement que nous proposons pour résoudre les difficultés qui nous ont été suscitées dans l'affaire des Lieux Saints, amène des complications compromettantes pour la paix, ce n'est pas sur nous que la responsabilité en devra peser aux yeux du monde.

Recevez, &c.  
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)

*St. Petersburg, May 30, 1853.*

PRINCE MENCHIKOFF'S mission to Turkey having already given occasion for the most exaggerated reports, which his departure, and the consequent interruption of relations, will doubtless only serve to increase, I think it right to transmit to you some general information on that matter, to aid you in the correction of the false impressions which may obtain currency in the country in which you reside.

I deem it superfluous to inform you that there is not a word of truth in the pretensions attributed to us by the newspapers, of requiring either a fresh aggrandisement of territory, or a more advantageous settlement of our Asiatic frontier, or the right of nomination or revocation of the Patriarchs of Constantinople, or in fine, any other religious Protectorate whatever which should go beyond that which we traditionally exercise, in fact and by right, in Turkey in virtue of our former Treaties. You are sufficiently acquainted with the policy of the Emperor to know that His Majesty does not desire the ruin and the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, which he has himself on two occasions preserved; that, on the contrary, he has always considered, and still considers, the actual state of things as the best possible combination which can be interposed between all the European interests which would not fail to clash in the East if the opening should there present itself; and that, as regards the protection of the Russian-Greek religion in Turkey, we have need of no other rights for watching over its interests than those assured to us by our Treaties, by our position, by the influence resulting from the religious sympathy which exists between fifty millions of Russians of the Greek Church and the great majority of the Christian subjects of the Sultan; a secular influence, and one which is inevitable because it rests on facts and not on words,—an influence which the Emperor found already established when he ascended the throne, and which he cannot renounce out of deference to the unjust suspicions which it excites, without abandoning the glorious inheritance of his august predecessors.

This will inform you how unfounded are all the reports which have been spread abroad on the subject of Prince Menchikoff's mission, which has never had any other object than the settlement of the affair of the Holy Places.

It would be too long to recapitulate to you in detail the history of all the phases through which this affair has passed since the year 1850. We are conscious of not having been the first to raise this question. We were too well aware how pregnant it was of results for the peace of the East—perhaps even for the peace of the world. We have not ceased, from its commencement, to call the serious attention of the great Cabinets to the position in which it would place us, and to the serious contingencies which might spring from it; and its continued development, by producing at length the present crisis, has but too well justified our sad anticipations. It will be sufficient for the present to remind you that, subsequently to the first concessions obtained by France in favour of the Latins at Jerusalem to the prejudice of the secular privileges granted to the Greeks, the Emperor, perceiving every day that the evident partiality of the Porte for the Latins was leading it on to make concessions more and more serious as regarded the rights and interests of the Eastern religion, felt himself obliged to address a friendly but serious letter to the Sultan on that subject. The results of this proceeding were, first, the appointment of a Commission exclusively composed of Turkish Ulemas, which employed itself in framing an arrangement calculated to reconcile the pretensions on both sides; in the next place, after long discussions, a letter from the Sultan in reply to the Emperor, announcing the definitive solution of the question, and containing the most solemn promises as to the maintenance of the ancient rights granted by the Porte to the Greek communities. A Firman, containing the details of this arrangement, was at the same time communicated to us. At the head of this Firman an autograph Hatti Scherif of the Sultan recognised and confirmed in the most formal manner the previous Acts granted to the Greeks at different periods, renewed by Sultan Mahmoud, and confirmed by the present Sovereign.

Notwithstanding that this letter and this Firman were conceived in a spirit and in terms which deviated in some degree from that strict *status quo* which we

had always insisted on maintaining, these documents having, however, appeared to the Emperor to satisfy up to a certain extent his just solicitude for the interests and the immunities of the Greco-Russian religion at Jerusalem, a conciliatory desire induced His Majesty to accept them. He took note of them so as to give them the value of a solemn and definitive transaction.

With these unequivocal documents, officially communicated at the close of a long and troublesome negotiation, the Imperial Government was surely justified in considering as for ever closed a discussion the dangers of which its moderation had succeeded in obviating, and which left the Latins in possession of new advantages. You are aware that, unhappily, such has not been the case.

I should be led on too far were I to recount here all the acts of weakness, of tergiversation, of duplicity which signalized the conduct of the Turkish authorities, when the question arose of carrying out the engagements entered into with us, and of proceeding at Jerusalem, according to customary forms, to the promulgation, enrolment, and execution of the Firman. The Turkish Commissioner despatched for this purpose to the Holy City according to the explicit assurance which our Mission at Constantinople had received, when once upon the spot, dared to declare to our Consul, who insisted on the Firman being read and enrolled, that he had no knowledge of that instrument, and that no mention was made of it in his instructions. Although at a later period, on our representations, the Firman was finally read and enrolled at Jerusalem, it was not so without restrictions injurious to the Eastern religion. But as regards the instrument itself, with the exception of the fulfilment of these mere formalities, the principal dispositions of it have been openly transgressed. The most flagrant infraction of it has been that of placing in the hands of the Latin Patriarch the key of the principal door of the Church of Bethlehem. This delivery of the key was contrary to the precise terms of the Firman. It was a severe blow to the clergy and the whole population of the Russo-Greek rite, because, according to the received ideas in Palestine, the mere possession of the key seems to imply that of the entire church. The Turkish Government thus demonstrated in the eyes of all, even against its own interest, the supremacy which it grants to a religion other than that to which the majority of its subjects subscribe.

Such a disregard of the most positive promises given in the Sultan's letter to the Emperor, so manifest a breach of faith, aggravated still more by the proceedings and derisive language of the councillors of his Highness, assuredly authorized our august master, wounded in his dignity, in his friendly confidence, in his religion, and in the religious sentiments which he holds in common with his people, to demand at once some unequivocal satisfaction. His Majesty might have done so if, as he is incessantly accused by an opinion altogether erroneous, he sought only a pretext for overthrowing the Ottoman Empire. But he did not desire this. He preferred to obtain this satisfaction by means of a pacific negotiation. He strove once more to enlighten the Sovereign of Turkey as to the wrongs he was inflicting upon us, as well as upon his own interests, to appeal to his wisdom from the faults of his Council; and it was to this end that he sent Prince Menchikoff to Constantinople.

His mission had two objects, still relating to the affair of the Holy Places.

1st. To negotiate, in lieu of the Firman which had been annulled, a new arrangement, which, without depriving the Latins of what they had lately acquired (for we wished to avoid, by requiring this retractation, placing the Ottoman Porte precisely in the same false position towards France in which it stood towards ourselves), should at least explain those concessions, in such a manner as to take from them the appearance of a victory obtained over the Greco-Russian religion, and should re-establish, by means of some legitimate compensation, the equilibrium which had been destroyed at the expense of the latter.

2nd. To consolidate this arrangement by an authentic Act, which should serve us at once for a reparation as to the past and for a guarantee as to the future.

As regards this first portion of the business of the mission of our Ambassador Extraordinary, very difficult and very embarrassing in itself, inasmuch as the question was to reconcile the reciprocal yet contradictory rights and interests of Russia and of France, we consider that we evinced an extreme spirit of conciliation, a disposition to which, it gives us pleasure to say,

the French Government has on its part responded. After lengthy discussions, it at length produced its fruits, and the result of it was the framing of two new Firmans, obtained without opposition from the Ambassador of France.

But, as I have said above, the question to be negotiated presented still another aspect. To obtain an arrangement was not all. Without an Act which should render this valid, which should offer us security that the new Firmans should be for the future carried out and religiously observed in their principle and in their consequences, it is clear that these documents, after the flagrant violation of the one which had preceded them, could have no more real value than the latter in our eyes. To this guarantee the Emperor attached the more importance, since it constituted in truth the single and only reparation which he demanded, after the outrage done to his dignity by the breach of faith on the part of the Ottoman Porte; above all, after the circumstances which had rendered that outrage still more manifest.

Prince Menchikoff was instructed to endeavour to obtain this, by means of a Convention which he was to sign with the Turkish Government. Of a Treaty, properly so called, there has never been any question. An outcry has been raised against the form of this Convention, as being injurious in principle to the Sultan's rights of sovereignty; as, in point of fact, conferring upon us, in the name of religion, a right of permanent interference in the internal affairs of Turkey. It appears to us that this is but creating a phantom, and prepossessing the mind with fears for which the foundation is more specious than real.

In principle, such a Convention or even Treaty would present nothing unusual; and we do not understand in what they would be more dangerous to the rights of the sovereign and independent Government of the Sultan than the Capitulations or other Acts which France and Austria already possess in Turkey. For, as regards the mere principle, that is to say as far as regards the independence of the Sultan, it is of little moment whether an Act applies to a larger or to a smaller number of his subjects in whose favour a right of foreign protection might be exercised. The guarantee by treaty, secured in another State to the interests of a foreign communion, has been customary from time immemorial. At the period of the Reformation, for example, States, even great Catholic States, concluded with others Treaties or Conventions by which they guaranteed to the Protestant communion within their dominions certain privileges, franchises, and immunities; so that even at the present time, the civil position of that communion rests in such States upon those foundations, without the States which have given such a guarantee considering themselves on that account to be injured in their sovereign rights or in their political independence. To a still greater degree, in principle, may such Acts be concluded with a Mussulman State, whose Christian subjects have suffered and do still so frequently suffer, not only in their privileges, but in their properties and in their lives.

As a matter of fact, as far as concerns us, the thing already exists, and the form of a Convention which we have proposed would offer nothing new as regards religious protection. The Treaty of Kainardji, by which the Porte engages constantly to protect in its States the Christian religion and churches, sufficiently implies as regards us a right of superintendence and of remonstrance. This right is laid down anew, and still more clearly specified in the Treaty of Adrianople, which confirmed all our previous engagements. That of Kainardji dates from 1774. Here then we actually possess in writing for nearly eighty years the very right which is now disputed with us, and the present mention of which is regarded as necessarily effecting quite a new revolution in our relations with the Ottoman Porte, by conferring on us real sovereignty over the immense majority of her subjects. Surely, during this lapse of time, if we had been disposed to abuse it, as the incurable suspicions of some will have it, the opportunity for doing so would not have been wanting, especially of late, when Europe was given up to anarchy, when the Governments, powerless against internal discord, were absorbed or distracted by the revolutions in the West, and left in the East free scope for the ambitious views which are attributed to us. If we had the intentions which people choose to imagine, should we have waited to put them into execution until peace was re-established in Europe? Should we have so disposed of our forces as to offer to our neighbours their moral or material assistance? Should we have laboured zealously, as we have done, to reconcile our allies, and to obviate everything which could injure the intimate union of the Powers? On the contrary, we should have sought to perpetuate their

misunderstandings. We should have left the European Governments to contend among themselves or with their revolted populations, and profiting by their embarrassment, we should have hastened without impediment to secure the object of what is constantly called our grasping policy. Now that social order is happily everywhere re-established, and that the States, settled on their bases, can dispose more freely of their action as well as of their force, the moment would be strangely chosen for carrying out such a policy.

Once more, in principle and in fact, a Convention with the Porte in the interest of our co-religionists has nothing new. It would offer us no advantage but what we had for a long time possessed, and which we might not have abused if our intentions were such as are supposed. If we are powerful, we have no need of it. If we are weak, such an act would not make us more to be feared. This is so true that we should never have dreamed of making the proposal in reference to the particular question of the Holy Places, unless the Porte had obliged us, by its disregard of former promises, to endeavour to bind it more closely to the maintenance of the *status quo* of the Sanctuaries of Palestine; unless, when we remonstrated against concessions made to our injury, it had made us the excuse that, as regarded the Holy Places, France had a Treaty, and that Russia had none.

Moreover, Sir, we have never made a Convention, properly so called, the condition *sine quâ non* of our reconciliation with the Porte. When the minute of the stipulations which he would have to negotiate was delivered in this form to Prince Menchikoff, on despatching him to Constantinople, full and entire latitude was left him not only to modify them as to their terms, but also to obtain them under whatever other form might be less objectionable to the susceptibilities of the Porte or of foreign diplomacy. It is in accordance with this authority that our negotiator, having arrived on the spot, and having convinced himself of the obstacles which our Draft of Convention would encounter, confined himself to requiring, under the title of *Sened*, an Act more in conformity with Oriental usage, and less so with the solemn meaning which the word Convention ordinarily implies in the public law of Europe. Two comprehensive Clauses of this first Draft of *Sened*, by which we required, not, as has been pretended, the right of confirming the election of the Patriarch of Constantinople, but simply the maintenance of the religious immunities and temporal advantages accorded *ab antiquo* by the Porte to the four Patriarchs of Constantinople, Antioch, Alexandria, and Jerusalem, as well as to the metropolitans, bishops, and other spiritual heads of the Eastern Church, having given rise to serious objections, Prince Menchikoff consented entirely to suppress those two Clauses.

The result of this was a second Draft of *Sened*, on the acceptance of which he long insisted. However, at the last moment, the Porte persisting in rejecting every kind of engagement which should assume any bilateral and synallagmatic form whatever, our Ambassador, acting in the spirit of his instructions, went so far as to declare that if the Porte would accept and sign at once a note similar to that of which you will find the literal draft hereunto annexed, he would on his side consent to be satisfied with such a document, and to consider it as sufficient reparation and guarantee.

This, then, was the real ultimatum insisted on by the Imperial Government at the moment when Prince Menchikoff left Constantinople, and it was in consequence of the delay of the Porte in accepting the document in question, that our negotiator at last weighed anchor for Odessa, and broke off our diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Government.

The concessions which he made as to the form, and even as to the substance of our proposals, he likewise made as to the period originally fixed for their acceptance. He had been enjoined, after waiting for a long time to no purpose, to require from the Porte a definitive reply within the space of three days; and although this reply should therefore have been delivered to him on the 8th of May, *n. s.*, he nevertheless only left Constantinople on the 21st.

After three consecutive months of laborious negotiation, having thus gone to the utmost limit of concessions, the Emperor considers himself obliged henceforth to insist peremptorily upon the plain and simple acceptance of the Draft of Note. Nevertheless, still influenced by the considerations of patience and of forbearance which have hitherto guided him, he grants the Porte a fresh

delay of eight days to come to a decision; after which, whatever effort it may cost his conciliatory desires, he will feel himself compelled to take measures for obtaining, by a more determined attitude, that satisfaction which he has hitherto in vain endeavoured to procure by pacific means.

It is not without sincere and deep regret that he will adopt this attitude; but it has been sought by blindness and obstinacy to thrust him into a situation in which Russia, driven, so to speak, to the extreme limit of moderation, could not yield another step except at the cost of her political dignity.

You will have the goodness, Sir, to communicate these facts to the Government to which you are accredited, in laying before them the important document which forms the annex to this despatch. We beg them most seriously to consider it; for it is at this time the Gordian knot of the question—the knot which we still desire to unravel by pacific means, but which it would seem to be wished to compel us to cut.

In submitting our ultimatum to the impartial judgment of the Cabinets, we leave them to decide whether, after such grave wrongs as the Porte has been guilty of towards us, after having given us so many legitimate causes for resentment, it was possible for us to be content with a smaller amount of satisfaction. The conscientious examination of our Draft of Note will show that, entirely divested of the form of a treaty or even of a synallagmatic contract, it contains nothing contrary to the sovereign rights of the Sultan; nothing which implies on our side the exaggerated pretensions which are attributed to us by a feeling of suspicion as injurious to us as it is little justified by our previous acts. This examination will suffice, we trust, to dispel the false reports circulated as to our ambitious pretensions, and to show that, if the rejection of the final means of accommodation which we propose for the solution of the difficulties which have been opposed to us in the affair of the Holy Places, should lead to complications dangerous to peace, it is not upon us that, in the eyes of the world, the responsibility ought to rest.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) NESSELRODE.

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*Annexe. Projet de Note.*

[See Inclosure 1 in No. 210.]

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No. 271.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 21.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, June 14, 1853.*

I HAVE the satisfaction of acquainting your Lordship, upon the authority of the Chancellor, that the final resolution of the Imperial Cabinet as to the occupation of the Principalities, will be taken only upon the answer of the Porte to the last intimation being known at St. Petersburg.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

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No. 272.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, June 21, 1853.*

HER Majesty's Government approve of the answer which, as stated in your despatch of the 3rd instant, you returned to Reshid Pasha's inquiry as to the course which the Porte should adopt in the event of a Russian army crossing the Danube and invading Turkey; and I have to instruct your Excellency to point out to the Porte, that the instructions to be given to Omar Pasha should be as specific as possible, for the Pasha cannot be well informed of the policy of his Government, and may do some act inconsistent with it.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 273.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, June 21, 1853.*

I HAVE to state to you that Her Majesty's Government agree in the remarks made by you in your despatch of the 9th instant, on Baron Brunnow's memorandum of the 25th of May, recapitulating his communications with Her Majesty's Government on Turkish affairs. Baron Brunnow has himself communicated to me a copy of that paper.

Her Majesty's Government were not made aware of any intentions of Russia towards Turkey unreasonable in themselves or infringing upon the independence of the Porte, or which, with more or less modification as to form, might not have been accepted by the Turkish Government; but, beyond the maintenance of the *status quo* in religious matters, all the demands of Russia were expressly limited to the Holy Places, and all apprehension as to the settlement of them, had reference less to the Porte than to France.

To the best of our belief, Baron Brunnow acted throughout in a frank and straightforward manner, and as far as his limited information went concealed nothing from Her Majesty's Government; but, that his information was limited is proved by the fact that some of Prince Menchikoff's demands were made known to him by me, and were received with doubt by him.

It was in consequence of such information from me, and the inquiries he made upon it, that Baron Brunnow received for the first time from St. Petersburg the Convention proposed by Prince Menchikoff, and which had already been altered at the suggestion of Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe.

If Baron Brunnow's memorandum was a faithful record not only of his communications with Her Majesty's Government, but of the demands really made by Russia, a complete and satisfactory arrangement might have been concluded without compromising the dignity of the Emperor, or menacing the independence of the Sultan.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 274:

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, June 21, 1853.*

I HAVE to state you, in reply to your despatch of the 10th instant, that no blame whatever attaches to you from the circumstance that the conduct of the Russian Government has proved to be at variance with the professions which you had informed Her Majesty's Government that you had received from them. You appear to have faithfully reported the assurances given to you, some of which were voluntarily offered.

Count Nesselrode does not seem to have questioned the accuracy of your reports, and there was no reason, but the contrary, for doubting assurances as to a course of action which was in harmony with the general principles laid down by the Emperor as to maintaining the independence of the Turkish Empire.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 275.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, June 21, 1853.*

THE Chevalier Bunsen, on the 4th instant, showed me a despatch from Baron Manteuffel, stating that he had learnt with sincere pleasure the moderate views entertained by Her Majesty's Government upon the Eastern question, and authorizing the Chevalier Bunsen to attend any conference here to which he

might be invited, having for its object a peaceful solution of the matters in dispute between Russia and the Porte, with the understanding, however, that any distinct proposal should be received by the Chevalier Bunsen subject to the approval of his Government.

I requested the Chevalier Bunsen, as your Lordship is also instructed, to express to Baron Manteuffel the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at this fresh proof of the confidence and identity of views that exist between the two Governments.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 276.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, June 21, 1853.*

ON the 19th instant, Count Colloredo read to me a despatch from Count Buol stating that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg had asked for the good offices of the Austrian Government with the Porte, and that the Internuncio had accordingly been instructed to point out to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs that as Prince Menchikoff, in his last project of note, had abandoned the bilateral form which was considered objectionable, there ought no longer to be the same difficulty in acceding to the proposals of Russia.

It was not expected, however, that this advice, even if it should arrive within the eight days allowed to the Porte for decision, would have any effect; and, in contemplation of its failure, the Internuncio was to request Reshid Pasha to consider what difference existed between Prince Menchikoff's last project and the note from the Porte which he declined to receive on the ground that official relations between the two countries had ceased; and that if this difference could be reconciled, and a new proposal were offered by the Porte, Count Buol engaged to make it known at St. Petersburg.

Count Buol then asks for the cooperation of Her Majesty's Government with the Turkish Government, and the intimation of our confidence in the Emperor of Russia, whose assurances, that by the occupation of the Principalities he does not intend war nor territorial aggrandisement, but simply their retention until he obtains satisfaction from the Porte, should be received by Europe as an unmistakeable pledge (*gage non équivoque*) of his peaceful sentiments.

Count Buol expresses an earnest hope that the Powers will abstain from all demonstrations that might unduly excite the hopes of the Porte, and still further embarrass the Emperor of Russia with reference to the national and religious feelings of his people.

But he adds that he should deplore that the Emperor gave immediate effect to his intention of occupying the Principalities; that the Austrian Government have frankly expressed themselves in that sense, and hope to obtain a delay if [*"pour peu que"*] the Sultan shows any spirit of conciliation; and, with that object, they have engaged the Porte not to give to the occupation of the Principalities a character of "flagrant hostility."

I told Count Colloredo that although I fully agreed with some portions of the despatch, yet I could not help saying that it would be more satisfactory if it were less one-sided, and if the concessions urged upon the Porte had likewise been recommended to Russia.

I told him, also, that confidence was not an act of volition, but depended on reason or experience, and, after all that had passed, we could feel no confidence that the violent and unjustifiable occupation of the Principalities would not be followed by a further invasion of the Turkish territory, in which event Her Majesty's Government reserved to itself an entire freedom of action, in conjunction with France, for the protection of Turkey.

Count Colloredo, I said, must be well aware from his previous communications with me, that Her Majesty's Government were anxious to cooperate with Austria in bringing this question to an amicable settlement; and I had the satisfaction to inform him that the instructions to the Internuncio did not

materially differ from those sent to Lord Stratford, who, I was sure, would gladly favour any proposal acceptable to the Emperor of Russia that did not compromise the independence of the Sultan; but that, if any such proposal were made, Austria, whose good offices had been asked by Russia, would have a right to insist upon its being received in a peaceful and conciliatory spirit.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 277.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 22.)*

(Extract.)

*Vienna, June 17, 1853.*

I WAITED this day upon Count Buol to communicate to him the telegraphic despatch that I had received late last night from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, dated the 10th instant, and which I have forwarded to your Lordship. Count Buol was not surprised at learning that Reshid Pasha and the Representatives of the Four Powers took the same view of the note of Count Nesselrode, and that to all appearance its terms would not be accepted by the Porte. He said that he had recommended the greatest moderation compatible with the honour and independence of the Sultan, and deeply lamented that the terms of that note gave little hope of an amicable solution. He feared the most serious consequences should the reply of the Porte lead to the occupation of the Principalities by Russia. It would then remain with the Sultan to determine if that measure should be looked upon as an act of war, and Count Buol fully recognizes the right of that Sovereign to do so, and to call for the assistance of the British and French fleets; but he still hopes that this may not be the case, and that in conformity with the declarations of Russia no act of hostility will be committed after that occupation by the Russians, and that the Powers, parties to the Treaty of 1841, may be enabled to interfere and by mediation to bring about such an arrangement as may satisfy the expectations of the Emperor, and secure the evacuation of those Principalities, and the establishment of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire; and to these objects the efforts of the Austrian Government would unceasingly be directed.

Count Buol declared that he had spared no efforts in his communications with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg to induce them to abandon the policy they appeared to have adopted towards the Turkish Government; he had not concealed from them the unfavourable impression it had created upon the sincerest friends of the Emperor, and he had still hopes that these remonstrances might produce their effect.

In replying to these assurances, I communicated to Count Buol the despatch from your Lordship of the 7th instant, in which I am instructed to express to him the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at his views of the Russian proceedings, and at the course the Austrian Government intended to pursue as reported in my despatch of the 30th of May; and with the view of bringing more explicitly before him your Lordship's sentiments, I read to him the last-mentioned despatch. Count Buol was much satisfied with your Lordship's expressions; he desired me to state that he considered himself as entirely united with your policy with respect to the Turkish Empire: he regards the maintenance of its independence and integrity as of the most essential importance to the best interests of Austria, and he would employ every means in his power to effect that object. He repeated his former declaration that he would take no engagements with Russia not to oppose her with arms, and he even added that should he be called upon to carry out an armed intervention on the frontiers, it would be in support of the authority and independence of the Sultan.

No. 278.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 23.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, June 7, 1853.*

THE Imperial firmans renewing and confirming the rights and privileges of the churches and clergy of the several Christian communities in Turkey, have received the Sultan's formal sanction, and are to be delivered to the respective heads of each in the course of the day.

I have the honour to inclose herewith M. Pisani's official report on this subject.

It is gratifying to observe that the Jewish community is included in the benefits of so solemn an act; and I have taken care that on this decisive occasion the Protestants should also be placed on terms of equality with the more ancient establishments.

The Sultan, by thus pledging himself before the world to maintain and enforce the privileges of the Christian churches and their respective clergy throughout his dominions, and by communicating his solemn declaration to the Five Great Powers of Christendom, appears to throw a strong additional light on the proceedings of that Power which has suspended its diplomatic relations with Turkey and thrown all Europe into anxiety and alarm, for the purpose of appropriating to itself and to its own exclusive policy a system of tolerance and protection which is now made to rest on foundations of real solidity, without prejudice to the independence of that Sovereignty from which it emanates.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 278.

*M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Pera, June 6, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the firmans, decorated with the Sultan's hatti-sheriff, have been returned to-day to the Porte, and Reshid Pasha is authorized to deliver them to the heads of each community. For that purpose His Highness sent an invitation to the three Patriarchs, to the Vakeel of the Protestants, and to the Chief Rabbin, requesting them to go to-morrow to his country-house between 11 and 12.

Copies of these firmans will be forwarded to the Representatives of the Four Powers, accompanied with a memorandum from the Porte.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) E. PISANI.

No. 279.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 23.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, June 7, 1853.*

THE Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs sent yesterday to consult me as to the expediency of writing in the name of the Porte to direct the Princes of Moldavia and Wallachia to retire from their respective Governments in the event of the Principalities being occupied by a Russian force.

I replied in the following words:

If the Princes of Moldavia and Wallachia were to leave their respective Governments in consequence of a Russian occupation, their retirement would afford to Russia a pretext for appointing other Princes from among its own creatures, and perhaps even making some new institutional arrangement favourable to its views against Turkey.

I think it would be better for the Princes to retain the reins of Government

as long as their communications with the Porte are free, and they are allowed to administer the affairs of the Principalities according to the existing institutions.

Should they be restrained in those respects, the Porte might then recall them.

It is to be hoped that the supposed contingency will not occur : but as the Porte appears to have adopted my advice, I should be glad to learn that it meets with your Lordship's approbation.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 280.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, June 24, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government have received, with great satisfaction, the account given in your despatch of the 7th instant, of the comprehensive nature of the firmans at that time about to be promulgated by the Sultan for the confirmation of the privileges of the non-Mussulman subjects of the Porte; and Her Majesty's Government highly approve the precaution taken by your Excellency to insure the extension of those privileges to the Protestant, as well as other Christian religious communities in Turkey.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 281.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, June 24, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the advice which you have given to the Turkish Government, as reported in your despatch of the 7th instant, with regard to the course which the Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia should be instructed to pursue in the event of the entrance of the Russian forces into the Principalities.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 282.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, June 24, 1853.*

HER Majesty's Government consider that every fair advantage should be taken of the present position of the Turkish Empire to press upon the Sultan and his Ministers the importance of removing all civil distinctions between the Christian and Mahomedan subjects of the Sultan, and of giving the former an equal degree of assurance with the latter as to the impartial administration of justice by the Turkish tribunals.

Your Excellency has long and zealously laboured to obtain for the Christians in Turkey that their evidence should be received in the courts of justice with the same consideration and respect as that of their Mussulman fellow-subjects, and that the barbarous distinction which fanaticism has long interposed between Turks and Rayahs in this respect should no longer be allowed to prevail.

The firman which in 1850 your Excellency obtained from the Porte for regulating the mixed jurisdiction in Egypt, gave a limited sanction to the principle for which Her Majesty's Government have so earnestly contended, that the oath of a Christian witness should be regarded in the same light as that

of a Mahomedan witness; and that a Mussulman should no longer enjoy impunity for crime on the ground that Christian testimony, frequently the only one that could be adduced, was inadmissible against a Mussulman.

Your Excellency is instructed to state to the Porte that it is the deliberate opinion of Her Majesty's Government that the only real security for the continued existence of Turkey as an independent Power, is to be sought by enlisting the feelings of its Christian subjects in its preservation; that, although Turkey may get over her present difficulties by the aid of her allies, she must not reckon upon external assistance as a permanent resource; but that she must create for herself a surer defence in the affections of the most intelligent, active, and enterprising class of her subjects; and that it is impossible to suppose that any true sympathy for their rulers will be felt by the Christians, so long as they are made to experience in all their daily transactions, the inferiority of their position as compared with that of their Mussulman fellow-subjects; so long as they are aware that they will seek in vain for justice for wrongs done either to their persons or their properties, because they are deemed a degraded race unworthy to be put into comparison with the followers of Mahomet.

Your Excellency will plainly and authoritatively state to the Porte that this state of things cannot be longer tolerated by Christian Powers. The Porte must decide between the maintenance of an erroneous religious principle, and the loss of the sympathy and support of its allies. You will point out to the Porte the immense importance of the election which it has to make; and Her Majesty's Government conceive that very little reflection will suffice to satisfy the Turkish Ministers that the Porte can no longer reckon upon its Mussulman subjects alone as a safeguard against external danger, and that without the hearty assistance of its Christian dependents, and the powerful sympathy and support of its Christian allies, the Turkish Empire must soon cease to exist.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 283.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 24.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Therapia, June 18, 1853.*

THE answer of the Porte to Count Nesselrode was sent yesterday to Odessa, as well as the records of the Russian Legation. News were received yesterday of the arrival of the army within two hours' march from Jassy. The English and French squadrons are at anchor near the entrance of the Dardanelles.

No. 284.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 24.)*

My Lord,

*Berlin, June 21, 1853.*

I CALLED on Baron Manteuffel this morning, and read to his Excellency, according to your Lordship's instructions, your despatch of the 14th instant, and its inclosure to Lord Westmorland.

Baron Manteuffel appeared gratified at the tone of this communication, and particularly at the assurances which it contained of the pacific policy Her Majesty's Government wishes to pursue, and the desire which is expressed, that an honourable issue should be found for Russia from the embarrassing position in which she was placed.

His Excellency afterwards listened with the greatest attention whilst I read your Lordship's despatch to Lord Westmorland; and was so struck with the arguments which it contained in favour of the maintenance of the *status quo* in Turkey, and the allusion to the dangers to which Austria would be exposed in the event of a war, that he requested me to leave it with him for communication to the King.

Thinking that there would be no inconvenience in my doing so, I left the despatch with his Excellency, and trust your Lordship will not disapprove of what I have done.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

## No. 285.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 24.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, June 16, 1853.*

IN consequence of a summons which I received from the Chancellor, I waited yesterday upon his Excellency at his villa.

The upshot of a very long conversation is, that for the moment no very decided course appears to be fixed upon by the Imperial Cabinet.

## No. 286.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 24.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, June 17, 1853.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 10th instant, I beg to inclose to your Lordship a copy of the Russian memorandum, drawn up with a view to establishing that the French Protectorate in Turkey applies as well to the Roman Catholic subjects of the Sultan as to Spaniards, Italians, and other strangers of the Roman Catholic religion resident in His Highness's dominions.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

## Inclosure in No. 286.

*Russian Memorandum on the French Protectorate of Latins.*

LA presse Française et Anglaise, à propos de la mission du Prince Menchikoff, cherche à prouver que le Protectorat exercé par la France sur les Catholiques en Orient ne saurait être invoqué aujourd'hui par la Russie comme un exemple et un précédent, parceque ce Protectorat ne s'applique qu'à des Catholiques étrangers domiciliés en Turquie, et non à des Catholiques soumis à la domination de la Porte.

Tous ceux qui suivent les mouvements de la politique Française en Orient, surtout à l'égard des Syriens et des Maronites, peuvent facilement citer des faits à l'appui du contraire. D'ailleurs la pensée qui sous ce rapport a guidé de tout temps le Gouvernement Français, se trouve exprimée d'une manière non douteuse dans un Acte public, nommément dans un Protocole sur les affaires de la Grèce du 3 Février, 1830, No. 3. Ce Protocole, signé pour la France par son Plénipotentiaire le Comte de Montmorency-Laval, renferme le passage suivant, que nous nous permettrons de citer textuellement :

" Le Plénipotentiaire Français a réclamé l'attention de la Conférence sur la situation particulière dans laquelle son Gouvernement se trouve relativement à une partie de la population Grecque.

" Il a représenté que depuis plusieurs siècles la France est en possession d'exercer en faveur des Catholiques soumis au Sultan, une patronage spécial que Sa Majesté Très Chrétienne croit devoir déposer aujourd'hui entre les mains du futur Souverain de la Grèce quant à ce qui concerne les provinces qui doivent composer le nouvel état ; mais en se déssaissant de cette prérogative, Sa Majesté Très Chrétienne se doit à elle-même et elle doit à une population qui a vécu si longtemps sous la protection de ses ancêtres, de demander que les Catholiques de terre ferme et des îles trouvent dans l'organisation qui va être donnée à la

Grèce, des garanties capables de suppléer à l'action que la France a exercée jusqu'à ce jour en leur faveur.

"Les Plénipotentiaires de la Grande Bretagne et de la Russie ont apprécié la justice de cette demande, et il a été arrêté que la religion Catholique jouira dans le nouvel état, du libre et public exercice de son culte ; que ses évêques seront maintenus dans l'intégrité des fonctions, droits, et privilèges dont ils ont joui sous le patronage du Roi de France ; et qu'enfin, d'après le même principe, les propriétés appartenant aux anciennes Missions Françaises seront reconnues et respectées."

Ainsi d'une côté nous voyons que la France n'hésite nullement à déclarer dans un Acte diplomatique formel qu'elle exerce un patronage spécial en faveur des Catholiques soumis au Sultan, et que ce patronage elle croit devoir le déposer entre les mains du futur Souverain de la Grèce quant à ce qui concerne les provinces qui doivent composer le nouvel état ; de l'autre, que le Plénipotentiaire de la Grande Bretagne n'a également aucun scrupule d'y apposer sa signature, probablement parceque son Gouvernement ne voyait pas dans la mention explicite du Protectorat Français une atteinte à l'indépendance de la Turquie et à la souveraineté du Sultan.

Pourquoi donc cette manière d'envisager la question a-t-elle varié depuis qu'il s'agit d'en faire l'application à la Russie ?

(Translation.)

THE French and English press, with reference to Prince Menchikoff's mission, is seeking to prove that the Protectorate exercised by France over the Catholics in the East cannot be cited by Russia at the present time as an example and precedent, inasmuch as that Protectorate only applies to foreign Catholics domiciled in Turkey, and not to Catholics subject to the rule of the Porte.

Those who follow the movements of French policy in the East, especially as regards the Syrians and the Maronites, can easily adduce facts to the contrary. Moreover the idea, which in this respect has always influenced the French Government, is expressed in an unequivocal manner in a public document, namely, in a Protocol on the affairs of Greece of the 3rd of February, 1830, No. 3. That Protocol, which was signed on behalf of France by her Plenipotentiary, the Count de Montmorency Laval, contains the following passage, which we will quote word for word :

"The French Plenipotentiary requested the attention of the Conference to the particular position in which his Government is placed relative to a portion of the Greek population.

"He represented that for many ages France has been entitled to exercise in favour of the Catholics subject to the Sultan, an especial protection which His Most Christian Majesty deems it to be his duty to deposit at the present time in the hands of the future Sovereign of Greece, so far as the provinces which are to form the new State are concerned ; but in divesting himself of this prerogative His Most Christian Majesty owes it to himself, and he owes it to a people who have lived so long under the protection of his ancestors, to require that the Catholics of the continent and of the islands shall find in the organisation which is about to be given to Greece, guarantees which may stand in lieu of the influence which France has hitherto exercised in their favour.

"The Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain and Russia appreciated the justice of this demand, and it was decided that the Catholic religion shall enjoy in the new State the free and public exercise of its worship ; that its property shall be guaranteed to it ; that its bishops shall be maintained in the integrity of the functions, rights and privileges which they have enjoyed under the protection of the Kings of France ; and that lastly, agreeably to the same principle, the properties belonging to the ancient French missions or French establishments shall be recognised and respected."

Thus, on the one hand, we perceive that France in no wise hesitates to declare, in a formal diplomatic Act, that she exercises a special patronage in behalf of the Catholic subjects of the Sultan, and that she deems it to be her duty to place that patronage in the hands of the future Sovereign of Greece, in so far as regards the provinces which are to compose the new State ; on the other

hand, that the Plenipotentiary of Great Britain has, in like manner, no scruple to affix his signature thereto, probably because his Government did not perceive in the explicit mention of the French Protectorate, any impeachment of the independence of Turkey and the sovereignty of the Sultan.

Why, then, has this manner of looking upon the question changed from the time that there is a question of applying it to Russia?

No. 287.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 24.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, June 17, 1853.*

THE conversation which I held with the Chancellor this morning, leaves me, I must confess, rather less sanguine than I was two days ago.

After some unprofitable controversy as to the Russian demands being or not in accordance with the expectations which Her Majesty's Government had a right to form, I observed that I was so desirous that there should be no further misapprehensions that, with a view to showing that my language was the expression of the feelings and views of Her Majesty's Government, I would read to his Excellency (although I was perhaps not authorized in doing so), your Lordship's two despatches of the 7th and 8th of June.

The Chancellor immediately took note of the words, "and to obtain such guarantees as should effectually guard against all future differences on the question," which are to be found in the first of these papers; and said, that in the construction to be placed upon this sentence lay the whole question pending between the two Governments.

The remark gave rise to a fresh argument, with which it is not necessary to trouble your Lordship.

At its conclusion the Chancellor observed, that the protectorate exercised in Turkey by the Emperor of Russia being a matter of fact and notoriety, it appeared to him incredible that the Governments interested in the existence of the Ottoman Empire should hesitate in advising her to subscribe to terms which evidently in no way changed the condition of things.

I begged to remark that this assumption was not borne out by fact; that, as it had been seen, not one of the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople would take upon himself to counsel the adoption of conditions which were considered dangerous to Turkey; and M. le Comte, I continued, permit me to remark, you alone are of your opinion; Russia, accustomed to majorities—Russia, in the habit of guiding other Governments, now finds that the opinions of the Four Great Powers are opposed to hers; surely this gives matter for reflection.

The Chancellor said, this might or might not be so; that he was grieved that any difference of opinion should prevail among Allied Powers; and at a later period of the conversation, acquainted me that pressing instructions had been sent from Vienna, urging the Turks to accept the note. But, the Chancellor said, the point of view from which the question is to be regarded, is this: you are interested in the continued existence of the Turkish Empire, and certainly you are not more so than we are ourselves; no Power is interested in this object in the same degree as Russia; but you must see that the force of Turkey is wasting away, and that one fillip (*chiquenaude*) from Russia causes it to fall altogether. Surely then, in common prudence, you should offer advice which, without producing any change in the real state of affairs, removes all danger from the Sultan's dominions.

Allow me, I returned, M. le Comte, to put the question differently. Interested as you ought to be, and as now, having lived some time in Russia, I believe you to be, in the preservation of Turkey, ought you not to refrain from placing her in the dilemma either of accepting a measure which the majority of her friends consider destructive of her independence, or, by a refusal, of incurring a war which implies her destruction?

The Chancellor could not allow the question to be so put; for Russia it was a matter of necessity that her influence should be very great, and this

influence is destroyed, if the Turks are not driven to accept the terms which have been proposed to them.

Count Nesselrode then enlarged upon the horrors of war, the unbounded injury which it would entail upon his own country and upon England, and commented upon the disproportion of the object as stated, with the sacrifices which would be made for its attainment. He thought war in such a cause could hardly be undertaken by the Government of a country professing such peaceable intentions, and so manifestly interested in the cultivation of peace, as England.

I observed that no Government and no people could be more disinclined to go to war than those of England; but that nothing could better prove the force of feeling in England, than that war should be coolly considered, when interests dear to all English feelings were considered in danger.

After some hesitation, Count Nesselrode begged to know whether I had any proposition to make to him. I replied, M. le Comte, the only thing I have to suggest is, that you should be good enough to take into consideration the words of Lord Clarendon's despatch to which you just now pointed, and that you should endeavour to strike out some course by which you may "obtain such guarantees as shall effectually guard against all future differences on the question (of the Holy Places), without seeking the guarantee in a measure of which the Allies in general, as you are aware, think very unfavourably."

The Chancellor having undertaken to speak to the Emperor upon the subject, and having expressed a wish of being allowed to read to His Majesty your Lordship's two despatches, I made up my mind to leaving them in his Excellency's hands.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 288.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, June 25, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held to Count Nesselrode in the conversation on the Turkish question, of which a report is contained in your despatch of the 17th instant; and they also approve of your having left in Count Nesselrode's hands my despatches of the 7th and 8th instant.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 289.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 27.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, June 10, 1853.*

A LETTER from Count Nesselrode to Reshid Pasha, dated St. Petersburg, May 19, I presume old style, was received yesterday by a Russian war-steamer under merchant colours, and delivered to the Pasha by M. Argyropulo, the Russian interpreter. Its purport is, that the Emperor entirely approves of Prince Menchikoff's conduct, and that, without actually making war, his army will in a few weeks cross the frontier to obtain a "material" guarantee from the Porte, until the "moral" one demanded by his Ambassador shall be obtained. Count Nesselrode ends by advising Reshid Pasha to sign the project of a note delivered to him by Prince Menchikoff before his departure from Constantinople, and to send it without the slightest alteration—"sans variation"—to that Ambassador at Odessa within eight days at latest. The rest of the letter is a mixture, as usual, of reproach, friendly assurances, and menace, conveyed in no flattering form.

Reshid Pasha lost no time in sending me a copy of the letter. He gave M. Pisani to understand that the Porte would not accept the overture, which is, in fact, the same identical proposal which has been already rejected.

Since writing what precedes, I have seen Reshid Pasha, the French Ambassador, the Prussian Envoy, and the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires, to whom copies of Count Nesselrode's letter had been sent. They all hold the same language with respect to that communication. It offers, in truth, no alternative but a simple acceptance of the terms before refused as inadmissible, or an armed invasion of the Turkish territory, with the view of obtaining by force what the Porte will not spontaneously accord. The Sultan has taken cognizance of the letter, which will also be submitted to the Council.

The present occasion does not admit of my saying more. My impression is, that the Porte will persist in its refusal of the Russian demands.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 290.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 27.)*

My Lord,

*Berlin, June 24, 1853.*

THE impression made on Baron Manteuffel by the last despatches which have reached him from St. Petersburg, is as unfavourable as ever, and he does not understand that there is the least disposition on the part of the Russian Government to modify their demands on the Porte.

His Excellency mentioned to me in confirmation of this opinion, that he had directed the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires to represent to Count Nesselrode the advantage in the interests of peace, of the Emperor receiving a Turkish Ambassador with new proposals for an arrangement of the points in discussion between the two Governments, and that the Chancellor had replied that the question could not be entertained until the note was signed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 291.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 27.)*

My Lord,

*Berlin, June 24, 1853.*

WHEN I was with Baron Manteuffel this evening, I read to his Excellency your Lordship's despatch of the 21st instant, in which you mention the communication by Chevalier Bunsen of a despatch authorizing that Minister to attend any conference to which he might be invited, having for its object a peaceful solution of the matters in dispute between Russia and Turkey, and his Excellency was gratified to learn the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at this fresh proof of the confidence and identity of views that exist between the two Governments.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 27.)*

My Lord,

*Vienna, June 21, 1853.*

I READ to Count Buol your Lordship's despatch of the 15th instant, in which you state that Her Majesty's Government have learnt the opinion of that Minister on the present aspect of Turkish affairs, as reported in my despatch of the 11th instant, with great satisfaction.

Count Buol was gratified by this statement of the sentiments of Her Majesty's Government; and as I afterwards read to him your Lordship's despatch of the 14th instant, in which your conversation with Count Colloredo is detailed, he begged me to assure you that he entirely coincided with the policy of Her Majesty's Government therein described, and that it was the greatest satisfaction to him to observe that, upon the important questions now pending in the East of Europe, there was no difference in the sentiments entertained in regard to them by either of the two Governments of England and of Austria.

Count Buol said that he had already received from Count Colloredo a report of the conversation described by your Lordship, with which he had been highly satisfied, but it had not entered into so many details as those given by your Lordship, which had rendered the expression of your sentiments still more valuable to him.

There was one point alone which was mentioned by your Lordship upon which he wished to make a remark, and which referred to the desire you expressed that Count Colloredo might be instructed to take part in any conference that it might be considered useful to hold in London, having for its object a solution of the existing difficulties in a manner both safe and honourable for Russia and for Turkey. Upon this proposal Count Buol desired to state that, however willing he should be to allow Count Colloredo to take part in bringing about the objects so described, yet he thought that, for the moment, while the decisions both of the Governments of Russia and of the Porte had not yet been declared, it would be premature to form a conference which might have the appearance of arranging itself in opposition to Russia, and of imposing terms upon her Government. Moved by this sentiment alone he recommended that, for the present, no measure should be taken towards the assembly or preparation of this conference, although he fully admitted the force of all the stipulations of the Treaty of 1841, and the obligations they imposed upon the Five Powers parties to it; and in case of the complications arising between Russia and Turkey, which at present there was too much reason to dread, he looked upon the stipulations of that Treaty as the groundwork upon which the peace of Europe could best be re-established, and to which the Austrian Government would lend its most cordial assistance.

Count Buol stated that he had received a communication as to a conference of the Five Powers from the French Government which was of a similar character to the one made by your Lordship. The despatch of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, which treated of this subject, and which had been read to him, was dated the 12th instant, and referred to the stipulations of the Treaty of 1841, by which the Five Powers were "garans de l'intégrité de la Turquie," and therefore the French Government called upon the Five Powers to meet in conference, to take into consideration the questions at present in dispute with the Porte before they should be resolved by one of those Five Powers by the force of arms.

Count Buol stated that he had replied in the same manner in which he had answered the proposal from your Lordship. He had, however, taken the opportunity of stating distinctly that he recognized all the obligations of the Treaty of 1841, and he looked to them, in case of more serious complications, as the hope and security for the future maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 27.)*

My Lord,

Paris, June 26, 1853.

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has addressed a circular\* of some length to the different French Missions, commenting on the Russian circular published in the public press of Europe.

The greater part of this paper contains refutations already used and repeated *usque ad nauseam* of the Russian arguments, but it comprises further a positive denial that the French Capitulations of 1740 give to France any right of protection over the Latin subjects of the Porte, and it contrasts the conduct of the French Government with that of Russia during the negotiation of the Question arising out of the disagreement respecting the Sacred Places. "France," M. Drouyn de Lhuys observes, "has quite as much reason to complain of, and has quite as much right to require satisfaction for the tergiversations of the Porte as Russia; but she had felt that those tergiversations were the natural consequence of a weak Power endeavouring to humour the antagonistic exigencies of two powerful States, and that the Porte was not to blame for them. France, on the other hand, had never obtained all that had been promised to her, while she had ceded to the Greeks certain advantages which had previously been in her exclusive and undisputed possession."

I asked M. Drouyn de Lhuys, with reference to his denial of any right of protectorate over the Latin subjects of the Sultan, whether he was aware of the declaration made by the Duc de Laval in the third Protocol on Greek affairs signed on the 5th of February, 1830. He replied that he knew to what I alluded, but that his explanation was quite ready. "The Greeks," he said, "in the islands, who professed the Roman Catholic faith, had always been denominated Franks, to which race the French Capitulations applied, and France had, in fact, up to the moment of the negotiation of the independence of Greece, always exercised the privilege of recommending or nominating the Greek or Frank Roman Catholic Bishops." "But what greater proof," exclaimed M. Drouyn de Lhuys, "could France give of her own value of the extent of her rights than both in this question and that of the Maronites in Syria? Instead of putting forward a claim to exclusive protection and therefore to exclusive jurisdiction, she stated her wishes to her allies, and submitted her demands for their examination." "Let Russia," he said, "do as much on the present occasion, before placing her conduct in contrast with that of France."

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

*M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Count Walewski.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Walewski, June 27.)*

M. le Comte,

Paris, le 25 Juin, 1853.

LE Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, en livrant à la publicité la dépêche circulaire que M. le Comte de Nesselrode vient, par ordre de Sa Majesté l'Empereur Nicolas, d'envoyer à toutes les Légations de Russie à l'étranger, a donné à ce document la valeur d'un manifeste adressé à l'Europe elle-même; aussi ai-je pensé qu'il était nécessaire de vous faire part des réflexions générales que sa lecture m'a suggérées.

Je remarquerai, tout d'abord, que de l'exposé même du différend de la Russie avec la Porte, tel que le représente M. de Nesselrode, il résulte que la mission de M. le Prince Menchikoff à Constantinople n'avait qu'un but—le règlement des difficultés relatives au partage des Saints Lieux de Jérusalem entre les diverses communions Chrétiennes—et que ce but a été rempli à la satisfaction du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg. La question qui se débat aujourd'hui est donc toute nouvelle; elle ne se rattache, par aucun côté, à celle de Jérusalem, et elle touche par tous à l'indépendance et à la souveraineté du

Sultan. C'est le jugement qu'en ont déjà porté, à Constantinople même, les Représentants de la France, de l'Autriche, de la Grande Bretagne, et de la Prusse.

Comment prétendre, en effet, que pour garantir aux Chrétiens du rit Oriental la possession de quelques sanctuaires déterminés, il faille les couvrir dans toute l'étendue de l'Empire Ottoman d'une protection officielle qui substituerait l'autorité morale de l'Empereur de Russie à celle qui revient légitimement au Grand Seigneur ? Quelle corrélation existe-t-il entre deux faits si différents, et en quoi le plus important pourrait-il être considéré comme un appendice, comme une conséquence nécessaire de celui qui l'est le moins ?

A l'appui de ses prétentions, le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg invoque ses anciens Traités avec la Porte, rappelle des analogies historiques, et fait valoir des griefs. Ce sont, M. le Comte, ces trois ordres d'arguments que je me propose de passer en revue aussi succinctement que possible.

Quand on examine les Traités que la Russie a conclus avec la Turquie, on voit que, si elle a quelque fois stipulé pour des sujets du Sultan, ces derniers appartenaient soit à des provinces que les chances de la guerre avaient momentanément fait perdre à la Porte et à la rétrocession desquelles des conditions pouvaient être posées, soit à des provinces qui, pendant la durée des hostilités, s'étaient compromises envers le Gouvernement Ottoman et que la politique et l'humanité commandaient de protéger contre son ressentiment.

Aucune de ces stipulations n'a le caractère de généralité qu'on essaye aujourd'hui de leur attribuer, et le Traité de Koutchouk-Kainardji, notamment, ne confère à la Russie qu'un droit de protection limité et défini sur une église desservie par des prêtres Russes, qu'il était question de fonder dans le faubourg de Galata. Cela ne veut pas dire assurément que dans la pratique et par la force des choses, le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg n'ait été naturellement amené à s'intéresser pour les Chrétiens du rit Grec qui forment dans la Turquie d'Europe la majorité de la population. Mais si la Porte, de son côté, a du tenir compte des sympathies de la Russie pour l'Eglise d'Orient, elle n'a pas jusqu'à présent souscrit d'engagement qui lui ôtât le mérite de sa tolérance, et lui imposât, au lieu de devoirs librement remplis à l'égard de ses propres sujets, des obligations envers une Puissance Etrangère. C'est là que réside toute la question, et en énoncer simplement les termes, c'est en démontrer déjà toute l'importance.

Les analogies auxquelles se réfère la circulaire de M. le Comte de Nesselrode, s'appliquent-elles mieux à la situation présente ?

S'il est survenu entre les Princes du Saint Empire, à l'époque de la réforme, des pactes relatifs à l'exercice du culte nouveau dans leurs possessions, faut-il rappeler d'abord que cet Empire était une association d'états régie par un même chef, et ensuite que les transactions dont on parle ont été le résultat de longues guerres intestines ou de combinaisons politiques dans lesquelles le caractère électif de la dignité Impériale exerçait nécessairement une grande influence ?

Quant à nos capitulations avec la Turquie, M. le Comte, vous savez qu'elles ne nous ont jamais donné le droit de protection sur les sujets Catholiques du Sultan. Si la France a pu rendre à cette fraction minime de la population Ottomane des services du genre de ceux que la Russie s'honore elle-même d'avoir rendus à ses coreligionnaires, sa protection directe et officielle ne s'est jamais exercée que sur des établissements étrangers desservis par des prêtres également étrangers et dont le chef spirituel réside à Rome. La protection de la Russie, au contraire, s'appliquerait à un clergé composé de sujets du Sultan et soumis hiérarchiquement à un patriarche qui dépend aussi de la Porte. Il n'y aurait donc aucune assimilation possible entre la position des deux Puissances.

Je consigne ici du reste un important passage d'un mémoire de M. le Comte de Saint Priest, Ambassadeur du Roi Louis XVI à Constantinople de 1768 à 1785, et qui détermine nettement le caractère de notre Protectorat. Voici comment s'exprime M. le Comte de Saint Priest :

“ On a décoré le zèle de nos rois de l'expression de protection de la religion Catholique en Levant ; mais elle est illusoire et servait à égarer ceux qui n'approfondissent pas la chose. Jamais les Sultans n'ont eu seulement l'idée que les monarques Français se crussent autorisés à s'immiscer de la religion des sujets de la Porte. Il n'y a point de Prince, dit fort sagement un de mes prédécesseurs, M. le Marquis de Bonnat, dans un mémoire sur cette matière, quelque

étroite union qu'il ait avec un autre Souverain, qui lui permette de se mêler de la religion de ses sujets. Les Turcs sont aussi délicats que d'autres là-dessus.

“Il est aisé de comprendre que la France, n'ayant jamais traité avec la Porte qu'à titre d'amitié, n'a pu lui imposer des obligations odieuses de leur nature. Aussi le premier point de mes instructions me prescrivait d'éviter tout ce qui pourrait causer de l'ombrage à la Porte en donnant trop d'extension aux capitulations en matière de religion.”

Cette citation me dispense de toute autre explication sur un point qu'elle éclaire avec une si incontestable autorité.

Ainsi donc, M. le Comte, ni les anciens Traités, ni les analogies que l'on invoque, ne peuvent servir de bases aussi solides qu'on le pense aux prétentions du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg.

Reste la question des griefs. Ce que la Russie reproche à la Porte, c'est un manque de procédés. Chaque Gouvernement, sans doute, est le seul juge des exigences de sa dignité ; mais il faut, cependant, que la réparation demeure toujours proportionnée à l'offense. Or des excuses ou des regrets constituent ordinairement la réparation d'un tort de forme. C'est pour la première fois que l'on voit exiger d'un Souverain, dans un cas semblable, l'abandon de son influence morale sur la plus notable partie de ses sujets.

J'ajouterai que, si la Russie fait à la Porte un grief de ses tergiversations dans l'affaire des Lieux Saints, la France ne serait pas moins fondée à lui adresser les mêmes reproches, et que si elle s'en est abstenue, c'est qu'elle a pris en considération les embarras d'une Puissance qui, entraînée par deux courants contraires et d'une force égale, ne croyait pouvoir garder son équilibre qu'en contractant tour à tour des obligations contradictoires.

Le même esprit de modération a porté le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale à tenir compte de la différence des temps, des changements opérés, depuis un siècle, dans les rapports des diverses Puissances, et de la Russie en particulier, avec l'Empire Ottoman ; et, bien que nous puissions alléguer, à l'appui des réclamations des pères de Terre Sainte, les clauses d'un Traité formel, nous n'avons rien demandé qui dût priver les Grecs des avantages que les événements avaient placés entre leurs mains ; loin de là, nous avons consenti à ce qu'on leur ouvrit un sanctuaire, celui de la Mosquée de l'Ascension, dont l'accès leur était interdit, et que les efforts tout récents d'un Ambassadeur de France, M. l'Amiral Roussin, avaient en partie restitué au culte Chrétien. Quant à cette clef de la grande porte de l'Eglise de Bethléem dont on a tant parlé, on a seulement oublié de dire que les Grecs en possédaient une toute semblable, et que celle des Latins, loin de leur assurer la propriété d'un temple toujours réservé à l'autre communion, ne leur accordait qu'un simple droit de passage. On n'a pas rappelé non plus qu'en réparation de l'oubli d'une promesse donnée à la Légation de Russie par le Divan, quand l'Ambassade de France en recevait une différente, l'un des deux firmans destinés à régler la question des Lieux Saints a concédé, sur la demande de M. le Prince Menchikoff, au Patriarche Grec de Jerusalem la surveillance exclusive de travaux de reconstruction qu'exige l'état de la grande coupole de l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre. Tous ces faits, M. le Comte, s'ils ne peuvent pas plus invalider nos titres, sous peine du renversement des principes généralement reconnus du droit public, que ne le ferait même un Traité conclu sans notre participation, constituent néanmoins autant de dérogations plus ou moins importantes, si non aux récents engagements de la Porte envers nous, que notre dignité nous imposait le devoir de faire respecter intégralement, du moins au texte précis de nos Capitulations de 1740. Si, donc, ses intentions eussent été moins conciliantes, s'il n'eut été pénétré de cette idée qu'aucune des Parties Contractantes de la Convention du 13 Juillet, 1841, ne pouvait user de tous ses droits antérieurs à cette transaction Européenne sans courir le risque de compromettre le repos que la garantie collective des Puissances a eu pour but d'assurer à l'Empire Ottoman, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale aurait eu la pleine faculté non seulement d'opposer des réserves qui sont d'un usage constant en diplomatie, mais de faire, à son tour, entendre des menaces.

C'est une autre ligne de conduite que la France a suivie, et la modération dont elle a fait preuve, outre qu'elle lui ôte toute part de responsabilité dans la crise actuelle, lui donne également le droit d'espérer que les sacrifices qu'elle a faits pour le maintien de la tranquillité en Orient, ne seront pas perdus, et que le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, mu par des considérations analogues, saura

enfin trouver un moyen de concilier ses prétentions avec les prérogatives de la souveraineté du Sultan, et trancher autrement que par la force un différend dont tant d'intérêts attendent aujourd'hui la solution.

Je vous autorise, M. le Comte, à communiquer cette dépêche à Lord Clarendon.

Agréé, &c.  
(Signé) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

(Translation.)

M. le Comte,

*Paris, June 25, 1853.*

THE Cabinet of St. Petersburg, by publishing the circular despatch which Count Nesselrode, by order of the Emperor Nicholas, has just sent to all the Russian Legations in foreign parts, has conferred on that document the value of a manifesto addressed to Europe itself; I have consequently considered it necessary to make known to you the general reflections suggested to me by the perusal of it.

I will in the first place observe, that from the very statement of the difference between Russia and the Porte, such as it is set forth by Count Nesselrode, it results that Prince Menchikoff's mission to Constantinople had only one object, the settlement of the difficulties relating to the partition of the holy places at Jerusalem among the various Christian communions, and that that object was accomplished to the satisfaction of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. The question at present under discussion is consequently altogether new; it has no connection in any way with that of Jerusalem, and in every way it affects the independence and the sovereignty of the Sultan. Such is the estimate which at Constantinople itself the Representatives of France, Austria, Great Britain, and Prussia have already formed of it.

How indeed is it possible to pretend that in order to assure to the Christians of the Eastern rite the possession of certain clearly defined sanctuaries, it was necessary to cover them throughout the whole extent of the Ottoman Empire with an official protection, whereby the moral authority of the Emperor of Russia would be substituted for that which is lawfully the attribute of the Grand Signor? What relation does there exist between facts so different in themselves, and how can the most important of the two be considered as an adjunct or a necessary consequence of that which is the least so?

In support of its pretensions, the Cabinet of St. Petersburg appeals to its ancient Treaties with the Porte; cites instances from history; and urges grievances. I propose, M. le Comte, to review as briefly as possible those three lines of argument.

On examining the Treaties which Russia has concluded with the Porte, it is seen that if she has at times stipulated for the subjects of the Sultan, these last belonged either to provinces of which the chances of war had for a time deprived the Porte, and to the restoration of which conditions might be attached, or to provinces which during the hostilities had compromised themselves in regard to the Ottoman Government, and which policy and humanity required should be protected against its resentment.

None of these stipulations possesses the general character which it is attempted to affix to them at the present time; and the Treaty of Koutchouk-Kainardji specifically only confers on Russia a limited and definite right of protection over a church administered by Russian priests, which there was a question of founding at Galata. It is certainly not intended to assert that, practically and by the force of circumstances, the Cabinet of St. Petersburg has not naturally been led to interest itself in behalf of the Christians of the Greek religion who form the majority of the population in Turkey in Europe. But if the Porte, on its part, has been compelled to respect the sympathies of Russia for the Oriental Church, it has not up to the present time entered into an engagement which would take from it the merit of its tolerance, and impose upon it, instead of duties freely discharged in regard to its own subjects, obligations towards a foreign Power. The entire question is involved in this; and a simple statement of it is sufficient at once to establish its full importance.

Are the instances referred to in Count Nesselrode's circular more applicable to the present state of things?

If at the period of the reformation, compacts were entered into between the Princes of the Empire respecting the exercise of the new form of worship in their possessions, is it necessary in the first place to advert to the circumstance that that Empire was an association of States ruled by one and the same chief, and that, in the next place, the transactions referred to were the result of long intestine wars or of political combinations, over which the elective character of the Imperial dignity necessarily exercised a great influence.

As regards our capitulations with Turkey, you are aware, M. le Comte, that they have never conferred upon us the right of protecting the Catholic subjects of the Sultan. If France has been able to render to this very small portion of the Ottoman population services such as those which Russia boasts of having rendered to her co-religionists, her direct and official protection has never been exerted save in behalf of foreign establishments administered by priests equally foreign, and whose spiritual chief resides at Rome. The protection of Russia, on the contrary, would apply to a clergy composed of the Sultan's subjects, and placed, as regards church government, under the authority of a patriarch equally dependent on the Porte. There would not therefore be any possible resemblance between the position of the two Powers.

Moreover, I insert here an important passage of a memoir by M. le Comte de St. Priest, Ambassador of King Louis XVI at Constantinople, from 1768 to 1785, and which clearly defines the character of our protectorate. The Count de St. Priest expresses himself in these terms :—

“The zeal of our Kings has been celebrated under the expression of the protection of the Catholic religion in the Levant; but it is illusory, and has contributed to lead into error those who do not thoroughly investigate the matter. It has never entered into the imagination of the Sultan that the monarchs of France could suppose themselves authorized to mix themselves up with the religion of the subjects of the Porte. There is no Prince whatever, wisely observes one of my predecessors, the Marquis de Bonnat, in a memoir on this subject, however closely he may be connected with another Sovereign, who would allow him to meddle with the religion of his subjects. The Turks are as nice as others on this point.

“It is easy to understand that France, having never treated with the Porte except on a footing of friendship, could not impose upon it obligations in their very nature repulsive. Consequently the first point of my instructions enjoined me to avoid everything that might cause umbrage to the Porte, by giving too great an extension to the capitulations in regard to religion.”

This quotation renders superfluous any further explanation on a point which it elucidates with such indisputable authority.

Thus, then, M. le Comte, neither the ancient Treaties, nor the instances which are adduced, can furnish grounds as solid as they are supposed to be, for the pretensions of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg.

The point of grievances remains to be considered. Russia reproaches the Porte with want of proper consideration. Every Government is doubtless the sole judge of what its own dignity requires; but it is necessary, however, that the reparation should always be proportioned to the offence. Accordingly, excuses or expressions of regret usually constitute the reparation of a wrong as regards a matter of form. It is for the first time that we witness exacted from a Sovereign in such a case the renunciation of his moral influence over the most remarkable portion of his subjects.

I will add, that if Russia reproaches the Porte with its tergiversations in the affair of the holy places, France would not be less justified in addressing to it the same reproaches; and if she has abstained from doing so, it is because she took into consideration the embarrassments of a Power, who under the influence of two opposing currents of equal force, conceived that it could only keep its balance by alternately contracting contradictory engagements.

The same spirit of moderation has induced His Imperial Majesty's Government to take into account the difference of time, the changes effected in the course of a century in the relations of the different Powers, and particularly of Russia with the Porte; and although we might have alleged, in support of the claims of the Fathers of the Holy Land, the clauses of a formal Treaty, we have required nothing which would deprive the Greeks of the advantages which circumstances had conferred upon them; far from that, we have consented that a sanctuary should be opened to them, that of the Mosque of the Ascension,

their entrance into which was forbidden, and which the efforts, altogether recent, of a French Ambassador, Admiral Roussin, had in part restored to Christian worship.

As regards the key of the great gate of the Church of Bethlehem, which has been so much spoken of, it has only been forgotten to mention that the Greeks possessed one exactly similar, and that the key of the Latins, far from ensuring them the property of a temple always reserved for the other rite, only granted them the mere right of passage. Neither has it been adverted to that by way of reparation for the disregard of a promise given by the Divan to the Russian Mission, when the French Embassy received a different one, one of the two firmans intended to settle the question of the holy places, has, on the demand of Prince Menchikoff, granted to the Greek Patriarch of Jerusalem the exclusive superintendence of the repairs rendered necessary by the state of the great cupola of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.

All these circumstances, M. le Comte, if they cannot, without subverting the generally recognized principles of public law, invalidate our title any more than even a Treaty concluded without our participation would do, nevertheless amount to infringements of more or less consequence, if not of the Porte's recent engagements to us which our dignity obliged us to cause to be observed in their full extent, at all events of the letter of our capitulations of 1740. If, then, its intentions had been less conciliatory, if it had not been impressed with the persuasion that no one of the Contracting Parties to the Convention of the 13th of July, 1841, could assert all its rights of an antecedent date to that European compact, without running the risk of compromising the tranquillity which it was the object of the collective guarantee of the Powers to ensure to the Ottoman Empire, His Imperial Majesty's Government would have been fully authorized, not only in making reservations according to the constant practice of diplomacy, but also in employing in its turn the language of menace.

France adopted another line of conduct; and the moderation which she has exhibited, besides relieving her from all share of responsibility as regards the existing crisis, equally confers upon her the right to expect that the sacrifices which she has made for the maintenance of tranquillity in the East will not be lost, and that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, under the influence of similar considerations, will at length devise the means of reconciling its pretensions with the prerogatives of the Sultan's sovereignty, and of terminating otherwise than by force a difference in the solution of which so many interests are involved.

I authorize you, M. le Comte, to communicate this despatch to Lord Clarendon.

Receive, &c.  
(Signed) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

No. 295.

*Draft of Note proposed by the French Government to be addressed by the Porte to Russia.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Walewski, June 27.)*

LE départ de M. le Prince Menchikoff dans des circonstances qui auraient pu jeter des doutes, heureusement mal fondés, sur le caractère amical et confiant des relations que Sa Majesté le Sultan a à cœur d'entretenir et de resserrer avec son auguste allié et voisin Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, a profondément peiné la Sublime Porte. Elle s'est donc occupé soigneusement de rechercher les moyens d'effacer les traces d'un si regrettable malentendu, et un iradé suprême, en date de \_\_\_\_\_, lui ayant fait connaître la décision Impériale, elle se félicite de pouvoir la communiquer à son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de Russie (ou à son Excellence M. le Comte de Nesselrode.)

Si à toute époque les Empereurs de Russie ont témoigné leur active sollicitude pour le maintien des immunités et privilèges de l'Eglise Orthodoxe Grecque dans l'Empire Ottoman, les Sultans ne se sont jamais refusés à les consacrer de nouveau par des Actes solennels qui attestaient leur ancienne et constante bienveillance à l'égard de leurs sujets Chrétiens. Sa Majesté le Sultan Abdul Medjid, aujourd'hui régnant, animé des mêmes dispositions et voulant donner à Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie un témoignage personnel de son

amitié la plus sincère et de son désir intime de consolider les anciennes relations de bon voisinage et de parfaite entente qui existent entre les deux Etats, n'a écouté que sa confiance infinie dans les qualités éminentes de son auguste amie et allié, et a daigné prendre en sérieuse considération les représentations dont son Excellence M. le Prince Menchikoff s'est rendu l'organe auprès d'elle.

Le Soussigné a reçu, en conséquence, l'ordre de déclarer par la présente que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan regarde qu'il est de son honneur de faire observer à tout jamais, et de préserver de toute atteinte, soit présentement, soit dans l'avenir, la jouissance des privilèges spirituels qui ont été accordés par les augustes aïeux de Sa Majesté, à l'Eglise Orthodoxe d'Orient, et qui sont maintenus et confirmés par elle : et en outre à faire participer, dans un esprit de haute équité, le rit Grec aux avantages concédés aux autres rites Chrétiens, par Convention ou disposition particulière.

Au reste comme le firman Impérial qui vient d'être donné au Patriarche et au clergé Grecs, et qui contient la confirmation de leurs privilèges spirituels, devra être regardé comme une nouvelle preuve de ces nobles sentiments, et comme, en outre, la proclamation de ce firman qui donne toute sécurité devra faire disparaître à jamais toute crainte à l'égard du rit qui est la religion de Sa Majesté l'Empereur, je suis heureux d'être chargé du devoir de faire la présente notification.

Quant à la garantie qu'à l'avenir il ne sera rien changé aux lieux de visitation de Jérusalem, elle résulte du firman revêtu du hatti-humayoun de 15 de la lune de Rebiul-akhir 1268 (Février 1852), expliqué et corroboré par les firmans des , et l'intention formelle de Sa Majesté le Sultan est de faire exécuter sans aucune altération ses décisions souveraines.

La Sublime Porte, en outre, promet officiellement qu'il ne sera apporté aucune modification à l'état des choses, sans que les Gouvernements de France et de Russie en soient préalablement informés. La même notification sera faite à l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français.

Pour le cas où la Cour Impériale de Russie en ferait demande, il sera assigné une localité convenable dans la ville de Jérusalem ou dans les environs, pour la construction d'une église consacrée à célébration du service divin par des ecclésiastiques Russes, et d'un hospice pour les pèlerins indigents ou malades de la même nation.

La Sublime Porte s'engage dès à présent à souscrire à cet égard un Acte solennel qui placera ces fondations pieuses sous la surveillance spéciale du Consulat-Général de Russie en Syrie et en Palestine.

Le Soussigné, &c.

(Translation.)

THE departure of Prince Menchikoff under circumstances which might have thrown doubts, happily unfounded, upon the friendly and confiding character of the relations which His Majesty the Sultan has at heart to maintain and draw closer with his august ally and neighbour, His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, has deeply grieved the Sublime Porte. It has accordingly diligently occupied itself in searching for the means of obliterating the traces of so lamentable a misunderstanding, and a Sovereign Iradé dated having made known to it the Imperial decision, it is happy to be able to communicate it to his Excellency the Ambassador of Russia (or to his Excellency Count Nesselrode).

If the Emperors of Russia have at all times evinced their active solicitude for the maintenance of the immunities and privileges of the orthodox Greek Church in the Ottoman Empire, the Sultans have never refused again to confirm them by solemn acts testifying their ancient and constant benevolence towards their Christian subjects. His Majesty the Sultan Abdul-Medjid, now reigning, inspired with the same dispositions, and being desirous of giving to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia a personal proof of his most sincere friendship, and of his hearty desire to consolidate the ancient relations of good neighbourhood and thorough understanding existing between the two States, has been solely influenced by his unbounded confidence in the eminent qualities of his august friend and ally, and has been pleased to take into serious consideration the representations of which Prince Menchikoff was the organ.

The Undersigned has accordingly received orders to declare by the present note that the Government of His Majesty the Sultan considers itself bound in honour to cause to be observed for ever, and to preserve from all prejudice, either now or hereafter, the enjoyment of the spiritual privileges which have been granted by His Majesty's august ancestors to the orthodox Eastern Church, and which are maintained and confirmed by him; and moreover in a spirit of exalted equity to cause the Greek rite to share in the advantages granted to the other Christian rites by Convention or special arrangement.

Furthermore, as the Imperial firman which has just been granted to the Greek Patriarch and clergy, and which contains the confirmation of their spiritual privileges, ought to be looked upon as a fresh proof of these noble sentiments, and as moreover the proclamation of that firman, which affords all security, ought to dispel for ever all apprehension in regard to the rite which is the religion of His Majesty the Emperor, I am happy to be charged with the duty of making the present notification.

As regards the guarantee that hereafter there shall no change be made as to the places of pilgrimage at Jerusalem, that results from the firman invested with the Hatti-humayoun of the 15th of the month of Rebi-ul akhîr (February 1852), explained and corroborated by the firmans of ; and it is the formal intention of His Majesty the Sultan to cause his sovereign decisions to be executed without any alteration.

The Sublime Porte moreover officially promises that the existing state of things shall in nowise be modified without previous communication to the Governments of France and Russia. The same notification shall be made to the Ambassador of His Majesty the Emperor of the French.

In case the Imperial Court of Russia should require it, a suitable spot shall be assigned in the City of Jerusalem or in its neighbourhood, for the construction of a church destined for the celebration of divine service by Russian ecclesiastics, and of a hospital for the indigent or sick pilgrims of the same nation.

The Sublime Porte engages, from the present time, to agree to a solemn Act in this respect, whereby these religious foundations shall be placed under the special superintendence of the Consulate-General of Russia in Syria and in Palestine.

The Undersigned, &c.

No. 296.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon. — (Received June 30.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, June 14, 1853.*

SINCE I wrote to you announcing the arrival of a letter from Count Nesselrode to Reshid Pasha, and stating in substance its contents, I have had the honour to receive your Lordship's instructions by the "Caradoc" and also by messenger Webster.

I am highly gratified by the approval of Her Majesty's Government expressed with reference to such of my proceedings relative to the late negotiations between Prince Menchikoff and the Porte, as had then come to your Lordship's knowledge. The flattering confidence which Her Majesty's Government have also indulgently placed in my discretion and zeal for the public service deserves my deepest gratitude, though I cannot be insensible to the grave responsibility which accompanies it. It will be my pride, as it is my duty, to take advantage of every passing circumstance calculated to improve the prospects of peace and to avert the dangers of an actual collision between Russia and the Porte.

I have communicated on this subject with the French Ambassador, and, judging from his language, have every reason to believe that he is animated by similar sentiments, and ready to cooperate heartily with me for the attainment of our common objects. He informs me that the French squadron at Salamis will probably reach the anchorage near Tenedos to-morrow, and I reckon upon the arrival of Admiral Dundas at the same well known station either to-night or in the morning.

I need not inform your Lordship that the Sultan and his Ministers are

greatly encouraged by such demonstrations of sympathy and support. It is satisfactory at the same time to know that they did not wait for those demonstrations in order to take their stand against the inadmissible demands of Russia. Your Lordship will have learnt from the anterior parts of my correspondence how early they perceived the dangerous tendency of these demands, and with what perseverance and courage they have pursued a course of procedure at once both firm and conciliatory.

I have now the honour to inclose a copy\* of Count Nesselrode's letter, and I am greatly mistaken if it does not increase the feelings of surprise and regret with which you have traced the late inconsistencies of Russian diplomacy. In communicating with Reshid Pasha on the subject of this letter, I have studiously abstained from the use of exciting language, but it is impossible not to be struck with the contrast which it exhibits between professions and acts, or to repress every indignant emotion when told with the utmost complacency that the Russian armies are soon to cross the frontier, not to make war on the Sultan, but to seize a material in place of a moral guarantee.

The Turkish Minister's reply will, in substance, reject the requisition which was rejected before; but, if my advice be followed, an opening will still be left for further negotiation, if Russia be content to forego that pretension which the voice of Europe has so universally condemned.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 297

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 30.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, June 15, 1853.*

I HAVE seen Reshid Pasha this morning. No change appears to have taken place in the counsels of the Porte respecting Russia. His Highness's answer to Count Nesselrode's letter will be delivered to-morrow for transmission to St. Petersburg. Count Nesselrode is given to understand that his advice cannot be followed in the present instance, but a readiness is expressed on the part of the Sultan's Government to send an Ambassador to St. Petersburg for the purpose of resuming the dropped negotiation, provided there be no further question of an engagement inconsistent with the sovereign rights and independence of the Porte.

Judging from the language of the Russian Embassy when it was here, I cannot venture to augur any good result from this overture. But I have not hesitated to recommend its adoption to Reshid Pasha, now that the Porte has taken up a ground acknowledged as right and necessary by the general voice of Europe, and that the Emperor of Russia may possibly be thereby disposed to better counsels, notwithstanding the embarrassing position in which he has placed himself.

I am just informed, though not on official authority, that Admiral Dundas has brought up his fleet to Besika Bay. The French Admiral will probably reach the same station to-day or to-morrow.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 298.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 30.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, June 16, 1853.*

I HASTEN to transmit herewith a copy of Reshid Pasha's answer to Count Nesselrode's letter, of which both the substance and a copy have been successively forwarded to your Lordship.

The Porte, as you will perceive, my Lord, has in no respect receded from

the position which it occupied at the time of Prince Menchikoff's departure. Appropriate remarks have been made on all the salient points of Count Nesselrode's letter. The menace of sending the Russian forces across the frontiers, at the same time that the intention of making war against the Sultan is discarded, has been noticed in becoming, though moderate, terms. The last proof of an unpretending and conciliatory spirit is given by the expression of the Porte's readiness to send an Ambassador to St. Petersburg, and there to resume the negotiations upon a distinct understanding that the Russian Government will no longer urge the pretension which at present forms the essential matter of difference between that Power and the Porte.

It may well be feared that the prospect of success in making this overture is extremely slender, but in the hope of averting so great a calamity as war, feel that no chance should be neglected.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 298.

*Reshid Pasha to Count Nesselrode.*

Monsieur,

Constantinople, le 1<sup>er</sup> Juin, 1853.

JE me suis empressé de mettre sous les yeux de Sa Majesté mon Auguste Maître la dépêche que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser le 1<sup>er</sup> Mai dernier.

Sa Majesté le Sultan a toujours montré en toute occasion les plus grands égards pour Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, qu'il considère comme son allié sincère et comme un voisin bien intentionné. La Sublime Porte, ne mettant nullement en doute les intentions généreuses de l'Empereur, a ressenti un profond chagrin de l'interruption des relations diplomatiques survenue malheureusement parce que l'on n'a pas bien compris peut-être l'impossibilité réelle où elle se trouvait à propos de la question soulevée par le Prince Menchikoff de consigner dans un engagement diplomatique les privilèges religieux accordés au rite Grec. Toutefois, elle éprouve la consolation de voir que pour sa part elle n'a nullement contribué à amener un semblable état de choses. En effet, le Gouvernement Ottoman a montré, dès le principe, les meilleures dispositions et toutes les facilités relativement à toutes les questions que le Prince Menchikoff était chargé de régler d'après les ordres de l'Empereur. Et même dans une question si délicate que celle des privilèges religieux de l'Eglise Grecque, s'inspirant encore de ses sentiments pacifiques et ne refusant pas les assurances que pouvaient faire disparaître et réduire à néant tous les doutes qui auraient pu s'élever à cet égard, la Sublime Porte espérait surtout de la sagesse reconnue de Prince Menchikoff que cet Ambassadeur se montrerait satisfait du projet de note qui lui avait été transmis en dernier lieu et qui contenait toutes les assurances demandées. Quoiqu'il en soit, ce fait regrettable s'est produit.

Il est vrai que Son Altesse le Prince Menchikoff a la seconde fois abrégé la minute de Sened qu'il avait présenté d'abord, et en donnant à la fin un projet de note il a fait quelques changemens soit dans les termes, soit dans la rédaction et le titre de la pièce; mais le sens d'un engagement s'y trouvait toujours; et comme cet engagement diplomatique ne peut s'accorder ni avec l'indépendance du Gouvernement Ottoman, ni avec les droits de son autorité souveraine, on ne saurait donner aux motifs d'impossibilité réelle présentés sur ce point par la Porte, le nom de refus, et faire de cela une question d'honneur pour l'Empereur de Russie.

De plus, si l'on se plaint de cette impossibilité en l'attribuant à un sentiment de défiance, la Russie, en ne tenant aucun compte de toutes les assurances offertes de la manière la plus solennelle par la Porte, et en déclarant qu'il était indispensable de les consigner dans un Acte ayant force d'engagement, ne donne-t-elle pas plutôt une preuve patente de son manque de confiance envers le Gouvernement Ottoman? Et celui-ci n'a-t-il pas à son tour le droit de s'en plaindre?

Il s'en remet pour répondre à ces deux points à la justice si connue de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, ainsi qu'à la haute raison et aux sentiments éminemment pacifiques de votre Excellence que chacun d'ailleurs a pu reconnaître et apprécier.

Sa Majesté le Sultan par des firmans Impériaux revêtus de son auguste khatti-sheriff, vient de confirmer de nouveau les privilèges, droits, et immunités dont les religieux et les églises du rite Grec jouissent *ab antiquo*.

La Sublime Porte n'hésitera jamais à maintenir et à donner les assurances contenues et promises dans le projet de note remis au Prince Menchikoff peu avant son départ. La dépêche reçue de la part de votre Excellence parle de l'intention de faire passer les frontières aux troupes Russes. Cette déclaration est incompatible avec les assurances de paix et de bon vouloir de Sa Majesté l'Empereur. Elle est, en vérité, si contraire à ce que l'on est en droit d'attendre de la part d'une Puissance amie, que la Sublime Porte ne saurait comment l'accepter.

Les préparatifs militaires et les travaux de défense ordonnés par la Porte, ainsi qu'elle l'a déclaré officiellement aux Puissances, ne sont donc nécessités que par les armements considérables de la Russie; ils ne constituent qu'une mesure purement défensive. Le Gouvernement du Sultan n'ayant aucune intention hostile contre la Russie, exprime le désir que les anciennes relations que Sa Majesté regarde comme si précieuses, et dont les nombreux avantages sont manifestés pour les deux parties, soient établies dans leur état primitif.

J'espère que la Cour de Russie appréciera avec un sentiment de confiance conciliation les intentions sincères et loyales de la Sublime Porte, et tiendra compte de l'impossibilité réelle où elle se trouve de déferer aux désirs qui lui ont été exprimés. Que cette impossibilité soit appréciée comme elle mérite de l'être, et la Sublime Porte, je puis l'assurer à votre Excellence, n'hésitera pas à charger un Ambassadeur Extraordinaire de se rendre à St. Pétersbourg pour y renouer les négociations et chercher de concert avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie un accommodement qui, tout en étant agréable à Sa Majesté, serait tel que la Porte pourrait accepter sans porter aucune atteinte soit aux bases de son indépendance soit à l'autorité souveraine de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

Votre Excellence peut tenir pour certain que pour ma part j'appelle ce résultat de tous mes vœux. J'aime à croire que de son côté il en est de même.

Je prie, &c.  
(Signé) RESHID.

(Translation.)

Sir,

Constantinople, June 1<sup>st</sup>, 1853.

I HASTENED to place before His Majesty, my august master, the despatch which your Excellency did me the honour to address to me on the 1<sup>st</sup> of May last.

His Majesty the Sultan has ever shown on all occasions the greatest regard for His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, whom he considers as his sincere ally and as a well-disposed neighbour. The Sublime Porte, entertaining no doubt as to the generous intentions of the Emperor, has felt deep sorrow at the interruption of diplomatic relations which has unfortunately occurred on account of the real impossibility, in which it was placed with respect to the question raised by Prince Menchikoff as to embodying in a diplomatic Act the religious privileges granted to the Greek Church, being perhaps not understood. At the same time His Majesty has the consolation of seeing that, on his part, he has in no way contributed to bring about such a state of things. In fact, the Turkish Government has shown from the outset the best disposition, and the utmost readiness with respect to all the questions which, by the Emperor's orders, Prince Menchikoff was charged to settle. And even in so delicate a question as the religious privileges of the Greek Church, the Sublime Porte, under the continued influence of its pacific sentiments, and not refusing to give assurances calculated to dispel and to set at rest the doubts which might have existed in this respect, hoped above all things from the acknowledged wisdom of Prince Menchikoff that that Ambassador would be satisfied with the project of note which was finally transmitted to him, and which contained all the assurances demanded. Be that as it may, this lamentable fact has occurred.

It is true that his Highness Prince Menchikoff for the second time modified the minute of Sened which he had at first presented, and on offering in the last

instance a project of note, he made some alterations as well in the terms as in the drawing up and in the title of the document : but the sense of an engagement was still there ; and inasmuch as such a diplomatic engagement cannot be reconciled either with the independence of the Turkish Government, or with the rights of its sovereign authority, the name of a refusal cannot be given to the motives of real impossibility alleged by the Porte on this point, nor can it be made a point of honour as regards the Emperor of Russia.

Further, if this impossibility is complained of, and is attributed to a feeling of distrust, does not Russia rather, by not at all taking into account all the assurances given in the most solemn manner by the Porte, and by declaring that it is indispensable that they should be embodied in an Act having the force of an engagement, give a public proof of her want of confidence in the Turkish Government ? And has not the latter, in its turn, a right to complain thereof ?

For an answer on these two points, it appeals to the well known justice of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, as well as to the great intelligence and eminently pacific feelings of your Excellency, which moreover every one has acknowledged and appreciated.

His Majesty the Sultan, by Imperial firmans bearing his august hattisherrif, has now confirmed anew the privileges, rights, and immunities, which the priesthood and churches of the Greek rite enjoy *ab antiquo*.

The Sublime Porte will never hesitate to maintain and to give the assurances contained and promised in the project of note communicated to Prince Menchikoff shortly before his departure. The despatch received from your Excellency speaks of an intention to cause the Russian troops to cross the frontiers. That declaration is incompatible with the assurances of peace and of good will on the part of His Majesty the Emperor. It is, in truth, so contrary to what might be expected on the part of a friendly Power, that the Sublime Porte does not know in what sense to take it.

The military preparations and works of defence ordered by the Porte, as it has officially declared to the Powers, have therefore only become necessary in consequence of the considerable armaments of Russia ; they are purely defensive measures. The Sultan's Government having no hostile intention towards Russia, expresses the wish that the ancient relations which His Majesty looks upon as so precious, and the manifold advantages of which to both parties are evident, should be established on their former footing.

I hope that the Court of Russia will appreciate with feelings of trust and conciliation the sincere and honest intentions of the Sublime Porte, and will take into account the real impossibility in which it finds itself of yielding to the wishes which have been expressed to it. Let the impossibility be appreciated as it deserves to be, and the Sublime Porte, I can assure your Excellency, will not hesitate to order an Ambassador Extraordinary to proceed to St. Petersburg, in order there to renew the negotiations, and to devise, in concert with the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, an arrangement which, whilst it shall be agreeable to His Majesty, shall also be such as the Porte can accept without prejudice either to the principles of its independence, or to the sovereign authority of His Majesty the Sultan.

Your Excellency may be assured that, for my part, all my wishes tend to this result. I would fain believe that it is the same on your side.

I request, &c.  
(Signed) RESHID.

No. 299.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 30.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, June 16, 1853.*

I HAD an audience of the Sultan this morning and presented Her Majesty's letter announcing the birth of a Prince. His Majesty received the communication with much interest, and desired me to assure the Queen that any incident calculated to augment Her Majesty's domestic happiness was a cause of real gratification to himself.

I took advantage of the opportunity to offer Her Majesty's condolence on the severe affliction which the Sultan had recently experienced by the loss of his mother, the late Validé Sultana.

I next referred to the arrival of Admiral Dundas with the squadron under his command in Besika Bay, and explained to His Imperial Majesty with what friendly sentiments and eventual intentions so powerful a force had been placed at my disposal. I gave him distinctly to understand that peace was the great object of British policy, as it was no doubt that of His Majesty's, and, consequently, that the services of the British squadron could only be called into more decided action for the purpose of averting an immediate and otherwise unavoidable danger from the Ottoman Empire, and the independence of His Majesty's authority when menaced by foreign aggression.

The Sultan acquiesced in this declaration of the views of Her Majesty's Government, and expressed a deep feeling of gratitude for the unequivocal marks of sympathy and cordial support afforded to him and his Empire under the critical circumstances in which he is now placed.

He was, moreover, pleased to express his satisfaction with the counsels which I had occasionally given him during the late negotiations.

No. 300.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 30.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, June 17, 1853.*

THE Porte's reply to Count Nesselrode's letter was conveyed this morning to Odessa by the last remaining member of the Russian diplomacy here. It is worthy of note that M. Balabine, the individual in question, took away with him the archives and official correspondence of the Legation.

No. 301.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 30.)*

(Extract.)

*Vienna, June 27, 1853.*

COUNT BUOL read to me his despatches to Count Colloredo, as well as the despatches to Baron Lebzeltern, the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg.

The result of this recapitulation of Count Buol's correspondence proved that he had blamed the manner and form of Prince Menchikoff's negotiations; that he objected to the Convention and the Sened he had proposed; that he also objected to some of the terms of the last note presented by him; but with regard to this note, he thought there might have been a possibility of connecting its expressions with those of the one which had been offered by Reshid Pasha, so as to satisfy the expectations of the Emperor; and in the anxious desire for the maintenance of peace, he had directed Baron Bruck to state that under such explanations there ought no longer to be the same difficulty in acceding to the proposals of Russia.

Upon this point I asked Count Buol whether I was right in representing his meaning by the words of my despatch of the 11th instant, which were "that he had pointed out to the Turkish Government how desirable it would be that they should seek, by every means consistent with the honour and independence of the Sultan, to meet the requisitions of the Emperor, and had expressed a hope that the last note which was proposed to Prince Menchikoff and refused by him, may by trifling alterations be adapted to the exigencies of the moment."

Count Buol entirely agreed to the exactitude of this representation of his intentions, and of the communication he had made to me previous to my writing the despatch.

No. 302.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 1.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, June 24, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour of informing you that I have placed in the hands of Count Nesselrode the draft of the firman which the Porte intended to publish for confirming the spiritual privileges of the Greek Church and its clergy. I called the attention of his Excellency to the unequivocal proof thus afforded by the Sultan of ameliorating the condition of his Christian subjects.

Count Nesselrode declined expressing any opinion upon the subject of this paper, but begged to be allowed to keep it for a time, that he might examine it at his leisure.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 303.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 1.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, June 24, 1853.*

IN obedience to your Lordship's orders your despatch of the 15th instant has been communicated to the Chancellor.

Before stating to your Lordship, however, what passed between his Excellency and myself upon the occasion of my reading this paper to him, I am desirous of making the following observations.

From the moment of intelligence having reached St. Petersburg of the rupture of diplomatic relations between Russia and the Porte, my object has been to gain time for the purpose of allowing the voice of moderation and reason to be heard, and of securing that the Russian Cabinet should be submitted to the impartial opinion of the Allied Governments as to the nature of the demands which have been made so imperatively upon the Sultan.

Most unfortunately, this desire on my part has been neutralized in considerable measure by the conviction which exists on the part of the Imperial Cabinet of their demands being of a nature the most moderate and reasonable—of such being, in fact the opinion of Foreign Governments; and of the opposition which they have encountered having no other origin than the desire entertained of interfering with Russia in the pursuit of a just and legitimate object necessary for the maintenance of her influence.

How a notion so totally unfounded can have arisen, I am at a loss to conceive; that it has existed and still prevails, is unfortunately not a matter of doubt.

When I waited on the Chancellor, which I did on the 22nd instant, I was pleased at hearing him state that the intelligence that he had received from London was pacific and satisfactory.

I observed that I might affirm in the most positive manner that the interests of peace were those upon which Her Majesty's Government were most intent, but that the objections entertained to Prince Menchikoff's demands in their present shape were insuperable; that there was no desire, however faint, of crossing the Emperor's just influence in the South, but that Her Majesty's Government, and any Government by which the present could be followed, could not abandon a point of such importance as the independence of Turkey.

Count Nesselrode desired to read me Prince Menchikoff's note, which lay before him, and asked how it were possible that any paper should be more respectful in language, and that any demands could be less open to objection than those which it contained; great concessions had been made; the idea of a Convention had been given up; the demand regarding the "Patriarch" had been suppressed; how, he would ask, could concession be carried further?

After some exchange of words, I observed that the question was one which it was quite useless to discuss; that the opinion of Her Majesty's Government was made up; that it agreed with those of all the other Cabinets, although the

particular position of Austria might render it possible that her feelings were expressed less plainly than by other Cabinets; that I would beg therefore to suggest, before it was too late, that some different form of guarantee might be devised by the Imperial Cabinet or their friends.

I proceeded to read to Count Nesselrode your Lordship's despatch, which gave rise to a great deal of discussion, the details of which I suppress, as it was but the repetition of what has passed so often of late between his Excellency and myself.

At its conclusion I observed that as Her Majesty's Government were sincerely anxious to arrive at a true knowledge of the question before us, I thought he would do well to draw up a memorandum which should explain as well those rights enjoyed *ab antiquo* by the Greek subjects of the Porte, as those of which Russia was possessed by virtue of the Treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople, the former of which, as regarding its provisions and their application to the present demands of Russia, was but imperfectly understood by Her Majesty's Government or by myself.

Count Nesselrode undertook that this memorandum should be prepared for communication to your Lordship, and as I did not feel myself authorized to leave your Lordship's despatch in his hands, agreeably to his request, I undertook to send him such an extract of it as should fully explain what was the information which was sought by Her Majesty's Government.

I accordingly sent his Excellency a memorandum formed of that portion of your Lordship's despatch which commences with the words "The Treaties relied on by Russia," and ending with these—"over fourteen millions of subjects of the Porte."

The conclusion of the conversation was more satisfactory than some preceding parts of it had been. The Chancellor said that in spite of all that was said and done, he still clung to the expectation of the present crisis being surmounted without an interruption of peace.

I must not, however, conceal from your Lordship my belief that the occupation of the Principalities is resolved upon; and that it is only at that stage of the proceedings that the Russian Cabinet looks to an amicable adjustment (however brought about) of the differences which now exist between the allied Cabinets.

No. 304.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 2, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency in reply to your despatch of the 16th ultimo, that Her Majesty's Government approve of the note addressed by Reshid Pasha to Count Nesselrode in reply to his note of the 31st of May.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 305.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 2, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held to the Sultan at the audience with His Highness of which a report is contained in your despatch of the 16th ultimo.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 306.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 2, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve your proceedings and the language held by you to Count Nesselrode, as reported in your despatches of the 24th ultimo.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 307.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 3.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, June 18, 1853.*

INCLOSED herewith is a translation of a firman addressed to the agent, or chief, of the Protestant subjects of the Porte, simultaneously with those which were delivered several days ago by Reshid Pasha to the heads of the other religious communities, not Mussulman, in Turkey.

I also forward herewith a translation of the Turkish memorandum by which the several firmans have been communicated to the Representatives of Austria, Great Britain, France, and Prussia, by order of the Porte.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 307.

*Memorandum of the Porte to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Translation.)

*June 12, 1853*

HIS Imperial Majesty the Sultan, in order to afford a fresh proof of his Royal benevolence towards all classes of his subjects, has issued Imperial orders adorned with the Royal cypher, addressed to the Greek, Armenian, and Catholic Patriarchs, to the Protestant Agent, and to the Chief Priest of the Jews, confirming their religious privileges, and the rights and immunities belonging to their churches and other places appertaining to them.

Copies of these firmans are inclosed for your Excellency's perusal.

Inclosure 2 in No. 307.

*Imperial Firman addressed to the Agent of the Protestants.*

(Translation.)

TO the Agent of the Protestants, Stephen; may his honours increase!  
Decreed:—

God, the dispenser of mercies, in placing my august person, in pursuance of his eternal will, upon the glorious and exalted throne of the Imperial Caliphate, having confided to my Royal hands and Sovereign rule as a sacred and special deposit—to him be the thanks and glory!—numerous countries and cities and many people of all classes and nations, ever since the glorious day on which I ascended the throne, according to the Imperial duties imposed upon the Caliphate, my Government has never ceased (by the Divine Grace), conformably with my Royal will and sincere and benevolent intentions, to give practically their constant and careful attention that all classes of my Imperial subjects should enjoy full protection, and that they should be more especially one and all at perfect ease with regard to their religious and spiritual affairs.

The beneficial effects and advantages accruing thereby have been at all times manifest, and it is my ardent and Imperial desire that no abuses whatever should

arise out of negligence or carelessness. I therefore wish and require that the special concessions granted by me in favour of my faithful Protestant subjects, concerning their worship and religious affairs and all other concerns relating thereto, should be at all times preserved inviolate; and my peremptory Imperial orders have been issued, to wit, that no contravention whatever of those concessions should take place, and that any persons acting in contravention thereto should know that they will thereby incur my Royal displeasure.

In order to remove all grounds of excuse on the part of those who should be guilty of negligence in these matters, communication hereof has been made to the necessary authorities; and this high decree has been issued from my Imperial Divan in public confirmation of my Royal intentions for the complete and truthful execution hereof.

You, the aforesaid agent, shall on receipt of these presents act always in conformity with this Imperial order, and be careful in abstaining from any contravention thereof. On the occurrence of anything inconsistent with this peremptory decision you will hasten to make immediate representation thereof to our Sublime Porte.

Be it therefore thus made known unto you, giving full credence to my Imperial cypher.

Given in the third decade of the illustrious Moon of Shaban in the year 1269 (beginning of June, 1853).

No. 308.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 3.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, June 20, 1853.*

NOTHING has yet come to my knowledge in confirmation of the intelligence transmitted to the Porte a few days ago by the agent of Prince Ghika, and purporting that the Russian army had already crossed the frontier of Moldavia, and were within two hours' march of Jassy.

This deficiency in our advices from the scene of action is the less important, as I learn from the correspondence received by the extra messenger Capel, that the Russian Government had declared its intentions of passing the frontier and occupying one or both of the Danubian Principalities the moment an unfavourable answer to Count Nesselrode's letter of the  $\frac{1}{3}\frac{2}{1}$  ultimo should be received at Odessa.

Of this intention I have admonished Reshid Pasha, and I have also communicated on the same subject with M. de la Cour.

I find them both disposed to act on my opinion, such as I have already announced to your Lordship in the anticipation of that very measure which Russia has now declared its resolution to adopt.

The military occupation of any part of the Ottoman Empire without the consent of the Porte would, no doubt, justify a recourse to hostilities. But the preservation of peace, so long as it is possible to preserve it with a chance of settling by negotiation the existing difference, is of such deep importance that I have not hesitated to advise forbearance on the approaching invasion of the Ottoman territory. It is notorious that the Principalities are placed under circumstances of a special character with reference to the neighbouring Powers, and the consequences of a foreign military occupation within their limits are in practice by no means so likely to disturb the interests of the Porte as if a similar act of aggression were committed against those parts of the Empire which are directly administered by this Government. It may be added that, in a military point of view, resistance could not be offered to Russia in that quarter under present circumstances with any prospect of success.

Reasoning from the above distinction the Porte, I conceive, may defer the moment of actual and reciprocal hostilities without discredit or increase of risk, until an opportunity is afforded for learning the sentiments entertained by Her Majesty's Government as well as by that of France.

Agreeably to the same course of policy, I have advised Reshid Pasha not to withdraw the Hospodars immediately on the entrance of the Russian forces;

and I have prepared an instruction for the guidance of Her Majesty's Consuls at Jassy and Bucharest.

Of this instruction I inclose herewith a copy, and solicit your Lordship's attention to its contents, as offering a more complete account of the motives and limitations under which I have framed it, in the hope of your Lordship's approval.

It is scarcely necessary for me to state that by protesting, instead of going to war, on the occupation of the Principalities, the question of bringing up the squadron to Constantinople is at least adjourned.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 308.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Her Majesty's Consuls at Jassy and Bucharest.*

Sir,

*Therapia, June 20, 1853.*

NOTWITHSTANDING the delusive appearances of quiet mentioned in the last report which I have received from you, there is no longer room for doubt as to the intentions of the Russian Government with respect to the two Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. An occupation of one or of both those provinces by the armies of Russia will take place with very little, if any delay; not, as on a former occasion with the consent and participation of Turkey, but for purposes adverse, if not hostile, to the views and interests of the Porte.

I have reason to presume that the Sultan's Government will not take full advantage of their right to resist such an invasion, and that, in a spirit of peace and conciliation, they will rather be disposed to learn the opinion of friendly Powers before they commit themselves to any act of defensive hostility.

It is natural to expect as a result of this principle, that the Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia will not be instructed to retire so long as they are allowed to keep up an unrestrained intercourse with the Porte, and so long as the existing institutions of each province are respected.

It appears to me that in the supposed case you will have no difficulty in remaining at your post, and in the discharge of your Consular functions, without any diminution of that respect and independence which attach to your official station under ordinary circumstances.

Should the policy adopted by Russia, on taking military possession of the provinces, be such as to oblige the Porte to withdraw its immediate representatives, the Hospodars, I shall not omit to furnish you with a fresh instruction adapted to the occasion; and, meanwhile, you will only act with necessary prudence in preparing with as little display or movement as possible, for a temporary suspension of your Consular functions, and perhaps your eventual retirement from the scene of their exercise.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 309.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 3.)*

My Lord,

*Vienna, June 28, 1853.*

COUNT BUOL, in speaking to me of the note of Reshid Pasha of the 16th instant to Count Nesselrode, has expressed his fears that it will not be accepted by the Russian Government as terminating the differences with the Porte. He thinks there are contradictions in this note, and particularly where it is said that it was impossible "de consigner dans un engagement diplomatique les privilèges religieux;" when afterwards it is stated that the note proposed to Prince Menchikoff "contenait toutes les assurances demandées," and again where it is said, "la Sublime Porte n'hésitera jamais à maintenir et à donner

les assurances contenues et promises dans le projet de note." Count Buol says, that assurances given in a diplomatic note between two Ministers charged with the Foreign Affairs of their respective States, constitute an engagement, and therefore that there need have been no difficulty in giving those assurances and in transmitting the late firmans, and in stating that what was therein contained was a concession and a promise of the Sultan to his subjects, and therefore an engagement taken towards them, which engagement he could not doubt the Emperor would consider as an inviolable pledge which could not be forfeited.

Count Buol stated that he should instruct Baron Bruck to bring his sentiments before Reshid Pasha, and inform him that if he would give the assurances he had formerly promised, and declare that the Ambassador whom he proposed to send to St. Petersburg would be charged to state them to the Emperor, at the same time that he would submit to him the firmans and the acts of grace the Sultan had lately issued, together with the declaration of the firm determination of maintaining them which was involved in his engagement towards his own subjects, he would in the strongest manner recommend to the Russian Cabinet to accept this mission and these assurances, and thus to bring to a close in a manner which would be honourable to both Parties, the unfortunate disagreement at present existing.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 310.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 3.)*

My Lord,

Vienna, June 30, 1853.

THE Emperor of Russia, some time ago, requested His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Austria to depute a general officer to be present at the military inspections and reviews which are about to take place at St. Petersburg, and in conformity with this desire Lieutenant-General Giulay, the Governor of Milan, has been designated for that mission, and he has this day left Vienna to fulfil its duties.

This officer is charged with an autograph letter from his Sovereign to the Emperor of Russia, strongly recommending him as possessing his entire confidence.

Although General Giulay has no political character, yet he has been made acquainted with the tenor of the despatches of which he is the bearer to the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires, M. de Lebzeltern, and he will use whatever opportunity may be afforded him to recommend to the Emperor the views of his Government, and to bring before him the dangerous complications which would undoubtedly arise from the occupation of the Principalities upon the refusal of the Porte to conform to the ultimatum transmitted by the note of Count Nesselrode of the 31st of May, and the hope that, by the mediation of the Allies of His Imperial Majesty and of the Sultan, such an arrangement may be arrived at as shall be satisfactory to both Parties.

In case these anxious desires of this Government should not be obtained, and General Giulay should find the occupation of the Principalities already accomplished or decided upon, he is then instructed to seek an opportunity strongly to urge the Emperor of Russia not to enter those provinces with any force which would create an apprehension that his views surpassed the object of obtaining a guarantee for the reparation he desired; an object which would as completely be fulfilled by a small body of troops as by an army.

As General Giulay is one of the most distinguished officers in the Imperial army, it is hoped that his influence may be beneficially exerted to promote the objects of his Government.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 4, 1853.*

COUNT COLLOREDO on the 28th ultimo read to me a despatch from Count Buol, reporting a conversation with the Baron de Bourqueney, who had been desired by M. Drouyn de Lhuys to inform him of the combined action of France and England upon Turkish affairs, and to point out the advantages that would ensue from a combined action between the Four Powers, having for its basis the Treaty of 1841, which in the opinion of M. Drouyn de Lhuys imposes upon the Powers who signed it an obligation to make identical efforts for the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire.

Upon this Count Buol observes that the Treaty of July 13, 1841, strictly imposes upon the Five Powers no other obligation than that of conforming to the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire for closing the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to foreign ships of war so long as the Porte remains at peace; but that the Treaty originated in the unanimous desire of the Great Powers to establish by a solemn act their union and the entire identity of their intentions for the establishment of European peace.

Count Buol adds that the Austrian Government fully admit that the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire is an essential condition of general peace, and that they will zealously aid in maintaining that Empire in the present moment of difficulty, although they cannot give to the Treaty of 1841 an interpretation more extended than the one above mentioned.

It follows, however, Count Buol says, that if the actual complication should unfortunately end in war, Austria would claim for herself and would recognize in other Powers who signed the Treaty of 1841 an entire liberty of action; and that if she did not act conjointly with the Three Powers, it was because she believed that acting singly was likely to lead to more useful results. Nevertheless, in eventually using this liberty of action for the re-establishment of peace and the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire as an element of European equilibrium, all the efforts of Austria in the present phases of the question must tend to prevent things from coming to this extremity.

With this object Count Buol informs Count Colloredo, that on the 16th instant he had instructed the Baron de Lebzeltern to renew to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg the most earnest entreaties (*les plus vives instances*) that the Russian troops should not enter the Principalities, provided that the Sultan upon refusing to sign the project of note of Prince Menchikoff, should show himself animated by an undoubted desire to come to a frank understanding with Russia; that the serious attention of the Court of St. Petersburg had at the same time been drawn to the grave consequences of an eventual occupation of the Principalities, whether the Porte should regard it as a declaration of war, or whether it submitted to it as a hard and inevitable necessity without opposing to it a material resistance.

The Austrian Government has advised the Porte to adopt the latter alternative, in case the united efforts of the Cabinets should unfortunately fail in dissuading the Emperor of Russia from occupying the Principalities, and has recommended the Turkish Government to consider the assurances of the Emperor, that in occupying the Principalities he no more intended to make war on the Porte than he aimed at territorial aggrandisement; that so long as the Porte did not itself proclaim war, the Treaty of 1841 would in the opinion of the Austrian Government retain its obligatory force upon the Powers which signed it.

Upon that hypothesis means of negotiation would still exist, and the Powers would have time to bring their conciliatory action to bear upon the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, which in the meantime would be in a moral impossibility to send troops beyond the Danube.

In the other alternative the Porte would doubtless open a field for disasters of an incalculable extent.

The despatch closes with the expression of a hope that instructions in

conformity with the views of the Austrian Government may be sent to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I told Count Colloredo that Her Majesty's Government would learn with much satisfaction that instructions of the nature described in Count Buol's despatch had been sent to St. Petersburg, as it was impossible not to expect that the moral influence of Austria, well directed, would have weight with the Emperor of Russia, who must naturally be disinclined to expose Austria to the serious dangers that the occupation of the Principalities would inevitably entail upon her.

I also informed Count Colloredo that generally Her Majesty's Government concurred in the interpretation of the Treaty of 1841 given by Count Buol, and admitted that the Articles alone had a binding and obligatory force upon the Powers that signed the Treaty; but at the same time I must observe that the preamble not only denoted the spirit and intentions of those Powers, but it also recorded a principle of European policy, and that Her Majesty's Government at the present moment were animated by the same spirit and had in view the same objects as in 1841.

These objects then, as now, were the maintenance of peace and of the Ottoman Empire, and that in furtherance of them the Austrian Government might reckon upon our most cordial cooperation. Our advice to the Sultan had been given in the same sense as that offered to His Highness by the Austrian Government with respect to the occupation of the Principalities, and we had recommended him in the first instance strongly to protest, but not to exercise his undoubted right of declaring war against Russia whenever this utterly unjustifiable act of violence should be perpetrated; but I requested Count Colloredo distinctly to understand and to convey to Count Buol that this forbearance on the part of the Porte must not be reckoned upon for any length of time, as the occupation of the Principalities without a declaration of war meant nothing but that the Emperor of Russia intended to give himself all the benefits of a state of peace without incurring any of the risks of war, and that he desired to keep the Treaty of 1841 in full vigour, and the Dardanelles closed against the fleet of England and France, while he gained time for preparing his armament and for making fresh demands on Turkey, whose resources would gradually become exhausted.

It was impossible, I said, that the Porte could long submit to the continuance of such a state of things, and it was the earnest desire, therefore, of Her Majesty's Government, in the event of the Principalities being occupied, that the result of any fresh negotiations that might be undertaken should be ascertained with the least possible delay.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 312.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 4, 1853.*

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatch of the 27th ultimo, reporting what passed between your Lordship and Count Buol on the Turkish question, and I have to instruct your Lordship to convey to Count Buol the best thanks of Her Majesty's Government for the clear and satisfactory explanation he has given of his views and the policy of the Austrian Government.

Her Majesty's Government are now more fully in possession than before of the sentiments of the Austrian Cabinet, and of the course which it has hitherto adopted, and that which it proposes to pursue in order to induce the Emperor of Russia to take a more correct view of his demands upon Turkey, of the great danger to which he exposes the peace of Europe, and in fact of his own position; for that position must be unsound and erroneous which compels the allies of His Imperial Majesty, who are most interested in maintaining friendly relations with Russia, to unite in condemnation of his proceedings.

Upon the nature of Prince Menchikoff's proposals Count Buol's own judgment is so correct, and the resolution of the Porte not to accede to them

has throughout been so firm and unwavering, that the determination of the Russian Government to throw upon Lord Stratford de Redcliffe the sole blame of their rejection would be incomprehensible if it were possible that it could be sincere. Notwithstanding that this strange fiction is still persisted in, and that the Emperor appears possessed with the erroneous idea that England is opposed to any claims he may justly be entitled to urge upon Turkey, Her Majesty's Government will not be deterred from pursuing their peaceful policy, and endeavouring that the difficulty shall be solved with due regard to the honour of the Emperor and the safety of the Sultan. Under the circumstances, however, and having regard to the position of intimacy in which Austria stands with respect to Russia, Her Majesty's Government feel that the moral influence of Austria must at this moment be greater than that which England or any other Power can exercise at St. Petersburg, and they cannot too strongly recommend that the Austrian Government should persist in their remonstrances against the ill-advised course which the Emperor of Russia seems determined to pursue, and which may shortly be attended with such disastrous results to Europe.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 313.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 4, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government have received with satisfaction the firman issued by the Sultan in behalf of his Protestant subjects, inclosed in your despatch of the 18th instant.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 314.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 4, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, in reply to your despatch of the 20th ultimo, that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the advice given by you to the Porte, and the instructions which you have addressed to Her Majesty's Consuls in the Principalities, with reference to the expected entrance of the Russian forces into those Provinces.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 315.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 5.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, July 4, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS read me this morning the copy of a despatch which he addressed yesterday to Count Walewski for communication to your Lordship, and in which he recounts the substance of a conversation which he had had with M. de Kisseleff on the subject of a supposed proposition made by M. de Bourqueney on the subject of the Oriental question.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys assures me that the only trace in M. de Bourqueney's correspondence of the plan attributed to him, appears in a despatch dated the 11th ultimo, where that Minister recounts the substance of a long conversation which he had had with M. de Meyendorff, in which the plan in question was one of the expedients for a settlement put forward on the part of the Russian Minister at Vienna.

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No. 316.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 5.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, June 27, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose the translation of a Manifesto issued this morning, but dated yesterday, Sunday, announcing the advance of the Russian armies into the Danubian Principalities.

The words underlined in the translation are considered by Russians as indicating in the original, that the troops have already entered the Principalities.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 316.

*Manifesto.*

(Translation.)

IT is known to all our faithful subjects that the defence of the Orthodox religion was from time immemorial the vow of our glorious forefathers.

From the time that it pleased Providence to intrust to us our hereditary throne, the defence of these holy obligations, inseparable from it, was the constant object of our solicitude and care; and these, based on the glorious Treaty of Kainardji, confirmed by other subsequent solemn Treaties with the Ottoman Porte, were ever directed to insure the inviolability of the Orthodox Church.

But to our great grief, recently, in despite of our efforts to defend the inviolability of the rights and privileges of our Orthodox Church, various arbitrary acts of the Porte have infringed these rights, and threaten, at least, the complete overthrow of the long perpetuated order so dear to orthodoxy.

Our exertions to restrain the Porte from similar deeds have proved fruitless, and even the solemnly pledged word of the Sultan to ourselves was soon faithlessly broken.

Having exhausted all persuasion and, with them, every means for obtaining pacific satisfaction of our just demands, *we have found it needful to advance our armies into the Danubian Principalities*, in order to show the Ottoman Porte to what its obstinacy may lead.

But even now we have not the intention to commence war.

By the occupation of the Principalities we desire to have such a security in our hands as will insure us in every event the restoration of our rights.

It is not conquest that we seek, Russia needs it not; we seek satisfaction for a just right so clearly infringed. We are ready even now to arrest the movement of our armies, if the Ottoman Porte will bind itself solemnly to observe the inviolability of the Orthodox Church.

But if blindness and obstinacy decide for the contrary, then, calling God to our aid, we shall leave the decision of the struggle to him, and, in full confidence in his omnipotent right hand, we shall march forwards for the Orthodox Church.

*St. Petersburg, Sunday, June  $\frac{14}{26}$ , 1853.*

*French Translation of Manifesto published in St. Petersburg Journal of  $\frac{17}{29}$  June, 1853.*

PAR la grâce de Dieu, nous, Nicolas Premier, Empereur et Autocrate de toutes les Russies, &c.

Savoir faisons :

Il est à la connaissance de nos fidèles et bien-aimés sujets que, de temps immémorial, nos glorieux prédécesseurs ont fait vœu de défendre la foi Orthodoxe.

Depuis l'instant où il a plu à la Divine Providence de nous transmettre

le Trône héréditaire, l'observation de ces devoirs sacrés qui en sont inséparables a constamment été l'objet de nos soins et de notre sollicitude. Basés sur le glorieux Traité de Kaïnardji, confirmé par les transactions solennelles, conclues postérieurement avec la Porte Ottomane, ces soins et cette sollicitude ont toujours eu pour but de garantir les droits de l'Eglise Orthodoxe.

Mais, à notre profonde affliction, malgré tous nos efforts pour défendre l'intégrité des droits et privilèges de notre Eglise Orthodoxe, dans ces derniers temps de nombreux actes arbitraires du Gouvernement Ottoman ont porté atteinte à ces droits, et menaçaient enfin d'anéantir complètement tout l'ordre de choses sanctionné par les siècles, et si cher à la foi Orthodoxe.

Nos efforts pour détourner la Porte d'actes semblables sont restés infructueux, et même la parole solennelle, que le Sultan nous avait donnée en cette occasion, n'a pas tardé à être violée.\*

Après avoir épuisé toutes les voies de la persuasion, et tous les moyens d'obtenir à l'amiable la satisfaction due à nos justes réclamations, *nous avons jugé indispensable de faire entrer nos troupes dans les Principautés Danubiennes*, afin de montrer à la Porte où peut la conduire son opiniâtreté. Toutefois, même à présent, notre intention n'est point de commencer la guerre; par l'occupation des Principautés nous voulons avoir entre les mains un gage qui nous réponde en tout état de cause du rétablissement de nos droits.

Nous ne cherchons point de conquêtes; la Russie n'en a pas besoin. Nous demandons qu'il soit satisfait à un droit légitime si ouvertement enfreint. Nous sommes prêts, même dès à présent, à arrêter le mouvement de nos troupes, si la Porte Ottomane s'engage à observer religieusement l'intégrité des privilèges de l'Eglise Orthodoxe. Mais, si l'obstination et l'aveuglement veulent absolument le contraire, alors, appelant Dieu à notre aide, nous nous en remettons à lui du soin de décider de notre différend, et plein d'espoir en sa main toute puissante, nous marcherons à la défense de la foi Orthodoxe.

## No. 317

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 7.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, June 27, 1853.*

I AM told that, in the course of a conversation which took place lately at Vienna between M. de Bourqueney and Baron Meyendorff, the former of these Ministers struck out an idea for settling the differences between Russia and the Porte.

According to M. de Bourqueney's plan, a Turkish Minister should be dispatched to St. Petersburg, as bearer of the note twice proposed in vain by Russia.

It was, however, to be agreed, that this note was to be delivered only upon the clear understanding that a corresponding answer (the terms of which should be previously agreed upon) should be returned on behalf of the Emperor, in which His Majesty should express the sense which he attributed to the protecting powers conferred upon him, and should at the same time give satisfactory assurances of the temperate use which he should ever make of them.

## No. 318.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 7.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, June 27, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour of inclosing to your Lordship a copy of the confidential letter which was addressed to me on the 26th instant by the Chancellor, giving some explanations as to the rights to which Russia is entitled by the Treaty of Kainardji, and of those enjoyed *ab antiquo* by the Greek subjects of the Porte, which it was now endeavoured to place under the solemn and recognized Protectorate of the Emperor.

The word "perfidiously" or "faithlessly" is omitted in this translation.

Count Nesselrode alludes to the Greek Protocol No. 3, in proof of England having been an acquiescent party to the Protectorate rights, a portion of which were made over by the Crown of France to that of Greece; and in my reply, a copy of which I have likewise the honour of transmitting, I have remarked that the Protocol in question offers at least tolerably conclusive evidence that, as regards a point of such European importance as any question relating to the independence of Turkey, no decision has hitherto been taken excepting after negotiation between the Powers interested in the existence of the Ottoman Empire.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 318.

*Count Nesselrode to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

(Confidentielle.)

Mon cher Sir Hamilton,

*St. Pétersbourg, le 14<sup>e</sup> Juin, 1853.*

LE meilleur moyen de résoudre les questions, est de ne point les compliquer gratuitement en leur donnant plus de portée sérieuse qu'elles n'en ont entre gens de bonne foi, et de ne point les pressurer, pour en faire sortir à toute force d'avance toutes les conséquences possibles ou imaginables.

Permettez-moi de vous dire que votre Gouvernement va chercher bien loin la signification de ce terme *ab antiquo*. Quand nous demandons le maintien des droits, privilèges et immunités accordés au culte Grec *ab antiquo* par les Sultans, nous voulons dire le maintien des droits, &c. &c., dont ce culte jouit actuellement et qu'une jouissance *ab antiquo* a consacré par la coutume; mais nous n'avons nulle intention d'aller déterrer *ex antiquo*, ou chercher *in antiquum* (je ne suis pas bien sûr de parler correctement Latin), des droits dont la religion et le clergé ont pu jouir originairement autrefois, mais dont ils ne jouissent plus aujourd'hui.

Le maintien strict du *status quo* actuel, tel qu'il résulte des privilèges accordés successivement aux Grecs par les Sultans et confirmés par leur successeur régnant aujourd'hui, c'est là tout ce que nous reclamons. Nous voulons conserver, non ressusciter. Nous ne demandons rien de nouveau, comme aussi rien de retroactif.

Nous en tenons à la base du présent, sans prétendre exhumer du passé des privilèges que l'Eglise a pu obtenir momentanément à l'origine de l'établissement des premiers Sultans en Europe, mais qu'elle a cessé de posséder à l'heure qu'il est par l'effet du temps, des changements administratifs, ou de la désuétude.

Veuillez relire le Protocole du 3 Février 1830, No. 3, relatif aux affaires Grecques, et sur lequel j'ai déjà appelé votre attention. En fait de droits, immunités, privilèges, cet Acte pourra vous donner l'exacte mesure des garanties que nous demandons, et que nous avons, vous et nous, accordées sans difficultés à la France.

Vous avez vous-même, à une époque, ou apparemment vous ne regardiez pas comme attentatoire en principe à l'indépendance du Sultan le protectorat que la France, plus explicite et plus franche qu'aujourd'hui, déclarait exercer traditionnellement en Turquie sur les Catholiques sujets du Sultan, imposé avec nous à la Grèce indépendante le maintien d'immunités telles que nous les demandons. Il a été arrêté par vous, Grande Bretagne (et cela par un Acte diplomatique autrement significatif qu'une simple note), que la religion Catholique jouirait dans le nouvel état du libre et public exercice de son culte, que ses propriétés seraient respectées, que les évêques seraient maintenus dans l'intégrité des fonctions, droits, et privilèges dont ils avaient joui auparavant sous le patronage des Rois de France, &c. &c. Eh bien! c'est là précisément la genre de droits, immunités, ou privilèges, dont nous demandons le maintien en Turquie pour notre culte, son clergé, et ses possessions, le tout sous l'égide du Sultan, ce qui est, certes, plus poli pour lui que le patronage si nettement articulé des Rois de France.

Vous faut-il un précédent? Nous nous en tiendrons à celui-là.

Et lorsque l'on fait dire à la Porte, comme dans sa dernière note aux

Représentants des quatre Puissances : “ que stipuler avec un Gouvernement étranger par sened, convention, note ou déclaration quelconque, les droits, privilèges et immunités en faveur d’une communauté sujette à la Porte, lors même qu’il ne s’agirait que de la religion, du culte, et de l’église, cela touche aux droits d’indépendance et aux bases fondamentales de la Puissance qui s’engage,—on renverse par là la base et l’on repudie en principe le Protocole auquel, d’accord avec nous, l’Angleterre comme la France ont apposé leur signature.

Permettez-moi encore une remarque. La France possède avec la Turquie des capitulations, confirmées successivement, mais dont la première origine remonte jusqu’au seizième siècle, et qui, si elles étaient prises à la lettre, lui donneraient à la rigueur le droit d’exiger le rétablissement de l’état de possession des Lieux Saints sur le pied où il se trouvait du temps de François I. Mais la France sent bien, tout en insistant sur son droit, que le poursuivre retro-activement et prétendre ramener les choses où elles en étaient à l’origine de sa première capitulation, sans tenir compte des changements qu’y ont apportés les siècles, ce serait exiger l’absurde. Pourquoi voulez-vous, mon cher Sir Hamilton, nous prêter à nous des vues plus déraisonnables ; et quelle déplorable méfiance porte votre Gouvernement à supposer que, le terme *ab antiquo* s’appliquant probablement dans notre pensée à une époque de beaucoup antérieure au Traité de Kainardji, nous pourrions y puiser le droit incontestable de réclamer des privilèges accordés au clergé Grec dès les premiers temps de la domination Mahométane ; privilèges tombés en désuétude aujourd’hui, mais qui ravivés par nous, et touchant à la puissance séculière comme spirituelle de clergé, nous permettraient d’exercer un contrôle suprême sur quatorze millions de sujets Turcs ? Veuillez donc vous persuader, qu’en fait de privilèges nous ne réclavons que ce qui existe, non pas ce qui a pu exister autrefois.

Quant au Traité de Kainardji, il est très vrai, si on le prend à la lettre, que les droits et privilèges du culte Grec n’y sont point mentionnés en termes exprès, mais la protection donnée à la religion et à ses églises implique bien, aux yeux de tout homme de sens et de bonne foi, celle des droits et privilèges des dites églises.

Du moment où le Sultan s’est engagé vis-à-vis de nous à les protéger, il nous a par là même conféré le droit de veiller à la manière dont il remplirait cet engagement.

Et pour ce qui concerne le mot de “ religion Chrétienne,” employé dans l’article du Traité, nous ne ferons pas au Cabinet Anglais l’injure de supposer qu’il veut subtiliser sur ce terme. Il est bien évident qu’en stipulant pour le culte et des églises en Turquie, le rit Catholique y étant déjà placé sous une autre protection que la nôtre, il n’a pu être question que du culte et des églises auxquels nous appartenions nous et nos coreligionnaires sujets du Sultan.

En résumé, mon cher Sir Hamilton, nous ne voulons en ce moment que ce qu’implique suffisamment le Traité de Kainardji. Nous ne demandons en fait de privilèges que ceux dont le clergé jouit actuellement (qu’ils lui aient été accordé récemment ou *ab antiquo* peu importe) et en fait de patronage, uniquement celui que l’Angleterre a déjà reconnu à la France, en vertu du Protocole de Février 1830, et qu’elle trouvait à cette époque très conciliable avec les droits et la dignité du Sultan comme du nouveau Gouvernement indépendant que nous étions occupés avec elle à fonder et à constituer.

Après une expérience de quatre vingt années, envisager tout d’un coup ce simple patronage comme un protectorat religieux et politique entièrement nouveau, qui ferait désormais de l’Empereur de Russie le vrai Souverain de la Turquie, et réduirait le Sultan aux conditions d’un vassal, nous ne pourrions que déplorer une telle exagération d’idée.

Si l’on va plus loin et que l’on veuille nous faire la guerre pour nous l’enlever, on met l’Empereur dans l’obligation de le défendre à toute outrance, parceque ce patronage fait partie de l’héritage de ses aïeux comme de la force de son empire, et l’on aura, pour écarter un danger imaginaire, provoqué un danger certain, allumé un incendie dont les conséquences sont incalculables, et dont la responsabilité ne nous appartiendra, certes, pas.

Agréez, &c.  
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)

(Confidential.)

My dear Sir Hamilton,

St. Petersburg, June  $\frac{14}{26}$ , 1853.

THE best method of arriving at a solution of questions is not to complicate them gratuitously by giving them a more serious character than they really have among persons of good faith, and not to press them too strongly, in order to deduce from them beforehand all possible or imaginable consequences.

Allow me to say that your Government is going very far in search of the meaning of that term *ab antiquo*. When we demand the maintenance of the rights, privileges, and immunities granted by the Sultans to the Greek religion *ab antiquo*, we mean to say the maintenance of the rights, &c., &c., which that religion at present enjoys, and which the enjoyment *ab antiquo* has by usage confirmed; but we have no intention of disinterring *ex antiquo*, or of looking for *in antiquum* (I am not sure of speaking Latin correctly) rights which the religion and the clergy may have originally enjoyed in former times, but which they no longer enjoy at present.

All that we require is the strict maintenance of the existing *status quo*, such as it results from the privileges successively granted to the Greeks by the Sultans, and confirmed by their successor now reigning. We wish to preserve, not to resuscitate; we ask for nothing new, and likewise for nothing retroactive.

We hold to the basis of the present, without pretending to disinter from the past privileges which the Church may for a time have obtained at the commencement of the establishment of the first Sultans in Europe, but which it has now ceased to possess, by reason of lapse of time, administrative changes, or desuetude.

Have the goodness to read over the Protocol of February 3, 1830, No. 3, relative to Greek affairs, and to which I have already called your attention. As regards rights, immunities, and privileges, that instrument will give you the exact measure of the guarantees which we demand, and which we and yourselves have both conceded without difficulty to France.

At a time when apparently you did not consider as affecting in principle the independence of the Sultan the Protectorate which France, more explicit and frank than now, declared that she exercised traditionally over the Catholic subjects of the Sultan, you yourselves, in conjunction with us, imposed on independent Greece the maintenance of immunities such as those we ask for. It was settled by you, Great Britain (and that by a diplomatic act more significant than a simple note), that the Catholic religion should enjoy in the new State the free and public exercise of its worship, that its properties should be respected, that its bishops should be maintained in the full possession of the functions, rights, and privileges which they had previously enjoyed under the patronage of the Kings of France, &c., &c. Well, that is precisely the kind of rights, immunities, or privileges, the maintenance of which we demand in Turkey for our religion, our clergy, and its possessions; the whole under the protection of the Sultan, which is certainly more considerate in regard to him than the patronage so plainly expressed of the Kings of France.

Do you require a precedent? We stand by that one.

And when the Porte is made to say, as in its last note to the Representatives of the Four Powers, "that to stipulate with a foreign Government by sened, convention, note, or declaration of whatever kind, for rights, privileges, and immunities in favour of a community subject to the Porte, even though there should only be question of the religion, the worship, and the church, affects the rights of independence and the fundamental bases of the Power which enters into such an engagement," the basis of the Protocol to which, in concert with ourselves, England as well as France have affixed their signatures, is overthrown, and its principle set aside.

Allow me a further observation. France has with Turkey capitulations, successively confirmed, but the first origin of which goes back to the sixteenth century, and which if taken literally would in strictness confer upon her the right to require the re-establishment of the state of possession of the holy places on the footing on which it stood in the time of Francis I. But France is fully sensible, while insisting on her right, that to pursue it retroactively, and to pretend to bring back matters to the state in which they stood at the origin of her first capitulations, without taking into account the changes produced in

them by lapse of time, would be to require what is absurd. Why will you, my dear Sir Hamilton, attribute to us more unreasonable views; and what lamentable mistrust induces your Government to suppose that, the term *ab antiquo* applying probably in our notion to a period far antecedent to the Treaty of Kainardji, we could deduce from it the incontestable right of claiming privileges granted to the Greek clergy from the first period of the Mahometan rule; privileges which have fallen into desuetude at the present time, but which revived by us, and affecting the secular as well as the spiritual power of the clergy, would admit of our exercising supreme control over fourteen millions of Turkish subjects? Be persuaded, then, that in regard to privileges we only demand what exists, not what may have existed heretofore.

As regards the Treaty of Kainardji, it is very true that if taken literally the rights and privileges of the Greek religion are not mentioned therein in express terms; but protection granted to religion and its churches clearly implies, in the estimation of every sensible and honest man, that of the rights and privileges of the said churches.

From the moment that the Sultan pledged himself to us to protect them, he by that very act conferred upon us the right of watching over the manner in which he fulfilled that engagement.

And as regards the term "Christian religion," employed in the Article of the Treaty, we will not do the English Cabinet the injustice to suppose that it is desirous of quibbling on that term. It is very evident that in stipulating for religion and churches in Turkey, the Catholic rite being already placed there under another protection than our own, there could only be a question of the religion and of the churches to which we and the subjects of the Sultan, our coreligionists, belong.

To conclude, my dear Sir Hamilton, we do not require at this time anything but what is sufficiently implied in the Treaty of Kainardji. We demand, as far as privileges are concerned, those only which the clergy now enjoys (it matters little whether they have been granted to them recently or *ab antiquo*); and as far as patronage is concerned, that only which England, in virtue of the Protocol of February 1830, has already recognized as appertaining to France, and which at that time she found to be very compatible with the rights and dignity of the Sultan, as well as with those of the new Government which we were engaged with her in founding and constituting.

We can only deplore the exaggeration of the notion by which, after the experience of eighty years, this simple patronage is suddenly looked upon as an entirely novel religious and political protectorate, which would henceforth make the Emperor of Russia the real Sovereign of Turkey, and reduce the Sultan to the condition of a vassal.

If it is desired to proceed further, and to make war upon us in order to deprive us of it, the Emperor is placed under the necessity of defending it to the last extremity, because that patronage constitutes a portion of the inheritance of his ancestors, as also of the strength of his Empire; and in order to avert an imaginary danger, a certain danger will have been created, and a flame lighted up of which the consequences are incalculable, and of which the responsibility will certainly not attach to us.

Receive, &c.  
(Signed) NESSELRODE.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 318.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to Count Nesselrode.*

(Confidential.)

My dear Count Nesselrode,

*St. Petersburg, June 14, 1853.*

I BEG to acknowledge the receipt of the confidential letter of this date, which you have done me the honour of addressing to me.

The object upon which, at this moment, my thoughts are the most intent being, that any misunderstanding between our two Governments should be removed by frank explanations and assurances, I abstain from

offering you several observations which are suggested by your communication.

Were it necessary, I might demonstrate the great difference which exists between a *de jure* Protectorate exercised by one Sovereign over a few thousand of Catholics, and that which it is proposed should be granted to another Sovereign by whom it would be exercised over several millions of his co-religionists.

This point, however, I only allude to; and passing over others in complete silence, I will only dwell upon one which, in your Excellency's opinion, appears to affect the consistency of Her Majesty's Government.

The English Government, you very correctly observe, were a party to the transfer from the Crown of France to that of Greece, of a portion of that protection exercised during centuries by the French Sovereigns over a certain number of the subjects of the Porte. You give to be understood, that it would be little reasonable were objections to be now raised to attributing to the Emperor of Russia a similar right of protection with regard to those subjects of the Sultan who profess the Greek creed.

I am hardly qualified to give an opinion upon the subject of the extent of the Protectorate rights enjoyed by France in virtue of her ancient capitulations; but a more important consideration presents itself forcibly to my mind.

If the independence of Turkey has been ever held to be an object of such European importance, that even a fraction of a privilege obtained from the Porte could not be transferred from a mighty Monarch like him of France, to a Sovereign of new creation and of such inferior power as the King of Greece, without the concurrence of Russia and Great Britain—a concurrence obtained by previous negotiation, how, I would ask, could it be otherwise but that the late sudden and unexpected attempt of one of the Great Powers to obtain for itself the immediate possession of a privilege of great magnitude, should give rise to surprise and hesitation on the part of Governments interested in, and pledged to the support of the Ottoman Empire?

It appears to me, that only one answer can be returned to the inquiry, and that the answer is of a nature to satisfy every impartial person that the difficulties which exist between the Crown of Russia and the Porte, ought to be settled by peaceable means, and not by violence; and that the questions pending are such as should be examined by the Great Powers, the Allies of Russia and the co-supporters of Turkish independence, as well as by Russia herself.

This inference is, I think, clear and unexceptionable; while, as regards the Queen's Government, the entire confidence which has been reposed in the assurances of the Imperial Cabinet may be taken as the surest pledge of the desire felt by Her Majesty's Ministers, that every just demand which can be made by the Emperor, should be fully acquiesced in by Turkey and by the Powers which have undertaken to support her independent existence.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 319.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 7.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, June 28, 1853.*

UPON calling upon the Chancellor yesterday, I learnt from him that orders for the occupation of the Principalities had been sent off on the 27th instant. According to a report which prevails here, these orders had been despatched some days previously; this, however, can hardly be the case after the assurance given to me by Count Nesselrode on the 13th instant.

The Chancellor placed in my hands the inclosed copy of the answer

returned to his letter by Reshid Pasha. He had, he said, no objection to urge against its style; still, however, it was a refusal of the Imperial propositions, and as such involved a resort by the Emperor to those measures which had been announced. At the same time his Excellency clung to the hope of matters being settled peaceably. He had little doubt that this result would be obtained if the occupation of the Principalities should not be regarded by Great Britain and France as a *casus belli*.

His Excellency proceeded to speak of the plan of reconciliation devised by M. de Bourqueney. He expressed his warm satisfaction at the idea, and observed that it was one which would be accepted willingly (*à deux mains*) by the Imperial Government.

He next adverted to the manifesto which had just been published.

This paper, a translated copy of which was forwarded to your Lordship by post yesterday, was intended for the Russian people; the circular, which was about to be made public, was directed in some measure to foreign States, and would be found to contain the most positive assurances as to the Emperor's intention of not seeking any territorial aggrandizement.

This may be so—but some degree of incredulity may be excused in those who, having followed the late proceedings of the Russian Government, have had the opportunity of seeing how impossible it is to reconcile professions with acts.

Of this difficulty fresh proof was offered me yesterday, when once more the Chancellor stated that the concessions on the part of the Porte insisted upon by the Emperor, were to be considered solely with reference to the question of the Holy Places, and to the precautions which it was necessary to take, to avoid a repetition of causes of complaint like those which had been given by the Porte.

This statement appears to be hardly reconcileable with the terms of the Russian manifesto, from which it might be inferred that the very existence of the Greek Church was in danger from the fanaticism of the Turks. If it is desired, however, to contrast the language of the Russian Cabinet with its acts, the materials are certainly not wanting.

Nothing can be more striking than to listen, as I frequently have occasion to do, to the ardent wishes for the preservation of peace expressed by the Chancellor, and to observe that these are accompanied, first, by the publication of the circular already in your Lordship's hands, next by the issue of orders for the occupation of the Principalities, then again by the issue of an appeal (and that upon false grounds) to the religious feelings of a people eminently sensible to any danger with which their Church is threatened, and then by the preparation of a fresh circular destined for publication.

It now is given to be understood (for I cannot say that it is directly stated) that the occupation of the Danubian Provinces will afford a fresh and favourable opportunity for negotiation.

I must confess that it strikes me that were the wishes of the Imperial Cabinet intent upon peace, occupation would not have been actually undertaken until sufficient time had been given for the deliberations of friendly Governments; nor again am I by any means satisfied that, when the occupation has been effected, it will be found that the Russian councils have become more reasonable than they are at present.

To return to the conversation which I held with the Chancellor, it remains only for me to state that his Excellency in alluding to the firman which it was in contemplation to issue in favour of the Greek Church, observed that, as must be known to me, the Emperor's Government could not accept of any firman in the light of an adequate reparation; that what one firman granted, another, as had been seen, could overthrow; and, consequently, that the Emperor desired that the concessions made by the Porte should be sanctioned by some instrument having the force of an international engagement.

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Inclosure in No. 319.

*Reshid Pasha to Count Nesselrode, June  $\frac{4}{16}$ , 1853.*

[See Inclosure in No. 298.]

No. 320.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 7.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, July 6, 1853.*

IN my despatch of the 4th instant I had the honour to call your Lordship's attention to a project, attributed to M. de Bourqueney, for the solution of the Oriental question. Since then an attempt has been made to induce the public to believe that that able diplomatist had, in truth, hit upon a plan acceptable to all parties, and that the Emperor's sanction had been given to it. I thought it right, therefore, to ask M. Drouyn de Lhuys, this morning, how far this latter assertion was compatible with truth.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that he had had an interview yesterday with M. de Kisseleff, at which he fully explained to him the Emperor's sentiments; and that there might be no mistake about them, he proposed writing a despatch to General Casteljacob, in which those sentiments would be more fully developed. They are to the following effect.

The Emperor could not advise the Porte to accept the plan submitted from St. Petersburg in the name of M. Bourqueney, and which consists in the full acceptance by the Porte of the "note-Menchikoff," under the understanding that the Russian Government shall, after that note shall have been transmitted signed to St. Petersburg, give such explanations as may seem to them befitting the circumstances and the necessity of the case; but if the Russian Cabinet is willing to submit for previous consideration the answer which, under the above-mentioned plan, would be made to the Porte, and that answer contained satisfactory assurances as to the scope and object of the Russian demands, while its stipulations were as binding on Russia as those contained in the Menchikoff note were obligatory on the Porte, His Majesty would be ready to consult with the Governments of England and Austria as to the propriety of recommending the Porte to accept this solution of its differences with Russia.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys said further, that he had recommended to M. de Kisseleff that the Russian Government should, in refusing to receive the Special Embassy offered by the Porte, state to the Ottoman Government, in precise and accurate terms, the interpretation given at St. Petersburg to the demands made by Prince Menchikoff. If those demands proved, after explanation, to be as harmless as they were represented by Russian diplomacy, the Porte might be advised to accede to them.

I should add that nothing has been received from M. de Bourqueney since I last wrote, making any mention of the project to which his name has been attached.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 321.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 8.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, June 24, 1853.*

WE are still without any positive information of the entrance of the Russian army into Moldavia, though everything indicates the approaching execution of that measure, and we are in daily expectation of hearing that it has actually taken place.

Meanwhile a new incident has occurred. The Internuncio, acting under instructions, has presented to Reshid Pasha an extract of a despatch addressed to him by Count Buol. The purport of the communication is an overture or proposal tending eventually towards a mediation by Austria. Reshid Pasha lost no time in sending it to me; and, subsequently, he extended the communication to my colleagues of France and Prussia. Baron de Bruck also made a similar communication successively to each of us. The extract of Count Buol's instruction is inclosed herewith in copy.

My first object was to ascertain the impression made on Reshid Pasha by this overture, and I found that he was no more disposed than before to recede from the principle hitherto maintained by the Porte. I learnt, moreover, that although Baron de Bruck had pressed him for an immediate answer, his Highness had declined giving one, until he should have conferred with his colleagues, and taken the Sultan's pleasure.

My second object was to obtain from Baron de Bruck some explanation of the ground on which Count Buol had placed his hope of a successful mediation. I could learn nothing beyond an anxiety to prevent war, and an impression that the Emperor of Russia was embarrassed, and would be glad to find some means of extrication. Could we hope by a prompt acceptance of the Austrian idea to afford Prince Menchikoff a motive for delaying the occupation of the Danubian Principalities? Nothing appeared to warrant any such hope.

In spite of these unpromising circumstances—of the recollection that neither Prince Menchikoff nor Count Nesselrode would hear of the slightest variation in the terms of that draft of a note which constituted the last Russian ultimatum, and of the certainty that neither could the Porte recede, nor could we advise her to recede, from the point at issue—I conceived that, independently of any prospect of success, no inconsiderable advantage might be made to accrue from the Austrian suggestion.

Far, therefore, from making any difficulties, I proposed a meeting of the four Representatives, which accordingly took place at my house this morning.

It is unnecessary to trouble your Lordship with the particulars of what occurred during our conference, which, being unauthorized by any special instructions, was carried on rather in the spirit of a desultory conversation than in that of a regular discussion. For my own part, I felt deeply the importance of keeping every chance of accommodation open as long as possible, of having it clearly understood at the same time that there could be no question of ceding the diplomatic engagement required by Russia, of keeping fairly in view the position of the Sultan's Government with respect to its allies and to its people, of not giving to such communication as we might agree in adopting any character but that of a mere suggestion proceeding from the four Representatives, and, finally, of bringing simultaneously before the Porte a strong expression of our belief that real and comprehensive improvement of the condition of the Sultan's non-Mussulman subjects could be no longer deferred.

It is but justice to state that I found the French Ambassador, the Austrian Internuncio, and the Prussian Envoy, animated as to these several points with sentiments of the most satisfactory description, and I infer from the harmony which prevailed among us, that whatever difference of opinion arising from difference of position may exist as to the ulterior means of supporting the Sultan in his struggle with Russia, your Lordship will find little difficulty in directing the joint moral action of the four Powers towards the adjustment of the present question, if it be capable of adjustment by diplomatic means, and to the establishment of a more complete understanding and concurrence between them and the Porte in that broad European sense and Christian spirit which Her Majesty's Government have never ceased to promote and to recommend. I found them at the same time most reasonably alive to the expediency of keeping open a door for Russia's accession to the same system of policy hereafter, and of our being, as much as possible, careful not to give umbrage in that quarter by any premature display of our concurrent understanding in contrast with the insulated position of Russia.

The immediate results of our meeting are consigned to a memorandum without signature, which I inclose herewith for your Lordship's information, though I am not at liberty to represent it as invested with any formal character. In fact, it is a simple unofficial record of the purpose of our meeting, and of certain points on which our opinions agreed.

Since we separated I have received from Mr. Pisani a report, which I inclose in copy herewith, and I have seen a Russian circular, dated from St. Petersburg the 30th ultimo, o. s., and published as a supplement to the "Odessa Gazette." Both these papers show that the Porte on its side, and Russia on hers, persist in maintaining respectively the one essential point in dispute, and the latter removes whatever doubt might by possibility have remained of the Emperor's determination to send his army into the Principalities.

Under these circumstances, I repeat that the object of entertaining the Austrian suggestion, so far as to place it under the notice of the Porte as an idea proceeding, by adoption, from the Representatives of the four Powers at Constantinople, is not with a view to any immediate result, but to afford an opportunity for diplomatic action in a form at once the most effective and the least unpalatable to Russia. It would seem, if solemn declarations are still to be trusted, that the Emperor of Russia, if not resisted by force, will confine his military aggressions on Turkey to the occupation of the two Principalities, and as it is all but certain that the Porte will not offer resistance to that measure, we may safely conclude that, barring accidents, no nearer approach to hostilities will take place for the present. It is obvious, at the same time, that the occupation itself is not only an aggressive act, constituting a case of war, and justly entitling the Porte to act at once on that principle, but that it has the effect of placing the Porte in a state of embarrassing and hazardous apprehension, imposing heavy burthens on the Empire, and unsettling its most important relations at home and abroad. So painful and exhausting is the attitude thus forced upon the Turkish Government, that if not relieved by more successful negotiations, or assisted without reserve by their allies, they can hardly be expected to hold out for any great length of time, and they will finally be reduced to the necessity of either surrendering what they conceive to be essential to the Sultan's independence and Sovereign right, or acquiescing in an act of spoliation wholly at variance with the declared principles of 1841, and, in fact, decisive of that great question which the five leading Powers of Christendom then hedged round with the most solemn pledges of their honour and good faith.

I venture, therefore, to submit that the course which I am now taking in concert with my colleagues of Austria, France, and Prussia, is the one best calculated to anticipate the views of Her Majesty's Government, and to meet the exigencies of the case, by affording Russia an opening for re-consideration, in so far as her own precipitancy admits of it, without that additional delay which would be incurred by a reference to our respective Courts.

If this last effort for a peaceful solution fail, it is difficult to foresee any issue of the struggle, acceptable either to the Porte or to Europe, but that which is to be obtained by the active cooperation of England and France, with a general concurrence from other Powers, and a long uncertain perspective of dangers and sacrifices, not indeed to be avoided, but not the less to be deplored.

I need not add that in uniting with my colleagues to submit Count Buol's suggestion to Reshid Pasha as a communication proceeding from the Four Powers, I do not propose to anticipate in any degree His Highness's own notion of the manner in which it may be carried into effect.

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## Inclosure 1 in No. 321.

*Count Buol to Baron Bruck.—(Communicated June 22, 1853.)*

(Extrait.)

DANS le cas où la Sublime Porte aurait donné une réponse négative il faudrait recommander de la manière la plus amicale à son Altesse M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'examiner encore une fois le projet de la note du Prince Menchikoff, et de la comparer avec celui que la Sublime Porte avait rédigé dans l'intention de l'adresser au Prince avant son départ. A cette comparaison son Altesse M. le Ministre devrait pondérer sérieusement, par lui-même, les variantes pour pouvoir se prononcer en quels points il considère comme essentielle la différence entre ces deux projets, et si cette différence en existe plus dans les expressions que dans la substance.

Pour le cas que M. le Ministre serait disposé de proposer quelques changements dans la note Russe que la Porte croirait pouvoir accepter, et qui présenteraient l'espoir d'être agréés à St. Pétersbourg, votre Excellence est autorisée à recevoir ces propositions, et à nous les communiquer pour y appuyer notre médiation ultérieure, et pour préparer un accueil favorable à l'Ambassadeur que la Sublime Porte a l'intention d'envoyer à St. Pétersbourg.

(Translation.)

(Extract.)

IN case the Sublime Porte should have replied in the negative, his Highness the Minister for Foreign Affairs should be recommended in the most friendly manner again to examine Prince Menchikoff's draft of note, and to compare it with that which the Sublime Porte had drawn up, with the intention of addressing it to the Prince before his departure. In making this comparison his Highness the Minister ought for himself seriously to reflect upon the variations, in order to be enabled to decide in what respects he considers the difference between these two drafts to be essential, and whether this difference exists more in the expressions than in the substance.

In case the Minister should be disposed to propose some alterations in the Russian note, which the Porte might think it could accept, and which might hold out an expectation of being accepted at St. Petersburg, your Excellency is authorized to receive those propositions, and to communicate them to us in order that we might rest thereupon our further mediation, and prepare a favourable reception for the Ambassador whom the Sublime Porte intends to send to St. Petersburg.

## Inclosure 2 in No. 321.

*Memorandum from the Four Representatives to the Porte.**June 24, 1853.*

AYANT reçu de la Porte communication officielle de la lettre adressée en dernier lieu par M. le Comte de Nesselrode à Reshid Pasha, et la réponse du Ministre Ottoman à son Excellence le Chancelier de Russie, et plus tard ayant aussi reçu de la part de son Excellence l'Internonce d'Autriche et de Reshid Pasha communication d'un extrait de dépêche adressée par M. le Comte de Buol à M. le Baron de Bruck, nous nous sommes réunis pour en constater le fait, et pour échanger mutuellement nos idées sur ces communications.

Nous nous sommes arrêtés à la proposition :

1. De suggérer au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères du Sultan de faire préparer un projet de communication basé sur l'idée d'une fusion du projet de note du Prince Menchikoff avec celui de Reshid Pasha, dans l'espoir de trouver une rédaction qui pourrait être acceptable à la Russie,

sans s'écarter du principe que la Porte a jugé être essentiel au maintien de ses droits souverains.

2. De porter cette suggestion à la connaissance du Ministre Ottoman au moyen d'une instruction adressée aux interprètes respectifs, en nous réservant de la faire accompagner d'une instruction séparée, par laquelle nous ferions connaître à la Porte nos conseils relatifs à l'amélioration nécessaire de l'état de ses sujets non-Mussulmans.

(Translation.)

June 24, 1853.

HAVING received from the Porte official communication of the letter addressed in the last instance by Count Nesselrode to Reshid Pasha, and the Ottoman Minister's reply to the Chancellor of Russia, and having subsequently likewise received from his Excellency the Internuncio of Austria and Reshid Pasha communication of an extract of a despatch addressed by Count Buol to Baron Bruck, we have met together to place the fact on record, and to interchange our opinions on these communications.

We have decided :

1. On suggesting to the Sultan's Minister for Foreign Affairs to cause a draft of communication to be prepared, founded on the idea of blending Prince Menchikoff's draft with that of Reshid Pasha, in the hope of devising a form of note which might be acceptable to Prussia, without departing from the principle which the Porte has deemed to be essential for the maintenance of its sovereign rights ;

2. On communicating this suggestion to the Ottoman Minister by means of an instruction addressed to the respective interpreters, reserving to ourselves to accompany the same by a separate instruction, by which we should make known to the Porte our advice relative to the improvement required in the condition of its non-Mussulman subjects.

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Inclosure 3 in No. 321.

*M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord.

*Therapia, June 23, 1853.*

RESHID PASHA informs me that M. de Steindl called to-day to urge his Highness to give him an answer whether the Porte was inclined to try the proposed experiment for the renewal of negotiations with Russia, as contained in the extract of the despatch communicated yesterday by Baron de Bruck.

The Pasha replied to M. de Steindl, that his answer was already given to Baron de Bruck himself, namely, that he could not take upon himself either to reject or to adopt the proposal, without previously taking the advice of his colleagues, and submitting the same to the Sultan. But in his opinion, he was led to believe that this experiment would not answer the purpose of Russia ; that the Porte had already offered official and formal assurances, which have not been considered as containing sufficient guarantees. Consequently the only thing which could satisfy the Emperor of Russia would be a treaty engagement ; to this the Porte added he, cannot yield, for the reasons repeatedly stated.

Subsequently, M. de Steindl communicated another despatch, which Baron de Bruck had just received, approving the line pursued by the Porte until now in the question at issue ; and stating, at the same time, that Russia does not entertain any hostile views against Turkey, but would enter the Principalities as a material guaranty until she could obtain some moral one.

Despatches arrived from the Princes of Moldavia and Wallachia contain nearly the same information, that Russia has no intention to go to war, but only to occupy the Principalities until she could compel the Porte to offer the guarantees required by the Emperor.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. PISANI.

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*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 8.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, June 24, 1853.*

HAVING observed in Count Nesselrode's despatch to Baron Brunnow of June 1, as communicated by the latter to your Lordship, a passage which, more tangibly than others of the same cast, conveys a very erroneous impression of my conduct during the late negotiations between Prince Menchikoff and Reshid Pasha, and one scarcely less malevolent of Reshid Pasha's opinions at the same juncture, I thought it due to the cause of truth and fair-dealing to put the matter at rest on the most obvious and indisputable authority.

I applied for a statement of the real facts to Reshid Pasha himself; and his Highness having mentioned Mr. Alison as also cognizant of the truth, I applied to that gentleman likewise for the same purpose.

I have now the honour to inclose the correspondence, which is, fortunately, as short as it is decisive.

I have to request that it may be submitted to Her Majesty the Queen, and also to the members of Her Majesty's Government.

Your Lordship knows how heavy a responsibility weighs on me at the present important and delicate juncture. I am earnestly desirous of meriting the confidence it implies; and I should despise the calumny propagated by Count Nesselrode, were it not purposely intended to deprive me of that confidence.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 322.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Reshid Pasha.*

M. le Ministre,

*Therapia, ce 20 Juin, 1853.*

DANS une dépêche communiquée du Cabinet Russe, j'ai eu occasion de remarquer le passage suivant :

"Enfin, au dernier moment quand le Prince Menchikoff avait consenti à abandonner même le *Sened* modifié pour se contenter d'une note, quand Reshid Pasha lui-même, frappé des dangers que le départ de notre Légation pouvait faire courir à la Porte, conjurait l'Ambassadeur Britannique avec instance de ne pas s'opposer à la remise de la note formulée par le Prince Menchikoff, Lord Redcliffe l'en a empêché, en déclarant que la note avait la valeur d'un *Traité*, et qu'elle était *inacceptable*."

Dans l'intérêt de la grande question du jour, et dans celui de la vérité, je prie votre Altesse de vouloir bien me mander par un mot de réponse à cette lettre si les assertions que je viens de citer sont conformes au fait, ou fondées en erreur.

Je profite, &c.  
(Signé) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

(Translation.)

M. le Ministre,

*Therapia, June 20, 1853.*

IN a despatch which has been communicated by the Russian Cabinet, I have had occasion to notice the following passage :

"Finally, at the last moment, when Prince Menchikoff had consented to abandon even the modified *Sened*, and to content himself with a note, when Reshid Pasha himself, struck with the dangers which the departure of our Legation might entail upon the Porte, earnestly conjured the British Ambassador not to oppose the acceptance of the note drawn up by Prince Menchikoff, Lord Redcliffe prevented its acceptance by declaring that the note had the force of a *Treaty*, and was inadmissible."

In the interest of the great question of the day, and in that of truth, I request your Excellency to acquaint me, by a word in reply to this letter, whether the assertions which I have cited are conformable to fact, or founded in error.

I avail, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 322.

*Reshid Pasha to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

M. l'Ambassadeur,

*Balta Liman, le 21 Juin, 1853.*

J'AI pris connaissance des assertions qui font l'objet de la lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire en date d'hier.

Il est manifeste que, de même que votre Excellence, je ne voulais non plus voir s'interrompre les relations amicales entre la Sublime Porte et la Russie, et que, pendant toute une semaine, depuis ma nomination au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères jusqu'à ce jour du départ du Prince Menchikoff, j'ai épuisé mes efforts à chercher un mode d'accommodement qui, sans porter atteinte à l'indépendance et aux droits sacrés de Sa Majesté Impériale mon Auguste Souverain, pût satisfaire la Cour de Russie.

Mais quant à la première des deux assertions en question, selon laquelle j'aurais conjuré votre Excellence de ne pas s'opposer à la remise de la note formulée par le Prince Menchikoff, je n'ai qu'à faire appel à la conscience de votre Excellence elle-même pour constater qu'une telle démarche n'a pas eu lieu de ma part.

Pour répondre à la seconde, il me suffit de faire mention que le projet de note en question m'étant parvenu de la part du Prince Menchikoff vers le soir de Vendredi Mai 20, veille du jour du départ de cet Ambassadeur de Buyukderé, et ce projet ayant été transmis tout de suite de ma part à votre Excellence le lendemain Samedi, dans la matinée, Mr. Alison vint me demander de la part de votre Excellence quelle était mon opinion sur le projet de note en question. Je lui repondis sans hésitation que, quoique la dénomination ou la forme de l'Acte exigé fût changée, l'engagement à prendre restant en fond le même, il était impossible pour la Sublime Porte de l'accepter; et j'ai recours à Mr. Alison lui-même pour qu'il veuille bien répéter ce qui précède.

Je saisis, &c.  
(Signé) RECHID.

(Translation.)

M. l'Ambassadeur,

*Balta Liman, June 21, 1853.*

I HAVE taken cognizance of the assertions which form the object of the letter which your Excellency did me the honour to address to me yesterday.

It is evident that, like your Excellency, neither did I desire to see interrupted the friendly relations between the Sublime Porte and Russia, and that during a whole week from the time of my appointment to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs up to the date of Prince Menchikoff's departure, I exhausted my efforts in seeking for a means of arrangement which might satisfy the Court of Russia, without prejudicing the independence and the sacred rights of His Imperial Majesty, my august Sovereign.

But as regards the first of the two assertions in question, according to which I conjured your Excellency not to oppose the acceptance of the note drawn up by Prince Menchikoff, I have only to appeal to your Excellency's own conscience to prove that no such step was taken by me.

In reply to the second it is enough for me to mention that the draft of note in question having reached me from Prince Menchikoff towards the evening of Friday the 20th of May, the day before the departure of that Ambassador from Buyukderé, and that draft having been forthwith forwarded by me to your Excellency, on the following day, Saturday, in the morning, Mr. Alison came to ask me on your Excellency's behalf what was my opinion on the draft of note

in question. I answered him without hesitation, that although the denomination or the form of the required Act was changed, the engagement to be entered into remaining substantially the same, it was impossible for the Sublime Porte to accept it; and I refer to Mr. Alison himself, that he may have the goodness to repeat what is now stated.

I take, &c.  
(Signed) RESHID

Inclosure 3 in No. 322.

*Mr. Alison to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Therapia, June 22, 1853.*

I HAVE perused Reshid Pasha's letter to your Excellency of yesterday's date; and I recollect very well having conveyed a message from his Highness to your Lordship to the purport alluded to in it. The Pasha's view of Prince Menchikoff's note was expressed without the communication on my part of any opinion which might have been entertained by your Lordship with regard to it.

A conference of the Representatives of Austria, France, and Prussia, having met that day [May 21] at the British Palace, I had occasion to repeat to them, in your Excellency's presence, the opinion expressed by the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) C. ALISON.

No. 323.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 8.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, June 24, 1853.*

I HAVE already forwarded to your Lordship a translation of the firman lately promulgated in favour of the Sultan's Protestant subjects, and I have now the honour to transmit herewith, in translation, another firman promulgated at the same time in favour of the Greek and Armenian Patriarchs as well as of the Haham Bashi, or Chief Rabbi of the Hebrew community.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 323.

*Imperial Firman sent by Reshid Pasha to the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople.*

(Traduction.)

26 Mai,  
7 Juin, 1853.

QUE l'on s'applique toujours et perpétuellement à l'exécution fidèle des résolutions contenues dans ma présente ordonnance Impériale, et que l'on s'abstienne et se garde de toute contravention.

Honneur de l'élite de la nation du Messie, soutien des grands du peuple de Jésus, Patriarche Grec de Constantinople et ses dépendances, moine Germanus, que Dieu te conserve ton rang! Quand mon ordonnance Impériale vous parvient il faut que vous sachiez ce qui suit.

L'Etre Suprême, l'unique dispensateur des bienfaits célestes, en daignant placer selon ses volontés éternelles mon auguste personne au trône Impérial glorieux et puissant du Califat, ayant confié entre mes mains souveraines et équitables comme un dépôt sacré et spécial tant de provinces et de villes et d'innombrables classes de sujets de différentes nations, depuis le jour à jamais glorieux de mon avènement au trône, ainsi qu'il est du devoir du Califat et de la haute mission de Souverain, mon Gouvernement n'a jamais cessé, conformément à ma volonté Impériale

sincère et bienveillante, de consacrer tous ses soins et de veiller attentivement à ce que toutes les classes de mes sujets soient autorisées d'une protection complète, et surtout, à ce qu'ils jouissent de la plus parfaite tranquillité par rapport à leur culte et leurs affaires spirituelles sans exception.

Les résultats favorables et heureux de cet état de choses ont été toujours évidents ; et l'objet de ma sollicitude Impériale est que les abus qui, à la suite de quelques négligences, ont su peu à peu se produire sous ce dernier rapport, soient totalement détruits et disparus sans pouvoir se renouveler à l'avenir.

Les privilèges spirituels et spéciaux accordés par mes illustres ancêtres au Clergé de mes fidèles sujets Chrétiens du rit Grec, et confirmés et consolidés aussi par moi, les immunités et les droits affectés aux Eglises et monastères et les terres et possessions y annexées, aux autres établissements religieux, aux lieux de dévotion de cette catégorie, et aux moines et prêtres spécialement, en un mot, les privilèges et concessions de même nature qui sont insérés dans les Berats contenant les anciennes conditions du Patriarche et des Métropolitains, doivent d'après ma volonté et ma sollicitude Impériale être à jamais préservés de toute atteinte.

Pour confirmer et manifester de nouveau mes volontés Impériales à ce sujet, de manière qu'aucune infraction n'y soit faite, et que l'on sache que ceux qui agiraient contrairement seront l'objet de ma colère souveraine, j'ai octroyé un ordre Impérial, qui a été porté à la connaissance de tous les fonctionnaires compétents, afin que l'on ne puisse plus s'excuser de la négligence qu'on aurait porté sous ce rapport ; et pour plus ample déclaration et notification que l'exécution fidèle et perpétuelle de cet ordre est exigé par ma volonté souveraine, le présent Firman Impérial vient d'être promulgué par ma Sublime Porte.

Vous, le Patriarche susmentionné, quand vous en prendrez connaissance, vous conformerez pour toujours votre conduite aux exigences de cette ordonnance ; vous vous abstenrez de toute contravention, et si quelque chose de contraire à cette ferme résolution vienne à être produite, vous devez vous empresser à la rapporter et la notifier à ma Sublime Porte. Sachez-le bien et portez foi à ce noble signe.

Emané vers la fin de la lune de Chaban 1269.

(Translation.)

May 26  
June 7, 1853.

LET attention be for ever and always given to the faithful execution of the resolutions contained in my present Imperial Ordinance, and let all infringement thereof be refrained from and guarded against.

Honour of the chosen of the nation of the Messiah, support of the dignitaries of the people of Jesus, Greek Patriarch of Constantinople and its dependencies, Monk Germanus, may God preserve thee thy rank ! When my Imperial Ordinance reaches you, you must know what follows.

The Supreme Being, sole dispenser of heavenly blessings, in deigning, according to his eternal will, to place my august person on the glorious and mighty Imperial Throne of the Caliphat, having entrusted to my sovereign and equitable hands as a special and sacred deposit so many provinces and towns and innumerable classes of subjects of different nations, from the ever glorious day of my accession to the throne, according as it is the duty of the Caliphat and of the high mission of a Sovereign, my Government has never ceased, in conformity with my sincere and benevolent imperial will, to devote all its care, and attentively to provide that all classes of my subjects should have the benefit of complete protection, and especially that they should enjoy the most perfect tranquillity in regard to their religion and their spiritual concerns without exception.

The favourable and happy results of this state of things have always been evident, and it is the object of my imperial solicitude that the abuses which, by reason of certain negligence, have by degrees crept in in this last respect, should be wholly put an end to and disappear without the possibility of their again being revived hereafter.

The spiritual and special privileges granted by my illustrious ancestors to the clergy of my faithful Christian subjects of the Greek rite, and confirmed and consolidated by myself likewise, the immunities and the rights appertaining to the churches and monasteries, and to the lands and possessions annexed thereunto, to the other religious establishments, to the places of devotion of that class, and to the monks and priests especially; in one word, the privileges and concessions of the same description which are inserted in the berats containing the ancient conditions of the Patriarch and of the Metropolitans, must, in conformity with my imperial will and solicitude, be for ever preserved from all prejudice.

In order to confirm and manifest afresh my imperial will on this subject, so that it may not in any wise be infringed, and in order that it may be known that those who may act in opposition thereto will be the object of my sovereign indignation, I have issued an imperial order which has been communicated to all competent authorities, in order that they may have no excuse hereafter for their negligence in this respect; and for the more complete declaration and notification that the faithful and perpetual execution of this order is required by my sovereign will, the present imperial firman has been published by my Sublime Porte.

You, Patriarch abovementioned, when you shall become acquainted therewith, will always act according to what is required by this ordinance; you will refrain from infringing it in any way, and if anything should occur at variance with this firm resolution, it will be your duty forthwith to report it and notify it to my Sublime Porte. Know this well, and give credence to this illustrious signet.

Issued towards the end of the moon of Chaban 1269.

No. 324.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 8.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, July 1, 1853.*

CONSIDERABLE sensation has been occasioned among the Foreign Missions at St. Petersburg, by the great differences observable in the Russian manifesto, as published in its original state, that is, as addressed to the Russian people, and in the official French translation destined for more general circulation, which appeared in the "St. Petersburg Journal."

The most striking word in the original was "perfidiousness," as applied to the conduct of the Sultan, an epithet which the Government translator appears to have been desired to omit.

I need not observe, that the suppression is calculated to give an erroneous general impression of the force of that appeal which the Emperor's Government has judged it necessary to make to the prejudices, for in this instance I will not say opinions, of the Russian people.

The expected circular has not yet been published.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 325.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 8.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, July 1, 1853.*

IN the course of a conversation which I held with the Chancellor on the 29th ultimo, he observed that the hopes of a peaceable solution of difficulties which he still entertained, were founded upon the resolution taken by England and France of not considering the occupation of the Principalities as constituting a *casus belli*, and upon the interpretation which he understood Her Majesty's Government to give to the provisions of the Convention of July 1841.

His Excellency stated to me twice over, and with considerable

emphasis, that the position of Russia was this: that her armies were entering the Principalities, and that she then waited for the overtures which might be made to her. "And," I added, "she is of course disposed to receive them favourably."

After some little hesitation, the Chancellor corrected my phrase by saying, "She remains in the hope that any overture which may be made, may be such as can be entertained." We proceeded to speak of the possibility of some middle course being taken, which might satisfy the demands of Russia without wounding the dignity or injuring the independence of Turkey; and as the Chancellor's language upon the subject was very guarded, I observed that what I was driven to conclude was, that the settlement of the question would be found in some arrangement which should reconcile the terms of the non-accepted note of Prince Menchikoff with those of the note of the Porte which the Prince had not felt at liberty to accept. By manner, but not in actual words, Count Nesselrode appeared to assent to this remark.

I begged Count Nesselrode to inform me whether it was true, as it had been stated to me, that the Emperor's Government had applied to that of Austria for its good offices? His Excellency replied, that he hardly knew how to answer the inquiry; that the thing had been done of itself, as it were spontaneously ("cela s'est fait de soi-même et pour ainsi dire spontanément").

In alluding to what is passing at Constantinople, I took an opportunity of remarking that nothing could be more pacific and judicious than the advice which had been constantly given to the Porte by Lord Stratford, and that his Lordship's conciliatory conduct had opposed the most dignified answer to the calumnies by which he had been assailed.

No. 326.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 8, 1853.*

COUNT WALEWSKI has informed me that M. Kisseleff had read to M. Drouyn de Lhuys two despatches from Count Nesselrode, in one of which it was stated that he had learnt from Baron Meyendorff that Lord Westmorland had suggested that an Ambassador should be sent by the Porte to settle the differences between Turkey and Russia at St. Petersburg. The other despatch stated that M. de Bourqueney proposed that the Porte should sign Prince Menchikoff's note without alteration, and receive in exchange a note declaring the interpretation put upon it by the Russian Government.

Count Walewski further told me that M. Drouyn de Lhuys had declared to M. Kisseleff that the French Government knew nothing of such a proposal; that M. de Bourqueney had no authority to make it; and that he had made no mention of having done so: to which M. Kisseleff replied that there might be some misunderstanding as to the origin of the plan, but that as it had been proposed by somebody they might as well discuss it together.

Upon this M. Drouyn de Lhuys appears to have inquired what the nature of the explanatory note would be, and whether it would be submitted beforehand for the approbation of the Porte and its allies. M. Kisseleff replied that such a course would not be consistent with the dignity of the Emperor, but that if the interpretation of Prince Menchikoff's note were left to his generosity, ample proof would be afforded of His Imperial Majesty's solicitude for the independence of Turkey.

Under these circumstances, Count Walewski said M. Drouyn de Lhuys gave M. Kisseleff no encouragement to hope that his project could meet with serious consideration.

I told Count Walewski that I had no reason to believe that the proposal attributed to Lord Westmorland had been made by him to Baron Meyendorff.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

## No. 327.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 8, 1853.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch of the 6th instant, you will inform M. Drouyn de Lhuys that Her Majesty's Government entirely concur in the views taken by the French Government of the project attributed to M. de Bourqueney, and the recommendations which M. de Castelbajac will be instructed to make to the Russian Government.

It would be impossible for the Porte to adopt Prince Menchikoff's note without a clear and satisfactory understanding beforehand of the interpretation to be put upon it; and, if Russia were acting with good faith, nothing would be more simple and at the same time more dignified on her part than to enter into an engagement of this kind upon a subject of such vital importance to the Porte, whose independence she still professes the wish to uphold.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

## No. 328.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 9, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve your proceedings, as reported in your despatch of the 24th June, with reference to the suggestion offered by the Cabinet of Vienna to the Turkish Government, with the view of affording an opportunity for the mediation of Austria between Russia and the Porte.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

## No. 329.

*Circular Despatch from Count Nesselrode to the Russian Ministers at Foreign Courts.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Baron Brunnow, July 9.)*

Monsieur,

*St. Pétersbourg, le <sup>20 Juin</sup><sub>2 Juillet</sub>, 1853.*

MA dépêche circulaire du 30 Mai passé, vous a informé de la rupture de nos rapports diplomatiques avec le Gouvernement Ottoman. Elle vous a chargé d'instruire le Cabinet près duquel vous êtes accrédité, des griefs que nous a donnés la Porte, de nos efforts infructueux pour en obtenir satisfaction, et des concessions successives que nous a fait faire notre désir sincère de conserver avec le Gouvernement Turc de bonnes et amicales relations. Vous savez qu'après avoir renoncé tour à tour à l'idée d'une garantie obtenue sous forme de Convention, Séned, ou autre Acte synallagmatique quelconque, nous avons réduit nos demandes à la signature d'une simple note, telle que celle dont le texte vous a été transmis. Vous aurez pu voir que cette note, indépendamment des dispositions plus particulières aux saints lieux, ne renferme au fond autre chose, quant à la garantie générale réclamée en faveur du culte, qu'une simple confirmation de celle que nous possédons depuis longtemps. Je vous ai fait remarquer, Monsieur, que la signature de cette pièce constituait aux yeux de l'Empereur la seule et vraie réparation qu'il puisse accepter pour l'offense commise envers lui par la violation du firman de l'année 1852, comme aussi des promesses personnelles qu'y avait jointes le Sultan. J'ai ajouté qu'un pareil Acte était d'ailleurs indispensable, puisque l'obtention de nouveaux firmans, susceptibles d'être enfreints aussi bien que le premier, ne pouvait plus à elle seule nous offrir de gage suffisant pour l'avenir. Enfin, je ne vous ai point

dissimulé que si, après huit jours de réflexion, la Porte Ottomane refusait d'obtempérer à notre demande, l'Empereur se verrait dans l'obligation de recourir, pour obtenir satisfaction, à des mesures plus décisives qu'une simple interruption de rapports.

En posant cet ultimatum à la Porte, nous avons plus particulièrement informé les grands Cabinets de nos intentions. Nous avons engagé nommément la France et la Grande Bretagne à ne pas compliquer par leur attitude les difficultés de la situation, à ne pas prendre trop tôt de mesures qui, d'un côté, auraient pour effet d'encourager l'opposition de la Porte, de l'autre, engageraient plus avant qu'ils ne l'étaient déjà dans la question, l'honneur et la dignité de l'Empereur.

J'ai le regret de vous annoncer, aujourd'hui, que cette double tentative a malheureusement été vaine.

La Porte, comme vous le verrez par la lettre ci-jointe de Reshid Pasha, vient de faire à celle que je lui avais adressée une réponse négative, ou au moins évasive.

D'autre part, les deux Puissances maritimes n'ont pas cru devoir déférer aux considérations que nous avons recommandées à leur sérieuse attention. Prenant avant nous l'initiative, elles ont jugé indispensable de dévancer immédiatement par une mesure effective, celles que nous ne leur avons annoncées que comme purement éventuelles, puisque nous en subordonnions la mise à effet aux résolutions finales de la Porte ; et qu'au moment même où j'écris, l'exécution n'en a pas encore commencé. Elles ont sur-le-champ envoyé leurs flottes dans les parages de Constantinople. Elles occupent déjà les eaux et ports de la domination Ottomane à portée des Dardanelles. Par cette attitude avancée, les deux Puissances nous ont placés sous le poids d'une démonstration comminatoire, qui, comme nous le leur avons fait pressentir, devait ajouter à la crise de nouvelles complications.

En présence du refus de la Porte, appuyé par la manifestation de la France et de l'Angleterre, il nous devient plus que jamais impossible de modifier les résolutions qu'en avait fait dépendre l'Empereur.

En conséquence, Sa Majesté Impériale vient d'envoyer au corps de nos troupes, stationné en ce moment en Bessarabie, l'ordre de passer la frontière pour occuper les Principautés.

Elles y entrent, non pour faire à la Porte une guerre offensive, que nous éviterons au contraire de tout notre pouvoir aussi longtemps qu'elle ne nous y forcera point ; mais parceque la Porte, en persistant à nous refuser la garantie morale que nous avons droit d'attendre, nous oblige à y substituer provisoirement une garantie matérielle ; parceque la position qu'ont prise les deux Puissances dans les ports et eaux de son Empire, en vue même de sa capitale, ne pouvant être envisagée par nous dans les circonstances actuelles que comme une occupation maritime, nous donne en outre une raison de rétablir l'équilibre des situations réciproques moyennant une prise de position militaire. Nous n'avons du reste aucune intention de garder cette position plus longtemps que ne l'exigeront notre honneur ou notre sécurité. Elle sera toute temporaire ; elle nous servira uniquement de gage, jusqu'à ce que de meilleurs conseils aient prévalu dans l'esprit des Ministres du Sultan. En occupant les Principautés pour un temps, nous désavouons d'avance toute idée de conquête. Nous ne prétendons obtenir aucun agrandissement de territoire. Sciemment et volontairement nous ne chercherons à exciter aucun soulèvement parmi les populations Chrétiennes de la Turquie. Dès que celle-ci nous aura accordé la satisfaction qui nous est due, et qu'en même temps viendra à cesser la pression qu'exerce sur nous l'attitude des deux Puissances maritimes, nos troupes rentreront à l'instant même dans les limites de la Russie. Quant aux habitants des Principautés, la présence de notre corps d'armée ne leur imposera ni charges ni contributions nouvelles. Les fournitures qu'ils nous feront seront liquidées par nos caisses militaires, en temps opportun et à un taux fixé d'avance avec leur Gouvernement. Les principes et règles de conduite que nous nous sommes prescrits à cet égard, vous les trouverez exposés dans la Proclamation ci-jointe que le Général Prince Gortchakoff, chef du corps d'occupation, a été chargé de publier à son entrée dans les deux provinces.

Nous ne nous dissimulons nullement, Monsieur, combien l'attitude que nous prenons a de portée, et quelles en peuvent devenir ultérieurement les conséquences, si le Gouvernement Turc nous oblige à la faire sortir du cercle

étroit et limité dans lequel nous désirons l'enfermer. Mais la position où il nous jette, en poussant les choses à l'extrême, en nous refusant toute satisfaction légitime, en ne répondant par aucune concession quelconque à toutes celles que le Prince Menchikoff avait faites successivement sur la forme comme sur le fond originaire de nos propositions, ne nous laisse plus d'autre parti à prendre. Il y a plus : les principes si péremptoirement posés, malgré la modération du langage, dans la lettre responsive de Rechid Pacha, aussi bien que dans sa note du 26 Mai dernier aux Représentants des quatre Puissances à Constantinople, n'iraient à rien moins, s'il fallait les prendre à la lettre, qu'à mettre en question tous nos droits acquis, qu'à frapper de nullité toutes nos transactions antérieures.

En effet, si le Gouvernement Ottoman juge contraire à son indépendance et à ses droits de souveraineté, tout engagement diplomatique quelconque, même sous forme de simple note, dans lequel il s'agirait de stipuler avec un Gouvernement Etranger pour la religion et les églises, que devient l'engagement qu'il a contracté autrefois envers nous sous une forme bien autrement obligatoire, de protéger dans ses Etats notre religion et ses églises ?

Pour peu que nous admettions un principe si absolu, il nous faudrait déchirer de nos propres mains le Traité de Kaïnardji, comme tous ceux qui le confirment ; et abandonner volontairement le droit qu'ils nous ont conféré de veiller à ce que le culte Grec soit efficacement protégé en Turquie.

Est-ce là ce que veut la Porte ? A-t-elle intention de se dégager de toutes ses obligations antérieures, et de faire sortir de la crise actuelle l'abolition à tout jamais de tout un ordre de relations que le temps avait consacré ?

L'Europe impartiale comprendra que, si la question se posait en ces termes, elle deviendrait pour la Russie, malgré les intentions les plus conciliantes, insoluble pacifiquement. Car, il s'agirait pour nous de nos Traités, de notre influence séculaire, de notre crédit moral, de nos sentiments les plus chers, nationaux et religieux.

Qu'on nous permette de le dire : la contestation actuelle et tout le retentissement que la presse lui a donné en dehors des Cabinets, reposent sur un pur malentendu ou sur un défaut d'attention suffisante à tous nos antécédents politiques.

On semble ignorer, ou l'on perd de vue, que la Russie jouit virtuellement, par position et par Traité, d'un ancien droit de surveillance à la protection efficace de son culte en Orient ; et le maintien de cet ancien droit qu'elle ne saurait abandonner, on se le représente comme impliquant la prétention toute nouvelle d'un protectorat à la fois religieux et politique, dont on s'exagère pour l'avenir la portée et les conséquences.

C'est à ce triste malentendu que tient toute la crise du moment.

La portée et les conséquences de notre prétendu nouveau protectorat politique n'ont point d'existence réelle. Nous ne demandons pour nos coreligionnaires en Orient que le strict *status quo*, que la conservation des privilèges qu'ils possèdent *ab antiquo* sous l'égide de leur Souverain. Nous ne nierons pas qu'il n'en résulte pour la Russie ce qu'on peut justement nommer un patronage religieux. C'est celui que de tout temps nous avons exercé en Orient. Or, si jusqu'ici l'indépendance et la souveraineté de la Turquie ont trouvé moyen de se concilier avec l'exercice de ce patronage, pourquoi l'une et l'autre en souffriraient-elles à l'avenir, du moment que nos prétentions se réduisent à ce qui n'en est au fond que la simple confirmation ?

Nous l'avons dit, et nous le répétons : l'Empereur ne veut pas plus aujourd'hui qu'il ne l'a voulu dans le passé renverser l'Empire Ottoman, ou s'aggrandir à ses dépens. Après l'usage si modéré qu'il a fait en 1829 de la victoire d'Andrinople, quand cette victoire et ses conséquences mettaient la Porte à sa merci ; après avoir, seul en Europe, sauvé la Turquie en 1833 d'un démembrement inévitable ; après avoir, en 1839, pris auprès des autres Puissances l'initiative des propositions qui, exécutées en commun, ont de nouveau empêché le Sultan de voir son trône faire place à un nouvel Empire Arabe ; il devient presque fastidieux de donner les preuves de cette vérité. Au contraire ; le principe fondamental de la politique de notre Auguste Maître a toujours été de maintenir aussi longtemps que possible le *status quo* actuel de l'Orient. Il l'a voulu et le veut encore, parceque tel est en définitive l'intérêt bien entendu de la Russie, déjà trop vaste pour avoir besoin d'une extension de territoire ; parceque prospère, paisible, inoffensif, placé comme utile intermédiaire entre des Etats puissants, l'Empire Ottoman arrête le choc des

rivalités qui, s'il tombait, se heurteraient incontinent pour s'en disputer les ruines ; parceque la prévoyance humaine s'épuise vainement à chercher les combinaisons les plus propres à combler le vide que laisserait dans l'équilibre politique la disparition de ce grand corps. Mais si telles sont les vues réelles, avouées, sincères de l'Empereur, pour qu'il puisse y rester fidèle, il faut aussi que la Turquie agisse envers nous de manière à nous offrir la possibilité de coexister avec elle : qu'elle respecte nos Traités particuliers et les conséquences qui en dérivent ; que des actes de mauvaise foi, de sourdes persécutions, des vexations perpétuelles, intentées à notre culte, ne nous créent pas une situation qui, intolérable à la longue, nous forcerait d'en confier le remède aux chances aveugles du hasard.

Telles sont, Monsieur, les considérations que vous êtes chargé de faire valoir auprès du Gouvernement ———, en portant à sa connaissance, par la présente dépêche, les résolutions et les intentions de Sa Majesté l'Empereur.

Recevez, &c.  
(Signé) NESSEIRODE.

(Translation.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, June 20, 1853.*  
*July 2.*

MY circular despatch of the 30th of May last informed you of the rupture of our diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Government. It directed you to apprise the Government to which you are accredited, of the causes of complaint which the Porte has given to us, of our fruitless efforts to obtain satisfaction for them, and of the successive concessions which our sincere desire to maintain good and friendly relations with the Turkish Government has caused us to make. You are aware that after having given up the notion of a guarantee to be obtained under the form of a Convention, Sened, or any other bipartite Act whatever, we had reduced our demands to the signature of a mere note such as that of which the terms were sent you. You will have been able to see that this note, independently of the arrangements more peculiarly relating to the holy places, contains in reality nothing, as regards the general guarantee required in favour of religion, but the mere confirmation of what we long since possess. I called your attention, Sir, to the circumstance that the signature of this note formed in the estimation of the Emperor the only real reparation which he could accept for the offence committed towards him by the violation of the firman of the year 1852, as likewise by that of the personal promises with which the Sultan accompanied it. I added that such an Act was moreover indispensable, since the obtaining of new firmans, liable like the first to be infringed, could no longer of itself alone offer us a sufficient pledge for the future. Lastly, I did not conceal from you that if after eight days' reflection, the Ottoman Porte refused to comply with our demand, the Emperor would be compelled, in order to obtain satisfaction, to have recourse to more decisive measures than the simple breaking off of relations.

In offering this alternative to the Porte, we had more particularly apprized the Great Cabinets of our intentions. We had specifically urged France and Great Britain not to complicate the difficulties of the case by the attitude which they might assume, nor to take precipitately measures which, on the one hand, might be calculated to encourage the resistance of the Porte, and on the other might involve, still more than they were already implicated in the question, the honour and dignity of the Emperor.

I regret now to announce to you that this twofold attempt has unfortunately been fruitless.

The Porte, as you will perceive by Reshid Pasha's inclosed letter, has returned a negative, or, at all events, an evasive answer to the letter which I had addressed to him.

On the other hand, the two maritime Powers have not thought fit to defer to the considerations which we had submitted to their serious attention. Taking before us the initiative, they have deemed it indispensable to anticipate at once by an effective measure, the measures which we had announced as merely eventual, since we made the execution of them to depend on the final resolutions of the Porte ; and at the time I am writing, the execution of them has not commenced. They have forthwith sent their fleets to the neighbourhood of

Constantinople. They already occupy the waters and ports of Turkey within reach of the Dardanelles. By this advanced attitude the Two Powers have subjected us to the pressure of a menacing demonstration, which, as we had given them to understand, must still further complicate the existing crisis.

Having to deal with the refusal of the Porte, supported by the manifestation of France and of England, it is more than ever impossible for us to modify the resolutions which the Emperor had made to depend on it.

Accordingly His Imperial Majesty has sent orders to the corps of our army at present stationed in Bessarabia, to pass the frontier in order to occupy the Principalities.

They enter there not to wage an offensive war with the Porte, which on the contrary we shall avoid as far as lies in us so long as the Porte shall not force us into it; but because the Porte, by persisting in refusing to us the moral guarantee which we had a right to claim, compels us for a time to substitute for it a material guarantee; because the position assumed by the Two Powers in the ports and waters of its empire, in the very sight of its capital, which can only be looked upon by us, under existing circumstances, in the light of a maritime occupation, furnishes us with an additional motive for reestablishing the equilibrium of the respective situations by the assumption of a military position. We entertain, however, no intention of maintaining this position longer than is required by our honour or our security. It will be altogether temporary; it will merely serve us as a pledge until better counsels shall obtain the mastery in the minds of the Sultan's Ministers. In occupying the Principalities for a time we disclaim at once all notion of conquest. We do not seek to obtain any aggrandisement of territory. Knowingly and voluntarily we will not seek to excite any commotion among the Christian population of Turkey. So soon as the latter shall have granted to us the satisfaction which is our due, and so soon as the pressure upon us caused by the attitude of the two Maritime Powers shall cease, our troops will instantly retire within the Russian frontiers. As regards the inhabitants of the Principalities, the presence of our corps d'armée will not impose upon them either new charges or contributions. The supplies with which they will furnish us will be paid for by our military chests at a suitable time, and at a rate settled beforehand with their Government. You will find the principles and rules of conduct which we have prescribed to ourselves in this respect, set forth in the annexed proclamation which General Prince Gortchakoff has been instructed to publish on his entrance into the two provinces.

We do not conceal from ourselves, Sir, the importance of the position which we have taken up, and the consequences which may eventually result from it if the Turkish Government should force us to pass beyond the narrow and limited circle to which we desire to restrict ourselves. But the position in which it has placed us by pushing matters to extremities, by refusing us all legitimate satisfaction, by not responding by any concession at all to those which Prince Menchikoff had successively made as well with regard to the form as to the original substance of our proposals, has left us no other course to adopt. Moreover, the principles so peremptorily laid down, notwithstanding the moderate language in which they are couched, in Reshid Pasha's reply, as likewise in his note of the 26th of May last to the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople, would tend to nothing else, if taken literally, than to call in question all the rights which we have acquired, and to nullify all our antecedent compacts.

In fact, if the Ottoman Government deems every diplomatic engagement whatever, even under the form of a simple note, in which it might be proposed to stipulate with a foreign Government concerning religion and churches, to be opposed to its independence and its rights of sovereignty, what becomes of the engagement which it has heretofore contracted with us in a form far more obligatory, to protect in its dominions our religion and its churches?

If we should admit so absolute a principle we must, with our own hands, tear in pieces the Treaty of Kainardji as well as all those which confirm it, and voluntarily renounce the right which they have conferred upon us of watching over the effectual protection of the Greek religion in Turkey.

Is that what the Porte desires? Does it propose to extricate itself from all its former obligations, and to extract from the existing crisis the perpetual abolition of an entire state of things which was long since established?

Impartial Europe will understand that, if the question is stated in these

terms it would, notwithstanding the most conciliatory intentions, never admit, as far as Russia is concerned, of a pacific solution. For our Treaties, our secular influence, our moral credit, and our most cherished feelings, national as well as religious, would be at stake.

Let us be allowed to say it: the present discussion and all the clamour which the press, independently of the Cabinets, has made about it, rest on a mere misunderstanding, or on want of sufficient attention to all our political antecedents.

People seem to be ignorant, or to lose sight, of the fact that Russia, from her position and by Treaty, virtually enjoys an ancient right of watching over the effectual protection of her religion in the East; and the maintenance of this ancient right which she cannot abandon, is represented as implying the wholly novel pretension to a protectorate at once religious and political, the future extent and consequences of which are exaggerated.

The whole of the present crisis is the result of this misconception.

The extent and consequences of our pretended new political protectorate have no real existence. We only ask for our coreligionists in the East the strict *status quo*, the maintenance of the privileges which they possess *ab antiquo* under the protection of their Sovereign. We will not deny that there accrues to Russia from this state of things, what may justly be designated as a religious patronage. It is what we have from all time exercised in the East. Consequently, if up to the present time the independence and sovereignty of Turkey have been able to co-exist with the exercise of this patronage, why should either of them suffer from it hereafter, from the time that our pretensions are reduced to what, in fact, amounts to nothing more than its mere confirmation?

We have said, and we repeat it, the Emperor is no more desirous now than he has been heretofore, of overthrowing the Ottoman Empire, or of aggrandizing himself at its expense. After the very moderate use which in 1829 he made of the victory of Adrianople, when that victory and its consequences placed the Porte at his mercy; after having, alone of all the Powers in Europe, preserved Turkey in 1833 from an inevitable dismemberment; after having in 1839 taken the initiative with the other Powers in the proposition which, being executed in common, again prevented the Sultan from witnessing his throne give place to a new Arab empire; it is almost tiresome to adduce proofs of this truth. On the contrary, the fundamental principle of our August Master's policy has always been to uphold as long as possible the actual *status quo* of the East. He has desired and still desires it, because such is after all the well-understood interest of Russia, already too vast to require an extension of territory; because the Ottoman Empire, prosperous, peaceable, inoffensive, placed as an useful intermediary between powerful States, arrests the conflict of rival interests, which, were it to fall, would instantly come into collision and contend among themselves for its ruins; because human foresight wearies itself to no purpose in the search of the arrangements best adapted to supply the void which the disappearance of this great body would occasion in the political balance. But if such are the real, avowed, and sincere views of the Emperor, it is necessary, in order that he may be able faithfully to adhere to them, that Turkey should act towards us in such a manner as to offer us a chance of coexisting with her; that she should respect our special Treaties and the consequences resulting from them; that acts of bad faith, that underhand persecutions, continued vexations directed against our religion, should not produce a state of things, which insupportable in the long run, should compel us to trust for a remedy to uncertain chance.

Such, Sir, are the considerations which you are instructed to press upon the Government of ——— in communicating to it by the present despatch the resolutions and intentions of His Majesty the Emperor.

Receive, &c.

(Signed) NESSELRODE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 329.

*Reshid Pasha to Count Nesselrode, June 1<sup>st</sup>, 1853.*

[See Inclosure in No. 298.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 329.

*Proclamation.*

Habitants de la Moldavie et de la Valachie !

SA Majesté l'Empereur mon Auguste Maître m'a ordonné d'occuper votre territoire avec le corps d'armée dont il a daigné me confier le commandement.

Nous n'arrivons au milieu de vous, ni avec des projets de conquête, ni avec l'intention de modifier les institutions qui vous régissent et la situation politique que des Traités solennels vous ont garantie.

L'occupation provisoire des Principautés, que je suis chargé d'effectuer, n'a d'autre but que celui d'une protection immédiate et efficace dans des circonstances imprévues et graves où le Gouvernement Ottoman, méconnaissant les nombreuses preuves d'une sincère alliance que la Cour Impériale n'a cessé de lui donner depuis la conclusion du Traité d'Andrinople, répond à nos propositions les plus justes par des refus, à nos conseils les plus désintéressés par la plus offensante méfiance.

Dans sa longanimité, dans son constant désir de maintenir la paix en Orient comme en Europe, l'Empereur évitera une guerre offensive contre la Turquie aussi longtemps que sa dignité et les intérêts de son Empire le lui permettront.

Le jour où il obtiendra la réparation qui lui est due et les garanties qu'il est en droit de réclamer pour l'avenir, ses troupes rentreront dans les limites de la Russie.

Habitants de la Moldavie et de la Valachie ! je remplis également un ordre de Sa Majesté Impériale en vous déclarant que la présence de ses troupes dans votre pays ne vous imposera ni charges ni contributions nouvelles, que les fournitures en vivres seront liquidées par nos caisses militaires en temps opportun et à un taux fixé d'avance d'accord avec vos Gouvernements.

Envisagez votre avenir sans inquiétude ; livrez-vous avec sécurité à vos travaux agricoles et à vos spéculations commerciales ; obéissez aux règlements qui vous régissent et aux autorités établies. C'est par le fidèle accomplissement de ces devoirs, que vous acquerrez les meilleurs titres à la généreuse sollicitude et à la puissante protection de Sa Majesté l'Empereur.

(Translation.)

Inhabitants of Moldavia and of Wallachia !

HIS Majesty the Emperor of Russia, my august master, has commanded me to occupy your territory with the corps d'armée of which he has been pleased to confide to me the command.

We arrive among you neither with plans of conquest nor with the intention of modifying the institutions by which you are governed, or the political situation guaranteed to you by solemn Treaties.

The provisional occupation of the Principalities which I am directed to carry out, has no other object than that of immediate and effectual protection in the unlooked-for and serious circumstances under which the Ottoman Government, disregarding the numerous proofs of a sincere alliance which the Imperial Court, since the conclusion of the Treaty of Adrianople, has never ceased to give it, responds to our most just proposals by refusals, to our most disinterested advice by the most offensive distrust.

In his longanimity, in his constant desire to maintain peace in the East as well as in Europe, the Emperor will avoid engaging in an offensive war against

Turkey, so long as his dignity and the interests of his Empire will permit him to do so.

On the very day that he shall obtain the reparation which is due to him, and the guarantee which he is entitled to require for the future, his troops will withdraw within the frontiers of Russia.

Inhabitants of Moldavia and Wallachia! I equally execute an order of His Imperial Majesty by declaring to you that the presence of his troops in your country will not impose upon you either fresh charges or contributions, that the supplies of provisions will be paid for by our military chests, at a suitable time and at a rate fixed beforehand in concert with your Governments.

Look upon what awaits you without disquietude; betake yourselves in security to your agricultural labours and to your commercial speculations; obey the laws which govern you, and the constituted authorities. By the faithful discharge of these duties you will acquire the best title to the generous solicitude and powerful protection of His Majesty the Emperor.

No. 330.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 9, 1853.*

HER Majesty's Government having, after mature deliberation, seen reason to advise the Sultan not to exercise his unquestionable right of declaring war against Russia upon the occupation of the Principalities, it was highly satisfactory to them to find that, before the receipt of my despatch of the 18th ultimo, your Excellency had tendered similar advice to his Highness, who had determined to act upon it; but if Russian aggression were to be carried further, and if any other portion of Turkish territory were to be invaded, active operations on the part of Turkey would seem to be inevitable, and eventually the English and French fleets might be called upon to protect Constantinople.

Before, however, the time for adopting a policy of resistance shall arrive, it is alike our duty and our interest to exert our utmost efforts, in conjunction with Her Majesty's allies, to preserve peace on terms that shall be safe and honourable to the Sultan, and shall satisfy every claim that Russia can with justice put forward.

The Emperor of Russia throughout these painful negotiations has declared, and he has recently, upon more than one occasion, renewed the declaration, that he seeks no increase of power or influence over the Greek subjects of the Porte; and desires only the maintenance of the *status quo* in religious matters, and the fulfilment of existing Treaties. Her Majesty's Government therefore recommend the Turkish Government to take this declaration as the basis of a fresh agreement, and to embody in one separate Convention the stipulations with respect to religious matters in the Treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople, by which Turkey is now bound to Russia.

I accordingly inclose the Project of a Convention which Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the Sultan, without loss of power, might propose, and the Emperor might, without loss of dignity, accept. Her Majesty's Government consider this form of agreement preferable to that of a note, because, as the Emperor has demanded the adoption of Prince Menchikoff's note, *sans variante*, and the Porte has rejected the demand, it can hardly be expected that any mode of settling the question by a note should be devised; while, on the other hand, a Convention is more precise and less liable to misconstruction than a note, followed, as the latter might be, by an answer giving to it a different meaning than that understood by the party signing it, which must either be admitted by silence, or the whole matter must again be reopened and discussed.

The first Article of the Convention commences by reciting the words of the seventh Article of the Treaty of Kainardji; it then adverts to the recent firmans, as showing how the obligation has been carried out by the Sultan, and concludes by renewing and confirming the Treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople.

This project has been proposed to the French Government, and has received its cordial assent.

Your Excellency is accordingly instructed to bring this Convention under the consideration of the Porte, and to state that Her Majesty's Government would further recommend that it should be sent to St. Petersburg by a special Ambassador, who should have power to sign, but not to alter it without reference to the Porte. He should lay before the Emperor the recent firman in favour of the Greek Church, together with the firmans respecting the holy places, and be empowered to give a written assurance as to their fulfilment, taking care, however, that such assurance should in no way infringe upon the rights acquired by the Latin Church, nor militate against a similar guarantee being given to France and to other Powers; and lastly, the Ambassador should by Convention or note assign to the Russians at Jerusalem a hospital, or such other buildings as may be required.

If the Porte should think proper to act upon this advice, and if a proposal so fair and honourable be rejected, Her Majesty's Government must consider that it will be manifest to the world that the claim of religious rights covers ulterior designs on the part of Russia, hostile to the independence of Turkey, and the Sultan may then justly claim the sympathy and support of every Government in Europe.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure in No. 330.

*Draft of Convention between Russia and the Porte.*

HIS Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias having expressed to His Highness the Sultan his desire, that at this particular juncture no doubt or uncertainty should exist as to the right of the members of the Orthodox Eastern Church fully to participate in the privileges, immunities, and other advantages which, by the Treaty between Russia and the Sublime Porte, concluded at Koutchouk-Kainardji on July  $\frac{10}{11}$ , 1774, and by the further Treaty between the same Powers, concluded at Adrianople on the  $\frac{4}{16}$  September, 1829, were secured to that Church in various parts of the Ottoman dominions; and His Highness the Sultan being anxious to comply with the desire of His Imperial Majesty in this respect; it has seemed good to His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, and to His Highness the Sultan, that a special and separate Act should be concluded between them for that purpose, and they have accordingly named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say, His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias

and His Highness the Sultan

who, having communicated their respective full powers, found in due and proper form, have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles:

ARTICLE I.

The Sublime Porte having in times past promised constantly to protect the Christian religion in all its churches within the Ottoman dominions, and His Highness the Sultan, in fulfilment of that promise, having since his accession to the Throne studied to insure to all classes of his subjects full and entire security for the exercise of their religion, and His Highness having in these latter days more specifically declared his sovereign will that the special privileges and immunities in regard to matters pertaining to their religion granted of old to the Christian clergy, subjects of the Sublime Porte, to their churches, convents, and other properties dependent on those establishments, to their shrines and oratories, should be hereafter and for ever maintained within His Highness' dominions, His Highness renews and confirms by the present instrument in favour of the ecclesiastics and other members of the Orthodox Eastern Church all the promises, engagements, and stipulations, in their favour contained in the Treaties concluded at Koutchouk-Kainardji on July  $\frac{10}{11}$ , 1774, and at Adrianople

on September 14, 1829, between Russia and the Sublime Porte. And His Highness the Sultan further engages that any privileges or immunities in regard to matters pertaining to their religion, which the Sublime Porte may hereafter grant to the clergy of other Christian sects, subjects of the Sublime Porte, within the Ottoman dominions, shall be equally granted to and enjoyed by the clergy of the Orthodox Eastern Church in the said dominions.

## ARTICLE II.

The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged, &c.

No. 331.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 9, 1853.*

HER Majesty's Government have read with sincere regret the manifesto of the Emperor of Russia inclosed in your despatch of the 27th ultimo. Such an exciting appeal to the feelings of the Russian people in behalf of their Church, which is not in danger, and of their religion, which has not been assailed, appears to Her Majesty's Government to be as uncalled for as it is inconsistent with the pacific objects which we are desired to believe are still entertained by the Russian Cabinet.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 332.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 9, 1853.*

ON the 7th instant Count Colloredo read me a despatch from Count Buol, stating that Baron Meyendorff had communicated to him several despatches of June 23, from Count Nesselrode, which showed the earnest desire of Russia for a peaceful solution of the question now pending with the Porte. Count Nesselrode affirms that Prince Menchikoff's note contains no other engagement than that which the Porte in its last note was ready to give, and he cannot conceive why modifications should be sought for unless it is to efface every vestige of guarantee for the immunities enjoyed *ab antiquo* by the Greek religion in Turkey. Besides, Russia has only announced the occupation of the Principalities as an eventual measure, whereas the two naval Powers have already put in execution an effective and immediate measure in taking up a position within the ports and maritime dominions of the Porte, and to this naval possession Russia can only oppose a military possession.

By thus compromising the dignity of Russia and giving encouragement to the Porte, the Cabinet of St. Petersburg has been placed in a position to render all negotiation impossible, whatever modifications might be proposed to the Russian note.

In another despatch Count Nesselrode expresses his satisfaction at the desire manifested by the French and English Representatives at Vienna to endeavour with the Austrian Government to find a satisfactory solution. He alludes particularly to the project of sending an Ambassador from the Porte with the note of Prince Menchikoff, and leaving to the Emperor to give in return to the Sultan the assurance that His Imperial Majesty in no way intended to encroach upon his sovereign rights. Count Nesselrode declares that this entirely meets the views of

the Emperor, and that the Russian troops, if they have entered the Principalities, would be immediately withdrawn, if the note signed is sent by an Ambassador to St. Petersburg, and the foreign fleets quit their present anchorage. The note once delivered, the Cabinet of St. Petersburg will be ready to explain its meaning (*à en préciser le sens*), by giving to the Ottoman Government all the assurances best calculated to tranquillize it upon the use and the extent of the guarantees demanded by Russia; these guarantees, Count Nesselrode affirms, being absolutely nothing more than the strict maintenance of the *status quo* founded in custom and Treaties. Russia asks nothing new, nothing that implies an intervention in the internal affairs of Turkey, nothing that shall go beyond the rights of superintendence (*surveillance*) over the orthodox creed and its churches resulting from the Treaty of Kainardji.

Count Buol then says that whatever may be the value of the arguments adduced by Russia, he cannot disguise from himself the grave and pressing reasons that should weigh with the Porte for effecting a reconciliation with its powerful neighbour as quickly as possible, provided that the honour and independence of the Sultan are guarded; and he dwells upon all the financial and political evils that a prolongation of the present crisis must entail upon Turkey. He adds that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, although it persists in obtaining Prince Menchikoff's note without alteration, yet offers at the same time to give the Porte all the assurances necessary for dissipating the doubts and calming the apprehensions that had led to her resistance, and Count Buol strongly recommends the Ottoman Government to accept the formal contradiction which Russia is ready to give beforehand to the alarm that the text of the Russian note had created, and to get rid of its present embarrassments, if not by signing Prince Menchikoff's note without alteration, at least by endeavouring to frame one as nearly as possible approaching to it, and of a nature to satisfy the Emperor of Russia within the limits traced by his Cabinet.

It is in this sense, Count Buol says, that Baron Bruck will be directed to advise the Porte, and he earnestly hopes that Her Majesty's Government, whose interests are entirely identical with those of Austria on the question, may instruct Lord Stratford to support the conciliatory efforts that will be made by the Internuncio.

My first remark to Count Colloredo had reference to the astounding statement of Count Nesselrode, that the occupation of the Principalities had been imposed upon Russia in consequence of the naval possession of the maritime dominions of the Porte by the fleets of England and France, which was a fiction so palpable that Count Nesselrode could not seriously expect that in any quarter it should be believed.

With respect to the project attributed to the French Minister at Vienna, I said that it might furnish the means of arriving at a peaceful solution of the difficulty, provided that the objectionable parts of Prince Menchikoff's note were entirely neutralized by the assurances that Count Nesselrode now seemed prepared to give; but that after all that had passed it was impossible to leave the Russian part of the transaction in doubt, and that the precise nature of the assurances promised must be communicated beforehand, and be satisfactory to the Porte.

I said Her Majesty's Government was happy to think that the interest of England and Austria were entirely identical upon the Eastern question, and that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe had already supported the recommendations of the Internuncio to the Porte, but that we could give no advice inconsistent with the dignity and independence of the Sultan, which Austria as well as England desired to uphold.

Count Colloredo earnestly requested me to permit his Government to give an assurance at St. Petersburg, that simultaneously with the evacuation of the Principalities, the British and French fleets would quit the Turkish waters.

I replied, that when all differences were settled between Russia and the Porte, and that the Principalities were evacuated, it might easily be supposed that the Bay of Besica was not a place where it was desirable that the combined fleets should long remain; but that Her Majesty's Government would give no assurance upon the subject, because the pre-

sence of the fleets in the Turkish waters was neither a violation of Treaties nor an infraction of international law, and could not therefore be considered in the same light as the occupation of the Principalities, which was a violation of Treaty and of the Law of Nations, and constituted an act of war against Turkey.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 333.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 9, 1853.*

ON the 7th instant, Count Colloredo read to me a despatch from Count Buol, containing the views of the Austrian Government upon the answers addressed by Reshid Pasha to the note of Count Nesselrode.

Count Buol anticipates that this answer will not be well received at St. Petersburg, because Reshid Pasha, although affirming that the Porte is ready to repeat the assurances given in the note communicated to Prince Menchikoff shortly before his departure, yet at the same time declares that the Sultan finds it really impossible to enter upon any diplomatic engagements for that object.

If by that, Count Buol remarks, Reshid Pasha understands a synallagmatic contract or a bilateral Act, his disinclination to agree to it is natural, because, in fact, a Convention imposing upon one of the contracting parties obligations, while the other offers nothing in return, might be interpreted as derogatory to the independence of the Sultan. But Russia does not require a bilateral Act. She will, on the contrary, be satisfied with a note, and if the Porte reserves to itself the right to modify the Russian ultimatum, which it cannot sign under a threat without loss of dignity, its course is intelligible; but if, emboldened by foreign sympathy, it withdraws from that which it has already conceded by the note transmitted to Prince Menchikoff, and if it thinks that, notwithstanding the gravity of the circumstances, it can decline any description of diplomatic engagement, even such an one as should be confined to assurances given in a note, it would, in the opinion of the Austrian Government, commit a grave error which might have the most disastrous consequences.

Count Buol says he has expressed this opinion to the Porte, and hopes that similar instructions will be given to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe by Her Majesty's Government. He will in the meanwhile renew his most urgent demands against the occupation of the Principalities.

He adds, that Count Giulay has received orders to omit no opportunity of stating both to the Emperor and to his Cabinet that the military occupation of the Principalities must gratuitously aggravate the situation, and leave the Porte masters of the immense question of general peace, because from that moment the Sultan may when he pleases suspend the Treaty of 1841, and leave to fate and to unforeseen accidents the peace of Europe and the mighty interests it involves.

Count Colloredo likewise read to me the despatch of Count Buol to Baron Bruck, in which it is stated that the Porte must consider the occupation of the Principalities as a direct consequence of its "insufficient" answer to the Russian Cabinet, and will have to bear all the responsibility of it; and Count Buol instructs Baron Bruck to urge the Turkish Government to take no precipitate step upon the occupation of the Principalities that would displease the Court of Russia, and render all future understanding impossible.

I expressed to Count Colloredo my regret that the Austrian Government, which professed to uphold the dignity of the Sultan, should blame the answer sent to Count Nesselrode as insufficient, and throw upon the Porte the responsibility of the occupation of the Principalities. The Sultan, I said, would have been utterly degraded if, under the threat

contained in Count Nesselrode's note, he had agreed to the terms of Prince Menchikoff which a few days previously he had rejected.

I then, as upon a former occasion, expressed to Count Colloredo my hope that the Austrian Government would urge upon the Emperor of Russia the necessity of modifying his demands and adopting a conciliatory course, as the spirit of fanaticism in Turkey was quite equal to that which had been excited in Russia, and it would be impossible for the Porte much longer to remain at peace while a portion of its territory was in the occupation of a Russian army

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 334.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 11, 1853.*

COUNT COLLOREDO has this day communicated to me a despatch addressed by Count Buol on the 6th instant, to Baron Lebzeltern, stating that the Imperial manifesto, dated the 26th of June, had unfortunately deprived the Austrian Government of the hope it had hitherto entertained, that the differences between Russia and the Porte might have been amicably settled without the occupation of the Principalities being considered necessary.

Count Buol says that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg will have foreseen, by his despatches of the 30th ultimo, the painful impression that the determination of the Emperor of Russia will have produced on the mind of the Emperor of Austria. By those despatches the Austrian Government had again implored (*itérativement conjuré*) the Imperial Cabinet well to weigh all the reasons of right and opportunity which were of a nature to make them desist from the occupation; and those representations having failed to modify the course that Russia had traced out for herself, it only remained for the Austrian Government to express its profound regret, which is all the more sincere as the difficulties of the task which the confidence of Russia had assigned to them are increased.

They will nevertheless, in the interest of peace, continue to use the conciliatory efforts at Constantinople, London, and Paris, which from the first they exerted in compliance with the desire of Russia; but their chances of success will be exceedingly weakened if Russia delays in supporting them efficaciously.

The Austrian Government has never concealed from the Russian Cabinet the lamentable effect that the occupation of the Principalities must produce on public opinion in Europe; and interpreted, as such a measure is susceptible of being, as a first act of flagrant hostility, it would entail imminent danger of war; and even if the Sultan, yielding to the advice of the Powers, did not treat it as an act of war, it must aggravate all the difficulties of a pacific arrangement.

The Austrian Government, however, renews its earnest entreaties to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg that the occupation should at least be circumscribed within the narrowest possible limits; and that with respect to its object and duration, precise explanations should be given of a nature to calm the uneasiness to which this act must give rise—explanations which are all the more necessary because the Manifesto of June 26 gives to the question proportions more vast than it hitherto possessed, and places it on a ground where it is impossible for Austria to identify herself with Russia, and which appears to the former infinitely to increase the difficulties as well as the dangers of the situation, because by appealing to the religious sentiments of the Russian people the risk is incurred of arousing Mussulman fanaticism.

The question of the Holy Places having been settled to the satisfaction of Russia, the Cabinet of St. Petersburg assured that of Vienna that it

had nothing more to desire except a guarantee for the future. Since that time the Sultan, with the intention of complying with the demands of Russia, has solemnly confirmed the privileges of the Greek clergy in his empire, and has called all Europe to witness his immutable will to maintain those privileges for ever; and he is prepared to reiterate the most positive assurances on the subject to the Emperor of Russia. How is it possible, then, adds Count Buol, to reconcile these facts with the passage of the manifesto, where it is said that the Ottoman Porte has attacked the rights of the Greek Church; that she has ended by threatening them with total destruction; and that every effort to bring the Ottoman Government to better sentiments has been fruitless? But if the rights of the Greek Church had been thus threatened, how comes it that the Patriarch of Constantinople, far from raising any complaint, has solemnly and publicly thanked the Porte for the confirmation of the privileges and immunities of his Church?

Count Buol appeals to the wisdom and impartiality of the Russian Cabinet to say whether these contradictions will not explain the doubt and uneasiness that more than one Government interested in upholding the Ottoman Empire cannot fail to entertain; and he asks whether it would not serve the cause of peace, which all desire to preserve, if Russia would give assurances calculated to satisfy Europe upon her real intentions.

I requested Count Colloredo, and I also request your Lordship, to thank Count Buol for this communication, and to assure him that the frankness with which he has offered sound advice to the Russian Cabinet is most satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government, who hope that it may be productive of the desired result, as the Emperor of Russia cannot be altogether indifferent to the counsels of his Allies, nor set at defiance the public opinion of Europe; but should this unfortunately not be the case, and should the Emperor reject the proposals for arrangement that might be made to him, and persist in retaining forcible possession of territory belonging to Turkey, Her Majesty's Government trusted that the Austrian Government would not remain neutral, but would come to the aid of the Sultan, who, having adopted the advice given to him by Austria as well as by England and France, has a right to expect that the Three Powers will cooperate together in his defence.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 335.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 11.)*

(Extract.)

*Berlin, July 7, 1852.*

I SAW Baron Manteuffel this morning, when we had some conversation on the aspect of affairs in the East. His Excellency said he had nothing of a satisfactory nature to communicate to me. He made some observations of a general nature on the Russian manifesto of June 26, which conveyed his marked disapprobation of this document, and then expressed his regret that the entrance of the troops into the Principalities should have followed so rapidly. He next informed me that Baron Budberg had communicated to him the proclamation which was to be issued by Prince Gortchakoff on crossing the Turkish frontier.

His Excellency then told me that the French Minister had communicated to him a draft of note for the settlement of the Russian and Turkish question, which had been prepared by his Government; that it was endeavoured in this paper to combine passages and expressions of Prince Menchikoff's projected note and Reshid Pasha's communication to Count Nesselrode; and that he should be very glad if it could be made acceptable.

Before leaving Baron Manteuffel, his Excellency told me he had written again to Baron Wildenbruch at Constantinople, directing him to

exert every effort to advance the solution of the difficulties, and to unite cordially for this purpose with Her Majesty's Ambassador to the Porte with M. de la Cour, and with Baron Bruck.

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No. 336.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.--(Received July 11.)*

(Extract.)

*Vienna, July 5, 1853.*

I FORWARDED to your Excellency this morning the telegraphic despatch which had been received from Bucharest by M. de Bourqueney, announcing the entry of the Russian troops into Moldavia and Wallachia on the 1st ultimo.

This intelligence, although not unexpected by this Government, is looked upon by them with the greatest possible regret; and I am requested by Count Buol to state this to your Lordship, as also to announce to you his intention immediately to convey this feeling to the Russian Cabinet, together with the expression of the disappointment he has felt at the sudden adoption of this measure while there still existed the hopes of an arrangement at Constantinople.

Count Buol yesterday read to me the various despatches he had received from Count Colloredo, reporting the conversations he had held with your Lordship as well as with Lord Aberdeen upon Turkish affairs, and detailing your opinions with regard to them and your general coincidence with the views of Austria, such as he had been instructed to bring them before you.

Count Buol expressed his entire satisfaction with the language your Lordship had held to Count Colloredo, agreeing, as he does, with the policy you recommended, and with the necessity which would arise in case the invasion of the Principalities took place, of concerting measures among the Powers—parties to the Treaty of 1841, with the view of obtaining from the Russian Cabinet the most distinct declarations as to the objects of that movement and the term which would be fixed for its duration. Count Buol, in his desire to prevent this invasion of the Principalities, wrote again yesterday to Baron Bruck, at Constantinople, to desire him to press upon the Turkish Government the adoption of a form of note which might be acceptable to the Emperor of Russia; while as an act of reciprocity, they should require from him a declaration of his determination to respect the integrity of the Sultan's dominions. Count Buol, who has received from Baron Bruck a very satisfactory report of his communications with Lord Stratford, has instructed that Minister to bring these views before his Lordship, and to request his advice and assistance in stating them to the Turkish Minister.

Count Buol read to me also the despatches he had received from Baron Lebzeltern of the 25th ultimo, according to which he had been unable to see Count Nesselrode for several days; he had, therefore, inclosed in a letter to him the despatches he had been directed to communicate.

These documents tended in the strongest manner to dissuade the Emperor from invading the Principalities.

I have seen Count Buol since the foregoing part of this despatch was written, and learn from him that he has received the manifesto of the Emperor of Russia upon the order given for the entry of his troops into the Principalities, in which he declares this measure to be imposed upon him for the maintenance of the religious rights and privileges appertaining to the Church of which he is the protector. Count Buol was unable to show me this document as he had sent it to the Emperor, but he looked upon it as likely to create a very dangerous excitement in the Greek population as well in Russia as in Turkey.

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No. 337.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 11, 1853.*

THE following passage occurs in Count Nesselrode's despatch to Baron Brunnow of the <sup>20th May</sup><sub>1st June</sub>, which was communicated to me by Baron Brunnow on the 8th of June :

“ Enfin au dernier moment, quand le Prince Menchikoff avait consenti à abandonner même le Sened modifié pour se contenter d'une note ; quand Reshid Pasha lui-même, frappé des dangers que le départ de notre Légation pouvait faire courir à la Porte, conjurait l'Ambassadeur Britannique avec instance de ne pas s'opposer à la remise de la note formulée par le Prince Menchikoff, Lord Redcliffe l'en a empêché, en déclarant que la note avait la valeur d'un Traité, et qu'elle était inacceptable.”

I have to instruct you, with reference to this passage, to communicate to Count Nesselrode the inclosures in Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe's despatch, of which I herewith transmit to you copies ;\* and in doing so, you will state to Count Nesselrode, that the honour of Her Majesty's Ambassador against whom this charge has been brought, demands the further investigation which Her Majesty's Government hope will be instituted by Count Nesselrode.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 338.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 12.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, July 3, 1853.*

THE Manifesto which was inclosed in my despatch of June 27, was read to-day in all the churches.

No. 339.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 12.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, July 11, 1853.*

M. DE BOURQUENEY denies in the most positive terms being the author of the project for the settlement of the Oriental question which bears his name.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 340.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 12, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that the explanations contained in your despatch of the 24th June, and its inclosures, with reference to the assertion made in Count Nesselrode's despatch to Baron Brunnow of the <sup>20th May</sup><sub>1st June</sub>, that your Excellency had prevented the Porte from accepting Prince Menchikoff's last proposal, are perfectly satisfactory to Her Majesty and to Her Majesty's Government, who gave no credit to the report made by Prince Menchikoff to his Government.

I have directed Sir Hamilton Seymour to communicate to Count Nesselrode the inclosures in your Excellency's despatch, and I have instructed him to state

that the honour of Her Majesty's Ambassador against whom the charge has been brought, demands the further investigation which Her Majesty's Government hope will be instituted by Count Nesselrode.

I have likewise transmitted copies of the inclosures in your Excellency's despatch to all Her Majesty's Ministers abroad, with instructions to communicate them to the Government to which they are accredited.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 341.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 12, 1853.*

THE following passage occurs in a despatch from Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow of the <sup>30 May</sup><sub>1 June</sub>, which was communicated to me by Baron Brunnow on the 8th of June:

“Enfin, au dernier moment, quand le Prince Menchikoff avait consenti à abandonner même le Sened modifié pour se contenter d'une note; quand Reshid Pasha lui-même, frappé des dangers que le départ de notre Légation pourrait faire courir à la Porte, conjurait l'Ambassadeur Britannique avec instance de ne pas s'opposer à la remise de la note formulée par le Prince Menchikoff, Lord Redcliffe l'en a empêché, en déclarant que la note avait la valeur d'un Traité, et qu'elle était inacceptable.”

Having communicated Count Nesselrode's despatch to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, I have received from his Excellency in reply a despatch† of the inclosures in which I herewith transmit to you copies in duplicate; and I have to instruct you to place one copy of these papers in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Court to which you are accredited.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 342.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 12, 1853.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 7th instant reporting what passed between Baron Manteuffel and yourself on the aspect of affairs in the East, I have to instruct your Lordship to inform Baron Manteuffel of the satisfaction which Her Majesty's Government derive from the expression of his opinions as reported in your Lordship's despatch.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 343.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 14.)*

(Extract.)

*Vienna, July 9, 1853.*

COUNT BUOL has informed me that in consequence of the occupation of the Principalities, the Austrian Government, having no troops in that direction, have ordered a brigade of infantry to assemble on the Servian frontier.

A despatch in the same terms was sent to all Her Majesty's Ministers abroad.

† See No. 322.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 15.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, July 8, 1853.*

I HAVE held this morning a very important conversation with the Chancellor.

It commenced by my saying that I had a serious question to put to his Excellency. I would ask whether, after the publications which had been lately made by the Russian Government, I, in common with every one else who desired peace, was to continue my endeavours towards finding an amicable solution for the difficulties which were thickening around us.

“*Cherchez toujours*,” Count Nesselrode answered; and bear in mind, that the solution is now the easier in consequence of the occupation of the Principalities having been effected.

This might be so, I replied; but to my apprehension, what was difficult before is rendered much more so by a military movement and by official publications.

Count Nesselrode said, that he would repeat that the entry of the Principalities made it easier for the Emperor to make some abatement of his demands, but did not explain this opinion; with regard to the publication of the circulars and manifestos, he desired to state that such an address to the public was indispensable after the attacks made upon Russia by the press of England and France—attacks which Her Majesty’s Government had never sought to mitigate by any observation as to the real views of the Russian Cabinet.

After a pause Count Nesselrode made some observation as to the backwardness of the friends of Russia in not proposing some scheme of arrangement (accommodement).

I replied that it appeared to me, on the contrary, that the wish of finding some middle course was that uppermost in the minds of all reasonable men; and that I would state to his Excellency what my plan was, only premising that I could not take upon myself to state whether my suggestion would meet the approbation either of Her Majesty’s Government or of the Cabinets of France and Austria. It was this:—

1. The publication of a hatti-sheriff confirming the privileges enjoyed by the Greeks, whether in virtue of prescription or of the stipulations of Treaties, with special mention of the arrangements made by the two late firmans respecting the holy places.

2. The notification of this hatti-sheriff to Russia, either in a letter from the Sultan or from the Grand Vizier, to be brought here by a special diplomatic agent from his Highness.

3. The official communication by the Porte of copies of the hatti-sheriff to the Missions of the Great Powers at Constantinople.

The Chancellor gave me to understand that the terms were such as would be accepted by the Emperor; the only point to be kept in view was, he said, that if objections which he considered unreasonable were to be maintained against the signature of the note by the Porte, some equivalent security must be found against the violation of the terms of the Jerusalem firmans.

How, Count Nesselrode then asked, did I contemplate that this proposition should reach the Emperor?

I replied that I must again remark that I was speaking in my own name and not in that of Her Majesty’s Government; but that knowing the conciliatory feelings of that Government I had suggested that the proposal should be made in what would probably be the manner the most acceptable to the Emperor, that is, through the Austrian Cabinet.

The Chancellor remarked that it was of course out of his power to return anything like a definitive opinion to the plan which I had mentioned, but that it appeared to him, *prima facie*, that something of the nature of what he termed the “*système-Seymour*” might be found acceptable, and that at all events whatever reached the Emperor at the hands of Austria was welcome and worthy of full consideration.

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*Circular Despatch to French Ministers abroad.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Walewski, July 16.)*

Monsieur,

*Paris, le 15 Juillet, 1853.*

LA nouvelle dépêche de M. le Comte de Nesselrode, que le "Journal de Saint Pétersbourg" publiait le lendemain du jour où elle était expédiée à toutes les Légations de Russie, a produit sur le Gouvernement de l'Empereur une impression que Sa Majesté Impériale m'a ordonné de vous faire connaître sans détour.

Nous ne pouvons que déplorer de voir la Russie, au moment même où les efforts de tous les Cabinets pour amener une solution satisfaisante des difficultés actuelles témoignent si hautement de leur modération, prendre une attitude qui rend le succès de leurs négociations plus incertain, et impose à quelques-uns d'entre eux le devoir de repousser la responsabilité que l'on essaierait vainement de faire peser sur leur politique.

Je ne voudrais pas, Monsieur, revenir sur une discussion épuisée; mais, comme M. le Comte de Nesselrode allégué toujours, à l'appui des prétentions de St. Pétersbourg, l'offense que la Porte aurait commise à son égard en ne tenant pas compte des promesses qu'elle aurait faites à la Légation de Russie à l'époque du premier règlement de la question des Lieux Saints, en 1852, je suis bien forcé de répéter que les firmans rendus par le Sultan, à la suite de la mission de M. le Prince Menchikoff, ont ôté tout fondement à cet unique grief, et que, s'il est un Gouvernement autorisé à élever des plaintes légitimes, ce n'est pas celui de Sa Majesté l'Empereur Nicolas.

En effet, à la date du 10 Mai dernier, M. le Comte de Nesselrode, qui venait de recevoir des dépêches de M. l'Ambassadeur de Russie à Constantinople, se félicitait, avec M. le Général de Castelbajac, d'un résultat qu'il considérait comme une heureuse conclusion de l'affaire des lieux saints; M. Kisséleff, à Paris, me faisait une semblable déclaration, et, partout, les agents du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg tenaient le même langage.

Les demandes formulées postérieurement par M. le Prince Menchikoff, quand l'objet principal de sa mission était atteint, quand on annonçait déjà son retour, ne se rattachaient donc par aucun lien à celles qu'il avait fait accueillir par la Porte; et c'était bien une nouvelle question, une difficulté plus grave qui surgissait à Constantinople, alors que l'Europe, un instant alarmée, était invitée par la Russie elle-même à se rassurer complètement.

Pris, en quelque sorte, au dépourvu par des exigences qu'ils n'avaient pas dû soupçonner, les Représentants de la France, de l'Autriche, de la Grande Bretagne, et de la Prusse à Constantinople ont loyalement employé leurs efforts pour empêcher une rupture dont les conséquences pouvaient être si fatales. Ils n'ont pas conseillé à la Porte une résistance de nature à l'exposer aux dangers les plus sérieux; et, reconnaissant à l'unanimité que les demandes de la Russie touchaient de trop près à la liberté d'action et à la souveraineté du Sultan pour qu'ils pussent se permettre un avis, ils ont laissé aux seuls Ministres de Sa Hautesse la responsabilité du parti à prendre. Il n'y a donc eu, de leur part, ni pression d'aucun genre, ni ingérence quelconque, et si le Gouvernement Ottoman, livré à lui-même, n'a pas voulu souscrire aux conditions qu'on prétendait lui imposer, il faut assurément qu'il les ait trouvées entièrement incompatibles avec son indépendance et sa dignité.

C'est dans de telles conjonctures, Monsieur, que M. le Prince Menchikoff a quitté Constantinople en rompant toute relation diplomatique entre la Russie et la Porte, et que les Puissances engagées par leurs traditions et leurs intérêts à maintenir l'intégrité de la Turquie ont eu à se tracer une ligne de conduite.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale, d'accord avec celui de Sa Majesté Britannique, a pensé que la situation était trop menaçante pour ne pas être surveillée de près, et les escadres de France et d'Angleterre reçurent bientôt l'ordre d'aller mouiller dans la Baie de Besika, où elles arrivèrent au milieu du mois de Juin.

Cette mesure, toute de prévoyance, n'avait aucun caractère hostile à l'égard de la Russie; elle était impérieusement commandée par la gravité des circon-

stances, et amplement justifiée par les préparatifs de guerre qui, depuis plusieurs mois, se faisaient en Bessarabie et dans la rade de Sebastopol.

Le motif de la rupture entre le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg et la Porte avait, pour ainsi dire, disparu ; la question qui pouvait se poser à l'improviste à Constantinople, c'était celle de l'existence même de l'Empire Ottoman, et jamais le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale n'admettra que de si vastes intérêts se trouvent en jeu sans revendiquer aussitôt la part d'influence et d'action qui convient à sa puissance et à son rang dans le monde. A la présence d'une armée Russe sur les frontières de terre de la Turquie, il avait le droit et le devoir de répondre par la présence de ses forces navales à Besika, dans une baie librement ouverte à toutes les marines, et située en deçà des limites que les Traités défendent de franchir en temps de paix.

Le Gouvernement de Russie, du reste, devait bientôt se charger d'expliquer lui-même la nécessité du mouvement ordonné aux deux escadres.

Le 31 Mai, en effet, quand il était impossible de connaître à St. Pétersbourg, où la nouvelle n'en parvint que le 17 Juin, les résolutions auxquelles pourraient s'arrêter la France et l'Angleterre, M. le Comte de Nesselrode envoyait à la Porte, sous forme d'une lettre à Reshid Pasha, un dernier ultimatum, à bref délai, et qui contenait, très-clairement exprimée, la menace d'une prochaine occupation des principautés du Danube.

Lorsque cette décision était prise avec une solennité qui ne permettait plus à un Gouvernement jaloux de sa dignité de la modifier, lorsque, par une circulaire datée du 11 Juin, Sa Majesté l'Empereur Nicolas la faisait annoncer à l'Europe, comme pour en rendre l'exécution plus irrévocable, notre escadre était encore à Salamine, et celle de l'Angleterre n'était pas sortie du port de Malte.

Ce simple rapprochement de dates suffit, Monsieur, pour indiquer de quel côté est partie cette initiative que l'on s'efforce aujourd'hui de déclinier en en rejetant la responsabilité sur la France et l'Angleterre ; il suffit également pour prouver qu'entre la communication faite à Paris et à Londres de la démarche tentée directement par M. le Comte de Nesselrode à Constantinople et le rejet de cet ultimatum, le temps a manqué matériellement aux Gouvernements de Sa Majesté Impériale et de Sa Majesté Britannique pour exercer, dans un sens quelconque, leur influence à Constantinople. Non, Monsieur, je le dis avec toute la puissance de la conviction, le Gouvernement Français, dans ce grave débat, n'a nul reproche à se faire ; il repousse du fond de sa conscience, non moins que devant l'Europe, la responsabilité qu'on lui impute, et, fort de sa modération, en appelle sans crainte à son tour au jugement des Cabinets.

Sauf le but si différent des deux démonstrations, il y avait peut être une sorte d'analogie dans les situations respectives quand l'armée Russe se tenait sur la rive gauche du Pruth et que les flottes de France et d'Angleterre jetaient l'ancre à Besika. Cette analogie a disparu depuis le passage de la rivière qui forme les limites de l'Empire Russe et de l'Empire Ottoman. M. le Comte de Nesselrode, d'ailleurs, semble le reconnaître quand il suppose déjà les escadres en vue même de Constantinople, et représente comme une compensation nécessaire à ce qu'il appelle notre occupation maritime la position militaire prise par les troupes Russes sur les bords du Danube.

Les forces Anglaises et Françaises ne portent, par leur présence en dehors des Dardanelles, aucune atteinte aux Traités existants. L'occupation de la Valachie et de la Moldavie, au contraire, constitue une violation manifeste de ces mêmes Traités. Celui d'Andrinople, qui détermine les conditions du Protectorat de la Russie, pose implicitement le cas où il serait permis à cette Puissance d'intervenir dans les Principautés : ce serait si leurs privilèges étaient reconnus par les Turcs.

En 1848, quand ces provinces ont été occupées par les Russes, elles se trouvaient en proie à une agitation révolutionnaire qui menaçait également leur sécurité, celle de la puissance souveraine et celle de la puissance protectrice. La Convention de Balta Liman, enfin, a admis que, si des événements semblables venaient à se renouveler dans une période de sept années, la Russie et la Turquie prendraient en commun les mesures les plus propres à rétablir l'ordre.

Les privilèges de la Moldavie et de la Valachie sont-ils menacés ? Des troubles révolutionnaires ont-ils éclaté sur leur territoire ? Les faits répondent d'eux-mêmes qu'il n'y a lieu, pour le moment, à l'application ni du Traité d'Andrinople, ni de la Convention de Balta Liman.

De quel droit les troupes Russes ont-elles donc passé le Pruth, si ce n'est

du droit de la guerre, d'une guerre, je le reconnais, dont on ne veut pas prononcer le vrai nom, mais qui dérive d'un principe nouveau, fécond en conséquences désastreuses, que l'on s'étonne de voir pratiquer pour la première fois par une Puissance conservatrice de l'ordre Européen à un degré aussi éminent que la Russie, et qui n'irait à rien moins qu'à l'oppression en pleine paix des Etats faibles par les Etats plus forts qui sont leurs voisins ?

L'intérêt général du monde s'oppose à l'admission d'un semblable doctrine, et la Porte, en particulier, a le droit incontestable de voir un acte de guerre dans l'envahissement de deux provinces qui, quelle que soit leur organisation spéciale, font partie intégrant de son empire. Elle ne violerait donc, pas plus que les Puissances qui viendraient à son aide, le Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, si elle déclarait les Détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore ouverts aux escadres de France et d'Angleterre. L'opinion du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale est formelle à cet égard, et bien que, dans sa pensée, elle n'exclue pas la recherche d'un moyen efficace de conciliation entre la Russie et la Turquie, j'ai invité M. le Général de Castelbajac à faire connaître notre manière de voir à M. le Comte de Nesselrode et à lui communiquer cette dépêche. Je vous autorise, également, à en remettre une copie à M. ———.

Agréé, &c.

(Signé) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

(Translation.)

Sir,

*Paris, July 15, 1853.*

COUNT NESSELRODE'S further despatch, which the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" published the day after it was sent off to all the Russian Missions, has produced on the Emperor's Government an impression which His Imperial Majesty has directed me to communicate to you without reserve.

We cannot but lament to see Russia, at the very time when the efforts of all the Cabinets to bring about a satisfactory solution of the present difficulties furnish such evident proof of their moderation, assume an attitude by which the success of their negotiations is rendered more uncertain, and which imposes upon some of them the duty of disclaiming a responsibility which it is vainly attempted to affix on their policy.

I have no wish, Sir, to reopen a discussion already exhausted, but as Count Nesselrode constantly alleges in support of the pretensions of St. Petersburg, the offence stated to have been committed by the Porte towards Russia in disregarding the promises which it made to the Russian Legation at the time of the first settlement of the question of the Holy Places in 1852, I am nevertheless compelled to repeat that the firmans issued by the Sultan in consequence of Prince Menchikoff's mission, have removed all ground for this single cause of complaint, and that if there is a Government rightfully entitled to complain, it certainly is not that of His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas.

In fact, on the 10th of May last, Count Nesselrode, who had just received despatches from the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, congratulated himself, with General de Castelbajac, on a result which he looked upon as a happy termination of the affair of the Holy Places; M. de Kisseleff, at Paris, made to me a similar declaration, and the agents of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg held everywhere the same language.

The demands subsequently put forward by Prince Menchikoff, when the main object of his mission was attained, when his return was already announced, had therefore no connection whatever with those which he had induced the Porte to agree to; and it was altogether a new question, a more serious difficulty, which sprung up at Constantinople, at the very time that Europe, which for an instant had taken alarm, was invited by Russia herself to be wholly reassured.

Surprised, as it were, by demands which they had no reason to anticipate, the Representatives of France, Austria, Great Britain, and Prussia, at Constantinople, honestly exerted themselves to prevent a rupture of which the consequences might be so fatal. They did not recommend the Porte to offer such a resistance as might expose it to the most serious dangers; and agreeing unanimously that the demands of Russia too closely affected the Sultan's freedom of action and sovereignty to admit of their offering him any advice, they left to His Highness' Ministers alone the responsibility of the course to be adopted.

There was therefore, on their side, no pressure or interference of any sort, and if the Ottoman Government, left to itself, did not choose to submit to the conditions which it was sought to impose upon it, it must assuredly have considered them incompatible with its independence and its dignity.

It is in this state of things, Sir, that Prince Menchikoff quitted Constantinople, breaking off all diplomatic relations between Russia and the Porte; and that the Powers, bound by their traditional policy and by their interests to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, had to chalk out for themselves a line of conduct.

His Imperial Majesty's Government, in concert with that of Her Britannic Majesty, considered that the state of affairs was too threatening not to be watched close at hand, and the squadrons of France and England presently received orders to go and anchor in Besika Bay, where they arrived in the middle of June.

This measure, which was wholly precautionary, had no hostile character as regards Russia; it was imperiously called for by the serious character of the circumstances, and fully justified by the preparations for war which for many months had been made in Bessarabia and in the roadstead of Sevastopol.

The cause for a rupture between the Cabinet of St. Petersburg and the Porte had, so to speak, disappeared; the question which might be suddenly agitated at Constantinople was that of the very existence of the Ottoman Empire: and His Imperial Majesty's Government will never allow interests of such moment to be at stake without assuming at once the share of influence and of action befitting its power and station in the world. It had the right and it was its duty to respond to the presence of a Russian army on the land frontier of Turkey, by the presence of its naval forces at Besika, in a bay open to the ships of all nations, and situated within the limits which by Treaty are forbidden to be passed in time of peace.

The Russian Government, moreover, was presently about itself to furnish an explanation as to the necessity of the movement prescribed to the two squadrons.

In fact, on the 31st of May, when it was impossible that the resolutions which might be adopted by France and England could be known at St. Petersburg, which place intelligence of them only reached on the 17th of June, Count Nesselrode sent to the Porte, in the form of a letter to Reshid Pasha, a final ultimatum, for the acceptance of which a short delay was allowed, and which contained in very plain terms the menace of an early occupation of the Danubian Principalities.

When this decision was adopted with a degree of solemnity which left no room for a Government jealous of its dignity to modify it; when by a circular dated the 11th of June His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas notified it to Europe, as if to render it still more impossible that it should be revoked, our squadron was still at Salamis, and that of England had not left the port of Malta.

This simple comparison of dates is sufficient, Sir, to show by which party the initiative was taken, which it is now sought to disclaim by throwing the responsibility of it on France and England. It is also sufficient to prove that between the communication to Paris and to London of the direct overture made by Count Nesselrode at Constantinople, there did not in reality intervene a sufficient space of time to admit of the Governments of His Imperial Majesty and of Her Britannic Majesty exerting their influence at Constantinople in any sense whatever. state with all the force of conviction, that the French Government has nothing to reproach itself with in this serious discussion; it disclaims in its conscience, no less than in the face of Europe, the responsibility which it is sought to fix upon it, and, strong in its moderation, it fearlessly appeals in its turn to the judgment of the Cabinets.

Setting aside the difference between the objects of the two demonstrations, there was, perhaps, a species of analogy between the respective situations when the Russian army remained on the left banks of the Pruth, and the fleets of France and England anchored at Besika. That analogy has disappeared since the passage of the river which forms the boundary between the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire. Count Nesselrode, moreover, seems to admit this, when he supposes that the squadrons are already within sight of Constantinople, and represents the military position taken up by the Russian troops on the banks of the Danube as being a necessary equivalent for what he terms our maritime occupation.

The English and French forces do not, by their presence outside the Dardanelles, violate existing Treaties. The occupation of Wallachia and Moldavia constitute, on the contrary, a manifest violation of those same Treaties. That of Adrianople, which defines the conditions of the Protectorate of Russia, lays down by implication the case in which it would be allowable for that Power to intervene in the Principalities, which would be if their privileges were disregarded by the Turks.

In 1848, when those provinces were occupied by the Russians, they were a prey to a revolutionary movement which equally menaced their security, that of the sovereign Power, and that of the protecting Power. The Convention of Balta Liman, in fact, has admitted that if similar events should occur within the space of seven years, Russia and Turkey might in common adopt the measures best calculated to restore order.

Are the privileges of Moldavia and Wallachia menaced? Have revolutionary disturbances broken out in their territory? The facts answer for themselves that at present there does not exist any ground for the application of the Treaty of Adrianople, or of the Convention of Balta Liman.

By what right then have the Russian troops crossed the Pruth, if not by the right of war—of a war, I admit, the real name of which it is not desired to pronounce, but which springs from a novel principle, pregnant with disastrous consequences, which is seen with astonishment to be acted upon for the first time by a Power which upholds order in Europe in so remarkable a degree as Russia, and the tendency of which would be no less than the oppression in full peace of feeble States by the more powerful States who are their neighbours?

The general interest of the world is opposed to the admission of such a doctrine, and the Porte, in particular, has the incontestable right of viewing as an act of war the invasion of two provinces, which, whatever may be their peculiar organization, form an integral part of its empire. It therefore would not, any more than the Powers who might come to its assistance, infringe the Treaty of July 13, 1841, if it declared the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus open to the squadrons of France and England. The opinion of His Imperial Majesty's Government is decided on this point; and although, in its judgment, it does not preclude it from seeking an effective measure of reconciliation between Russia and Turkey, I have requested General de Castelbajac to communicate to Count Nesselrode the view we take of the matter, and to communicate to him this despatch. I authorize you likewise to give a copy of it to —

Receive, &c.  
(Signed) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

No. 346.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 16, 1853.*

BARON BRUNNOW has communicated to me the circular despatch, dated <sup>20 June</sup> <sub>2 July</sub>, which Count Nesselrode has addressed to the Russian Missions.

It is difficult to express the astonishment and regret with which Her Majesty's Government have read in this despatch the declaration that the Principalities have been invaded and occupied in consequence of England and France having disregarded the recommendations of the Russian Government, and having sent their fleets to the waters of Turkey.

The passages of the despatch which contain this extraordinary statement are the following:

“En posant cet ultimatum à la Porte, nous avons plus particulièrement informé les grands Cabinets de nos intentions. Nous avons engagé nommément la France et la Grande Bretagne à ne pas compliquer par leur attitude les difficultés de la situation, à ne pas prendre trop tôt de mesures qui, d'un côté, auraient pour effet d'encourager l'opposition de la Porte, de l'autre, engageraient plus avant qu'ils ne l'étaient déjà dans la question l'honneur et la dignité de l'Empereur.”

“D'autre part, les deux Puissances maritimes n'ont pas cru devoir déferer

aux considérations que nous avons recommandées à leur sérieuse attention. Prenant avant nous l'initiative, elles ont jugé indispensable de dévancer immédiatement par une mesure effective, celles que nous ne leur avons annoncées que comme purement éventuelles, puisque nous en subordonnions la mise à effet aux résolutions finales de la Porte; et qu'au moment même où j'écris, l'exécution n'en a pas encore commencé. Elles ont sur-le-champ envoyé leurs flottes dans les parages de Constantinople. Elles occupent déjà les eaux et ports de la domination Ottomane à portée des Dardanelles. Par cette attitude avancée les deux Puissances nous ont placés sous le poids d'une démonstration comminatoire, qui, comme nous le leur avons fait pressentir, devait ajouter à la crise de nouvelles complications.

"En présence du refus de la Porte, appuyé par la manifestation de la France et de l'Angleterre, il nous devient plus que jamais impossible de modifier les résolutions qu'en avait fait dépendre l'Empereur.

"En conséquence, Sa Majesté Impériale vient d'envoyer au corps de nos troupes stationné en ce moment en Bessarabie l'ordre de passer la frontière pour occuper les Principautés."

With respect to the first passage, I have to observe that Count Nesselrode's despatch of June 1, to Baron Brunnow was not communicated to Her Majesty's Government till June 8, and therefore the order sent a week before to Admiral Dundas, to proceed to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, was not issued in disregard, as Count Nesselrode's circular affirms, of considerations brought to the knowledge of the British Government. But even if the case had been otherwise, and no orders had been issued, it was impossible for Her Majesty's Government to suppose that the threat to occupy the Principalities would be rendered null by the Porte accepting the terms which a few days before it had unhesitatingly rejected; and on the 8th of June, therefore, Her Majesty's Government were compelled to consider the occupation of the Principalities inevitable; and they conclude that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg is not now prepared to admit that the note of Count Nesselrode to Reshid Pasha contained an empty menace, the execution of which was never seriously contemplated. But, in fact, Count Nesselrode's note of May 31, communicating the hostile intentions of Russia, would of itself have been sufficient to justify Her Majesty's Government in taking measures for the protection of Turkey.

I shall now proceed to place on record at what time, and for what reasons, the British fleet was sent to the Turkish waters.

Prince Menchikoff, acting, it must be assumed, on the orders of his Government, stated in his note of the 5th of May, of which a copy was received in London on the 18th of May, that any further delay in answering his proposals respecting the Greek Church, could only be considered by him as "un manque de procédés envers son Gouvernement, ce qui lui imposerait des plus pénibles obligations."

Again, in his note of the 11th of May, a copy of which was received in London on the 30th of May, Prince Menchikoff says, that in case of an unsatisfactory decision on the part of the Porte—"si les principes qui en forment la base [of the Articles he was negotiating] sont rejetés, si par une opposition systématique la Sublime Porte persiste à lui fermer jusqu'aux voies d'une entente intime et directe, il devra considérer sa mission comme terminée, interrompre les relations avec le Cabinet de Sa Majesté le Sultan, et rejeter sur la responsabilité de ses Ministres toutes les conséquences qui pourraient en résulter." And lastly, in his note of the 15th of May, received in London June 1st, Prince Menchikoff concludes: "Il appartient à la sagacité de votre Altesse de peser les suites incalculables et les grandes calamités qui pourraient en résulter, et qui retomberaient de tout leur poids sur la responsabilité des Ministres de Sa Majesté le Sultan."

This succession of menaces, addressed to a Power whose independence Russia had declared her determination to uphold, and in support of claims so much at variance with the assurances given to Her Majesty's Government, together with the vast military and naval armaments which for months had been preparing on the very confines of Turkey, left no doubt on the mind of Her Majesty's Government of the imminent danger in which the Sultan was about to be placed. They deeply lamented that this danger should arise from acts of the Russian Government, which was a party to the Treaty of 1841; but as Her Majesty's Government adhere now, as firmly as in 1841, to the prin-

ciples which that Treaty records, and believe that the maintenance of European peace is involved in the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, they felt that the time had arrived when, in the interests of peace, they must be prepared to protect the Sultan; and upon learning the abrupt departure of Prince Menchikoff, it was determined that the British fleet, which up to that time had not quitted Malta, should be placed at the disposal of Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

On the 1st of June a despatch was forwarded to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, authorizing him, in certain specified contingencies, to send for the fleet, which would then repair to such place as he might point out. On the 2nd of June, instructions were sent to Admiral Dundas to proceed at once to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, and there to place himself in communication with Her Majesty's Ambassador.

On the previous day we received a copy of Prince Menchikoff's note of May 18, announcing the termination of his mission, and that the refusal of the guarantee demanded "*devra désormais imposer au Gouvernement Impérial la nécessité de la chercher dans sa propre puissance.*"

On the 2nd of June I communicated to Baron Brunnow the measure taken by Her Majesty's Government; it could not have been made known by him at St. Petersburg before the 7th or 8th, and consequently it could in no way influence the decision taken by the Russian Government; for Count Nesselrode's note to Reshid Pasha, announcing that, "*dans quelques semaines ses troupes recevront l'ordre de passer les frontières de l'Empire,*" was dated the 31st of May; and his despatch to Baron Brunnow, in which he said that if the Porte did not sign Prince Menchikoff's note within a week after the arrival of the note to Reshid Pasha, the Emperor "*ordonnera à ses troupes d'occuper les Principautés,*" was dated the 1st of June.

It is thus clearly established that the British fleet was not sent to the waters of Turkey in disregard of considerations submitted to Her Majesty's Government by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, and that on the day before the instructions to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe left London, the decision to occupy the Principalities was taken by the Russian Government; and I say that decision was taken, because the Russian Government could never for one moment seriously have expected the submission of the Porte to the terms, "*sans variante,*" that a regard for its own dignity and security had a few days before compelled it to decline. Yet Count Nesselrode in his circular despatch of July 2, affirms that the presence of the English and French fleets in the Bay of Besica has mainly provoked and fully justifies the occupation of the Principalities; he insists that they are in sight of the capital, from which they are nearly 200 miles distant; and that their maritime occupation of the Turkish waters and ports can only be balanced by a military position on the part of Russia.

But Her Majesty's Government must in the strongest terms protest against this assertion; and they deny that any resemblance exists between the position of the combined fleets in Besica Bay, and that of the Russian armies in the Principalities. The fleets have the same right to anchor in Besica Bay as in any port of the Mediterranean. Their presence there violates no treaty and no territory; it infringes no international law; it is no menace to Turkish independence, and it assuredly ought to be no cause of offence to Russia; whereas by occupying the Principalities, Russia does violate the territory of the Sultan and the special Treaty which regards that portion of his dominions: it is an infraction of the Law of Nations, and an act of direct hostility against the Sultan which he would be justified in meeting by a declaration of war, and by a requisition to the allied squadrons to come up to Constantinople for his defence; and, lastly, it is an act so dangerous as a precedent, and so violent on the part of a powerful State towards one whose very weakness should be its protection, that throughout Europe it has created feelings of alarm and reprobation. To admit that any similarity exists, or that any comparison can with truth be established, between the position of the English and French fleets outside the Dardanelles, and that of the Russian armies within the Principalities, is manifestly impossible.

It is with deep regret that Her Majesty's Government thus find themselves compelled to record their opinions upon the recent invasion of the Turkish territory; but they consider that the withholding of those opinions

would be an abandonment of duty on their part, and might render it difficult for them hereafter to interfere in defence and support of Treaties which constitute the International Law of Europe, and which are the only effectual guarantees of general peace and of the rights of nations.

The sufferings which the occupation of the Principalities must entail upon the inhabitants, will doubtless be much alleviated by the Russian Government taking upon itself the entire charge of that occupation.

As I have so often, and at such length, discussed the demands of Russia upon the Porte, it is hardly necessary for me to remark upon the other portions of Count Nesselrode's circular despatch, which in fact adduces no new fact or argument in support of those demands. I must, however, express the conviction of Her Majesty's Government that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg is altogether mistaken when it affirms that the Porte is indisposed to satisfy the just claims of Russia, or desires to shrink from its existing engagements with Russia. If this were correct, such influence as Her Majesty's Government may possess would be exercised to bring the Porte to a proper sense of its obligations: but they are as unaware of such breach of engagement on the part of the Porte, as they are of those numerous arbitrary acts of the Ottoman Government which, it is said, recently infringed the rights of the Greek Church, and threatened utterly to annihilate the order of things sanctioned by ages, and so dear to the orthodox faith.

Russia claims for her "co-religionnaires" in the East the strict *status quo*, and the maintenance of the privileges they have enjoyed under the protection of their Sovereign; but Count Nesselrode entirely omits to show how that *status quo* has been disturbed, how those privileges have been curtailed, what complaints have been made, what grievances remain without redress. Her Majesty's Government know only of one offence committed by the Turkish Government against Russia, which, by the admission of Prince Menchikoff, was satisfactorily atoned for; while on the other hand the recent firman of the Sultan confirming the privileges and immunities of the Greek Church has been gratefully acknowledged by the Patriarch of Constantinople.

Where then are the causes which Count Nesselrode, appealing to impartial Europe, assumes will justify the position now taken by Russia?

Count Nesselrode further says, that Russia by her position and by her Treaties, virtually enjoys the right of protecting the Greek Church in the East; if such be the case, and if that right, whatever its nature and extent may be, is undisturbed, it is Russia that throws doubt upon its existence or validity by endeavouring to force the Porte into fresh engagements. If ancient rights exist and are observed by Turkey, Russia has no cause of complaint against Turkey. But if she seeks to extend those rights, then is Turkey justified in closely examining the nature of such fresh demands, and in refusing those from which her independence and dignity would suffer.

Her Majesty's Government receive with sincere satisfaction the renewed assurances that it is the policy of His Imperial Majesty and the interest of Russia to maintain the existing order of things in the East; and as the interests of Turkey impose upon her the necessity of observing her engagements with Russia, Her Majesty's Government trust that Russia will not, by seeking at the present time to exact what the Porte ought not to yield, prolong a crisis that may render inevitable consequences which Europe is so deeply concerned in averting.

You will read this despatch to Count Nesselrode and furnish his Excellency with a copy of it.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 347.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 18, 1853.*

I TRANSMIT to you herewith duplicate copies of a despatch† which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Minister at St. Petersburg, with reference to the circular despatch of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg to the Representatives of Russia in foreign countries dated the <sup>20 June</sup><sub>2 July</sub>, and setting forth the grounds on which the Russian Government seeks to justify the entrance of the Russian troops into the Turkish provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia.

Of this circular, as communicated to me by the Russian Minister at this Court, I also inclose a copy‡ for your information.

I have to instruct you to place in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Court to which you are accredited, a copy of my despatch to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 348.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 18.)*

(Extract.)

*Vienna, July 12, 1853.*

I WAITED upon Count Buol to communicate to him your Lordship's despatches of the 4th instant, the first recapitulating the conversation your Lordship had held with Count Colloredo on the 28th ultimo, with reference to a despatch from Count Buol which he had read to you; the second referring to my despatch to your Lordship of the 27th ultimo, which reported what had passed between myself and Count Buol on the Turkish question, and instructing me to convey to that Minister the best thanks of Her Majesty's Government for the clear and satisfactory explanation he had given of his views and the policy of the Austrian Government.

Count Buol received the communication of these documents with the greatest satisfaction, and, with reference to the thanks I was directed to convey to him from Her Majesty's Government, he requested I would express to your Lordship his best acknowledgments for this valuable testimony to the concordance of the views by which the policy of the two Governments was directed upon this important question.

Count Buol had already received from Count Colloredo, as I have reported to your Lordship in my despatch of the 5th instant, the substance of your conversation with him on the 28th ultimo, and I have therein stated the remarks he made with regard to it. He now added the sincere regret he felt that the earnest entreaties he had used with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg had not succeeded in preventing the occupation of the Principalities, and your Lordship would find in the despatch he had written to Baron Lebzeltern on the 6th instant, how strongly he had expressed the distress and disappointment of His Majesty the Emperor, at the failure of those endeavours.

No. 349.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 19, 1853.*

REPORTS have been current in this country, and have led to questions in Parliament respecting the intended occupation of Bosnia and Servia by Austrian forces.

Her Majesty's Government give no credence to the report, but it is right that your Lordship should be informed of it, in order that if the measure should

A despatch in the same terms was addressed to all Her Majesty's Ministers abroad.

† No. 346.

‡ No. 329.

now or hereafter be entertained by the Austrian Government, your Lordship should use your utmost endeavours to prevent such an aggravation of existing difficulties.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 350.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

(Extract.)

*Foreign Office, July 19, 1853.*

ON the 16th instant Count Walewski informed me that the French project of note for settling the differences between Russia and Turkey had been shown confidentially by General Castelbajac to Count Nesselrode, who had approved of it, and said he thought it would meet the Emperor's views, but that he would give no answer upon the subject until he had taken the pleasure of His Imperial Majesty.

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No. 351.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 19, 1853.*

YOUR Excellency is instructed to communicate to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the project for settling the differences between Russia and the Porte, which Sir H. Seymour, in his despatch of July 8, reports that he has submitted to Count Nesselrode, and you will likewise inform M. Drouyn de Lhuys that Her Majesty's Government, although approving of the plan, and not doubting that it would be sanctioned by the French Government, yet do not think proper to recommend its adoption by the Porte, as other projects are under consideration, and that an addition to their number would create loss of time, and might possibly lead to confusion.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON

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No. 352.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 19, 1853.*

I HAVE the satisfaction to inform you that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the language held by you to Count Nesselrode, as reported in your despatch of the 8th instant.

Her Majesty's Government likewise approve of the plan which you submitted to Count Nesselrode for settling the differences between Russia and Turkey in a manner which appears to be honourable to both Powers, and they do not doubt that their opinion upon the plan will be shared by the French Government.

It is not the intention of Her Majesty's Government, however, at present to recommend its adoption by the Porte, because two if not three projects are now under consideration, and any addition to the number would cause loss of time, and might possibly lead to confusion.

Her Majesty's Government are also disposed, for the reasons stated in the inclosed despatch to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, to prefer the Convention of

which I privately transmitted a copy to you on the 13th instant, with instructions to communicate it to Count Nesselrode.

Should you find that this Convention is more acceptable to the Russian Government than any other project that has been submitted to them, you will receive the announcement of Count Nesselrode to that effect as official, and upon his Excellency giving you a distinct assurance in writing that it will be regarded by His Imperial Majesty as a final and satisfactory settlement of the demands of Russia upon the Porte, you are instructed immediately to send the information by a special messenger to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, with a request that he will advise the Porte to agree to these terms.

You will likewise transmit to his Excellency a copy of this despatch.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

### No. 353.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 20.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, July 4, 1853.*

OUR intense anxiety to maintain peace, notwithstanding the progress of circumstances prejudicial to its continuance, though derived from our best feelings, may eventually go far towards frustrating the object, without preventing the occurrence of a war. Not only is it my duty to submit this remark to your Lordship, but I am entitled to do so without fear of being misunderstood, since I may appeal with confidence to my correspondence in proof of the earnest endeavours I have made to avert a calamity now brought to our very doors, by inadmissible demands and deceptive declarations.

While Russia appears to have arrayed all Europe in opinion against her, and may be supposed to hesitate between the alternatives of an embarrassment created by her own pretensions, the Porte, after making every reasonable concession, is engaged in the most exhausting preparations, and exposed to the most perilous contingencies. In these respects the Sultan, unfortunately, has no room for choice. His resistance to an unfair and degrading requisition is universally approved. To that resistance he has hitherto assigned a moral character; and there is no reason to doubt that the occupation of the Principalities by Russia, though in principle constituting a case of war, will only be met, in the first instance, by a solemn protest and appeal to the other great Powers of Christendom. But surely His Majesty is bound in honour, in prudence, and in duty towards his nation and empire, to provide the means of defending both against more active hostilities, and also to prepare for the threatened dilemma of having either to comply with the Russian ultimatum, or to accept an indefinite occupation of the Principalities.

In either of these two cases, it is no exaggeration to state that the Eastern question would be virtually surrendered. I mean by the Eastern question, the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire in its present degree of independence and territorial integrity, attended with the effect of averting that violent disturbance of European interests which could hardly fail to ensue on any signal infraction of the principle. But in thus putting forward the point of political counterpoise, I would not willingly lose sight of other considerations involving the progress of trade and the prospects of social improvement in this quarter, with all their respective bearings on our national industry and international sympathies. It rests with Her Majesty's Government, and not, of course, with me, to determine the value of these interests, compared with the risks and sacrifices of war.

The chief advantage which Turkey may hope to derive from not pushing its right of hostilities to an extreme, in the event of a simple occupation, is, that time will thus be gained for attempting further negotiations, for effecting a more complete concert among the Powers agreeing in opinion with Turkey, and for completing the preparations of defence on this side of the Danube. But, although it is probable that the Turkish forces will make a steadier resistance than the defective state of their service might lead us to expect, the ultimate issue of the struggle, if the parties be left to themselves, can hardly be doubted.

Not that we are forbidden by those who can best appreciate the military resources of Russia, to entertain some misgiving as to their colossal strength when fairly put to the test by operations in a foreign country; nor are we called upon to undervalue the support which might be given to Turkey by its allies, without going the length of open and unlimited hostilities. But if the ultimate exclusion of Russia, as well from the Greek Protectorate as from the Principalities, be really that important object which has been hitherto presumed, success, I humbly conceive, will never be attained, according to any reasonable calculation, without a previous understanding on the part of England and France to stop at no sacrifice necessary to secure it.

The mere occupation of the Principalities will prove a heavy infliction, not only on those provinces, but on the whole empire, as obliging the Turkish Government to protract the state of tension, expense, and effort, which cannot last long without exhausting its available resources in men and money. Should the Danube be passed by a Russian army—should the Asiatic frontiers of the empire be invaded, an enormous increase of the Porte's embarrassments and sacrifices must be the inevitable consequence. Already the dissatisfaction prevailing in Bulgaria threatens to end in an insurrection of the Christians. A party in Servia is at the same time suspected—I hope erroneously—of looking to the first occasion for making a push towards independence. The whole of European Turkey, from the frontier of Austria to that of Greece, is almost denuded of regular soldiers, and exposed to the protection of Albanian hordes habituated to turbulence and plunder.

Information has reached me from Scutari that the Montenegrins are preparing to make an incursion into Turkey, with the prospect of finding sympathy and cooperation among the Christian tribes in that neighbourhood. A spirit of fanaticism, dangerous alike to the Rayahs and to the authorities—dangerous to neglect and difficult to control, appears to be rising in other parts of the country. The Greeks, though still quiet, have taken up a position, and hold in society a language which indicates views of ambition, unrestrained by principles or by Treaties. Letters from Tabreez assert that the Shah of Persia has reverted to his plan of collecting an army at Sultanieh, and that the change is attributable to Russian counsels.

It is evident that if the hostility of a powerful neighbour be turned in upon Turkey through all or most of these channels, while the Sultan's main army is occupied in opposing the principal attack, the odds will be fearfully to His Majesty's disadvantage, and, without very effective succours from abroad, the Empire will need some miracle to preserve it from a ruinous catastrophe.

I have the honour to inclose under cover of another despatch the various extracts of Consular correspondence on which these apprehensions are principally founded.

It is my impression, upon the whole, that the Sultan's Mussulman subjects are generally animated with a noble spirit of loyalty and devotion, though tainted with feelings of cruelty and fanaticism, while the Government themselves are ready to stake all upon the question at issue, provided they may reckon upon the cordial support and cooperation of England and France.

The resources of the country are also known to be immense, though hitherto but partially explored; and the necessities of a hazardous position are not unlikely to bring them into fuller activity for the benefit of other and more enterprising nations. But the efficient aid of powerful auxiliaries would seem to be the indispensable condition of a protracted and successful contest.

I have thus, my Lord, attempted to bring into one point of view the leading considerations which cannot with prudence be overlooked at the present important juncture. In no direction is the prospect a cheering one. Negotiation, if not in despair, appears to be at fault; and should a resort to force be unavoidable, the struggle must necessarily be sharp, and the issue uncertain. In any case, nothing can be worse than a hesitating, uncalculated course. It is no doubt a misfortune for Europe to be dragged, when least expecting it, to the verge of an arena from which it is difficult to recoil, and upon which it is almost impossible to enter with any limitation of consequences. But let it be remembered that an evil which is only postponed or evaded, is liable to recur with more inconvenience and danger, at no remote period, and that by venturing at once to look it in the face, we afford ourselves the best chance of

viewing it in its true proportions and employing the most judicious means for its correction.

Henceforward that extensive Empire of which Constantinople is the capital, must in all likelihood either take colour with Russia or be assimilated to Europe. In the latter case British influence and interests may be expected to find a widening field for their development; in the former, they may be tolerated for a time, but they will probably decline by degrees, and be finally excluded.

I can hardly doubt that the notion of Reshid Pasha and his friends, if fully supported from without, is, in failure of negotiation, to settle accounts with Russia once for all, and, in pursuance of his earlier promises and of my urgent and repeated representations, to carry out a system of internal improvement calculated to raise the condition of the Sultan's Christian subjects, and to place the Turkish Empire on a footing of close connexion with the leading, and particularly with the western, Powers of Europe.

The idea is no less brilliant than benevolent; but to realize it would be difficult, though far from impossible, and the Porte's existing sense of danger and need of assistance are powerful aids to success. At all events there is no choice but of difficulties, and human prudence can only choose the least, taking care to have the advantage of choosing in time, and while the circumstances are, as now, more favourable than they can be expected to prove hereafter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 354.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 20.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, July 4, 1853.*

REFERRING to my preceding despatch, I have the honour to inclose herewith a number of extracts from the correspondence lately addressed to me by Her Majesty's Consuls in the Levant. They are transmitted to your Lordship for the purpose of showing the grounds on which my representations concerning the state of this country in certain respects are founded. I am persuaded that your Lordship will find in their contents some additional reasons for recognizing the importance of taking an early decision with respect to such ulterior measures as the failure of every reasonable attempt to effect a settlement of the existing differences by negotiation may render indispensable for carrying out the principle on which Her Majesty's Government has hitherto acted in the affairs of this Empire.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 354.

*Consul Werry to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.)

*Aleppo, June 23, 1853.*

TRANQUILLITY continues to be maintained both here and in the Pashalic generally. The Ramazan is observed by the Moslems with orderly and good conduct, and the Christian sects have not experienced any molestation from them. The civil Government has been conducted with more energy than previously, and is supported by the military commander, who has adopted judicious measures by strengthening the posts, and the city is patrolled day and night. These measures, accompanied with the arrestation of some Moslems who were implicated in the last revolution, have greatly relieved the Christians from alarm, and also prevented them circulating exaggerated reports on the evil intentions of the Moslems.

## Inclosure 2 in No. 354.

*Consul Werry to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.)

*Aleppo, June 25, 1853.*

THE fanatical feelings of the lower orders of Moslems at Antioch, the whole population of which place is of a bad and intriguing character, has been exhibited against Mr. White, a British subject residing at that place, by gross ill usage and insult, and also against the other Europeans there. On the report made to me by the former, I have represented it, conjointly with Mr. Geoffroy, the Acting French Consul here, personally to our Pasha, who has promised to send a Moubasheer to the Moutselim of Antioch to inquire into these complaints and remedy them, and to bring the offenders complained of by Mr. White here for examination and punishment.

## Inclosure 3 in No. 354.

*Mr. Wyse to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.)

*Athens, April 17, 1853.*

THE opinion of most thinking men here is that the whole of these late movements have, as I had suspected, been got up with no intention of overt aggression on the Ottoman territory, but for the purpose of keeping alive in the Greek mind the idea of an intimate connection of this country and her interests with the late measures on the part of Russia.

*Athens, May 30, 1853.*

The Government remains apparently passive, but retains the 2000 troops on the frontier, and occupies the villages now known beyond doubt to belong to Turkey, on the plea no longer of repelling just aggression, but of assuring the tranquillity of the limitroph provinces, &c.

## Inclosure 4 in No. 354.

*Consul-General Fonblanque to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.)

*Belgrade, June 23, 1853.*

I HAVE not the least doubt of the Mission of General Mayerhoff to Servia and Bosnia being intended for objects the most inimical to the Porte, and distinctly auxiliary to the approaching Russian operations. That Prince Alexander quitted Belgrade to avoid M. de Ségur and me and give General Mayerhoff full scope at Kragujevatz is likewise presumable.

My reliance on the Servian agent at the Porte is very much shaken. There are many signs of pre-arrangement with the Prince of Servia and his Government, and I suspect M. Alexa Jacovitz of having come to an understanding at Vienna, either for an Austrian occupation of Servia, or at the very least for restraining any Servian action that could impede the Russian one.

## Inclosure 5 in No. 354.

*Consul Calvert to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.)

*Beyrout, June 10, 1853.*

ALTHOUGH the rupture of relations between Russia and the Porte has produced here an immense sensation, and has given rise to various speculations as to the issue, the tranquillity of the Pashalic of Sidon and of the Lebanon happily remains undisturbed. The Mahomedans feel no hesitation in expressing a desire for hostilities, for according to them continual war in Turkey is requisite to keep alive the spirit of Islamism. On the part of the Christian population hope and fear are equally balanced. When the startling intelligence was first

received much alarm was felt by them, but if they now live in a state of apprehension, all who are interested in the preservation of peace entertain a confident hope that the threatened danger will be averted through the joint and friendly offices of the Sultan's faithful Allies.

The opinions expressed by the foreign agents and European residents, to whom the Syrians look for information, have greatly contributed to the preservation of tranquillity.

As it was reported to me that the outlawed Emir Saad-ed-deen had assumed a rebellious attitude in Hasbeya, and that in open defiance of the Turkish authority he was endeavouring to excite the Druses against it, I wrote privately to Said Bey, &c.

The Emir, therefore, stands almost alone and unsupported, and he cannot avoid falling ere long into the power of Government.

*Beyrout, June 16, 1853.*

It is with satisfaction that I am able to state that in every part of the Pashalic of Sidon the utmost tranquillity is preserved, although it is believed that more alarm exists than is ventured to be openly expressed.

The cause of the ill-will displayed may be easily traced to the rumours of all kinds which are circulated in the town about the state of affairs at the capital. The opinion prevails that the anxiety of the Porte to preserve tranquillity within her own dominions is indicative of more imminent danger from without than she is willing to admit. The feeling of apprehension is shared in particular by the Christian population of the towns in this Pashalic in which they are in the minority, and is not confined to Beyrout alone, where the Mahommedan element is only two-sevenths of the whole population.

Nothing scarcely has given rise to more conjectures and alarm than the call for troops from this country. Many persons, English as well as natives, have expressed to me their fears of the result of weakening the military strength of Syria at a juncture which is generally looked upon as critical.

*June 24.*

The fear of the Christian inhabitants of Beyrout lest the Mussulmans should rise against them, betrays much pusillanimity. An idea has gained ground that many of the Mussulmans have secreted fire-arms in their houses and shops; but still as the Christians in the town are vastly in the majority and can always rely upon the assistance of their more daring bretheren of the Lebanon in an emergency, they have only themselves to blame when by manifesting so much alarm they encourage the Mussulmans to persevere in their display of ill-will towards them.

In many of the coast towns, such as Sidon, Tripoli, and Latakia, there is perhaps greater reason for apprehending disasters, should, by any eventuality, hostilities ensue in Turkey.

Inclosure 6 in No. 354.

*Consul Ongley to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.)

*Canea in Crete, June 25, 1853.*

THIS island is for the present quiet, but both Turks and Greeks appear apprehensive that it will not continue so. The former were beginning to send their families from the country to the town, but the Pasha sent them out again. The latter are providing themselves with European monies to have in hand in case of an emergency. It does not appear to be the wish of the inhabitants that any outbreak should take place, but they fear they may be forced into one by a few giddy headstrong individuals who may commit some excesses on the Turkish population in the country, which would lead to a retaliation, and a civil war be thus lighted up without either party wishing it. A few arms, and 33 quarter barrels, about 825 lbs. of gunpowder, were seized a few days ago, belonging to

some Greeks who were endeavouring to smuggle them into the interior. I am of opinion that the importation was made simply to supply the natural wants of the island, and not with any intention of arming the Greek population.

Inclosure 7 in No. 354.

*Consul Wood to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.)

*Damascus, June 7, 1853.*

THE unusual excitement which prevails in Damascus in consequence of the apprehensions entertained at the capital of a war with Russia, coupled with the disaffection occasioned by the really deplorable laxity and corruption of the local authorities, has produced a state of things that has added much to the general insecurity.

The most formidable Arab tribes have occupied the country from Merg, four leagues from Damascus, to Karieteyn, and are ready to avail themselves of any confusion that might occur to pillage and plunder.

But the worst feature under present circumstances is the highly agitated state of the population of this city. All the classes of the Mahometans are most anxious to see the embarrassments of the Porte increase, and herself involved in a disastrous war. They wish to see her humbled in the hope that her officers in Syria will cease to persevere in a system of administration prejudicial to the interests of the effendis and grandees, whose property has been sequestered under various pretexts, and has been so heavily taxed as to have reduced their incomes to one half, and to the artizans and tradesmen who find themselves at the mercy of rapacious tribunals and police officers.

To aggravate a state of things which is already unsatisfactory the locusts have partially destroyed the crops, while the disaffected districts have not been brought under cultivation.

Inclosure 8 in No. 354.

*Consul Brant to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.)

*Erzeroom, June 24, 1853.*

I HAVE inquired of various persons coming from Georgia whether any military preparations were making there. Some have said that troops were being assembled at Gumri; others, and those the most numerous, that everything was perfectly quiet, but that war was talked of as imminent. Our Pasha says that troops have certainly been collected at Gumri, but in so quiet a way as scarcely to have attracted public observation. It appears to me that no important movement of troops can have been made; but it is not unlikely that the Russians may fear that, in case of war, a simultaneous attack might be combined between the Daghestanlees and the Turks, and in that idea the garrison of Gumri may have been strengthened.

I cannot see that Russia would derive any advantage from the present occupation of Erzeroom; to do that, and to maintain a sufficient force to resist the attack of the Caucasian tribes, which would certainly be made were war commenced, would require a larger force than she could conveniently withdraw from those points where the principal struggle must take place; and were she victorious there, she could at any time occupy Erzeroom. I therefore conceive that the object of Russia is probably to maintain her positions in Georgia, without any addition to the forces she has there, which, though sufficient for defence, for offensive operations would scarce suffice. In the last invasion of this part of Turkey, the number of Russian soldiers did not exceed 10,000, though they were accompanied by a vast number of irregular native levies, but then Turkey had no disciplined troops; now there will be here, perhaps, a force of 20,000 disciplined troops, besides irregulars, so that it would be scarce safe for Russia to venture on an invasion with an army of less strength; and I doubt

whether she could detach so large a force from Georgia without offering too great an advantage to the Caucasian tribes ; so that I do not apprehend that we shall see a Russian army in Erzeroom for the present.

Inclosure 9 in No. 354.

*Consul Brant to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.)

*Erzeroom, June 25, 1853.*

IN every part of the country the Koords are actively engaged in robbing, both on the high roads and in the villages.

It is said that within a few days about seven battalions will have come in from Harpoot ; and some time since, seventy pieces of artillery set out on the way hither by a circuitous route, as the direct one was not practicable for guns. The detachments in the various out-stations have been called in, but I trust some troops will be left there, as the country will be at the mercy of the Koords, and incalculable injury to the cultivators will ensue.

The militia has been called out ; and altogether the force to be collected here will, it is said, amount to about 40,000 disciplined troops. I hope that with such an imposing force the Porte and the General may not be tempted to make an attack upon Georgia, as, from the want of skill in the Turkish officers, there would not be much hope of success. But if Russia were to meet with reverses in Europe, so as to disable her from succouring Georgia, and if an European force were landed in that country to cooperate with the Turkish force, then indeed a forward movement, combined with an attack on the part of the Caucasian tribes, would not fail to drive the Russians out of Georgia, for they would find few friends among the natives, were they to experience a reverse.

Inclosure 10 in No. 354.

————— *to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.)

*Erzeroom, June 25, 1853.*

THERE is no communication whatever between Gumri and Batoom, on account of the want of roads through the almost inaccessible country which separates the two places. Any news from the former town would naturally find its way through Kars to Erzeroom ; and I believe Mr. Brant is writing to your Excellency on this subject. I do not think it probable or possible for the Russians to march from Gumri on Batoom. The port could be occupied at any time by Russian vessels of war, or by troops marched by the frontier along the sea-shore. The country around Batoom is untenable, on account of its mountainous and densely-wooded character, so that the port alone could be occupied, and could, I imagine, be easily retaken at any moment.

Inclosure 11 in No. 354.

*Vice-Consul Damaschino to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Translation.)

(Extract.)

*Janina, June 10, 1853.*

AFTER orders had been issued for the departure of the troops, the Pasha thought it requisite to submit to the Council the representations made by the inhabitants concerning the danger which they considered themselves exposed to by the withdrawal of the regular troops. It was decided that the two regiments forming the garrisons of Janina and Arta should remain until further instructions.

Taking into consideration the circumstances of the country, and the character of the Albanians, who would most likely fall back into their old habits, the measure of not leaving the country altogether unprovided with regular troops is a very desirable one.

## Inclosure 12 in No. 354.

*Consul Longworth to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extracts.)

*Monastir, May 19, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit, herewith inclosed, a translation into Turkish from the Greek language, of an incendiary and anonymous address which was, during the last month or two, as I am informed, circulated in the neighbouring provinces of Thessaly and Salonica. It seems to have failed exciting disturbance of any kind, however it may have contributed to the recent panic.

*Monastir, June 10, 1853.*

Aoni Pasha is of opinion that it is exceedingly imprudent to leave the provinces of Thessaly and Thrace, the inhabitants of which are notoriously disaffected, and ready to join the Hellenes on the first opportunity, thus denuded of all regular defence.

Only 6,500 Albanian irregulars, picked men, are to be levied for Shumla. Considering the numerical force of the bands which Albania can furnish, if necessary, this is a very inconsiderable body indeed; and, coupled with the fact already mentioned, that all the regular troops are to be withdrawn from Thessaly and Thrace, leads me to infer that, in the event of the rising of the Greeks in these provinces, it is intended to employ the Albanians against them. How far a plan of this kind would be consistent with good policy, to say nothing of humanity, I must leave your Excellency to judge; believing, for my part, such a result (whether casual or contemplated) by no means improbable.

## Inclosure 13 in No. 354.

*Consul Longworth to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.)

*Monastir, June 23, 1853.*

AS I had the honour to state in my last despatch to your Excellency, some alarm and uneasiness have been experienced by the inhabitants of Monastir at the complete evacuation of the place by the Nizam or regular troops. The Austrian Vice-Consul, M. Westermager, having requested me to join him in representing to Aoni Pasha the danger of leaving the town in this defenceless state, I deemed it advisable (though by no means concurring with him as to the extent of that danger, or of the disorders which he believed had actually taken place), to recommend that a small number of regulars should be detained here, if they could be spared without causing inconvenience and embarrassment with regard to the military combinations now in progress. Aoni Pasha as well as the civil authorities at once acquiesced in the propriety of the suggestion, but said they could not venture to infringe the orders of Omer Pasha, who had positively instructed them to send forward all the regular troops.

The Austrian Vice-Consul, who appeared to labour under considerable excitement, then wished me to enter into a joint protest with him on the subject; but this I informed him I did not feel justified in doing. The fact is that although public security might be promoted by the detention of a few companies of infantry at Monastir, there are in the precarious social condition of European Turkey many other places where a still more urgent necessity might be pleaded for their presence: and yet if all such claims were attended to, serious obstacles would be opposed to the concentration of the Turkish army at Shumla.

## Inclosure 14 in No. 354.

*M. Tzucala to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.)

*Philippopoli, May 25, 1853.*

AN unpardonable indifference of the Porte to what is passing in Bulgaria, under the specious pretence of being a national Slavonic educational movement, has ruined all classes, both governing and governed. The public is excited by members of the Bulgaro-Slavonic Society acting under Russian influence.

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## Inclosure 15 in No. 354.

*Consul Saunders to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extracts.)

*Prevesa, April 13, 1853.*

The greater part of the villages along the whole line of boundary in Thessaly and Epirus, as well as the entire districts wherein these villages are situated, are almost exclusively tenanted by Christian subjects of the Porte in a state of extreme destitution.

*June 2, 1853.*

The frontier districts of Thessaly and Epirus appear likely to cause considerable embarrassment to the Government in the event of pending negotiations assuming a less pacific character.

The rural population, oppressed by fiscal exactions, and subjected to intolerable acts of violence and injustice, cannot be expected to entertain any but the most rancorous feelings towards their persecutors.

The inhabitants of the greater part of these villages being moreover exclusively Christians, and seeing no other prospect of relief open to them, are continually thronging the foreign Consulates with the view of seeking some friendly intervention.

After thus depicting to your Lordship the disastrous condition of these frontier districts from various causes, it may be readily conceived that for some time past the emigration of whole families to Greece, which can only be accomplished by stealth, has been practised to a considerable extent; and that parties so circumstanced, together with the whole body of Suliots, Chimariots, and other Epirotes domiciled in Greece will be eager to avail themselves of the first favourable occasion of promoting disturbances in this province.

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## Inclosure 16 in No. 354.

*Consul Blunt to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.)

*Salonica, June 23, 1853.*

THE inhabitants of Larissa and other towns in that district appear greatly alarmed for the consequences that may ensue from the removal of the regular troops, which does not appear to have been a prudent measure, having little confidence in the irregulars, who, generally speaking, spread alarm wherever they are stationed or move, owing to their well-known propensity to plunder.

On the 21st instant the Acting Governor of Salonica received intelligence of a band of sixty robbers, mostly Christians, which infest the district of Serres.

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Inclosure 17 in No. 354.

*Vice-Consul Bonatti to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Translation.)

(Extracts.)

*Scutari, June 1, 1853.*

ALL that remains to protect these districts are three battalions of regular troops and 1200 irregular Topchi, who are quartered on the borders. All the desperate characters have raised their heads again, and acts of rapine and robbery are again very frequent at the expense of the Christians.

Osman Pasha, the Governor of this province, is a Mussulman, and sees with perfect indifference all these excesses. The Christians, who are exposed to the vengeance of their enemies, live in a continual state of alarm. It must, however, be borne in mind that the Christian population of these districts is three times greater than the Turkish, and if they have been hitherto kept down it was merely by the hope of political improvement under the promising administration of Omer Pasha.

*Scutari, June 8, 1853.*

There now remain in these parts only three companies, incomplete, of regular troops, distributed among the various fortresses in this district.

A few days ago a conflict took place between the Montenegrins of Cuci and those of the tribe of Clementi in the Turkish territory. Several of the former tried to get into the village of Selei in Clementi, to carry away the cattle, and succeeded in driving off a few after killing two of the shepherds.

*Scutari, June 15, 1853.*

It is said that in the several Conferences held by the Chieftain Hassan Nica with Prince Daniel at Cettigne, the said Chieftain had promised that the mountainous tribes of this province should be favourable to the cause of Montenegro, and that he would get up an insurrection when a favourable opportunity presented itself. Prince Daniel sent for several of the Chiefs of the Clementi tribe to proceed to Cettigne and confer with him. They refused, however, to go.

P.S.—Intelligence has just been received from Montenegro that great warlike preparations are being made there, and that they are assembling all their forces to attack the Turkish territory. The Pasha is already sending a piece of cannon to Podgoritza. There are no regular troops in this province, nor can any assistance be expected from these mountain tribes. It is thought, on the contrary, that they would operate in favour of Montenegro.

Inclosure 18 in No. 354.

*Vice-Consul Bonatti to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Translation.)

(Extract.)

*Scutari, June 22, 1853.*

IT is much feared that in the event of a conflict with the Montenegro, the Christian mountaineers of this Province would refuse to join the Turks, because, as I have already reported, the influence of the Montenegro has begun to prevail amongst them; so that when the Pasha made his proposals to them concerning the campaign, in the event of provocation being given by the Montenegrins, the Turks themselves began to suspect the truth, because they replied that they would be ready to march whenever the Pasha would summon hither two Chiefs of every Christian tribe of the Mountains as hostages, inasmuch as they dreaded a collusion on their part.

It cannot be denied, on the other hand, that the Montenegrins suffer under constant provocations. A Turk of Podgoritza killed lately a Montenegrin of

Piperi in a spirit of pure fanaticism. Under the present misrule this feeling may lead to fatal consequences.

The Governor of Herzegovina, Mustapha Pasha, is ordered to assume the Pashalic of Scutari should hostilities break out on the part of Russia. Osman Pasha will replace him. This change is perhaps contemplated with reference to the influence which they would naturally exercise over their fellow-countrymen in favour of the Porte, they being both men of great note.

Three battalions of the reserve at Tiranna have deserted, not being able to obtain any pay, and their families are made to suffer for it.

Since the departure of Seraskier misrule prevails. Murder and plunder are of daily occurrence, and the Government enriches itself by mulcting the parties, &c. About ten murders have been committed within the last eight days between Scutari, Alessio, Dulcigno, and Tiranna. The public roads are infested, and no measures are taken.

Inclosure 19 in No. 354.

*Consul Stevens to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.)

*Tabreez, June 5, 1853.*

THE Prince Governor of Tabreez told my brother yesterday that he had received letters from Tehran, stating that the King had at one moment abandoned the intention of camping with a large army at Sultanieh during the summer, but that the Russian Minister had prevailed upon (the word used was "compelled") His Majesty to do so.

The Prince understood by his letters that the Russian Minister had urged upon the King the advantage which Persia might, with such a force under arms, derive in the event of a war between Turkey and Russia.

The Prince added that the King will therefore proceed to Sultanieh, and his army consists of 35,000 to 40,000 men.

Inclosure 20 in No. 354.

*Vice-Consul Stevens to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.)

*Trebizond, June 28, 1853.*

PRIVATE letters from Georgia recently received here mention that the Russians are actively employed strengthening their stations, and erecting new forts on the Circassian and Mingrelian coasts.

Inclosure 21 in No. 354.

*Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extracts.)

*Shumla, June 6, 1853.*

ALL along the road between Varna and Shumla I observed in the several places at which I stopped that the Turks were impressed with great fear, and the Christians with still greater, as they fear both the Russians on account of the devastation which a war would occasion, and the Turks on account of the vengeance which they anticipate they would indulge, in such an event, towards them.

The presence of the regular troops is certainly much to be desired in the view of quelling the rising feeling of animosity on the part of the Turkish population generally, and of suppressing it altogether should any outbreak arise.

*Turnova, June 12, 1853.*

As far as I have been enabled yet to observe, the military armaments and expected hostilities between Russia and the Porte have produced no other

feeling than that of panic of the usual consequences and disasters which may be anticipated from warfare in general, and more especially so at this period of the year when the peasantry are on the eve of gathering in their harvests ; and these considerations certainly influence in a predominant degree the feelings of the Bulgarian Christians, who form the majority of the population of this province. On the other hand, the Turkish inhabitants are evidently greatly alarmed and doubtful as to the fate that may await them in the issue of a war with Russia, which they appear sincerely to desire and hope may be averted. But irrespective of the warlike preparations on the part of Russia, and the defensive measures adopting by the Porte which at this moment engross the attention of all, the natural feelings and sentiments of the Christian population of this immediate district—comprising a population of about 160,000—exhibit a remarkable degree of independence of spirit, if not in action at least in their social relations with the Turkish inhabitants. In Turnova I cannot but remark a freedom of intercourse with the Turkish population, and an assumption of equality on the part of the Bulgarians which has greatly surprised me, so different is this state of things from the abased and humbled condition of the Christians in most other districts of this province. Hence I apprehend that if any acts of insubordination be meditated under such circumstances as those attending the presence of a Russian army on this side of the Danube, it is in this district of Bulgaria, where the people are imbued with a bold spirit and with a lurking disaffection, that the Turkish Government may look for demonstrations of a rebellious nature, rather than in any other parts of this province, where the Bulgarian Christians, subdued and humbled either by the presence of a greater proportion of the Mussulman population, or by a long course of submission to local oppression, are driven to outbreak and remonstrance only by some sudden and notable act of injustice.

*Turnova, June 16, 1853.*

The Turks I have found in some instances (and this impression may be more general than I am as yet prepared to state to your Lordship) are under the persuasion that Russia meditates a religious war upon this country, and that mosques of Christian origin, as Saint Sophia and others similarly associated, are demanded by Russia to be given up to the Greek sect ; these and the like impressions naturally inspiring the corresponding feeling of religious fanaticism in defence of their faith.

On the other hand, the Christians have in some cases expressed equally extravagant notions, not only of the extent of the demands of Russia on their behalf, but of the fanatical spirit of vengeance and hatred which such demands must create on the part of the Mussulmans, such impressions and conclusions filling their minds with much anxiety and fear.

*Turnova, June 17, 1853.*

Omer Pasha was of strong opinion that the Russians would on this occasion avoid the line of the coast, and occupy the centre of Bulgaria.

The uncertainty of operations by sea, and the sympathy which the Russians would hope to awaken among the Christian populations of these districts, were the principal considerations upon which this opinion of the General was founded.

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Inclosure 22 in No. 354.

*Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.)

*Turnova, June 28, 1853.*

THIS state of things is the more to be deplored under present circumstances, as the feelings of the Christian population are decidedly opposed to any foreign occupation, and both the Pasha and the Bishop of Turnova have repeatedly assured me, that were it not for the recurrence of these wanton and cold-blooded murders, and the consequent total insecurity of life, the Bulgarians would, they feel certain, ask for arms to resist an invasion of the country, espe-

cially at this moment, when the crops are ripe, and the fruits of all their toil may be lost by the commencement of hostilities ; still, the more pressing evil now becomes the dread which the Turks themselves inspire.

Inclosure 23 in No. 354:

*Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.)

*Turnova, July 1, 1853.*

MR. COLQUHOUN in speaking of Bulgaria, says :

“ People here assert that the Bulgarian population is decidedly Russian at heart, and were the armies of the Czar to cross the Danube that they would be received as brothers. The Bulgarians have several wealthy persons over here, and the Russian Consulate has been handling them, and endeavouring to make use of them, but I believe hitherto without success.”

With reference to these observations, I can only say, that from every opportunity I have had of observation, it appears to me that the Christian population of this province regards the threatened invasion by the Russians as a most disastrous and untoward event ; but they would doubtless make the best of the sympathy which the Russians would lavish on their behalf, to which may be added the most unfortunate and menacing attitude which the Turks have assumed towards the Christians in certain districts of this Pashalic, and I believe elsewhere in this province.

Reports of these menaces and threats reach me daily from Sistova, and yesterday an Ionian who arrived from that place states, that although he had not terminated his affairs there, he had decided upon leaving immediately, as the danger to which the Christians were exposed had become imminent, even the Moudir of that place having declared that after the Bayram it would go hard with the Christians.

No. 355.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 20.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, July 7, 1853.*

I AVAIL myself of this opportunity to forward copies of two instructions addressed by me to the Acting Chief Interpreter of Her Majesty's Embassy respecting the alarms entertained in some parts of the Empire by the Sultan's Christian and other tributary subjects, the comparative want of protection in districts from which the regular troops have been necessarily withdrawn, and the number of crimes committed, particularly in the province of Bulgaria, by Turks suspected of indulging a spirit of fanatical hatred towards the Christians. These instructions, as your Lordship will observe, were drawn up for communication to the Turkish Government, and I shall not fail to follow them up, if necessary, with other steps calculated to enforce the suggestions which they contain.

Apprehensions, not resting, as far as I yet know, on any well averred facts, are entertained in the capital, as well as elsewhere, of an intended rising against the Christians, and I have been urged by some well-informed persons to call up Her Majesty's squadron with a view to their protection. It may before long be found advisable to do so, but I am unwilling to resort to such a measure without a palpable urgency, considering that it might be construed into an act of menace against Russia, and diminish what slender chances still remain of a successful negotiation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

## Inclosure 1 in No. 355.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.*

Sir,

*Therapia, June 22, 1853.*

YOU will communicate to Reshid Pasha the several extracts of Consular reports from Scutari, Monastir, and Prevesa, annexed to this instruction. You will observe that they relate in part to those acts of disorder, injustice, and corruption, sometimes of a very atrocious kind, which I have frequently brought by your means to the knowledge of the Ottoman Porte. The assurances given to me by the late Grand Vizier, the appointment of a more trustworthy Pasha at Salonica, and the order for Hazzi Hussein Pasha to repair forthwith to Constantinople, had warranted a hope that the grievances so justly and loudly complained of could at length be effectively redressed. But it is with extreme disappointment and pain that I observe the continuance of evils which affect so deeply the welfare of the empire, and which assume a deeper character of importance in the present critical state of the Porte's relations with Russia. You will read this instruction to his Highness; you will communicate fully the contents of the accompanying extracts; and you will press upon his mind the urgency of adopting adequate measures for the repression of crime and the protection of the Sultan's loyal and peaceable subjects without further delay. I am aware that the Porte's attention is principally directed at present to their defensive preparations which cannot with safety be dispensed with; but it cannot be denied that the matters now brought into notice have an immediate bearing on the same great interest, and cannot be neglected with safety more than with justice.

You are at liberty to leave a translation of this instruction with Reshid Pasha, and also copies of the annexed extracts should his Highness appear to require them.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE

## Inclosure 2 in No. 355.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.*

Sir,

*Therapia, July 4, 1853.*

I HAVE frequently had occasion of late, and indeed for some years back, to bring to the knowledge of the Porte such atrocious instances of cruelty, rapine, and murder, as I have found, with extreme concern, in the Consular reports, exhibiting generally the disturbed and misgoverned condition of many parts of Roumelia, and calling loudly for redress from the Imperial Government. The character of these disorderly and brutal outrages may be said with truth to be, in general, that of Mussulman fanaticism, excited by cupidity and hatred against the Sultan's Christian subjects. I will not say that my friendly and earnest representations have been entirely disregarded. On the contrary, I have sometimes had the satisfaction of being instrumental towards the repression of crime, the alleviation of individual suffering, and the recall of incapable magistrates. But the evil, nevertheless, has not been permanently removed, and the effect of every partial check has been of short duration.

It is evident that the present political circumstances of the empire must tend directly to increase the temptations to crime, and to bring a much wider extent of country within the range of disorderly and outrageous passions. The Mussulmans are excited by the prospect of war. The Rayahs, from their numbers, especially in the European provinces of Turkey, are objects of fear, no less than of hatred and cupidity. The movement of troops; the calling out the Rediff; the concentration of regulars on the frontier; the demand of supplies; the scarcity of money; the pressure for payment of arrears; the anticipation of future taxes, concur to spread alarm among the peaceable, and to hold out a clearer prospect of impunity to the violent. The Pashas and subordinate Governors are perplexed; individuals possessing local wealth acquire a licentious

influence; and unless some powerful remedies be applied without further delay it is to be feared that the authority of the Central Government will be completely overpowered in some of the provinces, and that the people, despairing of protection, will augment the disorder by resorting to lawless means of self-preservation.

For the sake of the empire itself, no less than from motives of humanity, am inexpressibly anxious to engage the Porte's attention, ere it be too late, to this abundant source of evil and danger. I am well aware of the difficulties under which the Government labours, and that it is far more easy to describe any mischief and to trace it to its causes, than to find an efficient remedy. Yet such is the magnitude of the evil, and such the danger of its extension under present circumstances, that the necessity of checking its progress, and restoring some degree of confidence among the tributary classes, is scarcely subordinate to the duty of preparing the means of resistance against an invading foreign army.

In addition to the numerous extracts of my Consular correspondence which I have furnished to the office of Foreign Affairs with reference to this subject, now inclose, for special consideration, the intelligence which has reached me from an official source in Bulgaria. Reshid Pasha will learn from its contents how crying is the evil—how urgent the peril, even in a province where a very considerable portion of the regular army is being at this moment collected.

The more pressing and obvious wants are these: the correction, by means of explanation and control, of that fanatical and licentious spirit which now inflames the Mussulman population; some special means for the protection of the loyal and peaceably disposed, whether Mussulman or Rayah; an efficient responsibility on the part of the local governors and magistrates towards the Supreme Government; a more regular and judicious exercise of authority in the collection of supplies, and the direction of persons acting in concert with the army; relief for the labouring and the rural classes, by means of extraordinary aids obtained by the Porte from other sources, and applied to the payment of the forces, and other immediate wants of the State.

I abstain from offering any suggestions of a more particular kind, in the belief that the Porte is the best judge of its own resources, and in the hope that it will adopt every remedial measure to be found within the range of those resources.

You will leave a copy of this instruction with Reshid Pasha, after reading and fully explaining its contents to his Highness; and you will request that it may be brought, without delay, before His Majesty the Sultan and the Council of State, to the end that it may be taken into serious consideration; and that the Porte's decision may be communicated to me for the information of Her Majesty's Government.

Yours, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 356.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 20.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, July 7, 1853.*

WE have at length received official intelligence of the entrance of the Russian army in Bessarabia into the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. The crossing of the Pruth at Sculeni began at 8 o'clock in the forenoon of the 3rd instant.

Inclosed herewith is a copy of Consul Gardner's despatch to me, transmitting a copy of Prince Gortchakoff's Proclamation. As the terms of this document agree with the conditions on which I had recommended the Porte not to withdraw the Hospodars, I have every reason to believe that they will remain in their respective Governments for the present.

There are two passages in the Proclamation to which I beg leave to draw your Lordship's attention; one is that describing the conditions on which the Emperor is stated to abstain from offensive hostilities against Turkey, and the other indicative of the manner in which the pledge of not charging the inha-

bitants of the Principalities with the expenses of the occupation is to be redeemed. It cannot be necessary for me to trouble your Lordship with any comment upon the interpretation to which, in different ways, each of them is liable.

For your Lordship's more particular information, I inclose herewith in copy a despatch addressed by the Prince of Moldavia to Reshid Pasha.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 356.

*Consul Gardner to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Jassy, July 2, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to state to your Excellency that this morning I received a visit from the Minister Basil Ghyka, who had been requested by the Prince to call upon me. He brought the positive intelligence that the two Principalities would be immediately occupied by the forces of Russia, and showed me the different letters which the Prince had received from Prince Gortchakoff and the Russian Consul, the former announcing his arrival, and the Proclamation to be issued by him on entering the Principality (which is probably now under press), and the latter demanding that a deputation should be sent to meet the General. The Proclamation was permitted to be copied, and I have the honour to inclose it, as a document which removes every doubt.

I have felt it a duty to call upon the Hospodar, who has permitted me to send the present despatch under cover of his own to Constantinople by estafette. He gave me the further intelligence, which I repeat verbatim.

The Russian troops which will enter the Principality are the 4th Corps d'Armée, commanded by General Dannenberg, and a part of the 2nd Corps, forming a total 80,000 men. The remainder of the 2nd Corps, under command of its Chief, General Panajuttin, will pass the Pruth at Leova, and proceed to Wallachia and Bucharest, while the 5th Corps d'Armée, under General Lüders, will remain as a corps d'observation, ready on the first act of hostility by the Turks to cross the Danube, and from Toulcha march direct onwards to the Balkan, force the defiles, and attack Adrianople. Each corps d'armée is 60,000 strong. These strategic movements I pretend not to judge; I merely repeat what was observed by the Prince. I said to the Prince that my reports to your Excellency had been the repetition of his own assurances to me; that he had received no intelligence whatever of the intention of the Russian Government to occupy militarily these Principalities. His reply was, that until the present moment he had utterly disbelieved it himself, but that, entertaining no longer any further doubt of such an intention, he had immediately made it known to me.

The Prince subsequently added that he had lately received letters from Constantinople. The Divan complained of their receiving little or no positive information from him, and he could give none, for it was impossible for him to state as a fact what might be disproved by the events of the succeeding day; that his position was most difficult and delicate; that he would have proceeded at once to Constantinople, if the Sultan had required his presence there, but that it was now impossible for him to say what may be required of him or of his Government by the Russian authorities, who promise to respect every right and privilege, but whose future instructions must depend much, nay altogether, on the turn which events may take. In fact, all communication with Turkey might be interrupted.

The Prince is writing to Constantinople, and will dwell more at length on these topics. His Highness professes the utmost deference for the orders of the Porte, but must defer at the same time to others which may be in direct opposition to them.

I shall await with anxiety your Excellency's instructions to regulate my own conduct. My means are very restricted, for everything is absorbed by the expenses of the Consulate and salaries of my employés, and these visits render

everything dear. Within the last few years the price of everything has doubled or tripled.

I entreat your Excellency's consideration of my present position.

The present despatch contains a summary of the intelligence from his Highness. The matter I have been forced to compress, from want of time, as I have only had a brief hour to address your Excellency, but feel it as a real favour.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) S. GARDNER.

P.S.—The Russian troops will enter Jassy to-morrow (Sunday).

Inclosure 2 in No. 356.

*Proclamation of Prince Gortchakoff.*

[See Inclosure 2 in No. 329.]

Inclosure 3 in No. 356.

*Prince Ghyka to Reshid Pasha.*

Monseigneur,

Jassi, le 18 Juin, 1853.

JE m'empresse de porter à la connaissance de votre Altesse les notions suivantes :

Par la poste précédente j'ai eu l'occasion de prévenir le Prince Vogorides que M. Khaltchinski, Consul-Général à Bucarest, étant arrivé à Jassi en était reparti immédiatement pour se rendre en Bessarabie. De retour, après une absence de quatre jours, M. Khaltchinski avait été chargé de me prévenir de l'entrée probable des troupes Russes dans les Principautés, en ajoutant toutefois que l'ordre n'en était attendu par le Prince Gortchakoff, résidant à Kicheneff, que vers le 17 du courant. Aujourd'hui, le 18, vers midi M. Khaltchinski a quitté Jassi pour se rendre à Bucarest. Après son départ je viens de recevoir pour la première fois une communication officielle du Prince Gortchakoff comme Commandant-en-chef, par laquelle son Excellence me notifie que l'armée placée sous son commandement venait de recevoir l'ordre de franchir la frontière le 21 du courant, pour occuper les deux Principautés. En faisant allusion aux motifs de cette détermination, qui sont d'ailleurs exposés dans la proclamation émanée du quartier-général, le Commandant-en-chef s'attache à m'assurer que l'occupation s'opérera sans porter la moindre atteinte aux privilèges accordés aux provinces qui sont confiées à l'administration des Princes, et sans leur imposer aucune nouvelle charge ou corvée.

Il réclame finalement mon concours pour subvenir aux besoins des troupes, et promet que, animées du meilleur esprit de discipline, elles ne donneront aucun sujet de plainte. Cette communication, conçue dans les termes sus-mentionnés, a été accompagnée d'une proclamation destinée à être adressée aux habitants de la Moldavie et de la Valachie, et dont votre Altesse trouvera ci-jointe la copie textuelle. Cette proclamation sera sans doute publiée le jour même de l'entrée des troupes.

Le Commandant-en-chef a chargé en même temps le Consul résidant à Jassi de s'entendre avec le Gouvernement Moldave pour préparer les provisions nécessaires à l'entretien des troupes, qu'il s'engage de payer aux prix courants, et a requis en outre que des Commissaires Moldaves fussent accrédités auprès des Commandants, afin de faciliter l'acquisition des produits dont ils auraient besoin. Cette disposition, qui avait été constamment adoptée dans toutes les occasions précédentes, a été toujours considéré comme indispensable et avantageux pour le pays, en ce qu'elle admettait des intermédiaires indigènes entre les Commandants des troupes et la population. La note du Consulat de Russie, qui réquerait l'adoption de cette mesure, insistait à ce que les trois Commissaires désignés pour être placés auprès du Commandant-en-chef, se rendissent immédiatement à Kicheneff pour être mis à sa disposition. Je n'ai pas cru devoir

céder à une pareille demande inusitée, et me suis borné à enjoindre aux susdits Commissaires, ainsi qu'aux autres, de se trouver sur la frontière au moment du passage des troupes.

D'après les renseignements que j'ai pu recueillir, je me fais un devoir d'ajouter à ce que précède, que le Prince Gortchakoff réunit sous son commandement trois corps d'armée, le 2<sup>me</sup> sous les ordres du Général Paniutine, le 4<sup>me</sup> commandé par le Général Dannenberg, et le 5<sup>me</sup> sous le Général Lüders ; le 4<sup>me</sup> et partie du 5<sup>me</sup> Corps sont destinés à occuper les deux Principautés, le Général Lüders continuant d'ailleurs de résider en Bessarabie. Le passage s'effectuera par Scouleni et Leova, et le quartier-général sera établi à Bucarest.

Votre Altesse, pesant ma position dans sa sagesse, jugera, j'ose l'espérer, l'impossibilité où je me trouve de me refuser aux exigences de toute genre qu'implique une occupation militaire.

Aussi à défaut d'instructions sous la circonstance suis-je obligé de borner mon rôle à assurer la tranquillité publique, et à veiller à ce qu'il ne soit porté aucune lésion aux populations, et à ce que les contrats passés entre les commandants des troupes et des particuliers soient fidèlement exécutés.

Daignez, &c.

(Signé) G. GHYKA.

(Translation.)

Monseigneur,

*Jassy, June 18, 1853.*

I HASTEN to communicate to your Excellency the following particulars :

By the previous post I had occasion to apprise Prince Vogorides that M. Khaltchinski, Consul-General at Bucharest, having arrived at Jassy, set out from thence immediately on his way to Bessarabia. On his return, after an absence of four days, M. Khaltchinski was ordered to apprise me of the probable entrance of Russian troops into the Principalities, adding, however, that the order for it was not expected by Prince Gortchakoff, who was residing at Kicheneff, before about the 17th instant. To-day, the 18th, about noon, M. Khaltchinski left Jassy on his way to Bucharest. After his departure, I have received for the first time an official communication from Prince Gortchakoff, as Commander-in-chief, by which his Excellency makes known to me that the army placed under his orders had received orders to cross the frontier on the 21st instant, in order to occupy the two Principalities. In alluding to the grounds of this determination, which are moreover set forth in the proclamation issued from head-quarters, the Commander-in-chief makes a point of assuring me that the occupation will be effected without any prejudice to the privileges conferred upon the provinces which are entrusted to the administration of the Princes, and without imposing upon them any fresh charge or service.

Finally, he requests my concurrence for providing for the wants of the troops, and he promises that, animated with the best spirit of discipline, they will afford no cause for complaint. This communication, drawn up in the above mentioned terms, was accompanied by a proclamation intended to be addressed to the inhabitants of Moldavia and Wallachia, an exact copy of which your Excellency will find annexed.

The Commander-in-chief, at the same time, has directed the Consul residing at Jassy to come to an understanding with the Moldavian Government for the preparation of the provisions necessary for the subsistence of the troops, which he engages to pay for at the current prices ; and he has moreover required that Moldavian Commissaries should be accredited to the Commanders in order to facilitate obtaining the produce of which they may stand in need. This arrangement, which was constantly adopted on all previous occasions, has always been considered as indispensable and advantageous to the country, inasmuch as it allowed the interposition of native authorities between the Commanders of troops and the people. The note of the Russian Consulate, which required the adoption of this measure, urged that the three Commissioners whom it was intended to attach to the Commander-in-chief should proceed immediately to Kicheneff, to be at his disposal. I did not think it proper to accède to such an unusual demand, and I confined myself to desiring the said Commissioners, as well as the others, to be on the frontier at the passage of the troops.

According to the information which I have been able to collect, I make it my duty to add to what goes before that Prince Gortchakoff has under his command three corps d'armée, the second under the orders of General Paniutine, the fourth commanded by General Dannenberg, the fifth under General Lüders; the fourth and a part of the fifth corps are intended to occupy the two Principalities, General Lüders continuing, besides, to reside in Bessarabia. The passage will take place at Sculeni and Leova, and the head-quarters will be established at Bucharest.

Your Excellency, estimating in your wisdom my position, will, I venture to hope, judge how impossible it is for me to decline complying with the requirements of all kinds involved in a military occupation.

Accordingly, in default of instructions under the circumstances, I am obliged to confine myself to securing public tranquillity, and taking care that no injury is done to the people; and that the contracts entered into between the Commanders of troops and individuals are faithfully executed.

Be pleased, &c.  
(Signed) G. GHYKA.

No. 357.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 20.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, July 9, 1853.*

THE Austrian "suggestion," adopted, as I mentioned before, by the Representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia, has been laid before the Sultan, and after an unexplained delay of several days, returned to Reshid Pasha with His Majesty's sanction. No subsequent communication has, however, been made to me, or, as far as I know, to my colleagues on the subject, and the idea of a fusion of the two ultimatums must now be either abandoned, as offering no prospect of success, or united with the execution of what is suggested in your Lordship's instruction of June 18. The latter will probably be found the preferable course.

The Ministerial incidents of the last two days have necessarily postponed the completion of that proceeding, but I trust that, the Cabinet being now restored to its former construction, there will be no longer any delay which can by possibility be avoided.

No. 358.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 21, 1853.*

COUNT COLLOREDO yesterday communicated to me a despatch from Count Buol, stating that the French project of note for settling the differences between Russia and Turkey had been transmitted to Baron Bruck at Constantinople, with instructions to recommend its immediate adoption by the Porte, if the Austrian project then under consideration had not yet been agreed to; but Count Buol added if the latter project should in the meanwhile have been approved by the Turkish Government, and should arrive at Vienna, it was his intention, for the purpose of saving time, to send it immediately to St. Petersburg.

I told Count Colloredo that the course which Count Buol proposed to adopt appeared to be judicious, and I again impressed upon him the urgent necessity of avoiding delay.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

## No. 359.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 21.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, July 15, 1853.*

A CONVERSATION which I had this morning with the Chancellor was more satisfactory than any which I have held for some time with his Excellency.

Count Nesselrode professed himself much gratified by the assurances which I gave him of the conciliatory disposition by which Her Majesty's Government are still animated, in despite of all that has of late occurred, and expressed his confidence that under this state of things a disturbance of the European peace was not to be feared.

His expression was that he now felt very sanguine as to the future, since, as Her Majesty's Government were intent upon finding some solution of the present difficulty which would be acceptable to the Emperor, he was convinced that these means of escape from danger would be discovered.

## No. 360.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 22.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, July 21, 1853.*

I HAVE placed in M. Drouyn de Lhuys' hands the copy, transmitted to me for that purpose, of your Lordship's despatch of the 16th instant to Sir Hamilton Seymour. His Excellency, in requesting me to thank your Lordship for this communication, expressed his satisfaction at the manner in which it replied to the Russian circular of the 2nd instant.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

## No. 361.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 22, 1853.*

YOUR Excellency was instructed confidentially to submit to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the Project of Convention which Her Majesty's Government thought might be agreed to by Russia and the Porte for settling the differences between the two countries, and it was not until I heard from your Excellency that this project was fully approved by the French Government, that it was sent to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and to Her Majesty's Minister at St. Petersburg.

It is right, however, that an official record of this communication should exist, and I accordingly inclose a copy of the project,\* which you will give to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and repeat to him the assurance that it is not proposed by Her Majesty's Government in rivalry with any other projects that may be under consideration, and that it is quite immaterial to Her Majesty's Government which plan of arrangement is ultimately selected, provided that the principle for which, in conjunction with the Government of France, they have been contending is maintained, and that in offering to the Emperor of Russia terms which without loss of dignity he may accept, no concessions shall be made that would endanger the independence of Turkey.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 362.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 22, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the instructions which you gave to M. Pisani, and of which copies are inclosed in your despatch of the 7th instant, for representations to be made to the Porte with the view of securing better treatment for the Sultan's Christian subjects.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 363.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 22, 1853.*

I HAVE communicated to Baron Brunnow the substance of my despatch of the 19th instant to you, and informed him that I had not alluded in it to the evacuation of the Principalities as a necessary and immediate consequence of an arrangement of differences between Russia and the Porte, because I thought it would be little less than an insult to the Russian Government to suppose, after the public assurances that had been given on the subject, that any portion of the Turkish territory would be occupied by Russian forces for a day longer than was necessary for their evacuation when the question at issue between the two Governments was amicably settled.

Baron Brunnow expressed his entire concurrence in this view, and said he was sure that the motive of Her Majesty's Government for not referring to the Principalities would be duly appreciated at St. Petersburg, but that neither Her Majesty's Government nor the Porte need have any apprehension on the subject.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 364.

*Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Baron Brunnow, July 22.)*

M. le Baron,

*St. Pétersbourg, le 16<sup>e</sup> Juillet, 1853.*

DANS le No. 186 de ses dépêches votre Excellence a, entre autres, fait mention de l'arrière pensée que l'on nous attribue de vouloir entraver la navigation du Danube.

Le vif intérêt que le commerce attache au maintien des communications avec les Principautés par ce fleuve doit nous engager à ne pas laisser s'accréditer une pareille imputation. Je crois devoir en conséquence vous inviter, M. le Baron, à faire parvenir au Gouvernement et au commerce Anglais l'assurance formelle que l'entrée de nos troupes dans les Principautés n'ayant nullement le caractère d'un état de guerre, la sûreté et la liberté de la navigation du Danube, loin d'avoir à redouter de notre part des entraves préjudiciables aux transactions commerciales, ne cesseront de faire l'objet de la sollicitude particulière du Gouvernement Impérial. Rien ne saurait d'ailleurs mieux attester les intentions de l'Empereur à cet égard que les ordres transmis au Prince Gortchakoff afin que les bâtimens Turcs puissent naviguer librement sur le Danube, aussi longtemps que la crise actuelle n'aura pas dégénéré en une guerre ouverte.

A cette occasion je tiens aussi à vous annoncer, M. le Baron, pour votre information personnelle, que le Prince Gortchakoff va recevoir la recommandation d'aviser aux précautions nécessaires, afin de prévenir de la part des sujets et

protégés étrangers dans les Principautés des plaintes du genre de celles qui, lors de la dernière occupation de ces Provinces par nos troupes, avaient donné lieu à des discussions entre nous et le Gouvernement Britannique.

Recevez, &c.  
(Signed) NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)

M. le Baron,

*St. Petersburg, July 16, 1853.*

YOUR Excellency, in your despatch No. 186, mentioned among other things that the intention of throwing impediments in the way of the navigation of the Danube is attributed to us.

The lively interest taken by commerce in the maintenance of communications with the Principalities by means of this river must induce us not to allow such an imputation to obtain credence. Accordingly I have to request you, M. le Baron, to convey to the English Government and commerce the formal assurance that as the entrance of our troops into the Principalities has by no means the character of a state of war, the security and the freedom of the navigation of the Danube, far from having to apprehend from us obstructions injurious to commercial transactions, will not cease to form the object of the special solicitude of the Imperial Government. Nothing can, moreover, better demonstrate the intentions of the Emperor in this respect than the orders sent to Prince Gortchakoff, according to which Turkish vessels may freely navigate the Danube so long as the existing crisis shall not have degenerated into open war.

On this occasion I have also to announce to you, M. le Baron, for your own information, that Prince Gortchakoff will be recommended to take the necessary precautions in order to guard against complaints on the part of foreign subjects and protected persons in the Principalities such as those which at the time of the last occupation of those provinces by our troops gave rise to discussions between us and the British Government.

Receive, &c.  
(Signed) NESSELRODE.

No. 365.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 25.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, July 24, 1853.*

I HAVE placed in M. Drouyn de Lhuys' hands, as desired by your Lordship's despatch of the 22nd instant, an official copy of the Project of Convention which Her Majesty's Government has transmitted to St. Petersburg and the Porte in the hope that those two Powers will see in it an honourable means of terminating their present differences.

As this latter step was not taken without previous confidential communication with the French Government, it would be needless for me to add more, did I not think it desirable that some official record should exist, showing that that communication had taken place.

I have therefore the honour to state, that I received the Project in a confidential form on the 7th instant, and communicated it the same day to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, expressing the hope that it would have the approval and support of the French Government.

As soon as M. Drouyn de Lhuys could take the Emperor's orders, he informed me that neither His Majesty nor his Government had any objection to the Convention, but would recommend its adoption both at St. Petersburg and Constantinople, and anywhere else where your Lordship might send it; but, M. Drouyn de Lhuys added, I was aware that other projects had been brought forward with the desire of effecting a reconciliation between Russia and the Porte, and if either of these projects should be deemed a more satisfactory conclusion of the question by the parties more immediately interested in its solution, he could not bind himself to advise the adoption of the English Project of Convention in preference.

I replied, on my part, that your Lordship had no wish that he should do

so. All that Her Majesty's Government desired, was a speedy termination of the present state of affairs in the East, and they conceived such a termination was to be found in the Convention I had laid before him. But if any other mode of settling them, honourable to the Porte and satisfactory to Russia, was discovered, Her Majesty's Government would be very sorry that their Project should stand in the way of it. They had not put that Project forward in any spirit of rivalry, and would sincerely rejoice if either France or Austria devised a plan more worthy of acceptance.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 366.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 25.)*

My Lord,

Vienna, July 20, 1853.

I READ to Count Buol your Lordship's despatch of the 11th instant, and he observed with much satisfaction your Lordship's approval of his conduct in the advice he had offered to the Russian Cabinet, and generally of his despatch to Baron Lebzeltern of the 6th instant, which had been communicated to you by Count Colloredo.

Count Buol read to me the reports he had received from Count Colloredo of his interviews with your Lordship, which are in conformity with your despatches of the 9th instant.

I drew Count Buol's especial attention to the last paragraph in the despatch of the 11th instant, in which your Lordship expresses the hope that, in the unfortunate event of the Emperor of Russia's rejecting the proposals for arrangement that might be made to him, the Austrian Government would not remain neutral, but would come to the aid of the Sultan in cooperation with England and France.

Count Buol observed that he had not changed the opinions he had expressed to me, and which I fully reported to your Lordship in my despatches of the 17th and 27th of June, and which met with your Lordship's approbation, and that he still considered himself as entirely united with your policy with respect to the Turkish Empire. He would employ every means in his power to maintain its independence and integrity; he would take no engagement with Russia not to oppose her by arms; and he would take none for engaging in hostilities on either side; but if he should be called upon to carry out an armed intervention on the frontier, it would be in support of the authority and independence of the Sultan.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 367.

*Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 26.)*

(Extract.)

Paris, July 25, 1853.

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS informs me that he heard yesterday from Vienna by telegraph, and has forwarded the information to Count Walewski in the same manner, that, at a conference between Count Buol and the Representatives of England, France, and Prussia, it had been determined to support his proposition for settling the Turkish question, and that it was to be recommended by Austria simultaneously at Constantinople and St. Petersburg, with the understanding that the Porte should send it to St. Petersburg by an Ambassador, upon being assured both of its acceptance and of the evacuation of the Principalities.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys observed, that although he was still far from sanguine about an arrangement, what had taken place at Vienna was of value both from

Austria's having presided at the conference, and from Prussia's having joined in it.

His Excellency added, that he had no special predilection for his own proposition over that of Her Majesty's Government, that he was most in favour of the one which could be soonest accepted, and that he hoped your Lordship would not object to give instructions in that sense at St. Petersburg and Constantinople.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys presumed that the conference at Vienna had proceeded from the Emperor of Russia's expressed intention of consulting Austria upon the French proposal.

No. 368.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 27.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, July 14, 1853, 11½ P. M.*

I AVAIL myself of the Austrian post, whose departure is retarded for a few hours, to forward to your Lordship a French translation of the Porte's official protest against the military occupation by Russia of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia.

This translation was sent to me by the Porte with a Turkish copy of the original document.

I am prevented by want of time from making any addition to this statement.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 368.

*Protest of the Porte against the Occupation of the Principalities by Russia.*

(Traduction.)

LA Sublime Porte vient d'apprendre officiellement que l'armée Russe a passé le Pruth, et qu'elle est entrée dans la Moldavie avec l'intention d'occuper aussi la Valachie. Ce mouvement, opéré sans le concours de la Porte sur une partie intégrante de son Empire, a dû lui causer autant de peine que de surprise. Il lui est pénible de voir les habitants de ces provinces loyales et tranquilles exposés à toutes les chances d'une occupation militaire. Il lui est difficile de concilier une telle agression avec les déclarations pacifiques et les assurances amicales que le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg a tant de fois réitérées. Il lui est encore plus difficile de ne pas s'étonner d'une opération qui porte atteinte aux principes établis dans le Traité de 1841.

La Sublime Porte, en exprimant les sentiments que cet événement lui fait éprouver, ne peut se dispenser de mettre dans leur vrai jour quelques circonstances auxquelles les Ministres de Sa Majesté Impériale se sont efforcés en vain de donner une conclusion telle que leur amour de la justice et de la tranquillité leur faisait désirer.

Les négociations qui furent entamées de concert avec le Prince Menchikoff, se bornaient, d'abord, aux points qui souffraient des difficultés relativement à la question des lieux saints, et les différends qui en étaient les objets principaux ne tardèrent pas à recevoir une solution propre à satisfaire toutes les parties intéressées.

Nous avons consenti, en outre, à la construction d'une église et d'un hôpital à Jérusalem pour le service spécial des Russes, en sorte que les concessions demandées en faveur des prêtres et des pèlerins de la même nation n'ont pas été refusés non plus.

Après l'heureuse conclusion de la partie des négociations qui avaient trait au seul objet ostensible de la mission extraordinaire du Prince Menchikoff, cet Ambassadeur s'est empressé avec les plus vives instances de faire accepter une autre demande, dont les conséquences, si elle avait été admise par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan, n'aurait pas manqué de porter une grave

atteinte aux intérêts de l'Empire et de compromettre les droits souverains qui en sont les ornements et les soutiens.

On a vu par les communications officielles que la Sublime Porte a faites en temps et lieu aux Hautes Puissances, qu'elle n'hésite point à donner des assurances suffisantes capables de dissiper les doutes qui ont amenés les discussions relatives aux droits, aux privilèges spirituels, et à d'autres immunités qui s'y rattachent, et dont les Eglises Grecques et les prêtres Grecs sont en possession de la part de Sa Majesté le Sultan. Loin de songer à retirer une partie quelconque de ces privilèges, ou même à en restreindre la jouissance consacrée par leur utilité, Sa Majesté Impériale se fait une gloire de les confirmer publiquement, et fidèle aux maximes de la justice et de la clémence, de les mettre à l'abri de tout préjudice au moyen d'un Acte solennel revêtu de son hattî-chérif, et qui a été porté à la connaissance de tous les Gouvernements amis. Tel étant le cas, ce serait une chose oiseuse que d'encombrer cette question d'un tas de détails. Il suffit ici de constater que d'un côté la demande de l'Ambassadeur Russe, nonobstant certaines modifications, soit dans les termes soit dans la forme, demeurerait à la fin inadmissible à cause de ce qu'il vient d'être expliqué; tandis que de l'autre côté elle devenait sans objet réel par suite des garanties solennelles données spontanément par le Souverain lui-même à la face du monde entier. Ces faits incontestables suffisent pour dégager la Sublime Porte de toute obligation de s'excuser davantage au sujet des privilèges religieux. Il est d'une évidence incontestable que l'indépendance d'un Etat Souverain est nulle, si parmi ses attributions il n'existe pas celle de refuser, sans offense, une demande que les Traités n'autorisent point et dont l'acceptation serait en même temps superflue quant à son objet ostensible et non moins humiliante que nuisible à la haute partie qui s'en excuse.

Néanmoins la Sublime Porte ne se désiste en rien de son désir amical et profondément sincère de remplir avec la plus scrupuleuse exactitude, non seulement tous ses engagements envers la Russie, mais de lui donner en outre toute nouvelle preuve de ses dispositions cordiales qui soit compatible avec les droits sacrés de sa souveraineté et avec l'honneur et les intérêts fondamentaux de son Empire.

Elle est toujours prête à réitérer les assurances promises dans la lettre en date du 1<sup>er</sup> Juin, écrite en réponse à celle de son Excellence le Comte de Nesselrode portant la date du 19 Mai v. s., et elle est encore disposée, pour peu que l'on veuille s'arrêter à un arrangement propre à satisfaire la Cour de Russie sans préjudice aux droits sacrés du Sultan, à envoyer un Ambassadeur à St. Pétersbourg pour chercher, de concert avec le Cabinet Russe, les moyens de parvenir à ce but.

Quant au passage de la lettre de son Excellence le Comte de Nesselrode relative à l'invasion éventuelle du territoire Ottoman, la Sublime Porte a déjà déclaré qu'elle ne saurait l'accepter; et, puisque cette lettre, ainsi que la réponse du Ministère Ottoman ont été sur-le-champ communiquées aux Puissances signataires du Traité de 1841, il devient évidemment inutile de se répandre en détails sur une question aussi pénible.

A la suite de ces circonstances et en vertu de ces considérations, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté avait lieu d'espérer que les motifs fondés qu'il n'a cessé d'alléguer pour justifier le refus de son consentement, l'impossibilité dans laquelle il se trouve de l'accorder, et le désir sincère qu'il a exprimé à plusieurs reprises de voir renouer les relations cordiales des deux Hautes Parties, seraient enfin appréciés, et que la Cour de Russie reviendrait à des sentiments plus équitables à son égard. La Sublime Porte éprouve d'autant plus de douleur en se voyant déçue dans cet espoir, que les qualités éminentes de l'Empereur de Russie, sa modération et sa justice connues, ne lui permettent pas de supposer que Sa Majesté serait capable de vouloir fonder ses demandes sur d'autres bases que celles de la raison et du bon droit, et qu'elle a tout récemment donné, soit au Sultan lui-même, soit aux Puissances Européennes, des assurances positives de son désir de respecter la dignité et de maintenir l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman.

Voilà dans quel état de choses la Sublime Porte vient de recevoir l'avis officiel que les troupes Russes ont franchi la frontière.

Si la Cour de Russie persiste à fonder la demande de consacrer par un document obligatoire envers elle les privilèges religieux dont il est question sur le Traité de Kaïnardji, il est à remarquer que la promesse contenue dans la

première partie de l'Article VII de ce Traité relativement à la protection de la religion Chrétienne et de ses églises est une généralité, et l'on ne peut guères y voir le degré de force que la Russie lui attribuait, et encore moins une spécialité en faveur de la religion Grecque.

Quoiqu'il en soit, si la Sublime Porte manquait de protéger la religion et les églises Chrétiennes, c'est alors seulement qu'il faudrait lui rappeler sa promesse en citant le susdit Traité, et il n'est pas moins clair que cette nouvelle proposition ne saurait être fondée sur ce Traité, attendu que les privilèges et les immunités de la religion Grecque ont été octroyés par la Sublime Porte sans la demande ni l'intervention de qui que ce soit. C'est en effet un point d'honneur pour elle de les maintenir à présent et à l'avenir, et un devoir que lui impose son système plein de sollicitude pour ses sujets.

Les firmans qui viennent d'être promulgués et qui confirment les privilèges et les immunités de toutes les religions, témoignent publiquement les firmes intentions de la Sublime Porte à cet égard, de manière que sans le moindre doute une intervention étrangère n'est pas du tout nécessaire à cet effet. Seulement, puisque la Cour de Russie a conçu, quelqu'en puisse être le motif, des soupçons par rapport à ces privilèges religieux, et que la religion Grecque est celle de l'Auguste Empereur et d'une grande partie de ses sujets, la Sublime Porte, mue par ces considérations, comme aussi par déférence pour les relations amicales qui existent encore entre les deux Puissances, ne recule pas devant la résolution de donner à ce sujet des assurances suffisantes. Mais si un Gouvernement contracte sur les droits et les privilèges qu'il a de son propre mouvement accordés aux églises et aux prêtres d'une nation de tant de millions d'âmes soumises à son autorité, des obligations exclusives avec un autre Gouvernement, ce serait partager son autorité avec ce Gouvernement—ce ne serait que anéantir sa propre indépendance.

Les Traités conclus entre la Sublime Porte et la Cour de Russie concernant les deux Principautés n'autorisent en aucune manière l'envoi de la part de la Russie de troupes dans ces deux pays, et l'Article y relatif qui se trouve dans le Séned de Balta Liman est subordonné au cas où des troubles internes y éclateraient ; ce qui n'est nullement le cas dans la circonstance actuelle.

Le fait est que ce procédé agressif de la part de la Russie ne saurait être en principe considéré autrement que comme une déclaration de guerre, donnant à la Sublime Porte le droit incontestable d'employer, en revanche, la force militaire. Mais la Sublime Porte est loin de vouloir pousser ses droits à l'extrême. Forte de la justice qui règle sa politique envers les Puissances, elle préfère les réserver dans l'attente du retour spontané de la Russie à une manière d'agir plus conforme à ses déclarations. C'est dans le but d'écarter tout obstacle à ce retour, qu'elle se borne pour le moment à protester contre l'agression, dont elle a bien le droit de se plaindre. Elle croit offrir par ce moyen au monde entier une nouvelle preuve de la modération du système qu'elle a adopté dès le commencement de cette affaire. Elle s'abstient de tout acte hostile ; mais elle déclare qu'elle ne consent en aucune manière à ce que l'on fasse entrer de temps en temps des troupes dans les provinces de Moldavie et de Valachie, qui sont parties intégrantes de l'Empire Ottoman, en les regardant comme une maison sans maître.

Elle proteste donc formellement et ouvertement contre cet acte, et dans la conviction que les Puissances signataires du Traité de 1841, ne donneraient pas leur assentiment à une pareille agression, elle leur a fait un exposé des circonstances, et garde en attendant une attitude armée pour sa défense.

Pour en venir à la conclusion, elle répète que Sa Majesté le Sultan est toujours désireux d'aller au devant de toute réclamation fondée de la Cour de Russie, ce dont il a déjà donné maintes preuves, et prêt à redresser tout grief concernant les affaires religieuses dont ses sujets Grecs pourraient encore avoir à se plaindre ; que réparation a été faite par rapport aux lieux saints ; que cette question a été résolue à la satisfaction de la Russie, et que la Sublime Porte n'hésite pas à offrir des assurances plus explicites afin de confirmer l'arrangement qui a été fait au gré de toutes les parties.

*Constantinople, le  $\frac{3}{14}$  Juillet, 1853. (8 Cheval, 1269.)*

(Translation.)

THE Sublime Porte has officially learnt that the Russian army has passed the Pruth, and that it has entered Moldavia with the intention of occupying Wallachia also. This movement, which has been directed without the concurrence of the Porte against an integral portion of its Empire, has necessarily caused it as much pain as surprise. It pains it to see the loyal and peaceable inhabitants of those provinces exposed to all the chances of a military occupation. It is difficult for it to reconcile such an aggression with the pacific declarations and friendly assurances which the Cabinet of St. Petersburg has so often repeated. It is still more difficult for it not to feel astonishment at a proceeding which is in contravention with the principles laid down in the Treaty of 1841.

The Sublime Porte, while expressing the sentiments which this event causes it to feel, cannot omit to set forth in their true light certain circumstances to which His Imperial Majesty's Ministers have in vain endeavoured to attach a meaning which their regard for justice and tranquillity made them wish to do.

The negotiations which were entered into in concert with Prince Menchikoff were confined, in the first instance, to the points respecting the question of the holy places, about which difficulties had arisen, and the differences which were the main objects of those negotiations were presently solved in a manner calculated to satisfy all interested parties.

We consented, moreover, to the construction of a church and a hospital at Jerusalem for the special use of the Russians, so that the concessions demanded in favour of the priests and pilgrims of the same nation have likewise not been refused.

After the happy conclusion of the portion of the negotiations having reference to the sole ostensible object of Prince Menchikoff's extraordinary mission, that Ambassador made the most urgent representations to obtain the acceptance of another demand, the consequences of which, if it had been agreed to by the Government of His Majesty the Sultan, would not have failed seriously to prejudice the interests of the Empire, and to compromise the sovereign rights which are the ornaments and supports thereof.

It has been seen by the official communications made at the proper time by the Sublime Porte to the High Powers, that it does not hesitate to give sufficient assurances capable of dispelling the doubts which have led to the discussions respecting the rights, spiritual privileges, and other immunities attaching thereto, which the Greek Churches and the Greek priests possess from His Majesty the Sultan. Far from thinking to withdraw any portion whatever of these privileges, or even to restrict their enjoyment, the advantage of which is evident, His Imperial Majesty glories in publicly confirming them, and, faithful to the maxims of justice and clemency, in securing them from all mischief by means of a solemn Act invested with his Hatti-cherif, and which has been communicated to all friendly Governments. Such being the case, it would be idle to encumber the question with a mass of details. It is enough to record in this place that on the one hand the demand of the Russian Ambassador, notwithstanding certain modifications, either in the terms or in the form, proved in the end inadmissible for the reason already explained; while on the other hand it no longer possessed any real object by reason of the solemn guarantees spontaneously given by the Sovereign himself in the face of the whole world. These indisputable facts are sufficient to relieve the Sublime Porte from any obligation to make any further excuse for itself on the subject of religious privileges. It is unquestionable that the independence of a Sovereign State is a nullity if it does not possess the attribute of refusing, without offence, a demand unauthorized by Treaties, and the acceptance of which would at the same time be superfluous as regards its ostensible object, and not less humiliating than injurious to the high party which excuses itself from accepting it.

Nevertheless the Sublime Porte in no wise renounces its friendly and truly sincere wish not only to fulfil with the most scrupulous exactness all its engagements towards Russia, but likewise to afford every additional proof of its cordial feelings, which may be compatible with the sacred rights of its sovereignty, and with the honour and fundamental interests of its empire.

It is still prepared to repeat the assurances promised in the letter dated the

4<sup>th</sup> of June, written in reply to that of his Excellency Count Nesselrode, dated May 19, o. s. ; and it is still disposed, provided an arrangement can be made calculated to satisfy the Court of Russia without prejudice to the sacred rights of the Sultan, to send an Ambassador to St. Petersburg in order to seek, in concert with the Court of Russia, the means of attaining this end.

As regards the passage in his Excellency Count Nesselrode's letter which relates to the eventual invasion of the Ottoman territory, the Sublime Porte has already declared that it cannot accept it ; and since that letter, as well as the Ottoman Minister's reply, were forthwith communicated to the Powers who signed the Treaty of 1841, it is evidently useless to enter into details upon so painful a question.

As a result of these circumstances, and in virtue of these considerations, His Majesty's Government had cause to expect that the well-founded reasons which it has not ceased to adduce in justification of its refusal to consent, the impossibility of its concurring, and the sincere desire which it has repeatedly expressed for the renewal of the cordial relations of the two High Parties, would ultimately be appreciated, and that the Court of Russia would return to more equitable sentiments in regard to it. The Sublime Porte is the more pained at finding itself disappointed in this expectation, since the eminent qualities of the Emperor of Russia, his known moderation and justice, do not allow it to suppose that His Majesty would be capable of wishing to rest his demands on any other bases than those of reason and of right, and since he has very recently given, as well to the Sultan himself as to the European Powers, positive assurances of his desire to respect the dignity and maintain the independence of the Ottoman Empire.

Such is the state of things in which the Sublime Porte has received official intelligence that the Russian troops have crossed the frontier.

If the Court of Russia persists in resting upon the Treaty of Kainardji its demand that the religious privileges in question should be recorded in an Act having an obligatory effect in her favour, it is to be observed that the promise contained in the first part of the VIIth Article of that Treaty, relative to the protection of the Christian religion and of its churches, is of general import, and the degree of force attributed to it by Russia can scarcely be discovered in it, and still less a special engagement in favour of the Greek religion.

Be that as it may, if the Sublime Porte failed in protecting the Christian religion and churches, it is only in that case that it should be reminded of its promise by citing the aforesaid Treaty ; and it is not the less clear that this new proposition cannot be founded on that Treaty, seeing that the privileges and immunities of the Greek religion have been granted by the Sublime Porte without the demand or intervention of any Power whatever. It is indeed a point of honour with it to maintain them now and hereafter, and a duty imposed upon it by its system, full of solicitude for its subjects.

The firmans which have recently been issued, and which confirm the privileges and immunities of all religious sects, publicly manifest the firm intentions of the Sublime Porte in this respect, so that unquestionably foreign intervention is not at all necessary for that purpose. Only, since the Court of Russia, whatever may be its motive for doing so, has entertained suspicions in regard to these religious privileges, and since the Greek religion is that of the August Emperor and of a great portion of his subjects, the Sublime Porte, influenced by these considerations, as likewise from deference for the friendly relations which still subsist between the two Powers, does not go back from its resolution to give sufficient assurances on this subject. But if a Government should contract with another Government exclusive obligations in regard to the rights and privileges which from its own impulse it has granted to the churches and priests of a nation containing so many millions of persons subject to its authority, it would share its authority with that Government, which would amount to the annihilation of its own independence.

The Treaties concluded between the Sublime Porte and the Court of Russia concerning the two Principalities in no wise authorize Russia to send troops into those two countries, and the Article relating to that matter in the Sened of Balta Liman is applicable only to the case of internal troubles occurring therein, which is by no means the case in the present instance.

The fact is that this aggressive proceeding on the part of Russia cannot in

principle be looked upon otherwise than as a declaration of war, giving to the Sublime Porte the unquestionable right of employing, in return, its military force. But the Sublime Porte is far from desiring to push its rights to an extreme point. Strong in the justice which regulates its policy towards the Powers, it prefers to make reservation of them in the expectation of the spontaneous return of Russia to a course of conduct more consistent with her declarations. It is with the view of obviating any obstacle to this return that it confines itself for the time to protesting against this aggression, of which it is fully entitled to complain. It considers that by this means it offers to the whole world a fresh proof of the moderation of the system which it has adopted from the commencement of this question. It abstains from every act of hostility ; but it declares that it in no wise consents that troops should from time to time be introduced into the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia, which are integral parts of the Ottoman Empire, as if those provinces were to be regarded as having no owner.

It, therefore, formally and publicly protests against this act ; and, in the conviction that the Powers who signed the Treaty of 1841 would not give their assent to such an aggression, it has set before them these circumstances, and in the meanwhile maintains an armed attitude for its defence.

To conclude, it repeats that His Majesty the Sultan is always desirous to comply with every well-founded claim of the Emperor of Russia, whereof it has already given repeated proofs, and is ready to redress every grievance relating to religious matters of which his Greek subjects might still have to complain ; that reparation has been made in regard to the holy places ; that that question has been settled to the satisfaction of Russia ; and that the Sublime Porte does not hesitate to offer more explicit assurances in confirmation of the arrangement which has been made to the satisfaction of all parties.

*Constantinople, July 14, 1853. (8 Cheval, 1269.)*

No. 369.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 28, 1853.*

HER Majesty's Government learned with satisfaction from your Excellency's despatch of the 24th of June, that you had concurred with your colleagues of Austria, France, and Prussia, in recommending to the Porte to act upon the suggestion of the Austrian Cabinet, and to endeavour to frame a proposal based upon the draft of note which in the last instance Reshid Pasha was prepared to address to Prince Menchikoff, and also upon the draft of note which Prince Menchikoff required the Porte to sign, in the hope that from the two a note might be compiled which Russia would be willing to accept as a satisfactory termination of her discussions with the Porte.

But Her Majesty's Government have been greatly disappointed at finding by your Excellency's despatch of the 9th of July, that above a fortnight had then elapsed without any decision having been adopted, although it appears that the Sultan had actually approved of a note being prepared in conformity with the suggestions made by Austria and supported by the Representatives in their memorandum of the 24th of June.

Now it appears to Her Majesty's Government that the Porte ought to have lost no time in framing a note which it could with entire safety sign ; and if such a note had been urged upon the Emperor of Russia by Austria, there is reason to think that it would have answered the purpose, judging from the favourable reception given at St. Petersburg to a similar proposal made by the French Government.

Your Excellency seems, however, to think that the idea of a fusion of the two ultimatums must be abandoned as offering no prospect of success, but you assign no reason for this opinion.

As, however, the attention of Europe is now directed to the negotiations carrying on in different quarters by different Powers, upon the issue of which may depend the question of peace or war, it is highly important that no doubt or misunderstanding should exist upon the manner in which the negotiations

are conducted ; and Her Majesty's Government are therefore desirous to receive from your Excellency further and more precise information upon the proceedings of the Porte in this matter, respecting which, without further and detailed explanation, Her Majesty's Government are unable to form any judgment.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 370.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 28, 1853.*

YOUR Excellency's important despatch of the 4th instant has been laid before the Queen, and has received from Her Majesty's Government the most serious attention.

Your Excellency is aware that Her Majesty's Government have approved of the course pursued by the Sultan, and recommended by your Excellency, in not exercising his unquestionable right of declaring war against Russia upon the occupation of the Principalities ; and they also entirely agree with your Excellency that his Highness has acted wisely in preparing himself to repel any further aggression on the part of Russia. But it was in order to save the Sultan from the dilemma contemplated by your Excellency, of having to comply with the Russian ultimatum, or to accept an indefinite occupation of the Principalities, that Her Majesty's Government have ardently desired to effect an arrangement by negotiation.

The urgent necessity of extricating Turkey from her present position by peaceful means is now more strongly than ever impressed upon Her Majesty's Government by the numerous reports from Her Majesty's Consuls in different parts of the Empire, which your Excellency has transmitted, upon the alarming state of the country, and by your Excellency's opinion respecting the dangers which threaten the authority of the Sultan, in Bulgaria and Servia from the disaffection of the people, and in European Turkey from the absence of regular troops ; while it appears that the Montenegrins are preparing to make an incursion into Turkey ; and that the Shah of Persia, instigated by Russia, is collecting an army at Sultanieh ; and your Excellency considers that a spirit of fanaticism, dangerous alike to the Rayahs and to the authorities, is rising in various parts of the country ; and that the Greeks have taken up a position which indicates views unrestrained by principles or by treaties. But at the same time the Turkish Government is so little mindful of its interest not to offend Christian Powers at this moment, or so powerless to enforce its own orders, that your Excellency was compelled on the 22nd ultimo, and again on 4th instant, to address to the Porte an energetic remonstrance against the rapine, the exactions, and the cruelties, to which its Christian subjects were exposed.

It is evident then that imminent and daily increasing perils menace, not alone the authority of the Sultan, but the very existence of the Turkish Empire ; and there is too much reason to fear that the number and the intensity of these perils must be increased by delay in putting an end to the state of things which your Excellency has so powerfully described. But it is from England and France alone that Turkey can look for active sympathy and support ; in the event of a struggle all other Powers would be found neutral or would become hostile ; and if England and France were now prepared to run the risks of an European war, and to disregard the commercial, the social, and the political disasters it would entail, if they were prepared, in short, as your Excellency says, to stop at no sacrifice for the object they have in view, there is little doubt that they would cripple the resources of Russia, and that on the signature of peace, it is more than probable that the exclusion of that Power from the Greek Protectorate and from the Principalities would be secured. Russia would be effectually repelled, but Turkey in the meanwhile might be irretrievably ruined ; and we might then find it impossible to restore her integrity or to maintain her independence.

To protect Turkey against foreign aggression, is the interest of England

and France: nor would the task present any insurmountable difficulty; but both might find themselves powerless to guard Turkey against those elements of internal dissolution which now appear to constitute her greatest danger. There is no doubt that Russia, while she pretends to wish for the maintenance of the Turkish Empire, has, in her late measures, calculated on these causes of internal dissolution, and perhaps hastened their operation.

Her Majesty's Government are well aware that the resources of Turkey are great, and that hitherto they have been but partially explored; but they fear that their further development, or the adoption of those reforms which your Excellency has so long and so judiciously recommended, would be improbable during a time that the Sultan was engaged in war with a foreign Power, and his European provinces were reduced to a state bordering on anarchy, and which, even now, compels your Excellency to contemplate, as stated in your despatch of the 7th instant, the necessity of calling up the British fleet, not for the purpose of repelling a Russian attack upon Constantinople, but in order to protect the Christians from an intended rising of the Mahomedans against them.

It is not, then, because we have any doubt that the policy of Russia has been unjust and ungenerous, and is indefensible; it is not alone because we think that war is a calamity; but it is because we believe that war would be an additional danger to Turkey, that Her Majesty's Government are determined to preserve peace by every means consistent with the national honour, and the maintenance of that principle for which we have been contending in Turkey: and in this respect their opinions are strengthened by those of your Excellency, upon whose judgment, experience, and accurate information Her Majesty's Government place the fullest reliance.

Your Excellency will have learnt, by my despatch of the 9th instant, that Her Majesty's Government, so far from regarding negotiations as exhausted, see cause to hope that the present alarming state of affairs may be terminated in a manner safe and honourable to the Porte, and not unacceptable to Russia; and it is hardly necessary for me to add, that Her Majesty's Government consider the immediate evacuation of the Principalities as the condition of any Act being signed on the part of the Sultan for settling his differences with Russia.

Her Majesty's Government have entirely approved the course pursued by your Excellency in resisting the unjust claims of Russia, and maintaining the principle of Turkish independence; and in the event of any further act of aggression by Russia, or of undue delay on her part in accepting the terms for an amicable arrangement that may be proposed to her, Her Majesty's Government, in conjunction with that of France, will be prepared to take more active measures for the protection of Turkey against a Power of whose hostile designs there will then exist no reasonable doubt.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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PART II.

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CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES

OF THE

LATIN AND GREEK CHURCHES

IN

TURKEY

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*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.*  
1854.

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# Correspondence respecting the Rights and Privileges of the Latin and Greek Churches in Turkey.

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## PART II.

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### No. 1.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 25.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 24, 1853.*

COUNT BUOL sent to call me to-day, as well as M. Bourqueney and M. Canitz, and told us that from the last accounts from Constantinople (14th) the negotiations begun there had seemingly made no progress. He wishes to make a note based on that of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and to have it forwarded to the Porte for its acceptance with the approval of our respective Courts. Please let me know if I will be authorized or not by you to give such approval.

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### No. 2.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1853.*

WE approve of the mode of proceeding, but can give no positive sanction or support to the proposed note until we know in what manner it differs from the French note to which we have already agreed. Send me by telegraph the modifications of that note that are desired by the Austrian Minister.

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### No. 3.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienne, le 27 Juillet, 1853.*

VOICI les deux changements proposés par le Comte Buol sur le dispositif de la note de M. Drouyn de Lhuys : un à la suite de—"le soussigné a reçu l'ordre de déclarer par la présente que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan;" ajoutez—"fidèle à la lettre et à l'esprit des stipulations des Traités de Kainardji et Andrinople relatives à la protection du culte Chrétien, regarde," &c. Dans le paragraphe relatif aux lieux saints, remplacez les mots "sans que les Gouvernements de France" jusqu'à "l'Ambassadeur de France" inclusivement, par "sans entente préalable avec les Gouvernements de France et de Russie, et sans préjudice aucun pour les différentes communautés Chrétiennes." Quelques modifications du préambule devenues nécessaires par le changement de la situation, et jugées acceptables par nous tous, vous seront envoyés plus tard. Une réponse au plus vite est demandé.

(Translation.)

*Vienna, July 27, 1853.*

THESE are the two alterations proposed by Count Buol in the statements of M. Drouyn de Lhuys' note: one after the words "The Undersigned has received orders to declare by the present note that the Government of His

Majesty the Sultan ;” add, “faithful to the letter and to the spirit of the stipulations of the Treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople, relative to the protection of the Christian religion, considers, &c.” In the paragraph relating to the holy places, replace the words “without the Governments of France,” up to “the Ambassador of France” inclusively, by “without previous understanding with the Governments of France and Russia, and without any prejudice to the different Christian communities.” Certain modifications in the preamble, rendered necessary by the change in the state of affairs, and considered by all of us as acceptable, will be sent to you later. An answer is required as quickly as possible.

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## No. 4.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienne, le 27 Juillet, 1853.*

VOICI les modifications du préambule : remplacez “Depuis le départ du Prince Menchikoff” jusqu’à “un irade suprême,” par “Sa Majesté le Sultan n’ayant rien de plus à cœur que de rétablir entre elle et Sa Majesté l’Empereur de Russie les relations de bon voisinage et de parfaite entente qui ont été malheureusement altérées par de récentes et pénibles complications, a pris soigneusement à tâche de rechercher les moyens d’effacer les traces de ces différends.”

(Translation.)

*Vienna, July 27, 1853.*

THESE are the modifications in the preamble : replace “Since the departure of Prince Menchikoff” up to “a Sovereign Iradé,” by “His Majesty the Sultan having nothing more at heart than to reestablish between himself and His Majesty the Emperor of Russia the relations of good neighbourhood and perfect understanding which have been unfortunately impaired by recent and painful complications, has diligently endeavoured to discover the means of obliterating the traces of those differences.”

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## No. 5.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 28, 1853.*

WE agree to the modifications proposed. Inform Lord Stratford that Her Majesty’s Government desire that this Project should be adopted by the Porte, if no other arrangement has been already made.

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## No. 6.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1853.*

ON the 25th instant, I received from Lord Westmorland a telegraphic despatch of which I inclose a copy to your Lordship.\*

I lost no time in communicating upon the subject with Count Walewski, and his Excellency informed me that a similar despatch had been addressed to M. Drouyn de Lhuys by the Baron de Bourqueney, who stated that the modifications of the French note proposed by Count Buol were insignificant.

I told Count Walewski that the course suggested by Count Buol appeared to me unobjectionable, but that Her Majesty’s Government could not engage to sanction any change in the note they had agreed to without previously knowing that alteration was intended, and that great caution upon this matter was necessary. Count Walewski said that his Government intended to make a similar reservation in their answer to the Austrian proposal, and I afterwards sent to

him a copy of my reply to Lord Westmorland, of which I also inclose a copy to your Lordship.\*

I yesterday received by telegraph from Lord Westmorland a despatch containing the proposed modifications, and having again communicated with Count Walewski, I learned from him that similar information had been received by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who was prepared to approve of the alterations.

I inclose copies of Lord Westmorland's despatch and of my answer,† which your Excellency will communicate to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, informing him at the same time that the instruction that Lord Westmorland is directed to convey Lord Stratford de Redcliffe has for its object to prevent confusion in the event of any other arrangement having been adopted by the Porte before the arrival of this fresh project from Vienna.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 7.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 29.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, July 22, 1853.*

ALTHOUGH not directed to do so by your Lordship, I have not hesitated to read to Count Nesselrode your Lordship's despatch of the 9th instant.

The grievous difficulties from which the whole of Europe is at present suffering have proceeded mainly from concealment and underhand dealing, and, as certainly none of the views entertained upon the great question by Her Majesty's Government are such as any one can be ashamed to profess, I was desirous that the Chancellor should know from your Lordship's own language what was the opinion entertained in England of the Russian manifesto.

In the course of the conversation which ensued, Count Nesselrode again endeavoured to establish an analogy between the position occupied by Russia in the Principalities, and that taken up by France and England at Besika Bay. I entreated him not to press a point which, if insisted upon, would lead to serious consequences, as I would not conceal from him that Her Majesty's Government would never lend themselves to recognize that any such similarity existed.

No. 8.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 29.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, July 22, 1853.*

IN obedience to the orders contained in your Lordship's despatch of the 11th instant, I have pointed out to Count Nesselrode the unfounded accusation which had been directed against Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and to which additional force had been given by his Excellency's despatch to Baron Brunnow of the <sup>20 May</sup><sub>1 June</sub>.

I likewise communicated to Count Nesselrode the inclosures of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's despatch, and at the same time observed to him, on the part of your Lordship, that the charge which had been made against Her Majesty's Ambassador rendered it highly necessary that a further investigation (enquête) upon this point should be established.

Count Nesselrode stated, that it was impossible that he could take upon himself to advise the Emperor to accede to such a proposition; when, after remarking to him that he must not be surprised if Her Majesty's Government showed themselves very tenacious as to any point regarding the conduct of the Queen's diplomatic servants, I begged to leave the papers in his Excellency's hands, that he might satisfy himself what ample means existed for disproving the misrepresentation to which Lord Stratford de Redcliffe had been exposed.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

## No. 9.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienne, le 29 Juillet, 1853.*

LE COMTE BUOL nous a réunis aujourd'hui pour nous communiquer les dépêches de Constantinople du 20 Juillet. Après avoir pris les ordres de l'Empereur il nous a déclaré que la lettre de Reshid Pasha était de nature à aigrir les débats plus qu'à les concilier ; qu'il déclinait la responsabilité de l'envoyer ; que la marche adoptée ici ces jours derniers par lui, et approuvée par les Cabinets de Londres et de Paris, lui paraît la seule convenable, la seule efficace : en conséquence, le Cabinet Autrichien traite comme non avenue l'expédition de Constantinople du 20, et il se dispose à envoyer à Constantinople sous 48 heures un agent chargé de proposer définitivement à la Porte l'adoption du projet de note avec les modifications qui ont déjà reçu l'approbation du Cabinet Français, et sur lesquelles j'attend encore votre décision. Faites-moi savoir quelles instructions je dois transmettre à Lord Stratford.

(Translation.)

*Vienna, July 29, 1853.*

COUNT BUOL assembled us to day to communicate to us the despatches from Constantinople of the 20th of July. After having taken the Emperor's orders, he declared to us that Reshid Pasha's letter was calculated to embitter, rather than to smooth down, the discussion ; that he declined the responsibility of sending it ; that the course adopted by him here, and approved by the Cabinets of London and Paris, appears to him to be the only suitable, the only efficacious one : in consequence, the Austrian Cabinet sets aside the communication from Constantinople of the 20th, and proposes to send to Constantinople within forty-eight hours an agent charged to propose definitively to the Porte the adoption of the draft of note with the modifications which have already received the approval of the French Cabinet, and in regard to which I am still waiting for your decision. Let me know what instructions I am to send to Lord Stratford.

## No. 10.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, July 30, 1853.*

SUSPENDEZ l'envoi des dépêches de Constantinople adressées à Pétersbourg jusqu'à nouvel ordre.

Dans les modifications de la note Française suggérées par le Comte Buol, nous proposons après le mot " Sultan " d'ajouter " restera fidèle," &c. ; et après " culte Chrétien " d'ajouter " et que Sa Majesté regarde," &c.

Ces changements sont désirables afin d'assurer l'acceptation de la Porte, cependant nous n'en faisons pas un *sine quâ non* absolu. Informez le Comte Buol et vos collègues.

(Translation.)

*Foreign Office, July 30, 1853.*

SUSPEND until further orders the sending forward of the despatches from Constantinople addressed to St. Petersburg.

In the modifications of the French note suggested by Count Buol, we propose after the word " Sultan," to add " will remain faithful," &c., and after " Christian religion," to add " and that His Majesty considers."

These alterations are desirable in order to ensure the acceptance of the Porte ; nevertheless, we do not make of them an absolute *sine quâ non*. Inform Count Buol and your colleagues.

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## No. 11.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 30.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, July 16, 1853.*

SOON after the late readjustment of the Turkish Ministry I took occasion to visit the principal members of the Cabinet with the view of impressing upon their minds the extreme importance of acting with unity and steadiness under the present critical circumstances of the Empire. I must do them the justice to say that they took my admonitions in good part. I found at the same time that, with some trifling shades of difference, they all took the same view of the Russian demands, and, however anxious for the maintenance of peace, were unanimous in their resolution to oppose them to the last. I left them with the impression that there would soon be more to apprehend from their rashness than from their timidity.

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## No. 12.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 30.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, July 16, 1853.*

THE Porte had prepared its protest against the occupation of the Danubian Principalities before the official intelligence of that aggression had reached Constantinople. But the festival of Bairam, the momentary change of Ministers, and the unavoidable formalities of this Court, occasioned a delay of several days before it was communicated to the foreign Representatives. His Highness accompanied it with a note to the four Representatives. A copy of this document is inclosed herewith, and on its receipt I lost no time in proposing to my three colleagues a meeting, at which we might take both the note and the protest into consideration.

The proposed interview has since taken place at my house, and I am happy to state that we found no difficulty in determining the course to be pursued by us under the circumstances. A memorandum of what passed at our meeting is inclosed herewith. Your Lordship will observe that we concluded by agreeing to apply for a conference with Reshid Pasha. His Highness has since appointed an early hour to-morrow for receiving us.

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## Inclosure 1 in No. 12.

*Note from the Porte to the Four Representatives.*

(Traduction.)

*Le 8 Cheval, 1269. (14 Juillet, 1853.)*

LA Sublime Porte ayant pris le parti de protester contre l'entrée des troupes Russes en Valachie et en Moldavie, croit de son devoir de communiquer son acte de protestation aux Représentants des hautes Puissances qui de concert avec elle et avec la Cour de Russie ont signé le Traité de 1841. Ce dernier acte de la Sublime Porte est basé sur des motifs graves, et elle profite de la circonstance pour réitérer les assurances qu'elle a tant de fois données dans les négociations récentes de ses sentiments pacifiques et vraiment amicaux envers la Russie. Elle s'en remet à leurs Excellences pour faire tel usage de l'acte de protestation explicatif qu'elles jugeront propre à ramener la Russie à des dispositions analogues.

Je saisis, &c.

(Signé) MUSTAFA RECHID.

(Translation.)

July 14, 1853.

THE Sublime Porte having resolved upon protesting against the entrance of Russian troops into Wallachia and Moldavia, deems it to be its duty to communicate its protest to the Representatives of the High Powers who, in concert with it and with the Court of Russia, signed the Treaty of 1841. This last act of the Sublime Porte rests on serious considerations, and it avails itself of the circumstances to repeat the assurances which it has so often given in the late negotiations of its pacific and truly friendly sentiments in regard to Russia. It leaves to their Excellencies to make such use of this explanatory protest as they shall judge fit with the view of bringing Russia to a corresponding disposition.

I avail, &amp;c.

(Signed) MUSTAFA RESHID.

Inclosure 2 in No. 12.

*Memorandum of Conference of the Four Representatives.**Therapia, le 16 Juillet, 1853.*

LES Représentants d'Autriche, de France, de la Grande Bretagne, et de Prusse, se sont réunis pour échanger leurs idées relativement à la note officielle que venait de leur adresser son Altesse le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères Ottoman, afin de mettre à leur disposition l'acte de protestation fait par la Sublime Porte contre l'occupation militaire des Principautés Danubiennes par la Russie.

Ils se sont arrêtés à la résolution de proposer à Reshid Pasha de transmettre à son Excellence le Comte de Nesselrode copies de la note explicative renfermant la dite protestation et des firmans que sa Hautesse avait promulgués depuis peu dans le but de confirmer à perpétuité les privilèges religieux accordés aux divers cultes des sujets non-Mussulmans en Turquie. Ils sont, en outre, convenus, si la Porte le jugeait à propos, de prendre charge de la lettre que son Altesse voudrait bien écrire pour accomplir ce double objet, en réitérant au Cabinet Russe les assurances amicales qui se trouvent dans la note de protestation, et en exprimant le désir de recevoir au plutôt une réponse de la part de son Excellence le Chancelier de Russie.

Par rapport à l'expédition de cette lettre ils sont restés d'accord que la manière la plus convenable d'y donner cours serait de la faire remettre au Premier Secrétaire de l'Ambassade Ottomane à Vienne, qui recevrait de son Gouvernement l'ordre de la porter lui-même à sa destination, et au cas où, selon toute apparence, il ne lui serait pas permis de passer la frontière Russe, de prier le Cabinet de Vienne de vouloir bien le faire parvenir à M. le Comte de Nesselrode par le canal de son Représentant à St. Pétersbourg. On déciderait cette alternative à Vienne dans une réunion où les Quatre Puissances seraient représentées de concert avec ceux de la Russie et de la Sublime Porte, si, toutefois, l'un ou l'autre, ou tous les deux, jugeaient à propos d'y assister.

Il a été convenu en sus que les Représentants de l'Angleterre et de la France à Constantinople s'accorderaient pour adresser une lettre identique à leurs collègues respectifs en Russie, et que la lettre ainsi rédigée pour accompagner l'expédition de la lettre de son Altesse Reshid Pasha à son Excellence le Comte de Nesselrode servirait de fond et de mesure pour le parti à prendre comme ci-dessus à Vienne, et que dans ce but elle y serait envoyée d'ici sous cachet volant aux Représentants d'Angleterre et de France. M. l'Internonce d'Autriche et M. l'Envoyé de Prusse se sont réservés d'adresser une lettre analogue à leurs Cours, le dernier par l'entremise de son collègue à Vienne, pour hâter la décision sur le parti à prendre, sans d'ailleurs s'écarter de la ligne convenue.

Pour s'assurer du concours de la Porte on est finalement convenu de proposer une conférence à son Altesse Reshid Pasha.

(Translation.)

*Therapia, July 16, 1853.*

THE Representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia, have met together in order to impart to each other their sentiments respecting the official note which his Highness the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs has addressed to them with the view of putting them in possession of the protest made by the Sublime Porte against the military occupation of the Danubian Principalities by Russia.

They have determined to propose to Reshid Pasha to transmit to his Excellency Count Nesselrode copies of the explanatory note containing the aforesaid protest, and of the firmans which the Sultan had recently published with the object of confirming for ever the religious privileges granted to the different religions of his non-Mussulman subjects in Turkey. They have further agreed, if the Porte should think it advisable, to take charge of the letter which his Highness might be willing to write for the accomplishment of this twofold purpose, while repeating to the Russian Cabinet the friendly assurances contained in the protest, and expressing the desire, as soon as possible, to receive an answer from his Excellency the Chancellor of Russia.

As regards the manner in which this letter should be forwarded, they agreed that the most suitable means of doing so would be to cause it to be delivered to the First Secretary of the Ottoman Embassy at Vienna, who would be ordered by his Government himself to convey it to its destination; and, in the probable event of his not being allowed to cross the Russian frontier, to request the Cabinet of Vienna to transmit it to Count Nesselrode by means of its Representative at St. Petersburg. Which of these alternatives should be adopted might be determined upon at Vienna in a meeting at which the Four Powers would be represented, together with Russia and the Sublime Porte, at all events if one or other or both of them should think fit to take part in it.

It was, moreover, agreed that the Representatives of England and France at Constantinople should concur in addressing an identic letter to their respective colleagues in Russia, and that the letter thus drawn up, so that it might accompany the despatch of his Highness Reshid Pasha's letter to his Excellency Count Nesselrode, should serve for the basis of the course to be taken at Vienna as above-mentioned, and that for this purpose it should be sent from hence under flying seal to the Representatives of England and France. The Austrian Internuncio and the Prussian Envoy reserved to themselves the privilege of addressing a corresponding letter to their Courts, the latter through the channel of his colleague at Vienna, in order to hasten the decision as to the course to be adopted, without deviating in other respects from the plan agreed upon.

In order to obtain the assurance of the Porte's concurrence it was finally determined to propose a conference to his Highness Reshid Pasha.

No. 13.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 30.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, July 17, 1853.*

THE Russians in Moldavia have called upon the Hospodar of that province to suspend his communications with the Ottoman Government, and instead of sending the tribute as usual to Constantinople to keep it in reserve for their eventual disposal. It is naturally expected that the same course will be taken in Wallachia as soon as the Russian forces arrive at Bucharest.

The Porte, as your Lordship may remember, consulted me upon this subject some time ago, and, agreeably to my advice, the Hospodars were not withdrawn in consequence of the mere occupation of their provinces by the Russian army. The case which I had foreseen has now occurred; the Hospodars are forbidden to keep up their communications with the Porte, and the Treaties which regulate their relations with the Sovereign are violated. The Porte under these circumstances is not inclined to hesitate. The Hospodars are to be recalled, and should they fail to comply with the Porte's commands they will be dismissed.

I have conversed on this matter with the French Ambassador, and he agrees with me that our respective Consuls at Jassy and Bucharest cannot with propriety be allowed to remain in function after the Porte shall have announced to us officially its decision and the grounds thereof.

It might, possibly, be right to withdraw the Consuls altogether, but I am unwilling to adopt so extreme a measure while in almost daily expectation of hearing from your Lordship in reply to my despatch on that subject. In the interests of commerce a gradual may, perhaps, be preferable to an abrupt retirement of the Consuls.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 14.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 30.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, July 18, 1853.*

YOUR Lordship will learn from the letter inclosed herewith in copy, and addressed by Prince Gortchakoff to Reshid Pasha, who sent it to me, that the Russians profess the intention of acting with moderation similar to that which I have recommended to the Porte.

Inclosure in No. 14.

*Prince Gortchakoff to Reshid Pasha.*

M. le Ministre,

*Jassy, <sup>25 Juin</sup><sub>7 Juillet</sub>, 1853.*

JE remplis les ordres de mon auguste Souverain en faisant parvenir cette lettre à votre Excellence pour l'informer de l'entrée des corps d'armée placé sous mon commandement dans les Principautés de Moldavie et Valachie.

Mieux que personne votre Excellence connaît les raisons qui ont nécessité cette mesure. Le Gouvernement Impérial n'y a recours qu'après avoir épuisé tous les moyens de persuasion, toutes les voies diplomatiques, toutes les démarches de conciliation qui lui étaient dictées par son sincère désir de rester dans les meilleurs rapports d'amitié et de bon voisinage avec la Porte Ottomane.

Aujourd'hui encore, en faisant entrer son armée dans ces provinces placées en vertu des Traités sous la suzeraineté du Sultan et la protection de l'Empereur, Sa Majesté ne déclare pas la guerre à la Porte. Elle attendra que la Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan, mieux conseillé, mieux éclairé sur les intentions et les demandes légitimes de la Russie, y fasse droit sur la base des Traités existants.

Il dépend uniquement du Gouvernement Ottoman d'accélérer une entente sincère et réciproquement satisfaisante. Ce moment sera aussi celui où les troupes que je commande rentreront dans les limites qu'elles viennent de franchir.

Les ordres que je remplis en occupant militairement les Principautés me prescrivent de m'abstenir de tout mouvement hostile et agressif contre les troupes et les garnisons Turques stationnées au-delà du Danube.

C'est au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan de juger s'il doit adresser à ses commandants militaires les mêmes ordres, afin d'éviter toute collision regrettable qu'une démonstration offensive de leur part en deçà du Danube amènerait nécessairement entre nos forces respectives.

Je suis, &c.  
(Signé) GORTCHAKOFF.

(Translation.)

M. le Ministre,

*Jassy, <sup>June 25</sup><sub>July 7</sub>, 1853.*

I FULFIL the orders of my August Sovereign in addressing this letter to your Excellency, in order to inform you of the entrance of the corps d'armée placed under my orders into the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia.

Your Excellency knows better than any one else the reasons which have rendered this measure necessary. The Imperial Government has not had recourse to it until after it has exhausted all its means of persuasion, all diplomatic resources, all the conciliatory measures which were dictated to it by its sincere desire to remain in the best relations of friendship and good neighbourhood with the Ottoman Porte.

Even now, in causing his army to enter into these provinces, placed in virtue of the Treaties under the suzerainty of the Sultan and the protection of the Emperor, His Majesty does not declare war against the Porte. He will wait in expectation that the Government of the Sultan, better advised and more enlightened in regard to the intentions and the legitimate demands of Russia, will comply therewith on the basis of existing Treaties.

It rests solely with the Ottoman Government to hasten the attainment of a sincere and mutually satisfactory understanding. Simultaneous with it will be the withdrawal of the troops which I command within the limits which they have now passed.

The orders which I execute in occupying militarily the Principalities, enjoin me to abstain from any hostile and aggressive movement against the Turkish troops and garrisons on the other side of the Danube.

It rests with the Government of His Majesty the Sultan to judge whether it shall address the same orders to its military commanders with the view of obviating any lamentable collision which an offensive demonstration on their part on this side of the Danube would necessarily bring on between our respective forces.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) GORTCHAKOFF.

No. 15.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 30.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, July 18, 1853.*

RUMOURS, on which I place but little reliance, continue in some measure to prevail here of an intended massacre, in which the Turks would be the executioners and the Christians the principal victims. There is no doubt that considerable excitement exists among the Mussulman population, and it is more likely to increase than to diminish. But the Porte is deeply interested in preventing any kind of disorders here; and hitherto, with the exception of some trifling incidents, the public tranquillity has been admirably preserved.

No. 16.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 30.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, July 19, 1853.*

THE latest advices from Trebizond and Erzeroum discourage the idea of any immediate intention on the part of Russia to cross the Asiatic frontier of Turkey. Intelligence of a more alarming character was received at the Porte a short time ago from Kars, but it appears to have had no solid foundation.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 17.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 30.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, July 19, 1853.*

I FORWARD herewith, for your Lordship's information, a despatch which I have addressed to-day to Her Majesty's Envoy at St. Petersburg, and I request your Lordship's early attention to the delicate questions which form the subject matter of its contents.

I have communicated with the French Ambassador, as well on the question of urging the evacuation of the Principalities, as on that of eventually withdrawing the two squadrons to some distance from Besika Bay. He appears to hold the same opinion as myself on both subjects, and will, no doubt, take the commands of his Government thereon.

I am convinced that your Lordship will make me acquainted with the intentions of Her Majesty's Government without any unnecessary delay, affording the same advantage to Her Majesty's Representatives at Vienna and St. Petersburg.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

## Inclosure in No. 17.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Constantinople, July 19, 1853.*

IN the identical letter addressed by M. de la Cour and myself to you and General Castelbajac, mention is made of the very natural expectation entertained here that the evacuation of the Principalities by Russia will accompany the nomination of a Turkish Ambassador to St. Petersburg, supposing the preliminary agreement respecting religious privileges may be satisfactorily settled. I am prepared to learn that the Porte makes a formal condition of that measure. Indeed it is not easy to conceive how an independent Government, not yet reduced to despair by the necessities of war or the hazards of insulation, could make up its mind to send out an Embassy to Russia while two of its provinces are forcibly occupied by that Power.

It is principally owing to my sense of the difficulty arising from this cause, that I have concerted to throw out the prospect of a retirement of the squadrons from the immediate neighbourhood of the Dardanelles as a facility for the evacuation of the Principalities.

I send a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Government, with a request that their view of the matter may be transmitted to you with the least avoidable delay.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

## No. 18.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 30.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, July 20, 1853.*

THE proposed conference of the four Representatives with his Highness the Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs took place on the 17th instant. The memorandum, inclosed herewith, which, though unsigned, has received, like the preceding one, inclosed with another despatch, the sanction of Reshid Pasha and my three colleagues, will inform your Lordship, without going into details, of what passed between us on the occasion. We have since employed our best exertions in preparing to carry into effect the conciliatory proceeding which we then agreed to adopt.

I have now the honour of forwarding herewith to your Lordship the several despatches which, in addition to the two memorandums, I have drawn up, subject to the assent of my colleagues, or upon a general understanding with them. Their contents will serve, I trust, to explain whatever is necessary to enable Her Majesty's Government to form a correct judgment of the course which we have agreed to pursue in the hope of confirming the improved dispositions supposed to exist at St. Petersburg, and of securing them in favour of a peaceful arrangement on safe and honourable terms.

I trust that while endeavouring to remove such obstacles as unnecessarily encumber the avenues to peace, we have not neglected to guard the rights of the Sultan and the interests of his Empire.

I feel confident that your Lordship's indulgence will not be wanting wherever I have incurred responsibility for the sake of improving a favourable opportunity, or preventing an increase of the impending evils.

I shall naturally be anxious to learn your Lordship's opinion without loss of time, and I take the liberty of submitting, if the course now taken be acceptable to Her Majesty's Government, that their approval may be conveyed by telegraph to Vienna for further transmission by express to St. Petersburg.

Reshid Pasha's instruction to the Ottoman Ambassador at Vienna is inclosed herewith in translation.

## Inclosure 1 in No. 18.

*Memorandum of Conference of the Four Representatives with Reshid Pasha.*

LES quatre Représentants à Constantinople s'étant réunis avec le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères chez son Altesse à l'heure convenue, ils lui ont fait part de tout ce qu'ils avaient pris la résolution de lui proposer par suite de la communication qu'il leur avait faite au sujet de l'occupation militaire des Principautés Danubiennes par les troupes Russes, conformément au memorandum de la veille.

Le Ministre Ottoman, après avoir exprimé la satisfaction qui lui causait cette réunion, déclarait aux Représentants qu'en réservant l'approbation du Conseil et la sanction de Sa Majesté le Sultan, il se disposait à accepter les conseils qu'ils venaient de lui offrir; qu'il n'hésiterait pas à écrire à son Excellence le Comte de Nesselrode dans le sens proposé, et qu'il ne voyait pas d'objection à faire expédier sa lettre de la manière que leurs Excellences les Représentants lui avaient indiquée.

Son Altesse a déclaré en même temps que la Porte ne pourrait aucunement se désister de la résolution qu'elle avait déjà annoncée, c'est-à-dire, de ne jamais prendre envers la Russie un engagement diplomatique relatif aux privilèges de l'Eglise Grecque, et qu'il ne pouvait cacher sa conviction qu'un tel engagement équivaldrait à un arrêt de mort pour l'Empire Ottoman. A cette exception près, la Sublime Porte ne cessait pas d'entretenir toutes les dispositions propres à satisfaire la Russie, et à manifester à tout la monde son désir sincère de renouer les relations les plus amicales avec cette Puissance.

Les Représentants, sur la réponse de son Altesse, se sont bornés à lui faire sentir l'extrême importance de hâter la décision de son Gouvernement, ce que le Pasha a promis de faire avec tout le zèle possible.

Les Représentants se sont ensuite retirés pour donner cours aux propositions posées dans la Conférence.

Il fut entendu que l'offre à renouveler par la Porte d'envoyer une Ambassade Extraordinaire à la Cour de Russie serait réservée pour la dépêche que les Représentants comptaient adresser à leurs Cours, ou à leurs collègues respectifs à Vienne et à St. Pétersbourg, vû que cette offre se trouvait déjà dans la note de protestation, et que la Porte ne devrait pas s'exposer à l'humiliation d'un refus, en la formulant aussi dans la lettre de son Altesse au Chancelier de Russie.

*Thérapia, 17 Juillet, 1853.*

(Translation.)

THE Four Representatives at Constantinople having had a meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the hour appointed, communicated to him all that they had resolved to propose to him in consequence of the communication which he had made to them on the subject of the military occupation of the Danubian Principalities by the Russian troops, in conformity with the memorandum of the previous day.

The Ottoman Minister, after having expressed the satisfaction which this meeting caused him, declared to the Representatives that, with a reservation for the approval of the Council and the sanction of His Majesty the Sultan, he was inclined to accept the advice which they had offered to him; that he would not hesitate to write to his Excellency Count Nesselrode in the sense proposed, and that he saw no objection to sending his letter in the manner pointed out to him by their Excellencies the Representatives.

His Highness declared at the same time that the Porte could by no means desist from the resolution which it had already announced, that is to say, that of never entering into any diplomatic engagement with Russia relative to the privileges of the Greek Church, and that he could not conceal his conviction that such an engagement would be tantamount to a sentence of death for the Ottoman Empire. With this exception the Porte did not cease to entertain every disposition to satisfy Russia, and to manifest to all the world its sincere desire to renew the most friendly relations with that Power.

The Representatives, on his Excellency's reply, confined themselves to pointing out to him the extreme importance of hastening the decision of his Government, which the Pasha promised to do with the utmost zeal.

The Representatives thereupon withdrew in order to give effect to the proposals put forward in the Conference.

It was understood that the offer to be repeated by the Porte of sending an extraordinary Embassy to the Court of Russia should be reserved for the despatch which the Representatives should address to their Courts or to their respective colleagues at Vienna and at St. Petersburg, inasmuch as that offer was already contained in the protest, and the Porte ought not to expose itself to the humiliation of a refusal by likewise expressing it in his Highness' letter to the Chancellor of Russia.

*Therapia, July 17, 1853.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 18.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Monsieur,

*Constantinople, le 20 Juillet, 1853.*

L'OCCUPATION provisoire de la Moldavie et de la Valachie par les armées Russes ayant mis la Porte dans l'obligation de protester contre une mesure qu'elle serait fondée de regarder comme un cas de guerre, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères Ottoman m'a communiquée son acte de protestation accompagné d'une note verbale. Une pareille communication a été faite aux Représentants d'Autriche, de France, et de Prusse.

Les copies ci-jointes des deux pièces vous offrent l'occasion de reconnaître combien les sentiments de modération et de paix ont présidé à leur rédaction. Vous y verrez, en outre, que le Gouvernement Ottoman, tout en se référant aux Puissances signataires du Traité de 1841, donne à mes collègues ainsi qu'à moi la faculté de faire tel usage de sa protestation que nous jugerions convenable dans l'intérêt de la conciliation, basée sur ces principes dont la Porte n'a pas cru possible de se départir.

Partant de ce point, nous nous sommes réunis sans délai, et le résultat de nos délibérations a été consigné dans un memorandum dont j'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre copie ci-jointe.

La conférence que nous avons pris le parti de proposer à Reshid Pasha n'a pas tardé à avoir lieu chez son Altesse, et la partie essentielle de ce qui s'est passé à cette occasion, telle qu'elle se trouve dans un autre memorandum ci-joint en copie, ne manquera pas de fixer votre attention.

La lettre adressée, d'après notre suggestion, par le Ministre Ottoman à son Excellence le Chancelier de Russie renferme tout ce que nous croyons nécessaire pour constater les sentiments d'amitié et de confiance dont la Porte ne cesse d'être animée envers l'auguste Souverain auprès de qui vous avez l'honneur d'être accrédité, et pour ouvrir au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale, malgré la rupture des relations diplomatiques entre les deux empires, et les fâcheuses circonstances qui s'en sont suivies, un moyen à la fois pratique et honorable de mettre fin à un état de choses qui dérange les intérêts les plus importants de part et d'autre, et qui menace de compromettre la tranquillité de toute l'Europe.

L'original de cette lettre, dont copie ci-joint en traduction, doit être transmis d'abord à l'Ambassade Ottomane à Vienne, et de là à son destination finale par l'intermédiaire du Cabinet Autrichien à moins que le Premier Secrétaire de la dite Ambassade ne puisse obtenir un passeport pour le porter lui-même à St. Pétersbourg.

De telle manière que cette alternative serait déterminée par les Représentants à Vienne réunis en conférence, il est à désirer que la remise de la lettre à M. de Nesselrode ne soit effectuée sans votre concours, et l'on aura besoin de tout l'appui que vous seriez à même de lui prêter de concert avec vos collègues, pour faire sur le Cabinet Russe une impression désirée. Malgré que plus d'une circonstance ferait espérer que l'Empereur Nicolas est mieux disposé à un accommodement qu'il ne l'était il y a quelques semaines, la détermination déclarée par la Porte de ne jamais prendre un engagement diplomatique relatif aux privilèges de l'Eglise Grecque, présente toujours de grandes difficultés.

Cependant le Cabinet Russe désavoue toute prétention au-delà du maintien des privilèges qui lui ont été assurés dès les premiers temps, et cette circonstance fait espérer que l'Ambassade offerte de nouveau par la Porte pourrait être agréée, et que par votre entremise officieuse et celle de vos collègues, employée avec les ménagements propres à l'occasion, la base d'un accommodement qui en est le but pourrait être arrêtée d'avance. La communication, en forme de note, des firmans solennels qui confirment à perpétuité de la part du Sultan les dits privilèges semble fournir un moyen des plus efficaces de réaliser cet espoir, pour peu que le Gouvernement Impérial fût disposé, comme on l'affirme, à rassurer la Porte surtout par une déclaration formelle, dont la substance serait qu'il n'entend nullement empiéter sur l'indépendance du Sultan et le libre exercice de ses droits souverains. Je me borne à ce seul différend dans la conviction que les autres points contenus dans les dernières déclarations du Comte de Nesselrode seraient facilement arrangés.

En recommandant tous ces propos à votre zèle connu, M. le Chevalier, je n'ai pas besoin d'attirer votre attention sur l'extrême importance de hâter autant que possible l'expédition de la réponse que son Excellence M. de Nesselrode jugerait convenable à faire à la lettre de Reshid Pasha.

Au cas que les apparences feraient prévoir une réponse favorable, l'emploi de vos bons offices pourrait, ce me semble, contribuer à faire sentir à M. le Chancelier tout ce qu'il y aurait d'opportun et de conséquent dans l'évacuation des deux Principautés au moment même où la Porte, rassurée par la réponse de son Excellence, donnerait l'ordre à son Ambassadeur de se rendre à St. Pétersbourg. Il est à prévoir que l'effet immédiat d'une mesure si nécessaire serait de faire cesser toute démonstration d'inquiétude de ce côté-ci, et non-seulement de rassurer les populations Chrétiennes en Turquie, mais d'ôter aux Puissances alliées de la Porte tout motif de veiller plus qu'à l'ordinaire au maintien de son indépendance.

Il est convenu qu'une dépêche identique avec celle-ci sera adressée à votre collègue représentant de France, et que les Cours de Vienne et de Berlin feront parvenir sans délai des instructions analogues à leurs Représentants à St. Pétersbourg. Je me hâte de la soumettre au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté la Reine, et fort du soin que j'ai mis à la rendre conforme, soit à la lettre, soit à l'esprit de mes instructions, j'ose compter, en attendant, sur votre coopération obligeante pour y donner toute la suite dont elle serait capable.

Il va sans dire que l'assentiment clair et formel de la Porte accompagne tout ce que j'ai l'honneur de vous mander ici dans l'intérêt de la paix.

Je vous prie, &c.

(Signé)

STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

(Translation.

Sir,

Constantinople, July 20, 1853.

THE provisional occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia by the Russian armies having compelled the Porte to protest against a measure which it might be justified in looking upon as a case of war, the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs has communicated to me his protest, accompanied with a *note verbale*. A similar communication was made to the Representatives of Austria, France, and Prussia.

The annexed copies of the two documents furnish you with the means of perceiving in what a spirit of moderation and of peace they are drawn up. You will see, moreover, that the Ottoman Government, while appealing to the Powers who signed the Treaty of 1841, affords by this means to my colleagues and to myself the power of making such an use of its protest as we might deem advisable in the interest of conciliation, based on those principles from which the Porte has not conceived it possible for it to deviate.

Setting out from this point, we met together without delay, and the result of our deliberations was embodied in a memorandum of which I have the honour to send to you herewith a copy.

The Conference which we proposed to Reshid shortly afterwards took place at his Highness' house, and the essential part of what passed on that occasion, as it is recorded in another memorandum hereunto annexed, will not fail to attract your attention.

The letter addressed in conformity with our suggestion by the Ottoman Minister to his Excellency the Chancellor of Russia contains all that we think necessary to prove the sentiments of friendship and confidence by which the Porte does not cease to be animated in regard to the august Sovereign to whom you have the honour to be accredited, and to open for His Imperial Majesty's Government, notwithstanding the rupture of diplomatic relations between the two Empires, a mode at once practicable and honourable for putting an end to a state of things which deranges the most important interests of both parties, and threatens to place in jeopardy the tranquillity of the whole of Europe.

The original of this letter, of which a translated copy is annexed, is to be transmitted in the first instance to the Ottoman Embassy at Vienna, and from thence to its final destination by the channel of the Austrian Cabinet, unless the First Secretary of the said Embassy can obtain a passport to enable him himself to convey it to St. Petersburg.

In whatever manner this alternative may be decided by the Representatives at Vienna assembled in Conference, it is desirable that the letter should not be delivered to M. de Nesselrode except in concert with you, and all the support which you in common with your colleagues can afford, will be needed in order to make the wished-for impression in the Russian Cabinet. Notwithstanding that more than one circumstance would authorize a hope that the Emperor Nicholas is better disposed to an arrangement than he was a few weeks ago, the declared determination of the Porte never to enter into a diplomatic engagement in regard to the privileges of the Greek Church, still offers great difficulties. The Russian Cabinet, however, disclaims any pretension beyond the maintenance of the privileges secured to it of old, and this circumstance gives reason to hope that the Embassy again offered by the Porte may be accepted, and that by your friendly intervention and that of your colleagues, employed with all the delicacy required by the occasion, the basis of an arrangement which is the object of it, may be settled beforehand. The communication, in the shape of a note, of the solemn firmans which confirm for ever, on the part of the Sultan, the aforesaid privileges, appears to present one of the most favourable means for realizing this hope, provided that the Imperial Government should be disposed, as is asserted, to reassure the Porte by a formal declaration, the substance of which would be that it has no intention of trenching on the independence of the Sultan, or the free exercise of his sovereign rights. I confine myself to this single difference, in the persuasion that the other points contained in the late declarations of Count Nesselrode would be easily settled.

In recommending all these matters, Sir, to your well-known zeal, I have no occasion to draw your attention to the extreme importance of hastening, as much as possible, the sending off of the answer which his Excellency, M. de Nesselrode, may judge fit to make to Reshid Pasha's letter.

In case that appearances should lead you to anticipate a favourable answer, it appears to me that the employment of your good offices might contribute to make the Chancellor understand how suitable and proper would be the evacuation of the Principalities, at the very time that the Porte, reassured by his Excellency's reply, should direct its Ambassador to proceed to St. Petersburg. It is to be foreseen that the immediate effect of so necessary a measure would be to put an end to all manifestation of uneasiness in this quarter, and not only to reassure the Christian population in Turkey, but to take away from the allies of the Porte all grounds for watching more closely than ordinarily over the maintenance of its independence.

It has been settled that a despatch identic with this shall be addressed to your colleague the Representative of France, and that the Courts of Vienna and Berlin shall transmit corresponding instructions to their Representatives at St. Petersburg. I hasten to submit it to the Government of Her Majesty the Queen; and with the conviction that I have carefully adapted it as well to the letter as to the spirit of my instructions, I venture, in the meanwhile, to reckon on your obliging co-operation to give as much effect to it as it admits of.

It is understood that the Porte distinctly and formally assents to all that I have the honour now to write to you in the interest of peace.

I request, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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## Inclosure 3 in No. 18.

*Reshid Pasha to Count Nesselrode.**Le  $\frac{8}{20}$  Juillet, 1853.*

LES troupes de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie ayant occupé les provinces de Valachie et de Moldavie contre l'attente de leur propre Gouvernement, la Sublime Porte s'est trouvée dans la nécessité de protester contre cet acte et croit devoir transmettre à votre Excellence copie de la note qui renferme sa protestation.

Je me plais à espérer que votre Excellence dans son équité voudra bien reconnaître que la Sublime Porte y a évité soigneusement tout ce qui aurait pu rendre les circonstances actuelles plus fâcheuses, tandis qu'elle y réitère les assurances les plus formelles que Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, même à présent, ne désiste en rien de son désir amical et parfaitement sincère non-seulement de remplir tous les engagements envers les Russes, mais en outre de leur donner telle preuve de ses dispositions cordiales qui soit compatible avec les droits sacrés de la souveraineté et avec l'honneur et les intérêts fondamentaux de son Empire.

La Sublime Porte ayant communiqué aux Légations des Grandes Puissances à Constantinople copies des firmans Impériaux, &c., qui confirment les privilèges religieux du sujets des différents cultes dans l'Empire Ottoman, copies de ces firmans sont envoyées aussi à votre Excellence; et comme les anciens privilèges du culte professé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, et par la majeure partie de ses sujets, ont été pleinement confirmés à perpétuité, la Sublime Porte espère que le Gouvernement Russe l'apprendra avec plaisir.

Ayant pleine confiance dans les sentiments pacifiques de votre Excellence, j'aime à croire qu'une réponse analogue de sa part ne tardera guères à combler l'attente que je viens d'avoir l'honneur de lui réitérer.

(Translation.)

*July  $\frac{8}{20}$ , 1853.*

THE troops of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia having occupied the provinces of Wallachia and of Moldavia, contrary to the expectation of their own Government, the Sublime Porte has been under the necessity of protesting against that proceeding; and deems it necessary to forward to your Excellency a copy of the note which contains its protest.

I would fain hope that your Excellency, in your equity, will be pleased to admit that the Sublime Porte has carefully avoided everything that could have rendered the existing state of things more difficult; whilst it repeats the most formal assurances that His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, even at the present time, in no wise renounces his friendly and perfectly sincere wish not only to fulfil all his engagements towards the Russians, but furthermore to give them any additional proof of his cordial disposition which may be compatible with the sacred rights of sovereignty, and with the honour and fundamental interests of his Empire.

The Sublime Porte having communicated to the Missions of the Great Powers at Constantinople copies of the Imperial firmans, &c., which confirm the religious privileges of the subjects of the different rites in the Ottoman Empire, copies of those firmans are likewise sent to your Excellency; and as the ancient privileges of the religion professed by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, and by the greater part of his subjects, have been fully confirmed in perpetuity, the Sublime Porte hopes that the Russian Government will learn this with pleasure.

Having full confidence in your Excellency's pacific sentiments, I flatter myself that a corresponding answer on your part will speedily fulfil the expectation which I have the honour again to express to you.

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## Inclosure 4 in No. 18.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Westmorland.*

Sir,

*Therapia, July 19, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship, under flying seal, a despatch, accompanied with several inclosures, which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Envoy at St. Petersburg, in the hope of contributing to the restoration of a good understanding between Russia and Turkey, before their unfortunate differences assume a character of actual hostility. I have drawn it up in the French language, as being more convenient for purposes of communication with the Austrian, French, and Prussian Representatives, with whom I am acting on this occasion. M. de la Cour joins with me in adopting the same letter. Baron de Bruck and M. de Wildenbruch write in similar terms to their respective Courts.

For my guidance in this joint proceeding I have no special instructions entirely covering the case ; but the magnitude of the object, and its urgency, coming in aid of the letter and spirit of those which have reached me, leave no room to doubt the propriety of my course ; and I venture, therefore, to reckon with confidence upon your Lordship's cooperation as well as on that of Sir Hamilton Seymour.

The modes of reconciliation previously and separately suggested by the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin have dropped, through their inaptness to meet the conflicting exigencies of the case. The present experiment is based on the assertion of some marked improvement in the disposition of Russia, and it carries the advantage not only of being in accord with the principles declared in 1841, but of tending directly to remove, in one way or another, that baneful uncertainty which, in my humble judgment, cannot be prolonged without imminent danger to all the great interests at stake.

You will observe that our point of departure is the Porte's communication of its protest against the occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia by Russia. It would really seem, both in reason and justice, that the Porte's adoption of that milder course, accompanied with friendly explanations and still more friendly communications, ought to confirm the Russian Cabinet in any pre-existing improvement of its feelings towards Turkey.

It is obvious that the main difficulty subsists in framing a basis of arrangement respecting the religious privileges, which would satisfy Russia without betraying the Porte ; and it may be added, on the faith of the Porte's repeated declarations, that if the Emperor continues to insist on a guarantee, involving diplomatic or exclusive engagements, no plan of voluntary accommodation can possibly succeed. As for Prince Menchikoff's note, the Divan will not hear of it.

Allow me in other respects to refer you to the identical despatch, which I hope is sufficiently explicit in its terms.

I shall be anxious to know the result of your conference on the subject of its contents, and I have no doubt that you will convey all necessary information to Sir H. Seymour together with my despatch. Here we are all of opinion that expedition is of the utmost consequence ; and I need not add that, as the Four Powers, in so far as depends on us, are now united on treaty ground, it is extremely desirable, if I may be allowed an opinion, to keep them there, without overstepping the real intent of this present proceeding as sanctioned and shared by the Porte.

I conclude by forwarding to you herewith a translation of Reshid Pasha's instruction to the Ottoman Ambassador at Vienna. I have just received from His Highness a Turkish copy of the original sent for communication to the four Representatives.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

## Inclosure 5 in No. 18.

*Reshid Pasha to the Turkish Minister at Vienna.*

(Traduction.)

*Juillet, 1853.*

VOIRE Excellence aura déjà appris par les dépêches détaillées qui lui ont été adressées, que les troupes Russes ayant passé le Pruth et franchi la frontière en violation des Traités existants, la Sublime Porte, d'après l'usage des Gouvernements, a protesté publiquement et formellement contre ce procédé. Par suite donc d'une conférence tenue avec les Représentants des Quatre Puissances, des délibérations qui ont eu lieu dans le Conseil Suprême, et des ordres de Sa Majesté Impériale émanés à cet égard, une copie de la dépêche que j'ai adressé en cette occasion aussi au Comte de Nesselrode, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Russie, est transmise à votre Excellence.

Il a été décidé dans cette conférence et au Conseil que la dépêche en question serait confiée à un des Secrétaires de la Légation Impériale à Vienne le plus apte à ce service, afin qu'elle fût portée à St. Pétersbourg; mais si quelque difficulté à l'exécution de ce plan était opposée par le Ministre de Russie, M. de Meyendorff, la dépêche en question serait transmise à St. Pétersbourg par l'intermédiaire de son Excellence M. le Comte de Buol, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. Cette démarche ne devra pas être considérée comme une mesure isolée de la part de l'Autriche, celle-ci se trouvant dans la même position que font les Représentants des autres Gouvernements concourant à son adoption.

Vous êtes donc chargé, au reçu de la dépêche dont il s'agit, de vous réunir sans retard avec leurs Excellences le Comte de Buol et les Représentants d'Angleterre, de France, et de Prusse, afin de conférer avec eux sur cet objet, et de porter à exécution celui des deux projets qui sera adopté, en m'informant au plutôt du résultat définitif.

(Translation.)

*July 1853.*

YOUR Excellency will have already learned by the despatches which have been addressed to you at length, that the Russian troops having passed the Pruth, and crossed the frontier in violation of the existing Treaties, the Sublime Porte, in conformity with the practice of other Governments, has publicly and formally protested against that proceeding. As the result, therefore, of a Conference which has been held with the Representatives of the Four Powers, and of the deliberations which have taken place in the Supreme Council, and of the orders issued by His Imperial Majesty in this respect, a copy of the despatch which I have also addressed on this occasion to Count Nesselrode, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia, is transmitted to your Excellency.

It was decided in that Conference and at the Council, that the despatch in question should be entrusted to one of the Secretaries of the Imperial Legation at Vienna best qualified for that service, in order that it might be conveyed to St. Petersburg; but if any difficulty should be opposed by the Russian Minister, M. de Meyendorff, to the execution of this plan, the despatch in question should be sent to St. Petersburg through his Excellency the Count de Buol, Minister for Foreign Affairs. This step is not to be considered as an isolated measure on the part of Austria, that Power being in the same position as that of the Representatives of the other Governments who have concurred in adopting it.

You are accordingly instructed, on the receipt of the despatch in question, to meet their Excellencies Count Buol and the Representatives of England, France, and Prussia, in order to confer with them upon this point, and to carry into execution the plan which may be decided upon, informing me as soon as possible of the final result.

## No. 19.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.*

(Telegraphic.)

Vienne, le 31 Juillet, 4 P.M.

JE viens d'une conférence où les changements que vous proposez par la dépêche télégraphique que j'ai reçue ce matin, ont été immédiatement adoptés par le Comte Buol et par mes collègues. Le Comte Buol nous a lu le projet de note modifié, qui sera envoyé demain par un Colonel chargé d'instructions formelles au Baron de Bruck d'appuyer fortement auprès de la Porte cette proposition; il portera une lettre autographique de l'Empereur au Sultan. J'enverrai vos ordres à Lord Stratford par la même voie. Un courrier Turc m'apporte aujourd'hui des communications de Lord Stratford du 23, qui sont le complément de l'expédition du 20. J'en suspends l'envoi, comme les autres, jusqu'à nouvel ordre.

(Translation.)

(Extract.)

Vienna, July 31, 4 P. M.

I AM just returned from a Conference where the alterations which you propose in the telegraphic despatch which I have this morning received, were immediately adopted by Count Buol and my colleagues. Count Buol read to us the draft of note as modified, which will be despatched to-morrow by a Colonel charged with formal instructions to Baron de Bruck strongly to support this proposal at the Porte: he will be the bearer of an autograph letter from the Emperor to the Sultan. I will send by the same opportunity your instructions to Lord Stratford. A Turkish courier has brought me to day Lord Stratford's communications of the 23rd, supplementary to those of the 20th. I delay forwarding them, as well as the others, until further orders.

## No. 20.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 1.)*

(Extract.)

Berlin, July 29, 1853.

I SAW Baron Manteuffel this evening, and we had some conversation on the subject of a conference which appears to be established at Vienna between the Representatives of the Four Powers, for the purpose of drawing up a note, based on that proposed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, for the settlement of the quarrel between Russia and Turkey. His Excellency told me that Baron Canitz had been empowered on the part of Prussia to assist at this conference, and that he hoped it would secure a satisfactory result; but that as yet he was not in possession of any intelligence beyond the mere fact of the proposed meeting.

We then spoke of the several events which had occurred connected with the Eastern affairs since we last met. He said that he had read with much interest your Lordship's answer to the second Russian circular, and that he highly approved of your Lordship's draft of Convention, which he considered to have the advantage over the other projects, that it was explicit, and defined the position of Russia in the question under dispute more clearly than they did. But he added that he did not wish to pronounce a preference in favour of any one, for that he ardently desired to see the affair concluded in a manner which would insure the independence and integrity of Turkey.

## No. 21.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 1.)*

My Lord,

Vienna, July 25, 1853.

I YESTERDAY received a message from Count Buol requesting me to call upon him, which I did accordingly, when he explained that the despatches which he had received from Constantinople not having corresponded to the

hope he had entertained that some project, such as had been proposed to the Porte by the Austrian Internuncio, and accepted by the Representatives of England, France, and Prussia, would have been adopted by that Government, and would have been transmitted to him to be forwarded to St. Petersburg, he had come to the determination, with the sanction of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor, of calling upon M. de Bourqueney, Baron Canitz, and myself, to consult together, with the view of arriving at the adoption of some proposal which could be submitted to the Porte with the sanction of all our Governments.

Count Buol explained that his object in making this proposal was, that if the note we might approve of was adopted by the Porte, it should be transmitted to St. Petersburg with the same recommendation as to its acceptance as had been addressed to Turkey.

The other Ministers, as well as myself, having agreed to this proposal, as one which we would submit to our respective Governments, Count Buol stated that the note which had been proposed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys appeared to him to be the best foundation upon which we could proceed in the formation of the new one. I mentioned the Convention which your Lordship had drawn up; but as the note of M. Drouyn de Lhuys had already been transmitted to Constantinople, it was considered by the other Ministers as more likely to be accepted by the Government of the Sultan, by whom such strong objections had already been stated to any transaction in the form of a Convention.

The general opinion having, therefore, been pronounced in favour of the projected form of a note, I agreed to submit the proposal to your Lordship, and, as there would be no means of communicating with Constantinople until Friday next, by which time a courier from St. Petersburg was expected, it was agreed that Count Buol should draw up the note and submit it for our consideration, by which time it was expected that the answers from our respective Governments would be arrived.

The answer from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, agreeing to this proposal, has already been received from M. de Bourqueney, with the injunction only that the alterations in the original note, before they are adopted, are to be reported for the sanction of the French Government, and Count Buol has consequently proceeded in drawing up the note.

His Imperial Majesty the Emperor spoke to me of the anxiety he felt that the project proposed by Count Buol should be adopted; and he expressed his regret that Baron Meyendorff, who had been invited to attend the conference, had not considered himself authorized to do so. His Majesty stated that he felt great anxiety for the settlement of these lamentable complications, and that he had used every exertion to prevent them, and would, now that they had arisen, continue those exertions to put an end to them.

*July 26th.*—Since the above was written, I received, after 12 o'clock last night, your Lordship's telegraphic despatch of yesterday's date. I transmitted a copy of it early this morning to Count Buol, with a request that he would send me the modifications he proposed in the note to be adopted, that I might immediately transmit them by telegraph to your Lordship, and I am still waiting for his reply.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 22.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August*

My Lord,

*Vienna, July 26, 1853.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 19th instant, I have to state that I have received no information with respect to the intended occupation of Bosnia and Servia by Austrian troops, which would induce me to give any more credence to the report than is given to it by Her Majesty's Government; but in case the adoption of that measure should now or hereafter be entertained, I will act in accordance with your Lordship's instructions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

## No. 23.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 1.)*

My Lord,

Vienna, July 27, 1853.

COUNT BUOL called M. de Bourqueney, Baron Canitz, and myself, to a second conference this day, when he communicated to us a project of a note he had drawn up in accordance with the understanding come to at the last conference on the 24th instant, and reported to your Lordship in my despatch of the 25th instant.

The modifications he had made in the original note of M. Drouyn de Lhuys were discussed, and several alterations proposed and adopted, and the note was finally agreed to, to be submitted to our respective Governments.

Your Lordship will have received all the essential modifications inserted in this note by the telegraphic messages I transmitted to you this day, and if they meet with the approbation of the different Governments, it is Count Buol's intention to forward the note to Baron Bruck by the steamer which leaves Vienna on Friday the 29th, and will arrive in six or seven days at Constantinople.

Count Buol will instruct the Internuncio to recommend the adoption of this note by the Turkish Government in the strongest manner, as having been agreed to by the Four Powers.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

## No. 24.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

Foreign Office, August 2, 1853.

HER Majesty's Government approve of your proceedings as reported in your despatches of the 25th and 27th ultimo.

Shortly after the rupture between Russia and the Porte, the Austrian Government were made aware by my communications to Count Colloredo and to your Lordship, that a conference was desired by Her Majesty's Government as the fittest mode of bringing the designs of Russia upon Turkey under the deliberation and control of the Great Powers of Europe, and Her Majesty's Government therefore learned with satisfaction that your Lordship, together with your French and Prussian colleagues, had been invited by Count Buol to concert with him upon a plan of settlement that should be acceptable alike to the Emperor of Russia and to the Sultan.

As the mediation of Austria has been accepted by Russia, Her Majesty's Government regret that the Russian Minister should not have considered himself authorized to attend the conference, to which he seems to have also been invited by Count Buol.

Upon this point, however, Her Majesty's Government are desirous to receive precise information, as it is of the utmost importance that all unnecessary delay should be avoided, both with reference to the increasing excitement which prevails in Turkey, and to the advanced state of the season, which will not permit of the combined fleets remaining much longer in the open Bay of Besika; and I need hardly add that they will not move further from Constantinople so long as the Principalities are occupied by Russian troops.

As soon as it becomes known to the Austrian Government that the note has been accepted by the Porte and by Russia, Her Majesty's Government are extremely desirous that the Russian Government should be advised to commence the evacuation of the Principalities upon the arrival of the Turkish Ambassador at Odessa on his way to St. Petersburg; for to require the Sultan to send a mission to the Power whose troops hold possession of a portion of his territory, would be a humiliation to which an independent Sovereign might with reason decline to expose himself.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

## No. 25.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 2.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, July 29, 1853.*

THE short time allowed me for the perusal of Lord Stratford's despatches of the 20th, which I had the honour to forward to your Lordship this morning, prevented my seeing M. Drouyn de Lhuys before the departure of Lord Stratford's messenger, and informing your Lordship, by that occasion, of the impression made upon the French Government by the new turn which the Eastern question had taken at Constantinople.

I have since seen the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had been with the Emperor at St. Cloud, for the purpose of communicating to His Majesty the despatches from M. de la Cour, which the "Caradoc" had likewise conveyed to Marseilles. M. Drouyn de Lhuys was good enough to read them to me.

As far as my recollection serves, after the rapid perusal which I was forced to make of Lord Stratford's communications, there is no essential difference between his Excellency's accounts of the late transactions between Reshid Pasha and the Representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia, at Constantinople, and those transmitted to the French Government by M. de la Cour. In some points the latter were more circumstantial, in others less so, but in essentials the two agree.

After reading M. de la Cour's despatches to me, M. Drouyn de Lhuys observed that the first thing he had done, before even taking the Emperor's orders, was to enjoin M. de Bourqueney, by telegraph, not to act upon M. de la Cour's letter until further orders, it being his intention to consult with the British Government before taking any decision in this new phase of the question.

I must, however, add that the intelligence from Constantinople has not made a favourable impression either upon the Emperor or upon his Minister for Foreign Affairs, though both render full justice to the pacific spirit which animated the Representatives of the Great Powers at Constantinople, in entering upon the course which the despatches of Lord Stratford and M. de la Cour describe. But they are apprehensive that this new project may interfere with the discussions already commenced, if not brought to a conclusion, by the Representatives of the same Powers at Vienna, and they do not think the Constantinople project so likely to please the Emperor of Russia as that elaborated in the Austrian capital.

There were also points of detail, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said, to which he had strong objections. He doubted the success of an endeavour to resume negotiations with Russia by the transmission of the protest of the Porte, and he confessed that he should not like to send instructions to M. Castelbajac to give any support to a letter inclosing that document, because he saw in it admissions which he considered it would have been more advisable that the Porte should not have made. On this point he had reason to think that your Lordship agreed with him. Neither could he admit the analogy which would be drawn between the Russian occupation of the Principalities and the presence of the British and French fleets in Besika Bay, if the withdrawal of the former was to be in any way connected with the departure of the latter. He argued that neither Government could subscribe to such a condition after the declarations on the subject made by Her Majesty's Ministers in Parliament, and by the French Government in the note which had been published.

## No. 26.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 2.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, August 1, 1853.*

YOUR Lordship will have been informed by Count Walewski that the French Government approves and recommends the adoption of the modifications\*

See No. 10.

which your Lordship was desirous to see introduced into the Project of Note which the Representatives of the Four Powers at Vienna had agreed upon might be accepted by both Russia and Turkey as an honourable solution of their present differences.

Your Lordship will also have been made aware from Vienna that the same Representatives had considered it more prudent, in order to avoid all appearance of a combination against Russia, not to press the acceptance of this note on the Russian Cabinet by any representations addressed to their colleagues at St. Petersburg, but to leave it to their respective Governments to take such steps as each might judge advisable.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys informed me this morning, that in consequence of this determination he was about to send instructions to General Castelbajac to state that the French Government approved the Project which had been elaborated at Vienna, and which was to be transmitted to Constantinople this day for the sanction of the Turkish Government, and that they desired to know whether it would or would not be accepted by the Emperor of Russia.

## No. 27.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, August 2, 1853.*

ON the 30th ultimo Count Walewski informed me that he had received instructions to propose to Her Majesty's Government that in the event of Russia not accepting within a very short time, or not showing herself well disposed to accept, the measures of conciliation submitted to her, the fleets of France and England should without delay receive orders to enter the Dardanelles upon the first demand of the Porte.

I told Count Walewski that I adhered to the opinion I had several times expressed to him upon this subject, and that I could see no advantage in hypothetical agreements which would never supersede subsequent discussion and deliberation between our respective Governments, nor materially influence their decision upon events as they arose.

Count Walewski assured me that he was far from wishing for any formal engagement or even understanding, but simply for an exchange of opinions between the two Governments as to the course that in certain eventualities it might be desirable to pursue.

I then said that I would read to his Excellency the concluding paragraph of a despatch I had written to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and which had received the approval of more than one of my colleagues. The paragraph is as follows :

"In the event of any further act of aggression by Russia, or of undue delay on her part in accepting the terms for an amicable arrangement that may be proposed to her, Her Majesty's Government, in conjunction with that of France, will be prepared to take more active measures for the protection of Turkey against a Power of whose hostile designs there will then exist no reasonable doubt."

Count Walewski expressed his satisfaction, and I requested his Excellency clearly to understand that the term of delay to be granted to Russia and the future mode of operation were still left quite free and open for discussion between the French and English Governments. To this Count Walewski entirely assented.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

## No. 28.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 2.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, July 26, 1853.*

THE Chancellor spoke to me yesterday, of his own accord, of the Project de Convention between Russia and Turkey, proposed by the English Government.

He did not conceal from me that the objections which he entertained to

the plan were slight ; but observed, that he could give no positive answer until he had received some despatches, which in the course of a day or two must reach him from Vienna.

## No. 29.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 2.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, July 26, 1853.*

IN obedience to your Lordship's directions, I furnished the Chancellor yesterday with a copy of your Lordship's despatch of the 16th instant, which at the same time I begged leave to read to his Excellency.

Count Nesselrode listened with great attention to the despatch, but made no reply or observation beyond this, that when I came to the words "between the position of the English and French fleets outside of the Dardanelles," he remarked that this could not but be considered by the Emperor as a threatening attitude.

To this assumption, I, on my side, could of course not accede. Count Nesselrode then inquired if the despatch were to be considered as addressed to him ? To which I replied, that it certainly was not ; but that, being addressed to me, it was intended, as was seen by the concluding paragraph, for special communication to his Excellency.

The Chancellor then said that he should probably be obliged to address some observations in reply to Baron de Brunnow.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

## No. 30.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, August 2, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, in reply to your despatch of the 17th of July, that Her Majesty's Government approve the course which you have decided upon adopting in regard to Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General at Bucharest, and Consul at Jassy, upon the Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia being directed by the Russian authorities to suspend their relations with the Porte.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

## No. 31.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, August 2, 1853.*

I TRANSMITTED to your Excellency in my private letter of the 18th ultimo, a copy of the draft of note which had been submitted to Her Majesty's Government towards the end of June by the French Government, as being in their opinion calculated, if addressed by the Porte to Russia, to lead to a solution of the present differences between those Powers.

I learnt from Lord Westmorland, on the 25th ultimo, that Count Buol conceived that a note might be framed for the acceptance of the Porte based on the French draft ; and your Excellency will find in my despatch to Lord Cowley, and in the telegraphic despatches which have since passed between Lord Westmorland and myself, of which copies are now transmitted to you, the details of the course which has since been taken in regard to the Austrian proposal.

I now transmit to your Excellency a copy of the note in the terms to which Her Majesty's Government have assented, and in which they understand it will have been forwarded from Vienna to Constantinople.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 31.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley, July 29, 1853.*

[See No. 6.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 31.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon, July 24, 1853.*

[See No. 1.]

Inclosure 3 in No. 31.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland, July 25, 1853.*

[See No. 2.]

Inclosure 4 in No. 31.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon, July 27, 1853.*

[See No. 3.]

Inclosure 5 in No. 31.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon, July 27, 1853.*

[See No. 4.]

Inclosure 6 in No. 31.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland, July 28, 1853.*

[See No. 5.]

Inclosure 7 in No. 31.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon, July 29, 1853.*

[See No. 9.]

**Inclosure 8 in No. 31.**

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland, July 30, 1853.*

[See No. 10.]

Inclosure 9 in No. 31.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon, July 31, 1853.*

[See No. 19.]

Inclosure 10 in No. 31.

*Draft of Note proposed by the French Government to be addressed by the Porte to Russia, as altered at Vienna and London.*

SA Majesté le Sultan n'ayant rien de plus à cœur que de rétablir entre elle et Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie les relations de bon voisinage et de parfaite entente qui ont été malheureusement altérées par de récentes et pénibles complications, a pris soigneusement à tâche de rechercher les moyens d'effacer les traces de ces différends ; et un irade suprême en date de \_\_\_\_\_ lui ayant fait connaître la décision Impériale, elle se félicite de pouvoir la communiquer à son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de Russie (ou à son Excellence M. le Comte de Nesselrode).

Si, à toute époque, les Empereurs de Russie ont témoigné leur active sollicitude pour le maintien des immunités et privilèges de l'Eglise Orthodoxe Grecque dans l'Empire Ottoman, les Sultans ne se sont jamais refusés à les consacrer de nouveau par des actes solennels qui attestaient leur ancienne et constante bienveillance à l'égard de leurs sujets Chrétiens.

Sa Majesté le Sultan Abdul Medjid, aujourd'hui régnant, animé des mêmes dispositions, et voulant donner à Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie un témoignage personnel de son amitié la plus sincère et de son désir intime de consolider les anciennes relations de bon voisinage et de parfaite entente qui existent entre les deux Etats, n'a écouté que sa confiance infinie dans les qualités éminentes de son auguste ami et allié, et a daigné prendre en sérieuse considération les représentations dont son Excellence M. le Prince Menchikoff s'est rendu l'organe auprès d'elle.

Le Soussigné a reçu, en conséquence, l'ordre de déclarer par la présente que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan restera fidèle à la lettre et à l'esprit des stipulations des Traités de Kainardji et Andrinople relatives à la protection du culte Chrétien, et que Sa Majesté regarde qu'il est de son honneur de faire observer à tout jamais, et de préserver de toute atteinte, soit présentement soit dans l'avenir, la jouissance des privilèges spirituels qui ont été accordés par les augustes aïeux de Sa Majesté à l'Eglise Orthodoxe d'Orient, et qui sont maintenus et confirmés par elle; et, en outre, à faire participer, dans un esprit de haute équité, le rit Grec aux avantages concédés aux autres rites Chrétiens par convention ou disposition particulière.

Au reste, comme le firman Impérial qui vient d'être donné au patriarche et au clergé Grecs, et qui contient la confirmation de leurs privilèges spirituels, devra être regardé comme une nouvelle preuve de ces nobles sentiments, et comme, en outre, la proclamation de ce firman qui donne toute sécurité devra faire disparaître à jamais toute crainte à l'égard du rit qui est la religion de Sa Majesté l'Empereur, je suis heureux d'être chargé du devoir de faire la présente notification.

Quant à la garantie qu'à l'avenir il ne sera rien changé aux lieux de visitation de Jérusalem, elle résulte du firman revêtu du hattî-humayoun du 15 de la lune de Rebiul-Akhir, 1268 (Février 1852) expliqué et corroboré par les firmans de

; et l'intention formelle de Sa Majesté le Sultan est de faire exécuter sans aucune altération ses décisions souveraines.

La Sublime Porte en outre promet officiellement qu'il ne sera apporté aucune modification à l'état des choses sans entente préalable avec les Gouvernements de France et de Russie, et sans préjudice aucun pour les différentes communautés Chrétiennes.

Pour le cas où le Cour Impériale de Russie en ferait demande, il sera assigné une localité convenable dans la ville de Jerusalem, ou dans les environs, pour la construction d'une église consacrée à la célébration du service divin par des ecclésiastiques Russes, et d'un hospice pour les pèlerins indigents ou malades de la même nation.

La Sublime Porte s'engage, dès à présent, à souscrire à cet égard un Acte solennel qui placerait ces fondations pieuses sous la surveillance spéciale du Consulat-Général de Russie en Syrie et en Palestine.

Le Soussigné, &c.

(Translation.)

HIS Majesty the Sultan having nothing more at heart than to reestablish between himself and His Majesty the Emperor of Russia the relations of good neighbourhood and perfect understanding which have been unfortunately impaired by recent and painful complications, has diligently endeavoured to discover the means of obliterating the traces of those differences, and a Sovereign iradé dated \_\_\_\_\_ having made known to it the Imperial decision, it is happy to be able to communicate it to his Excellency the Ambassador of Russia (or to his Excellency Count Nesselrode).

If the Emperors of Russia have at all times evinced their active solicitude for the maintenance of the immunities and privileges of the orthodox Greek Church in the Ottoman Empire, the Sultans have never refused again to confirm them by solemn acts testifying their ancient and constant benevolence towards their Christian subjects. His Majesty the Sultan, Abdul-Medjid, now reigning, inspired with the same dispositions, and being desirous of giving to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia a personal proof of his most sincere friendship, and of his hearty desire to consolidate the ancient relations of good neighbourhood and thorough understanding existing between the two States, has been solely influenced by his unbounded confidence in the eminent qualities of his august friend and ally, and has been pleased to take into serious consideration the representations which his Excellency Prince Menchikoff conveyed to him.

The Undersigned has in consequence received orders to declare by the present note that the Government of His Majesty the Sultan will remain faithful to the letter and to the spirit of the Treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople relative to the protection of the Christian religion, and that His Majesty considers himself bound in honour to cause to be observed for ever, and to preserve from all prejudice either now or hereafter, the enjoyment of the spiritual privileges which have been granted by His Majesty's august ancestors to the orthodox Eastern Church, and which are maintained and confirmed by him; and moreover, in a spirit of exalted equity, to cause the Greek rite to share in the advantages granted to the other Christian rites by Convention or special arrangement.

Furthermore, as the Imperial firman which has just been granted to the Greek Patriarch and clergy, and which contains the confirmation of their spiritual privileges, ought to be looked upon as a fresh proof of these noble sentiments, and as, besides, the proclamation of this firman, which affords all security, ought to dispel for ever every apprehension in regard to the rite which is the religion of His Majesty the Emperor, I am happy to be charged with the duty of making the present notification.

As regards the guarantee that hereafter there shall no change be made as to the places of pilgrimage at Jerusalem, that results from the firman invested with the Hatti-humayoun of the 15th of the month of Rebi-ul-akhir (February 1852), explained and corroborated by the firmans of \_\_\_\_\_; and it is the formal intention of His Majesty the Sultan to cause his sovereign decisions to be executed without any alteration.

The Sublime Porte, moreover, officially promises that the existing state of things shall in no wise be modified without previous understanding with the

Governments of France and Russia, and without any prejudice to the different Christian communities.

In case the Imperial Court of Russia should require it, a suitable spot shall be assigned in the City of Jerusalem or its neighbourhood, for the construction of a church destined for the celebration of divine service by Russian ecclesiastics, and of a hospital for the indigent or sick pilgrims of the same nation.

The Sublime Porte engages now to consent to a solemn Act in this respect, whereby these religious foundations shall be placed under the special superintendence of the Consulate-General of Russia in Syria and in Palestine.

The Undersigned, &c.

No. 32.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, August 2, 1853.*

I HAVE the satisfaction to inform your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve your proceedings as reported in your despatch of the 20th ultimo, and the efforts you have made for the re-establishment of friendly relations between Russia and the Porte.

By my despatch of this day's date, your Excellency will learn that the despatches addressed by you and by M. de la Cour to Sir Hamilton Seymour and to General de Castelbajac, as well as the letter of Reshid Pasha to Count Nesselrode, have been detained at Vienna; and Her Majesty's Government have approved of this proceeding, because the mediation of Austria having been accepted by Russia, and the former having reason to believe that the French note, with some slight modifications, already agreed to by the Four Powers, would be acceptable to the Emperor of Russia, it appeared inexpedient to run the risk of embarrassment or confusion at St. Petersburg by a new form of arrangement which might also, if such should be the object of Russia, have furnished fresh pretext for delay.

Her Majesty's Government have, therefore, in preference to all other plans, adhered to this project of note as the means best calculated to effect a speedy and satisfactory solution of the differences. They consider that it fully guards the principle for which throughout we have been contending, and that it may therefore with perfect safety be signed by the Porte; and they further hope that your Excellency, before the receipt of this despatch, will have found no difficulty in procuring the assent of the Turkish Government to a project which the Allies of the Sultan unanimously concur in recommending for his adoption.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 33.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 2, 1853.*

HER Majesty's Government have learnt with extreme surprise, from the despatch of Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe of which a copy is herewith inclosed,\* that the Russians in Moldavia have called upon the Hospodar of that province to suspend his communications with the Ottoman Government, and instead of sending the tribute as usual to Constantinople to keep it in reserve for their eventual disposal. Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe adds that the same course was naturally expected to be taken in Wallachia as soon as the Russian forces arrived at Bucharest.

This assumption of complete sovereignty over the Turkish Provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia gives a character of more decided hostility to the act of their occupation; and Her Majesty's Government are at a loss to conjecture why it was resorted to, unless it be the intention of Russia to take permanent possession of the Principalities, or to compel the Porte to abandon the moderate and pacific policy it has hitherto adopted.

This proceeding, by which the Treaty of Balta Liman between Russia and the Porte is again trampled under foot, is unnecessary ; for Russia will gain no additional power by it in the Principalities, while it almost prohibits belief in the assurances published by the Russian Government that their occupation would be but temporary. It is in direct contradiction of the proclamation issued by Prince Gortchakoff, which declared, " Nous n'arrivons au milieu de vous, ni avec des projets de conquête, ni avec l'intention de modifier les institutions qui vous régissent, et la situation politique que des Traités solennelles vous ont garantie." And it is an act most ungracious towards the allies of Russia, who are labouring to bring about a peaceful and honourable solution of the difficulty, and whose labours may now be rendered abortive.

You are instructed to ask Count Nesselrode for such explanation as his Excellency is disposed to afford of a proceeding which throughout all ranks in this country has produced a most painful sensation.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 34.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, August 3, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve of your having read to Count Nesselrode my despatch of the 9th of July, respecting the Russian manifesto, and of your language in the conversation with his Excellency which ensued, as reported in your despatch of the 22nd of July.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 35.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, August 3, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve of your proceedings, as reported in your despatch of the 22nd of July, with reference to the calumnious charges brought by the Russian Government against Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe's conduct in the late discussions at Constantinople.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 36.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, August 3, 1853.*

I THINK it right to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government were induced to approve of the draft of note which the Porte has been recommended from Vienna to address directly to the Russian Government, by the expectation that such a note will be accepted by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg as a satisfactory solution of its differences with the Porte.

But Her Majesty's Government are anxious to be informed, at the earliest possible period, whether their anticipations are likely to be realized.

You will therefore endeavour clearly to ascertain from Count Nesselrode the intentions of the Russian Government on that point ; and you will report to me, without delay, the result of your communications with his Excellency.

I am &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 37.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 3.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, July 20, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the Sultan's proclamation, which has been expected for some days, is at length in my possession, and I hasten to forward a translation of it for the information of Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure in No. 37.

*Proclamation.*

(Translation.)

*Constantinople, July 13, 1853.*

IT has been already stated in the Turkish official "Gazette" that Russia, having broken off official relations with the Sublime Porte on certain matters on which they could not come to an understanding, withdrew her mission from Constantinople; and that, in consequence of the extensive preparations made by that Power by sea and by land, the Sublime Porte had made some military arrangements and defensive preparations, wholly for precaution and her own protection.

The real cause of the existing dispute with Russia is the desire of that Power to obtain a binding and exclusive engagement from the Porte concerning the religious privileges of the Greek churches and priesthood, which the Porte cannot in justice be expected to give.

Now these religious privileges, granted in the reign of his deceased Majesty Mehemed Khan, of glorious memory, and confirmed during the reigns of his illustrious successors, have been maintained ever since. In imitation of this noble example of his Royal predecessors, His present Majesty has likewise ratified and corroborated them. It never even entered into the imagination of any one to violate the ancient privileges granted *a proprio motu* by the Imperial Throne.

It has been repeatedly declared, in a friendly and sincere manner, that the Porte did not refuse to give assurances sufficient to remove the doubts on which the Russian Government establishes this dispute, in the same manner as the Porte can give assurances to the whole world in a matter so firmly settled; and that whereas, if one Government should enter into an engagement, having the colour or force of Treaty, with another, concerning the religious privileges of a nation consisting of so many millions of its subjects, the independence and sovereign rights of the Power thus bound would be impaired, such an engagement could not be consented to.

While no necessity existed for persisting to such an extent in this matter, the Government of Russia would not desist from its pretensions, and, indeed, the passage of the Russian troops across the Pruth to take temporary possession of and hold the Provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia, has been a subject of painful surprise to the Sublime Porte. This violation of the frontier is an infraction of existing Treaties, and has been immediately protested against, according to international law, that is, the Sublime Porte has officially and publicly notified to the Great Powers that she cannot accept such a violation of Treaty.

Since divers States, connected by the Treaties which they have contracted, constitute the links of mutual security with respect to territorial possessions and sovereign independence; since agreement and cooperation are the means now generally employed when serious disputes like the present arise; since, moreover, Russia has proclaimed that her real object was not to make war upon the Porte, but to hold possession of Wallachia and Moldavia as a guarantee until such times as her claims are satisfied; and since all the Great Powers, without exception, have displayed sentiments more or less favourable towards Turkey, while two of them, England and France, being Powers on which, from their

quality of maritime States, the Porte relies with special confidence, have given a practical manifestation of their friendship and goodwill, the Porte is engaged in communicating according to custom with the above States; and meanwhile, as she cannot possibly accept a proposition so detrimental to her independence and sovereign rights, she has adopted the unanimous resolution of assuming in her own defence an armed attitude, as well upon the Danube as upon her Asiatic frontier.

Such, then, is the real cause of the dispute with Russia, and the present aspect of the question. The Sublime Porte has at the same time been duly careful to adopt all necessary measures, and to make for her defence every requisite disposition of troops and ammunition of war.

The duty, therefore, of all the Porte's subjects, according to their several conditions, will be to continue in the tranquil prosecution of their respective concerns, agriculture, and commerce, and to hold themselves ready to execute any orders which may be issued to them by the Imperial Government.

As it has been clearly established in previous statements that, however the pretensions of Russia may relate to the religious privileges of the Greeks, neither the Greek people nor their Chiefs have any knowledge or participation therein; and the Sublime Porte is convinced that they are in every respect satisfied and grateful towards their Sovereign, and that they are concerned more than any other at such pretensions being put forward, it is on these accounts by no means fitting that any resentment should be felt towards them in this respect; and as the Greeks are equally faithful subjects of our gracious Master with the Armenians, the Catholics, the Protestants, and the Jews, it behoves all the Sultan's subjects, without exception, to be on good terms with one another, not acting hostilely, nor using abusive language; in short, the Mussulmans, as well as the other subjects of the Porte, should live on good terms with each other, none among them whatsoever committing any action contrary to the Supreme will, but attending to their own concerns.

The above dispositions and decision, as well as the admonitions as above stated, are the result of the deliberation of a general Council, comprising the Sheikh-el-Islam, the learned Chiefs of the law, the Seraskier, and all those in military office, and the other Ministers and public servants, and held in the presence of the Grand Vizier; and an Imperial firman having also been issued on this subject any one disapproving of this decision, and acting in contravention to these decisive admonitions, will be held a disobedient subject, and severely punished.

No. 38.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 3.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, July 23, 1853.*

AT the last meeting of the Four Representatives, held at my house on the 20th instant, I submitted for consideration a draft of a note, or part of a note, which might, if accepted by the Porte, be proposed to the Russian Cabinet as the final arrangement of the question of religious privileges, which a Turkish Extraordinary Ambassador would, if received at St. Petersburg, be authorized to conclude.

This suggestion was favourably received by my colleagues, and, when subsequently communicated to Reshid Pasha, by his Highness also, who laid it before the Council and submitted it to the Sultan. Approved by both, after some alteration of no real importance, I have now the honour to bring it officially under your Lordship's notice. It is inclosed herewith in its amended shape; and I hope to obtain the consent of the other Representatives, as well as of the Turkish Minister, for sending it jointly to Vienna and St. Petersburg by way of supplement to the identic despatch already forwarded, in copy, with my previous correspondence to your Lordship, and as offering to Russia, in a full though simple form, the utmost amount of satisfaction which the Porte can with safety give on the main point of difference.

The importance of not losing time will, I trust, excuse me for transmitting it at once to Her Majesty's Ministers at Vienna and Petersburg, with an urgent recommendation to use it without delay in carrying out the concerted plan of

reconciliation now on its way to those capitals. If it be true, as stated in some official correspondence, that the Emperor of Russia is ready to declare his respect for the sovereign rights of the Sultan in return for a declaration securing the privileges of his Church in Turkey, he can hardly object to a mode of arrangement which meets his demand without requiring any counter-declaration on his part; especially when it is considered that the offer will, in all likelihood, be brought before His Imperial Majesty with the concurrence and support of his allies in the Treaty of 1841, and that the Porte consents to make it while two of her provinces are occupied by Russian troops, and to confirm it by means of a special Embassy to Petersburg, notwithstanding the rupture by Russia of her diplomatic relations with that Power.

A process, so humiliating to any independent empire, may be supported for the sake of peace and in consideration of past errors; but it is evidently most desirable to shorten it by all available means, and to make it, in case of failure, the passage to a more determined and progressive state of things. I submit that a powerful Government, insulated by the opinion of Europe, cannot be allowed to triumph in its wrong, without inflicting a heavy blow on that international morality which best controls the spirit of aggression, and insures the continuance of peace. The worst form of triumph, I conceive, would in the present instance be that which, by prolonging indefinitely a state of harassing encroachment on the one side, of exhausting efforts on the other, of disturbance and excitement on both, would finally leave to the weaker and injured party no resource but that of ruinous conflict or degrading submission. With no pretensions to foresight, I cannot conceal my apprehension that if the last reasonable prospect of bringing Russia to terms by negotiation were allowed to close in despair, the responsibility would rest with those who are deterred from the performance of duty by the sacrifices it necessarily involves.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 38.

*Project of Note.*

AWARE of the deep interest taken by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia and by the vast majority of his people in all that concerns the religion which they profess, and fully appreciating the motives of that interest, I had much pleasure in making known to your Excellency the firmans which the Sultan, my gracious Sovereign, promulgated at the end of Shaban in this year; and for the removal of all doubts, I now assure you on behalf of the Sublime Porte that it is the sincere intention of His Imperial Majesty, reserving the sacred rights of sovereignty towards his own subjects, to secure to the Greek, or Orthodox Church, by means of those firmans duly enforced, the enjoyment of the privileges thereby confirmed, and also of such other privileges and immunities as may hereafter be granted by His Majesty to any other sect whatever of his Christian subjects.

The Sublime Porte entertains no doubt that the assurance grounded on the above-mentioned firmans, which have inspired confidence everywhere, will give satisfaction to Russia also.

No. 39.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 3.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, July 23, 1853.*

I RECEIVED this morning from Reshid Pasha an official invitation to attend a conference at his house. On repairing thither at the appointed hour, I found the French Ambassador, the Internuncio, and the Prussian Minister, already assembled with his Highness. The Ottoman Minister lost no time in acquainting us with the object of our meeting. He began by communicating, in a somewhat amended form, the project of an official note which I had proposed to my colleagues, and subsequently to his Highness, two or three days before.

The French translation which accompanied the Turkish original is inclosed herewith. Your Lordship may observe that it differs slightly in two or three expressions from the English version which I forwarded with a preceding despatch, and which would not be unlikely to prove the more acceptable of the two to Count Nesselrode. If the difference were deemed to be of any importance at St. Petersburg, I conceive that there would be little difficulty in reviving the dropped expressions when the note should be finally prepared for transmission to the Russian Government.

Reshid Pasha then proceeded to make us a formal declaration in the name of his Government, and the terms of the declaration having been consigned to paper in his presence, I beg to refer your Lordship for their exact purport to the memorandum inclosed herewith. It is certain that the Sultan and his Council have taken their line definitively, that they now consider themselves as making the last permissible effort for peace, and that their minds are made up for the consequences of a failure. Your Lordship will not fail to notice the last paragraph of the Porte's declaration. It stands in marked contrast with the incitement to a religious war paraded in the Emperor of Russia's manifesto.

The whole declaration was received by my colleagues without the slightest show of objection. The decision and firmness which it exhibits, accompanied as they are with fresh materials and renewed endeavours for an accommodation, appear to me, if I may hazard an opinion, both well-timed and creditable to the Porte. I hope they will be so viewed by Her Majesty's Government.

To complete your Lordship's information, I forward herewith copies of my additional letters to Sir George Seymour and Lord Westmorland. I must again apologise for writing to the former in French. I found it convenient for communicating with M. de la Cour, and securing a nearer approach to identity in our despatches on this occasion to St. Petersburg.

I repeat my former request, that your Lordship will be kindly pleased to apprise Lord Westmorland and Sir H. Seymour by telegraph of the sentiments of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the proposed course of proceeding.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 39.

*Project of Convention.*

*Balta Lima, le 23<sup>e</sup> Juillet, 1853.*

CONNAISSANT le profond intérêt que Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie ainsi que la grande majorité de son peuple prennent à tout ce qui concerne la religion qu'ils professent, et appréciant entièrement les motifs de cet intérêt, j'ai eu beaucoup de plaisir en faisant connaître à votre Excellence les firmans que mon auguste Souverain a promulgués vers la fin de Chaban de l'année courante. Et pour faire écarter tout le doute, je viens vous assurer de la part de la Sublime Porte que se réservant les droits sacrés de souveraineté envers ses propres sujets, il est de l'intention sincère de Sa Majesté Impériale d'assurer à l'Eglise Grecque à perpétuité la jouissance des privilèges spirituels qui y sont confirmés, et de lui accorder aussi tels autres privilèges et immunités qu'il plairait à Sa Majesté d'accorder désormais à tout autre culte quelconque de ses sujets Chrétiens.

Enfin, je n'ai pas le moindre doute que les assurances basées sur les firmans précités, qui ont inspiré de la confiance partout, ne donnent aussi de la satisfaction à la Russie.

(Translation.)

AWARE of the deep interest taken by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia and by the vast majority of his people in all that concerns the religion which they profess, and fully appreciating the motives of that interest, I have had much pleasure in making known to your Excellency the firmans which my august Sovereign promulgated at the end of Shaban in this year. And for the removal of all doubts, I now assure you on behalf of the Sublime Porte that it is

the sincere intention of His Imperial Majesty, reserving the sacred rights of sovereignty towards his own subjects, to secure for ever to the Greek Church the enjoyment of the spiritual privileges thereby confirmed, and also to grant to it such other privileges and immunities as His Majesty may hereafter be pleased to grant to any other sect whatever of his Christian subjects.

Finally, I entertain no doubt that the assurances grounded on the above-mentioned firmans, which have inspired confidence everywhere, will also give satisfaction to Russia.

Inclosure 2 in No. 39.

*Memorandum of Conference between Reshid Pasha and the Four Representatives.*

*Balta Lima, le 23 Juillet, 1853.*

LES Représentants d'Autriche, de France, de Grande Bretagne, et de Prusse, s'étant réunis en conférence chez le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères Ottoman sur l'invitation de son Altesse, Reshid Pasha a pris la parole comme il suit :

“ Je suis chargé par Sa Majesté le Sultan de communiquer à vos Excellences cette pièce avec sa traduction en langue Française, qui est un projet de note qui, dicté par de vrais sentiments de conciliation, paraît au Gouvernement Impérial de nature à répondre au désir de la Russie, par rapport à la question des privilèges religieux.

“ Je déclare officiellement que la Porte est décidée de ne point aller au-delà des termes d'une note strictement conformes à ce projet; tout autre arrangement lui paraissant une atteinte aux droits sacrés de sa souveraineté et de son indépendance.

“ Il est bien entendu qu'aussitôt que la Cour de Russie aura fait connaître l'acceptation de ce projet, la Porte n'hésitera pas d'envoyer un Ambassadeur à St. Pétersbourg chargé de la remise de la susdite note.

“ En retour de ces assurances formulées, la Sublime Porte attend que la Cour de Russie ne tardera pas à donner des ordres pour l'évacuation des Principautés Danubiennes.

“ Enfin, je déclare, au nom de Sa Majesté le Sultan, que si, malgré tous ces efforts pour arriver à un arrangement pacifique et honorable, il serait obligé de pourvoir par d'autres moyens à la défense de son empire et à l'intégrité de ses droits, la guerre qui en résulterait malheureusement, ne serait à ses yeux qu'une lutte ayant pour objet d'assurer son indépendance.”

Son Altesse a terminé sa communication en priant les Représentants de vouloir bien se charger de faire parvenir la déclaration qui précède, ainsi que le projet de note, à leurs collègues à Vienne et à St. Pétersbourg, de manière à compléter l'expédition précédente qui se rattache à la même affaire, et à provoquer dans le plus court délai possible une réponse du Cabinet Russe, laquelle devrait être envoyée au plutôt à Constantinople.

(Translation.)

*Balta Liman, July 23, 1853.*

THE Representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia having met together in conference with the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs on his Highness's invitation, Reshid Pasha stated as follows :

“ I am directed by His Majesty the Sultan to communicate to your Excellencies, with a translation in the French language, this document, which is a draft of note which, dictated by real sentiments of conciliation, appears to the Imperial Government calculated to meet the wish of Russia in regard to the question of religious privileges.

“ I declare officially, that the Porte is resolved not to go beyond the terms of a note strictly conformable to this draft; any other arrangement appearing to it to be prejudicial to the sacred rights of its sovereignty and of its independence.

“ It is well understood that so soon as the Court of Russia shall have announced its acceptance of this draft, the Porte will not hesitate to send an Ambassador to St. Petersburg, charged to deliver the aforesaid note.

"In return for these formal assurances, the Porte expects that the Court of Russia will not delay giving orders for the evacuation of the Danubian Principalities.

"Finally, I declare in the name of His Majesty the Sultan that if, notwithstanding all these efforts to arrive at a peaceful and honourable arrangement, he should be compelled to take other measures for the independence of his Empire and the integrity of his rights, the war which might ensue would only be looked upon by him as a contest for the maintenance of his independence."

His Highness concluded this communication by requesting the Representatives to have the goodness to undertake to convey the foregoing declaration, as well as the draft of note, to their colleagues at Vienna and at St. Petersburg, as supplementary to the previous communication relating to the same matter, and to obtain, with as little delay as possible, a reply from the Russian Cabinet, to be forwarded forthwith to Constantinople.

Inclosure 3 in No. 39.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

M. le Chevalier,

*Constantinople, le 23 Juillet, 1853.*

ME rapportant à la dépêche identique du 20 courant je m'empresse de vous envoyer ci-joint un projet de note que son Altesse le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères Ottoman vient de remettre aux quatre Représentants, comme ayant été arrêté en Conseil et devant être présenté au Cabinet de Russie de la part de la Porte par l'Ambassadeur Extraordinaire qui serait envoyé à St. Pétersbourg aussitôt que son Excellence le Comte de Nesselrode ferait connaître l'intention de sa Cour d'accepter les termes de la dite note.

J'ai l'honneur aussi de vous envoyer ci-joint en copie le memorandum d'une conférence qui vient d'avoir lieu aujourd'hui chez Reshid Pasha sur l'invitation adressée par son Altesse aux quatre Représentants. La déclaration que nous a faite le Ministre Ottoman, comme vous y verrez, au nom de Sa Majesté le Sultan et de son Gouvernement, mérite d'engager toute votre attention. Elle n'a rencontré aucune objection de notre part. Elle doit nécessairement augmenter notre désir de contribuer à l'heureux succès de la proposition qui est maintenant recommandée à vos bons offices et à ceux de vos collègues à St. Pétersbourg. Cette idée a réuni tous les suffrages ici, et j'aime à croire que vos efforts pour la faire agréer par son Excellence le Comte de Nesselrode auront le résultat que la Porte en attend.

Je profite d'un bateau-à-vapeur, expédié directement à Marseilles par l'Ambassadeur de France, pour faire passer un moment plutôt à Londres la note et la déclaration susdites, en priant le Comte de Clarendon de vouloir bien vous communiquer l'opinion du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté par le télégraphe électrique.

M. de la Cour écrit à son Excellence le Général de Castelbajac dans le sens de cette lettre, et j'ai tout lieu de croire que les Ministres d'Autriche et de Prusse ne restent pas en arrière.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.

(Signé)

STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

(Translation.)

M. le Chevalier,

*Constantinople, July 23, 1853.*

REFERRING to the identic despatch of the 20th instant, I hasten to send you herewith a draft of note which his Excellency the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs has just delivered to the Four Representatives, as being agreed upon in the Council, and intended to be presented, on the part of the Porte, to the Cabinet of Russia by an Ambassador Extraordinary to be sent to St. Petersburg so soon as Count Nesselrode should make known the intention of his Court to accept the terms of the said note.

I have likewise the honour to send to you herewith in copy a memorandum of a conference which has taken place to-day with Reshid Pasha on an invitation addressed by his Highness to the Four Representatives. The declaration which has been made to us by the Ottoman Minister, as you will perceive in the name

of His Majesty the Sultan and of his Government, is entitled to your fullest attention. It met with no objection on our side. It must needs increase our desire to contribute to the happy success of the proposition which is now recommended to your good offices, and to those of your colleagues at St. Petersburg. This idea has met with general approbation here, and I flatter myself that your efforts to induce Count Nesselrode to agree it will have the result expected by the Porte.

I avail myself of a steam-vessel dispatched by the French Ambassador direct to Marseilles, to transmit as quickly as possible to London the above-mentioned note and declaration, requesting Lord Clarendon to have the goodness to communicate to you the opinion of Her Majesty's Government by the electric telegraph.

M. de la Cour writes to his Excellency General Castelbajac in the sense of this letter, and I have every reason to believe that the Ministers of Austria and Prussia will not hold back.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 4 in No. 39.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, July 23, 1853.*

BY way of sequel to my despatch of the 20th instant, I now forward to you, under flying seal, a despatch, with two inclosures, which I have addressed in French, for the sake of more convenient communication with my colleagues, to Her Majesty's Envoy at the Court of St. Petersburg. I need not solicit your attention to the important contents of this correspondence; and I rely upon your Lordship's well-known zeal in the cause of peace for their prompt transmission to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

It may fairly be presumed that the Porte's intended note will afford facilities for accommodation, not only by the assurances which it contains, but the relinquishment of any pretension to a counter-declaration from Russia.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 40.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 3.)*

My Lord,

*Vienna, July 29, 1853.*

COUNT BUOL called a conference this day of the French and Prussian Ministers and myself, and brought under our consideration the communications he had received from Baron Bruck, and those also that the Turkish Ambassador had been instructed to make to him, and which had been transmitted from Constantinople on the 20th instant. Count Buol stated that, having taken the Emperor's orders upon these various communications, he could not agree to the proposals made to him. He must decline to transmit the note of Reshid Pasha to Count Nesselrode to St. Petersburg, or to recommend it, or the documents with which it was accompanied; nor could he advise the Ambassador to forward it, or to prepare to forward it, in the manner which had been recommended by the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople. He felt that these communications were not of a nature to encourage any hope that they would be well received by the Russian Cabinet, and therefore he entirely objected to them. He stated that the Emperor had determined to adhere to the recommendation to the Porte of the project of note which Count Buol had drawn up, and which had been assented to by the Three Powers, and which he would transmit by special Envoy, who would probably be the bearer of an autograph letter from himself to the Sultan, calling upon him to adopt it as the only means he thought likely of coming to a satisfactory arrangement.

Count Buol said that if the Porte agreed to this recommendation, the Emperor would make every exertion to obtain the consent of the Emperor of Russia to receive the note, which should be transmitted by an Ambassador from the Porte.

Count Buol did not contemplate sending this communication till the day after to-morrow, so that the members of the Conference would have time to receive the decision of their Governments with regard to his present proposal; and he strongly recommended that we should lose no time in applying for their directions, and for the orders which they would desire to have transmitted to their respective Ministers at Constantinople.

This declaration on the part of Count Buol rendered any discussion of the arrangement proposed by the Porte and by the Representatives at Constantinople impossible; each of us, however, communicated the objects proposed by our respective Ministers, and I particularly brought before the Conference the assurance I had received in a private letter from Lord Stratford that a further conciliatory proposal to be inserted in the note to be presented by the Ambassador, upon his arrival at St. Petersburg, was likely to be adopted by the Porte, and would be transmitted in two days from the date of the last despatches.

Count Buol declared that, after having received the Emperor's orders, he could not alter the measure which he had been ordered to carry out; he did not conceive that any addition made to the mode of addressing the Emperor, by sending a protest against his proceedings, could render the communication more likely to be accepted by him; he also conceived that this proposal, which was at present only to inquire whether an Ambassador would be received at St. Petersburg to enter into negotiation as to an arrangement, was of a nature to occasion so much delay at a moment when an early settlement was of the greatest consequence, that, upon that ground alone, he could be no party to it. He believed also that the proposal of the eventual retirement of the fleets from the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, in return for the immediate evacuation of the Principalities, was not likely (in face of the declarations lately made) to be accepted by the Governments of England and France. Count Buol stated that he most earnestly hoped our Governments would agree to and support the decision of the Emperor, which had been come to upon the sole conviction of its being the best chance (indeed, he believed the only one) of coming to an early solution of a complication which might by every day's delay be rendered more difficult of arrangement, and more dangerous to the peace of Europe.

Count Buol will communicate this project to St. Petersburg at the same time as it is despatched to Constantinople, and will in the strongest terms urge the Emperor of Russia to accept it. He hopes to have an answer from St. Petersburg by the time he receives that from Constantinople, and, if it is favourable, the Porte may immediately take the necessary measures for the appointment of an Ambassador.

We all urged upon Count Buol the extreme importance of an immediate evacuation of the Principalities as soon as any arrangement should be come to, and he declared to us that he should press upon the Russian Cabinet distinctly his hope that, whenever the Ambassador should be appointed to carry the note from Constantinople, the evacuation of the Principalities should commence.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

P.S.—Soon after the termination of the Conference, M. de Bourqueney received a telegraphic message from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, a copy of which is inclosed, by which he is directed to suspend the transmission of the proposals from Constantinople, and to apprise me of this order, as M. Drouyn de Lhuys would consult with regard to them with the English Government.

W,

## Inclosure in No. 40.

*Telegraphic Despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys to M. de Bourqueney.*

A M. de Bourqueney :

*Paris, le 29 Juillet, 12½.*

SUSPENDEZ jusqu'à nouvel ordre l'envoi à St. Pétersbourg des communications adressées par votre intermédiaire à M. de Castelbajac par M. de la Cour. Informez-en Lord Westmorland. Je vais m'entendre avec le Gouvernement Anglais.

(Translation.)

To M. de Bourqueney :

*Paris, July 29, 12½.*

SUSPEND until further orders the despatches to St. Petersburg of the communication addressed by M. de la Cour through your channel to M. de Castelbajac. Inform Lord Westmorland of this. I am about to come to an understanding with the English Government.

## No. 41.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 5.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, August 4, 1853.*

WITH reference to the conduct of the Russian Agents in the Principalities, it may be as well to state that the French Consuls in Moldavia and Wallachia were instructed some time back to suspend their Consular functions should any thing occur to disturb the regular Government of the Hospodars, and their actions consequently do not depend on any instructions which they may receive from M. de la Cour.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

## No. 42.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 5.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, August 4, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has profited by the passage of Mr. Tucker, returning by the "Caradoc," to write to M. de la Cour, explaining why the French Government preferred the note which had been agreed to at Vienna, to that sent by Reshid Pasha from Constantinople, and instructing him to use all his influence with the Porte to obtain its assent to the project recommended by the Four Powers.

I have had an opportunity of conversing with the Turkish Ambassador, and I was glad to find that his Excellency has written in the same sense to his Government.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY

## No. 43.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 5.)*

My Lord,

Paris, August 4, 1853.

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has addressed a despatch to General Casteljac, with reference to the conduct of the Russian Agents in the Principalities, of precisely the same tenour as your Lordship's to Sir Hamilton Seymour of the 2nd instant.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

## No. 44.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 5.)*

(Extract.)

St. Petersburg, July 30, 1853.

AT a visit which I have paid to Count Nesselrode this day, I began the conversation by requesting that his Excellency would attribute to its real motives the observation which I had to make to him; that nothing could be further from my intention than to utter what might be construed into a threat, but that I begged to remind him that the fine season was fast passing by, and that if negotiations should fail in their desired effect, or should become protracted, it might well happen that the fleets would be compelled to seek a more secure anchorage in the Sea of Marmora; as it could never be expected that the fleets could be withdrawn from Turkey leaving affairs there in the unsettled state which had led to their despatch to Besika Bay.

The Chancellor made a fresh attempt to prove to me how needless was the opposition which Prince Menchikoff's note had met with, and how readily its signature would settle all difficulties. This question, however, I declined to entertain, observing, a discussion of this sort is worse than useless upon a point in which the dignity and the interests of so many parties are concerned.

Count Nesselrode then read me a short despatch which he had just written to Baron Brunnow, in which he had stated the principal objections which he entertained to your Lordship's *Projet de Convention*, these being the length of the preamble and the omission of mention of the Jerusalem firmans and grant of an hospital. I entreated of his Excellency not to put forward principal objections, but to state all he had to mention, as it was becoming more and more important to guard against the loss of time. Count Nesselrode assented to this, and stated that Baron Brunnow's instructions would be so full as to obviate the necessity of reference to St. Petersburg.

The sum of the conversation which ensued was, that the delay which had occurred with regard to the plan of arrangement which Baron Bruck was pursuing was to be attributed in part to the Ramazan, in part to the late Ministerial crisis at Constantinople, and that very probably in a few days news might be received of this plan having been successful; that should it fail, Count Nesselrode should be prepared to fall back upon the *Projet de Convention* slightly altered.

## No. 45.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 5.)*

My Lord,

Vienna, July 31, 1853.

SINCE I had the honour of addressing to your Lordship my despatch of the 29th instant, I received your Lordship's telegraphic message of the 28th instant, stating "that you agreed to the modifications proposed, and that I was to announce to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe that Her Majesty's Government desires that the project should be adopted by the Porte

unless some other arrangement had already been made." And on this day have received your Lordship's telegraphic despatch of yesterday's date, which instructs me to suspend "the transmission of the despatches from Constantinople addressed to St. Petersburg, until further orders;" and adds, "In the modifications of the French note suggested by Count Buol, we propose, after the word 'Sultan,' to add, 'resterà fidèle, &c. ;' and after 'culte Chrétien,' to add, 'et que Sa Majesté regarde, &c.' These changes are desirable for the purpose of ensuring the acceptation by the Porte; nevertheless we do not make of it an absolute '*sine quâ non*.' Inform Count Buol and your colleagues."

I transmitted both these telegraphic messages to Count Buol, and this morning he called a conference, at which he explained his great satisfaction at the approbation your Lordship had given to the modifications proposed by him in the French note, and at the decision you had come to, to suspend the transmission to St. Petersburg of the propositions which had come from Constantinople. Count Buol then stated that he at once adopted the changes your Lordship proposed in the note he had drawn up, and this was approved by the other members of the Conference.

Count Buol then adverted to the despatches he had received from Constantinople, of the 23rd instant, and stated that the Turkish Ambassador had communicated to him those which he had received, and which, he supposed, were of the same purport as those transmitted to Baron Bourqueney, M. de Canitz, and myself. This having been found to be the case, Count Buol stated that he considered these communications as in no way altering the character of the proposals from Constantinople which had been discussed at the last conference; there was no change in them, with the exception of the official form given to the note hereafter to be presented to the Russian Government by an Ambassador from the Porte if his mission was accepted, and which had already been privately made known and considered at that conference; and with respect to the declaration made by Reshid Pasha to the Representatives at Constantinople, he did not consider it as applicable to his own proposals, which protected the honour and the best interests of the Porte as effectually as the measure Reshid Pasha had adopted. Count Buol therefore looked upon the propositions as unaltered, and he adhered to the decision he had taken with regard to them.

He then read to us the modifications which had been made in the draft of his note, and consented to by the three Governments to which they had been submitted; and also the despatch by which he instructs Baron Bruck to bring that note before the Turkish Government as the one proposed to be addressed to Count Nesselrode and signed by Reshid Pasha. He submitted this despatch for the approval of the members of the Conference, which we all unanimously gave. Count Buol then stated that these documents would be forwarded to Constantinople to-morrow evening by a Colonel, who would also be the bearer of an autograph letter to the Sultan from the Emperor, in which His Majesty would, in the strongest manner, recommend to the Sultan the adoption of the proposals now submitted to him, as being the best calculated to terminate the differences unhappily existing between his Government and that of Russia, with the maintenance of his honour, his dignity, and independence. Count Buol called upon each of the members of the Conference to engage our respective colleagues in Constantinople, in conformity with the instructions we had received from our Governments, to give their support to his proposition, assuring us that to their powerful influence and exertions he looked with the firm expectation that they would succeed in convincing the Turkish Government that it was made in the most friendly spirit, and with the conviction that it offered the best—perhaps the only—chance of terminating with honour, and with the least delay, the unfortunate complications which menaced the prosperity of their own Empire and the peace of Europe.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

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## No. 46.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 8.)*

My Lord,

Vienna, August 3, 1853.

I HAVE expressed to Count Buol the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at his renewed assurances of the policy of Austria in the unfortunate event of the differences between Russia and the Porte not being amicably arranged, and I have been requested by Count Buol to return your Lordship his thanks for this satisfactory communication.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

## No. 47.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 8.)*

My Lord,

Vienna, August 3, 1853.

I HAVE the honour of forwarding herewith a copy of the despatch addressed by me to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, on the 1st of August, transmitting to him, for his information and guidance, the two telegraphic despatches I had received from your Lordship dated respectively Thursday the 28th, and Saturday the 30th of July; the first of which, having reference to Count Buol's proposed note, directed me to inform Lord Stratford that Her Majesty's Government desired that that project should be adopted by the Porte, and the second instructing me to suspend the transmission of the despatches from Constantinople addressed to St. Petersburg until further orders, and directing me to obtain the alterations in Count Buol's note proposed by your Lordship.

I also forwarded as inclosures to Lord Stratford copies of my despatches of the 29th and 31st ultimo, in which I detailed what had passed at the two conferences held at Count Buol's and attended by the French Minister, the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires, and myself.

I also addressed a private letter to Lord Stratford in which I reported all the circumstances which had attended the drawing up of Count Buol's note, and informed him of its approval by the three Cabinets, as well as of the instructions forwarded by them to their respective Representatives at this Court to suspend the transmission to St. Petersburg of the despatches received from Constantinople.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

## Inclosure in No. 47.

*The Earl of Westmorland to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

Vienna, August 1, 1853.

I HAVE the honour of inclosing, for your Lordship's information and guidance, copies of the two telegraphic despatches I have received from Her Majesty's Government, the one dated Thursday, the 28th, the other dated Saturday, the 30th,\* both of which have reference to the negotiations pending for the settlement of the differences between the Governments of Russia and the Porte.

I inclose likewise copies of my two despatches of the 29th and 31st ultimo to Lord Clarendon,† on the same subject.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND

\* See Nos. 5 and 10.

† See Nos. 40 and 45.

## No. 48.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 8.)*

(Extract.)

*Berlin, August 5, 1853.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL has informed me that he should forward to-night to the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg, a copy of the note which had been agreed upon at a conference of the Representatives of the Four Powers at Vienna, for the settlement of the dispute between Russia and Turkey, and that he trusted it would be found acceptable by the Russian Government. He added, that he quite approved of all the proceedings that had taken place at Vienna.

Count Henckel is directed to do all in his power to urge the acceptance of this note, and thus to bring this unfortunate quarrel to an end.

## No. 49.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 9.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, August 8, 1853.*

M. DE BOURQUENEY mentions in a despatch to M. Drouyn de Lhuys dated the 3rd instant, that he had informed Count Buol that the French Consuls at Jassy and Bucharest were furnished with instructions to strike their flags should the Government of the Hospodars be suspended, and he inquired what line it was intended to pursue in regard to the Austrian Consuls.

Count Buol replied that the position of the Austrian Consuls in the Principalities was essentially different from that of the English and French Consuls, the latter having a diplomatic character which the former had not. The Austrian Consuls had only to superintend the commercial affairs of Austrian subjects, and their presence in the Principalities was a necessity.

Count Buol added that he did not believe that the Hospodars would obey the orders of the Porte to quit their seat of Government; but he did not the less blame the proceedings of Russia in regard to them and their relations with the Sultan, which he characterised as being at variance with the promises made by Russia on entering the Principalities.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

## No. 50.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, August 9, 1853.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 3rd instant, reporting your communication to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople of the telegraphic despatches which I addressed to you on the 28th and 30th ultimo, and of your despatches to me of the 29th and 31st ultimo, I have to inform your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government approve the course pursued by you on this occasion.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

## No. 51.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 9.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, July 25, 1853.*

IN concert with the French Ambassador I propose to confine the abeyance of our consular flags in the Danubian Principalities to Bucharest and Jassy, where the Hospodars reside, and not to extend the measure to Galatz, where our trade might be seriously inconvenienced by the suspension of Mr. Cunningham's functions. The Porte's order for the retirement of the two Princes will be forwarded to-morrow.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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## No. 52.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, August 9, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint you in reply to your despatch of the 25th of July, that Her Majesty's Government approve of your intention to allow Mr. Cunningham to continue to exercise his consular duties at Galatz, notwithstanding the suspension of their duties at Bucharest and Jassy by Mr. Colquhoun and Mr. Gardner.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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## No. 53.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 10.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, August 2, 1853.*

IN the conversation which I held yesterday with the Chancellor, I remarked that Her Majesty's Government were as much intent as ever upon arriving at a pacific arrangement, but that, as it was requisite that Her Majesty's Embassy, whilst pressing the Turkish Government to sign the note or Convention, or whatever other Act was to be concluded at Constantinople, should be able to give the Turks assurances as to this Act being the immediate prelude to the evacuation of the Principalities, I would request his Excellency to enable me to do so.

Count Nesselrode replied, that the Emperor's desire to leave the Principalities was well known, but that his intentions upon the point in question had not been signified.

Upon my repeating the inquiry in other words, Count Nesselrode entreated of me not to write upon a subject which might lead to complications. The English Government, he would again say, were not sufficiently occupied with the dangers with which Turkey was threatened. The neighbourhood of a Russian force might prove a great benefit to Turkey. Her Majesty's Government, he would say, did not press enough upon the Porte in stimulating it to give satisfaction to the Emperor, and pressed too much upon the Russian Government.

It was unfortunate, Count Nesselrode once again observed, that the "Menchikoff note" had not at once been signed; its importance had been unduly exaggerated; an artificial opinion against it had been created; but the Emperor's position was one from which His Majesty could not recede: His Majesty must obtain satisfaction, either in the shape in which it had been demanded, or in some other of equal value.

To this I replied that I had no desire to resort to recriminations, but that I must revert to my former objection: was it proper that Russian policy should

have brought matters to such a pass, that either there should be a prospect of war, or that the Governments the most interested in Turkey should be compelled to give their assent to a measure which they thought dangerous to her independence? Prince Menchikoff's note having been finally laid aside, it was, I thought, very necessary to adopt some other means of settling the question as speedily as possible; and I would remark that if it should prove that the scheme attempted by M. de Bruck had failed, it would be very desirable that the consent of the Russian Government should be given at once to the *Projet de Convention* prepared in England.

Count Nesselrode could say nothing upon that subject until he should receive the despatches which he was expecting from Vienna, beyond this, that it would not be in his power to agree to the *Projet de Convention* unless amended.

## No. 54.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 11.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, August 5, 1853.*

IT is my agreeable duty to acquaint your Lordship, that upon waiting upon the Chancellor this morning he stated that he had the satisfaction of informing me, that the Emperor had signified his acceptance (*acceptation pure et simple*) of the *projet de note* which had been received from Vienna, and a copy of which was dispatched on the 24th ultimo from Vienna to Constantinople.

Intelligence of the Emperor's decision will be sent off to-morrow to Baron Brunnow, and has been already conveyed by telegraph to Vienna.

Before leaving the Chancellor, I remarked that I must beg to call his attention once more to the occupation of the Principalities, and to express on behalf of Her Majesty's Government the hope that the occupation would cease as soon as the note should be signed.

Count Nesselrode thought it would be premature to give a direct answer to my question; and would inquire if it were suspected that the Russian army intended to remain in the Principalities permanently?

My question, I replied, did not imply that suspicion; but I felt obliged to make an inquiry which was justified by intelligence which had reached Her Majesty's Government, of roads and bridges which were in a course of construction, and of contracts for several months which had been made.

The Chancellor rejoined that he evidently could not speak positively until he should know whether the Turkish Government were prepared to sign the note which had been sent them; that in the meantime he could only state, that the Emperor was desirous that the occupation of the Principalities should not be prolonged by one day beyond the term which was absolutely necessary.

## No. 55.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 11.)*

My Lord,

*Vienna, August 7, 1853.*

THINKING it important that Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople should be made acquainted with the intelligence received by Baron Meyendorff relative to the Emperor of Russia's acceptance of Count Buol's proposed note, I have forwarded to Mr. Consul-General Fonblanque a telegraphic despatch of which I have the honour of inclosing a copy, with a request that he would forward by Tatar to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe the information which it conveys.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

## Inclosure in No. 55.

*The Earl of Westmorland to Consul-General Fonblanque.*

(Telegraphic.)

(Extract.)

*Vienne, 7 Août, 1853.*

FAITES passer immédiatement par Tatar à Lord Stratford la dépêche suivante :—

“Le Baron Meyendorff m’a communiqué une dépêche télégraphique, datée de St. Pétersbourg du 3 Août, qui porte que l’Empereur accepte la note proposée par le Comte Buol, et si la Porte l’accepte sans changement l’Ambassadeur Turque sera reçu à St. Pétersbourg. Lord Stratford est prié de faire savoir cette nouvelle à M. de Wildenbruch.”

(Translation.)

(Extract.)

*Vienna, August 7, 1853.*

TRANSMIT to Lord Stratford immediately, by Tatar, the following despatch :—

“Baron Meyendorff has communicated to me a telegraphic despatch dated St. Petersburg, the 3rd of August, the purport of which is that the Emperor accepts the note proposed by Count Buol, and if the Porte accepts it without alteration, the Turkish Ambassador will be received at St. Petersburg. Lord Stratford is requested to communicate this intelligence to M. de Wildenbruch.”

## No. 56.

*Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Baron Brunnow, August 12.)*

M. le Baron,

*St. Pétersbourg, le <sup>25</sup> Juillet / <sup>6</sup> Août, 1853.*

VOTRE Excellence aura déjà sans doute eu connaissance de la note rédigée par le Cabinet Autrichien avec la participation des Représentants d’Angleterre, de France, et de Prusse à Vienne. Je m’empresse de lui en envoyer ci-joint une copie, et de la prévenir que Sa Majesté l’Empereur a daigné consentir à recevoir un Ambassadeur Turc si cette pièce est acceptée par la Porte Ottomane. Pour vous mettre au fait, M. le Baron, de la manière dont nous avons cru devoir exprimer au Cabinet Autrichien l’adhésion de notre Auguste Maître à cette combinaison, j’ai l’honneur de vous transmettre ci-joint la copie d’une dépêche que j’adresse aujourd’hui au Baron de Meyendorff, et dont je vous prierai de donner lecture à Lord Clarendon.

Recevez, &c.  
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)

M. le Baron,

*St. Petersburg, <sup>July 25</sup> / <sup>August 6</sup>, 1853.*

YOUR Excellency will doubtless be already acquainted with the note drawn up by the Austrian Cabinet, with the participation of the Representatives of England, France, and Prussia, at Vienna. I forward to you herewith a copy of it, and apprise you that His Majesty the Emperor has been pleased to consent to receive a Turkish Ambassador if this document is accepted by the Ottoman Porte. In order that you may be aware, M. le Baron, of the manner in which we have thought fit to communicate to the Austrian Cabinet our august master’s adhesion to this arrangement, I have the honour to send to you herewith a despatch which I address to-day to Baron de Meyendorff, and which I will request you to read to Lord Clarendon.

Receive, &c.  
(Signed) NESSELRODE.

Inclosure in No. 56.

*Count Nesselrode to Baron Meyendorff.*

*St. Pétersbourg, le <sup>25 Juillet</sup><sub>6 Août</sub>, 1853.*

LE projet de l'ultimatum que vous nous avez communiqué par votre dépêche du  $\frac{1}{2}$ <sup>8</sup> de ce mois, et que le Cabinet de Vienne se proposait de transmettre à Constantinople, après en avoir concerté les clauses et la rédaction avec les Représentants des trois autres Puissances, a fixé toute notre attention.

Si ce projet ne répond pas pleinement aux demandes déjà si modérées que le Prince Menchikoff avait formulées dans la note dont nous avons réclamé la signature, il a la mérite à nos yeux d'un arrangement dont l'initiative a été prise par une Cour amie, et qui, délibéré en commun entre les Représentants des trois autres Puissances intervenues dans la question, a été unanimement reconnu comme devant être accepté par la Porte Ottomane et transmis à St. Pétersbourg par une Ambassade *ad hoc*.

Vous connaissez, M. le Baron, le désir très sincère de la part de notre Auguste Maître de faire cesser, en autant que cela peut dépendre de lui, les inquiétudes que l'on éprouve en Europe, avec quelque exagération peut-être, à l'occasion de notre différend actuel avec la Turquie. Sa Majesté vous charge, en conséquence, M. le Baron, de déclarer au Ministère de l'Empereur François-Joseph, ainsi qu'à vos collègues de France, d'Angleterre et de Prusse, que, pour notre part, nous acceptons tel quel le dernier Projet de Note formulé à Vienne, et qu'un Ambassadeur du Sultan, porteur de ce document, serait reçu à St. Pétersbourg sans aucune difficulté et avec tous les égards d'usage.

Je crois superflu de faire observer ici à votre Excellence qu'en accueillant, comme nous le faisons par esprit de conciliation, l'expédient concerté à Vienne de la note dont il s'agit, et l'envoi d'une Ambassade Turque, nous entendons bien ne plus avoir à examiner ou à discuter de nouvelles modifications et de nouveaux projets élaborés à Constantinople sous les inspirations belliqueuses qui paraissent dominer à cette heure le Sultan et la plupart de ses Ministres, et que, dans le cas où le Gouvernement Ottoman rejeterait encore ce dernier projet d'arrangement, nous ne nous considererions plus comme liés par le consentement que nous y donnons aujourd'hui.

Si l'Europe a besoin, comme on ne cesse de nous le dire, de voir se terminer la crise qui menace l'Orient, c'est à Constantinople que doivent s'adresser à l'avenir les bienveillants et pacifiques efforts des grandes Puissances, que nous secondons de notre côté par tous les sacrifices compatibles avec la dignité de la Russie et la justice de la cause dont elle a dû prendre en mains la défense.

Vous voudrez bien, M. le Baron, donner lecture et copie de la présente à M. le Comte de Buol, et en faire connaître également le contenu à vos principaux collègues du corps diplomatique.

Recevez, &c.  
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)

*St. Petersburg, <sup>July 25</sup><sub>August 6</sub>, 1853.*

THE draft of the ultimatum which you have communicated to us by your despatch of the  $\frac{1}{2}$ <sup>8</sup>th instant, and which the Cabinet of Vienna proposed to send to Constantinople, after having settled the clauses and the form of it with the Representatives of the three other Powers, has been attentively considered by us.

If this draft does not fully correspond with the demands already so modified which Prince Menchikoff had expressed in the note of which we required the signature, it possesses in our estimation the merit of an arrangement originating with a friendly Court, and which, discussed in common among the Representatives of the three Powers who have taken part in the question, has been unanimously looked upon as one which should be accepted by the Ottoman Porte, and transmitted to St. Petersburg by a special Embassy.

You are aware, M. le Baron, of our august master's very sincere desire to

put an end, as far as depends on him, to the anxieties felt in Europe, perhaps with a certain degree of exaggeration, in regard to our present difference with Turkey. His Majesty accordingly directs you, M. le Baron, to declare to the Ministry of the Emperor Francis-Joseph, and also to your colleagues of France, England, and Prussia, that for our part we accept in its present shape the last draft of note framed at Vienna; and that an Ambassador from the Sultan, who should be the bearer of that document, would be received at St. Petersburg without any difficulty and with all usual respect.

I consider it superfluous in this place to remark to your Excellency, that in accepting, as we do from a spirit of conciliation, the expedient devised at Vienna of the note in question, and the mission of a Turkish Embassy, we fully understand that we are not to have to examine or discuss fresh modifications and new drafts drawn up at Constantinople under the bellicose inspirations which at this moment seem to influence the Sultan and the majority of his Ministers; and that, in case the Ottoman Government should still reject this last plan of settlement, we should not consider ourselves as any longer bound by the consent which we now give to it.

If Europe, as we are incessantly told, requires the termination of the crisis by which the East is threatened, the benevolent and pacific efforts of the Great Powers, which we on our part support by all the sacrifices compatible with the dignity of Russia and the justice of the cause which she was bound to defend, must henceforth be addressed to Constantinople.

You will be pleased, M. le Baron, to read and give a copy of the present despatch to the Count de Buol, and likewise to communicate the contents of it to your principal colleagues of the diplomatic body.

Receive, &c.  
(Signed) NESSELRODE.

No. 57.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 15.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, July 27, 1853.*

THE Porte's orders for the retirement under present circumstances of the Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia from their respective Governments were forwarded by the Galatz steam-packet of yesterday to Bucharest and Jassy.

Inclosed herewith in copy are the Porte's letters to the two Princes, and those also which I have addressed to Mr. Colquhoun, Mr. Gardner, and Mr. Cunningham. Your Lordship will learn from this correspondence that I have pursued, in concert with the French Ambassador, the same course which I had previously announced to your Lordship.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 57.

*Reshid Pasha to the Prince of Moldavia.*

Mon Prince,

*Le  $\frac{13}{25}$  Juillet, 1853.*

LA Russie, tout en faisant entrer ses troupes dans les Principautés de Valachie et de Moldavie, a déclaré aussi qu'elle n'avait pas l'intention de modifier les institutions qui régissent ces provinces et la situation politique que des Traités solennels leurs ont garantie, et la Sublime Porte, se fiant à cette déclaration, pensait conserver votre Altesse et son Altesse le Prince de Valachie dans vos postes respectifs.

Cependant, nous apprenons par la lettre qui vient d'arriver de la part de votre Altesse que la Cour de Russie a ordonné que vous, ainsi que le Prince de Valachie, eussiez à rompre vos relations avec Constantinople, et à suspendre le tribut établi, qui doit être payé à la Sublime Porte; ce qui lui a causé beaucoup de surprise.

Comme la Cour de Russie a entamé le système de ces provinces par l'endroit qui regarde immédiatement la puissance propriétaire, c'est-à-dire, par ses bases fondamentales, la Sublime Porte voit clairement que dans cet état de choses l'exercice de l'autorité légitime dans les Principautés de Valachie et de Moldavie est impossible.

Par conséquence, la Sublime Porte, ainsi que ses droits sacrés et incontestables l'exigent, a décidé que votre Altesse, ainsi que son Altesse le Prince de Valachie, vous quittiez les Principautés provisoirement, et cette résolution a été aussi communiquée officiellement aux Grandes Puissances.

Il faut donc que vous, conformément aux ordres émanés du Trône Impérial à cet égard, vous quittiez de suite la province, et s'il arrive que vous agissiez d'une manière contraire à ces ordres souverains, la Sublime Porte, libre de son côté, prendra telles mesures qu'elle jugera conformes à ses propres affaires et à ses intérêts. Je m'empresse de vous renouveler, &c.

(Signé) RESHID.

(Translation.)

Mon Prince,

July  $\frac{13}{25}$ , 1853.

RUSSIA, while causing her troops to enter the Provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia, declared also that she had no intention of modifying the institutions by which those provinces are governed, and the political situation guaranteed to them by solemn Treaties, and the Sublime Porte, relying on this declaration, thought to maintain your Highness and his Highness the Prince of Wallachia in your respective posts.

We learn, however, by a letter which has arrived from your Highness, that the Court of Russia has ordered you, as well as the Prince of Wallachia, to interrupt your relations with Constantinople, and to suspend the established tribute which should be paid to the Porte, a circumstance which has much surprised it.

As the Court of Russia has attacked the system of these Provinces in what has an immediate bearing on the proprietary Power, that is to say, in its fundamental basis, the Sublime Porte clearly perceives that in this state of things the exercise of legitimate authority in the Principalities of Wallachia and of Moldavia is impossible.

Accordingly, the Sublime Porte, as is required by its sacred and indisputable rights, has determined that your Highness, as well as his Highness the Prince of Wallachia, should quit the Principalities provisionally; and this resolution has also been officially communicated to the Great Powers.

It is necessary, therefore, that, in conformity with the orders in this respect issued from the Imperial Throne, you should forthwith quit the Province; and if it should happen that you act in opposition to these sovereign orders, the Sublime Porte, free on its side, will take such measures as it shall judge conformable to its own affairs and interests.

I avail, &c.  
(Signed) RESHID.

Inclosure 2 in No. 57.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Consul-General Colquhoun.*

Sir,

*Therapia, July 26, 1853.*

I INCLOSE to you herewith a sealed packet addressed by the Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Hospodar of Wallachia. You will learn the nature of the orders transmitted to his Highness from the copy of Reshid Pasha's letter inclosed herewith for your personal information. You will lose no time in waiting privately on Prince Stirbey, and you will deliver the packet to him with your own hands, requesting that he will appoint an early hour for your return in order to know whether he has any communication to make to you.

If he should invite you to stay, you will of course do so; but neither in

the one case nor in the other are you at liberty to declare your knowledge of the contents of the packet, until he opens himself to you, or by his continued silence obliges you to inquire what course he means to take.

One of two things will happen. Prince Stirbey will either obey the orders of the Porte, or he will remain at Bucharest contumaciously.

In either of the two cases you will suspend your Consular functions, and cease hoisting your flag.

You will be careful to inform the Chief-Acting Wallachian authority that you remain as a private person at Bucharest for further instructions; and that you expect to be free to communicate with Her Majesty's Government and Embassy here, employing your good offices on behalf of any of Her Majesty's subjects who may require them.

Should this be refused, you will leave Bucharest at your earliest convenience, after protesting against the necessity imposed upon you, and you will retire to Galatz for further instructions.

I have to desire, in conclusion, that you will act in these matters on a perfect understanding with your colleague the French Consul, to whom instructions of a similar purport are transmitted by the present occasion, and that you will perform the duties enjoined to you without any unnecessary display, or want of consideration for the existing authorities.

The Porte's commands to Prince Ghika are forwarded through the French Embassy, and my instruction to Mr. Gardner is of the same purport as this.

You will direct the Vice-Consuls and Consular Agents at the outports to continue for the present in the exercise of their Consular functions, notwithstanding your retirement.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 57.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Consul Gardner.*

Sir,

*Therapia, July 26, 1853.*

IN consequence of what you will learn from the papers inclosed herewith for your confidential and personal information, the Porte has determined to recall provisionally the two Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia. Orders to that effect are conveyed by the present opportunity to Jassy. The French Ambassador has undertaken to forward them to their destination. Those of similar purport addressed to Prince Stirbey are entrusted to me, and I now inclose you a copy of my despatch to Mr. Colquhoun, which you will consider as equally addressed to yourself, with the exception of those parts which relate to the delivery of the Porte's letter.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 57.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Consul Cunningham.*

Sir,

*Therapia, July 26, 1853.*

YOU will lose no time in forwarding to Bucharest by an express the accompanying packet, addressed to Mr. Colquhoun, and you will be careful to select some person of confidence for the purpose.

The packet for Mr. Gardner is to be consigned by you to the French Vice-Consul, who, whether he be at Galatz or at Ibraila, has orders from his Ambassador to send an express to Jassy.

You will receive instructions to continue in the exercise of your Consular

functions, notwithstanding circumstances which oblige Her Majesty's Consuls at Bucharest and Jassy to suspend theirs.

You will forward by your express any packet which the French Vice-Consul, on learning your intention to send one, may wish to have conveyed to Bucharest.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 58.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, August 15, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the instructions which, as reported in your despatch of the 27th ultimo, you have given to Her Majesty's Consular authorities in the Principalities, on the occasion of the recall of the Hospodars by the Porte.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 59.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 15.)*

(Extract.)

*Vienna, August 9, 1853.*

I HAVE had the honour of receiving your Lordship's despatch of the 2nd instant, approving my proceedings as reported in my despatches of the 25th and 27th ultimo.

I communicated the substance of this despatch to Count Buol, informing him of the satisfaction with which Her Majesty's Government had learnt that he had invited me, together with my French and Prussian colleagues, to concert with him upon a plan of settlement that should be alike acceptable to the Emperor of Russia and to the Sultan, and I particularly pointed out to him that a conference of this nature had from the commencement of the differences between Russia and the Porte been suggested by your Lordship as most desirable.

Count Buol was happy to believe that the news from St. Petersburg of the 3rd instant would relieve your Lordship from the apprehensions you might have entertained as to the acceptance of his project by the Emperor of Russia, and he hoped that there would no longer be any difficulty upon that subject if the project was equally accepted at Constantinople; he also stated that he would use his best efforts to obtain such an arrangement as would prevent any obstacle from arising to the prompt evacuation of the Principalities by the Russian forces.

No. 60.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 18.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, August 12, 1853.*

WITH respect to your Lordship's despatch of the 2nd instant, I beg to state that I waited yesterday upon Count Nesselrode, to whom I reported the substance of your observations upon the conduct of the Russian authorities in preventing the payment of the tribute due by the Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia to the Porte.

No act, I remarked, of the Russian Government had given so much offence in Turkey as well as in England and France, the sensation produced having been all the stronger from the allies of Russia being at the time occupied in bringing about an amicable arrangement of difficulties which might be acceptable to the Emperor.

The Chancellor observed :

" You reproach us with our conduct in the Principalities, and you suspect that our object is to gain time and so prolong our occupation of them. Upon the first point I will observe that nothing can be more circumspect than our conduct has been ; we have made no changes in the administration of the country, we pay for everything, and shall leave the Principalities in a better state than that in which we found them. As for the tribute money, we could not allow it to be handed over to the Sultan—you would not have done so yourselves ; it is inconsistent with the very character of a military occupation that the occupying Power should allow supplies of money to be sent to the enemy."

I here interrupted the Chancellor to observe that the Sultan was not the enemy of Russia, that the two countries were not at war : his Excellency admitted the correction, and substituted the word " adversary " for " enemy."

I begged to inquire whether it was at least understood that the tribute-money was reserved for the later use of the Sultan ? To this question the Chancellor could return no definitive answer ; the Emperor's pleasure not having been signified, no determination had taken place.

The Chancellor resumed : " Now," he said, " about the delays which we are supposed to be desirous of interposing. The note which is intended to settle affairs reaches us on a Tuesday ; on the following day our acceptance of it, without the slightest alteration, is sent off by telegraph as far as Warsaw, and from thence by a feld-jäger to Vienna, where it arrives on Saturday ; we subscribe, without hesitation, to the slight changes made in the note at London and Paris, and the acknowledgment of our acquiescence reaches us again on the following Tuesday—a rapidity of communication of which there has been hitherto no example. This does not look like a desire to protract affairs. Now," Count Nesselrode said, " let me proceed further : you wish to see us out of the Principalities ; I beg of you not to speak to us upon that subject ; we are persuaded that you are anxious to be able to withdraw your ships from Besika. I entreat of you to believe that on our side we are just as desirous of leaving the Principalities ; these things are better not spoken of—they will come naturally and of themselves."

I again took an opportunity of expressing the sincere hope that the non-conclusion of affairs would not place the fleets under the necessity of entering the Dardanelles before the approach of autumnal weather.

Count Nesselrode expressed his conviction that long before that time the decision of the Porte must be known.

Reverting to the subject of the evacuation of the Principalities, I observed that it was highly important that the Emperor's intention of withdrawing his troops should be made known to the Turks, as a means of obtaining their adhesion to the proposed arrangement.

Count Nesselrode replied, that no such declaration was necessary—that the thing spoke for itself ; indeed, that the Emperor's intentions upon this point had been made known in his manifesto.

## No. 61.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 18.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, July 31, 1853.*

HAVING had occasion to revert to my correspondence with Sir Hamilton Seymour I observe in my letter of the 19th ultimo, sent home in copy, a passage which may be better for a word of explanation. It relates to the eventual retirement of the squadrons anchored in Besika Bay. Although, as I wrote with an express reference to Her Majesty's Government, no practical consequence attaches to it, I wish nevertheless to make my meaning clearer.

To bargain for the withdrawal of the squadrons as a preliminary to the evacuation of the Principalities, would be one thing : to call to mind, as a

favouring circumstance, that the settlement of the pending question, accompanied with the retirement of the Russian forces, would naturally be followed by the departure of the squadrons, is another. It was the latter idea which I had in my thoughts.

No. 62.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 18.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, August 4, 1853.*

INCLOSED herewith is the copy of a letter sent from the Porte to Omar Pasha, with instructions to his Excellency to transmit it under his signature to Prince Gortchakoff.

Your Lordship will observe that the Porte is determined not to submit quietly to any attempt on the part of the Russians to increase their armed force on the waters of the Danube above the confluence of the Pruth with that river.

Inclosure in No. 62.

*Omar Pasha to Prince Gortchakoff.*

(Translation.)

AS your Excellency is already aware from the answer addressed to you by the Porte, the passage of Russian ships of war up the Danube beyond the confluence of the Pruth with that river, is forbidden by Treaty; and I have therefore received instructions to prevent any vessels passing that point. In the event of any Russian vessels of war wishing, henceforward, to pass the point in question, they will be reminded, in the first place, in a friendly manner, of the Treaty restriction, and, should they not comply, your Excellency will understand how impossible it is for me to permit such a thing.

Previously to the receipt of these instructions, ships of war and pontoons (or gun-boats) had passed the point in question and gone to the neighbourhood of Galatz. It is to be hoped from your Excellency's sound sense and judgment, that however this may be, the vessels and pontoons which have passed that point will go back. They shall be permitted to do so unmolested; but if they should attempt to go upwards beyond Galatz, I shall be under the necessity of preventing them also.

In conformity with the pacific feelings which continue to animate the Porte, and of her special consideration towards the Government of Russia, I have considered it my duty to make this communication to you beforehand, and I avail myself, &c.

No. 63.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 18.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, August 4, 1853.*

YOUR Lordship's draft of a Convention reached me, with its covering despatch, on the 31st ultimo.

Your Lordship had forwarded the Convention to me in ignorance of the plan of arrangement adopted here by the Four Representatives, accepted definitively by the Porte, and transmitted to Vienna for conveyance to Count Nesselrode in the manner most likely to prove agreeable to the Court of Russia. I could not take upon myself, nor would it have been reasonable for

me, as I conceive, to propose the Convention as a substitute for that plan, which was in fact beyond our reach.

Aware that your Lordship has no predilection for one kind of arrangement more than for another, provided the parties be satisfied on just and honourable grounds, I have not hesitated to act according to what appeared to me the true situation and requirements of the case. Should the plan adopted here, and long ere this received in London and Vienna, be found incapable of execution, the Convention may be subsequently brought forward.

No. 64.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 22, 1853.*

THE following passage occurs in Count Nesselrode's circular despatch of the <sup>20 June</sup><sub>2 July</sub>: "Sciemment et volontairement nous ne chercherons à exciter aucun soulèvement parmi les populations Chrétiennes de la Turquie."

With reference to that assurance, I transcribe a passage in the despatch from Her Majesty's Consul in Bulgaria, of which I inclose a copy:

"The agents of Russia have been most active in widely spreading the circulars and manifestos which have issued of late from St. Petersburg. Within the last few days, the circular of the Russian Government, which represents the causes of the impending hostilities to be of a religious character, has been translated in various languages, and spread far and wide throughout this province, through the very channel of the Turkish post-office."

I have to instruct you to call Count Nesselrode's attention to this subject.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 65.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 29.)*

My Lord,

*Vienna, August 25, 1853.*

I HAVE this day transmitted to your Lordship two telegraphic despatches, both from Baron Bruck to Count Buol, the one of the 18th and the second of the 19th. I am happy to say this last despatch gives a more favourable explanation of what has taken place at Constantinople, as to the Vienna project of note, than the former one, as it states the acceptance of that note with modifications by the Sultan.

These modifications have been viewed by Count Buol with great regret, because they do not appear to have been sufficiently necessary to have imposed upon the Turkish Government the obligation of insisting upon them, in opposition to the advice of the Governments its allies, with the certainty of occasioning delay in the arrangement of the questions at issue, and the risk of reopening a discussion which, by the acceptance of the note by the Emperor of Russia, might have been considered as nearly closed.

Count Buol hopes, however, that this most regrettable delay may be the only check which may arise to the prompt settlement of these affairs, as the modifications in the note are generally rather verbal than affecting any material interests; and Baron Meyendorff has expressed his expectation and belief, that they will not prevent the acceptance of the note as it will now be forwarded to St. Petersburg.

The only alteration which appears to be of any particular importance is the one in the third paragraph, which inserts the words "par la Sublime Porte" after the words "la protection."

The communications from Constantinople to which I have alluded to in this despatch, will be forwarded this day by Stettin to St. Petersburg, where they will arrive on Tuesday next, the 30th instant.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

*Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Baron Brunnow, August 30.)*

M. le Baron,

*St. Pétersbourg, le  $\frac{1}{3}$  Août, 1853.*

JE viens de répondre, par les deux dépêches ci-jointes adressées à M. de Kisséleff, aux circulaires que le Gouvernement Français a fait imprimer dans le "Moniteur," en date du 25 Juin et du 15 Juillet.

La communication que M. de Castelbajac a reçu ordre de nous faire de la seconde, a précédé ici celle que Sir H. Seymour avait été également chargé de me donner de la dépêche de Lord Clarendon du 16 Juillet, laquelle roule sur les mêmes objets, et sert de réponse à ma circulaire du <sup>20 Juin</sup>~~2 Juillet~~. Comme les deux Gouvernements d'Angleterre et de France ont considéré sous le même point de vue et jugé de la même manière notre mesure coercitive envers la Porte et l'appréciation que nous avons faite de leur prise de position maritime, je me verrais nécessairement, M. le Baron, en répliquant à chacun d'eux séparément, entraîné à suivre deux fois le même ordre d'idées et à répéter exactement les mêmes arguments. Le Cabinet Anglais nous permettra donc de nous référer aux observations développées en détail dans nos pièces à la France. Vis-à-vis de Angleterre, comme de celle-ci, nous ne saurions que maintenir la corrélation qui existe entre les objets qui ont formé à Constantinople l'ensemble de la mission du Prince Menchikoff; les raisons qui nous ont forcé à attribuer à l'envoi simultané et combiné des deux flottes dans le Levant le caractère d'une manifestation comminatoire; la distinction que nous établissons entre les moyens de contrainte employés par nous envers les Turcs, et un véritable acte de guerre; enfin, les divers précédents sur lesquels nous nous baserions pour rejeter la responsabilité d'avoir les premiers introduit dans le droit public Européen un principe nouveau et fécond en désastreuses conséquences.

En portant officiellement ces deux dépêches et la présente à la connaissance de Lord Clarendon, vous voudrez bien toutefois lui faire observer que, comme la France se trouve par ses antécédents dans la question des Saints Lieux, et par l'envoi anticipé de sa flotte à Salamine, dans une position qui n'est pas en tous points identique à celle de l'Angleterre envers nous, et de plus comme M. Drouyn de Lhuys a, par la forme circulaire et ostensible qu'il a adoptée pour nous répondre, donné à ses pièces un autre caractère que ne l'a fait le Gouvernement Anglais, cette nuance essentielle a dû nécessairement influencer et sur notre manière de traiter le même sujet et sur le langage dont nous avons usé pour le faire. Les procédés antérieurs de la France envers la Turquie, avant et durant les premières phases de l'affaire des Lieux Saints, et la parallèle aussi peu équitable que désavantageuse pour nous que le Gouvernement Français a cru devoir établir entre sa conduite et la nôtre, devaient donner lieu de notre part à des objections et à des remarques qui ne concernent point le Gouvernement Britannique. Nous avons donc à prier Lord Clarendon de vouloir bien, en prenant lecture de nos pièces, faire la part des nuances que nous lui signalons ici, sans appliquer à son Cabinet ce qui n'appartient qu'à la France. Nous y tenons d'autant plus, M. le Baron, que les dernières ouvertures confidentielles que Sir H. Seymour a été chargé de nous faire, attestaient de la part du Gouvernement Britannique des dispositions conciliantes que nous avons hautement appréciées, et que non obstant la divergence fâcheuse qui existe entre l'Angleterre et nous sur le fond de la question actuelle, nous désirons écarter, autant que possible, de la discussion toute expression et toute forme qui serait susceptible de l'aigrir.

Recevez, &c.  
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)

M. le Baron,

*St. Petersburg, August  $\frac{1}{3}$ , 1853.*

BY the two inclosed despatches addressed to M. de Kisseleff, I have replied to the circulars dated the 25th of June and 15th of July, printed by the French Government in the "Moniteur."

The communication of the second, which M. de Castelbajac was ordered to make to me, preceded that which Sir Hamilton Seymour had equally been directed to make to me of Lord Clarendon's despatch of the 16th July, which relates to the same matters, and purports to be a reply to my circular of <sup>June 30</sup> July 2. As the two Governments of England and of France have regarded in the same light, and formed the same opinion of, the measure of coercion which we have adopted towards the Porte, and of the view which we have taken of the maritime position assumed by them, I should necessarily be led, in replying to each of them separately, to go twice over the same series of ideas and to repeat exactly the same arguments. The English Cabinet will therefore permit us to refer to the observations set forth at length in our despatches to France. As regards England, as well as France, we cannot but maintain the connection which subsists between the objects which it was the general purport of Prince Menchikoff's mission at Constantinople to effect; the reasons which have compelled us to attach to the simultaneous and combined movement of the two fleets in the Levant the character of a threatening manifestation; the distinction which we set up between the measures of coercion employed by us against the Turks and a direct act of war; finally, the various precedents on which we would rest our right to disclaim the responsibility of being the first to introduce into the public law of Europe a principle novel in itself and pregnant with disastrous consequences.

In communicating officially to Lord Clarendon these two despatches as well as my present one, you will however have the goodness to remark to him, that as by her previous conduct in regard to the question of the holy places, and by having been the first to send her fleet to Salamis, France stands towards us in a position which is not altogether identical with that of England; and, moreover, as M. Drouyn de Lhuys, by the circular and ostensible form which he has adopted in his reply to us, has bestowed upon his despatches a character different from that which the English Government has given to their own, this material difference has necessarily had an influence both on our manner of discussing the same subject, and upon the language which we have used in doing so. The former proceedings of France towards Turkey, previously to and during the first stages of the affair of the holy places, and the parallel, as little equitable as it is to our disadvantage, which the French Government has thought fit to institute between its conduct and our own, has necessarily given occasion for objections and remarks on our side which have no bearing as regards the British Government. We have therefore to request Lord Clarendon, in perusing our despatches, to have the goodness to take into account the shades of difference which we have thus pointed out, and not to apply to his Cabinet what only belongs to France. We attach the more importance to this, M. le Baron, since the late confidential overtures which Sir Hamilton Seymour has been instructed to make to us manifested, on the part of the British Government, a conciliatory disposition on which we have set a high value, and since, notwithstanding the painful difference of opinion which exists between England and ourselves on the principle of the question now at issue, we are desirous of keeping the discussion as far as possible clear of any expression and any form which might be calculated to embitter it.

Receive, &c.  
(Signed) NESSELRODE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 66.

*Count Nesselrode to M. de Kisseleff.*

*St. Pétersbourg, le  $\frac{1}{13}$  Août, 1853.*

LES deux circulaires de M. Drouyn de Lhuys, en date du 25 Juin et du 15 Juillet, imprimées dans "Le Moniteur," et dont M. le Marquis de Castelbajac a été chargé de me donner lecture de la dernière, me sont parvenues ici dans un moment où nous arrivaient de plusieurs côtés, et notamment de la France elle-même, divers projets d'un accommodement à effectuer entre nous et la Porte Ottomane. Animés du même esprit de conciliation qui avait dicté ces

différentes ouvertures, nous avons préféré vouer nos premiers soins à examiner ce qu'elles pouvaient présenter d'acceptable pour nous, au lieu de les subordonner à une discussion pénible, où les opinions contraires risquent plutôt de s'aigrir que de se rapprocher. Néanmoins, comme les deux dépêches du Gouvernement Français contiennent sur notre conduite antérieure et nos intentions quelques vues qui ne nous y semblent pas conformes, je ne saurais me dispenser plus longtemps de vous faire connaître à ce sujet l'impression du Cabinet Impérial.

Il nous est d'abord difficile d'admettre qu'il n'existe aucune corrélation entre l'arrangement particulier aux saints lieux, et la garantie générale que nous réclamons en faveur des privilèges religieux du culte orthodoxe. Dès l'origine du débat actuel nous n'en avons toujours fait qu'une seule et même question. Dans notre première circulaire nous avons clairement établi que les avantages conférés aux Latins à Jérusalem au détriment de nos coreligionnaires, n'avaient été que le couronnement d'une série d'actes du même genre, témoignant, de la part du Gouvernement Turc, d'une malveillance systématique contre le rit que nous professons et d'une évidente partialité pour les autres communions Chrétiennes. Nous avons ajouté que cette tendance, de jour en jour plus prononcée, avait mis l'Empereur dans la nécessité d'y apporter un terme; qu'à cette fin, Sa Majesté avait envoyé le Prince Menchikoff à Constantinople; et que si la mission de cet Ambassadeur n'avait qu'un seul but, comme nous l'avons dit effectivement en désavouant tout ce qu'on y mêlait d'étranger à la question religieuse, elle comprenait pourtant deux objets distincts:—1. Arrangement spécial des difficultés du présent. 2. Garantie générale pour l'avenir.

Ces deux objets, dès son début à Constantinople, le Prince Menchikoff les avait non moins formellement indiqués. Dans l'exposé de nos griefs, présenté par lui à la Porte le 4 Mars, il est dit expressément: "que l'arrangement à négocier dans un esprit de tolérance et de bonne entente ne saura plus se borner à des assurances stériles et incomplètes, lesquelles pourraient être de nouveau invalidées pour l'avenir, mais qu'un engagement solennel devra désormais attester l'accord sincère qu'il devient si urgent d'établir à ce sujet entre les deux Gouvernements." Et plus loin, dans la même pièce, après avoir porté plainte de la manière dont la Porte Ottomane accueillait les conseils du Gouvernement Impérial dans les questions du Monténégro, du Patriarche de Constantinople, et des différentes injustices commises contre les rayas Chrétiens, &c., notre Ambassadeur insistait "sur la nécessité de faire disparaître le profond et juste mécontentement qu'en éprouve Sa Majesté l'Empereur par un acte de confiance qui écarte pour l'avenir toute nuance de désaccord entre les deux Souverains."

La note verbale, adressée par le Prince Menchikoff à Rifaat Pasha le 7 Avril, est encore plus explicite. Après avoir énuméré et motivé de nouveau tout l'ensemble de nos demandes antérieures, "l'Ambassadeur," y est-il dit, "doit répéter ici à M. le Ministre des Relations Etrangères ce qu'il a déjà été dans le cas de lui exprimer plusieurs fois: que la Russie ne demande pas à la Porte de concessions politiques. Son désir est de calmer les consciences religieuses par la certitude du maintien de ce qui est et de ce qui a toujours été pratiqué jusqu'à nos temps. C'est donc à la suite des tendances hostiles qui se sont manifestées depuis quelques années contre tout ce qui touche à la Russie, qu'elle requiert, dans l'intérêt des immunités religieuses du culte orthodoxe, un Acte explicite et positif de garantie, Acte qui n'affecterait en rien ni les autres cultes, ni les relations de la Porte avec d'autres Puissances."

On voit donc que toutes les réclamations du Prince Menchikoff avaient été dès l'origine articulées et formulées simultanément. Comment dire d'après ce qui précède qu'il n'existe absolument aucun lien entre les deux objets dont se composait sa mission; que l'obtention seule des deux nouveaux firmans, aussi précaires que celui de 1852, ferait tomber l'unique grief que nous eussions à faire valoir contre la Sublime Porte; que la demande d'une garantie a été faite postérieurement; que c'était là une question entièrement nouvelle, et que le Gouvernement Français s'est trouvé pris au dépourvu par des exigences qu'on n'avait pu soupçonner à Constantinople? Le Gouvernement Français en particulier a été si peu pris au dépourvu que, dès le mois de Mars, la portée de nos demandes lui avait paru assez grave pour l'engager à envoyer son escadre dans le Levant, et que si ensuite cette escadre s'est arrêtée à Salamine sans pousser jusqu'aux Dardanelles, la seule cause en a été le refus de l'Angleterre de se joindre à cette démonstration.

Si en apprenant que de nouveaux firmans sur l'affaire des lieux saints

venaient d'être rendus à Constantinople par le Sultan, votre Excellence et moi nous nous sommes félicités avec le Gouvernement Français et le Ministre de France à St. Pétersbourg de cette heureuse conclusion, cela prouve seulement que nous nous sentions satisfaits de voir résolue la partie des négociations qui avait pu mettre un moment nos intérêts religieux en opposition plus immédiate avec ceux du Gouvernement Français. Mais il ne s'en suit nullement que dès cet instant nous considérions la mission du Prince Menchikoff comme finie, puisque l'autre objet qu'elle avait en vue nous restait encore à atteindre.

A l'appui de la garantie générale que nous réclamons pour consolider l'arrangement relatif aux saints lieux, nous avons invoqué nos Traités et soutenu que nous ne demandions que les droits, immunités et privilèges religieux qu'ils impliquent. M. Drouyn de Lhuys nous conteste l'autorité de ces Traités. Selon lui aucune de leurs stipulations n'offre le caractère de généralité que nous voudrions y attacher, et le Traité de Kainardji, notamment, ne confère, dit-il, à la Russie qu'un droit de protection limité et défini sur une église desservie par des prêtres Russes, qu'il était question de fonder dans le faubourg de Galata. Mais M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères nous semble avoir perdu de vue ce qui précède ces stipulations renfermées dans les Articles VII et XIV. L'Article VII pose en principe que le Sultan promet de protéger la religion Chrétienne et ses églises. La religion et les églises Grecques étant de ce nombre, nous en concluons que qui promet de protéger une religion et ses églises ne peut faire moins pour remp'ir cet engagement que de leur laisser les droits, immunités, et privilèges dont elles jouissent; ces droits, immunités, et privilèges dont jouissait alors le clergé Grec et qu'il possède *ab antiquo*, sont précisément ceux en faveur desquels nous réclamons. Obtenir le *status quo* actuel, nous ne voulons pas autre chose; et si la promesse renfermée dans le Traité de Kainardji n'a point été jugée contraire aux droits de souveraineté du Sultan, nous ne saurions voir que sa simple confirmation y puisse davantage porter atteinte.

Pour établir qu'en principe au moins—car il ne s'agit ici que d'un principe—un droit de protection religieuse exercé sur les sujets d'un état non Chrétien, n'est point aussi inconciliable qu'on le croit avec son indépendance politique, nous avons cité entre autres le patronage que la France a exercé de tous temps sur les Catholiques d'Orient. La circulaire de M. Drouyn de Lhuys repousse à cet égard toute analogie quelconque. Elle maintient que la France n'a jamais prétendu protéger en Orient que des sujets ou des établissements Français, sans étendre sa protection sur les Catholiques soumis au Sultan. C'est pour la première fois, Monsieur, que le Gouvernement Français tient ce langage. Car, il est de notoriété historique que de tout temps, depuis François I jusqu'à nous, la France a entendu protéger tous les Catholiques d'Orient, même sujets de la Porte Ottomane; bien plus, qu'en mainte occasion elle a prétendue exercer ce droit à l'exclusion même de toute autre Puissance Catholique. Tout récemment encore, dans les complications religieuses du Liban, qui suivirent la crise Orientale de 1840, et dans la guerre qui s'engagea entre les Druses et les Maronites, le Gouvernement Français continuait à se prévaloir de ce droit de protéger au nom de la France toute la population Chrétienne de Syrie. A l'appui de son assertion M. Drouyn de Lhuys a cité quelques phrases d'un mémoire du Comte de St. Priest, autrefois Ambassadeur de France à Constantinople. Or, l'opinion de ce diplomate prouve précisément, par le soin qu'il met à réfuter l'opinion opposée, que celle-ci était l'idée générale et dominante en France. Quoiqu'il en soit, on conviendra que l'autorité individuelle d'un Représentant Français ne saurait un seul instant entrer en balance avec celle du Gouvernement Français lui-même, constatée et consignée dans un Acte public Européen. On l'a déjà dit, le Protocole signé à Londres le 3 Février, 1830, par les Trois Puissances fondatrices de la Grèce est clair et positif sur ce point. Il établit, "que depuis plusieurs siècles la France est en possession d'exercer en faveur des Catholiques soumis au Sultan un patronage spécial que Sa Majesté Très-Chrétienne croit devoir déposer entre les mains du futur Souverain de la Grèce, quant à ce qui concerne les provinces qui doivent composer le nouvel état:" ce qui signifie que la France se le réserve quant aux provinces qui continueront à faire partie des Etats du Sultan. Il arrête ensuite, au nom des Trois Puissances: "que la religion Catholique jouira dans le nouvel état du libre et public exercice de son culte; que ses propriétés lui seront garanties; que ses évêques seront maintenus dans l'intégrité des fonctions, droits et privilèges dont ils ont joui sous le patronage des Rois de France."

Voilà donc, Monsieur, nonobstant l'autorité particulière du Comte de St. Priest, un Acte officiel revêtu de toutes les formes diplomatiques, qui constate que le patronage religieux de la France s'est exercé et s'exerce bien effectivement sur les sujets du Sultan—un Acte dans lequel l'Angleterre et nous-mêmes reconnaissons à la France la faculté de stipuler en faveur des sujets d'un Prince étranger le maintien de certains droits, immunités et privilèges religieux, sans que l'Angleterre ait plus que nous-mêmes trouvé cette faculté contraire à l'indépendance et à la souveraineté, soit du futur monarque de la Grèce, soit du Gouvernement Ottoman.

Nous ajouterons ici une remarque générale.

Ce n'est que tout récemment, qu'en cherchant à faire entrer la Turquie dans le droit Européen, on a prétendu appliquer d'une manière aussi absolue, en matière de protection, de souveraineté et d'indépendance, les principes qui guident entre elles les Puissances Européennes, à un Etat Mahométan, où toutes les notions de droit civil et politique diffèrent si essentiellement de celles en usage parmi les peuples et gouvernements de la Chrétienté. La chose a paru plausible en théorie ; mais dans la pratique on s'en écarte sans cesse. Où voit-on, par exemple, un Etat Chrétien dans lequel les étrangers aient dû être soustraits à la juridiction légale des autorités du pays, pour être placés directement sous celle de leurs Ambassades ou Consulats ? Toutes les fois que les intérêts d'un Catholique ou d'un Protestant sont lésés, la France et l'Angleterre interviennent activement pour lui d'une manière qui, partout ailleurs, ne se concilierait peut-être pas toujours avec les principes reconnus universellement en matière d'indépendance politique. C'est qu'en effet il ne peut en être autrement dans un Etat où les Chrétiens, en leur qualité de Rayas, et comme tels placés politiquement au-dessous de la race Musulmane, sont exposés à mille avanies et vexations de la part du peuple ou des Pachas, souvent même menacés dans leurs biens, leur religion et leur existence, comme l'ont prouvé encore si récemment les massacres l'Alep, les persécutions, les exactions pécuniaires, les destructions d'églises, les conversions forcées, et les cruautés de tout genre exercées en Bulgarie, en Bosnie et en Herzégovine. Nous ne saurions donc admettre sans aucunes restrictions l'incompatibilité absolue de toute protection religieuse étrangère avec les droits souverains du Sultan ; et le Gouvernement Français se souviendra peut-être que dans une occasion assez récente où nous avions insisté, l'Autriche et nous, sur l'obligation pour les étrangers d'accepter partout les lois et la juridiction des tribunaux du pays où ils résident, lui-même fit difficulté d'admettre abstraitement et sans réserves l'universalité du principe que nous posions, alléguant l'impossibilité de l'appliquer rigoureusement aux pays Mahométans ou idolâtres.

Nous aurions désiré, Monsieur, borner là nos observations, si la circulaire ne se terminait en instituant un parallèle entre notre conduite vis-à-vis de la Turquie et celle du Gouvernement Français, dans lequel on fait ressortir sous un jour peu favorable pour nous, la modération de la France à côté de nos exigences et de nos menaces. Nous sommes bien dès lors obligés de rappeler que si en effet la conduite du Gouvernement Français dans les derniers temps a fait preuve d'un esprit de conciliation auquel nous nous sommes d'ailleurs empressés de rendre hommage, son langage et son attitude dans les premières phases de la question, dans plusieurs affaires surtout concernant plus exclusivement la France, n'avaient pas toujours selon nous porté le même caractère. M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères s'autorise des sacrifices qu'aurait fait la France au repos de l'Orient et aux embarras de la Porte Ottomane, pour se croire en droit d'espérer que nous serons mûs par des considérations analogues. Nous serions peut-être nous-mêmes fondés à lui demander si le repos de l'Orient et les embarras de la Porte ont toujours été au même degré l'objet de ses préoccupations, et si le ton comminatoire, dont il nous reproche aujourd'hui d'user, a été constamment exclu de ses moyens de négociation à Constantinople ? Si ce n'est point par la menace, par celle d'un bombardement appuyée de l'apparition soudaine de sa flotte, qu'il a obtenu satisfaction de ses réclamations à Tripoli ; si l'affaire de Janina n'a pas été terminée par les mêmes moyens sommaires ; si, avant que les autres Puissances ne se fussent employées à trouver un *mezzo termine* qui légitimât l'entrée du vaisseau de guerre "le Charlemagne" dans les Dardanelles, le Gouvernement Français n'insistait pas dans des formes très-péremptoires sur l'admission de ce vaisseau, malgré la lettre expresse du Traité de 1841, qu'il invoque aujourd'hui contre nous ; si enfin,

la menace n'a été pour rien dans les premières concessions à notre détriment qu'il a obtenues dans l'affaire des saints lieux de la part de la Porte Ottomane, et dans l'infraction subséquent des promesses les plus solennelles données à l'Empereur par le Sultan ? Il nous permettra de le dire : c'est ce système d'intimidation, suivi jusqu'à ces derniers temps qui, en pesant sur la Porte, en effaçant momentanément à Constantinople toute autre influence que celle de la France, en y affaiblissant la position de tous les autres Cabinets, a récemment obligé l'Autriche, lors de la mission du Comte de Leiningen, à présenter ses réclamations sous des formes qu'elle n'est point habituée à suivre dans ses relations ordinaires d'amitié avec la Porte. C'est lui qui nous a nous-mêmes forcés à donner à la mission du Prince Menchikoff un autre caractère que celui qu'en toute autre circonstance nous eussions désiré lui imprimer. Sous ce rapport, si le Gouvernement Français veut bien ramener son attention sur toute sa conduite antérieure, il verra que nous ne saurions consentir à passer pour seuls responsables des complications qui graduellement ont amené en Turquie les choses à l'état où elles se trouvent aujourd'hui, et que lui-même n'est point à beaucoup près aussi complètement dégagé qu'il le croit de toute part de responsabilité dans la crise actuelle.

Avant de finir, Monsieur, il nous reste un dernier point sur lequel M. Drouyn de Lhuys nous permettra également de faire nos réserves.

C'est sur l'extension trop grande, selon nous, qu'il semblerait vouloir prêter au Traité de 1841, en le représentant comme une garantie collective que les Puissances auraient donnée à l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, et qui nous lierait par conséquent en notre qualité de signataires. Le Traité de 1841 n'a point et n'a jamais eu cette portée. Son but spécial a été simplement, de la part des Hautes Parties Contractantes, celui "de constater en commun par un Acte formel leur détermination unanime de se conformer à l'ancienne règle de l'Empire Ottoman, d'après laquelle le passage des deux Détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore doit toujours être fermé aux bâtiments de guerre étrangers, tant que la Porte se trouve en paix." Qu'on lise les trois seuls Articles du Traité, et l'on n'y verra pas autre chose. En donnant par là au Sultan, suivant les termes du préambule, "une preuve du respect qu'elles portent à l'inviolabilité de ses droits souverains," les Puissances expriment bien aussi "leur désir sincère de voir se consolider le repos de son Empire." Mais l'expression d'un désir, manifestée simplement dans le préambule d'un Traité, n'est point celle d'une obligation. Il y a intention, non pas engagement formel contracté par stipulation et pour toute éventualité quelconque. Nous aussi, nous éprouvons le désir de voir consolidé le repos de la Turquie, qui ne saurait l'être selon nous que si elle donne une légitime satisfaction aux sentiments religieux de la majorité de ses populations Chrétiennes. Que notre intention soit de ne rien changer au *status quo* territorial actuel de l'Orient, c'est ce qu'attestent tous nos actes antérieurs, et la déclaration même que nous avons faite, en prenant à regret envers la Turquie une mesure de rigueur temporaire, que nous désavouons toute idée de conquête ou d'agrandissement. La garantie qu'invoque le Gouvernement Français existe donc en effet. Elle existe, moralement, dans nos vues, dans les convictions de l'Empereur, dans l'intérêt bien-entendu de la Russie qui, comme nous l'avons exposé, lui fait désirer que rien ne renverse en Orient l'équilibre actuel des choses. Mais nos rapports de politique, de religion et de commerce avec le Gouvernement Ottoman sont trop nombreux, trop compliqués, et les occasions de divergence trop fréquentes, pour que la Russie ait pu s'interdire à tout jamais et pour toute éventualité la faculté d'obtenir par elle-même satisfaction de ses griefs particuliers, et s'obliger par Traité à recourir pour chaque lésion qu'auraient soufferte ses intérêts à l'intervention des autres Puissances. Assurer d'avance la Turquie qu'elle ne court aucun risque à nous molester, la délier, par une garantie expresse, de tous motifs d'appréhension ou d'égards, et confier à d'autres qu'à nous-mêmes la tutelle de notre honneur et de nos intérêts les plus chers, c'est ce à quoi de trop graves considérations ne pouvaient nous permettre de consentir. La Russie sera toujours prête à respecter l'indépendance d'autrui ; mais elle ne saurait pousser ce respect jusqu'à lui sacrifier la sienne propre.

Telles sont, Monsieur, les réflexions que nous a suggérées la première circulaire de M. Drouyn de Lhuys, et dont vous voudrez bien lui donner communication officielle.

Recevez, &c.  
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)

*St. Petersburg, August  $\frac{1}{13}$ , 1853.*

THE two circulars of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, dated June 25 and July 15, which have been printed in the "Moniteur," and the last of which the Marquis de Castelbajac was instructed to read to me, reached me at a time at which, from many quarters, and specifically from France herself, various projects of an arrangement to be made between us and the Ottoman Porte, came into our hands. Imbued with the same conciliatory spirit by which these different overtures were dictated, we have preferred to apply ourselves in the first instance to ascertain in what respect they might be acceptable to us, instead of entering upon a painful discussion in regard to them, in which opposite opinions run the risk rather of being embittered than of being brought into unison. Nevertheless as the two despatches of the French Government express, as regards our former conduct and our intentions, certain opinions which do not seem to us to be in accordance with them, I can no longer abstain from communicating to you, as regards this matter, the impression which has been made on the Imperial Cabinet.

It is in the first place difficult for us to admit that there exists no connection between the arrangement particularly relating to the holy places, and the general guarantee which we demand in behalf of the religious privileges of the orthodox religion. From the very commencement of the present discussion, we have never made them other than one and the same question. In our first circular we clearly set forth that the advantages conferred at Jerusalem upon the Latins, to the prejudice of our coreligionists, had been merely the closing transaction of a series of acts of the same kind, bearing evidence of systematic malevolence on the part of the Turkish Government towards the religion which we profess, and of an evident partiality for the other Christian communions. We added that this tendency, more clearly manifested from day to day, had forced the Emperor to put a stop to it; that for this purpose His Majesty had sent Prince Menchikoff to Constantinople; and that if that Ambassador's mission had but one object, as we have in fact declared to be the case, while disavowing all that was attempted to be mixed up with it foreign to the religious question, it nevertheless embraced two distinct points: 1st, the special arrangement of the difficulties of the present time; 2nd, a general guarantee for the future.

Prince Menchikoff, from the outset of his proceedings at Constantinople, adverted to these two points in no less formal a manner. In the statement of our grievances delivered by him to the Porte on the  $\frac{4}{16}$  March, it is expressly said "that the arrangement to be negotiated in a spirit of toleration and of good understanding can no longer be confined to barren and incomplete assurances which may hereafter be again rendered of no effect; but that a solemn engagement must henceforth attest the sincerity of the understanding which it has become so urgent to establish on this matter between the two Governments." And further on, in the same document, after complaining of the manner in which the Ottoman Porte had received the counsels of the Imperial Government in the questions of Montenegro, of the Patriarch of Constantinople, and of the different acts of injustice committed against the Christian Rayahs, our Ambassador insisted "on the necessity of dispelling the deep and just dissatisfaction of His Majesty the Emperor by an act of confidence whereby every shade of disagreement between the two Sovereigns should for the future be obviated."

The *note verbale* addressed by Prince Menchikoff to Rifaat Pasha on the  $\frac{7}{19}$  April is still more explicit. After recapitulating and explaining afresh the whole of our previous demands, "the Ambassador," it is said, "must here repeat to the Minister for Foreign Affairs what he has already had occasion to state to him on many occasions, that Russia does not require political concessions of the Porte. Her desire is to tranquillize the consciences of the religiously-minded by the certainty of the maintenance of that which exists and of that which has always been practised up to the present time. It is, therefore, in consequence of the hostile tendency evinced of late years as regards everything which affects Russia, that she requires, in behalf of the religious immunities of the orthodox rite, an explicit and positive act of guarantee, an act by which neither the other rites nor the relations of the Porte with other Powers would in any wise be affected."

It is evident then that all Prince Menchikoff's demands were simultaneously expressed and formally stated from the outset. How can it be said, after what precedes, that there is absolutely no connection between the two objects of which his mission was made up; that the mere obtaining of the two new firmans, as precarious as that of 1852, would remove the sole grievance which we had to urge against the Porte; that the demand of a guarantee was made at a later period; that that was a question altogether new; and that the French Government was taken unawares by demands of which no suspicion could have been entertained at Constantinople? The French Government especially was so little taken unawares, that from the month of March the bearing of our demands had appeared to it sufficiently serious to induce it to send its squadron to the Levant; and if that squadron subsequently stopped at Salamis, without proceeding on to the Dardanelles, the only reason for this was the refusal of England to join in that demonstration.

If on learning that new firmans in regard to the affair of the holy places had been issued at Constantinople by the Sultan, your Excellency and myself exchanged congratulations with the French Government and with the French Minister at St. Petersburg on this happy conclusion, that only proves that we felt satisfied at witnessing the settlement of that portion of the negotiations which might at one time have placed our religious interests in more direct opposition to those of the French Government. But it by no means follows that from that time we looked upon Prince Menchikoff's mission as ended, since the other objects which it had in view still remained to be attained.

In support of the general guarantee which we demand for the consolidation of the arrangement relative to the holy places, we have appealed to our Treaties and have maintained that we only required the rights, immunities, and religious privileges implied by them. M. Drouyn de Lhuys disputes the authority of these Treaties: according to him none of those stipulations bears the general character which we are desirous of affixing to them, and the Treaty of Kainardji, specifically, he says, only bestows upon Russia a limited and definite right of protection over a church administered by Russian priests which there was question of establishing in the suburb of Galata. But the Minister for Foreign Affairs appears to us to have lost sight of what precedes these stipulations, which are contained in Articles VII and XVI. Article VII lays down as a principle that the Sultan promises to protect the Christian religion and its churches. The Greek religion and churches being comprised in that number, we deduce from thence that he who promises to protect a religion and its churches cannot do less, in fulfilment of that engagement, than leave them in possession of the rights, immunities, and privileges of which they are in the enjoyment; those rights, immunities, and privileges which the Greek clergy enjoyed at that time, and which it possesses *ab antiquo*, are precisely those in regard to which our claim is made. We desire nothing more than to obtain the actual *status quo*; and if the promise contained in the Treaty of Kainardji has not been deemed to be contrary to the Sultan's rights of sovereignty, we cannot perceive that the mere confirmation thereof can in any greater degree affect it.

In order to establish that in principle at least—for here there is no question but of a principle—a right of religious protection exercised over the subjects of a non-Christian State is not as irreconcilable as is supposed with its political independence, we have instanced among other cases the patronage in all times exercised by France over the Catholics of the East. M. Drouyn de Lhuys' Circular denies the existence of any analogy whatever in this respect. It maintains that France has never assumed to protect in the East any other than French subjects or establishments, without extending her protection over the Catholic subjects of the Sultan. This, Sir, is the first time that the French Government holds this language. For it is historically notorious that from all time, from that of Francis I to our own, France has claimed to protect all the Catholics of the East, even those subject to the Ottoman Porte: still further, that in repeated instances she has assumed to exercise this right to the exclusion even of any other Catholic Power. Even very lately, in the religious troubles of the Lebanon which followed the Eastern crisis of 1840, and in the war which took place between the Druses and the Maronites, the French Government continued to avail itself of this right of protecting in the name of France the whole Christian population of Syria. In support of his assertion, M. Drouyn de Lhuys has quoted certain expressions of a memoir by the Count de St. Priest, formerly

French Ambassador at Constantinople. However, the opinion of this diplomatist, by the care which he takes to refute the opposite opinion, proves precisely that the latter was the general and prevailing idea in France. Be that as it may, it will be admitted that the individual authority of a French Representative cannot for an instant be set against that of the French Government itself, declared and recorded in a public European Act. It has already been said, the Protocol signed at London on the 3rd of February, 1830, by the three Powers who founded Greece, is clear and positive on that point. It sets forth "that for many centuries France is entitled to exercise in favour of the Catholic subjects of the Sultan a special patronage which His Most Christian Majesty deems it right to deposit in the hands of the future Sovereign of Greece, as regards the provinces which are to compose the new State;" which implies that France retains it for herself as regards the provinces which shall continue to form part of the Sultan's dominions. Thereupon it decides in the name of the Three Powers, "that the Catholic religion shall enjoy within the new State free and public exercise of its worship; that its properties shall be guaranteed to it; that its bishops shall in all respects be maintained in the full enjoyment of the functions, rights, and privileges which they have enjoyed under the patronage of the Kings of France."

Here then, Sir, notwithstanding the particular authority of the Count de St. Priest, is an official act invested with all the forms of diplomacy, which proves that the religious patronage of France has been very effectually exercised and is still exercised over the subjects of the Sultan—an act in which England and ourselves recognize in France the power of stipulating in favour of the subjects of a foreign Prince for the maintenance of certain religious rights, immunities, and privileges, without England any more than ourselves finding that power contrary to the independence and to the sovereignty either of the future Monarch of Greece or of the Ottoman Government.

We will add in this place a general remark.

It is only recently that, in seeking to bring Turkey within the pale of the public law of Europe, it has been assumed to apply so absolutely, as regards protection, sovereignty, and independence, the principles by which the Powers of Europe are guided in their intercourse with each other, to a Mahomedan State, in which all the notions of civil and political right are so essentially different from those entertained by the people and Governments of Christendom. The thing has appeared plausible in theory, but in practice it is essentially disregarded. Where, for instance, do we see a Christian State in which foreigners have necessarily been withdrawn from the legal jurisdiction of the native authorities, in order to be placed directly under that of their Embassies or Consulates? Wherever the interests of a Catholic or of a Protestant are prejudiced, France and England interfere actively in his behalf in a manner that, everywhere else, would not always be consistent with the principles uniformly recognized in regard to political independence. In fact, it cannot be otherwise in a State where Christians, in their character of Rayahs, and as such placed politically in subjection to the Mussulman race, are exposed to a thousand exactions and vexations on the part of the people or of the Pashas, frequently even threatened in their properties, their religion, and their existence, as has so very recently been proved by the massacres at Aleppo, by the persecutions, the pecuniary exactions, the destruction of churches, the forced conversions, and the cruelties of all kinds exercised in Bulgaria, Bosnia, and the Herzegovine. We cannot therefore admit, without some limitations, the absolute incompatibility of any foreign religious protection with the sovereign rights of the Sultan; and the French Government will perhaps recollect that in one instance sufficiently recent, in which Austria and ourselves insisted on the obligation of strangers everywhere to accept the laws and jurisdiction of the country wherein they reside, itself made difficulties about admitting, abstractedly and without reservation, the universality of the principle which we laid down, alleging the impossibility of strictly applying it to Mahomedan or idolatrous countries.

We should have wished, Sir, to limit our observations to what has been said, if the Circular had not concluded by instituting a parallel between our conduct towards Turkey and that of the French Government, in which the moderation of France is contrasted with our requisitions and menaces in a manner little favourable to ourselves. We are consequently compelled to remark that if in fact the conduct of the French Government has lately mani-

fested a spirit of conciliation, to which we have moreover readily given its due meed of praise, its language and its attitude in the first stages of the question, especially in many matters more exclusively regarding France, have not in our opinion always borne the same character. The Minister for Foreign Affairs considers himself warranted by the sacrifices which France has made out of regard for the peace of the East, and for the embarrassments of the Ottoman Porte, to expect that we shall be influenced by similar considerations. We might perhaps be ourselves entitled to ask whether the peace of the East and the embarrassments of the Porte have always been to the same extent the objects of his solicitude, and if the tone of menace, with the use of which we are now reproached, has been constantly excluded from his means of negotiation at Constantinople? If it is not by means of menace, by that of a bombardment supported by the sudden apparition of his fleet, that he obtained satisfaction for his demands at Tripoli; if the affair of Janina was not terminated by the same summary means; if, before the other Powers had occupied themselves in discovering a *mezzo termine* by which the entrance into the Dardanelles of the ship of war the "Charlemagne" might be legally allowed, the French Government did not insist in the most peremptory manner upon the admission of that vessel, notwithstanding the express letter of the Treaty of 1841, which is now appealed to against us; if, lastly, menace had nothing to do with the first concessions which, to our prejudice, he obtained from the Ottoman Porte in the affair of the holy places, and in the subsequent violation of the most solemn promises given by the Sultan to the Emperor? He will allow us to say,—it is this system of intimidation, pursued up to a very recent period, which by pressing on the Porte, by effacing for a time at Constantinople every other influence but that of France, by weakening there the position of all the other Cabinets, has lately compelled Austria, at the time of Count Leiningen's mission, to present its demands in a form which she is not wont to adopt in her ordinarily friendly relations with the Porte. It is this system which has constrained us to give to Prince Menchikoff's mission a different character from that which under any other circumstances we should have wished to impart to it. In this respect, if the French Government will be pleased to reconsider all its previous conduct, it will perceive that we cannot consent to pass for being alone responsible for the complications which have gradually brought matters in Turkey to the state in which they now are, and that it is by no means as free as it supposes from all responsibility in the actual crisis.

Before concluding, Sir, there remains a last point on which M. Drouyn de Lhuys will allow us likewise to make our reservations.

It regards the too great extension which, in our estimation, he would appear to desire to give to the Treaty of 1841, by representing it as a collective guarantee given by the Powers to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and accordingly binding upon us in our character of a signing party. The Treaty of 1841 does not bear and never did bear that construction. Its special object was simply, on the part of the High Contracting Parties, "to place on record collectively by a formal act their unanimous determination to act in accordance with the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, according to which the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus are always to be closed against foreign ships of war so long as the Porte is at peace." Let the three only articles of the Treaty be read, and nothing else will be found in them. In giving thereby to the Sultan, according to the terms of the preamble, "a proof of the respect felt by them for the inviolability of his sovereign rights," the Powers indeed, likewise express "their sincere desire to see the tranquillity of his Empire confirmed." But the expression of a desire, stated merely in the preamble of a Treaty, is not that of an obligation. It is an intention, but not a formal engagement contracted by express stipulation, and with reference to all contingencies. We also desire to see the tranquillity of Turkey confirmed, which it cannot be in our opinion unless she affords a legitimate satisfaction to the religious sentiments of the greater portion of her Christian subjects. That it is our intention to make no change in the present territorial *status quo* in the East is proved by all our antecedent conduct, and by the very declaration which we have made, while adopting, to our regret, towards Turkey a temporary measure of rigour, that we disavow all idea of conquest or of aggrandizement. The guarantee appealed to by the French Government does then exist in effect. It exists, morally, in our views, in the Emperor's conviction, in the interest of Russia rightly understood,

which, as we have stated, causes it to wish that nothing should overturn the existing balance of things in the East. But our political, religious, and commercial relations with the Ottoman Government are too numerous, too complicated, and the occasions of difference too frequent, for it to have been possible for Russia to debar herself for ever and under all contingencies from the power of obtaining for herself satisfaction for her peculiar grievances, and to bind herself by Treaty to have recourse to the intervention of other Powers with reference to each injury which her interests might sustain. But considerations of too weighty a nature could not admit of our consenting to give to Turkey beforehand the assurance that she runs no risk by molesting us, to release her by an express guarantee from all ground for apprehension or inducement to act in a conciliatory manner, to confide to others than ourselves the protection of our honour and of our dearest interests. Russia will always be ready to respect the independence of another Power, but she cannot carry that respect so far as to sacrifice to it her own.

Such, Sir, are the reflections which have been suggested to us by M. Drouyn de Lhuys' first circular, and which you will have the goodness to communicate to him officially.

Receive, &c.  
(Signed) NESSELRODE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 66.

*Count Nesselrode to M. de Kisseleff.*

*St. Pétersbourg, le  $\frac{1}{3}$  Août, 1853.*

EN répondant, par ma précédente dépêche, à la première circulaire de M. Drouyn de Lhuys, j'ai également examiné cette partie de la seconde qui a trait à la question religieuse. Il me reste à considérer ici ce qui, dans cette dernière pièce, concerne plus spécialement notre entrée temporaire dans les Principautés, le point de vue sous lequel nous avons dû envisager l'envoi de la flotte Anglo-Française dans le Levant, et le jugement que porte le Gouvernement Français sur notre attitude actuelle.

Qu'on nous permette d'abord de laisser de côté l'assertion qu'il n'y a eu à Constantinople, de la part d'aucun des Représentants étrangers, ni pression d'aucun genre, ni ingérence quelconque dans le refus de la Porte Ottomane d'accepter les dernières conditions que lui avait offertes le Prince Menchikoff. Nous réservons là-dessus notre sentiment, fondé sur des informations qui ne concorderaient pas entièrement avec l'opinion qu'exprime le Gouvernement Français.

Mais nous ne saurions ne pas appuyer sur notre manière d'envisager et les effets et le caractère que nous avons cru pouvoir attribuer à la démonstration navale des deux Puissances.

Le rapprochement de dates établit clairement que l'ordre donné aux escadres d'aller mouiller près des Dardanelles, l'a été sur la première nouvelle de la rupture de relations qui venait d'avoir lieu entre le Prince Menchikoff et la Porte, et avant qu'on ne pût savoir à Paris ou à Londres quel parti nous prendrions. Cet ordre a donc précédé l'annonce même des mesures, purement éventuelles, dont nous subordonnions encore l'exécution à la réponse qui nous serait donnée à Constantinople. L'arrivée des flottes dans les eaux Turques a également précédé cette réponse. Ne sommes nous pas fondés à dire que la présence des deux escadres a dû fortement influencer sur les décisions finales de la Porte, par conséquent influencer aussi sur nos propres décisions ?

On nous oppose que nos mesures avaient été annoncées de manière à ne pouvoir laisser aucun doute sur notre ferme intention d'y donner suite. Il n'en est pas moins constant que leur exécution dépendait de la conduite incertaine du Gouvernement Turc. Le Gouvernement Turc pouvait accepter notre ultimatum. Il pouvait, tout en ne l'acceptant pas, répondre néanmoins de manière à laisser une porte ouverte à la reprise en considération de nos mesures et des instances que l'Autriche nous adressait dans ce sens, c'est-à-dire, ne pas répondre comme l'a fait Reshid Pasha, en revenant sur les engagements mêmes que son Gouvernement avait déjà pris dans le dernier projet de note adressé au Prince Menchikoff, en posant un principe qui sape par la base celui que renferme au

sujet de la religion et des églises le Traité de Kaïnardji. Il ne nous paraît donc point que nos mesures, par cela seul que nous les avons annoncées d'avance, dûssent être dès-lors considérées comme étant déjà irrévocablement exécutées. On a vu d'ailleurs que c'est avant même de les connaître que les deux Puissances ont donné à leurs flottes l'ordre d'appareiller pour le Levant.

Que la démonstration des Puissances, anticipant sur nos décisions finales, ait mis en jeu notre honneur déjà engagé si avant dans la question, c'est ce que ne contestera pas M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, s'il reconnaît, suivant les termes de sa première circulaire, que chaque Gouvernement est le seul juge des exigences de sa dignité.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys rejette toute parité que nous voudrions établir entre les situations respectives. Vis-à-vis de la Turquie, sans contredit, et nous n'avons jamais prétendu qu'il y eût parité de situation vis-à-vis du Gouvernement Ottoman entre nous et les deux Puissances. Ce que nous croyons pouvoir maintenir c'est que les Puissances, par la position navale qu'elles ont prise, nous ont donné une raison de plus d'en chercher l'équivalent dans une position militaire. Et quand nous disons équivalent, nous croyons rester au-dessous du vrai. Que les flottes soient ou ne soient pas en vue de la capitale Ottomane, c'est-là une question de mots qu'on nous permettra de ne point traiter sérieusement, et nous retirons volontiers l'expression si, géographiquement, elle a pu paraître inexacte. Mais toujours est-il que la Baie de Besica est à courte distance des Dardanelles; que, quand les Puissances y ont pris position, nous ignorions aussi bien qu'elles comment la Porte envisagerait notre entrée dans les Principautés; que, d'après le témoignage de M. Drouyn de Lhuys lui-même, la Porte a été laissée entièrement libre de ses décisions; qu'elle avait droit, qu'elle a encore droit, selon lui, de considérer nos mesures comme un acte de guerre, et de déclarer les Détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore ouverts aux escadres de France et d'Angleterre. Dans une hypothèse pareille on n'a qu'à mesurer la distance ou plutôt les obstacles à franchir et à vaincre des deux parts pour décider si, non pas de nos frontières, mais même derrière le Danube, nous sommes par terre plus près de Constantinople, que ne le seraient par mer les deux Puissances de nos côtes et de nos ports.

Représenter l'attitude armée et combinée des deux plus grands Etats maritimes de l'Europe, dans un but nettement formulé, comme le mouillage inoffensif de quelques vaisseaux isolés, visitant sans y stationner des ports amis ouverts à toutes les marines, c'est, ce nous semble, faire une part bien faible à nos justes susceptibilités et à nos motifs de préoccupation non moins légitimes.

Nous avons exposé plus haut qu'en un certain cas la position prise par les deux Cours eût pu être bien plus menaçante pour nous que la nôtre ne l'est pour Constantinople. Mais ce cas extrême à part ne suffit-il pas du moindre coup de vent pour obliger les escadres alliées à changer leur mouillage actuel en une position toute différente? Pouvons nous oublier qu'en 1849, lorsque les deux Cours crurent devoir sans nécessité se placer dans la même attitude (nous disons "sans nécessité," puisque avant même de recevoir ici leurs premières communications, l'Empereur avait déjà, par déférence amicale pour le Sultan et pour l'envoi que lui fit ce Souverain d'un Ambassadeur Extraordinaire, renoncé spontanément à insister sur la partie principale de ses demandes); pouvions nous, dis-je, oublier qu'à cette époque le mauvais temps servit à l'Amiral Parker de raison suffisante pour quitter la station de Besica et pour pénétrer dans l'intérieur des Dardanelles? Même en dehors de ce Détroit, et sans être en vue de Constantinople, les deux Cours, par la présence de leurs flottes, n'en sont-elles pas maîtresses moralement? En cas de troubles dans la capitale, les destinées de l'Empire Ottoman ne seraient-elles pas dans leurs mains? Et pouvons-nous y voir d'un œil entièrement indifférent prédominer leur influence absolue, exclusive, au détriment de cette part d'action et d'influence que la France réclame à juste titre en Turquie, mais qu'à juste titre aussi la Russie peut réclamer pour elle-même? Il nous semble que poser ces questions cela suffit pour les résoudre.

Quand on voit, comme tout récemment dans un port de la Turquie ouvert librement à toutes les marines, les bâtiments de guerre de deux nations, également amies de la Porte Ottomane, se préparer l'une et l'autre au combat, et, en face d'un pareil fait, les autorités Ottomanes frappées d'impuissance et d'immobilité, il est facile de juger du degré d'indépendance que peut laisser à la Turquie la présence de vaisseaux étrangers dans ses ports et dans ses eaux libres.

Ce n'est donc point sans quelque raison que nous avons cru pouvoir envisager l'attitude navale des deux Puissances comme une démonstration autrement grave qu'un simple mouillage dans des ports ouverts à toutes les marines isolément, et que nous avons été contraints d'attribuer à cette attitude envers nous un caractère comminatoire, un caractère de pression exercée sur nos déterminations.

Pour compléter notre pensée nous demanderons à M. Drouyn de Lhuys de lui soumettre une hypothèse.

Supposons, ce qu'à Dieu ne plaise, qu'il vînt à survenir entre la France et l'Angleterre un de ces graves dissentiments, d'où peut sortir soudain la guerre ou qui tiennent du moins la paix en suspens. Au plus fort de ce démêlé, l'Angleterre, en vertu d'un Traité d'Alliance ou de tout autre accord préalable quelconque, nous invite à lui prêter le concours de nos forces maritimes. Tout d'un coup et sans qu'avis en ait été donné par nous au Gouvernement Français, 15 ou 20 vaisseaux Russes armés en guerre viennent du fond de la Baltique mouiller et prendre une position combinée avec les forces de la Grande Bretagne dans les ports de ce dernier pays, à portée plus au moins grande des côtes et établissements maritimes de la France. Le Gouvernement Français verrait-il là un mouillage inoffensif dans des eaux et ports ouverts librement à tout le monde ? Ne se sentirait-il pas quelque droit de qualifier un pareil mouvement de démonstration comminatoire ?

Nous adressons cette question avec confiance à sa loyauté et à ses sentiments d'honneur national.

La circulaire se termine par une accusation fort grave, qui n'irait à rien moins qu'à représenter le passage du Pruth par nos troupes comme introduisant dans le droit public un principe entièrement nouveau, à l'admission duquel s'oppose l'intérêt général du monde.

Un examen plus calme convaincra, nous l'espérons, M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères que notre entrée dans les Principautés n'a pourtant pas, comme précédent, toute la portée qu'il y attache.

De tout temps, dans le droit public Européen, il a existé une distinction marquée entre un acte de guerre positif et des mesures simplement coercitives. Cette distinction, le Gouvernement Français n'aurait pas à remonter bien loin pour en trouver plus d'un exemple dans l'histoire contemporaine et dans ses propres antécédents politiques. Sans parler de l'entrée des troupes Françaises en Morée, à l'époque de la révolution Grecque, pour en chasser celles du Sultan, quand le Sultan protestait hautement contre cette atteinte portée à l'intégrité d'un territoire qu'il regardait alors comme le sien propre ; du blocus des côtes ; de la capture et même de la destruction des vaisseaux Ottomans ; série de mesures de force qui ne déterminaient pourtant pas l'état de guerre ; nous pourrions rappeler encore que la France après 1830, de concert avec l'Angleterre, mais en opposition directe aux représentations de la Russie, de l'Autriche et de la Prusse, envahissait un territoire à l'abandon duquel le Roi des Pays-Bas n'avait pas encore souscrit ; exigeait de lui la retraite de ses troupes ; bombardait plus tard Anvers ; bloquait avec son alliée les ports Hollandais, malgré la protestation du Roi, malgré celle des trois autres Grandes Puissances, qui avaient cherché à décider ce Souverain à l'acceptation volontaire des conditions qu'on lui avait faites. Tous ces actes, la France et l'Angleterre les qualifiaient alors de mesures coercitives, renfermées dans un certain cercle qu'elles avaient d'avance tracé. Nous n'avons pas, que nous sachions, poussé jusqu'ici à un tel point l'extension des moyens de contrainte. Nous entrons, pour obtenir la satisfaction qu'on nous refuse, sur un territoire dont la Porte est Suzeraine, il est vrai, mais dans lequel il n'existe pas un seul Turc avec lequel nos troupes puissent se trouver en collision ; et quels que soient les dangers attachés, nous en convenons, à ces sortes de situations équivoques, néanmoins la distinction existant déjà entre les moyens coercitifs ou la guerre, et cette distinction se fondant sur des précédents bien plus graves que le cas actuel, nous ne saurions accepter le reproche d'avoir pour la première fois introduit un principe nouveau dans le monde, entraînant toutes les conséquences que M. Drouyn de Lhuys en fait découler.

Vous voudrez bien, Monsieur, en communiquant la présente au Gouvernement Français, lui soumettre ces réflexions, en réplique à celles qu'il nous fait entendre. Nous étions dans l'obligation de rétablir certains faits antérieurs et de maintenir quelques-unes de nos opinions, dont l'appréciation par lui ne nous

a pas paru entièrement équitable pour nous. Mais, au moment même où nos dernières nouvelles de Vienne semblent nous autoriser à ne pas renoncer tout-à-fait à l'espoir d'un arrangement avec la Turquie, nous nous verrions avec regret dans le cas de poursuivre avec la France une controverse qui, roulant sur le passé, réussira difficilement à concilier les opinions divergentes. Que, non-obstant cette divergence, notre désir soit encore, ce qu'il a toujours été, de nous prêter à la recherche d'un moyen efficace de rapprochement entre la Russie et la Porte, c'est ce qu'atteste la disposition que nous venons de montrer à donner notre approbation aux dernières propositions que l'Autriche vient de faire à Constantinople. Il dépendra maintenant du Gouvernement Français de concourir, par son langage et ses conseils à la Porte Ottomane, à accélérer une solution pacifique, que personne n'accueillera plus sincèrement que l'Empereur, pour peu qu'elle demeure conforme à ses intérêts et à sa dignité.

Recevez, &c.  
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)

*St. Petersburg, August  $\frac{1}{13}$ , 1853.*

WHILE replying by my previous despatch to M. Drouyn de Lhuys' first circular, I likewise examined that part of the second which relates to the religious question. It remains for me now to consider what, in this last paper, more especially relates to our temporary entrance into the Principalities, the point of view under which we must have needs looked upon the despatch of the English-French fleet to the Levant, and the opinion entertained by the French Government of our present position.

We must be allowed, in the first place, to leave unnoticed the assertion that there was not at Constantinople, on the part of any one of the foreign Representatives, either a pressure of any sort, or any interference whatever in regard to the refusal of the Ottoman Porte to accept the last conditions offered to it by Prince Menchikoff. We reserve our sentiments on that point, which rest upon information which would not be entirely in accordance with the opinion expressed by the French Government.

But we cannot refrain from dwelling upon the view which we take of the effects and the character which we have considered we might attach to the naval demonstration of the two Powers.

A comparison of dates clearly proves that the order to the squadrons to anchor in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles was given on the first intelligence of the rupture of relations between Prince Menchikoff and the Porte, and before it could be known at Paris or at London what course we should take. That order, therefore, preceded even the announcement of the measures, wholly contingent as they were, the execution of which we made still to depend on the answer which should be given to us at Constantinople. The arrival of the fleets in the Turkish waters equally preceded that answer. Are we not then justified in saying that the presence of the two squadrons must needs have had a powerful influence on the final decisions of the Porte, and consequently on our own also?

It is objected to us that our measures had been announced in such a manner as to leave no doubt in respect to our firm intention of carrying them into execution. It is not the less evident that the execution of them depended on the conduct of the Turkish Government, which was uncertain. The Turkish Government might accept our ultimatum. It might, while not accepting it, nevertheless reply in such a manner as to leave a door open for reconsidering our measures and the representations which Austria was addressing to us in that sense; that is to say, it might not reply as Reshid Pasha has done, by retracting the very engagements which his Government had already taken in the last draft of note addressed to Prince Menchikoff, by laying down a principle which saps the foundation of that contained in the Treaty of Kainardji in regard to religion and churches. It does not, therefore, appear to us that our measures, from the mere circumstance of our having announced them beforehand, should from that time have been considered as being already irrevocably executed. It has been seen, moreover, that the two Powers, even before knowing what those measures were, ordered their fleets to set sail for the Levant.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, if he admits, agreeably to the terms of his first circular, that every Government is the sole judge of what its dignity requires, will not dispute that the demonstration of the Powers, occurring before our final decisions were taken, placed at stake our honour, already so much implicated in the question.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys denies any resemblance which we might desire to set up between the respective situations. Such is doubtless the case as regards Turkey; and we have never pretended that there was any similarity between our position and that of the Two Powers as respects the Ottoman Government. What we conceive that we can maintain is, that the Powers, by the naval position which they have taken up, have given us an additional reason for looking for an equivalent in a military position. And when we speak of an equivalent we consider that we are saying less than the truth. Whether the fleets are or are not within sight of the Ottoman capital, is a question of words, which we may be allowed not to discuss seriously; and we willingly retract the expression if it should seem to be geographically incorrect.

But nevertheless it is true that Besika Bay is but a short distance from the Dardanelles; that when the Powers took up a position there, we were as ignorant as they were themselves how the Porte would look upon our entrance into the Principalities; that, according to the evidence of M. Drouyn de Lhuys himself, the Porte was left entirely free to take its own decisions; that it had the right, as it still has, according to him, to consider our measures as an act of war, and to declare the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus open to the squadrons of France and of England. Under such a supposition it is only necessary to measure the distance, or rather the obstacles to be overcome on either side, in order to decide whether, not from our frontiers, but even behind the Danube, we are nearer to Constantinople by land than the Two Powers would be by sea to our coast and ports.

It appears to us that to represent the armed and combined attitude of the two greatest maritime States of Europe, with an object clearly stated, as the harmless anchoring of some detached vessels, visiting, without abiding in, friendly ports open to the ships of all nations, is to pay but slight attention to our just susceptibility, and to our motives of apprehension not less well founded.

We have stated above, that in a certain case the position taken up by the two Courts might have been much more menacing for us than our own is for Constantinople. But setting aside this extreme case, is not the least blast of wind sufficient to compel the allied squadrons to change their present anchorage for a position altogether different? Could we forget that in 1849, when the two Courts thought fit needlessly to place themselves in the same attitude (we say "needlessly," because even before their first communications were received, the Emperor out of friendly deference for the Sultan, and for the mission to him by that Sovereign of an Extraordinary Ambassador, had already spontaneously given up insisting upon the principal part of his demands); could we, I say, forget that at that time bad weather served as a sufficient excuse for Admiral Parker quitting the anchorage at Besika, and entering within the Dardanelles? Even outside of those Straits, and without being in sight of Constantinople, are not the Courts, by the mere presence of their fleets, morally its masters? In case of troubles in the capital, would not the destinies of the Ottoman Empire be in their hands? And could we witness with entire indifference the predominance of their absolute and exclusive influence, to the prejudice of that share of action and of influence which France justly claims in Turkey, but which Russia may likewise justly claim for herself? It appears to us that the mere statement of these questions is sufficient.

When, as recently, in a Turkish port freely open to the ships of all nations, the ships of war of two nations equally in amity with the Ottoman Porte, are seen severally to make preparations for engaging, and the Ottoman authorities in such a state of things are seen to be paralyzed and unmoved, it is easy to judge of the degree of independence which the presence of foreign vessels in her ports and free waters, can leave to Turkey.

It is, therefore, not without some reason that we have considered that we might look upon the naval attitude of the two Powers as a more serious demonstration than a mere anchoring in ports open to the ships of all nations separately, and that we have been compelled to attach to that attitude as regards ourselves a character of menace, a character of pressure exerted over our decision.

In order fully to explain our notions, we will ask permission of M. Drouyn de Lhuys to submit to him an hypothesis.

Suppose, which God forbid, that there should arise between France and England one of those serious differences from which war may suddenly spring, or which at least render peace doubtful. In the height of the discussion, England, in virtue of a Treaty of Alliance, or of any other previously existing compact, applies to us for the cooperation of our maritime forces. Suddenly, and without any previous notice being given by us to the French Government, fifteen or twenty Russian ships equipped for war arrive from the bottom of the Baltic, anchor and take up a combined position with the forces of Great Britain in the ports of the latter country, more or less within reach of the coasts and maritime establishments of France. Would the French Government look upon this measure in the light of an inoffensive anchoring in waters and ports freely open to all the world? Would it not feel that it had some right to characterize such a movement as a menacing demonstration?

We address this question confidently to his sincerity and to his feelings of national honour.

The Circular concludes with a very serious accusation which would amount to nothing less than representing the passage of the Pruth by our troops as introducing into public law an entirely novel principle, to the admission of which the general interest of the world is opposed.

A calmer examination will, we trust, satisfy the Minister for Foreign Affairs that an entrance into the Principalities has nevertheless not the full bearing, as a precedent, which is attached to it.

From all time, a marked distinction has existed in the public law of Europe between a positive act of war and measures merely coercive. The French Government would not have to go far back to find more than one instance of this distinction in cotemporaneous history, and in its own political antecedents. Without speaking of the entrance of the French troops into the Morea, at the time of the Greek revolution, in order to expel from thence those of the Sultan, when the Sultan loudly protested against that attack on the integrity of a territory which at that time he looked upon as his own; of the blockade of the coasts; of the capture and even of the destruction of the Ottoman ships; a series of measures which, however, did not bring on a state of war; we might further call to mind that after 1830, France, in concert with England, but in direct opposition to the representations of Russia, of Austria, and of Prussia, invaded a territory which the King of the Netherlands had not yet consented to give up; required him to withdraw his troops; subsequently bombarded Antwerp; blockaded with her ally the Dutch ports, notwithstanding the protest of the King, notwithstanding that of the three other Great Powers who had sought to induce that Sovereign to accept voluntarily the conditions which had been proposed to him. All these acts were at that time characterized by France and England as measures of coercion, restricted to a certain circle which they had traced out beforehand. As far as we know we have not as yet pushed measures of constraint to such an extent. In order to obtain the satisfaction which has been refused to us we enter a territory of which the Porte, it is true, is the Suzerain, but in which there does not exist a single Turk with whom our troops could come into collision; and whatever may be the dangers which we admit attach to these kinds of equivocal situations, as the distinction nevertheless exists between measures of coercion or war, and as that distinction rests on precedents much more weighty than the present case, we cannot admit that we are open to the reproach of having, for the first time, introduced into the world a novel principle, involving all the consequences deduced from it by M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

You will have the goodness, Sir, in communicating the present despatch to the French Government, to lay before it these considerations in reply to those which it has submitted to us. We were obliged to recapitulate certain antecedent circumstances, and to uphold certain of our opinions which it had not appeared to appreciate in a manner entirely equitable as regards us. But at the very time when the last news from Vienna seems to warrant us in not renouncing altogether the hope of an arrangement with Turkey, we should regret to find ourselves engaged in a controversy with France, which turning altogether upon things past, will hardly serve to reconcile discrepancies of opinion. That notwithstanding these discrepancies we still desire, as we always

have done, to aid in the search of an effectual means of reconciliation between Russia and the Porte, is manifested by the disposition we have lately shown to bestow our approbation on the late propositions which Austria has recently made at Constantinople. It will rest now with the French Government to contribute by its language and by its advice to the Ottoman Porte, to hasten a pacific solution which no one will receive with greater sincerity than the Emperor, provided that it is consistent with his interests and with his dignity.

Receive, &c.

(Signed) NESSELRODE.

No. 67.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 31.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, August 13, 1853.*

YESTERDAY evening, between 5 and 6 o'clock, Her Majesty's steam-vessel "Caradoc" arrived here, with your Lordship's despatches of the 2nd instant. At an early hour this morning I waited on Reshid Pasha, and communicated to him the substance of your Lordship's instructions relative to the *projet de note* already received from Vienna. I called his attention to the strong and earnest manner in which that paper was recommended to the acceptance of the Porte, not only by Her Majesty's Government, but also by the Cabinets of Austria, France, and Prussia. I reminded him of the intelligence which had arrived from St. Petersburg the day before by telegraph, purporting that the Emperor of Russia had signified his readiness to accept the same note. I urged, moreover, the importance of his engaging the Porte to come to a decision with the least possible delay, and I put him at the same time in full possession of the motives by which your Lordship had been actuated in approving the detention at Vienna of His Highness's letter to Count Nesselrode, and the transmission to St. Petersburg and Constantinople of the above-mentioned *projet de note*, which had received the sanction of the Four Powers.

The Pasha listened with a very good grace to all I said. He gave me, however, to understand that there were parts of the note which were not satisfactory to him, and to which he anticipated objections on the part of his Government.

Of the passages thus pointed out as exceptionable, two only appear to involve considerations of any weight, presenting, in the one case, a question of fact, in the other a question of unsafe interference on the part of Russia.

In the beginning of the second paragraph the Emperors of Russia are represented, hypothetically, as having at all times displayed an active solicitude for the privileges and immunities of the Greek Church. The fact, however, according to Reshid Pasha, is that the Sovereigns of Russia never displayed their zeal on behalf of those privileges before the negotiation of the Treaty at Kainardji. He therefore proposes to draw a distinction between the general freedom of worship, at all times an object of interest to Russia, with respect to the Greek Church, and the privileges granted to its clergy especially maintained by the Ottoman Sultans, marking that difference by the use of corresponding terms in the note.

Again, at the end of the third paragraph, a form of expression is used, which, in the Pasha's opinion, if not amended would have the effect of extending Russian patronage over all those subjects of the Porte who belong to the Greek Church and its establishments. A consequence of this description is apprehended, from the terms of the Note, because they would entitle Russia to participate in the concessions made to Austria by the Treaties of Carlowitz, Belgrade and Sistova, which include all persons of the Roman Catholic persuasion in Turkey, without any reservation as to the Sultan's subjects.

For your Lordship's more complete information, I have the honour to inclose herewith the Articles of the Austrian Treaties which bear upon this question.

Our conversation, during the course of which I repeatedly urged the importance of an immediate decision, and the danger of declining, or only accepting with amendments, what the four friendly Powers so earnestly recommended, and what the Cabinet of St. Petersburg had accepted in its actual

state, terminated with an assurance on his part that he would bring the whole question before the Council in the course of the day, and make a suitable communication to the Four Representatives with the least practicable delay.

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Inclosure in No. 67.

*Treaty of Belgrade, September 18, 1739.*

#### ARTICLE IX.

TOUS les privilèges qui ont été accordés aux religieux professant la religion Chrétienne Catholique pendant les règnes des Sultans précédents de glorieuse mémoire, soit par les capitulations, soit par des ordonnances Impériales et des mandemens spéciaux, tant avant la paix de Passarovitz que depuis, tous ces privilèges, et spécialement ceux qui ont été accordés aux religieux Allemands de l'Ordre de la Trinité pour la rédemption des captifs, seront confirmés par le Sérénissime Empereur des Ottomans pour être observés aussi à l'avenir; en sorte que les susdits religieux puissent librement réparer et rétablir leurs églises d'une manière conforme à la loi Mussulmane et exercer leur culte accoutumé sans rencontrer aucune opposition. Il ne sera permis à personne contrairement aux lois et aux capitulations, par des demandes d'argent ou sous d'autres prétextes, de molester les dits religieux de la Trinité, ni ceux des autres ordres; au contraire, ces religieux pourront tous vivre paisiblement sous la protection de Sa Hautesse le Sultan. De plus, l'Ambassadeur de l'Empereur des Romains sera libre à son arrivée à Constantinople d'exposer ce qui leur sera commis par rapport à la religion, aux lieux que les Chrétiens visitent dans la cité de Jérusalem, et aux autres endroits où les dits religieux ont des églises.

(Translation.)

#### ARTICLE IX.

ALL the privileges which have been granted to the monks professing the Christian Catholic religion, during the reigns of preceding Sultans of glorious memory, either by the capitulations, or by Imperial ordinances and special commandments, as well before as since the peace of Passarowitz, and especially those which were granted to the German monks of the Order of the Trinity for the redemption of captives, shall be confirmed by the Most Serene Emperor of the Ottomans, to be likewise observed for the future; so that the aforesaid monks may freely repair and restore their churches consistently with the Mussulman law, and exercise their accustomed worship without encountering any opposition. No person shall be allowed, contrary to the laws and the capitulations, to vex the said monks of the Trinity, nor those of the other orders, by demands for money or under other pretences; on the contrary, those monks shall be permitted to live peaceably under the protection of His Highness the Sultan. Moreover, the Ambassador of the Emperor of the Romans shall have liberty, on his arrival at Constantinople, to explain what shall be given in charge to him in respect to religion, to the spots which the Christians visit in the city of Jerusalem, and to the other places where the said monks possess churches.

*Treaty of Sistova, August 4, 1791.*

#### ARTICLE XII.

ET quant à la liberté du culte accordée aux prêtres et aux sectateurs de la religion Catholique dans l'Empire Ottoman, ainsi que pour ce qui concerne l'entretien et la réparation de leurs églises, et la faculté de visiter, sous les auspices des autorités locales, les lieux saints de Jérusalem et autres endroits de

pèlerinage, la Sublime Porte Ottomane renouvelle et confirme, d'après le principe du *status quo* strict, non seulement les privilèges assurés à cette religion par l'Article IX du Traité de Belgrade, mais aussi ceux qui lui ont été particulièrement concédés par des firmans et par d'autres documents Impériaux.

(Translation.)

#### ARTICLE XII.

And as concerns the liberty of worship granted to the priests and followers of the Catholic religion in the Ottoman Empire, as well as in regard to what concerns the maintenance and repair of their churches, and the power of visiting, under the protection of the local authorities, the holy places of Jerusalem and other spots of pilgrimage, the Sublime Ottoman Porte renews and confirms, according to the principle of the strict *status quo*, not only the privileges secured to that religion by Article IX of the Treaty of Belgrade, but likewise those which have been specially conceded to it by firmans and other Imperial instruments.

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*Treaty of Peace with Austria, signed at Carlowitz, January 26, 1699.*

#### ARTICLE XIII.

A L'EGARD des religieux et de l'exercice de la religion Catholique Romaine, le Grand Seigneur promet de renouveler et de confirmer tous les privilèges qui leur ont été accordés par ses prédécesseurs. De plus il sera permis aux Ambassadeurs de l'Empereur d'adresser leurs plaintes et demandes à la Porte au sujet de la religion et de la visitation des lieux saints à Jerusalem.

(Translation.)

#### ARTICLE XIII.

As regards the monks and the exercise of the Roman Catholic religion, the Grand Seigneur promises to renew and confirm all the privileges which have been granted to them by his predecessors. Furthermore the Ambassadors of the Emperor shall be allowed to address to the Porte complaints and demands on the subject of religion and visiting the holy places at Jerusalem.

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No. 68.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 31.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, August 14, 1853.*

THE *projet de note* transmitted from Vienna was laid before the Council to-day by Reshid Pasha. All the Ministers were present to the number of seventeen, including the Sheik ul Islam. The majority of the Council declared it to be their firm intention to reject the new proposal, even if amendments were introduced.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs having submitted that the new *projet de note* was founded in some measure on the draft which he had himself prepared for Prince Menchikoff, the Council decided that time should be allowed for its members to compare the two papers at their leisure.

The adjournment which followed is not to extend beyond to-day or to-morrow.

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*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 31.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, August 18, 1853.*

AS soon as I saw reason to believe that the Turkish Ministers were resolved not to accept Count Buol's note without amendment, I felt myself compelled by a sense of duty to suggest some form of decision which might present the character of an acceptance, and yet leave room for such an adjustment of terms as would completely secure the Porte.

The Ministerial Council was to meet again on the following day, and would probably take its decision on the pending question. I employed the interval in trying to discover some adequate expedient, and finally settled upon the only one which seemed to offer a chance of success. It was simply that the Porte should signify its acceptance of the note under its own construction of the objectionable passages, and, for securities, rely on the assent and sanction of the Four Powers. A proposition to this effect, accompanied with the necessary explanations, was conveyed to Reshid Pasha by my direction, while the Council was sitting. Mr. Alison, who had charge of the message, was instructed to withhold it from the Ottoman Minister until he had ascertained, which it was not difficult for him to do, that the turn of the deliberations evinced a manifest intention to throw out the note in its present form. It was under these circumstances that the Pasha received my suggestion from Mr. Alison, and, on his return to the council-room, submitted it, as such, to his colleagues before the close of the debate. This, my Lord, is what he has since told me, adding that the proposal did not meet with favour from the assembly.

On calling yesterday, to learn from his own lips the exact state of the case, I found that Reshid Pasha had drawn up a note or memorandum, explanatory of the Porte's objections, and expressive of a grateful deference to the Four Powers, but declining the object of their friendly recommendations, unless it were amply amended in his sense. He translated the whole paper verbally for my information. I could only return his confidence by urging once more the disappointment which the Porte's refusal would occasion to the Powers most interested in its welfare, and reminding him of the consequences which were but too likely to ensue from such a decision. The tone and language of his composition appeared to be unexceptionable, and I confess that in substance it struck me as justifying, more than I felt myself at liberty to admit, or had even in some respects anticipated, the course which his Government was prepared to adopt.

I determined to make one more effort before the meeting of the Great Council, in order if possible to invest the Porte's decision with that character of constructive acceptance which might enable your Lordship to exert a powerful influence, and, in concert with France and the other Powers, realize the proposed arrangement in terms satisfactory to the Ottoman Government, and on that account more likely to carry with it the general approval of Europe. My notion was, that the note or memorandum proposed by Reshid Pasha should contain by way of resumé, a passage identical with the draft inclosed, and that I should propose at a meeting of the Four Representatives a form of reply more or less similar to the words inclosed herewith.

I am fully aware of the imperfections and difficulties which attach to this expedient, and I have ventured to put it forward solely because I can think of nothing better under circumstances fraught with danger to this Empire, and with serious disturbance to the most important interests of society.

Such as it is, I have directed M. Pisani to propose it confidentially to Reshid Pasha, as coming personally from me, and I have reason to think that his Highness will adopt the suggestion, if he can succeed in obtaining the Council's assent.

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## Inclosure 1 in No. 69.

*Draft of Passage proposed by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

WE still give a decided preference to the last note prepared at Constantinople; but acknowledging the friendly intentions of the Four Powers, and out of deference to their earnest recommendations, relying at the same time on their continued sympathy and support, we are willing to accept, and do in fact adopt, the note arranged by them, similar as it is in form and intent to our own, provided that the passages already pointed out as being of a doubtful and dangerous signification, should be understood in the sense explained by us and modified accordingly in the terms of expression, with the assent of the Powers, and the security resulting therefrom.

## Inclosure 2 in No. 69.

*Draft of Reply of the Four Representatives.*

WE learn with the sincerest pleasure that the Sublime Porte, though still preferring its own form of note, does justice to the friendly intentions of our respective Governments; and out of deference to their advice, and in reliance on their continued support, accepts the draft transmitted from Vienna with their concurrent recommendation.

In transmitting to our several Courts this new and signal proof of the moderate yet consistent sentiments which animate the Sublime Porte in the midst of no common provocations and difficulties, we shall be careful to fix their attention on those passages which, in the apprehension of the Porte, are liable to an uncertain or dangerous construction, and to make it clearly understood that in consenting to substitute the draft of the Four Powers for her own, the Porte expects that the passages in question will be adapted to the interpretation assumed by her as indispensable for a just appreciation of facts and the security of her sovereign rights, in concert with the Powers her friends and sincere advisers.

## No. 70.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 31.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, August 19, 1853.*

I AM fully aware of the honour conferred upon me by the serious attention which, as your Lordship has been kind enough to inform me, Her Majesty's Government have paid to the subject-matter of my report of the 4th ultimo. Encouraged by so flattering a mark of consideration, I venture to submit a few remarks suggested to me by passages of your Lordship's despatch of the 28th ultimo, in reply to mine.

In advising the Sultan to meet the occupation of the Principalities by a simple protest and appeal, I had a two-fold object in view; first, to afford time for endeavouring to settle the pending difference by a well-concerted and definitive negotiation; and secondly, to prepare for the effectual employment of other means in case negotiation should fail. I was deeply impressed with a foresight of the evils attending hesitation and uncertainty, when Russia had taken so aggressive a position, when public feeling was so completely roused, and when such vast interests were at stake, not only here, but in Europe also. It was not then in weakness, or with a view to any sacrifice of principle, but in the strength of a good cause, and in order to obtain a successful issue—in peace if possible, but at all events to obtain it—that I tendered the advice which Her Majesty's Government have honoured with their approval.

I have felt from the first that a question of so much moment as that which has been brought into play by Russia, could not, if once it passed the bounds of diplomatic discussion, be brought to the desirable solution by any partial or

limited application of force. At the same time it was evident that the principle for which the Porte was contending could not be surrendered without a virtual abandonment of what is called the Eastern question ; nor could it be niggardly or doubtfully vindicated with any degree of satisfaction to public opinion, or any fair prospect of durable tranquillity.

Under these impressions, on the departure of Prince Menchikoff, I submitted to your Lordship whatever occurred to me at that time as to the dangers which threatened Turkey, and the momentous interests to which she could fairly appeal in soliciting the continued good offices and active support of Great Britain.

When at a later period the Russian troops were about to enter the Principalities, I implored your Lordship with increased earnestness to contemplate the Eastern question in all its magnitude, and to pursue a course of policy which would successively enlist every kind of exertion in favour of a triumphant issue.

In proportion as I urged the claims of Turkey to a degree of support from England, which might eventually involve us in war, I felt more strongly the duty of not concealing the weak points of this Empire, but, on the contrary, of giving them a distinctive place in any calculation to be made of its internal resources, and of the means which might be required from without for its defence.

My starting points in argument were, the vastness of the interests at stake, the urgency of making timely provision for their security, and the heavy demands which might be thereby entailed on British generosity, good faith, and resolution.

It was no more an object of mine to gloss over the oppressions of Turkish administration than to conceal the vulnerable points of the Turkish Empire. Of course I did my best to obtain the correction of those evils which are always rife in declining or misgoverned countries ; but I did not understand that the merits of the Eastern question were of a strictly administrative nature. I thought that the Porte's independence and the balance of power in Europe were considerations of primary importance, and that the exigencies of the crisis were rather to be used for pleading the cause of improvement than the want of sufficient progress in that respect was to be viewed as a motive for leaving the crisis to take care of itself.

Great, no doubt, is the peril to which Turkey would be exposed in a single-handed contest with Russia, and it is probable that without succours from abroad the Sultan's Government would be compelled ultimately to submit. But there is also much danger in a continuance of the present state of expensive and irritating preparation ; and the Porte, unassisted, may find a fatal result in the one case as in the other. There are, no doubt, reasons for exhausting all the means of negotiation to avert a disaster ; but there are also reasons for pushing negotiation with vigour to a definite end, and still more for preparing and combining other and stronger ways of rescue in case of diplomatic failure.

I learn from the close of your Lordship's despatch, that Her Majesty's Government, though determined to leave no honourable expedient untried for the preservation of peace, are equally determined to maintain that principle which is now the main object of contention, and to take in due season, should it be necessary, more active measures for the protection of Turkey.

With such prospective intentions, Her Majesty's Government will learn with pleasure that the apprehensions of disturbance and massacre in the Turkish Provinces, and of fanatical exasperation against the Christians here, have been nowhere realized. I have reason to believe that much exaggeration has prevailed on those subjects. Greatly as a thorough redress of grievances, accompanied with administrative reform, is needed in Turkey, the present state of alarm and excitement among the Turkish population has not, with a few local and transient exceptions, had the effect of increasing the evils which existed before. Even among the Greeks and in Bulgaria the expectations of Russian partizans have not been fulfilled.

The Turkish authorities on their side have been so careful to repress any tendencies to disorder among the Mussulmans, that the painful circumstances to which I drew attention some time ago have not been followed by the consequences then apprehended.

I am able, on the contrary, to state, without fear of contradiction, that in

all which concerns the political proceedings and military operations directed by the Government and its principal functionaries, a most creditable display of firmness, energy, and prudence has been maintained. The capital and its neighbourhood have enjoyed unbroken tranquillity, notwithstanding apprehensions which at first seemed to warrant the adoption of precautionary measures. The country has been traversed in various directions by bodies of armed men—regulars, irregulars, militia, and policemen—without occasioning any complaint of a serious nature not immediately attended to. The defences of the Bosphorus, of the Balkan, and of the Danube, have been brought, in the opinion of competent judges, to a state of comparative efficiency, with admirable speed. The army and navy are both described, by officers who have reported them, as most respectable in numbers, discipline, and exercise. Even money and provisions are in some way or other procured in sufficient quantities to supply the wants of the moment, and no serious anxiety appears to be entertained by the Government in these respects.

The success which has hitherto attended the progress of these operations is, no doubt, a source of confidence at the Porte; and a portion of the spirit of late exhibited there is traceable to that cause, as well as to the fear of embarrassment likely to result from dispersing the army and dismantling the squadron, without a satisfactory arrangement, obtained, if not by military, at least by diplomatic exertions.

I need not repeat that such exertions are at the same time calculated to undermine the strength of the Empire. But surely they also give the Porte an additional claim to European sympathy, and to Europe an additional motive for rescuing the object of its solicitude from peril and ruin.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 71.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 31.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, August 20, 1853.*

AT a later hour to-day than I had expected, the Porte's definitive communication respecting Count Buol's note was put into my hands by Reshid Pasha's confidential Secretary. It comprises a Turkish official note, accompanied with a French translation, and a copy of the Austrian note, with the Porte's proposed modifications of those passages on which she claims a right to put her own construction.

Copies of the French translation and of the amended paragraphs are inclosed herewith.

I have already prepared your Lordship for the Porte's decision, which however it may fall short of the hopes entertained in London, I beg to recommend to the serious and candid appreciation of Her Majesty's Government. It is the result of much earnest deliberation. It unites the opinions of all parties. It was voted unanimously by a Council of sixty members, comprising the most distinguished statesmen of the capital, whether in or out of office. If it does not completely represent the public feeling of this country, it only fails in being framed with too much forbearance and moderation.

Your Lordship will observe that the Porte rather accepts than refuses the plan of arrangement recommended to it by the Four Powers, and that the interpretations which qualify its acceptance are accompanied with arguments and explanations worthy of deliberate attention.

Inclosure 1 in No. 71.

*Note addressed by Reshid Pasha to the Four Representatives.*

19 Août, 1853.

LE projet de note qui a été récemment fait à Vienne et remis à la Sublime Porte, a été lû et examiné au Conseil des Ministres.

Celui qui avait été précédemment rédigé à Constantinople et remis aux

Grandes Puissances sous une forme propre à faire disparaître le différend qui existe entre la Sublime Porte et la Russie, faisait espérer un résultat satisfaisant. Aussi le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan est-il très peiné de voir que ce projet n'a pas été pris en considération.

Quoique le projet de note rédigé auparavant par la Sublime Porte pour être remis au Prince Menchikoff ait été pris pour base en ce qui regarde le paragraphe du projet arrivé de Vienne concernant les privilèges religieux, la question n'a pas été circonscrite dans ce cercle. Certains paragraphes superflus et incompatibles avec les droits sacrés du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan y ayant été introduits, la Sublime Porte se trouve encore dans la pénible obligation d'émettre ses observations à ce sujet.

Le Gouvernement Impérial est habitué de longue date à recevoir des témoignages d'amitié des hautes Puissances, ses augustes alliées. Il est tout particulièrement reconnaissant de tant d'efforts pleins de bienveillance qu'elles n'ont cessé de faire depuis le commencement de la question actuelle. Il est donc évident qu'il lui répugne, en considération de ses égards particuliers pour ces Puissances, d'hésiter sur un point qui a obtenu leur commun accord. Mais le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan, qui avait été déclaré au commencement de l'affaire seul juge compétent des questions relatives à ses droits et à son indépendance, n'ayant pas été malheureusement consulté sur la rédaction du nouveau projet, est placé dans une position difficile.

On pourra dire que le Gouvernement de Russie, aussi, n'a pas été consulté sur la rédaction de ce projet. Mais les droits que l'on cherche à défendre sont ceux de la Sublime Porte, et c'est elle qui doit signer la note qui sera donnée à cet égard. Il appartient aux Grandes Puissances de juger dans leur équité reconnue s'il est juste de traiter sur ce point les deux parties sur un pied égal ; il a été par conséquent jugé convenable de ne pas s'étendre en détail sur ce point.

Le premier des points qui font hésiter la Sublime Porte est le paragraphe suivant :

“ Si à toute époque, les Empereurs de Russie ont témoigné leur active sollicitude pour le maintien des immunités et privilèges de l'Eglise Grecque Orthodoxe dans l'Empire Ottoman, les Sultans ne se sont jamais refusés à les consacrer de nouveau par des actes solennels.”

Que les Empereurs de la Russie témoignent leur sollicitude pour la prospérité de l'Eglise et de la religion qu'ils professent, ceci est naturel, et il n'y aurait rien à dire. Mais d'après le paragraphe ci-dessus cité, on comprendrait que les privilèges de l'Eglise Grecque dans les états de la Sublime Porte, n'ont été maintenus que par la sollicitude active des Empereurs de Russie.

Il est à remarquer, cependant, que le fait de mettre dans une note à donner par la Sublime Porte, le paragraphe ci-dessus mentionné tel qu'il se trouve dans le projet, pour des privilèges religieux qui ont été, depuis le règne du Sultan Mehmed le Conquérant, de glorieuse mémoire, jusqu'à ce jour, octroyés et maintenus sans la participation de qui que ce soit, impliquerait et offrirait des prétextes au Gouvernement Russe pour prétendre à s'immiscer dans de pareilles choses.

Personne ne saurait consentir à s'attirer les reproches et le blâme des contemporains aussi bien que de la postérité, en admettant qu'un état de choses aussi nuisible pour le présent que pour l'avenir s'établisse.

Pas un serviteur de l'Auguste famille Impériale Ottomane n'oserait ni ne serait capable de mettre par écrit des paroles qui tendraient à infirmer la gloire des institutions que les Empereurs Ottomans ont fondées par un mouvement spontané de leur générosité personnelle et de leur clémence innée.

Le second point à relever est le paragraphe du projet de note relatif au Traité de Kainardji. Comme personne ne saurait nier que ce Traité existe et qu'il est confirmé par celui d'Andrinople, il est de toute évidence que les dispositions précises en seront fidèlement observées.

Si, en insérant le paragraphe susmentionné, l'on a l'intention de considérer les privilèges religieux comme le résultat naturel et l'esprit commenté du Traité de Kainardji, la disposition réelle et précise de ce Traité est limitée à la seule promesse de la Sublime Porte de protéger, elle-même, la religion Chrétienne.

Les paragraphes que la Sublime Porte pourrait, en ce qui regarde les privilèges religieux, insérer dans la note qu'elle signera, ne devraient, comme il a été à toute époque déclaré, soit par écrit, soit verbalement, exprimer que des

assurances propres à faire disparaître les doutes mis en avant par le Gouvernement de Russie, et qui ont formé le sujet des discussions.

Mais en fortifiant, par de nouveaux liens, l'identité religieuse déjà existante entre une grande communauté des sujets de la Sublime Porte et une Puissance étrangère, donner au Gouvernement de Russie des motifs de prétendre à exercer un droit de surveillance et d'immiscion dans de pareilles matières, ce serait partager en quelque sorte les droits souverains, et mettre en danger l'indépendance de l'Empire. Aussi est-il de toute impossibilité pour le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan d'y donner son assentiment sans y être forcé.

Si, enfin, le but n'est que de faire renouveler les engagements du Traité de Kaïnardji, la Sublime Porte pourrait le faire par une note séparée.

Or, le Gouvernement Impérial attache la plus grande importance à ce que, ou le paragraphe relatif à ce Traité du projet envoyé soit supprimé, ou bien que, s'il est maintenu, la promesse de protéger que contient le Traité de Kaïnardji, et la question des privilèges religieux, soient séparées d'une manière explicite, pour qu'il soit compris, au premier coup d'œil, que ce sont deux choses différentes.

Et le troisième point c'est celui de faire participer le rit Grec aux avantages octroyés aux autres rites Chrétiens. On ne saurait douter que le Gouvernement Impérial n'hésitera pas à faire participer le rit Grec, non seulement aux avantages qu'il a de sa propre volonté accordés aux autres communions de la religion Chrétienne professée par les communautés ses sujettes, mais aussi à ceux qu'il pourrait leur octroyer à l'avenir.

Il est donc superflu d'ajouter que la Sublime Porte sera justifiée, si elle ne peut pas admettre l'emploi d'expressions aussi équivoques que celles de Convention ou de dispositions particulières en faveur d'une grande communauté de tant de millions de sujets qui professent le rit Grec.

Tels étant les points qui offrent des inconvénients à la Sublime Porte, elle ne peut, malgré ses plus grands égards pour les conseils des Hautes Puissances ses alliées, et son désir sincère de renouer ses relations avec le Gouvernement Impérial de Russie, son ami et voisin, ne peut, dis-je, s'empêcher de confier à l'équité et à la justice des Grandes Puissances les considérations relatives à ses droits de souveraineté et à son indépendance.

Si, enfin, le dernier projet de note qui a été rédigé par la Sublime Porte est accepté, ou bien si celui de Vienne reçoit les modifications désirées, le Cabinet Ottoman ne tardera point à signer l'un ou l'autre de ces deux projets, et d'envoyer immédiatement un Ambassadeur Extraordinaire sous la condition de l'évacuation des Principautés. Le Gouvernement de la Sublime Porte attend encore une garantie solide de la part des Hautes Puissances, contre toute ingérence à l'avenir et toute occupation de temps en temps des Principautés de Moldavie et de Valachie. Et le but du Gouvernement Ottoman, en se prémunissant de précautions à ce degré, consiste en celui d'éviter tout ce qui pourrait ramener une mésintelligence entre les deux Empires, une fois que la Sublime Porte aura renouvelé ses relations avec la Cour de Russie.

Les points du projet de Vienne, relatifs à l'affaire des Lieux Saints, et à la construction d'une église et d'un hôpital à Jerusalem, ont reçu l'adhésion complète de la Sublime Porte.

Une copie de la note de Vienne, contenant aussi les modifications que le Gouvernement Impérial a jugé convenable de faire, a été transmise à son Excellence.

La Sublime Porte, dans l'intention de donner encore une preuve de ses égards tout particuliers pour les Puissances signataires du Traité de 1841, lors même que le projet qu'elle a rédigé précédemment lui soit naturellement préférable, est prête à accepter le projet de Vienne avec les modifications qu'elle y a faits, et espère que les Puissances, qui n'ont cessé de reconnaître, dès le principe de la question, les droits du Gouvernement Impérial, et de donner des témoignages de leur bienveillance, appréciant ces modifications, agiront en conséquence.

Sa Majesté le Sultan m'ayant ordonné de communiquer ce qui précède à votre Excellence ainsi qu'aux autres Représentants ses collègues, je m'acquitte de ce devoir, en priant votre Excellence d'agréer, &c.

(Translation.)

*August 19, 1853.*

THE draft of note recently drawn up at Vienna and forwarded to the Sublime Porte, has been read and examined in the Council of Ministers.

That which had been previously drawn up at Constantinople, and delivered to the Great Powers in a form calculated to obliterate the difference which exists between the Sublime Porte and Russia, gave reason to expect a satisfactory result; wherefore the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan is much grieved at perceiving that that draft was not taken into consideration.

Although the draft of note previously drawn up by the Sublime Porte in order to its being delivered to Prince Menchikoff, was taken as the basis for the paragraph of the draft which has come from Vienna relating to the religious privileges, the question has not been confined within that limit; certain superfluous paragraphs incompatible with the sacred rights of His Majesty the Sultan's Government having been introduced therein, the Sublime Porte finds itself, to its sorrow, compelled to make its observations on this matter.

The Imperial Government is for a long time in the habit of receiving proofs of friendship from the High Powers its august allies. It is most especially grateful for the very many benevolent efforts which they have not ceased to make from the beginning of the present question. It is clear therefore that, in consideration of its particular regard for those Powers, it is averse to showing any hesitation on a point on which they are agreed. But the Government of His Majesty the Sultan, which at the commencement of the business had been declared to be the only competent judge in questions relative to its rights and independence, having unfortunately not been consulted in regard to the drawing up of the new draft, is placed in a difficult position.

It may be said that the Government of Russia also was not consulted in regard to the drawing up of that draft. But the rights which it is sought to defend are those of the Sublime Porte; and it is the Porte which is to sign the note to be given in this respect. It is for the Great Powers to judge, in their well-known equity, whether it is just on this point to treat the two parties on an equal footing; it has accordingly not been deemed suitable to enter into details on this point.

The first of the points which cause the Sublime Porte to hesitate is the following paragraph:

"If the Emperors of Russia have at all times evinced their active solicitude for the maintenance of the immunities and privileges of the orthodox Greek Church in the Ottoman Empire, the Sultans have never refused again to confirm them by solemn Acts."

It is natural that the Emperors of Russia should evince their solicitude for the prosperity of the Church and of the religion which they profess; and there is nothing to say on the subject. But according to the paragraph which has been quoted, it would be understood that the privileges of the Greek Church in the dominions of the Sublime Porte have only been maintained by the active solicitude of the Emperors of Russia.

It is to be remarked, however, that the circumstance of inserting in a note to be given by the Sublime Porte the paragraph above mentioned, such as it appears in the draft, in regard to religious privileges, which, since the reign of the Sultan Mahomet the Conqueror, of glorious memory, up to the present day, have been granted and maintained without the participation of any person whatever, would imply and afford pretexts to the Russian Government to claim to mix itself up with such matters.

No one could consent to bring down upon himself the reproaches and the blame of his cotemporaries, as well as of posterity, by admitting the establishment of a state of things as injurious for the present as for the future.

Not a single servant of the August Imperial Ottoman Family would dare to write or be capable of writing words the tendency of which would be to weaken the glory of the institutions which the Ottoman Emperors have founded by a spontaneous movement of their personal generosity and innate clemency.

The second point to be noticed is the paragraph of the draft of note relative to the Treaty of Kainardji. As no one can deny the existence of that Treaty

and that it is confirmed by that of Adrianople, it is clearly manifest that the exact provisions of it will be faithfully observed.

If by the insertion of the above-mentioned paragraph, it is intended to consider the religious privileges as the natural result and purport of the Treaty of Kainardji, the real and exact provision of that Treaty is confined to the single promise of the Sublime Porte itself to protect the Christian religion.

The paragraphs in regard to religious privileges which the Sublime Porte could insert in the note to be signed by it, ought not, as has constantly been declared either in writing or verbally, to express anything but assurances calculated to dispel the doubts put forward by the Government of Russia, and which have formed the subject of discussion.

But if the religious identity which already exists between a great community of the subjects of the Sublime Porte and a foreign Power should be strengthened by fresh bonds, if grounds for claiming to exercise a right of superintendence and interference in such matters should be given to the Government of Russia, the sovereign rights would to a certain extent be divided, and the independence of the Empire placed in danger. Consequently it is altogether impossible for the Government of His Majesty the Sultan to assent to this without being compelled to do so.

If, in fine, the object is only to renew the engagements of the Treaty of Kainardji, the Sublime Porte could do so by a separate note.

Accordingly, the Imperial Government attaches the greatest importance either to the suppression of the paragraph of the draft relating to that Treaty, or, if it is retained, to the promise of protection contained in the Treaty of Kainardji and the question of religious privileges being distinctly separated, so that it may be understood at first sight that they are two different things.

And the third point is, that of causing the Greek rite to participate in the advantages granted to the other Christian rites. It cannot be doubted that the Imperial Government will not hesitate to cause the Greek rite to participate not only in the advantages which, of its own will, it has granted to the other communions of the Christian religion professed by the communities its subjects, but in those also which it might grant to them for the future.

It is superfluous then to add that the Sublime Porte will be justified, if it cannot admit the employment of expressions so equivocal as those of "Convention" or "special arrangement" in favour of a great community of so many millions of subjects who profess the Greek rite.

Such being the points which present inconvenience to the Sublime Porte, it cannot, notwithstanding its very great regard for the counsels of the High Powers its allies, and its sincere desire to renew its relations with the Imperial Government of Russia, its friend and neighbour; it cannot, I say, refrain from confiding to the equity and the justice of the Great Powers the considerations affecting its rights of sovereignty and its independence.

If, finally, the last draft of note which was drawn up by the Sublime Porte, is accepted; or if that of Vienna is modified, as desired; the Ottoman Cabinet will not delay to sign one or other of those two drafts, and to send immediately an Ambassador Extraordinary, on condition of the evacuation of the Principalities. The Government of the Sublime Porte is further in expectation of receiving a solid guarantee on the part of the High Powers against all interference in future, and against the occupation from time to time of the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. And the object of the Ottoman Government in taking these precautions is, that of obviating everything that might revive a misunderstanding between the two Empires when once the Sublime Porte shall have renewed its relations with the Court of Russia.

The points of the Vienna draft relative to the affair of the holy places, and to the construction of a church, and of a hospital, at Jerusalem, have been completely adhered to by the Sublime Porte.

A copy of the Vienna note, containing likewise the modifications which the Imperial Government has judged it fitting to make, has been transmitted to your Excellency.

The Sublime Porte, with the intention of giving an additional proof of its very special consideration for the Powers who signed the Treaty of 1841, even although the draft which it had itself previously drawn up is naturally preferred by it, is ready to accept the Vienna draft with the modifications which it has

made; and it trusts that the Powers which have not ceased, from the commencement of the question, to recognise the rights of the Imperial Government, and to give proofs of their benevolence, will appreciate these modifications and act accordingly.

His Majesty the Sultan having ordered me to communicate the above to your Excellency, as well as to the other Representatives, your colleagues, I discharge that duty, requesting your Excellency, &c.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 71.

*Copy of the Vienna Projet de Note, as Modified by the Sublime Porte.*

[The Turkish modifications are in the foot note.]

SA Majesté le Sultan n'ayant rien de plus à cœur que de rétablir entre elle et Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie les relations de bon voisinage et de parfaite entente qui ont été malheureusement altérées par de récentes et pénibles complications, a pris soigneusement à tâche de rechercher les moyens d'effacer les traces de ce différend.

Un iradé suprême en date du \_\_\_\_\_ lui ayant fait connaître la décision Impériale, la Sublime Porte se félicite de pouvoir la communiquer à son Excellence M. le Comte de Nesselrode.

Si à toute époque les Empereurs de Russie ont témoigné leur active sollicitude pour *le maintien des immunités et privilèges de l'Eglise Orthodoxe Grecque dans l'Empire Ottoman*, les Sultans ne se sont jamais refusés à les consacrer\* de nouveau par des actes solennels qui attestaient de leur ancienne et constante bienveillance à l'égard de leurs sujets Chrétiens.

Sa Majesté le Sultan Abdul-Medjid, aujourd'hui régnant, animé des mêmes dispositions et voulant donner à Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie un témoignage personnel de son amitié la plus sincère, n'a écouté que sa confiance infinie dans les qualités éminentes de son auguste ami et allié, et a daigné prendre en sérieuse considération les représentations dont son Altesse le Prince de Menchikoff s'est rendu l'organe auprès de la Sublime Porte.

Le Soussigné a reçu en conséquence l'ordre de déclarer par la présente que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan restera fidèle à *la lettre et à l'esprit des stipulations des Traités de Kainardji et d'Andrinople, relatives à la protection du culte Chrétien*,† et que Sa Majesté regarde comme étant de son honneur de faire observer à tout jamais, et de préserver de toute atteinte, soit présentement, soit dans l'avenir, la jouissance des privilèges spirituels qui ont été accordés par les augustes aïeux de Sa Majesté à l'Eglise Orthodoxe de l'Orient, qui sont maintenus et confirmés par elle; et, en outre, à faire participer dans un esprit de haute équité le rit Grec aux avantages *concedés aux autres rites Chrétiens par Convention ou disposition particulière*.‡

Au reste, comme le firman Impérial qui vient d'être donné au patriarcat et au clergé Grec, et qui contient les confirmations de leurs privilèges spirituels, devra être regardé comme une nouvelle preuve de ses nobles sentiments, et comme, en outre, la proclamation de ce firman, qui donne toute sécurité, devra faire disparaître toute crainte à l'égard du rit qui est la religion de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie; je suis heureux d'être chargé du devoir de faire la présente notification.

(Translation.)

HIS Majesty the Sultan having nothing more at heart than to re-establish between himself and His Majesty the Emperor of Russia the relations of good neighbourhood and perfect understanding which have been unfortunately

*Le culte et l'Eglise Orthodoxe Grecque, les Sultans n'ont jamais cessé de veiller au maintien des immunités et privilèges qu'ils ont spontanément accordés à diverses reprises à ce culte et à cette Eglise dans l'Empire Ottoman, et de les consacrer.*

† *Aux stipulations du Traité de Kainardji confirmé par celui d'Andrinople, relatives à la protection par la Sublime Porte de la religion Chrétienne, et il est en outre chargé de faire connaître.*

‡ *Octroyés ou qui seraient octroyés aux autres communautés Chrétiennes, sujettes Ottomanes.*

impaired by recent and painful complications, has diligently endeavoured to discover the means of obliterating the traces of those differences.

A Sovereign iradé dated \_\_\_\_\_ having made known to it the Imperial decision, the Sublime Porte is happy to be able to communicate it to his Excellency Count Nesselrode.

If the Emperors of Russia have at all times evinced their active solicitude for the maintenance of the immunities and privileges of the orthodox Greek Church in the Ottoman Empire, the Sultans have never refused again to confirm them\* by solemn acts testifying their ancient and constant benevolence towards their Christian subjects.

His Majesty the Sultan Abdul-Medjid, now reigning, inspired with the same dispositions, and being desirous of giving to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia a personal proof of his most sincere friendship, has been solely influenced by his unbounded confidence in the eminent qualities of his august friend and ally, and has been pleased to take into serious consideration the representations which his Highness Prince Menchikoff conveyed to the Sublime Porte.

The Undersigned has in consequence received orders to declare by the present note that the Government of His Majesty the Sultan will remain faithful to the letter and to the spirit of the Treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople, relative to the protection of the Christian religion,† and that His Majesty considers himself bound in honour to cause to be observed for ever, and to preserve from all prejudice either now or hereafter, the enjoyment of the spiritual privileges which have been granted by His Majesty's august ancestors to the orthodox Eastern Church, which are maintained and confirmed by him; and moreover, in a spirit of exalted equity, to cause the Greek rite to share in the advantages granted to the other Christian rites by Convention or special arrangement.‡

Furthermore, as the Imperial firman which has just been granted to the Greek Patriarch and clergy, and which contains the confirmation of their spiritual privileges, ought to be looked upon as a fresh proof of these noble sentiments, and as besides the proclamation of this firman which affords all security ought to dispel for ever every apprehension in regard to the rite which is the religion of His Majesty the Emperor, I am happy to be charged with the duty of making the present notification.

## No. 72.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 31.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, August 20, 1853.*

AGREEABLY to the instruction contained in your Lordship's despatch of the 28th ultimo, I have made inquiries as to the causes which delayed the completion of that letter, which, under the name of "fusion," was to have been composed by Reshid Pasha.

Having addressed my inquiry to the Pasha himself, his Highness informed me that sundry incidents had retarded the composition; that while it was among the papers submitted to the Sultan, the invasion of the Principalities became known, and called away his attention to the Protest.

On looking back to the dates of that period, I perceive that M. Bruck's suggestion was made about the 22nd of June, and submitted to the Sultan on the following day.

How long it remained with the Sultan I cannot say, but it appears that Reshid Pasha was occupied with his "fusion" on the 29th. The suggestion having been approved by the Council, was before the Sultan on the 4th of

\* The religion and Orthodox Greek Church, the Sultans have never ceased to provide for the maintenance of the privileges and immunities which at different times they have spontaneously granted to that religion and to that church in the Ottoman Empire, and to confirm them.

† To the stipulations of the Treaty of Kainardji, confirmed by that of Adrianople, relative to the protection by the Sublime Porte of the Christian religion, and he is moreover charged to make known.

‡ Granted, or which might be granted, to the other Christian communities, Ottoman subjects.

July, and the festival of Bayram, which occupies three or four days, followed on the 6th, a day before the intelligence arrived of the Russians having crossed the Pruth and entered the Province of Moldavia. On the same day Reshid Pasha was dismissed, and a ministerial crisis, which occupied three days, succeeded.

On the whole, my Lord, it may be stated with some degree of confidence, that the delay and final relinquishment of the "fusion," however the "suggestion" may have been approved by the Sultan, are traceable more or less to all the successive causes just mentioned. The "fusion" was finally dropped in consequence of the act of protestation taking its place.

## No. 73.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 31.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, August 20, 1853.*

THOUGH I scrupulously abstained from expressing any private opinion on the merits of Count Buol's note while it was under consideration at the Porte, I think it incumbent on me to state frankly to your Lordship that the decision of the Council has in no degree surprised me. In making this avowal I have exclusively in view those passages of the note to which the Porte objects. It really appears to me, with all deference to your Lordship's superior judgment, that the first two of the objectionable passages could hardly stand as they are without exposing the Porte to inferences not borne out by facts, and eventually to pretensions that it would be equally inconvenient, if not dangerous, to admit or to resist.

With respect to the third amendment, its adoption would seem indispensable, unless it be intended to give Russia the full enjoyment of that right of interference which is secured to Austria by her Treaties with the Porte, and in particular by that of Sistova. Such a concession when practically claimed by Russia, would leave her nothing to desire as to the means of exercising a powerful influence on all the concerns of the Greek clergy, and interfering even on behalf of the Greek laity subjects of the Porte. I have the honour to inclose herewith, in copy, the Article of the above-mentioned Treaty to which I particularly refer.\* Confined to Austria, the privilege in question may be exercised with little inconvenience to the Porte; but in the hands of Russia, applicable to twelve millions of the Sultan's tributary subjects, the same right becomes a natural object of suspicion and well-founded apprehension.

• It cannot be necessary for me to trouble your Lordship further on this subject, important and delicate as it is. I am convinced that Her Majesty's Government will give it their fullest consideration, in a spirit of perfect fairness to all parties; and I venture to hope that the result of a further investigation of its merits will be favourable to the just interests and expectations of the Porte.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

## No. 74.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 31.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, August 20, 1853.*

I INCLOSE herewith in copy, for your Lordship's information, a letter addressed by his Excellency Prince Gortchakoff to Omar Pasha.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 74.

*Prince Gortchakoff to Omar Pasha.*

M. le Séraskier,

*Bucharest, le 2<sup>e</sup> Août, 1853.*

EN réponse à la lettre que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser en date du 10 Août, n. s., j'ai l'honneur de lui donner l'information suivante :

Au moment de franchir les frontières des provinces Danubiennes, je me suis fait un devoir, par la volonté de mon Auguste Maître, de communiquer à M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Sublime Porte que les ordres que je remplissais en occupant militairement les Principautés, me prescrivaient de m'abstenir de tout mouvement hostile et agressif contre les troupes et les garnisons Ottomanes stationnées au-delà du Danube, et que c'était au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan à juger s'il devait adresser à ses commandants militaires les mêmes ordres afin d'éviter toute collision regrettable qu'une démonstration offensive de leur part, en deçà du Danube, amènerait nécessairement entre nos forces respectives.

A la suite de mon entrée dans les Principautés j'ai donné l'ordre de placer des chaloupes canonnières pour défendre les ports de Galatz et de Braïla, mesure d'autant plus motivée que j'avais été informé qu'ils étaient menacés d'une incursion à main armée. Quant à des pontoons, j'ai l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que je n'en ai pas fait venir ni à Galatz ni à Braïla.

La réponse de M. le Ministre parvint entre mes mains au moment où ces chaloupes canonnières étaient déjà sur place. Son Excellence me mandait dans sa lettre que des instructions avaient été données aux commandants des troupes Ottomanes qu'ils devaient s'abstenir de tout acte d'hostilité tant qu'il n'y aura aucune espèce d'invasion de la rive gauche à la rive droite. Plus loin, M. le Ministre ajoutait que, si des bâtiments de guerre Russes remontaient au-delà de l'embouchure du Pruth, un tel acte constituerait une violation des confins riverains que la Sublime Porte ne pourra pas permettre, possédant des places fortes plus hautes que le confluent des deux fleuves.

Je ne saurais partager l'opinion de son Excellence Reshid Pasha. L'occupation des Principautés, amenée par des circonstances exceptionnelles, implique nécessairement la faculté d'en garder les ports et les côtes, et une garde fluviale est indispensablement inhérente à l'occupation des ports situés sur le même fleuve. Les chaloupes qui stationnent près de Galatz et de Braïla y sont placées dans un but évidemment défensif. Je me crois donc obligé de les laisser à leur poste et de ne pas permettre que les communications fluviales, nécessaires pour les approvisionner, soient entravées. Mais pour éviter toute cause de conflit ou de méentendu entre les forces des deux pays, j'ai l'honneur de prévenir votre Excellence que nos bâtiments de guerre ne s'approchent pas du rayon des fortresses Turques au-dessus de Braïla, et de lui réitérer l'assurance que conformément aux ordres précités de Sa Majesté l'Empereur mon maître, je m'abstiendrai de tout mouvement agressif au-delà du Danube.

Je suis convaincu que les lumières et l'expérience militaire de votre Excellence lui feront apprécier la justesse des considérations que je viens d'exposer, et que, de son côté aussi, elle prendra les mesures nécessaires pour qu'il n'arrive pas de conflit, qui serait contraire aux intentions des deux hautes Cours.

Au moment de terminer la présente lettre, je viens de recevoir le rapport que des soldats irréguliers de la garnison de Marzin ont traversé le Danube avec cinq barques et sont venus faucher du foin sur le territoire Valaque, au-dedans de la ligne sanitaire. Je crois devoir porter ce fait à la connaissance de votre Excellence, convaincu qu'elle voudra bien donner des ordres pour que de pareils actes, inadmissibles dans les conditions où nous nous trouvons, ne se renouvellent pas.

Je vous prie, &amp;c.

L'Aide-de-Camp Général,  
(Signé) PRINCE GORTCHAKOFF.

(Translation.)

M. le Seraskier,

*Bucharest, August 14, 1853.*

IN reply to the letter which your Excellency had the goodness to address to me on the 10th instant, *n. s.*, I have the honour to convey to you the following information.

At the moment of crossing the frontiers of the Danubian Provinces, I made it my duty, according to the will of my august master, to communicate to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sublime Porte that the orders which I was executing by occupying militarily the Principalities, enjoined me to abstain from any hostile or aggressive movement against the Ottoman troops and garrisons stationed beyond the Danube; and that it was for the Government of His Majesty the Sultan to judge whether it would address the same orders to its military commanders, in order to avoid any lamentable collision which an offensive demonstration on their part on this side of the Danube would necessarily bring on between our respective forces.

Subsequently to my entrance into the Principalities, I directed gun-boats to be stationed for the protection of Galatz and Ibraila,—a measure which was the more justifiable inasmuch as I had been informed that they were threatened with a hostile attack. As regards pontoons, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that I have not brought any to Galatz or to Ibraila.

The Minister's reply reached me at the time these gun-boats were already in their station. His Excellency informed me in his letter that instructions had been given to the commanders of the Ottoman troops to abstain from any act of hostility so long as no kind of incursion was made from the left on the right bank. Further, the Minister added, that if the Russian vessels of war ascended beyond the mouth of the Pruth, such a proceeding would constitute a violation of the river boundaries, which the Sublime Porte, being possessed of fortresses higher up than the confluence of the two rivers, could not allow.

I cannot share his Excellency Reshid Pasha's opinion. The occupation of the Principalities, which has been brought about by exceptional circumstances, necessarily involves the power of keeping guard over their ports and coasts, and a river-guard is indispensably connected with the occupation of the ports situated on the same river. The gun-boats stationed at Galatz and Ibraila are placed there with a clearly defensive object. I therefore feel myself obliged to leave them in their station, and not to allow the communications by the river, which are necessary in order to supply them with provisions, to be interrupted. But in order to avoid any cause of conflict or misunderstanding between the forces of the two countries, I have the honour to apprise your Excellency that our vessels of war will not approach the limits of the Turkish fortresses above Ibraila; and to repeat to you the assurance that, in conformity with the above-mentioned orders of His Majesty the Emperor my master, I will abstain from any aggressive movement beyond the Danube.

I am convinced that your Excellency's intelligence and military experience will cause you to appreciate the justness of the considerations which I have set forth, and that on your side also you will adopt the necessary measures to prevent the occurrence of any conflict which would be contrary to the intentions of the two High Courts.

While concluding my present letter, I have received a report that some irregulars belonging to the garrison of Marzin have crossed the Danube with five boats, in order to cut hay on the Wallachian territory within the sanitary line. I think it right to communicate this fact to your Excellency, being satisfied that you will have the goodness to give orders that such proceedings, which cannot be permitted under existing circumstances, may not occur again.

I request, &c.

(Signed)

PRINCE GORTCHAKOFF.

## No. 75.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 31.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, August 20, 1853.*

THE Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia, though offering laboured excuses to the Porte, are in fact contumacious, and have hitherto held back from the execution of its orders to quit the Principalities.

Mr. Colquhoun and his French colleague have lowered their respective flags. Mr. Gardner has suspended the execution of my instructions in that respect, although M. Testa, the French Consul at Jassy, has acted upon his Ambassador's instructions and ceased to hoist his colours.

It is the Porte's intention to repeat its commands to the Hospodars on pain of dismissal.

I purpose to direct Mr. Gardner to execute without farther delay the instructions which he has already received from me.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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## No. 76.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received August 31.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, August 30, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS regrets the introduction of any modifications into the Vienna note; but he certainly considers them to be alterations for the better, and hopes that the Russian Government will subscribe to them. He thinks the tone of the note addressed to the Representatives of the Four Powers moderate; and as the promise of the evacuation of the Principalities, and not the immediate reality, appears to be asked for, and as the Four Powers, and not Russia, are applied to for guarantees for the future, he is inclined to think that these points may be arranged satisfactorily if Russia does not demur to the proposed modifications of the note.

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## No. 77.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 1.)*

My Lord,

*Vienna, August 28, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour of forwarding a despatch\* which I have received, under flying-seal, from Lord Stratford, with the request that it should be transmitted to your Lordship with the utmost practicable expedition.

This despatch is confirmatory of the telegraphic despatches which I forwarded on the 25th instant. I waited upon Count Buol to inquire the impression made upon him by these communications, and the measures he intended to take upon them. Count Buol stated that he should write by messenger this day to St. Petersburg, charging Baron Lebzeltern to state to Count Nesselrode that he greatly lamented the modifications which the Porte had thought it right to introduce in the Vienna note, as it had originally been forwarded to Constantinople with the approval of the Four Governments; but that he strongly recommended their adoption as a means, without any loss of dignity to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, of bringing these unfortunate differences to a close. Count Buol would also remark, that the Porte having required an assurance as to the evacuation of the Principalities, he would leave it to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg to state what answer he was to return; that, knowing that it was the intention of the Emperor that these Principalities should be evacuated, he could only express his anxious desire that the earliest period for its commencement should be named, so that he might make

that communication both to the Porte and to the other allied Governments, with the view of preparing the execution of this most desirable object.

Count Buol stated, with respect to the declaration in the note of Reshid Pasha: "Que la Sublime Porte attend encore une garantie de la part des Hautes Puissances contre toute ingérence de," &c.; that as this did not refer to the Russian Government, but to the allies in general, he should not bring it forward officially at St. Petersburg; that it was a question rather to be treated after the pressing difficulties of the present moment should be arranged; and as it was not made by the Porte a condition of that settlement, he should abstain from making any further comments with regard to it.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 78.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 1, 1853.*

HER Majesty's Government earnestly hope that the modifications proposed by the Porte of the note sent from Vienna may receive the assent of the Emperor of Russia.

His Imperial Majesty accepted the note upon condition that no change in it should be made at Constantinople, and he is, therefore, perfectly free to reject the modifications. But Her Majesty's Government are confident that the Emperor, animated by a spirit of justice, will admit that the Turkish Government have a right to express their opinion upon the note they are required to sign, and their scrupulous attention to forms is no small proof that they recognize the binding character of the engagement they are about to contract, while there can be no doubt that the note as amended will effectually secure the maintenance of existing Treaties and of the *status quo* in religious matters which Russia has throughout declared to be the objects she had in view.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

P.S.—In the event of the modifications not being accepted, you will endeavour clearly to ascertain from Count Nesselrode the reasons of their rejection.

No. 79.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 2.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, August 26, 1853.*

THE Chancellor alluded to the orders sent by the Sultan to the Hospodars to withdraw from the Principalities, and stated that news had been received of their having declined to obey the summons. I replied that in that case I took for granted that they would be recalled by the Porte.

Count Nesselrode observed that this could hardly be, inasmuch as, without the consent of Russia, the removal of the Hospodars would not be legal.

I begged to remark in return that a very anomalous state of things had been created in the Principalities, and that if the removal of the Hospodars by Turkey constituted an illegality, that an illegality at least as striking was involved in their occupation by a Russian army.

The Chancellor could not admit that the Russian Government had acted illegally or wrongfully, and would repeat that the removal of the Hospodars could not be valid without the Emperor's consent, which certainly would not be given; at the same time he did not apprehend that in the event of the note being signed by the Porte this incident would give rise to any serious complication.

No. 80.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 3.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, September 2, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS stated to me yesterday, that upon the receipt of the intelligence from Constantinople that the Porte had refused to accept the Vienna note, he had addressed a short despatch to M. de la Cour, and another to General Casteljacob. The purport of the former was to express the disappointment with which the Emperor had learned the little attention paid by the Sultan's Ministers to the advice of His Majesty's allies, and to prescribe to M. de la Cour to use all his efforts to induce the Porte to rescind its present decision. The purport of the latter was to desire General Casteljacob to assure Count Nesselrode of the dissatisfaction (*déplaisir*) with which the news from Constantinople had been received at Paris, and the hope of the French Government, that, as the modifications desired by the Porte did not alter the sense of the original note, they would be admitted by the Emperor of Russia.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 81.

*M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Count Walewski.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Walewski, September 3, 1853.)*

M. le Comte,

*Paris, le 1 Septembre, 1853.*

JE vous ai déjà fait connaître sommairement l'opinion du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale sur la complication inattendue que les résolutions de la Porte ont fait naître dans un débat que nous pouvions croire arrivé à son terme.

Ce n'est pas, du reste, à ce point, quelle que soit son importance, que s'appliquent nos préoccupations les plus immédiates. La position de nos escadres à Besica devient, chaque jour, plus embarrassante, et le moment approche où elles devront quitter ce mouillage, si nous ne voulons pas compromettre leur sûreté. Je n'ai pas à exposer de nouveau les raisons qui ne nous permettent point de les rappeler à Toulon et à Malte—un mouvement en arrière est moralement impossible aujourd'hui; et néanmoins, il est indispensable de chercher, pour nos vaisseaux, un abri contre la mauvaise saison. L'Empereur pense donc que nous ne devons pas tarder davantage à demander à la Porte que nos forces navales, sans dépasser les châteaux, jettent l'ancre à l'entrée des Dardanelles de façon à être protégées contre les vents du Nord qui, à partir de la fin de Septembre, règnent avec violence en dehors du Détroit. En même temps, nous ferions clairement savoir à St. Pétersbourg que le parti auquel nous nous serions arrêtés, nous a été dicté non par le désir d'encourager la Porte dans un refus que nous désapprouvons, mais par des considérations purement nautiques; et nous nous engagerions à nous retirer aussitôt que l'ordre d'évacuer les provinces Danubiennes aurait été donné.

Sa Majesté, profondément convaincu de l'urgence d'une pareille mesure, et ayant à cœur de ne pas encourir la responsabilité des graves conséquences que pourrait avoir, pour nos escadres, un manque de prévoyance ou d'opportune résolution dans les circonstances actuelles, vous charge de recommander instamment à l'attention du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique le contenu de cette dépêche, dont vous voudrez bien laisser copie à Lord Clarendon.

Agréez, &amp;c.

(Signé) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

(Translation.)

M. le Comte,

*Paris, September 1, 1853.*

I HAVE already apprised you briefly of the opinion of His Imperial Majesty's Government in regard to the unlooked-for complication to which the Porte's resolutions have given rise in a discussion which we might have supposed to have reached its conclusion.

It is not, however, to this point, however important it may be, that our more immediate solicitude applies. The position of our squadrons at Besika daily becomes more embarrassing, and the time is approaching at which they must quit that anchorage if we do not wish to compromise their safety. It is not necessary for me again to set forth the reasons which will not admit of our recalling them to Toulon or to Malta—a retrograde movement is at the present time morally impossible; and nevertheless it is necessary to look for a shelter for our vessels against the bad season. The Emperor is therefore of opinion that we should no longer delay asking the Porte that our naval forces, without passing the castles, may anchor at the entrance of the Dardanelles so as to be protected from the north winds, which after the end of September prevail with violence outside the Strait. At the same time we should make it clearly known at St. Petersburg, that the course which we had adopted was prescribed to us not by the desire of encouraging the Porte in a refusal of which we disapprove, but by merely nautical considerations; and we should undertake to withdraw immediately that the order to evacuate the Danubian Provinces should have been given.

His Majesty, deeply convinced of the necessity of such a measure, and having at heart not to incur the responsibility of the serious consequences which want of foresight or of seasonable determination might entail upon our squadrons under existing circumstances, directs you earnestly to recommend to the attention of Her Britannic Majesty's Government the contents of this despatch, of which you will have the goodness to leave a copy with Lord Clarendon.

Receive, &c.

(Signed) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

No. 82.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 6.)*

(Extract.)

*Berlin, September 3, 1853.*

IN the course of conversation with Baron Manteuffel this evening, his Excellency said, that he had directed General Rochow to support the amendments of the note as proposed at Constantinople.

No. 83.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, September 6, 1853.*

ON the 3rd instant, Count Walewski placed in my hands the inclosed copy of a despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys.\*

I told his Excellency that the Earl of Aberdeen, Lord John Russell, and Viscount Palmerston, were then in London, and that I would immediately consult them upon the important subject to which the despatch refers.

On the following day I saw Count Walewski and informed him that my three colleagues and myself were unanimously of opinion that any movement of the fleets that should have the character of a retreat, or of abandoning the policy which France and England had been engaged in upholding, was not for a moment to be thought of; but that the future course of the two Governments must in a great measure depend upon that of the Emperor of Russia and upon his reasons for declining, if he does not accept, the modifications proposed by the Porte; and we therefore thought it advisable to come to no final decision respecting the fleets until the answer from St. Petersburg, which must arrive in the course of this week, had been received. Moreover, there did not appear to be any urgent necessity for a decision, as we had every reason to believe that throughout the month of September the fleets would be perfectly safe at their present anchorage.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, September 7, 1853.*

IT appears from a despatch from Count Nesselrode to the Russian Minister at Vienna, dated the 22nd August, which has been shown to me by Count Colloredo, that subsequently to the acceptance by Russia of the Vienna note, Baron Lebzeltern was instructed to inquire of Count Nesselrode what steps would be taken for the evacuation of the Principalities in the event of the Porte's agreeing to the note without alteration.

The reply of the Russian Government seems to have been a reference to the terms of the Circular of <sup>June 20</sup><sub>July 2</sub>, and more particularly to those of the Manifesto, as establishing clearly the temporary character of the occupation, and the intention to bring it to a close as soon as the Porte signed the note which Russia had stated she looked upon as a sufficient satisfaction; and as soon as that note should be delivered at St. Petersburg by a Turkish Ambassador, orders would be immediately issued for the return of the Russian troops within their own frontier.

This being the case the Emperor was somewhat surprised and grieved at the question which had been put to him; but he was led to suppose that Austria shared the doubts which had been stated in the British Parliament, that independently of the satisfaction required of the Porte, Russia required, as the condition of the evacuation of the Principalities, the previous withdrawal of the English and French squadrons.

Russia disclaimed any such interpretation of the circular. She never required that the squadrons should quit their position before the Russian troops quitted theirs; what she meant was, that, in the existing circumstances, the presence of the two squadrons had the appearance of menace and pressure directed towards Russia, and so long as that menace and pressure lasted, Russia could not abandon her military position. But now that the Maritime Powers, instead of employing their squadrons to encourage the resistance of the Porte, were engaged in advocating at Constantinople the plan of arrangement proposed at Vienna, and thereby obtaining the satisfaction due to Russia, the case is different; and if, at the same time, the required satisfaction is offered by the Porte, Russia would no longer have any reason for maintaining the position which she had taken up, and she conceived that the Powers would, on their side, no longer find it necessary to maintain theirs, after the reasons which had induced them to take it up had ceased to exist. And if the Powers, like Russia, have no intention of gratuitously prolonging the existing crisis, there was nothing to prevent the simultaneous withdrawal of their squadrons and of the Russian troops being the natural result of the settlement of the questions between Russia and the Porte, and being coincident in point of time without any sacrifice of honour on either side.

If such is the solution desired by Austria, Russia will give her an assurance to that effect, which she may make use of towards the Maritime Powers; and Russia repeats that she has no intention to raise, with reference to the withdrawal of the squadrons, any discussion of principle; and that, as far as she is concerned, if the note as drawn up at Vienna is delivered without alteration at St. Petersburg by a special Ambassador, the immediate evacuation of the Principalities will be decided.

Count Colloredo having asked me what answer I wished him to give to this despatch, I said that the renewed pledge to evacuate the Principalities, given by Russia, was satisfactory, and in the name of Her Majesty's Government I begged to thank Count Buol for having obtained it; but I must then, as on previous occasions, decline entering into any discussion respecting the withdrawal of the fleets. The Austrian Government, however, could hardly doubt that they would not remain at Besika Bay a moment longer than was necessary.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 85.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, September 7, 1853.*

COUNT COLLOREDO has communicated to me a despatch from Count Buol, dated August 31, stating that on the 28th of that month he had sent to Baron Lebzeltern the modifications which the Porte desired to have made in the note which it was proposed from Vienna that the Porte should address to Russia, with instructions to express the hope that they would be considered by the Emperor of Russia as not of sufficient importance to induce him to change his pacific intentions. Count Buol remarked to Count Colloredo upon the absence in the note returned from Constantinople of the concluding passage of the Vienna note; and inferring from thence that those passages are not objected to, he has inserted them in the amended copy which he has sent to St. Petersburg.

Baron Lebzeltern, it appears, is further instructed to request the Russian Government to enable the Cabinet of Vienna to give assurances to the Porte in regard to the evacuation of the Principalities.

Count Buol then goes on to observe, with reference to the expectation of the Porte to receive from the Powers a guarantee against any future interference on the part of Russia in its affairs, and against the eventual occupation of the Principalities, that the Internuncio had been instructed to declare to the Porte that Austria did not look upon the expression of this expectation as a condition on the realization of which the settlement of the existing differences with Russia was to depend; and that, for her part, Austria could not enter into any engagement such as the Porte seemed to contemplate. Austria considered that the Porte would find its best security against such contingencies in maintaining relations of friendship and confidence with all the Powers of Europe, and in the wisdom and efficaciousness of the measures which it might adopt for the improvement of its internal administration, and for the amelioration of the condition of its Christian subjects; and that Austria was of opinion that such a guarantee from the Powers as the Porte seemed to require would amount to a humiliating avowal of weakness, and a virtual sacrifice of its independence.

At all events, Count Buol observes, the question thus raised by the Porte ought not to be mixed up with that now pending; but appertaining, as it does, to the future, it should be entertained as one bearing on the general interests of Europe, and not exclusively and singly on those of the Ottoman Empire.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 86.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 9.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, August 24, 1853.*

WITH the despatches which were forwarded from here by the "Caradoc," I sent your Lordship in copy a letter addressed by Prince Gortchakoff to the Commander-in-chief of the army in Bulgaria.

The reasons alleged by Prince Gortchakoff for insisting on a right to violate the river Convention are as futile as they are illegal. He claims to set aside the Treaty in virtue of his military occupation of the Principalities, declared to have no object but that of giving Russia a pledge for the acceptance of Prince Menchikoff's note, and provisionally respected *de facto* by the Porte. He rests this pretension on the necessity of sending armed vessels up the river to obtain provisions for those which he has stationed in the Turkish waters for the protection of Ibraila and Galata, places which, under the existing circumstances, require no protection at all. He expects, on the other hand, that the Turkish authorities shall rely upon his assurance for the safety of their fortresses above the confluence of the two rivers; and he leaves out of view the facility with which his ostensible object of provisioning the armed Russian vessels near Galatz and Ibraila can be accomplished by means of mercantile vessels unarmed.

## No. 87.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 9.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, August 26, 1853.*

I AVAIL myself of this opportunity to forward the draft inclosed herewith of a letter prepared for Omar Pasha to address to Prince Gortchakoff.

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Inclosure in No. 87.

*Draft of Note to be addressed by Omar Pasha to Prince Gortchakoff.*

DANS la réponse que je viens de recevoir de votre Excellence, en date du <sup>se trouve la promesse que les bâtiments qui sont actuellement</sup> dans les ports de Galatz et d'Ibraila, ne seront pas envoyés dans le rayon des forteresses de la Sublime Porte. Il y est en même temps question de la nécessité que des bâtiments remontent plus haut que le confluent du Pruth avec le Danube afin de transporter des vivres.

Il est clair que tant que ces bâtiments qui se trouvent dans les ports en question n'iront pas plus haut qu'Ibraila, et qu'ils voudront s'en retourner à l'endroit d'où ils sont venus, l'on n'aura rien à leur objecter.

Comme le transport de vivres n'est pas exclusivement réservé aux bâtiments de guerre, mais qu'au contraire c'est par les bâtiments de commerce qu'il devrait s'effectuer, je me vois dispensé d'adhérer à vos considérations.

Il est donc certain, comme j'ai déjà eu l'honneur de vous le déclarer précédemment, que si vos bâtiments de guerre dépassaient de nouveau l'endroit désigné par le Traité, je me trouverais contraint d'exécuter mes instructions à l'égard de la prohibition, et c'est pour obvier à tout malentendu que je me crois en devoir de répéter ici cette circonstance.

Je saisis, &c.

(Translation.)

IT is promised in the answer which I have received from your Excellency, under date <sup>that the vessels now in the ports of Galata and Ibraila,</sup> shall not be sent within the limits of the fortresses of the Sublime Porte. It is at the same time stated, that it is necessary for the vessels to proceed higher than the confluence of the Pruth with the Danube for the transport of provisions.

It is clear that no objection will be offered so long as the vessels at present in the ports in question shall not proceed higher than Ibraila, and desire to return thencefrom to the places from whence they came.

As the transport of provisions is not exclusively reserved for ships of war, but as on the contrary it might be effected by merchant-ships, I am relieved from the necessity of concurring in the views which you have set forth.

It is certain, then, as I have already had the honour of stating to you previously, that if your vessels of war should again pass the spot designated by Treaty, I should be compelled to execute my instructions as regards the prohibition; and it is in order to avoid any misunderstanding that I think it right to mention this circumstance.

I avail, &c.

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No. 88.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, September 10, 1853.*

HER Majesty's Government have had under their serious consideration the note addressed by Reshid Pasha to the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople on the 19th of August, explaining the modifications proposed by the Porte to the project of note sent from Vienna.

Reshid Pasha appears to complain that the Porte was not consulted ; and have to observe that the course previously pursued by the Porte, when a proposal for settlement was submitted to it, appeared to render subsequent consultation inexpedient, as leading only to further loss of time. For it must be borne in mind, that on the 22nd of June the Internuncio, in pursuance of instructions given to him by Count Buol in anticipation of the possible refusal of the Porte to comply with the requisition contained in Count Nesselrode's letter to Reshid Pasha of the 31st of May, suggested to the Porte again to examine Prince Menchikoff's proposed note, and to compare it with that which Reshid Pasha was himself prepared to address to the Prince previously to his departure from Constantinople ; and if the Porte was inclined to propose any alteration in the Russian draft which it could accept itself, and which was likely to be accepted by Russia, the Internuncio offered to convey to his Government the proposals of the Porte as the basis of its further mediation, and with a view to preparing a favourable reception for the Ambassador whom the Porte intended to send to St. Petersburg.

Upon this suggestion being made known to your Excellency and to your colleagues of France and Prussia, by Reshid Pasha and also by the Internuncio, you assembled the Representatives of the Four Powers at your house, and they concurred in agreeing to suggest to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to frame a draft of note which should combine Prince Menchikoff's draft and that of Reshid Pasha, in the hope that a note might be drawn up which should be at once acceptable to Russia, and should at the same time not trench upon the principle which the Porte considered essential for the maintenance of its sovereign rights.

This suggestion was laid before the Sultan ; and, as stated in your Excellency's despatch of the 9th of July, after an unexplained delay of several days, returned to Reshid Pasha with His Majesty's sanction ; but no subsequent communication was made either to your Excellency, or, as far as you knew, to your colleagues, on the subject.

Her Majesty's Government thought it most unfortunate, as well as ungracious towards the Austrian Government, that this opportunity for effecting an arrangement should thus, and without even a reason for it being assigned, have been neglected ; but it was not unnatural for the Austrian Government to suppose that a repetition of the request would be useless ; and considering that the occupation of the Principalities was fraught with danger, not to Turkey alone, but to the peace of Europe, Count Buol thought it advisable to call together the Representatives of England, France, and Prussia, and with their concurrence to prepare a note that might prove acceptable both to Russia and to the Porte.

With this object they took the note which had been drawn up by the French Government, and which having been at one time communicated by the French Minister at St. Petersburg to Count Nesselrode, had been favourably received ; and Her Majesty's Government and the French Government were consulted as to adopting this note with certain modifications that it seemed to require ; and both Governments replied that, without seeing the modifications, they could give no assent ; but upon their being transmitted and carefully considered, they appeared to be unobjectionable, and were approved, although afterwards an alteration was made by Her Majesty's Government more effectually to guard the interests of Turkey. And it is hardly necessary to add, that if the English and French Governments had not concurred in thinking that those interests were protected, and that the principle for which we had all along been contending was maintained, neither Government would have assented to the note.

When things had thus far advanced the Turkish project arrived at Vienna. It consisted of the protest against the occupation of the Principalities, inclosed in a note from Reshid Pasha to Count Nesselrode, and to be followed by another note less definite in its meaning than that which he had been ready to address to Prince Menchikoff. Such a proposal could not have led to the renewal of diplomatic relations between the two countries—it was sure to be declined by Russia ; the forwarding it to St. Petersburg could only have been productive of further loss of time—a consideration of the utmost importance ; and a preference was therefore unanimously given to the note which in substance had been well received at St. Petersburg, and which there was every reason to expect

would meet the views of the Turkish Government. This project was received at Constantinople on the 9th ultimo; but it was not until the 19th that the note was accepted with modifications.

Her Majesty's Government are far from denying that these modifications are in themselves unobjectionable; but they do not consider them of that vital importance, nor that they offer such additional security to Turkey, as to counter-balance the risks to which the Ottoman Empire is exposed by further postponing the settlement of this unfortunate question.

The first objection taken by the Porte is to the following paragraph: "*Si à toute époque les Empereurs de Russie ont témoigné leur active sollicitude pour le maintien des immunités et privilèges de l'Eglise Grecque Orthodoxe dans l'Empire Ottoman, les Sultans ne se sont jamais refusés à les consacrer de nouveau par des Actes solennels.*"

Now it appears to be natural that the Emperors of Russia should exhibit solicitude for those who profess their religion, and are living under Mahomedan rule; but Her Majesty's Government cannot consider that by the paragraph in question this solicitude shown in times past can be taken to have imposed any obligation, or to imply that the acts of the Sultans in favour of the Greek Church were not voluntary and spontaneous; and upon no construction of this passage could Russia found any future claim to require of the Sultan to perform such acts. The passage is simply historical, and may be true or false; but Russia establishes no right, and Turkey takes no engagement by the recital. The Great Powers of Europe have at different times manifested their active solicitude for the Christian subjects of the Porte; none more frequently and energetically than England. They have done so in behalf of suffering humanity and outraged religion; and their just remonstrances have met with more or less success. But the power of the Sultan not to listen to them has never been questioned; and the right of Christian Powers thus to interfere may again and again be exercised without prejudice to his independence. Can there be any doubt that the firmans which the Sultan of his own free will lately issued, were in consequence of the anxiety for his Christian subjects felt by his Christian allies; or that those Christian subjects will not obtain some alleviation of the sufferings and injustice to which they are exposed, by the powerful protests which your Excellency a short time ago felt yourself compelled to address to the Porte? In listening to such remonstrances and in acting upon them, the Porte acquires respect and esteem, but it parts with no right and contracts no engagement.

Reshid Pasha says, with reference to the paragraph, that no one would consent to draw down upon himself the reproaches and the blame of his contemporaries, as well as posterity, by admitting the establishment of a state of things as injurious for the present as the future; or to put in writing words that could detract from the glory of institutions that the Ottoman Emperors have founded by a spontaneous movement of their personal generosity and innate clemency. But the paragraph neither warrants any such interpretation, nor calls for any such censure; and if it did, it would be as applicable to Great Britain, to France, and to Austria, as to Russia.

In considering the original draft of the note, the special attention of Her Majesty's Government was directed to the Treaty of Kainardji, for the purpose of securing that the Porte should be called upon to do no more with respect to religious privileges than that to which Reshid Pasha says it is ready to consent, namely, to express "*des assurances propres à faire disparaître les doutes mis en avant par le Gouvernement de Russie, et qui ont formé le sujet des discussions.*"

But the paragraph states "*que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan restera fidèle à la lettre et à l'esprit des stipulations des Traités de Kainardji et d'Andrinople relatives à la protection du culte Chrétien.*"

To this there can be no objection, because Reshid Pasha says, "*Comme personne ne saurait nier que ce Traité existe, et qu'il est confirmé par celui d'Andrinople, il est de toute évidence que les dispositions précises en seront fidèlement observées.*"

The second part of the paragraph, however, is in no way dependent on the first, but on the contrary is disconnected from it. It does not say that as a consequence of the Treaty, the Sultan "*will regard,*" &c., but the word "*and*" is expressly introduced to guard against such a consequence being assumed. The

true reading, therefore, is, "the Sultan will remain faithful to the Treaties." His Majesty also "regarde comme étant de son honneur de faire observer à tout jamais et de préserver de toute atteinte, soit présentement, soit dans l'avenir, la jouissance des privilèges spirituels qui ont été accordés par les augustes aïeux de Sa Majesté à l'Eglise Orthodoxe de l'Orient, et sont maintenus et confirmés par elle."

Now if any part of this paragraph can justify the fears entertained by Reshid Pasha of giving "au Gouvernement de Russie des motifs de prétendre à exercer un droit de surveillance et d'immiscion dans de pareilles matières," it assuredly is not the first passage nor its supposed connexion with the second; but it is the second itself, by which the Sultan makes no ordinary engagement, but pledges his honour to maintain for ever inviolate all the privileges enjoyed by the Greek Church; and this second passage is taken from the note which Reshid Pasha was prepared to address to Prince Menchikoff.

With respect to the third paragraph objected to by the Porte, the view of Her Majesty's Government was precisely that which is taken in the note of Reshid Pasha, namely, "On ne saurait douter que le Gouvernement Impérial n'hésitera pas à faire participer le rit Grec non seulement aux avantages qu'il a de sa propre volonté accordés aux autres communions de la religion Chrétienne professées par les communautés ses sujettes, mais aussi à ceux qu'il pourrait leur octroyer à l'avenir."

The passage which follows the words "en outre" was meant to have a prospective sense, and the words "rits Chrétiens" were understood to apply to subjects of the Porte.

It would be simply absurd to suppose that the idea ever could have been contemplated of extending to several millions of the subjects of the Porte religious privileges granted at different times to the subjects of other Powers residing within the Ottoman territory. Her Majesty's Government had not, nor have they now upon reconsideration, any fear that this passage could be interpreted in the sense attributed to it by Reshid Pasha; nor do they conceive that there is really any substantial difference between the passage in the Vienna note and the modification proposed by the Porte, which could leave room for misunderstanding hereafter.

Such being the opinions of Her Majesty's Government, they cannot but regret the course that has been pursued at Constantinople. They do not question the right, or the propriety, on the part of the Turkish Government, to examine closely the note that was proposed for their adoption; but if it had been signed subject to any reservations that the Porte thought necessary, or if the judicious proposal of your Excellency, as reported in your despatch of the 18th of August, had been acted upon, great delay would have been avoided, and some important advantages might have been gained.

Such a mode of proceeding would at once have removed the doubts which now generally prevail respecting the desire or intention of the Porte to effect a peaceful settlement; and as the modifications proposed by the Turkish Government merely interpret the note in the sense intended by the Four Powers, they could not have hesitated to accept them, and thus give the Sultan a security for the future. In fact, they would have constituted themselves referees as to the true interpretation of the note, in the event of any difference arising hereafter upon it between the Porte and Russia. Not only were these modifications considered unimportant and as not altering the sense of the note by the Austrian Government, but by the Russian Minister at Vienna; and it might reasonably therefore have been expected, that if the note had been signed Russia would have joined the Four Powers in agreeing to its right interpretation.

Your Excellency will understand that the modifications, although in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government unnecessary, are not objected to as unreasonable, but that the mode of proposing them is likely to be productive of embarrassment, and to retard the solution of a question which Turkey is so deeply interested in settling; and they do not disguise from themselves that the Emperor of Russia, with reference to the condition upon which he reluctantly adhered to the note, may now decline to agree to the changes, notwithstanding that they have been strongly recommended by the Four Powers to his acceptance.

Reshid Pasha in his note says, that in the event of the modifications being adopted the Porte will immediately send an Ambassador Extraordinary, upon

condition of the evacuation of the Principalities ; and he adds, that a solid guarantee will be expected from the Powers “ contre toute ingérence à l’avenir et toute occupation de tems en tems des Principautés de Moldavie et de Valachie.”

With respect to the first, it has always been considered, not only by Her Majesty’s Government, but by the four Powers, that the evacuation of the Principalities was the *sine quâ non* of any arrangement being concluded on the part of the Porte ; and they have no reason to doubt, but on the contrary they have cause to believe, that if the note had been accepted by the Porte the orders for the withdrawal of the Russian troops would long before this time have been given.

As regards the solid guarantee expected by the Porte, Reshid Pasha must well know that it is utterly impossible for the Four Powers to enter into any such engagement. The term “ingérence” by itself is most vague, and might be held to apply to the legitimate reclamations and remonstrances that, according to international law and usage, every Government is entitled to address to another ; nor could the Four Powers make such a proposal to Russia, and still less give any guarantee upon the subject, without reciprocally imposing upon themselves similar conditions, and thus leaving the Turkish Government at perfect liberty to deal as it pleased with the religious, the social, and the commercial interests of their respective subjects throughout the Ottoman Empire. In short, it would be as impossible to promise that for the future there shall be no “ingérence” on the part of Russia, as it would be to undertake that towards that Power there shall never be a just cause of complaint given by Turkey ; and if any such engagement were entered into by the Four Powers, it might be justly considered by Turkey as an insult to her honour, and a disregard for her independence which she would not endure.

Equally difficult would it be to give a solid guarantee against any future occupation of the Principalities with reference to the peculiar Treaty which exists between the Two Powers respecting those provinces, and which under certain circumstances (of which the Powers could not always constitute themselves judges) gives to Russia as well as to Turkey the right of sending troops there. That Treaty, it is true, has now been grossly violated ; but it is to be hoped that there will be no renewal of an act against which the opinion of Europe has been unequivocally pronounced.

The Porte, however, may be well assured that its own interest can hardly exceed that of its allies in endeavouring by every means in their power to prevent the recurrence of events such as those which for some months past have endangered the peace of the world.

In conclusion, I have to observe that these last conditions were not made in the note sent to Vienna, and which, without them, the Porte was prepared to sign as a final settlement of the question. There is consequently some reason to apprehend that they have since been brought forward, under the conviction that they could not be complied with ; and should this unfortunately be the case it will verify the prediction of your Excellency made as long ago as the 16th of July, that there would soon be more to apprehend from the rashness than from the timidity of the Turkish Ministers ; and it will confirm the opinion lately communicated to Her Majesty’s Government, and which they gather also from the tone of your Excellency’s despatches, namely, that the feeling of the Turkish Government is a desire for war, founded on the conviction that France and England must still perforce side with Turkey, and that the war will, therefore, be a successful one for the Sultan, and obtain for him guarantees for the future which will materially strengthen his tottering power.

England and France will shrink from no obligation that their honour and their duty clearly prescribe, let the sacrifice be what it may of fulfilling that obligation. Although bound by no Treaty stipulations, they look upon the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire as a great feature of European policy, and they desire to uphold the dignity and independence of the Sultan. But other interests besides those of Turkey are committed to their charge, and before they expose these to the dangers and the injury that war would inevitably entail, they are bound to take care that no effort for the preservation of peace has been omitted ; and it is, therefore, in the most friendly spirit, and with a sincere regard for the best interests of Turkey, that Her Majesty’s Government advise the Porte not to be dazzled by the military preparations which with laudable zeal for their own

defence they have lately made, not to yield to the religious fanaticism for which such just provocation has been given, nor to think that war under the present circumstances of the Ottoman Empire can fail to be attended with consequences most disastrous; but, on the contrary, that they should exhibit a cordial readiness to adopt, and not a desire to evade, such an adjustment of their present unfortunate differences with Russia as they may think safe and honourable.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 89.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 10.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, September 2, 1853.*

THE Russian Government are still without any details as to the objections entertained by the Sultan as to the *projet de note* in its present form, which was sent from Vienna.

Their Vienna intelligence comes down only to the 25th ultimo, and acquaints them simply that the Sultan's acceptance of the note is subjected to its receiving several modifications, the nature and extent of which are not indicated.

When I saw the Chancellor yesterday, he spoke to me with some animation of the conduct of the Turks. If they had, he said, the faintest perception of their own interests, they ought to have given their adhesion to the *projet de note* with alacrity (*des deux mains*). That which the Emperor had received without change or hesitation in the course of twenty-four hours, should unquestionably have been received by the Turks with the same expedition; their hesitation or their refusal was most deplorable, and it led to the suspicion of the Turkish Government not having been made sufficiently sensible of the dangers to which they were exposing themselves.

I replied, that I regretted as much as Count Nesselrode could do that the note had not been accepted as it stood; but that when he blamed the Turks, I must only remind him that every allowance was to be made for a people who were trembling not only for their religion, but for their very existence. That it must not be forgotten that the late conduct of Russian agents in Bulgaria, who had been disseminating translations of the Imperial Circular and Manifesto, was calculated to arouse the religious and political feelings of a sensitive people, and that it appeared to have that effect to such a degree, that the suspicions of the Turks were directed not only against their avowed enemies, but against their Christian friends and allies.

The Chancellor retorted, that the conduct ascribed to Russian agency would have no influence upon the Turks, or upon their interests; that what must infallibly affect them would be the persecutions which the Christians were enduring in Bosnia.

Of them, as I stated, I had no knowledge, and I thought that any facts bearing upon these accusations required close examination.

The Chancellor proceeded to remark, that being unacquainted with the details of the alterations required by the Porte, he could only say, that after all the concessions which had been made by the Emperor, it might be conjectured that concession had reached its term; this, indeed, had been plainly stated in the despatch to Baron Meyendorff, signifying His Majesty's acceptance [*sans variante*] of the Vienna *projet de note*.\*

This despatch was, Count Nesselrode said, known to your Lordship.

## No. 90.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 16.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, September 8, 1853.*

I HELD yesterday a short but important conversation with the Chancellor.

The subject of the late decision of the Porte having been broached, Count Nesselrode said that he could only confirm the decision for which his previous remarks must have prepared me.

It would, he said, be impossible for the Emperor, after the concessions which he had already made, to abate any further his demands upon the Porte, and to admit any alterations in a document which he had accepted with the alterations in it made by the English and French Governments, and that within twenty-four hours.

The Chancellor stated his intention of addressing to Baron Bruunow, by a messenger who would be sent off to London on the 10th instant, a despatch, in which the Emperor's final resolution and the grounds on which it is taken would be made known to him, for communication to Her Majesty's Government.

Having requested Count Nesselrode to point out to me what the particular alteration or alterations suggested by the Turks were to which the Russians object, his Excellency replied, that what was objected to was, to any alteration having been proposed, to the principle of alteration, to the fact of the Porte having done that which, out of regard for the wishes of the Allied Powers, His Imperial Majesty refrained from doing.

## No. 91.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 16.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, September 10, 1853.*

WHEN I waited upon Count Nesselrode to-day, he placed in my hands the despatch which has been addressed to Baron Meyendorff, explaining the grounds upon which the Emperor finds himself unable to accede to the changes which the Porte proposes in the *projet de note* sent to them on the part of the Four Powers at Vienna.

It is a copy of that despatch dated the <sup>26 August</sup><sub>7 September</sub>, which will be transmitted to-morrow to Baron Bruunow, for the purpose of being communicated to Her Majesty's Government.

With its general substance your Lordship will be already acquainted from the report of my conversation upon the subject, and as the paper itself will be communicated to you, it is not necessary that I should offer your Lordship a summary of the whole.

The most important passages which it contains are to the following effect. The conviction expressed by Count Nesselrode that the course alone calculated to settle the pending question would be that the Allied Powers "declarent franchement et fermement à la Porte que lui ayant en vain ouvert la seule voie que pût mener au rétablissement immédiat de ses relations avec nous [with Russia], c'est à elle-même que désormais elles en abandonneraient la tâche."

"A declaration of this sort would," the Chancellor observes, "be certain to bring the Porte to an immediate sense of its interests."

The concluding paragraphs of the despatch are perhaps of even greater significance. After stating that the Emperor will not admit of any negotiation for his purpose of obtaining the evacuation of the Principalities, Count Nesselrode refers to his despatch to Baron Meyendorff of the  $\frac{10}{2}$  August\* as containing the declaration that orders for the evacuation of the Principalities will be immediately given so soon as a Turkish Ambassador shall arrive here charged with the note of which the project was settled at Vienna.

## No. 92.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, September 16, 1853.*

BARON BRUNNOW called upon me yesterday, and in the course of conversation inquired if I should object to inform him of the views and intentions of Her Majesty's Government now that the modifications of the Vienna note proposed by the Porte had not been adopted by the Emperor of Russia.

I replied that as the fact of their rejection alone was known by the telegraph, and that we were as yet ignorant in what manner or upon what grounds they had been rejected, I could not say what course it might be the duty of Her Majesty's Government to pursue, but that I should have no difficulty in stating to him the views of Her Majesty's Government respecting the modifications themselves; they were thought unnecessary, as affording no additional security or guarantee to the Porte, and because the note was originally framed, and of course was now interpreted by the Four Powers in the sense of the modifications; and it was therefore a matter of regret that they should have been proposed and insisted upon by the Turkish Government. The Four Powers, however, had not hesitated in recommending them to the acceptance of the Emperor, for they were not looked upon as altering the character of the note; and as the true meaning and intention of that note was not to confer any new power or right whatever upon Russia in Turkey, the Four Powers expected that the amendments would not have been disapproved by His Imperial Majesty, who on various occasions had declared that he looked for no new right nor increased power in Turkey, but desired simply the maintenance of existing Treaties, and the strict *status quo* in religious matters.

The Emperor had, reluctantly as I was aware, accepted the note upon a condition (which might be binding upon himself, but could not be so either on the Conference at Vienna or on the Porte), that no change was made in it at Constantinople; but it must be borne in mind that it was on the part of the Sultan, and not of the Emperor, that the note was to be signed, and that the Turkish Government had therefore a right narrowly to examine the terms in which it was framed, and to propose any amendments they might think indispensable for the future safety and independence of the Ottoman Empire.

The amendments were not viewed in that light by the Four Powers, and the course pursued by the Porte was the more to be regretted, as it delayed the evacuation of the Principalities, which they did not permit themselves to doubt would at once have taken place on the acceptance of the note by the Turkish Government. Nevertheless the modifications could not be disregarded, because they were thought to be of importance at Constantinople, and because they were not at variance with the intentions of the Conference at Vienna.

But, I added, if the Emperor adheres to his intention of seeking no increase of power in Turkey, if he retains his opinion that the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire is a great principle of European policy, and that its dissolution would be a great European catastrophe, it was difficult to understand why he should object to these amendments of the note, or to believe that he would expose Europe to the dangers of war, and hasten the event he deprecates, rather than adopt certain modifications, unimportant as they were assumed to be, simply because they were proposed by the Porte.

Baron Brunnow said that as he had not then received the despatches he was expecting from St. Petersburg, he could give me no information as to the grounds upon which the Emperor had rejected the modifications, but he asked me if it was still the intention of Her Majesty's Government to cooperate with Austria towards bringing about a peaceful solution of the question; and I answered that such was their intention, as we had every reason to believe that no difference of opinion existed between the two Governments.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 93.

*Count Nesselrode to Baron Meyendorff.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Baron Brunnow, September 16.)*

*St. Pétersbourg, le <sup>26 Août</sup><sub>7 Septembre</sub>, 1853.*

NOUS venons de recevoir avec les rapports de votre Excellence, en date du  $\frac{16}{28}$  Août, les modifications apportées par le Gouvernement Ottoman au projet de note rédigé à Vienne.

Il suffira à M. le Comte de Buol de se rappeler les termes de notre communication du 25 Juillet passé, pour se rendre compte de l'impression que ces modifications ont dû faire sur l'esprit de l'Empereur.

En acceptant, au nom de Sa Majesté, le projet de note que l'Autriche, après l'avoir préalablement fait agréer et approuver par les Cours de France et d'Angleterre, nous avait annoncé comme un ultimatum qu'elle se proposait de présenter à la Porte, et de l'acceptation duquel dépendrait la continuation de ses bons offices, j'ajoutais, M. le Baron, dans la dépêche qu'il nous était prescrit de communiquer au Cabinet Autrichien les réflexions et réserves suivantes :

“ Je crois superflu de faire observer ici à votre Excellence qu'en accueillant, comme nous le faisons par esprit de conciliation, l'expédient concerté à Vienne et l'envoi d'un Ambassadeur Turc, nous entendons bien ne plus avoir à examiner ou à discuter de nouvelles modifications et de nouveaux projets élaborés à Constantinople sous les inspirations belliqueuses qui paraissent dominer à cette heure le Sultan et la plupart de ses Ministres, et que dans le cas où le Gouvernement Ottoman rejetterait encore ce dernier projet d'arrangement nous ne nous considérerions plus comme liés par le consentement que nous y donnons aujourd'hui.”

Des paroles aussi positives ne sauraient avoir laissé au Gouvernement Autrichien un doute sur nos intentions actuelles.

Je n'examinerai point ici les changements de rédaction qui viennent d'être faits à Constantinople. J'en ai fait dans une autre dépêche l'objet d'un travail à part. Je me bornerai pour le moment à demander si l'Empereur, après s'être interdit la faculté de changer même un seul mot à un projet de note arrêté sans sa participation, peut admettre que la Porte Ottomane se réserve à elle seule cette faculté, et souffrir que la Russie soit ainsi placée vis-à-vis de la Turquie dans une position d'infériorité ? Nous pensons que la dignité de l'Empereur s'y oppose. Qu'on veuille bien se rappeler comment les choses se sont passées. Au lieu de la “ note-Menchikoff,” dont nous avons posé l'adoption sans variantes comme condition du rétablissement de nos relations avec la Porte, on nous a proposé une note différente. Nous aurions pu pour cette raison seule refuser de la discuter. Nous aurions pu, tout en nous y prêtant, trouver plus d'une objection à y faire, plus d'un changement de termes à y introduire. Vous savez bien, M. le Baron, que du moment où nous consentons à modifier notre ultimatum de Constantinople, la forme d'une note n'est pas celle qui aurait pû nous convenir. Vous connaissez le plan et la forme d'arrangement que nous aurions préférés. Cependant nous n'avons pas insisté sur ce plan. Nous l'avons mis complètement de côté du moment où d'autres ouvertures nous ont été faites. Pourquoi ? Parcequ'en s'opposant à celles-ci un contre-projet ou des contre-propositions quelconques, ce que pourtant nous étions parfaitement et pleinement en droit de faire, nous aurions pu encourir le reproche de chercher à traîner la chose en longueur, de prolonger gratuitement une crise qui tient en anxiété l'Europe. Désirant, tout au contraire, faire cesser cette crise le plus tôt possible, et allant sous ce rapport au-devant des vœux qui nous étaient exprimés, nous avons fait le sacrifice de nos objections de fond et de forme. A la simple réception du premier projet de note concerté à Vienne, et avant même de savoir s'il serait approuvé à Londres et à Paris, nous vous avons fait savoir notre adhésion par le télégraphe.

Le projet finalement arrêté nous a été plus tard transmis, et bien qu'on l'ait modifié dans un sens sur lequel nous ne pouvions nous méprendre, nous n'avons

pas néanmoins pour cela révoqué notre adhésion ou élevé la moindre difficulté. Était-il possible, nous le demandons, de témoigner plus d'empressement et des dispositions plus conciliantes ? Mais quand nous agissions ainsi, c'était, bien entendu, à la condition qu'un projet que l'Empereur accueillait sans le discuter serait accueilli de la même façon par la Porte. C'était dans la conviction que l'Autriche l'envisagerait comme un ultimatum auquel il n'y avait plus rien à changer, comme un dernier effort de son entremise officieuse qui, si l'effort venait d'échouer contre l'obstination du Divan, cesserait par le fait même. Nous regrettons de voir qu'il n'en est point ainsi. Mais si le Cabinet de Vienne conviendra de son côté que s'il s'est agi, non pas d'un ultimatum, mais d'un nouveau projet de note à laquelle chacune des deux parties pouvait apporter telle ou telle modification, nous rentrons dès-lors dans le droit dont nous avons fait volontairement abandon, de proposer à notre tour nos propres variantes, de reprendre en considération le projet d'arrangement et d'en altérer non seulement les termes mais la forme.

Ce résultat pourrait-il entrer dans les vues de l'Autriche ? Convendrait-il aux Puissances qui, en modifiant et en adoptant son projet de note, en ont fait leur œuvre commune ? Il leur appartient de peser les délais qui en seront la conséquence nécessaire, ou d'examiner s'il est de l'intérêt de l'Europe qu'il soit coupé court à ces retards. Nous ne voyons qu'un seul moyen d'y mettre fin. C'est que l'Autriche et les Puissances déclarent franchement et fermement à la Porte que lui ayant en vain ouvert la seule voie qui pût mener au rétablissement immédiat de ses relations avec nous, c'est à elle-même que désormais elles en abandonneront la tâche. Nous pensons que si elles lui tiennent ce langage unanimement, les Turcs, cédant aux conseils de l'Europe au lieu de compter sur son assistance dans une lutte contre la Russie, accepteront la note telle quelle, et cesseront de compromettre leur situation d'une manière aussi grave pour se donner la satisfaction puérile d'avoir modifié quelques termes de la pièce que nous avons acceptée sans discussion. Car, de deux choses l'une : ou les modifications que la Porte réclame sont importantes, et alors il devient fort simple que nous refusions d'y consentir ; ou elles sont insignifiantes, et alors pourquoi la Porte continuerait-elle sans nécessité à y subordonner son acceptation ?

En résumé, M. le Baron, l'ultimatum arrêté à Vienne n'est point le nôtre. C'est celui de l'Autriche et des Puissances qui après l'avoir concerté, discuté et modifié préalablement dans son texte originaire, l'ont reconnu acceptable par la Porte sans compromis pour ses intérêts et pour son honneur. C'est donc à elles, et non point à nous, à faire cesser un moment plus tôt les incertitudes de la crise actuelle. Nous avons fait de notre côté tout ce qui pouvait dépendre de nous pour abréger d'inutiles délais, en renonçant, quand l'arrangement nous à été soumis, à toute espèce de contre-propositions quelconques. C'est un témoignage que personne ne refusera de rendre à la loyauté de l'Empereur. Ayant épuisé depuis longtemps la mesure des concessions sans que la Porte en ait fait jusqu'à présent une seule, Sa Majesté ne peut aller plus loin sans compromettre toute sa position, et sans s'exposer à renouer ses relations politiques avec la Turquie sous des auspices défavorables qui leur ôteraient pour l'avenir toute solidité, et amèneraient inévitablement une nouvelle et plus éclatante rupture. Dans le moment même de nouvelles concessions sur les termes de la note ne serviraient à rien : car nous voyons d'après vos dépêches que le Gouvernement Ottoman n'attend que notre adhésion aux changements apportés à la note de Vienne pour en subordonner la signature, comme l'envoi de l'Ambassadeur qui doit la porter ici, à de nouvelles conditions, et qu'il a déjà mis en avant, au sujet de l'évacuation des Principautés, des propositions inadmissibles. Sur ce dernier point, M. le Baron, nous ne saurions que nous référer aux assurances et explications renfermées dans notre dépêche du 10 Août, et répéter qu'il suffira de l'arrivée à St. Pétersbourg de l'Ambassadeur Turc, porteur de la note Autrichienne sans changements, pour que l'ordre soit immédiatement donné à nos troupes de repasser notre frontière.

Recevez, &c.  
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)

*St. Petersburg,* <sup>August 26</sup><sub>September 7,</sub> 1853.

WE have received with your Excellency's reports dated August  $\frac{16}{28}$ , the modifications introduced by the Ottoman Government into the draft of note drawn up at Vienna.

It will be sufficient for Count Buol to call to mind the terms of our communication of the 25th of July last, in order to appreciate the impression which those modifications must needs have made on the Emperor's mind.

In accepting in His Majesty's name the draft of note which Austria, after having first obtained the assent and approval of the Courts of France and of England, had announced to us as an ultimatum which she proposed to offer to the Porte, and on the acceptance of which depended the continuance of her good offices, I added, M. le Baron, in the despatch, that it was incumbent on us to communicate to the Austrian Cabinet the following observations and reservations:

"I consider it superfluous in this place to remark to your Excellency that in accepting, as we do from a spirit of conciliation, the expedient devised at Vienna and the mission of a Turkish Ambassador, we fully understand that we are not to have to examine or discuss fresh modifications and new drafts, drawn up at Constantinople under the bellicose inspirations which at this moment seem to influence the Sultan and the majority of his Ministers; and that in case the Ottoman Government should still reject this last plan of settlement, we should not consider ourselves as any longer bound by the consent which we now give to it."

Words so positive could not have left the Austrian Government in any doubt as to our present intentions.

I will not in this place examine the alterations which have been made at Constantinople. I have done so in a separate despatch. I will for the present confine myself to demanding whether the Emperor, after having denied himself the power of changing even a single word in a draft of note drawn up without his participation, can allow the Ottoman Porte to retain that power for itself, and permit Russia to be thus placed in a position of inferiority as regards Turkey. We conceive that the dignity of the Emperor precludes this. Let the course of events be called to mind. In the place of the "Menchikoff note," the adoption of which without alteration we had put forward as the condition of the re-establishment of our relations with the Porte, a different note was proposed to us. For this reason alone we might have declined to discuss it. We might, whilst acceding to it, have had more than one objection to offer to it, more than one alteration of its terms to insert in it. You are well aware, M. le Baron, that from the time that we consented to modify the ultimatum which we had presented at Constantinople, the form of a note is not that which could have suited us. You are acquainted with the plan and form of arrangement which we should have preferred. Nevertheless, we did not insist on that plan. We set it completely aside as soon as other proposals were made to us. Wherefore? Because, by opposing to these a counter-project or any counter-propositions whatsoever, which, nevertheless, we had a full and perfect right to do, we might have incurred the reproach of seeking to protract the matter, and gratuitously to prolong a crisis which occasions anxiety to Europe. Wishing, on the contrary, to bring that crisis as soon as possible to an end, and acquiescing with this view in the wishes which were expressed to us, we sacrificed our objections of substance and of form. On the mere receipt of the first draft of note agreed upon at Vienna, and even before we knew if it would be approved at London and at Paris, we announced by telegraph our adhesion to it.

The draft, as finally agreed upon, was sent to us at a later period, and although it had been modified in a sense which we could not mistake, nevertheless we did not on that account retract our adhesion or raise the slightest difficulty. Was it possible, we ask, to manifest greater readiness and more conciliatory dispositions? But when we acted in this manner, it was well understood that it was on condition that the draft of note which the Emperor had accepted without discussion should be accepted in the same manner by the

Porte. It was under the conviction that Austria would regard it as an ultimatum in which no change was to be made, as a last effort of its friendly intervention which, if the effort were to fail by reason of the obstinacy of the Divan, would cease *ipso facto*. We regret to perceive that such is not the case. But the Cabinet of Vienna will on its side admit that if it is a question not of an ultimatum, but of a new draft of note which each of the two parties is at liberty to modify, we then resume the right which we had voluntarily renounced, of proposing in our turn our own alterations, of again considering the draft of arrangement, and of altering not only its terms but its form.

Would this result enter into the views of Austria? Would it suit the Powers who, by modifying and adopting her draft of note, made it their own work? It is for them to consider the delays which will necessarily result from such a course, or to examine whether it is for the interest of Europe to cut those delays short. We see only one way of putting an end to them. It is that Austria and the Powers should frankly and firmly declare to the Porte that having opened to it in vain the only way which can lead to the immediate re-establishment of its relations with us, they henceforth abandon to it the task. We conceive that if they hold this language unanimously to them, the Turks, yielding to the advice of Europe instead of reckoning upon its assistance in a contest against Russia, will accept the note such as it is, and will cease to prejudice their position in so serious a manner in order to afford themselves the childish satisfaction of having modified certain expressions of the document which we had accepted without discussion. For one of two things: either the modifications required by the Porte are important, and then it is very obvious that we should refuse to assent to them; or they are insignificant, and in that case why should the Porte continue, without necessity, to make its acceptance dependent on them?

In conclusion, M. le Baron, the ultimatum agreed upon at Vienna is not ours. It is that of Austria and of the Powers who having in the first instance devised, discussed, and modified it in its original terms, have considered that it might be accepted by the Porte without prejudice to its interests and to its honour. It is for them, therefore, and not for us, forthwith to bring to an end the uncertainties of the present crisis. We on our side have done all that depended on us to abridge useless delays, by renouncing, when the arrangement was proposed to us, all kinds of counter-propositions whatsoever: no one can refuse this testimony to the sincerity of the Emperor. Having for a long time exhausted the measure of concessions without the Porte having hitherto made a single one, His Majesty cannot go further without prejudice to his position, and without exposing himself to the risk of renewing his political relations with Turkey under unfavourable circumstances, which would deprive them of all stability for the future, and would inevitably bring on a fresh and more decided rupture. At the present moment, indeed, fresh concessions in regard to the terms of the note would serve no purpose; for we perceive by your despatches that the Ottoman Government is only waiting for our acquiescence in the alterations made in the Vienna note, in order to make its signature of it, as well as the mission of the Ambassador who is to convey it here, dependent on fresh conditions and inadmissible propositions, which it has already put forward on the subject of the evacuation of the Principalities. On this last point, M. le Baron, we can only refer to the assurances and explanations contained in our despatch of the 10th of August, and repeat that the arrival at St. Petersburg of a Turkish Ambassador, bearer of the Austrian note without alterations, will be sufficient to ensure our troops being immediately ordered to repass our frontier.

Receive, &c.  
(Signed) NESSELRODE.

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## No. 94.

*Russian Analysis of the Three Modifications introduced by the Ottoman Porte into the Vienna Note.*

1. DANS le projet de Vienne il est dit : “ Si à toute époque les Empereurs de Russie ont témoigné leur active sollicitude pour le maintien des immunités et privilèges de l'Eglise Orthodoxe Grecque dans l'Empire Ottoman, &c.”

On modifie ainsi ce passage : “ Si à toute époque les Empereurs de Russie ont témoigné leur active sollicitude pour le culte et l'Eglise Orthodoxe Grecque.”

Les mots “ dans l'Empire Ottoman,” ainsi que ceux, “ le maintien des immunités et privilèges, &c.” ont été éliminés, pour être transposés plus loin et appliqués uniquement aux Sultans. Cette omission ôte toute portée, tout sens même, à la phrase tronquée. Car personne assurément ne conteste aux Souverains de la Russie leur active sollicitude pour le culte qu'ils professent eux-mêmes, et qui est celui de leurs sujets. Ce qu'il s'agissait de reconnaître, c'est qu'il y a de tous tems sollicitude active de la part de la Russie pour ses coreligionnaires de la Turquie, comme pour le maintien de leurs immunités religieuses ; et que le Gouvernement Ottoman est disposé à avoir égard à cette sollicitude comme à laisser intactes ces immunités.

La phrase actuelle devient d'autant plus inacceptable que, par les termes qui suivent, on attribue au Sultan plus que de la sollicitude pour le culte orthodoxe. On affirme qu'on n'a jamais cessé de veiller au maintien de ses immunités et privilèges, non plus que de les consacrer par des actes solennels. Or, c'est précisément le contraire de ce qu'on affirme qui, ayant eu lieu dans les derniers tems à plus d'une reprise, et notamment dans l'affaire des lieux saints, nous a obligé d'y porter remède par la demande d'une garantie plus expresse pour l'avenir. Si nous nous prêtons à reconnaître que le Gouvernement Ottoman n'a jamais cessé de veiller au maintien des privilèges de l'Eglise Grecque, que deviennent les plaintes que nous avons formées contre lui ? Nous reconnaissons par là même que nous n'avons pas de griefs légitimes ; que la mission du Prince Menchikoff était sans motif ; qu'en un mot la note même qu'on nous a adressée était parfaitement superflue.

2. Les suppressions et additions de mots introduits ici avec une affectation marquée, ont pour but évident d'invalider le Traité de Kainardji, tout en ayant l'air de le confirmer.

Il était dit dans la rédaction originairement conçue à Vienne que “ fidèle à la lettre et à l'esprit des stipulations des Traités de Kainardji et d'Andrinople relatives à la protection du culte Chrétien, le Sultan regarde comme étant de son honneur . . . . de préserver de toute atteinte . . . . les immunités et privilèges accordés à l'Eglise Orthodoxe.” Cette rédaction, qui faisait dériver de l'esprit même du Traité, c'est-à-dire, du principe général déposé dans l'Article VII, le maintien des immunités, était conforme à la doctrine que nous avons soutenue et soutenons. Car, selon nous, la promesse de protéger un culte et ses églises, implique de nécessité le maintien des immunités dont ils jouissent. Ce sont deux choses inséparables. Cette rédaction primitive concertée à Vienne a subi plus tard à Paris et à Londres une première modification, et si nous n'y avons pas objecté dans le tems, comme nous aurions eu le droit de le faire, ce n'est pas que nous nous soyons mépris sur la portée de ce changement. Nous nous étions bien aperçus de la distinction introduite entre deux points qui sont pour nous indissolublement liés l'un à l'autre ; mais cette distinction était pourtant encore indiquée d'une manière assez délicate pour que nous ayons pu, par esprit de conciliation, et désir d'arriver promptement à une solution définitive, accepter telle quelle une rédaction que nous regardions dès-lors comme invariable. Ces motifs de déférence ne s'appliquent plus à la nouvelle modification du même passage qui vient d'être faite à Constantinople. La ligne de démarcation entre les deux objets y est beaucoup trop nettement tranchée pour que nous puissions l'accepter sans donner un démenti à tout ce que nous avons dit et écrit. La mention du Traité de Kainardji devient superflue, et sa confirmation sans objet, du moment qu'on cesse d'en appliquer le principe général au maintien des immunités religieuses du culte. C'est dans ce but qu'on a supprimé ces deux mots, “ la lettre et l'esprit.” On appuie sans nécessité sur le fait que la

protection du culte Chrétien s'exerce " par la Sublime Porte," comme si nous prétendions exercer cette protection nous-mêmes dans les Etats du Sultan ; et comme on néglige en même tems de rappeler qu'aux termes du Traité la protection est une promesse faite, un engagement pris par le Sultan, on a l'air de jeter un doute sur le droit que nous avons de veiller à la stricte exécution de cette promesse.

3. Le changement que l'on propose dans cet endroit de la note Autrichienne est surtout inadmissible.

Le Gouvernement Ottoman ne s'engagerait à faire participer l'Eglise Orthodoxe qu'aux avantages qu'il octroyerait à d'autres communautés Chrétiennes *sujettes de la Porte*. Mais si ces communautés, bien que Catholiques ou autres, n'étaient pas formées d'indigènes rayas, mais de religieux ou laïques étrangers (et tel est le cas de la presque totalité des couvents, hospices, séminaires et évêchés du rit Latin en Turquie), et si, disons-nous, le bon plaisir de la Porte était d'accorder à ces établissements des avantages et privilèges religieux nouveaux, les communautés Orthodoxes, en leur qualité de *sujettes Ottomanes*, n'auraient pas, d'après les termes que l'on veut introduire dans la note, le droit de réclamer les mêmes faveurs, ni la Russie le droit d'intercéder pour elles.

L'intention malveillante des Ministres de la Porte deviendra plus évident encore si nous citons un exemple, une éventualité possible. Supposons le cas très probable où le Patriarche Latin de Jérusalem, préconisé en dernier lieu, obtînt de la Porte des prérogatives dont le Patriarche Grec ne jouit pas. Toute réclamation de la part de ce dernier serait rejetée, vu sa qualité de *sujet de la Porte*.

La même objection serait faite par le Ministère Ottoman par rapport aux établissements Catholiques de la Palestine, dans le cas où quelque nouvel avantage ou droit non spécifié dans les derniers firmans, vînt à leur être accordé par la suite au préjudice des communautés indigènes.

(Translation.)

1. IN the Vienna draft it is said, " If the Emperors of Russia have at all times evinced their active solicitude for the maintenance of the immunities and privileges of the orthodox Greek Church in the Ottoman Empire," &c.

This passage has been thus modified : " If the Emperors of Russia have at all times evinced their active solicitude for the religion and orthodox Greek Church."

The words " in the Ottoman Empire," as well as those " the maintenance of the immunities and privileges," have been struck out, in order to be transposed to a subsequent passage, and applied to the Sultans alone. This omission deprives the mutilated passage of all its meaning and sense. For no one assuredly disputes the active solicitude of the Sovereigns of Russia for the religion which they profess themselves and which is that of their subjects. What it was designed to recognize is, that there has ever existed on the part of Russia active solicitude for her coreligionists in Turkey, as also for the maintenance of their religious immunities ; and that the Ottoman Government is disposed to take account of that solicitude, and also to leave those immunities untouched.

The present expression is the more unacceptable since, by the terms which follow it, more than solicitude for the orthodox religion is attributed to the Sultans. It is affirmed that they have never ceased to watch over the maintenance of its immunities and privileges, and to confirm them by solemn Acts. However, it is precisely the reverse of what is thus stated, which, having more than once occurred in times past, and specifically in the affair of the holy places, has compelled us to apply a remedy to it, by demanding a more express guarantee for the future. If we lend ourselves to the admission that the Ottoman Government has never ceased to watch over the maintenance of the privileges of the Greek Church, what becomes of the complaints which we have brought forward against it ? By doing so we admit that we had no legitimate grounds of complaint ; that Prince Menchikoff's mission was without motive ; that, in a word, even the note which it has addressed to us was wholly superfluous.

2. The suppressions and additions of words introduced into this passage

with marked affectation are evidently intended to invalidate the Treaty of Kainardji, while having the appearance of confirming it.

It was said in the note originally drawn up at Vienna, that, "faithful to the letter and to the spirit of the stipulations of the Treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople relative to the protection of the Christian religion, the Sultan considers himself bound in honour . . . . to preserve from all prejudice . . . . the immunities and privileges granted to the orthodox Church."

These terms, which made the maintenance of the immunities to be derived from the very spirit of the Treaty, that is to say, from the general principle laid down in the VIIth Article, were in conformity with the doctrine which we have maintained and still maintain. For, according to us, the promise to protect a religion and its churches implies of necessity the maintenance of the immunities enjoyed by them. They are two inseparable things. These terms, originally agreed upon at Vienna, were subsequently first modified at Paris and at London; and if we did not object to this at the time, as we should have been entitled to do, it is not that we misunderstood the purport of that alteration. We clearly perceived the distinction made between two points which, in our estimation, are indissolubly connected with each other; but this distinction was, however, marked with sufficient delicacy to admit of our accepting, from a spirit of conciliation, and from a desire of speedily arriving at a definitive solution, the terms of the note as they were presented to us, which we thenceforth looked upon as unalterable. These motives of deference no longer apply to the fresh modification of the same passage which has been made at Constantinople. The line of demarcation between the two objects is there too plainly drawn to admit of our accepting it without falsifying all that we have said and written. The mention of the Treaty of Kainardji is superfluous, and its confirmation without object, from the time that its general principle is no longer applied to the maintenance of the religious immunities of the religion. It is for this object that the words "the letter and the spirit" have been suppressed. The fact that the protection of the Christian religion is exercised "by the Sublime Porte," is needlessly insisted on, as if we pretended ourselves to exercise that protection in the Sultan's dominions; and as it is at the same time omitted to notice that, according to the terms of the Treaty, the protection is a promise made and an engagement undertaken by the Sultan, there is an appearance of throwing a doubt upon the right which we possess of watching over the strict fulfilment of that promise.

3. The alteration proposed in this passage of the Austrian note is altogether inadmissible.

The Ottoman Government would merely engage to allow the Orthodox Church to share in the advantages which it might grant to other Christian communities, subjects of the Porte. But if those communities, whether Catholics or others, were not composed of native Rayahs, but of foreign monks or laymen (and such is the case with nearly the whole of the convents, hospitals, seminaries, and bishoprics of the Latin rite in Turkey), and if, let us say, it should be the good pleasure of the Porte to grant to those establishments fresh religious advantages and privileges, the Orthodox communities, in their character of Ottoman subjects, would not, under the terms which it is desired to introduce into this note, have the right of claiming the same favours, nor would Russia have the right of interceding for them.

The malevolent intention of the Ministers of the Porte will become still more evident, if we cite an instance, a possible contingency. Let us suppose the very probable case of the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, recently extolled, obtaining from the Porte prerogatives not enjoyed by the Greek Patriarch. Any claim on the part of the latter would be rejected, in consideration of his character of "subject of the Porte."

The same objection would be made by the Ottoman Ministry with reference to the Catholic establishments of Palestine, in case any fresh advantage or right not specified in the last firmans should hereafter be granted to them to the prejudice of the native communities.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 19.)*

(Extract.)

*Vienna, September 14, 1853.*

I HAVE already reported to your Lordship by telegraph this day, that the despatches from Count Nesselrode announcing the decision of the Emperor Nicholas not to accept the modifications of the Vienna note which had been proposed by the Porte, had been received by Baron Meyendorff. These despatches were communicated by the Russian Minister to Count Buol, who immediately requested the members of the Conference, Count Arnim, Baron Bourqueney, and myself, to meet him at his residence.

Count Buol placed in our hands the despatch of Count Nesselrode announcing the receipt of the Vienna note, amended according to the proposals of the Turkish Government; and after entering into various details as to the manner in which the original note had been submitted to the Emperor and had been accepted by him, Count Nesselrode announces that His Imperial Majesty, while adhering to his acceptance of the note as it had been originally presented to him by the Austrian Government, with the sanction of the Governments of England, France, and Prussia, declined to agree to any modification of it.

Count Buol informed the members present that the despatch of Count Nesselrode had been communicated by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg to our respective Governments; and as it will consequently be in your Lordship's possession before this despatch can reach you, I need not enter into any further description of its contents.

Count Buol then stated that he admitted the perfect right of the Emperor of Russia (after having accepted a proposal which had been submitted to him by the Four Powers) to refuse to adopt any alterations in the character of that note which the Governments in alliance with Turkey had not considered necessary for the maintenance of her dignity and independence; and although he had recommended to the Cabinet of His Imperial Majesty the adoption of the modifications, yet, as that advice had not been accepted, he felt that he had now no other course to pursue than to report this failure to the Government of the Sultan, and to reiterate to them in the strongest manner the advice he had originally given them to accept the note such as the Four Powers had proposed it. Count Buol remarked upon the importance of the Emperor of Russia's declaration that in adhering to his acceptance of the original note, he was still in the intention (as soon as it should be presented to him by an Ambassador) to order the evacuation of the Principalities, and from that moment to consider the relations between Russia and the Porte as reestablished.

Count Buol stated that Baron Meyendorff had received a second despatch from Count Nesselrode, expressing the great disappointment felt by the Emperor of Russia at the modification of the original note by the Porte, and his regret at the consequent delay in the execution of the order which had already been prepared for commencing the evacuation of the Principalities, and which would have taken place immediately upon the Emperor's receiving the assurance that that note had been adopted by the Porte, and would be presented to him. Count Nesselrode declares in this despatch that this measure will still be carried out, if the Emperor should receive a satisfactory assurance from the Sultan in time for the evacuation to take place during the month of October; later in the year it would not be possible to move the troops.

Count Buol read to the Conference the despatch he had addressed to the Internuncio at Constantinople, directing him to use every means to induce the Turkish Government to adhere to the original note which had been submitted to them, and to represent to them that the Austrian Government adopted that course in the fullest persuasion that it was entirely consonant with what was due to the honour of the Sultan, and that it was the only proposal they could suggest, or could undertake to bring forward, which would at once secure the termination of the dangerous and distressing complications at present existing.

The substance of this despatch and the advice contained in it has been communicated to the Turkish Ambassador here, who has written to his Government recommending its adoption

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## No. 96.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 19.)*

My Lord,

*Berlin, September 16, 1853.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL read to me this morning a despatch which he had just received from Count Arnim, the Prussian Minister at Vienna, giving an account of the meeting of the Representatives of the Four Powers which had been held on the 13th instant, when Count Buol communicated to them a despatch addressed by Count Nesselrode to Baron Meyendorff on the 7th instant announcing the refusal of the Emperor of Russia to accept the Turkish amendments of the Vienna note.

Your Lordship will receive from Lord Westmorland by the present messenger a report of what occurred at this Conference, and the few observations made to me by Baron Manteuffel are unimportant; he sees the imperative necessity under existing circumstances of urging the Porte to accept the original note, and has this day addressed by telegraph an instruction to Baron Wildenbruch at Constantinople to act in concert with his colleagues in giving his support to the steps which Baron Bruck has been directed to take in this matter.

Baron Manteuffel thinks it not impossible that the Porte's answer may be received at Vienna before the departure of the Emperor of Russia from Olmütz, and if so that some step towards the evacuation of the Principalities might be taken before the return of His Imperial Majesty to Warsaw.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

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## No. 97.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.--(Received September 19.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, August 27, 1853.*

I LEARN from M. Pisani that the Porte, in transmitting to Omar Pasha the draft of an answer to Prince Gortchakoff's letter to that Commander, copy of which draft was forwarded confidentially to your Lordship a few days ago, has directed him not to send it on to its destination, unless he is quite satisfied that the intended passage up the Danube of armed Russian vessels, in search of provisions, would prove dangerous to the interests of Turkey; that is, to the safety of the Turkish fortresses on the right bank of the river.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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## No. 98.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 19.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, August 30, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information the copy of a letter addressed by Reshid Pasha to the Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia, with the view of confirming the Sultan's previous command that

their Highnesses should retire, unless the restrictions laid upon them by the Russian authorities are really and in fact abandoned.

Copies are also inclosed herewith of the instructions which I have addressed on the same occasion to Her Majesty's Consuls at Bucharest and Jassy.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 98.

*Reshid Pasha to the Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia.*

*Le 30 Août, 1853.*

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la dépêche de votre Altesse en date du 11 Août que je me suis empressé de soumettre à Sa Majesté le Sultan avec l'adresse qui l'accompagnait, et dans laquelle il est dit qu'il ne serait pas convenable à votre Altesse de quitter la Principauté dans les circonstances actuelles.

Les attributions de l'assemblée qui a rédigé cette adresse étant exclusivement limitées à l'expédition des affaires courantes et ordinaires de la Province, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté ne peut nullement reconnaître à cette assemblée le droit de discuter et de délibérer sur une mesure purement politique et dépendante absolument des droits souverains de la Sublime Porte, comme celle du rappel temporaire de votre Altesse de la <sup>Valachie</sup> Moldavie.

Sa Majesté le Sultan, qui, dans sa haute bienveillance a toujours à cœur le bien-être et la sécurité des habitants de la Moldo-Valachie formant partie intégrante de ses Etats Impériaux, ne veut certainement pas permettre que la moindre atteinte soit portée à leur système administratif. Mais malheureusement la rupture des relations des deux Principautés avec la Sublime Porte et la suspension du tribut, signifiées aux Hospodars par la Cour de Russie, ont entraîné après elle la dernière décision du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

L'importance que la Sublime Porte attache à la continuation de ses relations ordinaires avec votre Altesse n'est point basée sur le désir de s'enquérir du nombre, des dispositions, ou de mouvement des troupes Russes. Et la suspension du tribut qui n'est que bien peu de chose comparativement aux sommes considérables dépensées par le Gouvernement Ottoman pour les préparatifs qui se poursuivent, ne peut non plus porter le moindre inconvénient à la marche des affaires les moins importantes de l'Etat. Si la Sublime Porte insiste sur ce point, ce n'est pas évidemment par un besoin urgent de toucher les fonds de ce tribut ; mais comme la continuation des rapports des deux Principautés avec Constantinople comme par le passé, et le paiement sans délai du tribut établi à ses échéances respectives, font, en conclusion, partie des attributions ostensibles de l'autorité de la Sublime Porte, le Gouvernement Impérial autorise votre Altesse à rester à son poste, si elle est à même de respecter ces attributions comme auparavant. Si, au contraire, il lui est impossible de s'y conformer, il sera de nouveau constaté que l'exercice du pouvoir légitime dans les Principautés est impossible.

Par conséquent le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan renouvelle, dans ce cas, à votre Altesse ses ordres de quitter immédiatement le pays.

Je saisis, &c.

(Translation.)

*August 30, 1853.*

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Highness' despatch dated the 11th of August, which I hastened to submit to His Majesty the Sultan, with the address by which it was accompanied, and in which it was said, that it would not be proper for your Excellency to quit the Principality under existing circumstances.

The attributes of the Assembly which drew up this address being exclusively limited to the despatch of the current and ordinary affairs of the province, His

Majesty's Government cannot by any means recognize in that Assembly, the right of discussing and deliberating upon a measure purely political and depending absolutely on the sovereign rights of the Sublime Porte, like that of the temporary recall of your Highness from <sup>Wallachia</sup> ~~Moldavia~~.

His Majesty the Sultan, who in his exalted benevolence has always at heart the welfare and security of the inhabitants of Moldavia and Wallachia, which constitute an integral part of his imperial dominions, will not assuredly allow their administrative system to be in the least infringed. But, unhappily, the rupture of the relations of the two Principalities with the Sublime Porte, and the suspension of the tribute, notified to the Hospodars by the Court of Russia, have occasioned the late decision of the Government of His Majesty the Sultan.

The importance attached by the Sublime Porte to the continuance of its ordinary relations with your Highness is not founded on any desire to obtain information in regard to the number, distribution, or movements of the Russian troops. Neither does the suspension of the tribute, which is but a very small matter in comparison with the considerable sums expended by the Ottoman Government for the preparations now in progress, cause the slightest inconvenience to the progress of the least important affairs of the State. If the Sublime Porte insists on this point, it is evidently not from an urgent want of the money of this tribute; but as the continuance of the relations of the two Principalities with Constantinople as in times past, and the payment without delay of the fixed tribute as it becomes due, are, in fine, part of the ostensible attributes of the authority of the Sublime Porte, the Imperial Government authorizes your Highness to remain at your post if you are enabled as heretofore to respect these attributes. If, on the contrary, you cannot conform thereto, it will be again made evident that the exercise of lawful power in the Principalities is impossible.

Consequently, the Government of His Majesty the Sultan repeats, in that case, its orders to your Highness immediately to quit the country.

I take, &c.

Inclosure 2 in No. 98.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Her Majesty's Consuls at Bucharest and Jassy.*

Sir,

*Therapia, August 30, 1853.*

I AM authorised by my communications with the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs to inform you that the Porte has not allowed itself to be warped from its original intention with respect to the retirement of the Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia in consequence of the restrictions laid upon them by the Russian authorities. After weighing with due consideration the motives alleged by their Highnesses for demurring to execute the commands of their Sovereign, the Porte has repeated its previous instructions, and I inclose herewith for your confidential information a copy of the despatch addressed for that purpose to each of the Princes by the Secretary of State. You will observe that the only contingency admitted by the Porte as warranting a further postponement of their departure is the revocation or relinquishment of the restrictions lately imposed upon them by the Russian authorities. I need not remark to you that such a return to the common principles of justice must, to have its effect with any degree of propriety, be made so clear as to leave no doubt whatever of its reality.

The Porte's instructions are forwarded by express from Constantinople to-day.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 99.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 19.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, September 5, 1853.*

THE day before yesterday I had a conversation with Reshid Pasha at his house on the Bosphorus. He assured me that his colleagues continued to be unanimous, and that they would all retire from office rather than put their signatures to Count Buol's note as sent from Vienna.

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No. 100.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, September 20, 1853.*

I INCLOSE copies of despatches\* which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, and to Sir G. H. Seymour, respecting the modifications of the note sent from Vienna that have been proposed by the Porte.

It is important that your Lordship should be in possession of the views of Her Majesty's Government upon this subject, as you are going to Olmütz, and may possibly have an opportunity of communicating with the Emperor of Russia, or with Count Nesselrode, who it is understood will accompany His Imperial Majesty.

Your Lordship will perceive that Her Majesty's Government considered the modifications to be unimportant, and regretted that they had been proposed. Her Majesty's Government were accordingly prepared still to recommend that the note should be accepted by the Porte upon their interpretation of it, which was that of the Conference at Vienna; for the Four Powers, who have anxiously laboured to effect a peaceful and honourable solution of the question, thought they did justice and gave ample security to the Porte by acting upon the declaration so repeatedly made by the Emperor, that he sought for no new right and no increase of power in Turkey, but desired only the maintenance of existing Treaties, and the *status quo* in religious matters. Upon this principle, and with no other intention, the note was framed, and Her Majesty's Government considered that no other meaning could be attached to it; but the reasons given by Count Nesselrode in his analysis of the modifications proposed by the Porte induce Her Majesty's Government to think that the apprehensions entertained by the Porte, so far from being groundless, are to a great extent justified by the construction put upon the original note by Count Nesselrode.

I do not now propose to enter into a discussion upon the objections raised by Count Nesselrode. It is sufficient to say, that they are at variance with the intentions of the Four Powers; and Her Majesty's Government feel that it would not be just or honourable, either towards the Emperor or the Sultan, to press the acceptance of the note upon the Porte so long as any misunderstanding existed upon its true meaning; and they feel, moreover, that the reestablishment of real and permanent friendly relations between Russia and Turkey, the object which the Four Powers have sincerely at heart, would be defeated if the note which they looked upon as the basis of reconciliation were hereafter to be made a cause of irritating discussion with respect to claims which it might be held to justify, and the resistance to them which, on the other side, would appear equally warrantable. The importance of avoiding all misunderstanding upon the question itself, and at the critical period at which it has arrived, cannot be exaggerated; and Her Majesty's Government, therefore, in the interest of peace, and possibly as the last hope of preserving Europe from the danger which now appears imminent, are anxious to learn whether the Emperor is still determined to seek no new right and no further extension of power in Turkey; and as they feel convinced that His Imperial Majesty will not hesitate to renew his former declarations to that effect, they cannot believe that he will object to such

alterations of the Vienna note as would have the effect of quieting the alarm of the Porte, or that he will, upon a misunderstanding that it is in his power to rectify, permit the recent negotiations to prove fruitless and thus expose Europe to the risks of war, which would entail the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire—an event which the Emperor, in common with all his allies, has never ceased to deprecate as a calamity of the greatest magnitude.

In the event of your Lordship being honoured by an interview with the Emperor at Olmütz, you will govern yourself by the language of this despatch and its inclosures, and you will make the views of Her Majesty's Government known to Count Nesselrode, who, with reference to the importance and pressing nature of the subject, will doubtless overlook the irregularity of the communication being made through your Lordship, who has no official relations with the Court of Russia.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 101.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, September 21, 1853.*

COUNT COLLOREDO communicated to me yesterday two despatches, dated the 13th instant, which had been addressed by Count Buol to Baron Bruck, on the receipt of the intelligence of the refusal of the Emperor of Russia to acquiesce in the modifications which the Porte desired to introduce into the Vienna note.

The first of these despatches purports to give the substance of the answer from St. Petersburg; that the Emperor of Russia's consent to accept the Vienna note was contingent on its acceptance, unaltered, by the Porte; that having renounced for himself the pretension to change the terms of the note, the Emperor could not admit that the Porte was entitled to make any alteration, and by so doing place Russia in a position of inferiority towards Turkey; that the Emperor had done all that could be required of him in accepting, without hesitation, a note which, in various respects, could not but be distasteful to him; and that, though entitled to make alterations if Turkey might do so, His Imperial Majesty had considered that the Porte would, like himself, look upon the note as not open to alteration, and on this understanding His Imperial Majesty had accepted it. That the Emperor, therefore, insisted upon the acceptance of the note by the Porte; and although released from his engagements by the refusal of the Porte, he was nevertheless still ready, on the arrival at St. Petersburg of a Turkish Ambassador with the note unaltered, and without any conditions being attached to it, to withdraw his troops from the Turkish territory.

Such being the tenor of the accounts from St. Petersburg, Count Buol goes on to say, that nothing remained but to exhort the Porte duly to weigh the serious consequences of rejecting the only remaining chance of an amicable arrangement. Austria, undeterred by any feeling of pique at the rejection of the note which she had proposed, had urged Russia to accept the modifications, of which Austria herself did not approve. Whatever shades of difference might exist in the language and views of their Representatives at Constantinople, the Four Powers were unanimously of opinion that the note was worthy of acceptance by the Porte, and was not calculated to prejudice either the interests or the dignity of the Sultan. With no less unanimity did they regret the hesitation shown by the Porte to listen to their advice; and the Austrian Government felt sure that they would now all agree in urging the Porte no longer to refuse accepting the note as it stood. At all events, if her counsels were again disregarded, Austria, while deploring the fatal consequences which must ensue from a fresh refusal on the part of the Porte to defer to the wishes of the Powers, could only consider her efforts to effect a reconciliation as at an end.

In the second despatch Baron Bruck is directed to urge, not only the influential members of the Ottoman Ministry, but even the Sultan in person, no longer to defer adopting the only course which the state of affairs required; to press for the immediate dispatch of the note in its original shape by a special Ambassador to Vienna, or that the Turkish Ambassador at Vienna should be

authorized to seek an opportunity to place it before the Emperor Nicholas : and the Austrian Government would, in that case, endeavour to obtain an audience for the Ambassador before the Emperor of Russia set out from Warsaw on his return to St. Petersburg, as the only means of effecting the evacuation of the Principalities before the winter.

Count Buol goes on to say, that it might be suggested to the Sultan to accompany the note with an autograph letter to the Emperor Nicholas, in which his Highness might express the doubts which had occasioned the hesitation of the Divan, and so afford the Emperor an opportunity of tranquillizing the alarm which had been excited. Austria would, in that case, exert herself, and she had reason to suppose not without effect, to obtain still greater concessions for Turkey ; for Austria could not doubt that the views of the Emperor were pacific, and his desire sincere to effect a reconciliation with the Porte ; no better proof of which could be adduced than the fact that the Russian army had already been ordered to prepare for the evacuation of the Ottoman territory, in case the Vienna note had been accepted by the Porte. In fact, Austria knew that the arrival of the Turkish Ambassador at St. Petersburg would not have been waited for as a preliminary to the commencement of the withdrawal of the Russian forces.

When Count Colloredo had finished reading these despatches he said, it was of the utmost importance that Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople should receive instructions similar to those which had been transmitted to the Internuncio, again to press the Vienna note on the acceptance of the Porte.

In reply, I expressed my regret that such instructions could not be sent, as I had that morning received despatches from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, stating that it was utterly impossible for the Turkish Government to agree to the note without modifications ; but that the chief reason which must influence Her Majesty's Government no longer to urge the Porte on this subject, was Count Nesselrode's analysis of the Turkish modifications, explaining the grounds upon which the Russian Government objected to them ; and I could not help expressing my surprise, that no allusion should have been made to that document in the despatches which Count Colloredo had just read, for it was now clear that the Russian Government endeavoured to give to the note a construction not intended by the Four Powers who framed it.

Count Colloredo said, that if instructions in the sense that Count Buol requested were not sent to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, there would be an end to the Conference at Vienna. I answered that that would be a matter of sincere regret to Her Majesty's Government, who had considered that united opinion and action of the Four Powers upon not only the present, but future questions, between Russia and the Porte, would tend to preserve peace and to uphold the Ottoman Empire ; but that no advantage could be worth purchasing by dishonesty ; and Her Majesty's Government would consider it nothing short of dishonesty to persuade the Turkish Government to sign the note, now that they were made aware that their interpretation of it was not that of the Emperor of Russia.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 102.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 21.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, September 19, 1853.*

M. DE KISSELEFF communicated this afternoon to M. Drouyn de Lhuys two documents, of which I have no doubt your Lordship has knowledge through M. de Brunnow ; the one being a despatch stating why the Emperor of Russia has determined on rejecting the Vienna note as modified by the Porte ; the other being a memorandum examining the modifications themselves, and showing the points on which the Russian Government differed from the interpretation sought to be put upon them by the Porte.

No. 103.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 21.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, September 20, 1853.*

I HAVE just seen M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who read to me a despatch which he had received this morning from Count Walewski giving an account of a conversation which that Ambassador had held with your Lordship yesterday in the presence of the Earl of Aberdeen. Count Walewski stated that your Lordship had read to him the reasons why Russia refused to adhere to the modifications demanded by the Porte before the latter could accept the Vienna note ; that these reasons showed that Russia put a very different interpretation upon the sense of the Vienna note from that intended by the Conference ; that it appeared consequently to Lord Aberdeen and to yourself that any further proceedings at Vienna would be useless, for that it would not be fair to urge the Porte to sign a document which would give Russia such advantages as it was now clear the Russian Government expected from it.

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No. 104.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, September 21, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, in reply to your despatch of the 30th of August, that Her Majesty's Government approve the instructions which you have given to Her Majesty's Consular officers in Wallachia and Moldavia with reference to the reiterated orders sent by the Porte to the Hospodars to withdraw from those provinces in the event of the continued opposition of the Russian authorities to their maintaining their proper intercourse with and deference to the Porte.

Your Excellency will acquaint Mr. Consul-General Colquhoun that I approve of the manner in which he is acting at the present crisis.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 105.

*Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 23.)*

(Extract.)

*Berlin, September 18, 1853.*

IN the course of the conversation which I had the honour of holding with the King, His Majesty alluded to Eastern affairs.

His Majesty requested me to state to your Lordship his anxious desire to cooperate with England in this question, for it was the common interest of both countries to leave no means untried to preserve the peace of the world.

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## No. 106.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

(Extract.)

*Foreign Office, September 23, 1853.*

HER Majesty's Government, under the altered phase of affairs caused by the recent interpretation given by Russia to the Vienna note, do not think it expedient further to press the note on the acceptance of the Porte, nor to offer the British interpretation of it as an inducement to the Turkish Government to adopt it.

The reasons which have induced Her Majesty's Government to come to this determination are fully explained in my despatch of the 20th instant to the Earl of Westmorland,\* of which, as well as of Count Nesselrode's despatch to Baron Meyendorff and of the Russian objections to the modifications of the Porte,† copies have been forwarded to you.

It will be a satisfaction to Her Majesty's Government to find that the French Government concur in their views on this subject.

## No. 107.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

(Extract.)

*Foreign Office, September 23, 1853.*

HOWEVER much Her Majesty's Government will lament the commencement of active hostilities, yet they will certainly offer no advice to the Turkish Government contrary to the interests of the Porte; and those interests might be seriously affected by the maintenance of the actual *status quo*, which would leave Russia in peaceful possession of the Principalities during the winter.

## No. 108.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, September 23, 1853.*

I INCLOSE the copy of a telegraphic despatch from M. de la Cour which has been communicated to me by Count Walewski, stating the serious apprehensions that were entertained of a catastrophe of which the European inhabitants of Constantinople would be the first victims, and which might endanger the Throne of the Sultan, and that Reshid Pasha and the Grand Vizier had informed the French and English Ambassadors that the lives and properties of their countrymen might thus be exposed to serious danger, which the Government would be powerless to avert.

M. de la Cour further states, that having consulted Viscount de Redcliffe they had determined each to send for two war-steamers from Besika for the purpose of protecting their respective countrymen, and in case of need to contribute to the personal safety of the Sultan.

Count Walewski then informed the Earl of Aberdeen (who was present at the interview) and myself, that his Government, with reference to the crisis which appeared to be imminent, thought it indispensably necessary that both fleets should be ordered up to Constantinople; and his Excellency added that he was directed to ask for the immediate decision of Her Majesty's Government, in order that no time might be lost in sending instructions to the Ambassadors and Admirals.

I told Count Walewski that no intelligence of the nature referred to by M. de la Cour had been received from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and that so long as the Porte did not declare war against Russia and desire the presence

of the British fleet, it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government to observe the Treaty of 1841 ; but Lord Aberdeen and I concurred in stating to Count Walewski that under such circumstances as those reported by M. de la Cour the provisions of any Treaty must necessarily, and as a matter of course, be set aside, and that we would without hesitation take upon ourselves to agree to the proposal of the French Government that the Ambassadors should be instructed to call up the fleets to Constantinople for the security of British and French interests, and, if necessary, for the protection of the Sultan.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure in No. 108.

*M. de la Cour to M. Drouyn de Lhuys.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Therapia, le 11 Septembre, 1853.*

L'Ambassadeur de France, à Constantinople, à M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères :

LA position du Gouvernement Turc s'aggrave de plus en plus, et les choses sont au point de faire craindre sérieusement une catastrophe dont les habitants Rayahs ou Européens seraient les premières victimes, et qui menacerait même le trône du Sultan.

Reshid Pasha et le Grand Vizir m'ont fait part de ces appréhensions. Ils ne m'ont pas caché que les personnes et les intérêts de mes nationaux seraient dans cette occurrence exposés à de graves dangers qu'ils se sentaient impuissants à conjurer par suite de la désunion qui existait dans le Ministère, et les menaces qui sont dirigées contre eux-mêmes.

Le même avis a été donné à l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, et après nous être concertés, nous avons décidé à faire venir de Besica, chacun, deux navires à vapeur de haut bord, pour renforcer la station de Constantinople, et avoir sous la main des ressources suffisantes pour protéger nos nationaux, et même, au besoin, prêter appui au Sultan si le mouvement provoqué par la partie de la guerre allait jusqu'à menacer son autorité.

(Signé) DE LA COUR.

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Therapia, September 11, 1853.*

The Ambassador of France at Constantinople to the Minister for Foreign Affairs :

THE position of the Turkish Government becomes worse and worse, and matters are arrived at such a state as to cause serious apprehensions to be entertained of a catastrophe, of which the inhabitants, Rayahs or Europeans, would be the first victims, and which would even threaten the Sultan's throne.

Reshid Pasha and the Grand Vizier have imparted these apprehensions to me. They have not concealed from me, that the persons and the interests of my countrymen would in that case be exposed to serious dangers, which they were sensible they were incapable of preventing by reason of the want of union in the Ministry, and the threats directed against themselves.

The same notice has been given to the Ambassador of England, and, after having come to an understanding with each other, we have decided upon summoning from Besika, each of us, two powerful steam-vessels, in order to reinforce the ships at Constantinople, and that we may have at our disposal sufficient resources for the protection of our countrymen, and, if necessary, for affording support even to the Sultan, in case the movement urged on by the war-party should go the length of menacing his authority.

(Signed) DE LA COUR.

No. 109.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, September 23, 1853.*

BY a telegraphic despatch of the 11th instant from M. de la Cour to his Government, which has been communicated to me by Count Walewski, Her Majesty's Government have learnt the alarming state of affairs which then existed at Constantinople; and that, upon the representations of Reshid Pasha and the Grand Vizier to your Excellency and M. de la Cour, you had each determined to send for two war-steamers from Besika.

The latest date of the despatches received from your Excellency at this office is the 5th instant, and Her Majesty's Government have, therefore, no information of the events alluded to by M. de la Cour; but assuming, of course, that his report is correct, I have the satisfaction of conveying to you the approval of Her Majesty's Government.

Under ordinary circumstances, and as long as the Sultan does not declare war against Russia, nor demand the presence of the British fleet, we must scrupulously observe the Treaty of 1841, and your Excellency's original instructions on this matter remain therefore in full force. But when it appears that the lives and properties of British subjects are exposed to serious danger, and that the Turkish Government declares itself unable to avert that danger, it is clear that the Treaty has no longer a binding force upon us, and that urgent necessity supersedes its provisions.

Your Excellency is therefore instructed to send for the British fleet to Constantinople, and, in conjunction with the Admiral, to dispose of it in the manner you deem most expedient for protecting British interests and the personal safety of the Sultan; and Her Majesty's Government have no doubt that the Turkish Government will, without hesitation, furnish the necessary firmans for that object.

Similar instructions will be sent to M. de la Cour; and I need hardly say, how essential it is that your Excellency should act in entire concert with your French colleague.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 110.

*Baron Brunnow to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 26.)*

Milord,

*Londres, le  $\frac{1}{2}$ <sup>3</sup>/<sub>5</sub> Septembre, 1853.*

LE <sup>21 Mai</sup><sub>2 Juin</sub> vous m'avez annoncé que Lord Stratford avait reçu l'autorisation éventuelle d'appeler l'escadre Anglaise dans le Détroit des Dardanelles, si Constantinople était attaqué.

Je vous ai fait observer que si l'entrée d'une escadre étrangère dans le Détroit avait lieu avant que le cas de guerre prévu par le Traité de  $\frac{1}{13}$  Juillet, 1841, ne fût arrivé, cet acte constituerait une infraction au dit Traité.

Afin de m'assurer de l'exactitude avec laquelle j'avais rapporté vos paroles, j'ai eu l'honneur de placer le même jour sous vos yeux la dépêche que j'ai adressée au Cabinet Impérial pour lui rendre compte de notre entretien.

Jusqu'ici, l'éventualité que vous m'aviez signalée, ne s'est point réalisée.

Constantinople est resté de notre part en pleine sûreté et par mer et par terre.

Notre escadre s'est abstenue de toute démonstration qui pût mettre en péril la capitale de l'Empire Ottoman.

Son repos est demeuré également à l'abri de toute atteinte du côté de terre ferme. Car je n'ai pas besoin de vous rappeler, M. le Comte, qu'à l'époque où les troupes Russes sont entrées dans les Principautés, vous avez été informé des limites prescrites par l'Empereur à leur mouvement. Elles n'ont point franchi

le Danube. Sans vue d'hostilité, l'Empereur a renfermé son action dans une mesure de sûreté temporairement prise pour gage d'une réparation qui lui fût offerte, dans les voies de la conciliation et de la paix.

Il dépendait du Gouvernement Ottoman, vous me l'avez dit, de considérer alors cette mesure comme un cas de guerre. Il ne l'a point fait.

Les conseils du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, je ne l'ignore pas, ont eu une part méritoire à ce résultat, accompli dans l'intérêt bien entendu de la paix, surtout dans celui de la Porte elle-même.

Le Divan appréciant cette vérité, d'autant plus qu'à cette époque il avait le sentiment de sa faiblesse, a suivi les conseils qui fesaient sa sûreté.

Malgré l'interruption de nos relations diplomatiques, malgré l'occupation temporaire des Provinces Danubiennes, la paix a continué à subsister entre la Russie et l'Empire Ottoman.

Les relations commerciales entre les deux pays n'ont point été interrompues. De plus, toute chance de conflit a été prévenu entre les troupes Russes et Ottomanes par une entente établie entre les commandants respectifs. Dans ce but, le Prince Gortchakoff a annoncé à Reshid Pasha qu'il avait pour instruction de ne point se porter à des mesures offensives sur la rive droite du Danube, et qu'il dépendait du Gouvernement Ottoman de munir ses officiers de directions conçues dans le même esprit, pour empêcher toute collision. En retour de cette communication Reshid Pasha a répondu que les commandants Turcs avaient l'ordre de s'abstenir de toute hostilité, tant que les troupes Russes resteraient sur la rive gauche. De part et d'autre cette entente formellement établie a maintenu les relations réciproques sur le pied de paix. Cet état de choses, reconnu par la Porte, a subsisté jusqu'au <sup>28 Août</sup><sub>9 Septembre</sub>, date de la dernière communication officielle, qui m'est parvenue hier, du Prince Gortchakoff.

Enfin, une négociation conduite d'après le désir de l'Empereur, sous les bons offices de l'Autriche, a continué jusqu'à ce jour à nous inspirer l'espoir d'une solution pacifique de la crise actuelle.

Déjà un arrangement à l'amiable proposé par le Cabinet de Vienne, avec le concours des autres Grandes Puissances, avait obtenu l'assentiment franc et cordial de l'Empereur.

Tandis que ce plan faisait l'objet d'un échange de communications amicales entre les Cabinets et la Porte, tandis que celle-ci était invitée à envoyer à St. Pétersbourg un Ambassadeur comme l'organe d'une réconciliation qu'on aimait à croire prochaine, il n'y avait assurément pas lieu d'admettre que le Gouvernement Ottoman considérât la paix comme déjà rompue. Elle restait intacte. Elle durait, je le constate, tout à l'avantage de la Porte ; car aussi longtemps qu'elle se prolongeait, les Turcs augmentaient de jour en jour leurs armements, sans que la Russie, forte de ses propres intentions pacifiques, en demandât compte ou qu'elle cherchât à y mettre obstacle.

Mais, de bonne foi, la guerre, en droit public, ne se présume point. Avant qu'elle éclate, elle se déclare.

A ma connaissance, nul acte de déclaration de guerre n'a eu lieu de la part de la Porte. Et, en ce qui regarde les déterminations de ma Cour, vous savez, M. le Comte, que tout récemment encore j'ai été chargé de vous exprimer combien Sa Majesté l'Empereur tenait à cœur d'accélérer la conclusion d'un arrangement à l'amiable qui lui permît de faire cesser toute cause de més-intelligence avec la Porte, et de faire rentrer aussitôt ses troupes dans nos frontières.

C'est ce moment même que le Divan paraît avoir choisi pour élever contre cette œuvre de conciliation de nouveaux obstacles, en appelant le pavillon de guerre étranger dans le Détroit dont la fermeture avait été placée, par le Traité de 1841, sous la sauvegarde d'un Acte Européen.

Cette transaction, dont les termes précis me sont d'autant mieux connus que j'ai été appelé à y concourir, renferme un double engagement.

D'une part le Sultan a déclaré " la ferme résolution de maintenir à l'avenir le principe invariablement établi comme ancienne règle de son Empire, en vertu duquel il a été de tout temps défendu aux bâtiments de guerre des Puissances Etrangères d'entrer dans les Détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore, et que tant que la Porte se trouve en paix, Sa Hautesse n'admettra aucun bâtiment de guerre étranger dans les dits Détroits."

De l'autre, les Cinq Grandes Puissances se sont engagées " à respecter cette détermination du Sultan et à se conformer au principe ci-dessus énoncé."

S'il est vrai, comme je l'apprends, que le Sultan ait appelé dans le Déroit des bâtimens de guerre étrangers, tandis que la paix continuait à durer, sans qu'elle fût déclarée rompue par un Acte formel, public, patent, je dirai que le Sultan a manqué à un engagement qui lui était imposé par un Traité dont je suis signataire.

C'est avec un vif regret que je devrai dire en même temps que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique en se rendant à une invitation du Sultan, contraire à cet engagement, sans délibération préalable avec les autres Puissances Contractantes, ne s'est point conformé au principe que le Traité du 1<sup>er</sup> Juillet nous imposait l'obligation de respecter.

J'attends, M. le Comte, que vous me fassiez connaître, pour l'information de ma Cour, les circonstances qui ont précédé et accompagné un fait si grave. Il demande explication.

Je la réclame de la loyauté du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique. Lorsqu'il l'aura donnée, l'Empereur, de concert avec les autres Hautes Parties Contractantes, sera en mesure de se prononcer sur les conséquences d'une situation contre laquelle j'élève mes remontrances et je prends mes réserves, dans l'accomplissement strict de mes devoirs, dès l'instant où ce fait parvient à ma connaissance.

Je remplis ce devoir en invitant formellement votre Excellence à prendre acte de ces réserves, que j'établis, par la présente, au nom de ma Cour.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.

(Signé) BRUNNOW.

(Translation.)

My Lord,

London, September 1<sup>st</sup>/<sub>25</sub>, 1853.

ON the <sup>21st May</sup><sub>2nd June</sub> you announced to me that Lord Stratford had been contingently authorized to call the British squadron within the Straits of the Dardanelles, if Constantinople should be attacked.

I remarked that if a foreign squadron entered the Dardanelles before the occurrence of the case of war contemplated by the Treaty of the 1<sup>st</sup>/<sub>3</sub>th July, that proceeding would amount to a breach of that Treaty.

In order to assure myself of the correctness with which I had reported what you said, I had the honour to place before you, on the same day, the despatch which I addressed to the Imperial Cabinet, giving an account of our conversation.

Hitherto the contingency which you had pointed out to me has not arisen. Constantinople, as far as we are concerned, has remained in full security both by sea and by land.

Our squadron has refrained from any demonstration which could place in danger the capital of the Ottoman Empire.

Its tranquillity has equally been undisturbed by any attack on the land side. For I need not remind you, M. le Comte, that at the time when the Russian troops entered the Principalities, you were informed of the limits which the Emperor had set to their movements. They have not crossed the Danube. Having no hostile view the Emperor has confined his action to a measure of security, adopted for a time as a pledge for a reparation which might be offered to him, and within the limits of conciliation and of peace.

It rested with the Ottoman Government, you told me, at that time to consider this measure as a case of war. It has not done so.

I am not ignorant that the recommendations of Her Britannic Majesty's Government meritoriously contributed to this result, effected in the well-understood interest of peace, especially in that of the Porte itself.

The Divan, appreciating this truth, the more so that at that time it was conscious of its weakness, followed the advice on which its safety depended.

Notwithstanding the interruption of our diplomatic relations, notwithstanding the temporary occupation of the Danubian provinces, peace has continued to subsist between Russia and the Ottoman Empire.

The commercial relations between the two countries have not been interrupted. Furthermore, all chance of conflict between the Russian and Ottoman troops has been prevented by an understanding arrived at between the respective commanders. With this view, Prince Gortchakoff announced to Reshid Pasha

that he was instructed not to have recourse to offensive measures on the right bank of the Danube, and that it rested with the Ottoman Government to furnish its officers with instructions of the same kind in order to prevent any collision.

In reply to this communication Reshid Pasha stated that the Turkish commanders were ordered to refrain from any act of hostility so long as the Russian troops remained on the left bank. This understanding, formally established on both sides, has maintained the relations of both parties on a footing of peace. This state of things, acquiesced in by the Porte, continued up to the <sup>28th August</sup><sub>9th September</sub>, the date of the last official communication from Prince Gortchakoff, which reached me yesterday.

Finally, a negotiation, carried on by the Emperor's desire under the good offices of Austria, has continued up to the present day to inspire us with the hope of a pacific solution of the existing crisis.

An amicable settlement proposed by the Cabinet of Vienna, with the concurrence of the other Great Powers, had already obtained the frank and cordial assent of the Emperor.

Whilst this plan was forming the object of amicable communications between the Cabinets and the Porte; whilst the latter was being invited to send to St. Petersburg an Ambassador, as the organ of a reconciliation which was fondly supposed to be at hand, there was assuredly no ground for admitting that the Porte could look upon peace as already broken. It remained unimpaired. It continued, I maintain, altogether for the advantage of the Porte; for so long as it was protracted the Turks were daily augmenting their armaments, while Russia, relying on her own pacific intentions, did not ask any explanations in regard to them, or offer to them any obstacle.

But, in good faith, war, according to public law, is not a matter of assumption. Before it breaks out it is declared.

As far as I know, no declaration of war has been made on the part of the Porte. And as regards the determinations of my Court, you are aware, M. le Comte, that even very recently I have been instructed to express to you how much His Majesty the Emperor had at heart to hasten the conclusion of an amicable arrangement which might allow him to put an end to every cause of misunderstanding with the Porte, and forthwith to withdraw his troops within our frontiers.

It is this very time which appears to have been chosen by the Divan for raising up fresh obstacles to this work of reconciliation, by summoning a foreign flag of war within the Strait, the closing of which had been placed by the Treaty of 1841 under the protection of an European Act.

That compact, with the precise terms of which I am the better acquainted from having been called to take part in it, comprises a twofold engagement.

On the one hand, the Sultan declared "his firm resolution to maintain for the future the principle invariably established as the ancient rule of his Empire, in virtue of which the ships of war of foreign Powers have at all times been prohibited from entering into the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus, and that so long as the Porte is at peace, his Highness will not admit any foreign ship of war within the said Straits."

On the other hand, the Five Great Powers engaged "to respect this determination of the Sultan and to conform to the principle above set forth."

If it is true, as I learn, that the Sultan has summoned foreign ships of war within the Straits while peace continued to subsist, without its being declared by a formal, patent, and public Act to be broken, I will assert that the Sultan has failed in an engagement imposed upon him by a Treaty to which I am a signing party.

It is with lively regret that I must state at the same time that Her Britannic Majesty's Government, by complying with an invitation from the Sultan opposed to that engagement, without previous deliberation with the other Contracting Powers, has not acted in conformity with the principle which the Treaty of the 13<sup>th</sup> July imposed upon us the obligation to respect.

I expect, M. le Comte, that you will acquaint me, for the information of my Court, with the circumstances which have preceded and accompanied so serious a proceeding. It requires explanation.

I require it of the good faith of Her Britannic Majesty's Government. When it shall have been afforded, the Emperor, in concert with the other High

Contracting Parties, will be in a position to declare himself as to the consequences of a state of things against which, in the strict discharge of my duties, I raise my remonstrances and make my reservations the instant that that proceeding has come to my knowledge.

I fulfil that duty by formally requesting your Excellency to take note of these reservations, which, by the present communication, I make in the name of my Court.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) BRUNNOW.

No. 111.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 27.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, September 26, 1853.*

I HAVE read to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the copy of your Lordship's despatch of the 20th instant to Her Majesty's Envoy at Vienna; and I told him at the same time, as directed in your despatch to me of the 23rd instant, that it would be a satisfaction to Her Majesty's Government to find that the French Government concur in their views respecting the present state of the Eastern question, as developed in those instructions to Lord Westmorland. M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied, without hesitation, that he subscribed entirely to your Lordship's reasoning.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 112.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 27.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, September 26, 1853.*

I HAVE communicated to M. Drouyn de Lhuys your Lordship's despatch of the 23rd instant, in which you inform me that Her Majesty's Government assents to the proposition made by the French Government, that the fleets should be ordered up to Constantinople; and I have read to him also, the instructions which you have addressed in consequence to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe. M. Drouyn de Lhuys has read me, in return, the despatches which were sent to M. de la Cour last night, to be forwarded by a special steamer from Marseilles.

No. 113.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 27.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, September 26, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has received despatches from Constantinople up to the 15th instant. In them M. de la Cour relates the reasons which led the Ottoman Minister to ask for the presence of a few vessels from the combined fleets; those reasons being an attempt made by the Ulemas, but which failed, to excite the Turkish population of Constantinople to dictate terms to the Sultan. The vessels sent for had arrived, and together with those previously stationed or accidentally at Constantinople, made a squadron of some nine or ten ships.

## No. 114.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 28.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, September 15, 1853.*

A PLACARD urging the Government to declare war was lately posted on one of the mosques at Constantinople. That demonstration of popular excitement was followed after several days by a petition of the same purport presented to the Council and to the Sultan himself by a knot of individuals belonging to the class of muderris, or theological students. The paper was signed by thirty-five persons of no individual distinction, but having the corporate importance of belonging to the "Ulemah." Though free from menace, it was worded in serious and impressive terms, implying a strong sense of religious duty, and a very independent disregard of consequences. The Ministers took alarm, and conceived it to be the immediate forerunner of a revolution. I was implored to take part in measures calculated to maintain the public tranquillity.

The French Ambassador called upon me to compare his information with mine, and to consult as to the course which it would be most advisable to pursue. The Internuncio also sent his principal interpreter to make me a similar communication. Both had been apprized by his Highness the Foreign Secretary of danger impending in the shape of a popular revolution, and both were ready to join with me in adopting measures adequate to the occasion.

I expressed in reply a cordial readiness to act in concert with them, but I declared at the same time that I was desirous of taking no step unwarranted by the necessities of the case, and that I wished to guard myself against mistake or exaggeration by a more precise knowledge of circumstances. Any joint interference on our parts, whether by note to the Minister or by direct application to the Sultan, would in my judgment be attended with serious inconvenience; and I was still less inclined to join in bringing up the squadrons to Constantinople without more proofs of urgent peril than we had yet obtained. I suggested, as an opinion of my own, that we should do well, in the actual state of our information, to procure from our respective Admirals such an addition of steam force as might protect us from any immediate attack, and enable us to assist the Government in case of an outbreak threatening its existence, without attracting any unusual attention, or assuming an air of intimidation. This limited plan has been carried into effect with much appearance of success by the French Ambassador and myself. The Admirals at Besika Bay have complied with our request.

I have since received, not only from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, but also from the greater part of his colleagues, including the Grand Vizier and Sheik-ul-Islam, a strong assurance that the revolutionary movement is checked for the present.

## No. 115.

*Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 26.)*

(Extract.)

*Berlin, September 23, 1853.*

IN an interview I had this morning with Baron Manteuffel his Excellency informed me that he had just received a telegraphic despatch from Count Arnim, the Prussian Minister at Vienna, dated yesterday afternoon, stating, that "Lord Westmorland had read to the Conference a telegraphic despatch, according to which the English Cabinet says, that as the Cabinet of Russia, according to its last despatches, did not interpret the Vienna note as the British Government did, they could no longer counsel the Porte to accept the Vienna note."

His Excellency seemed much surprised at this intelligence, and was evidently anxious for some explanation of the despatch which Lord Westmorland had received from your Lordship, and which he had communicated yesterday to the Conference at Vienna. As his Excellency informed me that he was about to

communicate this telegraphic despatch to the King, I deemed it of importance that his Excellency should be enabled to convey to His Majesty a correct view on the subject, and I judged it would be in accordance with your Lordship's wishes that I should communicate, confidentially, to **Baron Manteuffel**, any information which would relieve his mind of doubts or prevent false deductions.

Your Lordship's despatch of the 20th of September\* to the **Earl of Westmorland** (which I received yesterday under flying-seal), enabled me to give the following explanations to **Baron Manteuffel**.

I commenced by stating to his Excellency, that he had been aware of the moderate and conciliatory course which Her Majesty's Government had pursued from the commencement of this tedious and difficult negotiation; that Her Majesty's Government had had deeply at heart the pacific solution of the differences between Russia and Turkey in a manner consistent with the honour of the Sultan and the independence of Turkey; that with this view the note drawn up at Vienna had been recommended to the acceptance of the Porte; and further, that the modifications to that note which had been proposed by Turkey, had been considered as unimportant, and as bearing the same interpretation as contained in the Vienna note; whilst Her Majesty's Government in adopting these views had placed confidence in the declaration which the Emperor of Russia had repeatedly put forth, viz., that he sought for no new right and no increase of power in Turkey. I then observed to his Excellency, that the reasons put forth by the Russian Government for the rejection of the modifications proposed by Turkey, were of a nature to awaken fears that the interpretation of the Vienna note was viewed otherwise by Count Nesselrode than by the framers of that note, and that Russia seemed to put a different construction on the terms of that note than the one entertained by Her Majesty's Government.

I remarked to his Excellency, that the object which the Four Powers have been labouring to attain, is to establish, both now and hereafter, permanent friendly relations between Russia and Turkey, and that it was obvious that the interpretation of the note, which was to be considered as the basis of reconciliation, should be one and the same; that it should bear the same sense in the opinion of both parties, and that it was highly important that no difference of interpretation should hereafter arise which might lead to fresh disputes. His Excellency would, therefore, doubtless acknowledge that in the interest of peace it was most desirable, nay, of paramount importance, that all cause for future misunderstanding should be avoided, and that for this purpose it was imperatively necessary that any doubts which might be entertained by either party as to the interpretation of this note should be cleared up, and that it was expedient that this understanding should be arrived at previous to its signature by Turkey.

I added, that after the repeated declarations of the Emperor of Russia that he seeks no new right and no further extension of power in Turkey, it might confidently be hoped that His Imperial Majesty would not hesitate to give those assurances which would quiet the present fears of Turkey, and which, if happily the present differences were adjusted, would tend to consolidate on a firmer and surer basis the future friendly relations of the two States.

His Excellency listened carefully to my observations, and, without expressing any decided opinion, seemed to assent to the justice of the views I had exposed.

I trust your Lordship will approve of my having made this communication to **Baron Manteuffel**, as well as of the substance of my observations.

No. 116.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 29, 1853.

I RECEIVED yesterday evening your Excellency's despatch of the 15th instant, reporting the circumstances under which your Excellency and the French Ambassador had severally called up from Besika Bay a portion of the British and French ships of war stationed at that anchorage.

Your Excellency will have learned by my despatch of the 23rd instant that Her Majesty's Government approve the course which you have pursued in this respect, under the critical circumstances which existed at Constantinople.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 117.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 30, 1853.

THE despatch from Count Nesselrode to Baron Meyendorff, communicated to me by Baron Brunnow, announcing that the Turkish modifications of the Vienna note had been rejected by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, and the analysis of the grounds upon which that decision was founded, would appear to preclude the hope of an amicable arrangement between Russia and Turkey, and as their effects may consequently be disastrous to Europe, they have received the serious attention of Her Majesty's Government; and I shall now proceed to state the opinion that has been formed of them with reference to the intentions of the Conference of Vienna in framing the note, to the motives of the Ottoman Government in proposing amendments, and to the repeated declarations of the Emperor that he desired no new right nor any extension of influence in Turkey.

In his despatch Count Nesselrode alludes to the terms on which the note had been accepted at St. Petersburg, and the understanding that if any changes were introduced at Constantinople, the Russian Government would be at liberty to withhold its assent.

The Russian Government had of course a right to make this condition, or to suggest amendments to the note. The Turkish Government possessing a similar right, exercised it by proposing certain modifications. The Conference had no power to impose the note on either party: its position was that of a mediator endeavouring to do equal justice to both parties, and its intention was to guard the honour and independence of the Sultan, and secure to Russia what she was entitled to claim, but no more, viz., the maintenance of existing Treaties, and the *status quo* in matters of religion. The Conference, therefore, could not refuse to entertain the modifications of the Porte, although regretting the loss of time which they occasioned. They were not looked upon as altering the sense of the note, nor at variance with the intentions of the Conference, and they were unanimously recommended to the acceptance of the Russian Government, the Russian Minister at Vienna, it is understood, concurring in the recommendation.

They have been rejected, but the Russian Government did not take its stand upon the condition on which the note had been accepted, viz., that of no change being made, but has fully entered into the objections to which it considered the modifications were liable, and which showed that inferences were drawn from the note, and claims were to be established by means of it hereafter altogether inconsistent with the views and intentions of the Four Powers.

The frankness of this proceeding on the part of the Russian Government, and the determination that its intentions should not be misapprehended, are doubtless very proper; but on the other hand Her Majesty's Government feel, that even while retaining their own original interpretation of the note, it would now be highly dishonourable to press its acceptance on the Porte, when they have been duly warned by the Power to whom the note is to be addressed, that another and a totally different meaning is attached to it by that Power. And even if this were not dishonourable, it would be in the highest degree impolitic for the reasons stated in Count Nesselrode's despatch with reference to admitting of any amendments, viz., that the Emperor would expose himself "to renew political relations with Turkey under unfavourable auspices, which would deprive them of all solidity for the future, and inevitably bring about a fresh and more decided rupture."

Her Majesty's Government earnestly desire to see the relations between Russia and the Porte re-established on a friendly and permanent footing, and they consequently can be no party to an arrangement which the Cabinet of St. Petersburg has shown would frustrate the object which they have at heart.

Count Nesselrode appears to think that the modifications are by no means insignificant; but he seems not to be aware that this goes far to justify the Turkish Government in proposing them; and his Excellency altogether fails to show by what right, or in reparation of what injury, Russia claims admissions and concessions from the Sultan, who is unwilling to make them, and whose independence Russia, together with the other Powers of Europe, have determined to respect.

With regard to the first objection in Count Nesselrode's note, I have to observe, that the Conference at Vienna, in adverting to the active solicitude at all times displayed by the Emperor of Russia for the maintenance of the privileges and immunities of the Greco-Orthodox Church, simply intended to record the anxiety which every Sovereign must feel for the welfare in a foreign country of the religion he himself professes; but the Conference by no means intended to affirm that the immunities and privileges in question were solely due to the solicitude of the Emperors of Russia; and the Porte is justified in asserting that many of these privileges are of a date anterior to the existence of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Count Nesselrode alludes to other grievances, but specifies none except that regarding the Holy Places, which has been satisfactorily settled; nor have any other grievances connected with religious matters at any time been put forward by Russia, and it was not for the Conference to assume the existence of wrongs of which they had no knowledge.

But Count Nesselrode asks, where then was the object of Prince Menchikoff's mission?—and the answer to that is the assurance repeatedly given, that it was to settle the question of the Holy Places, and to obtain a guarantee for its not being again disturbed. That question has been settled to the satisfaction of all parties, and the Vienna note contains a guarantee against which Russia raises no objection.

The modification proposed by the Porte with reference to the Treaty of Kainardji appeared to Her Majesty's Government wholly uncalled for, until they read the objection made to it by Count Nesselrode's note. Her Majesty's Government considered that the stipulations of the Treaty of Kainardji, and the maintenance of religious privileges, had been disconnected in the note in a manner not to be mistaken, and indeed this is admitted by Count Nesselrode; but the Russian Government, while disclaiming all pretension to exercise a Protectorate, yet affirms that all these religious privileges and immunities are direct consequences of the Treaty, which was doubtless a solemn engagement taken by Turkey towards Russia; and the fulfilment of that engagement, but no more, it was the object of the Conference to secure. By Count Nesselrode's interpretation of the note, however, Russia would, under the seventh Article of the Treaty, be entitled to superintend all these privileges and immunities, which are of that peculiar character that she would be constantly able, if so minded, to interfere between the Sultan and his subjects; and thus the religious Protectorate, which is abjured, and the new rights and extended influence, which are equally disclaimed, would be established.

It is superfluous to say that no such intention was entertained by the

Conference; nor can the Treaty of Kainardji, by any subtlety of reasoning, be so construed. By the seventh Article of that Treaty, the Porte promises to protect the Christian religion in all its churches throughout the Ottoman dominions; but by the same Article the Ministers of Russia are permitted to make representations in favour of a new church and its ministers; and this clause would have been wholly unnecessary if Russian diplomacy had also been allowed to make representations on every matter connected with religion. If the Article bore the sense that Count Nesselrode now seeks to attach to it, and if the two Contracting Parties had been agreed upon it, it is reasonable to suppose that at the signing of the Treaty a stipulation so important as that of maintaining the privileges and immunities of the Greek Church would not have been omitted.

The third objection raised by Count Nesselrode is even more than the two which precede it at variance with the intention of the Conference, which assuredly was not that the Sultan should enter into an engagement with Russia to concede to the Greek Church all such advantages as might be granted to other Christian denominations, but only those advantages which were conceded to communities who, like the Greeks, were Ottoman subjects.

The spiritual head of the Roman Catholics in Turkey, as elsewhere, is a foreign Sovereign; and if it pleased the Sultan to enter into a Concordat with the Pope, conferring privileges upon Roman Catholics not subjects of the Porte, surely that ought to confer no right upon the Emperor of Russia to claim all the benefits of that Concordat for the Greek community subjects of the Porte, whose spiritual head, the Patriarch of Constantinople, is also a subject of the Sultan.

No Christian community being subjects of the Sultan would have any right to participate in the privileges and advantages that the Sultan might confer upon Russian convents, ecclesiastics, or laymen, such, for example, as the Russian church and hospital about to be built at Jerusalem; and in the same manner the Greek community, consisting of many millions, would have no right to participate in advantages granted to foreign convents or ecclesiastics, and which might not, for many and obvious reasons, be fitting for a Christian community subject to the Porte.

In fact, if the Sultan has at any time, in the exercise of his sovereign authority, conferred religious privileges upon a community not subject to him; or if he at any future time should think proper to do so, Count Nesselrode claims that Russia should have a right to demand that several millions of Greeks who are subjects of the Porte should at once be placed upon the footing of foreigners, and should enjoy, through the intervention of Russia, all the advantages which the Sultan, for reasons of which he is the only competent judge, may have granted to such foreigners.

How such a claim can be reconciled with the professed desire for the maintenance of existing Treaties and the strict *status quo* in religious matters, it is not for Her Majesty's Government to explain; but they consider that it exhibits a total disregard for the feelings and interests of the European Powers, who, in common with Russia, have declared that they will uphold the independence of Turkey, and who cannot therefore see with indifference that Russia should thus surreptitiously seek to obtain a virtual Protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Porte. And with respect to Count Nesselrode's supposition, that some new privilege, not mentioned in the recent firmans, might be granted to the Roman Catholic establishment in Palestine, to the prejudice of the native communities, his Excellency appears to have overlooked that by the Vienna note the Porte engages that no change shall be made in the order of things lately established at Jerusalem, without previous communication with the Governments of Russia and France.

I have now fully stated in what spirit and with what intentions the Vienna note was framed; but in interpreting it as Count Nesselrode has done by his objections to the modifications, his Excellency not only does not prove, but he does not even advert to, any obligation by which the Porte is bound to make concessions utterly irreconcilable with its independence. But Her Majesty's Government are compelled to consider that the claims put forward by Russia are equally irreconcilable with the assurance that no extended power or influence is sought in Turkey. They deeply regret that such claims should have

been made; for even were they successful, they would be useless to Russia if she sincerely desires the independence of the Ottoman Empire; but under any circumstances they must produce feelings of suspicion and distrust on the part of the Porte; and differences between the Two Powers will thus in future, as of late, be a source of anxiety to Europe, and expose the general peace to constant danger of disturbance.

You will communicate this despatch to Count Nesselrode, or to M. de Séniavine, should Count Nesselrode be still absent, and also give him a copy.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 118.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Baron Brunnov.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, October 1, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 25th ultimo, in which you express your opinion that if the Sultan has admitted foreign ships into the Straits of the Dardanelles while peace continued to exist, and without its having been declared broken by a formal, public, patent act, he has violated an engagement imposed upon him by the Treaty of 13th July, 1841.

You add that Her Majesty's Government in complying with the request of the Sultan, contrary to that engagement, and without previous deliberation with the other Contracting Powers, has not conformed to the principle which the Treaty imposed upon them the obligation to respect.

And you further say that you expect to learn from me, for the information of your Court, the circumstances which have preceded and accompanied a fact so grave, which demands explanation.

The foundation upon which you rest your right to make this inquiry is the Treaty of July 13, 1841, which, as you correctly state, binds the Sultan not to admit, and the other Contracting Powers not to send, ships of war, not Turkish, into those Straits as long as the Porte is at peace; and you allege that this engagement has been broken by the Porte and by the British Government.

But the Porte has ceased to be at peace from the moment when the first Russian soldier entered the Danubian Principalities, and from that moment the Sultan had a right to invite the British squadron into the Straits, and Her Majesty's Government had a right to send the British squadron into, and if necessary, through those Straits.

It is true that on entering the Principalities war was not declared by Russia, but a country whose territory is forcibly invaded and retained in contravention of a special Treaty engagement, for the purpose of compelling it to submit to conditions which it considers incompatible with its political independence, whose functionaries are forbidden to hold intercourse with its Government, and whose tribute is suspended,—that country cannot consistently with international law or usage, or with common sense, be considered at peace with the Power that so acts towards it; and I repeat, therefore, that from the day on which the Principalities were occupied, the Treaty, in accordance with its own provisions, has been suspended, and it rested with the Sultan and with Her Majesty's Government to determine at what time, and for what purposes, the British squadron should enter the Dardanelles.

It is not necessary to pursue this subject further, as Her Majesty's Ambassador has called up a portion of that squadron to Constantinople, not, as you appear to suppose, to favour an object on the part of the Divan of opposing fresh obstacles to the work of conciliation, but exclusively from apprehension of local dangers to British life and property; his proceedings have been entirely approved by Her Majesty's Government, who, with the same object in view, have instructed him to send for the whole of the squadron.

That the apprehension was well-founded there can exist no doubt, because the protracted occupation of the Principalities, the military preparations which the Porte has lately been compelled to make on that account, and in consequence

of the vast number of Russian troops that for a long time past have been assembled on the frontier of Turkey, have led to a state of things in Turkey which is natural, and must have been calculated upon, but which, on the other hand, is viewed with deep concern by those who desire the preservation of peace, and who regard the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire as an essential feature of European policy.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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## No. 119.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 2.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, September 23, 1853.*

I WOULD take the liberty of stating to your Lordship that the impression left upon my mind by the conversations which I held with the Chancellor, and by the hasty perusal of the despatch of <sup>August 26</sup><sub>September 7</sub> to Baron Meyendorff, which was placed in my hands, is that the Emperor, by refusing the Turkish amendments, was not to be understood as closing the door against arrangement or negotiation, but as declining to concede to the Sultan a faculty which he himself had not exercised, as considering his assent to the Vienna note cancelled so soon as the Sultan's refusal to agree to it became decided, and in this manner as reserving to himself perfect freedom as to the future course of diplomatic action.

Unfortunately the warlike disposition manifested by the Turks, together with the idea which has been encouraged by the public press of the Emperor's consent having been extorted from him under pressure, are certain to increase the difficulty of obtaining concessions on the side of Russia; and the chances of a favourable issue are further diminished by the belief indulged (as I know upon certain grounds) by the Russian Cabinet of its being impossible that the Turkish armies should hold together until the spring.

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## No. 120.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 2.)*

(Télégraphique.)

*Constantinople, Septembre 25, 1853.*

LA Porte ayant appris le refus de la Russie, et ne voulant pas accepter la note de Vienne sans ses modifications, se dispose à prendre la partie de la guerre malgré les conseils des Quatre Représentants. Demain la question doit être formellement décidée en Conseil Général. C'est le Sultan lui-même qui a ordonné que le Conseil fût assemblé. Il se (query, peut ?) que la Porte demande l'entrée des escadres aux Dardanelles, soit pour venir jusqu'à Constantinople, soit pour s'abriter entre les châteaux. Je dois avoir des instructions à cet égard. pour l'un comme pour l'autre cas.

(Signé) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, September 25, 1853.*

THE Porte having learnt the refusal of Russia, and being unwilling to accept the Vienna note without its modifications, is inclined to have recourse to war, notwithstanding the advice of the four Representatives. The question will be formally decided to-morrow in the Great Council. It is the Sultan himself who has ordered that the Council should be assembled. It is possible

that the Porte will demand the entrance of the squadrons into the Dardanelles, in order either that they should come up to Constantinople, or should obtain shelter within the Castles. I ought to have instructions in this respect for either contingency.

(Signed)

STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 121.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 2.)*

(Extract.)

*Olmütz, September 28, 1853.*

IN pursuance of the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch of the 20th instant, I waited upon Count Nesselrode soon after his arrival in Olmütz, and communicated to him that despatch, together with its inclosures.

Count Nesselrode stated that having received the orders of his Sovereign to enter fully with me into all such questions regarding the affairs of Turkey as I might be desirous of bringing before him, he should be most happy to do so, and that it gave him pleasure to be able at once to say that the despatch I had read to him, addressed by your Lordship to Lord Stratford on the 10th instant,\* was satisfactory to him.

With regard to your Lordship's despatch to me, Count Nesselrode stated that the former declaration of the Emperor, which you cited, "that he sought for no new right, and no increase of power in Turkey, but only desired the maintenance of existing Treaties, and the *status quo* in religious matters," was the one to which His Majesty most strictly adhered; and that no act of his, no interpretation of any document which had emanated from his authority or with his sanction, could give a colour to the supposition that he had swerved from the determination he had so unequivocally announced. Count Nesselrode, in remarking upon the rest of the despatch, distinctly stated that the Emperor sought no new rights, no further extension of power, but that His Majesty could not be expected, because suspicions were entertained of his holding views in opposition to his declarations, to abandon the decision he had announced of implicitly adhering to the note of the Four Powers which had been proposed to him, and which he had unhesitatingly accepted. Count Nesselrode said that he would submit to the Emperor the substance of the documents I had communicated to him, and would announce to me the decision which should be taken with regard to them.

I this day by appointment had a second interview with Count Nesselrode, when he stated that His Majesty the Emperor had expressed his satisfaction with the views and reasoning so ably put forward by your Lordship in the despatch addressed to Lord Stratford; but that he had been annoyed and hurt at the doubts which seemed to be expressed in the one addressed to me, as to whether he intended to adhere to the policy he had so distinctly and so unreservedly declared to be the one by which he would be ruled.

His Majesty, while giving expression to these feelings, had, notwithstanding, authorized Count Nesselrode to confer with Count Buol as to the adoption of any proposal by which a still further guarantee might be offered to the Porte that he would maintain inviolate the assurances he had given; that he sought no new right, no further extension of power; and that he looked to nothing but the maintenance of Treaties, and the *status quo* in religious matters. His Majesty had directed Count Nesselrode to report, for his approval, any recommendation which, in furtherance of his object, he might, in conjunction with Count Buol, consider it advisable to adopt.

Count Nesselrode stated that in consequence of these directions he, together with Count Buol, had drawn up the form of a note which contained the assurances above referred to, and which might be delivered to the Government of the Sultan by the Representatives of the Four Powers, upon the understanding that it should be received by the Porte as a sufficient guarantee for the acceptance of

the original Vienna note, the signature of which, and the appointment of an Ambassador to convey it to the Emperor, should immediately follow upon the delivery of the declaration now projected.

Such having been the result of communications with Count Buol, Count Nesselrode informed me that he had reported it to the Emperor, and that His Majesty had sanctioned the adoption of the proposed measure. Count Buol would therefore immediately transmit this project to the Allied Governments, and an instruction would be forwarded to the Russian Ministers at the different Courts to support and recommend it.

His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas, previous to his departure from Olmütz which took place this evening, was pleased, on taking leave of me, to refer to the decision he had taken with reference to this measure, and to assure me that he had thus endeavoured, by allowing his former declarations to be strengthened by repetition, to give an additional proof of his desire to meet every legitimate wish which was expressed to him by those Powers, whom he believed to be animated by a desire that his own just rights should be upholden, in common with those of every independent State.

### No. 122.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 2.)*

My Lord,

Olmütz, September 28, 1853.

COUNT BUOL has communicated to me the draft of a note, approved by Count Nesselrode, which it is his intention to propose as well to Her Majesty's Government as to those of France and Prussia, with a view to its being addressed to the Porte, as a security and guarantee upon which the latter may be called upon to adopt the original Vienna note.

In the anxious desire to find some means by which the Turkish Government could be induced to give such assurances to the Emperor of Russia as might terminate the present differences, Count Buol would have given up the Vienna note, and have sought some other means of attaining that object, had he not found an invincible repugnance on the part of Count Nesselrode to abandon the only basis which by the Emperor of Russia's acceptance of that note had been established amongst the Five Powers. These considerations had induced Count Buol to adhere to the original note, and to adopt the project which he now proposed, and of which he showed me the draft, informing me at the same time that it would be transmitted without delay to the Austrian Ministers in London, Paris, and Berlin, to be by them brought before the Governments to which they are severally accredited.

The general substance of this note, into the details of which I have not now time to enter, is as follows :

"The Representatives of the Four Powers, upon the promise being given by the Porte that it will sign in its original form the Vienna note, are ready to deliver to the Turkish Government a declaration, founded upon the assurances given by His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia, to the effect that His Majesty asks only for a general guarantee of the immunities already granted to the Greek Church, and for nothing which could in any way prejudice the independence or rights of the Sultan, or which would imply a desire to interfere (*ingérer*) with the internal affairs of the Porte.

"That what the Emperor desires is the strict maintenance of the *status quo* in all matters appertaining to the 'Orthodox Greek Church,' and the promise to make that Church participate in any future advantages which at a time subsequent to the present the Sultan may be disposed to grant to any other denominations of Christians."

This claim, as your Lordship will observe, is very different from that implied in the interpretation which has been given to the paragraph in the Vienna note, objected to by Reshid Pasha as conferring upon several millions of the subjects of the Porte religious privileges granted at different times to the subjects of other Powers residing within the Ottoman territory. The pretension now put forward is only that in future if any additional immunities are granted

to Christians of any denomination, they shall not be withheld from members of the Greek Church ; it is therefore prospective in its operation, and as such it is not believed that it ought to be considered in any way a condition onerous to the Porte, or unfitting for it to grant.

It is the intention of Count Nesselrode to instruct the various Representatives of Russia to confirm the declarations of the Emperor Nicholas, put forward in the present project of note.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

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### No. 123.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 3.)*

(Télégraphique.)

*Constantinople, le 26 Septembre, 10½ du soir.*

LE Conseil Turc s'est prononcé aujourd'hui pour la guerre après avoir déclaré la note de Vienne, telle quelle est, à jamais inadmissible. La déclaration [de] la guerre, et les mesures à prendre, sont laissées au Sultan et à ses Ministres. Les décisions ont été unanimes. Cette réunion [fut] composée de plus de 120 personnes. Les efforts des quatre Représentants pour obtenir une solution pacifique ont manqué d'effet, de même que ceux que j'ai faits de matin à la suite de l'arrivée pendant la nuit de vos dépêches expédiées par le "Triton." Je me propose de vous envoyer un exprès au plutôt par Marseilles.

(Signé) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, September 26, 10½ P.M.*

THE Turkish Council has given its decision in favour of war, after having declared the Vienna note in its present form to be inadmissible. The declaration of war, and the measures to be taken, are left to the Sultan and to his Ministers. The decisions were unanimous. The meeting consisted of more than 100 persons. The efforts of the four Representatives to obtain a pacific solution were fruitless, as well as those which I made this morning subsequently to the arrival in the course of the night of your despatches forwarded by the "Triton."

I purpose sending you an express by Marseilles as soon as possible.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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### No. 124.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 5.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, October 4, 1853.*

ON Friday last, the 30th ultimo, M. Drouyn de Lhuys received a telegraphic despatch from Vienna, stating that a fresh proposition for the settlement of the Eastern question had been sent from Olmütz, for the consideration of the Cabinets of London and Paris. In mentioning this to me M. Drouyn de Lhuys added, in reply to a question which I put to him, that he did not know the exact tenour of the proposition, but he seemed inclined to augur favourably of it.

On Sunday M. de Hübner made the communication which M. Drouyn de Lhuys had been led to expect, and he left with his Excellency copies of the note which it is proposed that the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople should address to the Porte, and of Count Buol's despatch urging the French Government to adopt this course. As your Lordship must be in possession of these papers, I need not attempt a description of them. M. Drouyn de

Lhuys stated at once to M. de Hübner that he must confine his official answer for the present to a promise to examine the proposition attentively, and with a sincere desire to find in it a solution of the present very critical juncture of the Eastern question; that before he could say more he must take the Emperor's orders, and must know the impression which the communication from Olmütz had made upon the British Government.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys saw the Emperor the same day. On the following morning (yesterday), M. de Hübner called upon his Excellency again, and was told that no decision would be taken by the French Government until Her Majesty's Government had been consulted.

I saw M. Drouyn de Lhuys later in the day, when he read me the Olmütz communications, and related to me what had passed between himself and M. de Hübner. He then said that the Emperor was inclined to view the proposed declaration favourably; that His Majesty thought that it guarded the points on which the French and English Governments had the most insisted, viz., the non-interference of Russia in the internal affairs of Turkey, or any assumed right of Russia to obtain privileges for the Greek, other than those enjoyed or to be conceded to other Christian communities, subjects of the Porte. That His Majesty had directed a communication to be made in this sense to Count Walewski, who would be instructed at the same time to request your Lordship, if, in your opinion, there were objections to the proposed declaration which had escaped the eyes of the French Government, to have the goodness to point them out.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys then asked me, as was natural, what I thought of the proposal? I replied, that having as yet no knowledge of the impression produced by it upon my Government, any observation I made must not be considered as carrying with it official weight.

There were, I said, several points to be considered; the nature of the declaration, the value of it: and, supposing these to be resolved satisfactorily, the time and manner of making it known to the Porte. With regard to the nature of the declaration, it seemed to me that we were required to give assurances as coming from Russia, of which we had no official knowledge, while care had been taken to make us well and officially acquainted with a Russian document of a very different character and meaning. In fact, the declaration would rather convert us into advocates for Russia than recognize us as friends of the Porte. With respect to its value, there were no doubt valuable admissions apparently made by Russia, but the fourth paragraph seemed to me so obscurely worded, that its meaning might be doubted. The first part of it which explained the *status quo*, was satisfactory enough. It was clearly laid down that nothing was asked for the Greek community which was not enjoyed by other Christian communities, subjects of the Porte. But the latter part, which regarded the future, was not so clear, for then the stipulation ran in favour of concession to the Greeks of all privileges which might hereafter be granted to other Christian rites. No mention was here made of Christians, subjects of the Porte; and as this was a point on which the Ottoman Government was peculiarly susceptible, the paragraph would hardly prove satisfactory to them. However this, as well as other objections which I had ventured to signalise, admitted of correction. But then came the question, would the Porte, after all that had happened, and with the knowledge, which no doubt the Turkish Ministers possessed, of the interpretation given by Count Nesselrode to the Vienna note, would the Porte be satisfied with this declaration on the part of the Conference? And, if she was not, how far would the two Governments be prepared to go in combating the Porte's continued objections to sign the Vienna note? I felt certain, I said, that Her Majesty's Government would not go the lengths recommended by Count Buol, or abandon the Porte to her fate, because she maintained a right to have an independent opinion respecting an engagement so important as that into which she was called upon to enter. I asked M. Drouyn de Lhuys whether the Emperor had considered this part of the question, and the position in which the two Governments would find themselves, if, with their fleets before Constantinople, they pressed the acceptance of the Vienna note upon the Porte, and the Porte persisted in her refusal, and war was the consequence? M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that he certainly had not put the question categorically to the Emperor, but that he felt (and he had stated as much to M. de Hübner) that France could not abandon Turkey, because she

took her own view of her own interests, while the act of aggression on the part of Russia remained the same; and he added that the general tenour of the observations which had fallen from the Emperor, in the course of these long negotiations, would lead him to suppose that His Majesty entertained the same opinion.

At the end of a long conversation, M. Drouyn de Lhuys seemed inclined to think that the Cabinets of Paris and London might reply to the Austrian proposal, by saying that they had no objection to submit it to the Porte, and recommend the Ottoman Ministers to examine it and see whether they could not find in it assurances sufficiently explicit to enable them to sign the Vienna note, and the two Governments might reserve to themselves, as indeed Austria herself had done, perfect liberty of action, should the Porte persist in her refusal.

P.S.—Since writing this despatch, I find that M. de Kisseleff has seen M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and informed him that he is able to certify that the Emperor of Russia gave the assurances referred to in the note which Austria proposes should be addressed to the Porte. C.

No. 125.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, October 5, 1853.*

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship a copy of a despatch\* which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Minister at St. Petersburg, and I have to instruct you to communicate that despatch to Baron Manteuffel, and to state to him that it is quite impossible for Her Majesty's Government now, under any circumstances or conditions whatever, to recommend the adoption of the Vienna note to the Porte; for Count Nesselrode's analysis of the Turkish modifications leaves no doubt that Russia intended by that note to establish rights and influences that she never before possessed in Turkey.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 126.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, October 5, 1853.*

COUNT COLLOREDO has placed in my hands a despatch from Count Buol, in which he refers to the effect produced on the Cabinets of London and Paris by the confidential communication made by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg in support of its rejection of the modifications required by the Porte in the Vienna note, and to the explanations which the British and French Governments have considered indispensable, in consequence of the interpretation given to that note by the Government of Russia.

Baron de Bourqueney, at the moment of Count Buol's departure for Olmütz, received instructions to invite Count Buol to declare, in conjunction with the Representatives of the Three Powers, the true sense of the Vienna note to be opposed to the interpretation put upon it by Count Nesselrode; and although Count Buol could not entirely agree to this proposition, he availed himself of the occasion afforded to him in his interview with Count Nesselrode to devise some means of giving renewed action to the Conferences which had been for the moment paralysed.

No. 117.

The explanations of Count Nesselrode have confirmed Count Buol in the conviction that Russia does not aim at any interference in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, and that the demands of the Emperor of Russia do not involve anything derogatory to the sovereign rights of the Sultan. And Count Buol regards the declaration of this conviction, as it is embodied in the inclosed *projet de note*, to be the exact and authentic expression of the meaning of the Emperor of Russia, the more especially as His Imperial Majesty has seen and approved this note as expressing his real intentions; and Count Buol is of opinion that the proper method of offering a guarantee against any false interpretation being put on the Vienna note, and of overcoming the scruples of the Porte, would be to make known these intentions by a simultaneous declaration of the Representatives of the Four Powers.

The Austrian Government is ready to authorize the Internuncio at Constantinople to make the declaration contained in the annexed *projet de note* as soon as his colleagues shall have received a similar authority from their Governments, and shall have been assured that the presentation of this note will be followed by the immediate signature of the Vienna note, and its transmission by an Ambassador to St. Petersburg.

Count Buol hopes that this *projet de note* is calculated to efface the impression produced on the English and French Governments by the last communication from the Russian Government, and is of opinion, that as the Cabinet of Russia disavows all intention of interference in the internal affairs of Turkey, and gives a more satisfactory definition of the rights which it wishes to see guaranteed, as well as an unconditional adherence to the *projet de note*, the objections to the Vienna note appear groundless. It appears to Count Buol to be of great importance to adhere to the Vienna note, notwithstanding the difficulty of getting it accepted at Constantinople, and he hopes that the resistance of the Ottoman Government will give way before the united and energetic representations of the Four Powers. Should it be otherwise, and should the Porte obey the dictates of impulse rather than the advice of its friends, such conduct would lead the Austrian Government to suppose that the Porte has decided to adopt a course which Austria is not inclined to follow.

But the Austrian Government does not anticipate the occurrence of such an extremity, if the Porte is made to understand that should it remain deaf to the representations of its allies, it will lose all title to their support. Nothing would have more effect, in the opinion of the Austrian Government, in making the advisers of the Porte aware of the dangers to which the Ottoman Empire is exposed, than language held by the maritime Powers proportioned to the gravity of the occasion. If the Porte should push their blindness so far as to desire to take the initiative in hostilities, then the Austrian Government considers it time to declare openly to the Porte that it will be reduced to the complete isolation of which it can easily foresee the consequences.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure in No. 126.

*Draft of Note.*

EN conseillant unanimement à la Sublime Porte l'adoption du projet de note concerté à Vienne, les Cours d'Autriche, de France, d'Angleterre, et de Prusse sont pénétrées de la conviction que ce document ne porte nullement atteinte aux droits souverains et à la dignité de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

Cette conviction est fondée sur les assurances positives que le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg a données quant aux intentions qui animent Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie en demandant une garantie générale des immunités religieuses accordées par les Sultans à l'Eglise Grecque dans leur Empire.

Il ressort de ces assurances qu'en demandant en vertu du principe posé dans le Traité de Kainardji, que le culte et le clergé Grecs continuent à jouir de leurs privilèges spirituels sous l'égide de leur Souverain le Sultan. L'Empereur ne demande rien de contraire à l'indépendance et aux droits du Sultan, rien qui

implique une intention d'ingérence dans les affaires intérieures de l'Empire Ottoman.

Ce que veut l'Empereur de Russie c'est le maintien strict du *status quo* religieux de son culte : savoir, une égalité entière de droits et d'immunités entre l'Eglise Grecque et les autres communautés Chrétiennes, sujettes de la Porte ; par conséquent, la jouissance en faveur de l'Eglise Grecque des avantages déjà accordés à ces communautés. Il n'entend point ressusciter les privilèges de l'Eglise Grecque tombés en désuétude par l'effet du temps, ou des changements administratifs, mais demande que le Sultan la fasse participer à tous les avantages qu'il accordera à l'avenir à d'autres rits Chrétiens.

Le Cabinet Impérial d'Autriche aime, par conséquent, à ne pas douter que la Sublime Porte en pondérant encore une fois avec toute la sérieuse attention que la gravité de la situation exige, les explications données par la Russie, dans le but de préciser la nature et l'extension de ses demandes, ne se décide à l'adoption pure et simple de la note de Vienne. Cette adoption tout en assurant au Gouvernement Ottoman de nouveaux titres à la sympathie et à l'appui des Puissances qui la lui ont conseillée, lui offre à la fois un moyen aussi prompt qu'honorable d'opérer sa franche réconciliation avec l'Empire de Russie, réconciliation que tant d'intérêts majeurs réclament si impérieusement.

(Translation.)

IN recommending unanimously to the Porte to adopt the draft of note drawn up at Vienna, the Courts of Austria, France, England, and Prussia, are convinced that that document by no means prejudices the sovereign rights and dignity of His Majesty the Sultan.

That conviction is founded on the positive assurances which the Cabinet of St. Petersburg has given in regard to the intentions by which His Majesty the Emperor of Russia is animated in requiring a general guarantee of the religious immunities granted by the Sultans to the Greek Church within their Empire.

It results from these assurances that in requiring, in virtue of the principle laid down in the Treaty of Kainardji, that the Greek religion and clergy should continue to enjoy their spiritual privileges under the protection of their sovereign the Sultan, the Emperor demands nothing contrary to the independence and the rights of the Sultan, nothing which implies an intention to interfere in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire.

What the Emperor of Russia desires, is the strict maintenance of the religious *status quo* of his religion, that is to say, an entire equality of rights and immunities between the Greek Church and the other Christian communities subjects of the Porte ; consequently, the enjoyment by the Greek Church of the advantages already granted to those communities. He has no intention of resuscitating the privileges of the Greek Church which have fallen into disuse by the effect of time or administrative changes, but he requires that the Sultan should allow it to share in all the advantages which he shall hereafter grant to other Christian rites.

The Imperial Cabinet of Austria would, consequently, fain not doubt that the Sublime Porte, considering anew, with all the serious attention which the gravity of the state of affairs requires, the explanations given by Russia with the view of defining exactly the nature and extent of her demands, will decide upon adopting in its integrity the Vienna note. The adoption of it, while it gives to the Ottoman Government fresh claims to the sympathy and support of the Powers which have recommended it, offers it at the same time means as ready as they are honourable for effecting its frank reconciliation with the Emperor of Russia, a reconciliation so imperiously required by so many vast interests.

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*M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Count Walewski.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Walewski, October 6.)*

M. le Comte,

*Paris, le 4 Octobre, 1853.*

JE vous ai fait connaître dans la dépêche que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous écrire avant hier, l'opinion du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale sur la proposition du Cabinet de Vienne. Vous avez vu que nous rendions justice aux efforts tentés par M. le Comte de Buol pour maintenir les affaires d'Orient dans la voie des négociations, et que tout en trouvant le projet de déclaration qui nous était soumis susceptible de quelques modifications, nous pensions néanmoins qu'afin de nous montrer conséquents avec la politique de conciliation que nous n'avons cessé de suivre depuis l'origine du différend survenu entre le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg et la Sublime Porte, nous devons examiner avec soin toutes les combinaisons de nature à empêcher l'explosion des hostilités.

Cette manière de voir, M. le Comte, est toujours celle de l'Empereur ; mais les événements marchent plus vite que les volontés, et les nouvelles que je reçois de Constantinople révèlent une situation qui semble incompatible, pour le moment du moins, avec l'espoir d'une solution pacifique, et qui commande aux Cabinets, pénétrés de la nécessité de maintenir l'indépendance et l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman, des résolutions plus arrêtées.

En effet, à cet état mitoyen, qui n'était ni la paix ni la guerre, qui plaçait déjà les armées en présence, mais qui suspendait entre elles tout engagement, dans l'espoir d'une heureuse issue des négociations entamées à Vienne, ont succédé depuis quelques jours des faits sur le caractère desquels il serait imprudent de se méprendre.

Pendant que l'armée Russe se rapproche du Danube, la Porte, malgré les efforts unanimes des Représentants de la France, de l'Autriche, de la Grande Bretagne, et de la Prusse, et sans connaître encore le nouveau commentaire que M. le Comte de Nesselrode a donné de la note émanée de la Conférence, a persisté, pour la seconde fois, dans sa résolution, et déclare que cette note, dans son texte original, était à jamais inadmissible. Le Divan, à l'unanimité, a remis au Sultan la soin de déclarer la guerre. Les hostilités sont donc imminentes ; peut-être même sont-elles commencées.

A côté de l'intérêt qui s'attache à la réconciliation de la Russie avec la Turquie, but que nous ne voulons pas perdre de vue, s'il existe encore un moyen de l'atteindre, vient aujourd'hui se placer une autre préoccupation non moins sérieuse ; je veux parler des dangers qui menacent un Empire dont l'existence est indispensable à l'équilibre de l'Europe. Nous avons loyalement servi le premier de ces intérêts ; toutes les traditions de notre politique nous font un devoir de ne pas négliger le second ; et l'envoi de l'escadre Française, d'abord à Salamine, plus tard à Besica, indique assez la vigilance du Gouvernement de l'Empereur.

Le moment est venu de donner suite aux instructions remises à l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Impériale à la veille de son départ pour Constantinople, puisque nous touchons aux extrémités que ces instructions prévoyaient, et que nous avons vainement essayé de conjurer.

Dans ces graves conjonctures, M. le Comte, nous sentons le besoin de nous entendre avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique et de lui faire connaître nos intentions.

L'Empereur, vous le savez, s'est déjà décidé à transmettre à M. de la Cour l'ordre d'appeler notre escadre à Constantinople et de se concerter à cet effet avec Lord Stratford.

Il s'agit maintenant de déterminer l'usage qui sera fait de ces forces navales. Leur présence dans les eaux du Bosphore témoignera de l'union intime de la France et de l'Angleterre. Cette preuve éclatante de l'accord des deux Grandes Puissances Maritimes, et de leur commune sollicitude pour les destinées de la Turquie, donnera à la Sublime Porte une force morale qui lui permettra de se tenir dans les conditions d'un Gouvernement régulier, de compter sur la tranquillité de ses populations, et de ne faire appel ni au fanatisme des sentiments religieux, ni à de funestes auxiliaires.

Mais ce n'est pas à ce résultat, si important qu'il soit, que notre démon-

stration doit se borner; dans l'opinion de l'Empereur notre flotte serait également destinée à jouer un rôle dans la défense de l'Empire Ottoman. Elle servirait particulièrement à couvrir Constantinople et à opérer au besoin, sur les côtes occidentales de la Mer Noire jusqu'à la hauteur de Varna. A ce point, en effet, commence la chaîne des Balkans qui forme une première barrière fortement occupée par l'armée Turque et offrant des garanties suffisantes contre une invasion par terre. Dans les limites que j'ai indiquées, au contraire, les moyens naturels de défense contre un débarquement sont presque nuls, et des surprises sont possibles. C'est à ces périls soudains qu'il nous appartient de pourvoir.

Je proposerais donc, M. le Comte, de munir M. le Vice-Amiral Hamelin et M. le Vice-Amiral Dundas d'instructions qui leur enjoindraient, après avoir consulté nos Ambassadeurs, de distribuer les forces qu'ils commandent de façon à ce que la ville de Constantinople se trouve, autant que possible, à l'abri des hostilités, et, dans cette position, à attendre, mais sans la rechercher, l'occasion d'accomplir leur devoir. Faire plus, ce serait donner à notre attitude un caractère agressif qu'elle ne doit point avoir; faire moins, ce serait exposer tous les intérêts que notre bût est de sauvegarder.

Veillez me faire connaître, sans retard, M. le Comte, si ce plan de conduite a l'approbation du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, et remettre à Lord Clarendon une copie de cette dépêche, après lui en avoir donné lecture.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé)

DROUYN DE LHUYS.

(Translation.)

M. le Comte,

*Paris, October 4, 1853.*

IN the despatch which I had the honour to address to you the day before yesterday, I acquainted you with the opinion of His Imperial Majesty's Government upon the proposal of the Cabinet of Vienna. You have seen that we did justice to the efforts made by Count Buol in order to keep the affairs of the East in the way of negotiations; and that, while considering that the draft of declaration which had been submitted to us admitted of certain modifications, we nevertheless thought that, in order to show ourselves consistent with the policy of conciliation which we have not ceased to pursue from the very commencement of the difference which has arisen between the Cabinet of St. Petersburg and the Sublime Porte, it was incumbent on us carefully to examine all the plans calculated to prevent the breaking out of hostilities.

The Emperor still looks upon the matter, M. le Comte, in this light; but events advance with greater rapidity than our wishes, and the intelligence which I receive from Constantinople discloses a state of things which seems incompatible, at least for the moment, with the hope of a pacific solution, and which requires of the Cabinets, impressed with the necessity of maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, more decided resolutions.

In fact, to this middle state, which was neither peace nor war, which placed the armies in presence of each other, but which suspended all conflict between them in the expectation of a favourable issue of the negotiations commenced at Vienna, have succeeded within the last few days circumstances the character of which it would be imprudent to misapprehend.

Whilst the Russian army is approaching the Danube, the Porte, notwithstanding the unanimous efforts of the Representatives of France, of Austria, of Great Britain, and of Prussia, and without being yet acquainted with the new interpretation which Count Nesselrode has given to the note put forth by the Conference, has persisted, for the second time, in its resolution, and declared that this note, in its original terms, was for ever inadmissible. The Divan has unanimously devolved on the Sultan the duty of declaring war. Hostilities are therefore imminent; perhaps even now they have commenced.

By the side of the interest which is attached to the reconciliation of Russia with Turkey—an object which we do not wish to lose sight of, if means still exist of attaining it—there is now ranged a no less serious source of anxiety: I would speak of the dangers which menace an Empire the existence of which is indispensable for the balance of Europe. We have honestly promoted the first of those interests; all the traditions of our policy impose upon us the duty of

not neglecting the second ; and the dispatch of the French squadron, first to Salamis, and subsequently to Besika, sufficiently proves the vigilance of the Emperor's Government.

The time is arrived for giving effect to the instructions addressed to His Imperial Majesty's Ambassador on the eve of his departure for Constantinople, because we are on the brink of the extremities foreseen by those instructions, and which we have in vain attempted to avert.

Under these serious circumstances, M. le Comte, we feel it necessary to come to an understanding with Her Britannic Majesty's Government, and to communicate to it our intentions.

The Emperor, you are aware, has already determined to send orders to M. de la Cour to summon our squadron to Constantinople, and to concert with Lord Stratford for this purpose.

The question now is, to determine what use shall be made of these naval forces. Their presence in the waters of the Bosphorus will manifest the ultimate union of France and England. This striking proof of the agreement of the two great maritime Powers, and of their common solicitude for the destinies of Turkey, will afford the Sublime Porte a moral proof which will admit of its maintaining itself as a regular Government, of its calculating upon the tranquillity of its populations, and of its abstaining from appealing either to religious feelings or to fatal auxiliaries.

But our demonstration should not be confined to this result, however important it may be. In the Emperor's opinion our fleet should equally be destined to play a part in the defence of the Ottoman Empire. It should serve especially to cover Constantinople, and in case of need to operate on the western shores of the Black Sea as far as Varna. At this point, in fact, begins the chain of the Balkan, which forms a first barrier strongly occupied by the Turkish army, and offering sufficient guarantees against an invasion by land. Within the limits which I have indicated, on the contrary, the natural means of defence against a disembarkation are nearly null, and surprises are possible. It is for us to provide against these sudden dangers.

I would propose, then, M. le Comte, to furnish Vice-Admiral Hamelin and Vice-Admiral Dundas with instructions which should enjoin them, after consultation with our Ambassadors, to distribute the forces which they command in such a manner as that the city of Constantinople may, as far as possible, be secure from hostilities, and in this position to await, without seeking for it, the occasion of executing their duty. To do more, would be to give to the attitude which we have assumed an aggressive character which it ought not to have ; to do less, would be to expose all the interests which it is our object to preserve.

Have the goodness, M. le Comte, to inform me without delay whether this plan of conduct is approved by Her Britannic Majesty's Government, and to deliver a copy of this despatch to Lord Clarendon after having read it to him.

Receive, &c.

(Signed) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

No. 128.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, October 6, 1853.*

BARON BRUNNOW called upon me yesterday to inquire whether any decision had been taken by Her Majesty's Government upon Count Buol's despatch, which, as he learned from Count Nesselrode, was to be communicated to me by Count Colloredo.

In reply, I told Baron Brunnow that no final decision could be taken on that despatch until it had been submitted to the Cabinet ; but in the meanwhile I should not hesitate to inform him that, under no circumstances would Her Majesty's Government recommend the Turkish Government now to accept the Vienna note : 1st, because it would be useless, as the Porte had determined not to accept it without modifications ; and 2ndly, because a despatch from the Austrian Government, containing assurances as to the intentions of Russia, could not, in the eyes of Her Majesty's Government, neutralize the analysis of

Count Nesselrode, in which those intentions were disclosed in a manner to leave no doubt as to the interpretation that would hereafter be put upon the Vienna note by Russia.

I added that, assuming that Russia only asked what she had a right to claim, and what, consequently, Turkey was prepared to concede, it appeared incredible that all Europe should be kept in a state of suspense and excitement respecting a form of words which, under the circumstances, I assumed ought to present no difficulty whatever; but that no settlement of differences was possible by notes requiring explanations, and accompanied by vague assurances.

Baron Brunnow subsequently alluded to the letter he had received from me, and begged I would receive a remark he was about to make with the same friendly spirit and sincere desire to avoid misunderstanding between our Governments in which it was offered; and he then, after reciting the passage in my letter respecting the right of the British fleet not only to enter the Dardanelles, but to pass through the Straits, said, that if the British fleet entered the Black Sea, it might be regarded by the Russian Government as a serious proceeding, that would impart a new character to the question at issue. But Baron Brunnow again requested me to understand that he had no instructions from his Government on the subject, and had merely wished to record his own opinion.

I said that the passage of the letter to which he referred was a statement of the right possessed by Her Majesty's Government in consequence of the occupation of the Principalities by Russia, and the suspension of the Treaty of 1841; and that the manner of exercising that right would depend upon circumstances into which I should not then enter, as he had received no instructions from his Government to make the inquiry, and had confined himself to giving his own opinion in a tone and spirit that were unobjectionable.

Baron Brunnow informed me that it would be his duty to send a reply to my note, but he hoped it would not render a rejoinder necessary, as he should regret that the correspondence was prolonged. I said that would entirely depend upon the nature of his reply.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 129.

*Baron Brunnow to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 6.)*

M. le Comte,

*Chesham House, <sup>24 Septembre</sup>  
6 Octobre*, 1853.

LA note que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser le 1er Octobre m'est parvenu le 3.

En réponse à ma communication du  $\frac{1}{2}$  <sup>$\frac{2}{5}$</sup>  Septembre, elle établit que l'entrée des bâtiments de guerre, appelés par M. l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, dans le Détroit, a été uniquement motivée par la nécessité de mettre la sûreté des nationaux Anglais à l'abri d'un danger local; et écarte la supposition que la présence de ces bâtiments devienne pour le Divan un encouragement à élever de nouveaux obstacles à l'œuvre de conciliation.

Je rendrai compte de ces informations au Cabinet Impérial.

Après avoir rempli ce devoir, je partage avec vous l'opinion qu'il serait inutile de suivre plus loin un sujet de discussion sur lequel nous différons d'avis en ce qui regarde le Traité du  $\frac{1}{3}$  Juillet, 1841.

Cette discussion s'arrête pour moi à l'instant où le Sultan, comme je l'apprends, met fin à ce Traité par une déclaration de guerre. Elle constitue, à mes yeux, un acte nouveau sur lequel je ne suis point appelé à me prononcer avant d'avoir reçu les ordres de ma Cour.

Cet acte, je le constate, est survenu du chef de la Porte, trois mois après l'occupation des Principautés. Si des conseils plus sages ont déterminé le Sultan à ne point en faire un cas de guerre, cette situation, je le maintiens, n'a pas été insolite et contraire aux principes établis en saine logique, et en droit international, comme vous paraissent le croire à mon vif regret.

Votre Excellence en trouvera un exemple si elle veut bien se rappeler qu'après la journée de Navarin, la Turquie ne s'est point reconnue en état d'hostilité avec la Grande Bretagne; bien que celle-ci, de concert avec ses

alliés, eût détruit la flotte Ottomane, chassé Ibrahim Pacha de la Morée, et soustrait la Grèce à l'autorité de la Porte.

Si le Gouvernement Britannique n'a pas été censé se trouver en guerre avec la Turquie, malgré ces faits accomplis avec effusion de sang ; à plus forte raison la Russie, sans acte d'hostilité commis de part et d'autre, pouvait-elle compter sur la continuation de la paix, tandis que se prolongeait une négociation, qui, jusqu'à ce jour, laissait heureusement la voie ouverte à un arrangement à l'amiable.

J'ai eu l'honneur de communiquer dans le temps à votre Excellence la dépêche du <sup>20 Juin</sup>~~2 Juillet~~, qui a déterminé l'attitude prise alors par l'Empereur sans vue d'hostilité ni d'agression envers l'Empire Ottoman.

Je me fais un devoir de me référer à ce document, jusqu'à la réception des ordres ultérieurs que pourrait réclamer la situation, sous l'aspect nouveau que les déterminations actuelles de la Porte peuvent lui faire prendre.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.  
(Signé) BRUNNOW

(Translation.)

M. le Comte,

*Chesham House*, <sup>September 24</sup>~~October 6~~, 1853.

THE note which your Excellency did me the honour to address to me on the 1st of October reached me on the 3rd.

In reply to my communication of the  $\frac{13}{5}$  September, it maintains that the entrance into the Strait of the ships of war, which have been summoned by the Ambassador of England, has been occasioned solely by the necessity of securing from a local danger the safety of English subjects ; and it sets aside the supposition, that the presence of those vessels will encourage the Divan to raise up fresh obstacles to the work of reconciliation.

I will report this information to the Imperial Cabinet.

After having performed this duty, I agree with you in opinion, that it would be useless to pursue further a subject of discussion upon which we entertain different opinions, in so far as regards the Treaty of July  $\frac{1}{13}$ , 1841.

That discussion, as far as I am concerned, is brought to a close from the instant that the Sultan, as I learn, puts an end to that Treaty by a declaration of war. That, in my view, amounts to a new proceeding, upon which I am not called to pronounce before I receive the orders of my Court.

That proceeding, I remark, has emanated from the Porte three months after the occupation of the Principalities. If wiser counsels have determined the Sultan not to make that occupation a case of war, that state of things, I maintain, has not been unusual and contrary to the principles of sound logic and international law, as to my great regret you seem to suppose.

Your Excellency will find an instance of this, if you will have the goodness to recall to mind, that after the battle of Navarino Turkey did not consider herself in a state of war with Great Britain, although the latter, in concert with her allies, had destroyed the Ottoman fleet, driven Ibrahim Pasha from the Morea, and withdrawn Greece from the authority of the Porte.

If the British Government did not consider itself at war with Turkey, notwithstanding those transactions which were effected with bloodshed, with still greater reason might Russia, when no act of hostility had been committed on either side, reckon upon the continuance of peace while a negotiation was going on, which, up to the present time, happily left the way open for an amicable arrangement.

I had the honour at the time to communicate to your Excellency the despatch of the <sup>20 June</sup>~~2 July~~, which defined the attitude then adopted by the Emperor without any view of hostility or aggression against the Ottoman Empire.

It is my duty to refer to that document until the receipt of the further orders which may be required by the existing state of affairs, under the new aspect which the present decision of the Porte may cause it to assume.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) BRUNNOW

## No. 130.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, October 7, 1853.*

ON the 4th instant Count Walewski informed me that the assurances as to the intentions of Russia contained in Count Buol's project of note appeared satisfactory to the French Government, who were prepared, with the concurrence of Her Majesty's Government to agree to the signature of that note by the Four Representatives at Constantinople; and that it should be offered to the Porte in exchange for the note originally sent from Vienna.

I told Count Walewski that Count Buol's despatch and project of note had not yet been considered by the Cabinet, but that I knew enough of the opinions of my colleagues to assure his Excellency that Her Majesty's Government could not concur in a measure which they must know beforehand would be useless, and which would not be justifiable even if it were not useless.

It was unnecessary, I added, now to revert to the nature of the modifications proposed by the Porte. The Porte had a right to make them; we had recognised that right, and the Turkish Government was pledged not to accept the note without them. It would therefore be imprudent on the part of the English and French Governments, and unfair towards the Porte, to offer advice in favour of the Vienna note, which must beyond all doubt be rejected.

I desired moreover to observe that if we accepted Count Buol's project of note, we should at once admit that the assurances given on the part of Russia were complete and satisfactory, that the Emperor had offered sufficient guarantees of his intention, and that no further resistance to his demands on the part of the Porte could be sanctioned by our respective Governments; but a despatch from the Austrian Government containing these assurances (supposing them to be satisfactory, which I was far from admitting) would offer no real security to the Turkish Government, and would not neutralize the analysis of Count Nesselrode, which disclosed the views of Russia, and justified the fears of the Porte.

The proposed collective note would, therefore, as a matter of course, be refused, and the position of the English and French Governments would then be false and embarrassing.

Count Walewski concurred in these views, which, he said, he should immediately submit to the consideration of his Government.

Count Walewski yesterday informed me, that his Government had renounced all idea of again recommending the Vienna note to the Porte, and his Excellency placed in my hands a despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, copy of which is herewith inclosed, stating the course which the Government of the Emperor proposes to pursue.

This despatch has been attentively considered by the Cabinet; and I have to inform your Excellency, that the views of Her Majesty's Government coincide generally with those of the French Government.

It is to be hoped that the combined fleets are now at Constantinople, and prepared to act in defence of the Sultan; but it is to be borne in mind, that our information as to the actual state of things there is confined to a telegraphic despatch of the 26th ultimo, announcing that the Supreme Council had determined in favour of war, but had left the declaration of war, and the mode of carrying it on, to the Sultan and his Ministers; and it therefore appears advisable to Her Majesty's Government, that general instructions should be given to the Ambassadors and Admirals to employ the combined fleets in whatever manner, and at whatever place, they may think necessary for defending the Turkish territory against direct aggression. If the Russian fleet were to come out of Sevastopol the fleets would, as a matter of course, pass through the Bosphorus, but a descent, such as that contemplated by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, upon a place now so strongly fortified as Varna, and which the Turkish fleet could of itself effectually protect, appears very improbable; and Her Majesty's Government consider therefore, that at the present moment, and in the absence of precise information, it would be expedient that the fleets should be stationed at Buyukderé, as the point from which they could most readily be employed for the

protection of Constantinople, or of any other part of the Sultan's dominions which might be in danger of attack. The fleets would thus be in the position desired by the French Government, of waiting, without seeking, for the occasion of performing their duty ; they would neither assume the aggressive attitude which they ought not to have, nor expose the interests which it is our object to protect.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 131.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 7.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, September 30, 1853.*

I THINK it right to state to your Lordship, with reference to your despatch to Lord Westmorland of the 20th instant,\* that neither myself nor the French Minister are acquainted with Count Nesselrode's analysis, explaining the interpretation put by the Russian Government upon the note prepared for the signature of the Porte at Vienna. The despatch which I read, as far as a very hurried perusal of it enables me to speak of it, dwelt rather upon the objections entertained by the Emperor to allowing any alterations of a note to which he had acceded in its original form, than upon the nature of the proposed modifications themselves.

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No. 132.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 7.)*

My Lord,

*Vienna, October 4, 1853.*

I TRANSMITTED to your Lordship, the day before yesterday, the two telegraphic despatches which had reached me from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, dated Constantinople, the 25th and 26th ultimo, the last of which contained the important intelligence of the decision in favour of a declaration of war against Russia, which had been adopted by the Great Council of the Ottoman Empire.

I communicated this intelligence to Count Buol, who had not as yet received it from the Internuncio, although from his previous despatches he was prepared to expect it.

Fully aware of the gravity of such a decision unanimously adopted by the Divan, Count Buol still did not consider it as precluding all hopes of a peaceable arrangement. He looked upon the statement in Lord Stratford's despatch "that this decision had been taken notwithstanding the efforts of the Representatives of the Four Powers, and more particularly of his own," as affording some reason to expect that the counsel of the Sultan's allies might still have weight in preventing immediate hostilities—an expectation which was fortified by the decision of the Council that the declaration of war, and the measures to be adopted, were to be left to the Sultan.

Count Buol expressed his anxious hope that the united action of the Four Powers would be employed to obtain this object, and should a term be fixed (as reported by M. de la Cour) for the evacuation of the Principalities previous to the commencement of hostilities, he thought that the time so gained might be taken advantage of to present to the Government of the Sultan the project of declaration submitted for your Lordship's approval, and which had received the sanction of the Russian Government, so as to induce the Turkish Ministers to pause before they brought upon their country the incalculable evils and dangers inseparable from a state of war.

Count Buol reiterated his conviction, that the statement contained in that declaration gave such assurances as ought to be a guarantee to the Sultan's Government, that the Emperor Nicholas only required the maintenance of the *status quo* in religious matters, and sought for the exercise of no new right in

Turkey; and upon these grounds he rested his hopes, that the ultimate recourse to arms might yet be averted.

I confess I do not feel as sanguine as Count Buol appears to be at the result to be expected from the course he recommends; but there can be no doubt that, with his sanction, every means will be resorted to that offers a chance, however slight, of obtaining the recall of the decision taken at Constantinople.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 133.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, October 8, 1853.*

YOUR Excellency's despatches by telegraph, of the 25th and 26th ultimo, have been received. By the latter it appears that "Le Conseil Turc s'est prononcé aujourd'hui pour la guerre, après avoir déclaré la note de Vienne, telle qu'elle est, à jamais inadmissible. La déclaration (de) la guerre, et les mesures à prendre, sont laissées au Sultan et à ses Ministres. Les décisions ont été unanimes. Cette réunion (fut) composée de plus de 120 personnes. Les efforts des quatre Représentants pour obtenir une solution pacifique ont manqué d'effet, de même que ceux que j'ai faits ce matin à la suite de l'arrivée pendant la nuit de vos dépêches expédiées par le 'Triton.' Je me propose de vous envoyer un exprès au plutôt par Marseilles."

No later intelligence having since arrived, Her Majesty's Government are uninformed whether the Sultan has adopted the recommendation of the Council, and has actually declared war.

The continued occupation of the Principalities, the great efforts made, and the vast expense incurred for defence, the enthusiasm of the army, and the excitement of the people, and lastly, the rejection by Russia of the modifications of the note proposed by the Porte, are circumstances which may have rendered the determination of the Council a measure of indispensable necessity; but Her Majesty's Government observe that your Excellency more than once endeavoured to bring about a different result, and until they learn the grounds upon which your advice was rejected, or whether it may subsequently have been acted upon by the Sultan, it is difficult to send you precise instructions upon a state of things so critical, but with respect to which so much uncertainty still prevails.

Assuming, however, as the event most probable, that war has been declared, Her Majesty's Government would learn with satisfaction that your Excellency, acting either upon your original instructions, or upon those which were sent to you on the 23rd of September, had, in conjunction with your French colleague, called up the British and French fleets to Constantinople; but as it is possible that your Excellency may not have taken upon yourself this responsibility, I have to instruct you, after concerting with M. de la Cour, whose instructions will be to a similar effect, to request that Admiral Dundas will bring the British fleet to Constantinople, whether war has been declared by the Sultan or not, provided that this course should not meet with objection on the part of his Highness.

Her Majesty's Government have at present no means of judging whether the Porte, by declaring war, renounces all hope of a peaceful arrangement of its differences with Russia, or whether active hostilities are immediately to be commenced; but even though hostilities should unfortunately have commenced, Her Majesty's Government do not yet despair of amicably terminating the question at issue, towards the settlement of which their anxious efforts are still directed.

You will observe that the instructions now given to your Excellency authorize the employment of the British fleet only in defensive operations. You are authorized, acting in concert with Admiral Dundas and your French colleague, to employ the combined fleets in whatever manner, or at whatever place, your Excellency may think necessary for defending the Turkish territory against

direct aggression; but if the Russian fleet were to come out of Sevastopol, the fleets would then, as a matter of course, pass through the Bosphorus.

I inclose the copy of a despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, which was placed in my hands by Count Walewski, and the copy of a despatch I have addressed to Lord Cowley.\*

I have to observe that a descent such as that contemplated by M. de Lhuys upon a place now so strongly fortified as Varna, appears very improbable.

Her Majesty's Government are far from intending to impose upon your Excellency any responsibility that they can properly take upon themselves, but having explained the reasons which render precise instructions impossible, they think it advisable to leave to your Excellency and to Admiral Dundas, in concert with the French Ambassador and Admiral, to determine upon the best mode of giving effect to their views for the defence of the Ottoman dominions against direct aggression. I shall only add that Buyukderé appears to Her Majesty's Government to be the station from which the fleets could most readily be made available for any service that might be required of them for the protection of Constantinople, or of any other parts of the Turkish territory, whether in Europe or in Asia, that might be in danger of attack.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 134.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 8, 1853.

IT will be necessary that Admiral Dundas should inform the Russian Admiral commanding at Sevastopol that if the Russian fleet should come out of that port for the purpose of landing troops on any portion of the Turkish territory, or of committing any act of overt hostility against the Porte, his orders are to protect the Sultan's dominions from attack, and he will express a hope that no measures will be resorted to by the Russian Admiral that would endanger the peaceful relations between Great Britain and Russia.

A similar communication will probably at the same time be made by the French Admiral.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 135.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 8, 1853.

IN my despatch of the 5th instant I stated to you the substance of a despatch from Count Buol, which had been communicated to me by Count Colloredo, and which contained a project of note to be signed by the Four Representatives at Constantinople, and delivered in exchange for the original note sent from Vienna.

Your Lordship will express to Count Buol the regret of Her Majesty's Government at being unable to concur in a measure to which the Austrian Government attaches so much importance, but which Her Majesty's Government are convinced would be attended with no other result than fresh disappointment and further loss of time.

The Turkish Government have declared that they cannot accept the Vienna note without the modifications, which they had a perfect right to propose, and which were adopted by the Conference, but which were unfortunately rejected by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. Her Majesty's Government know, therefore, that it would be useless to recommend the note in its unaltered form;

and they know, moreover, that it would be dishonourable to do so with reference to the interpretation put upon it by Count Nesselrode, which the project of note now proposed by Count Buol would not neutralize, nor would it afford any real security to the Porte.

Her Majesty's Government will not doubt that the assurances contained in that note were given with a desire to remove the apprehensions felt by the Turkish Government; but there is reason to fear that by such means the object desired will not be attained, for the note appears to adopt the sense in which Russia persists in construing the Seventh Article of the Treaty of Kainardji, and thus, by maintaining that the privileges and immunities of the Greek Church have been conferred in consequence and in fulfilment of that Article, to assume a protectorate over the Greek subjects of the Sultan.

But the Seventh Article, by which the Sultan promises protection to the Christian religion in all its churches, confers no protectorate upon the Emperor of Russia. A new right is therefore sought, and it is one that the Sultan, with due regard to his independence, cannot concede. The Emperor of Russia, however, disclaims all desire of acquiring any new right, and it is impossible therefore to comprehend why a point that could so easily be made clear should so perseveringly be left in doubt.

Count Buol's note renews the assurances that are to be found in the circular of Count Nesselrode, that the Emperor asks nothing contrary to the rights and independence of the Sultan; but if His Imperial Majesty obtains a protectorate over the Greek Church, he will acquire a right of interfering between the Sultan and his subjects that must be contrary to the independence of the Sultan.

Her Majesty's Government observe with satisfaction that Count Buol's note contains an assurance that, as regards the present, the Emperor of Russia demands only in favour of the Greek Church the advantages already granted to other religious communities subjects of the Porte; but for the future His Imperial Majesty would seem to demand that the Sultan should grant to the Greek Church every advantage accorded to other Christian communities.

If the omission of the words "subjects of the Porte" after the words "other Christian communities" is intentional, a new right would be established by which the Emperor might demand for twelve million subjects of the Porte every advantage that the Sultan by agreement with the Pope or any other Catholic Power might choose to grant to Catholics residing in his dominions.

Count Buol will therefore perceive that in addition to the reasons I have already stated, which render it impossible for Her Majesty's Government to advise the Porte to adopt the original Vienna note, there are also objections to his own project of note which they cannot overlook. But in the interest of peace, which we are all so deeply concerned in maintaining, and possibly as the last hope of averting the crisis which we all deprecate, Her Majesty's Government earnestly desire that the influence of Austria may be exerted to induce the Cabinet of St. Petersburg to adopt a form of words that shall leave no doubt of the Emperor's intentions, and no cause for alarm on the part of the Porte, nor of those Powers who desire to maintain the independence of Turkey.

It seems impossible that the Emperor of Russia should think that his personal dignity, or his position, either at home or in Europe, requires him to insist upon a form of note which the Sultan affirms is inconsistent with that independence which the Emperor has declared his wish to uphold, or that His Imperial Majesty, who since his accession to the throne has laboured for the preservation of peace, should now seriously contemplate war upon a strained construction of the Treaty of Kainardji, and a claim for religious privileges to the Sultan's subjects which they have not hitherto enjoyed; while the Emperor at the same time disclaims all desire for further influence, while the only grievance he had against the Porte has been satisfactorily settled, and a guarantee against its recurrence is given, and while the Sultan renews his Treaty engagements and solemnly promises to maintain inviolate every privilege and immunity granted to the Greek Church by himself or his ancestors.

If Europe is for such causes to be exposed to the calamities of war, they will be without parallel in history; and I again express the earnest hope of Her Majesty's Government, that the Austrian Government will not attempt to obtain the concessions contained in the Vienna note, which the Porte cannot

grant ; but that it will spare no effort to persuade the Cabinet of St. Petersburg frankly and at once to give effect to the reiterated declarations of the Emperor.

You will communicate this despatch to Count Buol, and give him a copy should he desire it.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 136.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 9.)*

(Télégraphique.)

Vienna, October 8, 1853.

JE viens de recevoir de Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, en date de Constantinople, le 1<sup>er</sup> du courant, ce qui suit :

Il paraît hors de doute que toute négociation ayant pour but un arrangement agréable aux deux parties est pour le moment sans espoir.

Je ne m'aperçois que de deux manières d'agir, l'une et l'autre à peine possible, par lesquelles on pourrait éviter la guerre.

Chacun de ces expédients dépendrait pour son succès d'une entente complète entre les Quatre Puissances, et d'une intervention décidée de leur part.

La première peut être ébauchée dans ces termes :

Une nouvelle rédaction pure de la note de Vienne, renfermant en substance les modifications proposées par la Porte et communiquées aux Cabinets Russe et Turc par les dites Puissances, accompagnée d'une déclaration portant qu'elle a été adoptée par elles comme portion du Traité Sextuple de 1841, dans la conviction qu'elle ne diffère pas essentiellement quant au sens du droit original, et que les droits des Traités Russes et les droits souverains de la Porte se trouvent par elle également garantis.

Une pareille manière d'agir serait mutuellement basée sur les principes déclarés en 1841, ainsi que sur les assertions respectives de la Russie et de la Turquie, que la première n'exige aucune nouvelle concession, et que la dernière ne cherche à éluder aucune obligation existante.

Le seul expédient qui semble rester serait un arbitrage auquel les Quatre Puissances prendraient part de concert avec une cinquième choisie par elles.

La question en litige devrait être résolue d'après les principes annoncés ci-dessus dans les limites de la note de Vienne, et des modifications proposées à la majorité de voix de cinq arbitraires.

Si l'une ou l'autre de ces idées était approuvée comme susceptible, elle devait être mise en pratique sans le moindre retard.

L'évacuation des Principautés devait être la suite immédiate de la décision qui serait émise.

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, October 8, 1853.

I HAVE just received what follows from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, dated Constantinople, the 1st instant :

It appears beyond doubt that any negotiation having for its object an arrangement acceptable to both parties, is for the time hopeless.

I can only perceive two modes of action, either of them scarcely possible, by which war may be avoided.

Each of these expedients would depend for its success, on a complete understanding between the Four Powers, and on a decided intervention on their part.

The first may be sketched out in these terms.

A fresh draft of the Vienna note, containing in substance the modifications proposed by the Porte and communicated by the said Powers to the Russian

and Turkish Cabinets, accompanied by a declaration to the effect that it had been adopted by them as a portion of the Sextuple Treaty of 1841, in the conviction that it does not essentially differ in sense from the original right, and that the rights of the Russian Treaties and the sovereign rights of the Porte are equally guaranteed by it.

Such a course of proceeding would be mutually based on the principles declared in 1841, as well as upon the respective assertions of Russia and of Turkey, that the former does not require any fresh concession, and that the latter does not seek to evade any existing obligation.

The sole remaining expedient would seem to be an arbitration in which the Four Powers would take part, in concert with a fifth selected by them.

The question at issue would have to be settled, agreeably to the principles above stated, within the limits of the Vienna note, and of the modifications proposed by the majority of the five arbitrators.

If either of these notions should be considered practicable, it should be carried into effect without the least delay.

The evacuation of the Principalities would have to be the immediate consequence of the decision which might be given.

No. 137.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 10.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, October 9, 1853.*

I HAVE read to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the latter part of your Lordship's despatch of the 7th instant, and the instructions to the Earl of Westmorland and to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe of the 8th instant. The French Minister read to me in return two despatches which he had addressed on the 7th instant to M. de Bourqueney. The first of these, intended for communication to Count Buol, has I believe been made known to your Lordship by Count Walewski; the second, a despatch of great length and great merit, was read to me in so hurried a manner by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that I should not do justice to it by attempting to analyse it.

It contains a recapitulation of what has been the conduct and motives of France in the Eastern question, and shows the dangers to which Europe, and Austria in particular, will be exposed, should war be the result.

The instructions for M. de la Cour are not yet ready. M. Drouyn de Lhuys had not in his late conversations with the Emperor contemplated the possibility of the fleets being employed on the Asiatic coasts of the Black Sea, and he is unwilling to send instructions to the French Admiral "to employ the combined fleets in whatever manner, and at whatever place, they may think necessary for defending the Turkish territory against direct aggression," without a further reference to His Imperial Majesty. He did not, however, after the explanations which I gave him of the value of Batoom and Trebizond, appear to doubt that he should be empowered to extend M. de la Cour's powers, and as he has an extraordinary occasion for communicating with that Ambassador by a steamer which will leave Marseilles on the 14th instant, and which is intended to arrive at Constantinople before the ordinary steamer which leaves on the 11th, nothing will be lost by the delay.

With reference to that part of your despatch of the 7th instant to me, and of your despatch of the 8th instant to Viscount Stratford, commenting on the improbability of an attack by the Russians on Varna, which appeared to be apprehended M. Drouyn de Lhuys, I beg to observe that when the French Minister for Foreign Affairs proposed that the line of the Balkan with Varna should be considered to be the rayon of defence for Constantinople, and that the operations of the fleet therefore should be confined to the defence of the coast between the entry from the Bosphorus into the Black Sea and the fortress of Varna, I did not understand him either to propose that the fleets, or any part of them, should necessarily and immediately enter the Black Sea, or to express fears for the safety of Varna. I have inquired of his Excellency this morning whether my interpre-

tation of his words is correct, and I find that it is so ; that he had no contemplation of exposing the fleets at this season in the Black Sea, unless the Russians should cross the Danube and attempt to turn the Balkan by Varna, or, what was still more in his thoughts, unless a Russian expedition should attempt to land between Varna and the mouth of the Bosphorus,—at Bourgas, for instance. He quite agrees with your Lordship that there cannot be a better spot than Buyukderé for the present rendezvous of the combined fleets.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 138.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

(Télégraphique.)

*Foreign Office, October 10, 6.45 P.M.*

FAITES-MOI savoir tout de suite l'opinion du Cabinet Autrichien sur la première proposition contenue dans la dépêche de Lord Stratford du 1er Octobre. Elle a été favorablement accueillie ici comme la seule solution possible.

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, October 10, 6.45 P.M.*

LET me know immediately the opinion of the Austrian Cabinet on the first proposition contained in Lord Stratford's despatch of the 1st October. It has been favourably received here as the only possible solution.

No. 139.

*Reshid Pasha to M. Musurus.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by M. Musurus, October 11.)*

(Traduction.)

22 Zilhadje, 1269. (25 Septembre, 1853.)

NOTRE Ambassadeur à Paris vient de nous écrire qu'on y était porté à soupçonner que Lord Stratford de Redcliffe était disposé à la guerre, et que, dès-lors, il ne remplissait pas strictement les instructions de son Gouvernement dans la question actuelle. Le fait est que l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, conformément à ses instructions, non-seulement n'a exprimé à la Sublime Porte rien qui l'encourageât à la guerre, mais qu'au contraire, d'accord avec ses collègues, il a fait tous ses efforts pour exhorter et déterminer la Sublime Porte à accepter, sans modifications, le projet de note de Vienne.

La non-acceptation par la Sublime Porte de la note de Vienne n'est que l'effet de son propre jugement. Les imputations donc dirigées contre la personne de l'Ambassadeur de la Grande Bretagne, ne sauraient être considérées que comme des inventions émanant des ennemis de la Sublime Porte.

Comme j'ai reçu l'ordre de Sa Majesté de faire connaître à notre Ambassadeur à Paris combien ces imputations sont dénuées de fondement, je suis autorisé à vous en faire également part, afin que vous ayez à tenir à Londres tel langage que les circonstances exigeraient.

Veillez, &c.  
(Signé) RESHID.

(Translation.)

22 Zilhadje, 1269. (September 25, 1853.)

OUR Ambassador at Paris has written to us that they were induced there to suspect that Lord Stratford was inclined to war, and that consequently he did not strictly execute the instructions of his Government in regard to the present question. The fact is that the Ambassador of England, in conformity with his instructions, has not only not said anything to the Sublime Porte which would encourage it to go war ; but on the contrary, in concert with his colleagues, has exerted all his efforts in order to exhort and induce the Sublime Porte to accept without modifications the Vienna draft of note.

The non-acceptance by the Sublime Porte of the Vienna note is the result

of its own judgment alone. Wherefore the imputations cast upon the Ambassador of Great Britain can only be considered as inventions emanating from the enemies of the Sublime Porte.

As I have received His Majesty's orders to communicate to our Ambassador at Paris how destitute of foundation those imputations are, I am authorised to make the same communication to you, in order that you may hold in London such a language as circumstances may require.

Be pleased, &c.  
(Signed) RESHID.

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No. 140.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, October 11, 1853.*

*Tuesday.*—M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has no objection to Lord Stratford's first proposition. He will desire M. Bourqueney to support it, if made by Lord Westmorland.

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No. 141.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(Received October 12.)

(Extract.)

*Therapia, September 25, 1853.*

MY colleagues of Austria, France, and Prussia have received telegraphic despatches from Vienna, announcing the total refusal of the Porte's modifications by Russia, and recommending anew the acceptance of Count Buol's note without amendments. The idea of Austria and Prussia appears to be that the Porte should send its acceptance by an Ambassador to Olmütz, in the hope that the Emperor of Austria being there with the Emperor Nicholas, His Majesty might prevail upon the latter to evacuate the Principalities at once, and remove the Porte's distrust by satisfactory assurances.

The Ottoman Ministers, on the other hand, persist in their previous determination. They continue to attach a vital importance to the modifications of the Austrian note demanded by their Government; and their intentions, since they received from the Sultan's Ambassador at Vienna a confirmation of the Russian negative, assume more and more a character of resistance even to war.

Yesterday morning the Sultan commanded the attendance of his principal Ministers at the palace: and, after establishing in their presence the facts of the refusal of the Porte's amendments by Russia, and the Porte's determination not to give them up, directed a meeting of the General Council to be called for this day.

According to the information which has reached me, I have reason to believe that war in principle will be the result of its deliberations, and that an actual declaration of war will be delayed awhile in order to afford time for some additional preparations, and for giving effect to some auxiliary measures that cannot be dispensed with. It is reported that about 100 individuals are invited to the Council, and that among them is an unusual number of the Ulema.

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No. 142.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.*—(Received October 12.)

(Extract.)

*Therapia, September 26, 1853.*

YOUR despatch of the 10th instant, forwarded from Marseilles in Her Majesty's steam-ship "Triton," reached me in the night, and at an early hour this morning I waited on Reshid Pasha, intending, with its assistance, to make yet another effort in favour of peace.

The General Council, in its sitting of yesterday, had not come to an irrevocable decision. It was to meet again to-day, and there still existed a bare possibility of its being induced to follow a less precipitate course.

With this last chance in view, I brought the whole purport of your Lordship's instruction under his Highness's consideration. I apprised him of the friendly and attentive manner in which the Porte's modifications had been examined by Her Majesty's Government, and of your Lordship's deliberate conviction that they make no real addition to the securities implied in the terms, and particularly in the spirit, of Count Buol's note. I painted in strong colours the danger to which the Porte would expose itself by staking its resources single-handed against those of the Russian Empire. I made no secret of those circumstances which, operating generally throughout Europe, forbid the Porte to look with any degree of confidence to active cooperation from without. Admitting the unexpected and effective energy which had been displayed in preparing for the worst, I reminded the Ottoman Minister of the several obvious deficiencies, especially in point of finance, under which the Porte would have to labour in a hostile contest with Russia. I did not conceal from him our opinion that, even if the allied squadrons were to appear in the Black Sea, they could not be expected to afford any effectual aid, either for impeding the progress of an invasion in Bulgaria, or for compelling the Russian army to evacuate the Principalities.

Providing at the same time for the almost certain contingency of a decision in favour of war, I implored his Highness to prevail, if possible, on the Council, even should it adopt the principle of going to war rather than accept the Vienna note, so far, at least, to suspend the application of that principle as to allow time for one more appeal to the Four Powers on the basis of their concurring to guarantee the Porte's interpretation of the note. I could not, on this supposition, dispute the necessity of fixing a term, perhaps even a short one, for receiving an answer from Vienna; but there was so evident an advantage in keeping open a door, even partially, for the chances of settlement by negotiation, that I was urgent with the Ottoman Minister to place my suggestion before his colleagues and the Council in its most favourable light.

Reshid Pasha assured me that he would act in the manner I requested; but he held out a very slender prospect of success, and it was evident on the whole that although he admitted the truth of my remarks, and was not insensible to the danger in prospect, he considered the decision as virtually taken, and the popular feeling so strongly pronounced, as to leave the Government no safe or satisfactory course to pursue but that of resistance by force of arms.

I did not leave the Pasha till it was time for him to repair to the Council. The decision of that Assembly, which comprised at its second meeting upwards of one hundred and twenty members, appears to have corresponded entirely with my anticipations. The Vienna note has been universally rejected as inadmissible without the required modifications, and a recourse to war has been declared indispensable; the time and circumstances of its declaration, together with such measures as are to accompany it, being left to the discretion of the Ministerial Council, confirmed by the Sultan's authority.

#### No. 143.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 12.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, September 28, 1853.*

THE prospect of war between Russia and Turkey is become so imminent, not to say certain, that, while I am anxious to overlook nothing which may afford a chance of preserving peace, it can hardly be thought premature if I bring forward some points which, in case of actual hostilities, would probably, if not necessarily, require the attention of Her Majesty's Government.

It appears beyond a doubt that all negotiation directed to the arrangement of terms acceptable to both parties is, for the present at least, utterly hopeless. I can perceive but two ways, and they are little more than possibilities, by which

a declaration of war might still be averted. Each would depend upon a complete understanding among the Four Powers, and a determined interference on their part.

The first may be thus expressed: a *new form* of the Vienna note, embodying *in substance* the Porte's modifications, to be communicated to the Ottoman and Russian Cabinets by the Four Powers, with a declaration purporting that it has been adopted by them, as parties to the Sextuple Treaty of 1841, under a conviction that it does not essentially differ *in meaning* from the original draft, and that the Treaty rights of Russia and the sovereign rights of the Porte are thereby alike guaranteed. Such a course of action would obviously be grounded on the principles declared in 1841, and also on the respective assertions of Russia and Turkey that the former requires no new concession, and that the latter declines no existing obligation.

The sole remaining expedient would seem to be that of an arbitration, the Four Powers being the arbiters, with the addition of a Fifth selected by them, and a majority of the Five being authorised to determine the pending question upon the above-mentioned principles, within the limits of the Vienna note and its proposed modifications.

If either of these ideas were deemed susceptible of application, the utmost expedition would evidently be needed in order to secure a chance of success. The Porte's intention is not to declare war till after Prince Gortchakoff shall have refused to withdraw from the Principalities; and the approach of winter will probably put a *veto* on military operations for this season. But the Russian General may decide on crossing the Danube at once; and I will not answer for a perfect measure of forbearance on this side now that a hostile resolution is taken.

Supposing the worst to happen, it is evident that the Porte will enter upon its perilous course with the advantage, in principle, of exercising an unquestionable right. That the unauthorised occupation of the two Principalities by a Russian army constituted a case of war, has been generally admitted throughout Europe; and unless the right to take it up has been forfeited by the act of protestation referred to the Four Powers, or by the Porte's unwillingness to surrender the appreciation of her own vital interests to them, her present resolution, however its consequences may prove deplorable, can hardly be condemned. Having witnessed the whole course of pretension and intimidation to which the Sultan and his Ministers have been submitted, and the conciliatory though firm consistency with which so many vexatious proceedings have been met, I may be allowed, while lamenting the necessity of war, to admire the gallant and orderly spirit which has hitherto prevailed, with slight exceptions, in all the proceedings and preparatory measures of this Government.

It is far from improbable that Russia, when summoned to evacuate the Principalities, will display her consistent policy by continuing the occupation without declaring war. There is little doubt that in that case the Porte will proceed to exercise her right, under a sincere conviction that the responsibility of whatever may ensue will devolve upon the unjust invader of her territory. The Sultan may or may not rely on those friendly Powers who have publicly declared their determination to respect the independence and integrity of his Empire, but he can hardly fail to perceive that if the former has been insulted, and the latter violated by Russia, she is fairly entitled to their sympathy and support, if not to their active cooperation.

I have reason to believe that the Porte thinks of inviting the squadrons to pass the Dardanelles; and there is a case which, though not strictly falling within the letter of my instructions, may suggest the propriety of complying with its request. I mean a declaration of war by the Porte in consequence, as I stated above, of Russia's rejecting a summons to evacuate the Principalities. On that supposition it may fairly be alleged that the provocation would lie as much to the charge of Russia as if she had been the first to declare war, and therefore that the provisions of your Lordship's instruction of the 31st of May would virtually apply to the case.

Additional grounds of compliance are suggested by the advanced season of the year, and the motive which Russia may find in that circumstance for making some forward movement without delay.

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## No. 144.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 12.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, September 28, 1853.*

RESHID PASHA has stated to M. Pisani, in reply to an inquiry which I directed him to make, that the General Council, which had met on the 25th and 26th instant, had decided irrevocably that the Vienna note can by no means be accepted by the Porte without modifications.

The Pasha added that war had been resolved by the unanimous votes of 172 individuals, who, being present at the meetings, had all subscribed the report addressed to the Sultan; that a manifesto to be conveyed to the Four Powers by their respective Representatives here, and a proclamation to the Empire, with other details, were left to His Majesty and his Ministers; that the Ministerial Council is to deliberate on these matters as soon as the Imperial pleasure shall be signified; that Omar Pasha will be instructed to summon Prince Gortchakoff, by letter, to evacuate the Principalities within fifteen days from the receipt of his letter; that the Prince's refusal will be considered as tantamount to a declaration of war on the part of Russia; that hostilities will be declared thereupon by the Porte; that all persons now here in the employment of Russia will then be requested to withdraw: and, finally, that all merchant-vessels under Russian colours will also be required to leave the port of Constantinople.

I have learnt from the same authentic source that all direct communication between the Porte and the Russian Government is closed from the present; and that on war being declared, the Dardanelles and Black Sea will be open to all ships of war belonging to friendly Governments and destined to assist the Sultan.

## No. 145.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 12.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, September 30, 1853.*

THE Sultan has confirmed the report of the last two meetings of the General Council by a hatti-scheriff.

The Sheik-ul-Islam has also issued his fetva for going to war.

Hosreff Pasha, being too weak to attend the Council, has, nevertheless, signed the report at his house.

## No. 146.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 12.)*

(Télégraphique.)

11 Octobre, 1853, 8 P.M.

J'AI communiqué votre dépêche télégraphique de hier au Comte de Buol en l'engageant d'accueillir favorablement, comme elle était par vous, la première proposition contenue dans la dépêche de Lord Stratford du 1er Octobre. Il a répondu que comme les Cabinets de Londres et de Paris n'ont pas cru devoir appuyer l'acceptation de la note de Vienne, le Cabinet Autrichien croyait aussi de son côté de la laisser tomber de manière qu'elle ne pourrait plus recommander des modifications de cette même note.

Un moment après cet entretien une dépêche télégraphique est arrivée de l'Internonce de Constantinople en date du 5 du courant, qui annonce un courier qui porte le manifeste de la Porte et la copie d'une note qu'Omar Pasha doit adresser au Prince Gortchakoff qui déclare que l'état de guerre doit commencer 15 jours après sa réception à moins que les provinces ne soient évacuées. Le commerce de la Mer Noire restera ouverte excepté au pavillon Russe. La flotte Turque se placera à Baltschik.

Ces nouvelles ont décidé le Comte Buol à déclarer qu'une proposition faite à la Russie au moment que la Porte lui déclare la guerre ne serait d'aucune valeur.

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

October 11, 1853, 8 P.M.

I HAVE communicated to Count Buol your telegraphic despatch of yesterday, inviting him to receive favourably, as it was received by you, the first proposition contained in Lord Stratford's despatch of October 1. He replied that, as the Cabinets of London and Paris had not thought proper to support the acceptance of the Vienna note, the Austrian Cabinet, for its part, was of opinion that it should be suffered to fall to the ground ; so that it could no longer recommend any modifications of that same note.

Immediately after this conversation, a telegraphic despatch arrived from the Internuncio at Constantinople, dated the 5th instant, announcing a courier bearing the Porte's manifesto, and the copy of a note which Omar Pasha is to address to Prince Gortchakoff, and which declares that the state of war is to commence fifteen days after its receipt unless the Provinces should be evacuated. The commerce of the Black Sea will remain open, save to the Russian flag. The Turkish fleet will be stationed at Batschik.

This intelligence has determined Count Buol to declare, that a proposition made to Russia at the moment of the Porte's declaring war against her would be of no value.

No. 147.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

(Télégraphique.)

Le 12 Octobre, 1853, 6.15 P.M.

COMMUNIQUEZ ce qui suit à M. Fonblanque, qui doit l'envoyer sans le moindre délai à Lord Stratford de Redcliffe :

“ La première proposition contenue dans votre dépêche télégraphique du 1er Octobre et de votre dépêche du 28 Septembre a été favorablement accueillie par l'Angleterre et la France ; mais si les hostilités commencent, cette solution paisible du différend deviendra fort difficile, si non impossible. Tâchez d'en empêcher le commencement. Vos dépêches par le ‘Fury’ sont arrivées.”

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

October 12, 1853, 6.15 P.M.

COMMUNICATE what follows to M. Fonblanque, who must send it, without the least delay, to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe :

“ The first proposition contained in your telegraphic despatch of the 1st of October, and of your despatch of September 28, has been favourably received by England and France ; but if hostilities begin, this peaceable solution of the difference will become very difficult, if not impossible. Endeavour to prevent the commencement of them. Your despatches by the ‘Fury’ have arrived.”

No. 148.

*Reshid Pasha to M. Musurus.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by M. Musurus, October 12.)*

(Traduction.)

28 Zilhadji, 1269. (October 1, 1853.)

LA Sublime Porte a reçu la nouvelle de la non-acceptation par le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg des modifications qu'elle avait proposées au projet de note de Vienne.

Quoique les Puissances amies eussent recommandé à la Sublime Porte ce projet de note, et l'eussent pressée de l'accepter, le Gouvernement Impérial, tant à cause de l'impossibilité d'agréer un semblable document sans les modifications proposées, qu'à cause des inconvénients résultant de la prolongation de l'état de choses actuel, a dû, bon gré malgré, se décider pour la guerre.

En me bornant à vous informer à la hâte de cette résolution, je me réserve à vous en communiquer par la suite tous les détails.

Le Gouvernement Impérial compte, dans les circonstances actuelles, sur l'appui moral et matériel de l'Angleterre et de la France ; et c'est là que doit tendre le langage que vous aurez à tenir à Londres.

Veuillez, &c.  
(Signé) RESHID.

(Translation.)

28 Zilhadji, 1269. (October 1, 1853.)

THE Sublime Porte has received intelligence of the non-acceptance by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg of the modifications which it had proposed in the Vienna draft of note.

Although the friendly Powers had recommended that draft of note to the Sublime Porte, and had urged its acceptance, the Imperial Government, as well on account of the impossibility of accepting such a document without the modifications which it had proposed, as on account of their conveniences resulting from the prolongation of the existing state of things, has been obliged, whether it would or not, to determine upon going to war.

While confining myself to informing you hastily of this resolution, I propose to communicate to you hereafter all the details.

The Imperial Government, under existing circumstances, reckons upon the moral and material support of England and France ; and it is to that object that the language which you will have to hold at London should be directed.

Be pleased, &c.  
(Signed) RESHID.

No. 149.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 14.)*

My Lord,

Therapia, October 4, 1853.

HER Majesty's steam-ship "Caradoc" being on the point of starting, by the Admiral's order, for Malta, with the view of catching the Indian home-bound mail, I can only forward the important papers which I have this moment received from the Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. They consist of an explanatory declaration or kind of manifesto addressed to the Four Representatives, a summons to be addressed by Omer Pasha to Prince Gortchakoff, and an official note accompanying these two papers.

The originals are in Turkish, the French translations transmitted herewith were sent to me from the Porte. The English translation of the note was made by Mr. Alison.

My previous correspondence will have prepared your Lordship for this decisive communication.

M. Pisani informs me that the papers now forwarded have received the Sultan's formal sanction ; and that the letter for Omar Pasha will be transmitted to Shumla early to-morrow morning.

I learn, moreover, on the same authority, that the Sultan has directed Reshid Pasha to apply to the French Ambassador and myself by note for the assistance of the respective squadrons.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 149.

*Circular addressed by the Porte to the Four Representatives.*

*Foreign Office, Moharrem 1, 1270.*

*(October 4, 1853.)*

(Translation.)

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Excellency copies of the manifesto setting forth the motives which have obliged the Porte to come to its present decision concerning the Russian question, and of the letter which is to be addressed by his Excellency Omer Pasha to Prince Gortchakoff. I beg to request that you will communicate this manifesto to your Government, and to express the earnest hope that the illustrious Government of Great Britain will acknowledge the just grounds on which the Porte has issued that manifesto.

Inclosure 2 in No. 149.

*Omar Pasha to Prince Gortchakoff.*

M. le Général,

C'EST par l'ordre de mon Gouvernement que j'ai l'honneur d'adresser cette lettre à votre Excellence.

Tandisque la Sublime Porte épuisait tous les moyens de la conciliation pour maintenir la paix de même que son indépendance, la Cour de Russie n'a pas cessé de faire naître des difficultés jusqu'à ce qu'elle a violé les Traités par l'envahissement des deux Principautés de Valachie et de Moldavie, parties intégrantes de l'Empire Ottoman.

Fidèle à son système pacifique, la Sublime Porte, au lieu d'user de son droit de représailles, s'est bornée alors à protester sans s'écarter de la voie qui pouvait encore mener à un arrangement.

La Russie, au contraire, se gardant bien de montrer des sentiments analogues, a fini par rejeter des propositions recommandées par les augustes Cours médiatrices, et nécessaires à l'honneur comme à la sûreté de la Sublime Porte.

Il ne reste par conséquent à celle-ci que l'indispensable obligation de recourir à la guerre. Mais puisque l'invasion des Principautés et la violation des Traités qui l'accompagne sont les causes inévitables de la guerre, la Sublime Porte, pour dernière expression de ses sentiments pacifiques, propose à votre Excellence par mon intermédiaire l'évacuation des deux Provinces, et offre pour votre décision un terme de quinze jours à dater de la réception de cette lettre. Si, dans ce délai, une réponse négative me parvenait de la part de votre Excellence, le commencement des hostilités en serait la conséquence naturelle.

C'est ce que j'ai l'honneur, &c.

(Translation.)

M. le Général,

IT is by order of my Government that I have the honour to address the present letter to your Excellency.

Whilst the Sublime Porte was exhausting all the means of conciliation, in order to maintain peace as well as its independence, the Court of Russia has not ceased to raise up difficulties, until it has violated the Treaties by the invasion of the two Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, which are integral portions of the Ottoman Empire.

The Sublime Porte, faithful to its pacific system, instead of resorting to its right of reprisals, confined itself at that time to protesting, without departing from the course which might still lead to an arrangement.

Russia, on the contrary, carefully abstaining from manifesting corresponding sentiments, has ended by rejecting propositions recommended by the august mediating Courts, and necessary for the honour as well as for the security of the Sublime Porte.

Consequently, there only remains for the latter the indispensable obligation of declaring war. But since the invasion of the Principalities, and the violation of the Treaties which attended it, are the inevitable causes of the war, the Sublime Porte, as the last expression of its pacific sentiments, proposes to your Excellency, through my channel, the evacuation of the Principalities, and offers a term of fifteen days from the date of the receipt of this letter for you to make up your mind. If within this term a negative answer should reach me from your Excellency, the commencement of hostilities would naturally ensue from it.

This is what I have the honour, &c.

Inclosure 3 in No. 149.

*Manifesto.*

(Traduction.)

1 Moharrem, 1270.

DANS les circonstances actuelles il serait superflu de reprendre, dès l'origine, l'exposé du différend survenu entre la Sublime et la Russie, d'entrer de nouveau dans le détail des diverses phrases que ce différend a parcouru, ainsi que de reproduire les opinions et appréciations du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan, qui ont été rendue notoires par les précis officielles publiées en temps et lieu.

Malgré le désir de ne pas revenir sur les motifs pressants qui ont déterminé les modifications apportées par la Sublime Porte au projet de note élaboré à Vienne, motifs exposés aussi précédemment dans une note explicative, de nouvelles sollicitations ayant été faites pour l'adoption pure et simple du dit projet, à la suite de la non-acceptation de la Russie à ces mêmes modifications, le Gouvernement Ottoman, se trouvant aujourd'hui, quant à l'adoption du projet de note en question, sous l'empire de la plus grande impossibilité et forcé d'entreprendre la guerre, croit de son devoir de faire l'exposé des raisons impérieuses de cette importante détermination, ainsi que de celles qui l'ont obligé à ne pas conformer pour cette fois sa conduite aux conseils des Grandes Puissances ses alliées, bien qu'il n'ait jamais cessé d'apprécier la nature bienveillante de leurs observations.

Les points principaux que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan relevra d'abord sont ceux-ci : c'est que, dès le principe, il n'a existé dans sa conduite aucun motif de querelle, et qu'animé du désir de conserver la paix, c'est avec un remarquable esprit de modération et de conciliation qu'il a agi depuis le commencement du différend jusqu'à présent. Il est facile de prouver ces faits à tous les esprits qui ne s'écarteront pas de la voie de la justice et de l'équité.

Quand même la Russie aurait eu un sujet de plainte à élever relativement à la question des Lieux Saints, elle aurait dû circoncrire ses démarches et ses

sollicitations dans les limites de cette seule question et ne pas élever des prétensions que l'objet même de ses réclamations ne pouvait comporter. Elle aurait dû, en outre, ne pas prendre des mesures d'intimidation, comme celles d'envoyer ses troupes aux frontières et de faire des préparatifs de force maritime à Sévastopol, au sujet d'une question qui aurait pu être résolue amicalement entre les Deux Puissances. Or, il est évident que c'est tout-à-fait le contraire qui a eu lieu.

La question des Lieux Saints avait été résolue à la satisfaction de toutes les parties ; le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan avait témoigné de favorables dispositions au sujet des assurances demandées pour cette question, et pour certaines autres demandes relatives à Jérusalem. En fin, il n'y avait plus lieu, de la part de la Russie, d'élever aucune réclamation. N'est-ce pas chercher un prétexte de guerre que d'insister, comme elle la fait, sur la question des privilèges de l'Eglise Grecque, octroyés par le Gouvernement Ottoman—privilèges qu'il croit de son honneur, de sa dignité et de son autorité suzeraine de maintenir, et au sujet desquels il ne peut admettre ni l'immiscion ni la surveillance d'aucun Gouvernement. N'est-ce pas la Russie qui a occupé avec des forces considérables les Principautés de Moldavie et de Valachie, en déclarant que ces provinces lui serviraient de garantie jusqu'à ce qu'elle eût obtenu ce qu'elle exige ? Cet acte n'a-t-il pas été justement considéré par la Sublime Porte comme une violation des Traités et par conséquent comme un *casus belli* ? Les autres Puissances elles-mêmes ont-elles pu en juger autrement ? Qui donc pourra douter que la Russie ne soit l'agresseur ?

La Sublime Porte, qui a toujours observé avec une fidélité notoire tous ses Traités, a-t-elle pu les enfreindre au point de déterminer la Russie à une démarche aussi violente que celle d'enfreindre elle-même ces mêmes Traités ? Ou bien contrairement à la promesse consignée explicitement dans le Traité de Kainardjé, s'est-il produit dans l'Empire Ottoman des faits pareils à ceux de démolition des églises Chrétiennes ou d'obstacles apportés à l'exercice du culte Chrétien ?

Le Cabinet Ottoman sans vouloir entrer dans de plus long détails sur ces points, ne doute pas que les Hautes Puissances ses alliées ne trouvent et ne jugent tout-à-fait juste et véridique ce qui vient d'être mentionné.

Quant à la non-adoption sous la forme pure et simple du projet de note de Vienne par la Sublime Porte, il est à remarquer que ce projet sans être tout-à-fait conforme à la note du Prince Menchikoff, et tout en contenant, il est vrai, dans sa composition, quelques-uns des paragraphes du projet de note de la Sublime Porte elle-même, n'est point dans son ensemble, soit dans sa lettre, soit dans son esprit, essentiellement différent de celui du Prince Menchikoff.

Les assurances récemment données par les Représentants des Grandes Puissances au sujet du danger d'interprétations nuisibles du projet de note en question, sont une nouvelle preuve des bonnes intentions de leurs Gouvernements respectifs pour la Sublime Porte ; elles ont par conséquent causé une vive satisfaction au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan. Il faut remarquer cependant, au moment où nous avons encore sous les yeux le début des privilèges religieux soulevé par la Russie, qui cherche à s'appuyer sur un paragraphe si clair et si précis du Traité de Kainardjé, que vouloir consigner dans une pièce diplomatique le paragraphe concernant la sollicitude active des Empereurs de Russie pour le maintien, dans les Etats de la Sublime Porte, des immunités et des privilèges religieux octroyés du culte Grec par les Empereurs Ottomans, avant l'existence même de la Russie comme Empire, laisser dans un état douteux et obscur l'absence de tout rapport entre ces privilèges et le Traité de Kainardjé, employer en faveur d'une grande communauté de sujets de la Sublime Porte professant le rit Grec des expressions qui pourraient faire allusion à des Traités conclus avec la France et l'Autriche relativement aux religieux Français et Latins, ce serait courir la chance de mettre à la disposition de la Russie certaines paragraphes, vagues et obscurs, dont quelques-uns mêmes sont contraires à la réalité des faits ; ce serait également, sans nul doute, offrir à la Russie un prétexte solide pour ses prétensions de surveillance et de protectorat religieux—prétensions qu'elle essaierait de produire en affirmant qu'elles n'ont rien d' attentatoire aux droits souverains et à l'indépendance de la Sublime Porte.

Le langage même des employés et agents de la Russie qui ont déclaré que l'intention de leur Gouvernement n'était autre que de remplir l'office d'avocat auprès de la Sublime Porte, toutefois que des actes contraires aux privilèges

existant auraient lieu, est une preuve patente de la justesse de l'opinion du Gouvernement Ottoman.

Si le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan a jugé nécessaire de demander des assurances lors même que les modifications proposées par lui à la note de Vienne auraient été accueillies, comment, en conscience, pourrait-il être tranquille, si la note de Vienne était maintenue dans son intégrité et sans modifications ? La Sublime Porte en acceptant ce qu'elle a déclaré à tout le monde ne pouvoir admettre sans y être forcée, compromettrait sa dignité vis-à-vis des autres Puissances ; elle la sacrifierait aux yeux même de ses propres sujets, et tout en attendant à son honneur, elle commettrait un suicide moral et matériel sur elle-même.

Quoique le refus de la Russie d'accéder aux modifications réclamées par la Sublime Porte ait été basé sur une question d'honneur, l'on ne saurait nier que la cause réelle du refus de la Russie provient uniquement de son désir de ne pas remplacer par des termes explicites, des expressions vagues qui pourraient ultérieurement lui fournir un prétexte d'immiscion. Une semblable conduite oblige conséquemment la Sublime Porte à persister de son côté dans sa non-adhésion.

Les raisons qui ont déterminé le Gouvernement Ottoman à faire ses modifications ayant été appréciées par les Représentants des Quatre Puissances, il est prouvé que la Sublime Porte a eu complètement raison de ne pas adhérer à l'adoption pure et simple de la note de Vienne.

En entrant en discussion sur les inconvénients que cette note présente, le but n'est pas de critiquer un projet qui a obtenu l'assentiment des Grandes Puissances. Leurs efforts ont toujours tendu, tout en désirant de préserver les droits et l'indépendance du Gouvernement Impérial, à conserver la paix. Les démarches faites dans cette intention étant on ne peut plus louables, la Sublime Porte ne saurait assez les apprécier. Mais comme chaque Gouvernement possède évidemment, par suite de ses connaissances propres et de son expérience locale, plus de facilités que tout autre Gouvernement pour juger les points qui touchent à ses propres droits, l'exposé que fait le Gouvernement Ottoman provient de l'unique désir de justifier la situation obligatoire où il se trouve placé à son plus grand regret, tandis qu'il aurait désiré continuer à ne point s'écarter des conseils bienveillants qui lui ont été offerts par ses alliées depuis l'origine du différend et qu'il a suivis jusqu'à présent.

Si on allègue que l'empressement avec lequel on a arrêté en Europe un projet, résulte de la lenteur de la Sublime Porte à proposer un arrangement, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan se trouve dans l'obligation de justifier en exposant les faits suivants.

Avant l'entrée des troupes Russes dans les deux Principautés, quelques-uns des Représentants des Puissances, guidés par l'intention sincère de prévenir l'occupation de ces provinces, ont exposé à la Sublime Porte la nécessité de rédiger un projet de fusion des projets de note de la Sublime Porte et du Prince Menchikoff.

Plus tard les Représentants des Puissances ont réunis confidentiellement à la Sublime Porte différents projets d'arrangement. Aucun de ces derniers ne répondant aux vues de Gouvernement Impérial, le Cabinet Ottoman était sur le point d'entrer en négociations avec les Représentants des Puissances sur un projet rédigé par lui-même conformément à leur suggestion. Dans ce moment la nouvelle du passage du Pruth par les Russes étant arrivée, ce fait a changé la question de face. Le projet de note proposé par la Sublime Porte a dû être mis de côté, et les Cabinets ont été priés d'exprimer leur manière de voir sur cette violation des Traités, après la protestation de la Sublime Porte. D'un côté le Cabinet Ottoman a dû attendre les réponses, et de l'autre il a arrêté sur la suggestion des Représentants des Puissances un projet d'arrangement qui a été envoyé à Vienne. Pour toute réponse à toutes ces démarches actives, le projet de note élaboré à Vienne a paru.

Quoiqu'il en soit, le Gouvernement Ottoman craignant à juste titre tout ce qui impliquerait un droit d'immiscion en faveur de la Russie dans les affaires religieuses, ne pouvait faire plus que de donner des assurances propres à dissiper les doutes qui étaient devenus le sujet de la discussion ; et ce ne sera pas surtout après tant de préparatifs et de sacrifices qu'il acceptera des propositions qui n'ont pu être accueillies lors du séjour du Prince Menchikoff à Constan-

tinople. Puisque le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg ne s'est pas contenté des assurances qui lui ont été offertes ; puisque les efforts bienveillants des Hautes Puissances sont demeurés infructueux ; puisqu'enfin la Sublime Porte ne peut tolérer ni souffrir plus longtemps l'état de choses actuel, ainsi que la prolongation de l'occupation des Principautés Moldo-Valaques, parties intégrantes de son Empire, le Cabinet Ottoman, dans l'intention ferme et louable de défendre les droits sacrés de souveraineté et l'indépendance de son Gouvernement, usera de justes représailles contre une violation des Traités qu'il considère comme un *casus belli*. Il notifie, donc, officiellement que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan se trouve obligé à déclarer la guerre, et qu'il a donné les instructions les plus catégoriques à son Excellence Eamer Pacha pour inviter le Prince Gortchakoff à évacuer les Principautés, et de commencer les hostilités, si dans un délai de quinze jours à partir de l'arrivée de son dépêche au quartier-général Russe, une réponse négative lui parvenait.

Il est bien entendu que si la réponse du Prince Gortchakoff est négative, les agents Russes devront quitter les Etats Ottomans, et que les relations commerciales des sujets respectifs des deux Gouvernements devront être interrompues.

Toutefois la Sublime Porte ne trouve pas juste que l'embargo soit mis sur les navires marchands Russes conformément aux anciens usages. En conséquence il leur sera donné avis de se rendre dans la Mer Noire ou dans la Méditerranée à leur choix, dans un délai qui sera fixé ultérieurement. En outre, le Gouvernement Ottoman ne voulant pas apporter d'entraves aux relations commerciales des sujets des Puissances amies, laissera, pendant la guerre, les Détroits ouverts à leur marine marchande.

(Translation.)

Moharrem 1, 1270.

UNDER existing circumstances it would be superfluous to recapitulate from the commencement the narrative of the difference which has arisen between the Sublime Porte and Russia, to enter into a fresh detail of the different stages of this difference, as well as to recite the opinions and views of the Government of His Majesty the Sultan, which have been made public by the official documents published from time to time.

Notwithstanding our desire not to revert to the urgent motives which led to the modifications introduced by the Sublime Porte into the draft of note prepared at Vienna, motives which have moreover been previously set forth in an explanatory note, fresh representations having been made, subsequently to the refusal of Russia to accept those same modifications, in favour of the adoption of the said draft without alteration, the Ottoman Government finding it at the present time utterly impossible to adopt the draft of note in question, and being compelled to declare war, deems it to be its duty to set forth the imperative reasons of this important determination, as well as those which have constrained it not to adapt its conduct in this instance to the recommendations of the Great Powers its allies, although it has never ceased to appreciate the benevolent character of their observations.

The principal points which the Government of His Majesty the Sultan will in the first place notice, are these : that, at the outset, there was nothing in its conduct to give occasion for complaint, and that, animated with the desire of preserving peace, it has acted with a remarkable spirit of moderation and conciliation from the commencement of the difference up to the present time. It is easy to prove these facts to all who do not deviate from the paths of justice and equity.

Even though Russia might have had a ground of complaint in regard to the question of the Holy Places, she ought to have confined her measures and representations within the limits of that single question, and not put forth pretensions which the object of her claims could not bear out. Moreover she ought not to have had recourse to measures of intimidation, such as those of sending her troops to the frontiers and of making maritime preparations at Sevastopol, in regard to a question which might have been amicably settled

between the two Powers. However, it is clear that the contrary of all this has taken place.

The question of the Holy Places had been settled to the satisfaction of all parties: the Government of His Majesty the Sultan had shown itself to be favourably disposed on the subject of the assurances required as to that question, and as to certain other demands relative to Jerusalem. In fine, there was no ground for putting forward on the part of Russia any further demand. Is it not to seek occasion for war to insist, as she does, on the question of the privileges of the Greek Church which have been bestowed by the Ottoman Government, privileges which it considers it a matter of honour, of dignity, and of its sovereign authority to uphold, and in regard to which it cannot admit of the interference or supervision of any Government? Has not Russia occupied with a considerable force the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, declaring that those provinces should serve her for a guarantee until such time as she should have obtained what she requires? Was not this act justly considered by the Porte as an infraction of Treaties, and consequently as a *casus belli*? Could the other Powers themselves entertain any other opinion of it? Who then can doubt that Russia is the aggressor? Was it possible that the Sublime Porte, which has always observed with notorious fidelity all its Treaties, should have infringed them to such a degree as to induce Russia to adopt so violent a course as that of herself violating these Treaties? Or, have there occurred within the Ottoman Empire, in disregard of the promise explicitly recorded in the Treaty of Kainardji, such acts as the demolition of Christian churches, or have any obstacles been offered to the exercise of the Christian religion?

The Ottoman Cabinet, without wishing to enter into longer details on these points, entertains no doubt that the High Powers, its allies, will find and consider what has been mentioned to be altogether correct and true.

In regard to the non-acceptance by the Sublime Porte of the Vienna draft of note in its unaltered form, it is to be observed that that draft, without being altogether the same as Prince Menchikoff's note, and while it comprised indeed some paragraphs of the Sublime Porte's own draft of note, does not on the whole, either in letter or in spirit, differ essentially from that of Prince Menchikoff.

The assurances recently given by the Representatives of the Great Powers in regard to the danger to be apprehended from mischievous interpretations of the draft of note in question, are a further proof of the good intentions of their respective Governments towards the Sublime Porte; they have consequently afforded lively satisfaction to the Government of His Majesty the Sultan. It is to be observed, however, that, while we have still before our eyes the commencement of the question of religious privileges which has been raised by Russia, who seeks to rest her claim on a paragraph so clear and so precise of the Treaty of Kainardji, to consent to record in a diplomatic document the paragraph concerning the active solicitude of the Emperors of Russia for the maintenance, within the States of the Sublime Porte, of the immunities and religious privileges granted to the Greek religion by the Ottoman Emperors, before the existence even of Russia as an Empire; to leave in a state of doubt and obscurity the fact that there is no relation between these privileges and the Treaty of Kainardji; to employ in favour of a great community of subjects of the Sublime Porte professing the Greek religion, expressions which should contain an allusion to Treaties concluded with France and Austria in regard to the French and Latin monks, would be to incur the risk of leaving at the disposal of Russia certain vague and obscure paragraphs, some of which are inconsistent with fact; it would likewise, without any doubt, offer to Russia a good ground for its claims to supervision and to religious protectorate, claims which she would attempt to put forward, asserting that they are by no means prejudicial to the sovereign rights and independence of the Sublime Porte.

The very language of the officers and agents of Russia, who have declared that the intention of their Government was no other than to discharge the office of advocate with the Sublime Porte so often as proceedings contrary to the existing privileges should take place, is an evident proof of the correctness of the opinion of the Ottoman Government.

If the Government of His Majesty the Sultan has deemed it necessary to require assurances, even should the modifications of the Vienna note which it proposed itself have been admitted, how could it, in conscience, be at ease if the

Vienna note was maintained in its integrity and without modifications? The Sublime Porte, by accepting that which it has publicly declared it would not accept without compulsion, would compromise its dignity in the estimation of the other Powers; it would sacrifice it in the estimation even of its own subjects; it would commit a moral and material suicide.

Although the refusal of Russia to acquiesce in the modifications required by the Sublime Porte was based on a question of honour, it cannot be denied that the real cause for the refusal of Russia is merely her desire not to substitute explicit terms for vague expressions, which might furnish her with a further pretext for interference. Such a conduct consequently obliges the Porte on its side to persist in its refusal.

The reasons which have decided the Ottoman Government to make its modifications having been appreciated by the Representatives of the Four Powers, it is proved that the Sublime Porte was altogether in the right in not adopting the Vienna note without alteration.

By discussing the inconveniences presented by this note, it is not intended to criticise a draft which has obtained the assent of the Great Powers. Their efforts have always aimed at the maintenance of peace, while desiring to preserve the rights and independence of the Imperial Government. Their proceedings in this respect being in the highest degree commendable, the Sublime Porte cannot sufficiently appreciate them. But as each Government, by reason of its own knowledge and local experience, evidently possesses greater facility than any other Government for estimating the matters which affect its own rights, the statement made by the Ottoman Government is wholly the result of its desire to justify the obligation under which, to its great regret, it finds itself, while it would have wished to continue not to deviate from the benevolent advice which from the commencement of the difference has been offered to it by its allies, and which it has followed up to the present time.

If it is alleged that the eagerness with which a draft has been framed in Europe results from the tardiness of the Sublime Porte to propose an arrangement; the Government of His Majesty the Sultan is compelled to justify itself by stating the following facts:—

Before the entrance of the Russian troops into the two Principalities, certain of the Representatives of the Powers, influenced by the sincere desire of preventing the occupation of those Provinces, represented to the Sublime Porte the necessity of drawing up a draft in which the draft of note of the Sublime Porte and that of Prince Menchikoff should be blended together.

Subsequently the Representatives of the Powers submitted confidentially to the Porte various plans of arrangement. None of these last meeting the views of the Imperial Government, the Ottoman Cabinet was on the point of entering into negotiations with the Representatives of the Powers in regard to a draft drawn up by itself in conformity with their suggestion. At this moment, news having arrived of the passage of the Pruth by the Russians, the aspect of the question became changed. The draft of note proposed by the Sublime Porte was necessarily laid aside; and the Cabinets, after the protest of the Sublime Porte, were requested to express their sentiments on this violation of Treaties.

On the one hand, the Ottoman Cabinet had to wait for the answers; and on the other, it drew up, at the suggestion of the Representatives of the Powers, a draft of arrangement which was sent to Vienna. As the only answer to all this, appeared the draft of note drawn up at Vienna.

Be that as it may, the Ottoman Government, being reasonably apprehensive of anything which might imply, in favour of Russia, a right of intervention in religious matters, could do no more than give assurances calculated to dispel the doubts which had led to the discussion; and, after so many preparations and sacrifices, it certainly will not accept propositions which could not be accepted during Prince Menchikoff's stay at Constantinople. Since the Cabinet of St. Petersburg is not satisfied with the assurances which have been offered to it; since the benevolent efforts of the High Powers have been fruitless; since, finally, the Porte can no longer tolerate or endure the existing state of things, as well as the prolonged occupation of the Moldo-Wallachian Principalities, which are integral parts of its Empire; the Ottoman Cabinet, with the fixed and laudable intention of defending the sacred rights of sovereignty and the independence of its Government, will resort to just reprisals against a violation of

Treaties which it looks upon as a *casus belli*. It therefore officially makes known that the Government of His Majesty the Sultan is obliged to declare war, and that it has given the most positive instructions to his Excellency Omer Pasha to call upon Prince Gortchakoff to evacuate the Principalities, and to commence hostilities if, within fifteen days after the arrival of his letter at the Russian head-quarters, a negative answer should reach him.

It is well understood that if Prince Gortchakoff's answer is in the negative, the Russian agents must quit the Ottoman dominions, and that the commercial relations of the respective subjects of the two Governments must be interrupted.

The Sublime Porte, however, does not consider it just that, agreeably to ancient usage, an embargo should be laid on Russian merchant-vessels. Accordingly they will be warned to proceed, within a period to be fixed hereafter, to the Black Sea or to the Mediterranean, as they may choose. Moreover, the Imperial Government, being unwilling to interrupt the commercial relations of the subjects of friendly Powers, will leave the Straits open to their mercantile marine during the war.

## No. 150.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 12.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, October 11, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to state that His Imperial Majesty has directed that Admiral Hamelin shall be instructed to act in concert with Admiral Dundas, upon the joint orders of the English and French Ambassadors at Constantinople, wherever it may be judged necessary to employ the naval forces of the two countries for the defence of the Sultan's dominions.

## No. 151.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 17.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, October 9, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour of inclosing to your Lordship the copy of a letter containing very unfavourable intelligence from Constantinople, which reached me to-day by post from Her Majesty's Consul at Odessa.

## Inclosure in No. 151.

*Consul Yeames to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Odessa, September 31, 1853.*

THE steam-packets from Constantinople have of late brought accounts successively more disquieting, though it is probable that the apprehensions of some popular commotion, likely to be excited by fanaticism, have been exaggerated.

The intelligence received the day before yesterday by private letters of the 26th, is of a most alarming nature; for it is stated that, in consequence of the rejection of the "note" as modified, a great Divan was assembled on the preceding day (the 25th), in which the resolution was carried to summon the Russian Commander-in-chief to evacuate the Danubian Principalities within the term of fourteen days, and in case of non-compliance to proceed to a declaration of war.

At the present time, the 13th Division of Infantry, composed of sixteen battalions, with two batteries of guns, is embarking at Sevastopol, in order to be conveyed to Secoum-Kalé.

These troops are thence to march by Hovi, and through Mingrelia and Imeritia, towards the frontiers of Turkey. I am also told of a large force of Cossacks directed to Stavropol for the Caucasus.

A squadron is to come here shortly to carry the 1st Brigade of the 14th Division of Infantry to Sevastopol, there, with some battalions of the reserves from Perecop, to replace the 13th Division

The object of these movements might have been doubtful, were not the present disturbances in the Caucasus notorious, extending even to the south-western frontier, excited perhaps by emissaries, or by the mere vicinity of a Mussulman army said to be now forming in that part of the Ottoman Empire.

From these circumstances, and from the fact that the reinforcements have been called for by Prince Woronzow himself, we may for the present presume that these measures are adopted with no design of assuming a menacing attitude in that quarter, or in contemplation of aggressive operations.

I just now learn that the 2nd Brigade of the 14th Division is ordered to advance instantly to Ismail, a large Ottoman force having appeared about Toultscha, Isaktcha, and Matchin.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) JAMES YEAMES.

No. 152.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, October 18, 1853.*

I HEREWITH inclose the copy of a despatch\* from Sir H. Seymour transmitting one from Her Majesty's Consul-General at Odessa by which it appears that a portion of the Russian fleet at Sevastopol was about to be employed in conveying troops from Sevastopol to Soucoum-Kalé in order to reinforce the army under the command of Prince Woronzow.

Upon this subject Her Majesty's Government are convinced that it is unnecessary to furnish your Excellency with instructions, and it is only to prevent the possibility of misunderstanding with reference to my despatch of the 8th instant, that I inform your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government consider that the British fleet should not be sent into the Black Sea for the purpose of interfering in any way with the transport of troops from one portion of the Russian territory to another, and which troops are not so moved with the object of making an attack upon the Turkish territory.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 153.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, October 18, 1853.*

I HAVE the satisfaction of conveying to your Excellency the entire approval of Her Majesty's Government of the course pursued by you as reported in your despatch of the 26th ultimo.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 151.

## No. 154.

*Consul-General Fonblanque to the Earl of Clarendon.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Belgrade, le 16 Octobre, 1853.*

M. MUCHIN arrivera demain ici comme Consul-Général de Russie. Il n'est pas muni d'un bérat du Sultan.

(Translation.)

*Belgrade, October 16, 1853.*

M. MUCHIN will arrive here to-morrow as Consul-General of Russia. He is not provided with a berat from the Sultan.

## No. 155.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 18.)*

My Lord,

*Vienna, October 11, 1853.*

I RECEIVED last night after 12 o'clock your Lordship's telegraphic despatch of the same evening, and I waited this morning upon Count Buol to communicate to him its contents.

I read to him first Lord Stratford's despatch of the 1st instant, and then your Lordship's despatch asking the opinion of the Austrian Cabinet upon the first proposition of Lord Stratford, and stating it had been favourably received by Her Majesty's Government as the only solution which was now possible.

Count Buol told me he had just received notice that a messenger from the Porte was on his way to Vienna, supposed to be charged with the declaration of war, in which case any proposition of arrangement to be made at St. Petersburg would be useless, if based upon the acceptance of the modifications that Government had so recently rejected; besides which, as the Governments of England and of France had declined to recommend to the Porte the acceptance of that note, and as the Porte had declared it "telle qu'elle est à jamais inadmissible," the Austrian Government had determined no longer to adhere to it.

I replied to Count Buol that Lord Stratford's proposal was to draw up a new *rédaction* of the Vienna note, containing the substance of the modifications proposed by the Porte, and accompanied by a declaration by the Representatives of the Four Powers that it did not materially differ from the original of that note, and I even pointed out to him the way in which this declaration might be worded; but he objected to any remodelling of that note, which had met with so little success, and in which the modifications which had already been rejected were to be embodied. Count Buol also stated that he had not as yet even received any official notice from the Governments of England or France that his own proposal of a declaration, forwarded from Olmütz on the 27th ultimo, had been rejected, or the reasons for its being so; and although he would make no point of this, if a project was submitted to him which he believed might be successful, yet he could not undertake to adopt one which he was satisfied would prove a failure.

I stated that in the present state of the question with Turkey, and with the anxious desire of all parties to avoid the extremities of war, which are menaced, I thought every effort should be tried; but Count Buol again repeated that if the declaration of war arrived by the messenger who was announced, all hope of any immediate settlement would be, for the moment, at an end; and shortly afterwards this declaration was received, and Count Buol brought it to my house, and communicated it to me, stating that he felt that the affair had thus assumed so different an aspect that any proposition of arrangement must be taken upon new grounds.

I cannot but express to your Lordship the great disappointment I have

felt at the want of success which has attended this last attempt to arrive at a conciliatory termination of this long and painful negotiation, and which has been so abruptly put an end to.

I have the honour of inclosing a copy of the telegraphic despatch of the 5th instant, which was received by Count Buol from the Internuncio at Constantinople, and which, as above stated, he communicated to me.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 155.

*Baron Bruck to Count Buol.*

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, October 5, 1853.*

A TURKISH courier is the bearer of the manifesto of the Porte, and of a note which Omar Pasha is to address to Prince Gortchakoff. The proclamation to the Ottoman people will follow. The manifesto consists of an act of justification by the Porte, in which is reiterated what has been already often enough said. The note (to Prince Gortchakoff) declares that the state of war is to commence fifteen days after receipt of the same, unless the Provinces be evacuated. Except to the Russian flag the commerce of the Black Sea is to be left open. No embargo will be laid upon Russian ships. Russian Consuls and employés will be desired to leave the Turkish territory. The Turkish fleet is to sail out and to take up its position at Baltshick.

No. 156.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 19.)*

My Lord,

*Vienna, October 15, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour of acknowledging the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 8th instant, which was brought by the Austrian courier, and transmitted to me by Count Buol, to whom I communicated it, in obedience to your Lordship's instructions. Count Buol was already informed by Count Colloredo of the general purport of the document. He read it with great attention, and made the following remarks. He admitted that since the proposition to which this despatch referred had been submitted to your Lordship, the circumstances to which it was intended to apply had so changed that it might be considered as no longer adapted to them. He accepted, therefore, your Lordship's reasons for being unable concur in it, and stated that he was himself ready to abandon it: he now felt that in the present posture of the affairs of the East, it had become necessary to seek some new form by which the unfortunate rupture of the friendly relations between the Governments of Russia and Turkey, which by the declaration of the Sultan had taken place, might be put an end to, and for that purpose he looked with hope to the continued concert of the Four Powers who had hitherto so strenuously exerted themselves to prevent it. Count Buol stated that the position of Austria in the contest which had arisen was, and would continue to be, that of a strict neutrality, and while he recognised the more advanced engagements which had been taken by the Governments of England and of France, he hoped that the support which they would afford to the Government of the Sultan would not in any way interfere with their character of mediators, and that the great influence which by the late events they had acquired at Constantinople would be employed for the reestablishment of that peace which the Austrian Government had laboured in common with them so assiduously to maintain. Count Buol stated that when he took into consideration the assurances which had been given by the Emperor Nicholas that he sought no conquest, nor extension of dominion, and also bore in mind the pacific disposition which had been manifested by the Sultan, he could not but persuade himself that the friendly intervention of the Governments, the allies of both

Empires, would be able to effect the reestablishment of their former relations. He believed that a fitting opportunity for the exercise of this intervention by the allied Powers would be afforded by the impediments which the advanced period of the season would oppose to the commencement of actual hostilities between the parties, and he must anxiously hope that this opportunity would be seized upon to carry into effect all the advantages which would be derived from the perfect unity of counsels amongst the mediating Powers. Count Buol in requesting me to leave with him a copy of your Lordship's despatch, which I was instructed to propose to him, assured me that he should consider it with the greatest attention, and that he should transmit his remarks upon it to Count Colloredo, and that your Lordship might rely upon his labouring with the most anxious desire for the reestablishment of peace.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

### No. 157.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 19.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, October 5, 1853.*

IT is very desirable for your Lordship to have the means of judging how far the Porte may be swayed by other than urgent and indispensable motives, in bringing its differences with Russia to the immediate hazard of war. The practical importance of such knowledge in the present stage of the question may perhaps lie open to doubt; but still it is natural for your Lordship to seek a clear view of the subject; and it would be satisfactory for all who deprecate the disasters of war to find that the Sultan's Ministers have not given way to groundless fears or to illusive speculations. On these points I can, however, add but little to what your Lordship has been able to derive from my preceding correspondence and the language of the Sultan's Minister in London. Allowing the assertions on one side to be neutralized by the suspicions entertained on the other, conjecture and inference are all I have to offer.

It must be admitted that the Porte has had reason to derive an increase of courage from circumstances which have occurred since the departure of Prince Menchikoff. She has seen the Four Powers acting together on her behalf; she has heard the voice of all Europe condemning her adversary; she perceives that the public sentiment of England and France is almost universally in her favour; she hears from all sides that the occupation of the Principalities by Russia constitutes a case of war; and she has not only put herself into a state of respectable defence, but she has appealed with perfect success to the zeal of her Mussulman and to the loyalty of her Christian subjects.

The effect of these successive encouragements can hardly have failed to raise her confidence and to strengthen her resolution. Even on the first presentation of Prince Menchikoff's ultimatum, the general feeling was one of resistance to his pretensions. There was indeed a visible abundance of desire and endeavour to avoid an extreme course; but the point at issue, namely, the exercise of Russian influence by means of a recognized right to interfere in the management of Greek ecclesiastical affairs, was stoutly rejected, and the dangers officially intimated as likely to follow on the breach of diplomatic relations between Russia and Turkey were braved deliberately by the Sultan and his Government.

Motives to a decided course of action have also sprung naturally from another source, or rather from the same taken in a different point of view. Large armies and powerful squadrons cannot be collected anywhere without exciting strong feelings among the people, and proclamations enlisting the hearts of all in a cause of common interest must necessarily bring out that popular spirit and national will which few Governments can entirely control, and which no Government can afford to throw away or to chill by unseasonable disappointment. The personal sacrifices attendant on military preparations opposed to such a neighbour as Russia, the increased pressure of taxation, and the enormous expenses devolving unavoidably, with much alarm and anxiety, on the State, must also have had their effect in producing an eager and impatient desire to

reach some kind of final result. The Turks must naturally long to change their present irksome position, and to put away the vexation and disgrace of acquiescing indefinitely in a forced occupation of two of their largest provinces by foreign armies. There may be some degree of excitement in the feelings thus called out; but while the Sovereign and his Government, in sympathizing with their people, must take the public opinion into their account, they have also substantial reasons of policy to plead in their justification. Such exertions as they have been making since the retirement of Prince Menchikoff tend more and more, as they are prolonged, to exhaust the resources of the Empire, and to render any future assertion of its independence, however great may be the necessity, difficult and almost hopeless. It can hardly be matter of surprise that such a concurrence of excited feelings and reasonable motives should have produced a ferment among the fanatical, but not on that account the less influential, classes of the capital; that a sympathising party should have been formed in the Ministry; and that all should have relieved themselves from individual responsibility by gathering round the throne, and resorting, in failure of other hopes, to their own imperfect yet self-dependent means of relief.

It is clear that there would have been imminent danger, under the circumstances, in taking any other course, and the more pacific members of the Cabinet appeared as little disposed as able to make head against the general determination. Reshid Pasha, and others of his ability and experience, cannot be ignorant of the peril to which they expose their country by engaging single-handed in a war against Russia. They may reckon to a certain degree upon the chances of eventual assistance from England and France; but they have been too often admonished by me and my colleagues of the precarious nature of such expectations to entertain them as justifiable reasons for entering upon a war policy. My impression is that their motives for going to war are such as I have described above, and that they indulge the hope of succour from abroad, upon the same principle that when a ship is on fire the seamen throw themselves overboard, and take their chance for struggling with the waves until they are picked up by some other vessel already in sight.

Notwithstanding all this, an inference of opposite tendency may possibly be drawn from the Porte's conduct in the late negotiations. The Turkish Ministers may be thought to have shown a want of readiness to close with fair terms of accommodation, by making unnecessary objections, by shifting their grounds, or by acting with gratuitous slowness.

On these several points I cannot hope to offer your Lordship any fresh information. If there be some appearances respecting them to justify a suspicion that the Porte has looked at times rather to the camp than to the Cabinet for a solution of its differences with Russia, they cannot in fairness be separated from the difficulties and complications of the matter in hand, or from the peculiarities which still prevail here in the habits of thinking, the modes of transacting business, and the processes of communication. There is much, no doubt, to disapprove, and even to complain of, in the Porte's habitual relations with Christendom; but the manner, at once firm and conciliatory, with which, on the whole, she has proceeded under circumstances of unusual provocation and unjust aggression, adhering to her rights in a spirit of independence, and accepting humiliations in deference to the counsels of her allies, ought surely to pass to her credit and entitle her to indulgence. If she asked at one time for the guarantee of the Four Powers as a supplement to the terms which alone she considered safe and honourable, she has since evinced a willingness to desist from that condition. She had previously declared her readiness to subscribe the Vienna note; not, indeed, without modifications, but with such as their allies have judged to be reasonable in substance, though superfluous in form, and which they have strongly recommended to the acceptance of the Emperor Nicholas.

At all events, my Lord, whatever circumstances may in reality have turned the scale from peace to war, I am slow to believe that the Turkish Ministers are acting from a political preference for the latter course. It is more natural and reasonable to suppose that they are not plunging wantonly into hostilities under the influence of any unreflecting passion; but that in despair, however mistakenly, of securing what they conceive to be essential to the sovereignty and independence of the Porte, and fearful of a popular revolution, together with the exhaustion of their available resources, they have resorted courageously, though reluctantly,

to the only remaining chance, as they imagine, of at least saving their honour, if they do not succeed in anything else.

There is, no doubt, some rashness in deciding on such a course; but a more timid line of policy would, in their estimation, have dangers of its own, without offering a permanent escape from those of war. The Sultan and his Ministers cannot be blind to a truth which is obvious to every one. They must perceive that their hold upon the sympathies of any auxiliary Power is one which has its origin in the sense entertained by that Power of its own interests. Temporary circumstances may produce an exceptional effect; but in their very natural and reasonable anxiety to elude the grasp of Russia, they can hardly be blamed for looking with hope to the adverse interests and corresponding policy of England and France.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 158.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 19.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, October 5, 1853.*

A SPIRIT of self-devotion, unaccompanied with fanatical demonstrations, and showing itself among the highest functionaries of the State, bids fair to give an extraordinary impulse to any military enterprise which may be undertaken against Russia by the Turkish Government.

The Sultan has given his reluctant consent to the negotiation of a loan. The corps of Ulema are preparing, as it is currently reported, to advance a considerable sum in support of the war. The Grand Vizier, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and other leading members of the Administration, have resigned a large proportion of their horses for the service of the artillery. Reinforcements continue to be directed towards the Danube and the Georgian frontier. Several steam-frigates are to be sent almost immediately into the Black Sea. In short, it is evident that, if hostilities commence, they will be prosecuted in a manner to test the strength of the contending parties, and to leave on the one side or on the other deep and durable traces of a truly national struggle. That the chances are greatly in favour of Russia, when we look to the final result, can be doubted by few, unless the assistance of the maritime Powers be given to Turkey with that degree of frankness and cordiality which passing circumstances may render difficult, but which more lasting interests would seem eventually to require.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 159.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, October 19, 1853.*

I INCLOSE herewith a copy of a telegraphic despatch\* which I have received from Her Majesty's Consul in Servia reporting the expected arrival of M. Muchin as Russian Consul-General, and I have to instruct you to ask Count Nesselrode whether the information therein contained is correct.

Such acts, denoting as they do a disregard of the Sultan's authority, must add to the existing difficulties, and evince a spirit on the part of the Russian Government which Her Majesty's Government much regret.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 160.

*Mr. Wyse to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 19.)*

My Lord,

*Athens, October 7, 1853.*

A FEW days since, it having been rumoured that additional troops were to be sent to the frontier, consisting of a certain number of artillery, and four field-pieces from Athens, and half of the garrison from Nauplia, and finding that it created some solicitude on the part of my Ottoman colleague, I officially inquired from M. Païcos, what foundation existed for these rumours; and, if founded, what grounds were given for the movement by the Government.

M. Païcos told me that he was quite ignorant of the matter, but would answer my question on conferring with the Minister of War.

I knew at the time from Neshet Bey, that M. Rouen had seen him on the same question (since confirmed by M. Rouen himself), to whom he gave as answer, that the troops in question from Athens were only to replace a portion of the forces now at Lamia.

It was observed that no necessity appeared to exist for the exchange of artillery between Lamia and Athens.

I have since had a few words in conformity with his promise from M. Païcos. He writes that, "as far as the marching of additional troops to the frontier from Nauplia is in question, his colleague the Minister of War informs him that a single soldier has not quitted that fortress; a company only of artillery, with four pieces of cannon, has left Athens within these last few days to replace another at Lamia."

Much the same plea was given at the time the troops were originally marched to the same quarter; but I have not heard of any returning, nor is it likely that I shall. It is also to be observed that M. Païcos does not answer my allegation: though no soldiers have yet been sent from Nauplia, it does not follow that none will yet be sent from those quarters. I understood from other sources that this was admitted, and accounted for on the ground that it was the ordinary routine of the service, half of the garrison of Nauplia being usually changed once a year.

I am the more particular in bringing these details under your notice, from the unsatisfactory manner with which M. Païcos has treated the subject from the very beginning. It was at first alleged that these forces were required to suppress brigandage; but the excesses which have since taken place, especially in Eubœa, in that respect, are the best comment on the reality or success of such an object. He now tells me, that they are designed to repress the spirit of disorder and aggression which would not fail to display itself amongst the Greeks on the frontier were there not sufficient means on the part of the Government to meet or prevent it. This is hardly in accordance with what I hear from other quarters, and the doubtful language held by influential partizans of Russia here, as well as by Neshet Bey, on the same question. He states that an Hetæria is in full operation at Lamia, and in communication with sympathizers on both sides of the frontier, under the eyes of Greek authorities, and without any effectual means having been taken for their repression.

I have, &c.

(Signed) THOS. WYSE.

No. 161.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 22.)*

(Télégraphique.)

*Constantinople, le 15 Octobre, 1853.*

IL y a toute apparence que les hostilités commenceront en huit ou dix jours, sinon plutôt. Le Sultan a demandé l'entrée des escadres, et je suis d'accord avec l'Ambassadeur de France à cet égard. Elles franchiront le Détroit en masse :

pour le moment une partie seule de chaque escadre viendra ici. Aucune proposition formelle n'est arrivée de Vienne à la suite de la réunion à Olmütz. Le projet annoncé confidentiellement par M. de Bruck est regardé comme inadmissible par la Porte. Reshid Pasha et, peut-être, ses collègues seraient favorables à l'idée d'une rédaction de la note de Vienne dépouillée également des modifications et des passages auxquelles elles se rapportent ; mais l'acceptation d'une telle note par le Conseil Général doit être censée impossible dans la circonstance actuelle.

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 15, 1853.

THERE is every appearance that hostilities will commence in eight or ten days, if not sooner. The Sultan has required the entrance of the squadrons, and I am agreed with the French Ambassador in this respect. They will pass the Straits in a body : for the present, a portion only of each squadron will come here. No formal proposition has come here from Vienna subsequently to the meeting at Olmütz. The draft confidentially announced by M. Bruck is looked upon by the Porte as inadmissible. Reshid Pasha, and perhaps his colleagues, would be favourable to the notion of a draft of the Vienna note free equally from the modifications and from the passages to which they apply ; but the acceptance of such a note by the Council General must be looked upon as impossible under existing circumstances.

No. 162.

*Baron Manteuffel to Chevalier Bunsen.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Chevalier Bunsen, October 21.)*

Monsieur,

Berlin, le 14 Octobre, 1853.

LES rapports de votre Excellence ne nous ont, à notre sincère regret, laissé point de doute sur l'attitude déclinatoire que le Cabinet du Londres a cru devoir prendre au sujet de la proposition de l'Autriche de faire remettre par les Représentants des Quatre Puissances à Constantinople une note identique à la Sublime Porte pour la rassurer sur la portée et les conséquences de la signature de la note de Vienne. Je me dispense de revenir sur les motifs de cette nouvelle attitude du Cabinet de Londres. Je la considère comme un de ces faits dont un examen purement retrospectif n'est pas de nature à aplanir les voies de conciliation et de paix ; mais qu'il faut mettre en ligne de compte pour chercher de nouvelles formes d'arrangement. Or, il n'a pu nous échapper que les objections élevées contre le projet d'Olmütz touchent plutôt la forme que le fond de ce document. On convient, et sous ce rapport le langage du Cabinet de Londres s'accorde avec les énonciations du Gouvernement Français, que la substance du document en question, en précisant les limites de ce que la Turquie accorde, renferme l'indication de toutes les idées nécessaires pour un arrangement propre à satisfaire tous les Cabinets.

Mais on lui reproche d'abord d'être venu trop tard, parceque au moment où il s'agissait de le prendre en considération, les rapports de Constantinople nous avaient apporté la nouvelle du refus péremptoire de la Sublime Porte de signer la note de Vienne, et puisque, ne contenant que les conseils et les déclarations des Quatre Puissances, il ne suffirait pas pour neutraliser l'effet de l'interprétation Russe consignée dans l'examen des modifications proposées par la Porte. Quant au premier point nous concevons, quoiqu'avec regret, qu'au premier moment les nouvelles incomplètes et exagérées de Constantinople dont l'arrivée coïncidait avec la proposition Autrichienne, aient produit un effet préjudiciable à celle-ci en la faisant apparaître comme dévancée par la marche des événements. Mais depuis que nous connaissons plus exactement les faits, tels qu'ils se sont passés le 24 et 25 Septembre à Constantinople, et les décisions

auxquelles le Gouvernement Ottoman, inaccessible aux Conseils des Puissances, s'est arrêté, nous devons, il me semble, puiser dans les difficultés aggravées de la situation de nouveaux motifs pour employer tous nos efforts, afin de retenir, par de nouvelles propositions d'arrangement, les parties immédiatement intéressées sur la pente rapide vers de conflits armés.

A cet effet je m'adresse avec confiance au jugement calme et éclairé du Gouvernement Britannique, qui, certes, ne se fera pas plus que nous illusion sur la gravité du moment, et sur l'immense responsabilité qui s'attache à la crise imminente ; qu'il détache le fond du projet d'Olmütz de sa forme ; qu'il ne le considère plus comme corollaire du projet originaire de Vienne, mais comme point de départ pour un nouveau projet de note à remettre par un Ambassadeur Turc à l'Empereur de Russie ; qu'il nous communique le plus tôt possible, et tout-à-fait confidentiellement, ce projet ; nous le soumettrons à un examen consciencieux et impartial, et nous tâcherons de nous l'approprier, si nous y voyons un moyen d'amener la solution des questions si longtemps débattues. Sans prendre d'avance un engagement quelconque, impossible à l'égard d'un projet à formuler encore, nous n'hésitons pas à énoncer que nous serons heureux de pouvoir nous prévaloir, avec toute la sincérité d'un complet désintéressement, de nos rapports de confiance avec la Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg pour l'y faire accueillir.

L'entière impartialité de notre position nous fournira, nous l'espérons, le moyen de concilier des intérêts peut-être moins divergents en réalité qu'ils ne le paraissent être à la suite d'une controverse peut-être non exempte d'acrimonie.

Pour pouvoir nous flatter de quelques chances à ce sujet, nous devons avant tout tâcher de prévenir toute précipitation guerrière de la part de la Sublime Porte ; et nous venons d'enjoindre à l'Envoyé du Roi à Constantinople d'élever sa voix dans ce sens à toute occasion qui se présentera. Mais nous attachons le plus grand prix à ce que le Cabinet de Londres veuille bien se servir également de ses moyens d'action beaucoup plus efficaces sur le Divan pour préserver, sur le terrain même du différend qu'il s'agit de vider, le domaine des négociations de toute atteinte préjudiciable à la solution pacifique.

Veuillez, Monsieur, porter la présente dépêche à la connaissance de Lord Clarendon, et vous faire l'organe du vif et sincère intérêt avec lequel nous attendons sa réponse à l'idée qui y est émise.

Veuillez, &c.  
(Signé) MANTEUFFEL.

(Translation.)

Sir,

*Berlin, October 14, 1853.*

YOUR Excellency's reports have left us, to our sincere regret, no doubt as to the Cabinet of London having thought proper to decline acceding to the proposal of Austria to cause to be delivered to the Sublime Porte, by the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople, an identic note in order to reassure it as to the bearing and consequences of the signature of the Vienna note. I abstain from reverting to the grounds of the new attitude thus taken up by the Cabinet of London. I look upon it as one of those facts into which a merely retrospective examination is not calculated to render the ways of conciliation and of peace more even, but which it is necessary to take into account in order to devise new forms of arrangement. Accordingly it has not escaped our observation that the objections raised against the Olmütz plan apply rather to the form than to the substance of that document. It is admitted, and in this respect the language of the Cabinet of London is in accordance with the declaration of the French Government, that the substance of the document in question, in defining the limits of what is agreed to by Turkey, comprises all the ideas necessary for an arrangement calculated to satisfy all the Cabinets.

But it is in the first instance objected that it has come too late, because at the time at which it was proposed to take it into consideration, the reports from Constantinople had brought us the intelligence of the peremptory refusal of the Sublime Porte to sign the Vienna note ; and since, as it contains nothing more than the advice and declaration of the Four Powers, it would not suffice to neutralize the effect of the Russian interpretation given in the analysis of the modifications proposed by the Porte. As regards the first point we conceive,

although with regret, that, in the first instance, the incomplete and exaggerated accounts from Constantinople, the arrival of which coincided with that of the Austrian proposal, should have had a prejudicial effect on the latter by making it appear to be anticipated by the progress of events. But since we are more exactly acquainted with the circumstances which occurred at Constantinople on the 24th and 25th of September, and with the decision which the Ottoman Government adopted in opposition to the advice of the Powers, we ought, it appears to me, to derive from the increased difficulties of the situation additional motives to employ all our efforts in order, by further proposals for a settlement, to arrest the parties immediately interested in their rapid course towards armed conflict.

For this purpose, I appeal with confidence to the calm and enlightened judgment of the British Government, which assuredly will not, any more than ourselves, deceive itself in regard to the serious character of the present state of affairs, and the immense responsibility connected with the impending crisis; let it separate the substance of the Olmütz project from its form; let it no longer look upon it as a corollary to the original Vienna project, but as a starting-point for a new draft of note, to be delivered by a Turkish Ambassador to the Emperor of Russia; let it communicate to us that draft as soon as possible, and altogether confidentially; we will conscientiously and impartially examine it, and we will endeavour to acquiesce in it, if we perceive in it the means of solving the questions which have been so long in discussion. Without taking any engagement beforehand, which it is impossible to do in regard to a draft which is still to be drawn up, we do not hesitate to state that we shall be happy to be able, with all the sincerity of complete disinterestedness, to avail ourselves of our confidential relations with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg in order to cause its acceptance there.

The entire impartiality of our position will furnish us, we trust, with the means of reconciling interests perhaps less divergent in reality than they seem to be after a controversy not altogether free from bitterness.

In order that we may flatter ourselves with some chance of success in this matter, we must in the first place endeavour to prevent any warlike precipitation on the part of the Sublime Porte, and we have enjoined the King's Envoy at Constantinople to express himself in this sense on every opportunity which shall offer itself. But we attach the greatest value to the Cabinet of London being pleased equally to employ its means of acting, which have much more effect, on the Divan, in order to secure within the limits of the difference which it is wished to settle, the course of the negotiation from every assault which might be prejudicial to a peaceful solution.

Have the goodness, Sir, to communicate the present despatch to Lord Clarendon, and to make yourself the channel of the lively and sincere interest with which we await his reply to the suggestion which is made in it.

Be pleased, &c.  
(Signed) MANTEUFFEL.

No. 163.

*Count Buol to Count Colloredo.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Colloredo, October 22.)*

M. le Comte,

*Vienne, le 16 Octobre, 1853.*

LORD WESTMORLAND s'est acquittée de la communication que votre Excellence m'avait préalablement annoncée par l'expédition confiée au courier Steindl. J'ai l'honneur, M. le Comte, de vous transmettre ci-près le texte de la dépêche de Lord Clarendon dont M. l'Envoyé Britannique m'a laissé copie.

Nous avons espéré que le *projet de note* élaboré à Olmütz, par cela même qu'il renfermait l'expression la plus authentique et la plus récente de la pensée de l'Empereur de Russie, serait de nature à contrebalancer, si non à effacer entièrement, l'impression fâcheuse produite sur le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique par l'analyse des amendemens apportés par la Porte à la note

primitive de Vienne, analyse à laquelle le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg s'était livré dans une dépêche confidentielle du 7 Septembre dernier.

En tout état de choses, nous avons pensé que le projet d'Olmütz offrait des éléments susceptibles d'être utilisés au profit de l'œuvre de pacification que les Quatre Puissances avaient également à cœur de voir couronnée de succès.

Nous ne pouvons que regretter que le Cabinet de St. James ait apprécié différemment ce projet. Nous savons toutefois nous rendre compte des motifs qui peuvent l'avoir engagé à refuser son suffrage et son concours au projet d'Olmütz, en réfléchissant que ce projet tendait à maintenir, en y ajoutant des garanties morales, la note primitive de Vienne que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique a été le premier à laisser tomber définitivement.

Sur ces entrefaites d'ailleurs les événements ont marché. Depuis que la Sublime Porte s'est proclamée elle-même en état de guerre avec la Russie, nous comprenons à notre tour que la note de Vienne a perdue toute chance d'être acceptée de part et d'autre comme moyen d'accommodement. Aussi n'avons nous pas hésité à nous expliquer dans ce sens tant à Constantinople qu'envers le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg.

Nous sommes du reste trop pénétrées de l'immense gravité des intérêts qui se rattachent au maintien de la paix pour ne pas être disposés à continuer avec zèle les efforts que nous avons faits jusqu'ici, de concert avec les autres Cabinets, pour préserver l'Europe des calamités d'une guerre. Afin toutefois de pouvoir travailler dans ce sens avec quelque espoir de succès, il nous semble nécessaire d'attendre que la situation se définisse plus nettement. Il y a surtout deux points à l'égard desquels nous sentons le besoin d'être éclairés.

Nous attachons d'abord de l'intérêt à connaître l'impression que produiront sur Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie la déclaration de guerre émanée de la Porte, et la sommation adressée au Prince Gortchakoff d'évacuer sans délai les Principautés Danubiennes.

Il nous importe, de l'autre côté, de nous assurer que malgré le changement survenu dans la situation, les Quatre Puissances se trouvent encore placées dans une attitude identique qui nous permette de continuer en commun le rôle intermédiaire et conciliant que nous avons tâché de remplir jusqu'ici, et dans lequel nous ne demandons pas mieux, pour notre part que de pouvoir persister.

Je vous charge, M. le Comte, d'en donner l'assurance positif à Lord Clarendon en lui communiquant la présente dépêche en copie, s'il devait vous en témoigner le désir.

Recevez, &c.  
(Signé) BUOI

(Translation.)

M. le Comte,

*Vienna, October 16, 1853.*

LORD WESTMORLAND has executed the Commission which your Excellency had previously announced to me by the despatch entrusted to the courier Steindl. I have the honour, M. le Comte, to transmit to you herewith Lord Clarendon's despatch, of which the British Envoy has left me a copy.

We had hoped that the draft of note drawn up at Olmütz, from the very circumstance that it contained the most authentic and the most recent intimation of the Emperor of Russia's views, would be calculated to counteract, if not to efface entirely, the painful impression produced on Her Britannic Majesty's Government by the analysis of the amendments introduced by the Porte into the original Vienna note, which the Cabinet of St. Petersburg entered into in a confidential despatch of the 7th of September last.

In any state of things we supposed that the Olmütz draft offered materials which might be turned to good account for the work of pacification, which the Four Powers have equally at heart to see brought to a successful conclusion.

We cannot but regret that the Cabinet of St. James's has taken a different view of that draft. We can, however, understand the motives which may have induced it to refuse its assent and cooperation to the Olmütz draft, considering that the tendency of the draft was to maintain, with the addition of moral guarantees, the primitive original Vienna note which Her Britannic Majesty's Government has been the first definitively to set aside.

In the mean while, moreover, events have moved onwards. Since the

Sublime Porte has declared itself at war with Russia, we in our turn understand that the Vienna note has lost all chance of being accepted by either party as a means of settlement. Accordingly we have not hesitated to express our views in this respect, as well at Constantinople as to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg.

We are, however, too fully impressed with the immense importance of the interests connected with the maintenance of peace, not to be disposed zealously to continue the efforts which we have hitherto made, in concert with the other Cabinets, to preserve Europe from the calamities of a war. In order, however, that we may be able to labour for this purpose with some hope of success, it seems to us necessary to wait until matters assume a more definite aspect. There are two points especially in regard to which we consider it necessary to have some explanation.

In the first place, we are anxious to know the impression produced on His Majesty the Emperor of Russia by the declaration of war issued by the Porte, and the summons addressed to Prince Gortchakoff to evacuate without delay the Danubian Principalities.

It is, on the other hand, important that we should be assured that, notwithstanding the change which has taken place in the state of affairs, the Four Powers are still placed on an identical footing which may admit of our continuing in common the work of mediation and reconciliation which we have hitherto endeavoured to fulfil, and in which, for our part, we ask nothing better than to be able to persevere.

I instruct you, M. le Comte, to give this positive assurance to Lord Clarendon while communicating to him a copy of this despatch, if he should evince a desire for it.

Receive, &c.  
(Signed) BUOL.

No. 164.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, October 24, 1853.*

THE two proposals for an amicable settlement of the difference between Russia and the Porte, contained in your Excellency's despatch of the 28th September, and your telegraphic despatch of the 1st October, have received the best consideration of Her Majesty's Government.

For reasons upon which it is not necessary to enter, the first of these proposals has been preferred. On the 12th instant I informed your Excellency by the telegraph *via* Belgrade, that it had been favourably received by Her Majesty's Government and the French Government; and I requested that your Excellency would endeavour to prevent the commencement of hostilities which would render a peaceful solution of the question at the present moment very difficult, if not impossible.

In the hope that the efforts of your Excellency with this object may have proved successful, and that the state of things in Turkey may not be such on the arrival of this despatch as to preclude a final settlement otherwise than by a new Treaty between the Porte and Russia, Her Majesty's Government, in concert with that of France, have prepared a note for the acceptance of the Porte, together with a note founded upon the preamble of the Treaty of 1841, copies of which are herewith inclosed.

The latter note is for the signature of your Excellency and of M. de la Cour, but copies of both have been sent to Vienna and Berlin, and it is to be hoped that your Austrian and Prussian colleagues will receive instructions to act in complete concert with yourself and the French Ambassador. Under any circumstances, however, Her Majesty's Government think it expedient that the note should be proposed to the acceptance of the Porte. Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna will be instructed to inform your Excellency, by telegraph, of the decision of the Austrian Cabinet. I send this despatch by Her Majesty's steamer "Fury," which is now waiting at Marseilles, in order to save time.

The objections raised against the Vienna note have been carefully attended to in the one now proposed, which has been framed with an anxious regard for the dignity and independence of the Sultan, and is recommended to the most serious consideration of the Porte.

It is, however, my duty to inform your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government observe with regret that due attention has not been paid by the Turkish Government to the advice tendered by your Excellency with a sincere regard for the Sultan's own interests, and when, with no other motive than that of preserving peace without detriment to the honour and independence of the Sultan, you desired that the declaration of war and the commencement of hostilities should be delayed until all attempts at negotiation should have finally proved unsuccessful.

Her Majesty's Government make every allowance for the great difficulties in which the Sultan finds himself placed; but as it is their duty to guard the dignity and the interests of England, and as they are prepared to assist the Sultan in defending his territory, and as the presence of the British fleet at Constantinople affords unmistakeable evidence of the friendly disposition of this country towards the Porte, Her Majesty's Government are entitled to expect that the counsels of a sincere and powerful ally, conveyed through your Excellency, shall be received with becoming deference.

Your Excellency is instructed firmly, but in the most friendly spirit, to convey this caution to Reshid Pasha, and you will not conceal from him how great will be the disappointment of Her Majesty's Government if he should now reject the note which has been framed with due regard to the Sultan's honour, and if, moreover, the rejection of the note should rest on no better grounds than popular excitement or military enthusiasm, inducing the Porte to prefer war to peace, and to incur the risk of all the evils and the dangers which such a decision must necessarily bring with it.

Considering the assurances of support already given, and the measures actually adopted, by Great Britain for the protection of the Turkish territory, it is indispensable that all further progress of hostilities should be suspended by the Porte, for a reasonable time, during the course of the negotiation in which Her Majesty's Government are engaged for the reestablishment of friendly relations between the Porte and Russia, upon the understanding that no hostile movement is made on the part of Russia.

To your Excellency I need hardly state that the traditional policy of this country in the East will be rigidly adhered to. The highest political interests, not alone of England, but of Europe, are involved in the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, and those interests demand that any act of aggression by Russia against Turkey should be vigorously resisted. But a desire for war on the part of the Porte, in disregard of its consequences either to Turkey herself or to her allies, while there is yet a possibility that the legitimate objects which the Porte has in view may be attained by negotiation, would be viewed with great displeasure by this country, and would necessarily influence the policy towards the Sultan that it might be the duty of Her Majesty's Government to pursue.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON

Inclosure 1 in No. 164.

*Projet de Note.*

SA Majesté le Sultan n'ayant rien de plus à cœur que de rétablir entre elle et Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie les relations de bon voisinage et de parfaite entente qui ont été malheureusement altérées par de récentes et pénibles complications, a pris soigneusement à tâche de rechercher les moyens d'effacer les traces de ce différend.

Dans ce but le Soussigné a l'ordre de déclarer par rapport aux stipulations du Traité de Kainardji, confirmé par celui d'Andrinople, que la Sublime Porte est fermement résolue de maintenir la promesse y consignée, en continuant à protéger constamment la religion Chrétienne et toutes ses Eglises.

Quant aux privilèges religieux du culte Grec, il est de l'honneur de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan de maintenir en vigueur et à l'abri de toute atteinte, pour le présent comme pour l'avenir, les privilèges spirituels accordés à l'Eglise Grecque par les augustes prédécesseurs de Sa Majesté et confirmées par elle-même, et dans un esprit de bienveillance et d'équité, conforme aux principes qui dirigent le Gouvernement Ottoman, de faire participer cette Eglise aux privilèges spirituels accordés, ou qui seraient accordés, à toute autre communauté Chrétienne, sujette Ottomane.

Le Soussigné a l'honneur de transmettre ci-incluse une copie du firman Impérial confirmatif des privilèges du clergé Grec, qui a été dernièrement remis au Patriarcat de ce rit.

Ce firman est une nouvelle preuve des intentions généreuses et de la volonté souveraine de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan à cet égard, qui a inspiré partout la confiance que la promulgation de ce firman suffira à dissiper tout doute ou appréhension au sujet du culte professé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie.

Pour ce qui concerne la garantie contre tout changement futur dans l'état des choses actuel des lieux de pèlerinage à Jérusalem, la Sublime Porte promet officiellement qu'aucune modification ne sera portée à ce qui a été réglé par les firmans Impériaux dernièrement émanés à cet égard sans une entente préalable avec les Gouvernements de France et de Russie.

Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan adhère au vœu exprimé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie pour la construction d'une église qui sera desservie par des ecclésiastiques Russes, et d'un hospice pour les pèlerins indigents ou malades de la même nation ; et la Sublime Porte est disposée, et dès ce moment prête, à conclure un Acte solennel à cet égard. L'empressement avec lequel la demande concernant la construction d'une église et d'un hospice Russes à Jérusalem a été accueillie par la Sublime Porte, prouve une fois de plus que si Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan regarde qu'il est de son honneur de veiller au maintien des privilèges spirituels octroyés à l'Eglise Grecque par ses illustres ancêtres ; si, dans l'exercice de ses droits de souveraineté, elle ambitionne d'être l'auteur de la prospérité de ses peuples et l'objet de leurs bénédictions, elle met une égale ambition non seulement à observer scrupuleusement les Traités existants entre la Sublime Porte et la Russie, mais à satisfaire à tout désir exprimé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, son auguste allié, et dont l'accomplissement contribuerait à resserrer plus étroitement les liens d'amitié qui unissent les deux Souverains.

En communiquant à votre Excellence ce qui précède par ordre de Sa Majesté Impériale, mon gracieux Souverain, je saisis, &c.

(Translation.)

HIS Majesty the Sultan having nothing more at heart than to re-establish between himself and His Majesty the Emperor of Russia the relations of good neighbourhood and of perfect understanding which have unfortunately been impaired by recent and painful complications, has anxiously endeavoured to discover the means of obliterating the traces of that difference.

With this view the Undersigned is ordered to declare, with reference to the stipulations of the Treaty of Kainardji, confirmed by that of Adrianople, that the Sublime Porte is firmly resolved to observe the promise contained therein, by continuing constantly to protect the Christian religion and all its churches.

As regards the religious privileges of the Greek rite, it is a point of honour with His Imperial Majesty the Sultan to maintain in force, and in security from all prejudice, for the present as well as for the future, the spiritual privileges granted to the Greek Church by His Majesty's august predecessors and confirmed by himself; and, in a spirit of benevolence and of equity conformable to the principles which direct the Ottoman Government, to cause that Church to partake of the spiritual privileges granted, or which may be granted, to any Christian community, subject to the Ottoman Government.

The Undersigned has the honour to inclose a copy of the Imperial firman confirmatory of the privileges of the Greek clergy, which has lately been delivered to the Patriarch of that rite.

This firman is a fresh proof of the generous intentions and of the sovereign

will of His Majesty the Sultan in this respect, which has in all quarters inspired confidence that the promulgation of this firman will suffice to dispel all doubt or apprehension on the subject of the religion professed by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia.

As regards the guarantee against any future change in the present state of things affecting the places of pilgrimage at Jerusalem, the Sublime Porte officially promises that no modification shall be made in what has been settled by the Imperial firmans lately issued in that respect, without a previous understanding with the Governments of France and of Russia.

His Imperial Majesty the Sultan acquiesces in the wish expressed by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, for the construction of a church to be administered by Russian ecclesiastics, and of an hospital for the indigent or sick pilgrims of the same nation; and the Sublime Porte is disposed, and from this moment prepared, to conclude a solemn engagement in that respect. The readiness with which the Sublime Porte has acquiesced in the demand relative to the construction of a Russian church and hospital at Jerusalem, proves once more that if His Imperial Majesty the Sultan regards it as a point of honour to watch over the maintenance of the spiritual privileges granted to the Greek Church by his illustrious ancestors; if, in the exercise of his rights of sovereignty, he is ambitious of being the author of the prosperity of his people and the object of their benedictions, he attaches an equal importance not only to the scrupulous observance of the existing Treaties between the Sublime Porte and Russia, but also to the fulfilment of every desire expressed by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, his august ally, the accomplishment of which would contribute to draw more closely the bonds of friendship which unite the two Sovereigns.

In communicating what precedes to your Excellency, by order of His Imperial Majesty, my gracious Sovereign, I avail, &c.

Inclosure 2 in No. 164.

*Projet de Note.*

LES Représentants de                      ont reçu l'ordre de porter à la connaissance de la Sublime Porte que leurs Gouvernements respectifs, persuadés de la haute importance de maintenir le principe consacré dans le préambule du Traité de Juillet 13, 1841, et animés du désir le plus sincère pour la conservation de la paix générale; et les dits Gouvernements, voulant attester ce désir, et en égard aux réclamations de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie et aux droits souverains de Sa Majesté le Sultan, et ayant de plus reçu de la part du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg les assurances les plus formelles que Sa Majesté Impériale ne cherche aucune nouvelle concession ni aucun droit d'ingérence dans les affaires de la Turquie, et de la part de Sa Majesté le Sultan les assurances également formelles qu'elle observera fidèlement ses engagements, et qu'en outre elle regarde comme étant de son honneur de maintenir à tout jamais les privilèges spirituels accordés au clergé et à l'Eglise Grecques; et considérant que ces assurances, appuyées par les firmans adressés au Patriarche Grec, sont aux yeux des dits Gouvernements une garantie suffisante pour le maintien de ces privilèges: les dits Gouvernements, dans le but de mettre fin au différend qui malheureusement s'est élevé entre la Russie et la Sublime Porte, ont donné l'ordre aux Soussignés de soumettre à la considération de la Sublime Porte la note ci-incluse, par laquelle se trouveront assurés la dignité et les droits de l'une et de l'autre Puissance.

(Translation.)

THE Representatives of                      have been instructed to apprise the Sublime Porte that their respective Governments, convinced of the great importance of maintaining the principle recorded in the Preamble of the Treaty of July 13, 1841, and animated with the most sincere desire for the maintenance of the general peace; and the said Governments being desirous of giving proof of this desire, and taking into account the demands of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, and the sovereign rights of His Majesty the Sultan, and having

besides received from the Cabinet of St. Petersburg the most formal assurances that His Imperial Majesty does not seek any fresh concession or any right of interference in the affairs of Turkey, and from His Majesty the Sultan assurances equally formal that he will faithfully observe his engagements, and that moreover, he considers it as a point of honour to maintain at all times the spiritual privileges granted to the Greek clergy and Church; and considering that these assurances, supported by the firmans addressed to the Greek Patriarch, are in the estimation of the said Governments a sufficient guarantee for the maintainance of those privileges; the said Governments, with the view of putting an end to the difference which has unfortunately arisen between Russia and the Sublime Porte, have instructed the Undersigned to submit to the consideration of the Porte the inclosed note, by which the dignity and the rights of either Power will be secured.

No. 165.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, October 24, 1853.*

IN the event of the Turkish Government desiring to propose any modifications of the note which, by my other despatch of this day, your Excellency is instructed to bring under their consideration, you are at liberty to admit such modifications, provided they appear reasonable to yourself and to your colleagues, and that they are not of a character to preclude the acceptance of the note by the Emperor of Russia.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 166.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, October 24, 1853.*

YOUR Excellency's despatch of the 15th instant, by telegraph from Belgrade, reached me on the 22nd; and I have the satisfaction of informing your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve of your having, in concert with the French Ambassador, acceded to the request of the Sultan, that the combined fleets should enter the Dardanelles.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 167.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord

*Foreign Office, October 24, 1853.*

HER Majesty's Government have read with much satisfaction the manifesto of the Turkish Government, inclosed in your Excellency's despatch of the 4th instant.

The moderate and dignified tone in which an appeal is thereby made to the public opinion of Europe, cannot fail to produce an impression highly favourable to the cause of the Sultan.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 168.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 25, 1853

YOUR Lordship's despatch of the 15th instant has been received and laid before the Queen.

Her Majesty's Government learn with sincere satisfaction that the desire of the Cabinet of Vienna to co-operate with them for the maintenance of peace has undergone no change; and your Lordship will inform Count Buol that that desire is fully reciprocated on the part of Her Majesty's Government.

The report of your Lordship's conversation with Count Buol was confirmed by a despatch from his Excellency, which Count Colloredo has placed in my hands, and a copy of which is herewith inclosed.\*

Count Buol appears to consider that the present moment is not opportune for taking any further steps upon the momentous question at issue, and that it would be desirable to wait until the views of the Emperor of Russia are known upon the declaration of war by the Turkish Government.

Her Majesty's Government, however, have arrived at a different conclusion, and, in the belief that an opening was still left for negotiation, Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople was instructed, a few days ago, to use his efforts to prevent the commencement of hostilities. Her Majesty's Government are, therefore, on every account bound to give effect to their intentions with the least delay possible, and I accordingly inclose to you the copies of two notes† which you will submit to the consideration of Count Buol, and earnestly recommend for the adoption of the Austrian Government.

The first is founded upon the Treaty of 1841, and refers to the assurances repeatedly given by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, and recently renewed at Olmütz, as well as to the assurances that on various occasions have been received from the Porte. It is hoped that this note will be signed by the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople, recommending to the acceptance of the Porte the note which has been framed with due regard for the honour and independence of the Sultan, while the maintenance of existing engagements between Russia and Turkey, the spiritual privileges of the Greek Church, and the guarantee respecting the holy places, are provided for in strict accordance with the assurances of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg as to what was really desired of the Porte.

Your Lordship will, however, see by my despatch‡ of the 24th instant to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, of which a copy is inclosed, and which you will also communicate to Count Buol, that Her Majesty's Ambassador is at liberty to admit of such modifications to this note as to himself and his colleagues may appear reasonable, and which shall not be of a character to preclude the acceptance of the note by the Emperor of Russia.

Her Majesty's Government consider this to be just, because the Turkish Government are the only competent judges of the form of note they can properly assent to; and it is indispensable, in order to avoid the error committed on a former occasion, which the Emperor of Russia, no less than the Sultan, has a right to expect shall not again be repeated, that no proposal shall be made to His Imperial Majesty which has not previously been agreed to by the Porte.

To avoid delay is manifestly of the utmost importance, and the notes, which have the entire approbation of the French Government, will be sent this evening to Constantinople *via* Marseilles, where Her Majesty's ship "Fury" is waiting; but I at the same time forward them to your Lordship by a messenger whom you are at liberty to send on to Constantinople with the decision of the Austrian Government and the instructions which Her Majesty's Government confidently hope will be given to the Internuncio to support Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Your Lordship is instructed to communicate by telegraph the decision of the Austrian Government to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, who will thus be made aware of it about the same time that the arrival of the "Fury" may be expected

\* No. 163.

† Inclosures 1 and 2 in No. 164.

‡ No. 165.

at Constantinople, in which case he will wait for the cooperation of his Austrian colleague, before communicating with the Turkish Government on the subject.

I have taken measures to invite the concurrence of the Cabinet of Berlin in the proposal now forwarded to your Lordship.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 169.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, October 25, 1853.*

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship the copy of a despatch from Baron Manteuffel,\* which has been placed in my hands by the Chevalier Bunsen expressing the regret of the Prussian Government that Her Majesty's Government had declined to take any further measures for inducing the Porte to agree to the original note, but suggesting that a new form of note, which might embody the assurances lately given at Olmütz on the part of Russia, should be offered for the acceptance of the Turkish Government.

The drafts of notes† which I inclose, will show that the views of Her Majesty's Government correspond with those which are expressed in Baron Manteuffel's despatch to the Chevalier Bunsen.

The first is founded on the Treaty of 1841, and refers to the assurances repeatedly given by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, and recently renewed at Olmütz, as well as to the assurances that on various occasions have been received from the Porte. It is hoped that this note will be signed by the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople, recommending to the acceptance of the Porte the note which has been framed, with due regard for the honour and independence of the Sultan, while the maintenance of existing engagements between Russia and Turkey, the spiritual privileges of the Greek Church, and the guarantee respecting the holy places, are provided for in strict accordance with the assurances of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg as to what was really desired of the Porte.

Your Lordship will, however, see by my despatch‡ of the 24th instant to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, of which a copy is inclosed, and which you will also communicate to Baron Manteuffel, that Her Majesty's Ambassador is at liberty to admit of such modifications to this note as to himself and his colleagues may appear reasonable, and which shall not be of a character to preclude the acceptance of the note by the Emperor of Russia.

Her Majesty's Government consider this to be just, because the Turkish Government are the only competent judges of the form of note they can properly assent to, and it is indispensable, in order to avoid the error committed on a former occasion, which the Emperor of Russia, no less than the Sultan, has a right to expect shall not again be repeated, that no proposal shall be made to His Imperial Majesty which has not previously been agreed to by the Porte.

To avoid delay is manifestly of the utmost importance, and the notes, which have the entire approbation of the French Government, will be sent this evening to Constantinople *via* Marseilles, where Her Majesty's ship "Fury" is waiting; but I at the same time forward them to your Lordship by a messenger, who will proceed by the way of Vienna to Constantinople; and Her Majesty's Government confidently hope that the Prussian Minister will be instructed to support Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Your Lordship will communicate, by telegraph, the decision of the Prussian Government to Lord Westmorland, who will make it known to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe both by the telegraph, to Belgrade, and by the messenger who proceeds to Constantinople.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 170.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 25.)*

My Lord,

Vienna, October 18, 1853.

THE Turkish Ambassador at this Court received on Friday last the copies of the summons to be addressed by Omar Pasha to Prince Gortchakoff, and of the manifesto of the Sultan to his subjects, and he immediately communicated them to Count Buol. The latter stated to me that although he deeply regretted the step taken by the Porte in opposition to the advice of the Four Powers, he found nothing to complain of in the documents themselves, which appeared to him to be drawn up with moderation, and to place the case of Turkey in the most favourable point of view.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 171.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 25.)*

(Extract.)

St. Petersburg, October 14, 1853.

UPON the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 30th ultimo I applied to Count Nesselrode to know when I could call upon him, and finding that, as he was obliged to proceed to Zarskoe Zeloe, he could only receive me on Friday the 14th instant, I sent him a copy of the despatch as soon as I was able to have it written out.

I have just returned from the Foreign Office, where I have held a conversation with his Excellency.

Little was said upon the subject of your Lordship's despatch beyond this, that Count Nesselrode remarked that it contained much reasoning, and that he was causing it therefore to be translated before placing it in the hands of the Emperor.

Upon my entering his room the Chancellor observed that a fresh complication had now risen, news having been just received of the Porte having declared war with Russia.

To this circumstance, however, Count Nesselrode said he was not disposed to attach too much importance: one of the few considerations indeed which led him to hope that peace might yet be maintained was this, that although it was easy to declare war, it was difficult to carry on war under the rapid approach of winter.

Count Nesselrode then expressed his surprise at all hesitation on the part of the English Government not having been removed by the declaration as to the Emperor's intentions which the Four Powers had been empowered to make in the *projet de note* lately drawn up at Olmütz.

I replied that I was glad to have an opportunity of offering a remark which appeared to me to have been often called for in the course of the late negotiations, that frequent allusion had been made to the character of the Emperor as offering a guarantee for the proper use of powers with which he might be invested, whereas in affairs of this kind personal considerations ought to be excluded.

Such weight, I said, as may be given to personal character may well be allowed to that of the Emperor; but in affairs between States, as in those between individuals, it is the character of the agreement and not of the person which is to be considered: the stipulations to be undertaken by Turkey are those which are to be binding on her not only during the reign of the Emperor Nicholas but under those of His Majesty's followers on the Throne.

Count Nesselrode wished that he could feel certain that the existence of unjust suspicions had not been betrayed of late, and added that, although grieved to say so, he would not conceal from me his apprehension that it was the settled purpose of Her Majesty's Government to humiliate Russia. I might be assured

that under no possible circumstances would humiliation be submitted to by the Emperor.

If, I replied, this feeling exists I am glad you have expressed it, for I can declare to you that your suspicion is unjust; you may be very certain that no disposition, however slight, exists with us to humiliate either Russia or the Emperor, or even to deprive Russia of any portion of her just influence; but a wish is felt and a resolution is taken not to admit claims which Her Majesty's Government consider that Russia is not entitled to make.

Beyond this, I continued, I am willing to admit that Her Majesty's Government, although as anxious as at the outset for the continuance of peace, is intent upon that peace being of a durable kind; if it is desired to make only such an arrangement as would but stave off war for a few months, Her Majesty's Government care very little whether the storm breaks now or a little later: in fine, M. le Comte, I entreat of you to dismiss from your mind a suspicion which is unworthy, and which has not a shadow of foundation.

The Chancellor wished that it were in his power to set his mind at ease; but observed, that the feeling which he attributed to Her Majesty's Government was common to all England. How, he would ask, was it possible that such hostility should be felt throughout all classes against Russia?

I thought the feeling admitted of an easy explanation; the English public had been led to believe, in the spring, that the differences between Russia and Turkey were to be immediately arranged; they saw no approach to agreement; they considered the independence of Turkey in danger; the whole community suffered, every man in his own interests, and it could not be wondered at if, at last, any measures were desired by the public which should put an end to prolonged uncertainty.

Count Nesselrode proceeded to speak with much feeling of the horrors of war in general; particularly of war between two powerful countries—two old allies like England and Russia—countries which, whilst they may be of infinite use to one another, possessed each the means of inflicting great injury upon its antagonist; and ended by saying, that if for any motives known to him war should be declared against Russia by England, it would be the most unintelligible and the least justifiable war ever undertaken.

At the conclusion of some conversation to which this observation gave rise, the Chancellor said, "In a few words our position is this: war has been declared against us by Turkey; we shall, in all probability, issue no counter declaration, nor shall we make any attack upon Turkey; we shall remain with folded arms, only resolved to repel any assault made upon us, whether in the Principalities or on our Asiatic frontier, which we have been reinforcing: so we shall remain during the winter, ready to receive any peaceful overtures which, during that time, may be made to us by Turkey; that is our position."

No. 172.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 25.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, October 15, 1853.*

JUST as the messenger is about to set off, I receive a note from Count Nesselrode, to say that the Government received last night the Sultan's declaration of war, and the summons addressed to Prince Gortchakoff.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 173.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 28.)*

(Télégraphique.)

*Constantinople, le 21 Octobre, 1853.*

LORD STRATFORD vient d'obtenir une courte suspension d'hostilités du côté de la Porte, et il transmet cette nuit à Vienne par estafette les projets de note et d'une déclaration adaptée à la suggestion favorablement accueillie par l'Angleterre et la France.

(Translation.)

*Constantinople, October 21, 1853.*

LORD STRATFORD has obtained a short suspension of hostilities on the part of the Porte, and he forwards to Vienna to-night by estafette the drafts of a note and of a declaration adapted to the suggestion favourably received by England and France.

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No. 174.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 28.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, October 27, 1853.*

WITH reference to the instructions sent to Constantinople, Vienna, and Berlin, on the 24th and 25th instant, I have the honour to state that, having communicated those instructions yesterday to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, his Excellency informed me that his despatches to M. de la Cour, transmitted by Her Majesty's ship "Fury," were of the same nature as those addressed by your Lordship to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, and that he proposed in the course of the day writing to the Emperor's Ministers at Vienna and Berlin, desiring them to support the Earl of Westmorland and Lord A. Loftus in their endeavours to obtain the assistance of the Austrian and Russian Governments in the fresh effort which the French and English Governments were about to make at Constantinople to reconcile the Porte with the Court of Russia.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 175.

*Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 29.)*

My Lord,

*Berlin, October 25, 1853.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL informed me this morning that he had received a despatch from the Prussian Consul at Bucharest, stating that the Turks had made an attempt to occupy an island in the Danube, situated near the town of Widdin.

It appears that this island was occupied by a corp of Wallachians, and not by Russian troops.

The Turks, after an exchange of shots, retired.

On the following day the Turkish Commander, Hussein Pasha, repeated the attempt with a force of 2000 men. Some Cossack troops came to the assistance of the Wallachians; but they eventually retired, after a mere demonstration of resistance, and having courteously saluted the Turkish Commander, who was left in occupation of the island.

No lives were lost in this affair, the distance from the Turkish fortress having been too great for the shots fired to take effect.

The only importance which is attached to this affray (if it merits such an appellation) is the probability that it may be the object of the Turks, in occupying this island, to facilitate the construction of a bridge for the passage of the Danube, and the possibility that the Russians would be induced on the same account to favour their undertaking.

As exaggerated accounts may possibly be given of this transaction, I have thought it my duty to report to your Lordship the true statement of what has occurred, as reported to me by Baron Manteuffel.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

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No. 176.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 29.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, October 18, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour of inclosing the copy of a letter which I have received from Mr. Consul-General Yeames, which will be found to convey some intelligence as to the movements of troops in the south of Russia.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 176.

*Consul-General Yeames to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Odessa, October 7, 1853.*

I FEAR that in my letter of the 30th ultimo I omitted to acknowledge the receipt of the letter with which you honoured me on August 21st.

That of the 10th ultimo reached me only yesterday, and I cannot account for the extraordinary delay in its conveyance.

In reference to the movement of troops mentioned by me in my last, I have now to state that the fleet, consisting of twelve line-of-battle ships, four frigates, and some steamers, with the 13th Division of Infantry on board, sailed from Sevastopol on the 29th ultimo, with a fair wind, for Secoum Kalé.

On the 2nd instant the "Selafael," and the "Uriel," of eighty-four guns, the "Flora" frigate, and a large corvette, arrived off this port, and having embarked a regiment of the 1st brigade of the 14th Division of Infantry, sailed for Sevastopol on the 4th. This squadron will return for the 2nd regiment of the same brigade.

More than 100 merchantmen have arrived here since yesterday morning, and some of them in less than forty-eight hours from the Bosphorus. The reports of the shipmasters are absurdly contradictory, and we must wait till to-morrow for more positive intelligence by the steamer.

It is believed, however, that the Sultan has been compelled to sign the summons to the Russian Commander-in-chief for the immediate evacuation of the Principalities, a measure carried in the Divan held on the 25th ultimo, to be followed by a declaration of war, in case of non-compliance.

It is probable that such an act will be attended by no consequences on this side.

The design of offensive hostilities may perhaps be not entertained here; and it is a fact that no preparations for them have been made, or can be made, for a long time to come.

Since the first occupation of the Principalities, there has been no movement of troops that way. They may be rather apprehended on the Asiatic frontier.

The fleets are still in Besika Bay, with the exception of the steamers, the apparition of which on the Bosphorus seems to have caused so much sensation in England.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) JAMES YEAMES.

No. 177.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, October 30, 1853, 7.30 P.M.*

IT is not proposed to send the note to St. Petersburg until it has been accepted by the Porte, in order to prevent the same difficulties that occurred before.

If any other note arrives from Lord Stratford, to which the Porte has already agreed, we hope it will be favourably considered at Vienna.

No. 178.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 31.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, October 30, 1853.*

I HAD the honour to apprise your Lordship by a telegraphic despatch, dated the 25th instant, that the Emperor had determined on recalling M. de la Cour, his present Ambassador at the Ottoman Porte, and on replacing him by General Baraguay d'Hilliers. This change has since been made public.

I have had two or three conversations with the General since his nomination; and I have every reason to be satisfied with them. He informed me that his instructions were based on the most complete and cordial understanding between France and England, a policy which he himself had always advocated; nor can I exaggerate the terms in which he assured me of his desire to maintain the most frank and friendly intercourse with Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte.

At the General's desire I furnish him with a letter for Lord Stratford, in order that he may find no difficulty in opening an immediate communication with his Excellency.

The General will leave Paris to-morrow evening, and as a special steamer has been placed at his orders, he hopes to be at Constantinople by the 10th proximo.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 179.

*Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 31.)*

(Extract.)

*Berlin, October 28, 1853.*

THE messenger Poignand delivered to me yesterday your Lordship's despatch of the 25th instant.

As Baron Manteuffel did not return to Berlin till a late hour last evening, I was unable to see him until this morning, when I had an interview with his Excellency at an early hour.

In conformity with your Lordship's instructions I read to him your Lordship's despatch, and communicated to him the drafts of the notes inclosed in that despatch, leaving in his Excellency's hands copies of those documents to be immediately submitted to the King.

His Excellency expressed his concurrence with the arrangement which those documents seek to attain, and seems to entertain great hopes that they will meet the end so ardently desired by Europe.

I likewise communicated to his Excellency the copy of your Lordship's despatch of the 24th instant to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, empowering him to admit of such modifications as may appear reasonable to his Excellency or his colleagues, and which should not be of a character to preclude the acceptance of the note by the Emperor of Russia.

Baron Manteuffel seemed to consider that the tone and nature of these documents gave evidence of the conciliatory disposition evinced towards the Emperor of Russia, whilst they contain every security and regard for the sovereign rights and dignity of the Sultan.

His Excellency assured me that I might safely inform your Lordship of the entire concurrence of the Prussian Government, and that instructions will be sent to Baron Wildenbruch to sign the note, and to support Lord Stratford de Redcliffe in urging the Porte to accept the arrangement proposed.

Of course his Excellency could not inform me, until he had taken the King's commands, officially of the adhesion of the Prussian Government, but he expressed his certain conviction that His Majesty would unhesitatingly accede to the invitation which your Lordship has addressed to the Prussian Government.

I hope by to-morrow evening to receive from Baron Manteuffel His Majesty's decision, and shall not fail to transmit it, in obedience with your Lordship's instructions, by telegraph to the Earl of Westmorland.

## No. 180.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 31.)*

My Lord,

Vienna, October 25, 1853.

IN answer to your Lordship's inquiry as to how far the Turkish and Russian Ministers were informed of the proceedings of the Conference,\* I am happy to give your Lordship the information you desire on a subject upon which a good deal of misrepresentation has prevailed.

Baron Meyendorff was in the first instance asked by Count Buol, by direction of the Emperor, to attend the Conference which it was proposed to assemble; but he declined upon the grounds of his not having been authorized by his Government to take part in any meeting of that nature.

The Turkish Ambassador was at that time living at Baden, but on his immediate return to Vienna I informed him of the first meeting of the Conference, and of the proposals which had been made. He, as well as Baron Meyendorff, said he had no instructions to discuss any project of arrangement.

The note which it was proposed to adopt was shown to the Turkish Ambassador, and Baron Meyendorff was made acquainted with it, but by neither was any objection made, although each said he could form no official opinion upon a measure on which he had no instructions.

The Turkish Ambassador and the Russian Minister were thus treated, as far as information with respect to the terms of the note is concerned, with equal attention and consideration.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

## No. 181.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 31.)*

My Lord,

Vienna, October 25, 1853.

THE latest intelligence which Count Buol has received from the Intercuncio is of the 10th instant from Constantinople. He reports the general disposition of the Turkish Government for the prosecution of the war which has been declared, and which he supposes will be commenced by hostilities on the part of the Turkish army under the orders of Omar Pasha.

Baron Bruck expresses his regret that the assurances contained in Count Buol's note from Olmütz did not arrive before the declaration of war, as he thinks they might have made a favourable impression; but he states, that the remarks of Count Nesselrode upon the Turkish modifications had fortified Reshid Pasha in his conviction, that these modifications ought to have been adopted.

I communicated to Count Buol Lord Stratford's telegraphic despatch of the 15th instant. He remarked upon it, that he was already aware of the disposition which had been taken with respect to the passage of the combined fleets through the Dardanelles: but what he regretted to learn from the despatch was the disinclination which it seemed to imply on the part of the General Council in Constantinople, to the acceptance of terms of arrangement with Russia, towards which it appeared that Reshid Pasha might have been favourably disposed.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

\* Namely, in July, at Vienna.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 31.)*

My Lord,

*Vienna, October 25, 1853.*

AT the invitation of Count Buol I this day met my colleagues, M. de Bourqueney and Count Arnim, at his house, when he read to us a despatch addressed by Count Nesselrode on the 17th instant to Baron Meyendorff, and communicated by the latter to Count Buol. I have the honour of inclosing a copy of this despatch to your Lordship, and you will perceive that it was written in answer to one from M. de Fonton, dated the 6th instant, announcing the declaration of war by the Porte, and an expedient proposed by Count Buol upon the receipt of that intelligence.

In placing the copy of Count Nesselrode's despatch in our hands, Count Buol observed, that although it addressed to him alone the authorization to open fresh communications, upon the plan he had suggested, with the Government of the Sultan, he felt that it was more conformable to that unity of councils which had existed between the Four Powers throughout the negotiations, to lay his expedient before their Representatives in conference, in order that they might take the deliberate opinions of their respective Governments upon it; and he stated, that he should await the replies of the three Cabinets before he should take any step whatever upon the subject.

The plan which Count Buol suggests for the approval of Her Majesty's Government, and those of our allies, is, that a collective note should be addressed by the Four Powers to the Porte, founded upon the principle that the Government of the Sultan is ready to adhere to the engagements which they have spontaneously taken in the course of the negotiations, and to re-establish their former relations with Russia upon conditions conformable to the dignity and sovereign rights of the Sultan, and inviting them to agree to an armistice, and to the appointment of a Plenipotentiary to treat with a Russian Plenipotentiary, the two to meet at some place to be fixed upon by mutual consent of the two Governments. The proposed note would contain the renewed declaration of the Four Powers of the assurances given by the Emperor of Russia, and their adherence to the conditions which the Porte had agreed to accept in the modified Vienna note, omitting all reference to any concession by the Sultan to the Greek Church of the rights and immunities which he might in future accord to any other Christian community. As in consequence of the declaration of war, a Treaty or Diplomatic Convention becomes necessary, the Ottoman Government will be invited by the note to inform the Four Powers, through the Turkish Ambassador at Vienna, of the stipulations on which such Convention might be agreed to, and these stipulations would be immediately forwarded by the Representatives from Vienna to St. Petersburg, and the Cabinet requested to send an answer through the Russian Minister at this place, so that the negotiation would not be exposed to the delays which might arise from direct discussions between the Government of Russia and the Porte. The Plenipotentiaries to be named by both parties would, in fact, only have to meet to sign, and the Four Powers would retain a control over the whole of the transaction.

Count Buol stated, that he would not adopt the proposal in Count Nesselrode's despatch that the Sultan's Plenipotentiary should proceed to the Russian head-quarters; indeed, it was in contradiction to the former part of the despatch.

In submitting these propositions to the consideration of the Allied Governments, Count Buol expressed his anxious hope that the general principles embodied in them might meet with your Lordship's approbation. He stated that he should be ready to attend to any suggestions which the Cabinets might think it advisable to offer, in order that whatever might be agreed upon to propose to the contending parties should be calculated to secure the great object which is equally sought for by all, the re-establishment of peace and the maintenance of that harmony and good understanding amongst the States of Europe which has so long existed, and has contributed so essentially to the general prosperity of all.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 182.

*Count Nesselrode to Baron Meyendorff.**St. Pétersbourg, le 17<sup>5</sup> Octobre, 1853.*

J'AI trouvé ici à mon retour de Varsovie une dépêche que M. Fonton m'avait adressée de Vienne le <sup>24 Septembre</sup><sub>6 Octobre</sub>. Elle m'annonce deux nouvelles graves ; la déclaration de guerre contre nous à laquelle la Porte vient de se décider, et le rejet par les deux Cours maritimes des propositions qui leur avaient été faites d'Olmütz par le Cabinet Autrichien.

Désirant ne point voir rompre entièrement par ces deux incidens le fil des négociations pacifiques, le Comte de Buol a songé à mettre en œuvre un expédient dont il m'avait déjà entretenu durant mon séjour à Olmütz.

Cet expédient consisterait dans la remise au Divan par les quatre Cours d'une note collective qui, conçue à peu près dans le sens de celle convenue à Olmütz, c'est-à-dire, renfermant des assurances positives sur les véritables intentions de l'Empereur à l'égard de la Turquie, engagerait celle-ci, non plus à signer la note Autrichienne pure et simple, mais à s'entendre directement avec la Russie, et à envoyer à cet effet un Plénipotentiaire dans un endroit qu'elle choisirait pour ces négociations d'un commun accord avec notre Cabinet.

M. le Comte de Buol sentira que dans la position nouvelle où nous mettent la déclaration de guerre de la Porte d'un côté, et de l'autre l'attitude que semblerait vouloir prendre l'Angleterre ou la France, ce n'est point à la Russie à rechercher de nouveaux expédiens auxquels la Porte n'aurait pas donné son consentement préalable, et que l'initiative des ouvertures en cette occasion ne saurait nous appartenir. Il nous paraît même peu probable que la Porte, dans l'état d'enivrement belliqueux où elle est à cette heure, et après une prise de position si marquée que celle que lui donne sa déclaration de guerre, veuille faire les premiers pas vers une tentative de pacification. Néanmoins, si le Cabinet Autrichien croit pouvoir lui faire comprendre que l'initiative doit venir d'elle, et employer efficacement ses efforts auprès des deux Puissances maritimes pour leur faire accepter de la part de l'Autriche la proposition dont il s'agit, ce n'est pas de l'Empereur que viendront les obstacles à sa mise à exécution. Que la Porte se détermine à envoyer un négociateur au quartier-général du Prince Gortchakoff, et ce dernier, assisté d'un Plénipotentiaire qui lui sera adjoint d'ici *ad hoc*, sera muni des instructions nécessaires pour traiter directement avec le Gouvernement Ottoman. Pour ne rien faire qui puisse entraver le succès de cette dernière tentative de conciliation, l'Empereur, non-obstant la déclaration de guerre de la Porte, compte ne rien changer provisoirement à son attitude actuelle. Nos troupes auront l'ordre de rester sur la défensive attendant l'attaque des Turcs et les repoussant s'il y a lieu. Rien ne s'oppose donc de notre part à ce que M. le Comte de Buol donne suite à son projet d'ouvertures, s'il croit pouvoir, dans les circonstances actuelles, en attendre un bon résultat.

Recevez, &c.  
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)

*St. Petersburg, October 17<sup>5</sup>, 1853.*

I FOUND here, on my return from Warsaw, a despatch which M. Fonton had addressed to me from Vienna on <sup>September 24</sup><sub>October 6</sub>. It announces to me two important pieces of intelligence: the declaration of war against us, upon which the Porte has just determined; and the rejection, by the two Maritime Courts, of the propositions which had been made to them from Olmütz by the Austrian Cabinet.

Being desirous of not seeing the thread of pacific negotiations entirely interrupted by these two events, Count Buol meditated having recourse to an expedient which he had already mentioned to me during my residence at Olmütz.

This expedient would consist in the delivery to the Divan by the Four Courts of a collective note, which, drawn up nearly in the sense of that agreed upon at Olmütz, that is to say, containing positive assurances in regard to the

real intentions of the Emperor with respect to Turkey, would invite the latter, no longer to sign the Austrian note without alteration, but to come to a direct understanding with Russia, and for that purpose to send a Plenipotentiary to a place which, by common agreement with our Cabinet, she might choose for those negotiations.

Count Buol will feel that, in the new position in which we are placed on the one side by the Porte's declaration of war, and on the other by the attitude which England or France would appear disposed to assume, it is not for Russia to devise fresh expedients to which the Porte may not have given its previous assent, and that it cannot be for us to take the first step in the overtures on this occasion. It even appears to us little probable that the Porte in its present state of warlike intoxication, and after it has taken up so distinct a position as it has assumed by its declaration of war, would be disposed to take the first step towards an attempt at pacification. Nevertheless, if the Austrian Cabinet conceives that it can make it understand that it must take the first step, and can effectually employ its efforts to induce the Maritime Powers to accept from Austria the proposition in question, obstacles to its being put into execution will not originate with the Emperor. Let the Porte decide upon sending a negotiator to Prince Gortchakoff's head-quarters, and the latter, assisted by a Plenipotentiary who will be attached to him from hence for that purpose, will be furnished with the necessary instructions for treating directly with the Ottoman Government. In order to do nothing which might interfere with the success of this last attempt at reconciliation, the Emperor, notwithstanding the Porte's declaration of war, proposes to make for a while no change in his present attitude. Our troops will be ordered to remain on the defensive, awaiting the attack of the Turks, and repelling them if it should take place. There is, therefore, no obstacle on our side to Count Buol's giving effect to his proposed overtures if he conceives that, under existing circumstances, he can expect any good result from them.

Receive, &c.  
(Signed) NESSELRODE.

No. 183.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 31.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, October 6, 1853.*

I AM deeply sensible of the interest so liberally displayed by Her Majesty's Government in the preservation of British lives and property at Constantinople, under the impressions derived from M. de la Cour's telegraphic despatch of the 11th ultimo. It is with reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 23rd ultimo that I express this sentiment, applying it, moreover, to that part of those instructions which authorizes me to consider the presence of Her Majesty's squadron here, if I thought proper to require it, as intended to embrace the protection of the Sultan also in case of need.

Fortunately there is no necessity whatever for calling up the squadron on either account. My despatches, which had not reached London when M. de la Cour's telegraphic despatch was communicated there, will have informed your Lordship of the degree of danger which appeared to exist when they were written, and my reasons, if I remember right, for resisting all exaggerated proposals, and confining myself to an application, in concert with the French Ambassador, for two or three large war-steamers from each of the squadrons. I am still of opinion that assistance thus limited would have answered every purpose, unless indeed the Ottoman squadron had taken part against the Sultan, which was a very extreme case to suppose. I wished to save Her Majesty's Government from any embarrassments likely to accrue from a premature passage of the Dardanelles by Admiral Dundas' squadron, and at the same time to take precautions adequate to the appearance of danger. I did not form my opinion in this respect without taking the opinion of Her Majesty's senior officer in command in the Bosphorus.

I am gratified by your Lordship's approval, as founded on M. de la Cour's statement, and I shall be still more so if honoured by its repetition after your Lordship had received my expected despatches.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 184.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 31.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, October 15, 1853.*

THE Sultan has invited the squadrons to enter the Dardanelles. I have the honour to inclose herewith a copy of Reshid Pasha's official note communicating His Majesty's request. Your Lordship will observe that the application is grounded on the Porte's resolution to make war, and on its declared apprehension that Russia may commence hostilities even before the expiration of the fifteen days assigned to Prince Gortchakoff for his evacuation of the Principalities. Though war has been hitherto declared only with that reservation, I have thought it my duty, under your Lordship's instructions, to comply with the Sultan's invitation. I have, nevertheless, withheld my consent for a few days, and arranged with M. de la Cour that the ships shall not arrive here till after the middle of next week. In doing so I have been actuated by a wish to keep open the chances of peace for any acceptable result of the meeting at Olmütz, and to guard against the possibility of furnishing a shadow of pretence for the continued occupation of the Provinces by Russia. The hope of any available proposition from Olmütz has vanished with the communication made by Baron Bruck to Reshid Pasha after the arrival of the last post from Vienna; and when the portions of the squadrons destined for Constantinople shall arrive here, it will be impossible that any effect should be thereby produced at the Russian head-quarters in Wallachia.

Inclosed herewith is my intended answer to Reshid Pasha's note. The French Ambassador will address his Highness in the same sense.

I have also the honour to inclose a memorandum of the course which I propose to follow, in concert with M. de la Cour and the Turkish Government, respecting the entrance of the squadrons. I have reason to believe that it is in accordance with Admiral Dundas's opinions.

Your Lordship will not fail to understand, that in taking a decision on this subject I have been guided by a reference to my original instructions. The juncture for which the last ones were framed, has long since ceased to have any existence in fact, and whatever peril may in future arise from unforeseen circumstances, I see no reason at present to apprehend its revival.

I have laboured to provide for all the considerations attached to this intended movement of the squadrons, and hope that the difficulty of doing so will atone for any oversight, and obtain for me, nevertheless, your Lordship's indulgent approval.

Inclosure 1 in No. 184.

*Reshid Pasha to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Translation.)

*October 8, 1853.*

YOUR Excellency already knows that the proceedings of the Russian Government have led to war, and that if a negative answer was received within the term appointed to the letter from his Excellency Omer Pasha to Prince Gortchakoff concerning the evacuation of the Principalities, hostilities were to commence.

The term thus fixed by the Sublime Porte will be duly observed; but Russia may have acquired earlier intelligence of the Porte's final decision, and may hasten hostilities. I am therefore ordered by His Imperial Majesty the Sultan to inform your Lordship that it is highly important in the opinion of the Sublime Porte

that a part (whatever may be considered necessary) of the allied naval forces lying outside the Straits, as a mark of the friendly dispositions of the English and French Governments on behalf of the Sublime Porte, should enter within the Straits of the Dardanelles.

An official note similar to the present has been addressed to the French Embassy.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) RESHID.

Inclosure 2 in No. 184.

*Projet of Answer to the Porte.*

THE Undersigned, in acknowledging the Porte's official note transmitted him by his Highness Reshid Pasha, for the purpose of inviting part of Her Majesty's squadron, now at anchor near the Dardanelles, to come within those Straits, on the grounds of the Porte's having been led by the proceedings of Russia to resolve on war, and of its apprehending that hostilities may commence even before the term assigned in the summons to Prince Gortchakoff, has the honour to state that, having taken these considerations, and particularly the one last mentioned, into his serious and friendly consideration, he is prepared to comply with the Sultan's request, as soon as the necessary communications and arrangements can be made; suggesting, however, that it may be found most expedient, considering the lateness of the season, that the whole squadron should be sheltered within the Dardanelles, such part of it only as may be required being brought up to Constantinople.

His Highness the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is requested to send the necessary firmans to the Dardanelles.

The Undersigned, &c.

Inclosure 3 in No. 184.

*Memorandum.*

*Samedi, le 13 Octobre, 1853.*

ENVOYER à Reshid Pasha les notes responsives demain matin.

Ecrire demain aux deux Amiraux dans les mêmes termes.

Les escadres entreraient dans le Détroit des Dardanelles Mercredi, ou tout au plus tard Jeudi.

Qu'elles mouillent, selon les dispositions concertées des Amiraux, quelque part entre Koum Kalé et Gallipoli.

Qu'on détache de chaque escadre soit deux vaisseaux de ligne, soit une grosse frégate avec un vaisseau, à Constantinople, en y ajoutant quatre frégates à vapeur.

Leur arrivée ici ne doit pas avoir lieu plutôt que Vendredi matin.

(Translation.)

*Saturday, October 13, 1853.*

TO send the answers to Reshid Pasha to-morrow morning.

To write to-morrow to the two Admirals in the same terms.

The squadrons should enter the Straits of the Dardanelles Wednesday, or at the latest on Thursday.

They should anchor, as may be arranged by the Admirals, somewhere between Koum Kale and Gallipoli.

That there should be detached to Constantinople from each squadron either two ships of the line, or a heavy frigate and one ship of the line, with the addition of four steam-frigates.

They should not arrive here sooner than Friday morning.

No. 185.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 31.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, October 15, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, a paper given in to Reshid Pasha, and communicated to me, and I believe to M. de la Cour also, by the Austrian Internuncio soon after the arrival of the last courier from Vienna.

Reshid Pasha informed me that he considered the proposal announced in this memorandum as not only inadmissible, but even as less satisfactory to the Porte than other suggestions which had preceded. Such in substance was his reply to the Austrian interpreter on receiving the communication from him. Nor has that reply surprised me, considering the position in which the Porte is now placed between the declaration of war unanimously adopted by the General Council and the formal invitation addressed to Prince Gortchakoff, accompanied with proclamations to the Mussulman people and army, such as those which are inclosed herewith.

Had any propositions made by Count Buol after the meeting of the Emperors at Olmütz, been calculated to obtain the concurrence of the British and French Governments, I cannot but presume that some indication of the fact would have reached the French Ambassador or myself by this time, at least through our respective colleagues at Vienna.

It seems to be almost impossible in the present state of affairs that any proposition short of a complete surrender of Russian views should be able to avert the declaration of hostilities. It is more reasonable, though less satisfactory, to look forward to the natural effects of the approaching season for some opportunity, not indeed of preventing war, but of restoring peace before any considerable loss may have been sustained on either side. In a late conversation with the Internuncio, I remarked that his Excellency's opinion appeared in that respect to agree with mine.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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 Inclosure 1 in No. 185.
*Memorandum addressed to the Porte by the Austrian Internuncio.*

[See Inclosure in No. 126.]

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 Inclosure 2 in No. 185.
*Proclamation issued to the Inhabitants of Constantinople, Eyoub, Scutari, and Galatz.*

(Traduction.)

L'ACCEPTATION des propositions telles que la Russie les a faites et que tout le monde connaît relativement aux privilèges religieux, aurait non seulement porté atteinte aux droits de souveraineté et d'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman ; elle serait aussi la source immédiate, aussi que dans le temps à venir, de préjudices de toute espèce, dont Dieu nous garde !

La Russie a pris par ses immenses préparatifs de guerre une attitude ménaçante.

Quant à la Sublime Porte, tout en prenant de son côté aussi des mesures de précaution et de défense, et en envoyant des forces aux frontières Impériales, soit dans l'Anatolie soit dans la Roumelie, elle a, en même temps, ainsi que son système et ses principes pacifiques lui en imposeraient le devoir, épuisé tous les

moyens que la plume fournit, présenté un arrangement modéré, et fait tous ses efforts pour conserver la paix. La paix est objet de tout temps chéri et sacré. Mais tout cela n'a produit aucun effet ; et, à la fin, l'armée Russe a passé le Pruth, et envahi, en dernier lieu, les Principautés de Valachie et de Moldavie, pays héréditaires de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

Malgré cet état de choses, la Sublime Porte a employé des intermédiaires pour opérer une réconciliation dans l'intérêt du maintien de la paix ; mais cela n'a pas été possible, et, en conséquence, un Conseil-Général a été convoqué les 22 et 23 du mois de Zilhadji, composé des Vizir, des Caziaskers, des Ulemas, des chefs militaires, et d'autres fonctionnaires, et la question y a été examinée dans toutes ses faces. Or, étant devenu clair et évident que, puisque la Cour de Russie n'accepte pas l'arrangement auquel la Sublime Porte peut adhérer, la solution de ces contestations d'une manière pacifique n'est pas possible, étant dans la connaissance de tout le monde que c'est la Russie qui a violé les Traités en faisant envahir par ses troupes des pays Ottomans, et la prolongation de cet état de choses étant nuisible, il a été décidé à l'unanimité de mettre notre confiance en l'assistance Divine et en celle de notre Saint Prophète, d'entreprendre la guerre, et de commencer les mouvemens des troupes. Cette décision du Conseil a été confirmée par un Fetva du Sheik-ul-Islam,—Fetva qu'on a jugé à propos de mettre en exécution,—et un rapport à cet égard ayant été mis aux pieds du trône pour prendre les ordres du Sultan, le Mazbata du Conseil-Général a été sanctionné par un Hatti-shérif, et le tout a été porté à la connaissance des Caziaskers des corps d'armée de Roumelie et d'Anatolie, et de tous les habitans de l'Empire en publiant des firmans partout.

Ainsi vous autres vous réunirez les Imaums des quartiers, et vous leur direz que, comme c'est la Russie qui a donné lieu à cette affaire, et que c'est sur elle que tombe la responsabilité, ils doivent adresser des prières au Dieu des armées pour le triomphe de la Sublime Porte et des troupes Impériales ; et vous leur ordonnerez de prier sans cesse et avec ferveur pour la prospérité de notre cause ; et, en même temps, vous ferez comprendre à tous que, comme cette guerre est une guerre contre un Gouvernement qui, sans le moindre raison, a voulu violer les droits de l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman, les relations amicales qui existent entre la Sublime Porte et les autres Puissances amies, n'ont subi la moindre altération par suite de cette situation, et, par conséquent, nul ne doit molester les négocians ni les sujets de ces Puissances, ni les personnes des différentes religions, en ce qui regarde la vie, l'honneur, et la fortune, et nul ne doit se permettre de les molester de quelque manière que ce puisse être, car la loi protège la vie, l'honneur, et la fortune de chaque classe des sujets et de Rayas comme les nôtres ; tous doivent d'après nos saintes lois être traités en chaque circonstance avec justice et jouir d'une parfaite sécurité : en un mot, il répugne à la sainte loi, ainsi qu'à la simple raison, comme cela a été publié par le passé, de tenir les Rayas de la Sublime Porte, qui professent une religion ayant de la conformité avec celle de la Russie, responsable de la conduite du Gouvernement Russe ; ce qui ce Gouvernement demande, il le demande dans ses propres intérêts et pour augmenter son influence. Les sujets de la Sublime Porte jouissent depuis des siècles des privilèges religieux que les Empereurs Ottomans leur ont accordés sous la protection particulière de la Sublime Porte, et ces privilèges acquerèrent tous les jours plus de force et plus d'extension. Ils savent que la prétension du Gouvernement Russe de prendre leurs privilèges sous sa sauvegarde aurait pour résultat de les affaiblir.

Vous ferez bien comprendre à tous qu'une des causes extérieures de triomphe imploré c'est que toutes les classes des sujets de sa Hautesse passent bien ensemble, que les uns ne molestent ni humilient les autres, et que tous tâchent de vivre dans une parfaite union, et de servir une patrie commune.

Si, par négligence, par ignorance, ou par rancune, quelqu'un agit contrairement à ces ordres légitimes, il sera sévèrement puni pour cela.

Toutes les dispositions précitées ont été arrêtées dans les Conseils Généraux tenus par le passé et tout récemment encore.

Vous aurez donc soin que nul ne se permette d'actes contraires aux ordres sus-énoncés.

*Le 5 Moharem, 1270. (8 Octobre, 1853.)*

(Translation.)

**THE** acceptance of the proposals as made by Russia, and which are known to all the world, relative to religious privileges, would not only have been injurious to the rights of sovereignty and independence of the Ottoman Empire; it would also have been the cause, now as well as hereafter, of mischief of every kind, from which may God preserve us!

Russia, by her vast warlike preparations, has assumed a menacing attitude.

As regards the Sublime Porte, whilst adopting on its side also measures of precaution and of defence, and whilst despatching forces to the frontiers of the Empire, both in Anatolia and in Roumelia, it has, at the same time, as a duty imposed upon it by its pacific system and principles, exhausted every means which the pen affords; proposed a moderate arrangement; and exerted all its efforts for the preservation of peace. Peace is an object at all times cherished and sacred. But all this has produced no effect; and, in short, the Russian army has passed the Pruth, and has at length invaded the Principalities of Wallachia and of Moldavia, the hereditary territory of His Majesty the Sultan.

Notwithstanding this state of things, the Sublime Porte has employed mediators to bring about a reconciliation in the interest of the maintenance of peace; but this has not been possible, and consequently a General Council was convoked on the 22nd and 23rd of the month of Zilhadjé, composed of the Viziers, the Caziaskers, the Ulemas, the military chiefs, and other functionaries, and the question was there examined in all its aspects. Now, as it has become clear and evident that, since the Court of Russia does not accept the arrangement to which the Sublime Porte can adhere, the solution of these disputes in a pacific manner is not possible; as it is known to everybody that it is Russia who has violated the Treaties, by causing the Ottoman territory to be invaded by her troops; and as the prolongation of this state of things is prejudicial; it has been unanimously decided to put our trust in the divine assistance, and in that of our holy Prophet, to go to war, and to commence the movement of our troops. This decision of the Council has been confirmed by a fetva of the Sheik-ul-Islam, a fetva which it has been thought fit to put into execution; and a report to this effect having been laid at the foot of the throne, in order to take the royal pleasure, the Mazbata of the General Council has been sanctioned by a hattî-sheriff, and the entire proceeding has been brought to the knowledge of the Caziaskers of the armies of Roumelia and of Anatolia, and of all the inhabitants of the Empire, by the publication of firmans everywhere.

You also will in like manner assemble the Imaums of the various quarters and you will tell them that as it is Russia who has given rise to this affair, and that as upon her must fall the responsibility, they should address their prayers to the God of armies for the triumph of the Sublime Porte and of the Imperial troops; and you will command them to pray incessantly and with fervour for the success of our cause; and at the same time you will make every one understand, that as this war is a war directed against a Government which, without the smallest reason, has thought fit to violate the independent rights of the Ottoman Empire, the friendly relations existing between the Sublime Porte and other friendly Powers have not undergone the slightest alterations in consequence of the position of affairs, and, consequently, no one must molest the merchants or the subjects of those Powers, or persons of different religions, as regards their lives, their honour, and their fortunes, and no one must permit himself to molest them in any manner whatsoever, for the law protects the life, honour, and fortune of every class of subjects and rayahs as much as our own; all, according to our sacred laws, should be treated under every circumstance with justice, and should enjoy perfect security; in a word, as has been promulgated in times past, it is contrary to the sacred law, as well as to plain reason, to hold the Rayahs of the Sublime Porte, who profess a religion in conformity with that of Russia, responsible for the conduct of the Russian Government; what that Government demands, it demands for its own interests and to increase its influence. The subjects of the Sublime Porte have enjoyed for ages religious privileges which the Ottoman Emperors have granted them, under the special protection of the Sublime Porte, and these privileges daily acquired more strength and greater extension. They know that the pretension of the Russian Government to take their privileges under its protection would have the effect of weakening them.

You will make all people thoroughly understand that one of the outward causes of our prayers for success is, that all classes of his Highness's subjects may dwell peaceably together, that one may neither molest nor humiliate the others, and that all may strive to live in perfect harmony, and to serve one common country.

If through negligence, through ignorance, or through jealousy, any one acts contrary to these legitimate orders, he will be severely punished for it.

All the foregoing regulations have been agreed upon in the General Councils held in times past, and also quite recently.

You will then take heed lest any one should commit acts contrary to the orders set forth above.

*The 5th Moharem, 1270. (October 8, 1853.)*

### Inclosure 3 in No. 185.

#### *Proclamation to the Army at Shumla.*

**Ai Soldati Imperiali !**

QUANDO noi combatteremo col nostro nemico, affine di essere sempre fermi e coraggiosi, e non voltiamo le spalle allo stesso, e possiamo vendicarci di lui, noi sacrificheremo la nostra testa e la nostra anima. Ecco il Coran ! Noi l'abbiamo giurato sul Corano. Voi sicte Mussulmani, e non dubito che voi sacrificherete la vostra testa e la vostra anima per la religione e pel Governo.

Ma se vi ha fra voi, un sol uomo che ha paura della guerra, lo dica ; perchè è assai pericoloso presentarsi al nemico con tali uomini. La paura è una malattia del cuore. Chi ha paura verrà impiegato negli ospedali ed in altri servizi ; ma per chi in guerra voltasse le spalle al nemico, verrà fucilato.

Gli uomini coraggiosi che vorranno per contro sacrificarsi per la religione e per il trono restino. Essi uniscano il loro cuore a Dio, amino la religione, si mostrino valorosi, e Dio darà loro certamente la vittoria.

Soldati ! purifichiamo il nostro cuore, e poi confidiamoci pure all' aiuto di Dio.

Combattiamo, e facciamo sacrificio di noi, come già gli avi nostri, e come essi ci hanno lasciato il nostro paese, la nostra religione, così noi dobbiamo lasciarli ai nostri filij. Voi tutte sapete che lo scopo di questa vita è quello di servire degnamente Dio e il Sultano ; e guadagnare così il cielo.

Soldati ! chi ha onore deve pensare così e servire secondo questi sentimenti. Così Dio vi protegga. Amen.

(Translation.)

**To the Imperial Soldiers !**

WHEN we are fighting with our enemy, let us be always firm and courageous. We will not turn our backs upon him. We will be avenged, and will sacrifice our heads and our lives. Here is the Koran ! We have sworn it on the Koran. You are Moslems ! and I am sure that you will sacrifice your heads and your lives for your religion and Government.

But if there is a single man amongst you afraid of the war, let him say so ; for it is highly dangerous to go up to the enemy with such men. Fear is a disease of the heart. He who is afraid shall be employed in the hospitals, and in other services ; but the man who turns his back on his enemy in war, shall be shot.

But let those brave men remain who are ready to sacrifice themselves for religion and the Throne. Let them unite their hearts to God ; let them love religion ; let them show themselves brave men, and God will surely give them the victory.

Soldiers ! let us purify our hearts, and then indeed we will trust in the help of God.

Let us fight, and offer ourselves up as our ancestors have done. As they have left our country and our religion to us, so must we leave them to our

children. All of you know that the object of this life is to serve worthily God and the Sultan, and thus to gain heaven.

Soldiers ! the man of honour should have these feelings, and act in accordance with them. May God thus protect you ! Amen.

## No. 186.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 31.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, October 17, 1853.*

I HAD a private audience of the Sultan this morning, and delivered in the usual manner the Queen's reply to His Majesty's letter announcing the birth of a Prince in the Imperial family.

The Sultan took occasion to express his thanks for my compliance with his request that Her Majesty's squadron, now anchored at Besika Bay, should come within the Dardanelles, and he also expressed a hope that so signal a mark of Her Majesty's friendship would prove the forerunner of a still more effective support. I said, in reply, that the deep interest taken by Her Majesty's Government in the independence and welfare of the Ottoman Empire was a sufficient pledge for times of increased peril ; and that although I would not take upon myself to say more without special instructions, I felt assured that any well-founded appeal to their sympathy would meet with the most friendly consideration ; but in order to secure the effects of such sympathy, it was essential that the Porte should not only exert its own means to the utmost, keeping the door open for negotiation on reasonable grounds, but that it should proceed frankly in a course of administrative progress, calculated by the enforcement of just and liberal principles to satisfy the expectations of such a country as Great Britain.

The Sultan said that he was always ready to listen to my suggestions, and when approved on examination by his Ministers, to give them effect, together with any addition of theirs.

I exhorted His Majesty to bear in mind the extreme importance, now that the Empire was menaced with all the dangers of a war with Russia, to act upon a broader system than that of mere military operations, and without further loss of time to take effective measures for securing internal tranquillity, providing against reverses, and removing all subjects of complaint and pretexts of aggression on the side of Persia and of Greece.

The Sultan listened attentively to my remarks, but seemed more inclined to acquiesce silently in their truth, than to enter upon any of the topics to which they referred.

Allow me, in conclusion, to add, that His Majesty's language to me, personally, was, as usual, expressive of confidence and kindness.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

## No. 187.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 31.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, October 21, 1853.*

INCLOSED herewith are copies of a despatch addressed and forwarded by me to Vice-Admiral Dundas, yesterday, requiring that officer to bring Her Majesty's squadron under his command within the Straits of the Dardanelles ; of a previous despatch addressed by me to that officer four days before, with a view to the same operation ; and of an official note from Reshid Pasha in acknowledgment of my reply to his note inviting me in the Sultan's name to require the presence of Her Majesty's squadron within the Straits of the Dardanelles.

The French Ambassador has acted in perfect concert with me, and it is probable that the two squadrons are by this time within the Dardanelles, and that the detachments destined for the Bosphorus will be here to-morrow or next day.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 187.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.*

Sir,

*Therapia, October 20, 1853.*

AT the Sultan's request, and in virtue of my instructions, I require the presence of Her Majesty's squadron under your command within the Straits of the Dardanelles.

The French Ambassador has addressed a similar requisition to Vice-Admiral Hamelin.

Orders for the admission of both squadrons will be dispatched by the Ottoman Government in the course of to-day.

I have directed Her Majesty's Consul at the Dardanelles to ascertain, and to acquaint you with the fact of their being received.

As soon after hearing to that effect from him, as you can conveniently move the squadron, it is desirable that you should enter the Straits.

My despatch of the 16th instant will have enabled you to concert whatever may be necessary with the Commander of the French squadron.

I repeat that agreeably to the Porte's proposal two sail-of-the-line and four steam-frigates from each squadron will suffice for the present in the Bosphorus.

Convenient ground for anchoring the required number of ships will be reserved in this part of the Straits towards the entrance from the Black Sea. The Honourable Captain Drummond, who proceeds to-day with the "Retribution" to join your squadron, will give you more exact information on that point.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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Inclosure 2 in No. 187.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.*

Sir,

*Therapia, October 16, 1855.*

I HAVE to prepare you for the removal of Her Majesty's squadron under your command from its present anchorage at Besika Bay, in concurrence with the French squadron under Vice-Admiral Hamelin.

The Porte has addressed to me, and also to the French Ambassador, an invitation in the Sultan's name for parts of the respective squadrons to come within the Dardanelles, and we have signified our intention to comply with His Majesty's request.

At the same time we are alive to the importance of not leaving any portion of the ships exposed without necessity to the violent winds which often prevail at your anchorage in the season now close at hand, and we therefore learn with satisfaction that the Porte is preparing to address us in that sense.

We are therefore of opinion that you will best provide for the requirements of the case by bringing the whole of your squadron within the Dardanelles as soon as you are informed officially that the necessary firmans for your passage have been received by the Turkish officers commanding there. We further propose that you should detach two ships-of-the-line with four steam-frigates to Constantinople, and that you should anchor the remainder of your force at some convenient place either in the Straits, or on this side of them, below the Isle of Marmora.

A similar instruction is conveyed to Vice-Admiral Hamelin by his Excel-

lency the French Ambassador, who dispatches a steamer this evening with our joint communication to the squadrons.

We conceive that your professional experience, united to that of Vice-Admiral Hamelin, will best determine the most suitable anchorage for ships within the above-mentioned limits. It is proposed, in compliance with the wishes of the Porte, that the vessels detached to Constantinople shall anchor on their arrival in the Bosphorus opposite to Therapia.

Orders will be sent from the Porte to facilitate the purchase of provisions in those districts which are near to the selected places of anchorage as soon as they are known; and the firmans of admission will probably reach the Dardanelles in three days from the present date.

Should you see no objection to coming up in person with the detachment of ships destined for the capital, I shall gladly avail myself of the opportunity to communicate with you more completely than by correspondence, and I cannot but think that the interests of the public service would be promoted by our interview.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 187.

*Reshid Pasha to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Translation.)

Moharem 16, 1270. (October 19, 1853.)

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Excellency's reply to my note of the 5th of Moharem, relative to the squadrons lying outside the Dardanelles. The promptness with which the Porte's invitation thereon has been complied with affords a proof of your Government's sincere disposition on behalf of the Sublime Porte. His Imperial Majesty has received it with satisfaction; and I am especially charged to convey his Imperial thanks thereon. The Sublime Porte considers that it will suffice, for the present, that two line-of-battle ships and four large steamers from each of the squadrons, English and French, should be brought near to the entrance of the Black Sea; and that, since it is really impossible for the rest of the ships to remain outside the Dardanelles during the bad season without danger, they also should take up their station, either separately or together, at some convenient and safe anchorage, within or on this side of the Straits.

I am therefore ordered by his Imperial Majesty to send directions to the Commandant of the Straits to allow both the vessels which are to come in this direction as well as those which are to remain within the Straits, to pass, and to communicate the same to your Excellency, and to your colleague the French Ambassador.

I avail, &c.  
(Signed) MUSTAPHA RESHID.

No. 188.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 31.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, October 21, 1853.*

I HAVE lost no time in giving effect to your Lordship's instructions respecting a suspension of hostilities. The difficulties are necessarily great in this advanced stage of the business; but they are surmounted, in so far as the Government is concerned, and I only hope that facts will be found as tractable as opinions. I fear, however, that it will prove otherwise in the result.

The telegraphic despatch from Vienna, announcing that the first of my two suggestions had been favourably received by the British and French Governments, reached me in the afternoon of the 18th instant. My first object was to see M. de la Cour, but I did not succeed in finding him till late, and he had not then received his telegraphic despatch, which left Belgrade before mine.

and was found, when it reached him, to contain no instruction to the purpose. His Excellency was nevertheless quite ready to act upon your Lordship's instruction to me, and we agreed to have a meeting of the Four Representatives, in order to address our united solicitations to the Porte for a suspension of hostilities. Unfortunately the Internuncio was expecting his weekly courier from Vienna, and declined a meeting before its arrival. All that I could do, therefore, in the interval was to prepare Reshid Pasha for the intended application. Early in the morning yesterday a meeting of the four took place at my house. After stating that I had received official advice of a new proposal directed to the maintenance of peace on terms approved in London and Paris, with an instruction from your Lordship to obtain, if possible, a suspension of hostilities, preparatory, as we might presume, to a fresh concerted attempt at negotiation, I proposed a joint application to the Porte in that sense. The French Ambassador and the Prussian Envoy acceded to the proposal at once. The Internuncio hesitated in a manner which wore the appearance of an unwillingness to act ostensibly with us; but finally he consented to send a verbal message to Reshid Pasha of the same purport which I had suggested. His latest instructions from Vienna were of the 10th instant, mine were two days later from London, and therefore he concluded, reasonably enough, that he might still receive instructions which would make him regret the immediate commencement of hostilities.

As soon as we had separated, I directed M. Pisani to inform Reshid Pasha of what had passed, and to interest his Highness to obtain, if possible, the assent of his colleagues to our joint advice. A Council of Ministers, with the addition of the Sheik-ul-Islam, was accordingly summoned for 5 o'clock in the afternoon, and those who attended sat in deliberation till 6 this morning.

In spite of much resistance, the point in question has been carried, and steamers are now in readiness to start for Trebizond, Batoom, and Varna, with the Porte's orders for a suspension of hostilities, as soon as the Sultan's pleasure shall have been made known. The strictest secrecy is enjoined, under an impression that the people might be dangerously excited by a knowledge of the Porte's intentions.

Your Lordship will understand how close a run it is when I state that Prince Gortchakoff's answer to the summons of Omar Pasha is considered by the Porte as that refusal to evacuate which authorises the commencement of hostilities; and, consequently, that war now actually exists between the two Empires. Add to this the undoubted fact that a steamer has been sent from Varna to the Asiatic frontier with orders to attack immediately after the close of the fifteen days, which expire on the 24th instant.

Reshid Pasha, before he went to meet his colleagues, inquired of me for how many days I proposed to defer the commencement of hostilities; what was to be done if they had already commenced; and whether the intended declaration would be communicated previously to the Porte.

I said in reply that it would be useless to suspend the commencement of hostilities for less than eleven or twelve days—the end of the month, for instance; that if hostilities had begun the Porte must do its best to prevent their continuance; and, with respect to the supposed declaration, that if adopted at all, it would probably be sent to both parties at once.

I have only to add that the delays which have hitherto postponed the commencement of hostilities originated with me; that I was unable to procure a month's delay, which I proposed, instead of fifteen days; and that I know not how to press more delay without incurring the responsibility of exposing the Porte to serious disadvantages, and an increase of danger, both from within and from without.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

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No. 189.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 31.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, October 22, 1853.*

ENCOURAGED by your telegraphic instruction through Vienna, announcing the favorable reception of the first of the two suggestions which I submitted to your Lordship in my despatch of the 28th ultimo, and anxious to enlist any chance in favour of a pacific arrangement, however difficult and all but impossible at this late hour, I determined on framing drafts of a new note and declaration according to the idea contained in that suggestion, and sending them as a forlorn hope to Her Majesty's Envoy at Vienna.

It is true that the time allowed for delaying the commencement of hostilities, if they have not already begun, is very short; and that, if the idea, approved in London and Paris, has been followed up at Vienna, the work has already, in all likelihood, assumed a definite shape. But so much being at stake, I have thought it better to risk an endeavour which may prove superfluous, than to have the mortification of thinking that a good opportunity had been lost through want of spirit at a decisive moment.

Copies of the two drafts, which I drew up yesterday, and of my covering despatch to Lord Westmorland, are inclosed herewith.

Neither the time nor the nature of the case allowed of my taking the opinion of the Turkish Ministers on the suggested course of proceeding; but I cannot anticipate any insurmountable difficulty on their part, unless the progress of events should close the avenues of peace and oblige them to persist in the prosecution of hostile measures against Russia.

They are evidently apprehensive of being embarrassed by fresh proposals from Vienna at variance with their repeated declarations; and hence, I presume, the official note, of which a translation is inclosed herewith, addressed to me and also to the French Ambassador in the course of yesterday.

I may state in conclusion, that M. de la Cour has co-operated with me in framing the draft transmitted herewith in copy.

The Austrian and Prussian Ministers confined themselves to a simple application for the suspension of hostilities.

Inclosure 1 in No. 189.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

*Therapia, October 21, 1853.*

IN pursuance of the instructions addressed to me by Lord Clarendon on the 12th instant, and transmitted by telegraph, I have solicited and obtained the Porte's consent to a brief delay in the commencement of hostilities. The accompanying translation of a note addressed to me, and also to the French Ambassador, by Reshid Pasha to-day, will apprise your Lordship of the limitations attached to that consent. In order to provide, as far as the shortness of the interval will allow, for the eventual execution of that suggestion, which is stated by the Earl of Clarendon to have been favourably received by the British and French Governments, I have framed, with the approval and assistance of M. de la Cour, a new *projet de note*, and also a form of declaration on the part of the Four Powers. The two drafts are inclosed herewith, and I place them at your Lordship's disposal, on the contingency of their being available, in the absence of any preferable arrangements, and in virtue of an understanding between the four Courts, consequent upon instructions received by your Lordship from England.

I regret that the unavoidable length of these papers will not allow of their transmission by telegraph, and that the present state of affairs between the Porte and Russia affords so slight an opening for the hope of their successful applica-

tion, especially if they were to be rendered unacceptable here by any changes at all inconsistent with the plain unquestionable substance of the Porte's modifications of the original note.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 189.

*Draft of Declaration.*

LES Cours d'Autriche, de France, de la Grande Bretagne, et de Prusse, signataires, conjointement avec le Cabinet de Russie et la Porte Ottomane, du Traité conclu en 1841, en vue de manifester solennellement leur intention de veiller au maintien de l'indépendance et de l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, ont vu avec un profond regret les pénibles différends survenus en dernier lieu entre ces deux Puissances, leurs augustes alliés. Elles ont employé avec zèle leurs bons offices les plus empressés pour amener un rapprochement amiable entre les deux Gouvernements.

Si jusqu'à présent leurs efforts n'ont pas été couronnés de succès, elles n'en sont pas moins animées du même désir de voir cesser au plutôt un état de choses qui ne peut continuer sans porter une grave atteinte aux principes rappelés plus haut, et auxquels elles veulent rester fidèles.

A cet effet, obéissant à leur conviction, et se fondant, en outre, sur les assurances qu'elles ont reçues des deux parties, et d'où il résulte que l'une d'elles n'entend demander aucune concession nouvelle, pas plus que l'autre n'a intention d'éluder aucune obligation déjà contractée, elles se sont arrêtés à la rédaction d'une nouvelle note qu'elles jugent propre à écarter tous les doutes comme à donner toutes les garanties nécessaires.

Ce projet, paraphé par leurs Représentants et annexé à la présente déclaration, est porté à la connaissance des deux Cours dont les relations diplomatiques sont en ce moment suspendues.

Les quatre Cours ci-dessus désignées y joignent l'expression de leur désir le plus ardent de le voir accepté de part et d'autre comme offrant une solution juste et honorable à la fois des questions en litige, en même temps qu'il fournit une garantie des droits de souveraineté sans affaiblir les engagements dont l'exécution est garantie à la Russie par ses Traités avec la Porte.

(Translation.

THE Courts of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia, who, in conjunction with the Cabinet of Russia and the Ottoman Porte, signed the Treaty concluded in 1841, in order solemnly to evince their intention to provide for the maintenance of the independence and of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, have seen with deep regret the painful differences which have recently arisen between those two Powers, their august allies. They have zealously employed their most energetic good offices to effect an amicable arrangement between the two Powers.

If their efforts have hitherto not been crowned with success, they are not the less desirous of witnessing, as soon as possible, the cessation of a state of things which cannot continue without grievous prejudice to the principles recorded above, and to which they are desirous of remaining faithful.

For this purpose, yielding to their conviction, and relying moreover on the assurances which they have received from the two parties, and from which it results that one of them has no intention of demanding any fresh concession, more than the other has any purpose of eluding any obligation already contracted, they have determined upon drawing up a fresh note, which they consider to be calculated to remove all doubt, as also to provide all necessary guarantees.

This draft, which has been initialled by their Representatives and annexed to the present declaration, is brought to the knowledge of the two Courts whose diplomatic relations are at this moment suspended.

The four Courts above mentioned join thereto the expression of their most

ardent desire to see it accepted by both parties, as offering a solution at once just and honourable of the questions in discussion, at the same time that it furnishes a guarantee for the rights of sovereignty without weakening the engagements, the execution of which is guaranteed to Russia by her Treaties with the Porte.

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Inclosure 3 in No. 189.

*Draft of Note.*

SA Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, ayant donné en mainte circonstance les assurances les plus amicales de sa constante bienveillance envers l'Empire Ottoman, et Sa Majesté le Sultan n'ayant, de son côté, rien de plus à cœur que de rétablir entr'elle et son auguste allié les relations de bon voisinage et de parfaite entente qui ont été malheureusement altérées par de récentes et pénibles complications, la Sublime Porte a pris soigneusement à tâche de rechercher les moyens d'effacer les traces de ce différend et de répondre ainsi au désir de la Cour Impériale de Russie.

Un iradé suprême en date de \_\_\_\_\_ a fait connaître au Soussigné la décision Impériale; il se félicite de pouvoir la communiquer au nom de la Sublime Porte à son Excellence M. le Comte de Nesselrode.

Sa Majesté le Sultan Abdul-Medjid, aujourd'hui régnant, voulant donner à Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie un témoignage personnel de son amitié la plus sincère et de son ardent désir de consolider les anciennes relations de bon voisinage et de parfaite entente entre les deux Etats, a daigné prendre en sérieuse considération les communications dont son Altesse M. le Prince de Menchikoff a été l'organe auprès de la Sublime Porte, et Sa Majesté espère que l'Empereur, son auguste ami et allié, lui saura gré de la confiance qu'il prend plaisir à lui manifester encore dans cette occasion.

Le Soussigné a reçu, en conséquence, l'ordre de faire connaître par la présente que Sa Majesté le Sultan n'est animé que du désir du rester fidèle aux stipulations du Traité de Kainardji confirmé par celui d'Andrinople, concernant le culte Chrétien et ses églises. Il est, en outre, chargé de faire connaître que Sa Majesté regarde comme étant de son honneur de maintenir à tout jamais l'Eglise orthodoxe d'Orient dans la jouissance des privilèges spirituels qui lui ont été octroyés par les augustes aïeux de Sa Majesté le Sultan, lesquels privilèges sont confirmés par elle.

C'est aussi l'intention sincère de Sa Majesté de faire participer l'Eglise Grecque d'Orient à tels autres privilèges religieux qu'il lui plairait d'accorder dorénavant à tout autre communauté quelconque de ses sujets Chrétiens, ou qui leur ont été déjà octroyés par Sa Majesté ou par ses glorieux ancêtres.

Le firman Impérial, qui vient d'être donné au patriarcat et au clergé Grecs, et qui contient la confirmation de leurs privilèges spirituels, ayant eu pour objet de donner une nouvelle preuve de ces nobles sentiments, et, en outre, la proclamation de ce firman, qui donne toute sécurité, devant faire disparaître toute crainte à l'égard du culte professé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, le Soussigné est heureux de faire la présente communication.

Quant à la garantie qu'à l'avenir il ne sera rien changé aux lieux de visitation de Jérusalem, elle résulte du firman revêtu du Hatti-humayoun du 15 de la lune de Rebi-ul-Akhir, 1268 (Février 1852), expliqué et corroboré par les firmans de \_\_\_\_\_, et l'intention formelle de Sa Majesté le Sultan est de faire exécuter sans aucune altération ses décisions souveraines.

La Sublime Porte, en outre, promet officiellement qu'il ne sera apporté aucune modification à l'état de choses sans entente préalable avec les Gouvernements de France et de Russie, et qu'il ne sera causé aucun préjudice aux différentes communautés Chrétiennes.

Pour le cas où la Cour Impériale de Russie en ferait demande, il sera assigné une localité convenable dans la ville de Jérusalem, ou dans les environs, pour la construction d'une église consacrée à la célébration du service divin par des ecclésiastiques Russes, et d'un hospice pour les pèlerins indigents ou malades de la même nation.

La Sublime Porte s'engage dès à présent à souscrire à cet égard un Acte solennel qui placerait ces fondations pieuses sous la surveillance spéciale du Consulat-Général de Russie en Syrie et en Palestine.

(Translation.)

HIS Majesty the Emperor of Russia having repeatedly given the most solemn assurances of his constant good-will towards the Ottoman Empire; and His Majesty the Sultan, having on his side nothing more at heart than to re-establish between him and his august ally the relations of good neighbourhood and perfect understanding which have unfortunately been impaired by recent and painful complications, the Sublime Porte has studiously endeavoured to discover the means of obliterating the traces of that difference, and of thus complying with the desire of the Imperial Court of Russia.

A Supreme Iradé, dated \_\_\_\_\_ has made known to the Undersigned the Imperial decision; he is happy to be able to communicate it, in the name of the Sublime Porte, to his Excellency Count Nesselrode.

His Majesty the Sultan Abdul-Medjid, now reigning, being desirous of giving to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia a personal proof of his most sincere friendship, and of his ardent desire to consolidate the ancient relations of good neighbourhood and of thorough understanding between the two States, has been pleased to take into his serious consideration the communications of which his Highness the Prince Menchikoff was the organ; and His Majesty hopes that the Emperor, his august friend and ally, will be pleased with the confidence which he takes pleasure in again manifesting towards him on this occasion.

The Undersigned has, in consequence, received orders to make known by the present note that His Majesty the Sultan has no other desire than that of remaining faithful to the stipulations of the Treaty of Kainardji, confirmed by that of Adrianople, concerning the Christian religion and its churches. He is, moreover, charged to make known that His Majesty looks upon it as a point of honour for ever to uphold the orthodox Eastern Church in the enjoyment of the spiritual privileges which have been granted to it by the august ancestors of His Majesty the Sultan, which privileges are confirmed by him.

It is likewise His Majesty's sincere intention to cause the Greek Church to share in such other privileges as it may hereafter please him to grant to any other community whatever of his Christian subjects, or which have already been granted to them by His Majesty, or by his glorious ancestors.

As the Imperial firman which has been granted to the Greek Patriarchate and clergy, and which contains the confirmation of their spiritual privileges, is designed to furnish a fresh proof of these noble sentiments; and moreover, as the proclamation of this firman, which affords all security, ought to dispel for ever all apprehension in regard to the religion professed by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, the Undersigned is happy to make the present communication.

As regards the guarantee that hereafter there shall no change be made as to the places of pilgrimage at Jerusalem, that results from the firman invested with the Hatti-humayoun of the 15th of the month of Rebi-ul-akhir (February 1852), explained and corroborated by the firmans of \_\_\_\_\_ and it is the formal intention of His Majesty the Sultan to cause his sovereign decisions to be executed without any alteration.

The Sublime Porte, moreover, officially promises that the existing state of things shall in no wise be modified without previous understanding with the Governments of France and Russia, and without any prejudice to the different Christian communities.

In case the Imperial Court of Russia should require it, a suitable spot shall be assigned in the city of Jerusalem or its neighbourhood, for the construction of a church destined for the celebration of divine service by Russian ecclesiastics, and of a hospital for the indigent or sick pilgrims of the same nation.

The Sublime Porte engages from this time to consent to a solemn Act in this respect, whereby these religious foundations shall be placed under the special superintendence of the Consulate-General of Russia in Syria and in Palestine

The Undersigned, &c.

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Inclosure 4 in No. 189.

*Reshid Pasha to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Translation.)

October 21, 1853.

WE learn from the communication now made to us that there is an idea of drawing up a new project of arrangement, and that it is desired that hostilities should be put off for the term of ten days, counting from to-day (Friday). The Sublime Porte, in deference to the counsels of her illustrious allies, consents to postpone hostilities during the term in question, and orders have been sent to the Commanders in Roumelia and Anatolia by special steamers this day.

But the war may have begun in some places before the arrival of these orders, and as in that case it will be impossible to desist, the Sublime Porte hopes that no blame will be attributed to her in this respect.

With reference to the other points, the Porte cannot consent to the introduction into the note to be given to Russia of the passage concerning the ancient solicitude of the Emperors of Russia for the maintenance of the religious privileges in the Ottoman Empire, as set forth in the corrections made in the Vienna draft of note, as well as in the note which accompanied the amended draft; nor that those privileges should be considered as deriving from the natural construction of the Treaty of Kainardji. Neither can she consent to the expression of "treaty or special disposition" concerning the participation by the professors of the Greek religion in the spiritual advantages granted to other Christian communities. The Porte, moreover, cannot consent to the passage in the note implying that the participation in question is granted at the demand of Russia.

As the assurances, stating that it is not the intention of the Russian Government to touch the independence of the Sublime Porte, or to meddle with the internal affairs, affect the dignity of the Imperial Government of Turkey, the securities and guarantee sought for must be limited only to the assurance that Russia will not make the note which is to be addressed to her a pretext for intermeddling in religious matters.

The acceptance of the new draft of note in question will depend upon the issue of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan's orders consequent upon the examination [of that draft] by the General Council, and the Ministers of the Porte cannot hold out any promises in that respect; neither can the Ministers of the Porte, in the event of the draft in question being rejected, again prolong the term [for the commencement of hostilities] already put off.

I make this communication to your Excellency as the Imperial Government considers it important that the Representatives of England and France, the sincere allies of Turkey, should be apprized beforehand of the subject of it.

No. 190.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 31.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, October 22, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith a copy of the letter addressed to Omar Pasha by Prince Gortchakoff, in reply to the summons which he had received on the 9th instant from the Turkish Commander-in-chief.

Reshid Pasha has informed me officially that the negative character of that reply constitutes, in his point of view, the beginning of war.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 190.

*Prince Gortchakoff to Omer Pasha.*

M. le Mouchir,

*Bucarest, le <sup>28 Septembre</sup><sub>10 Octobre</sub>, 1853.*

J'AI l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que j'ai reçu le 27 Septembre, à 3 heures du matin, la lettre que vous m'avez adressée en date du 26 Septembre, v. s.

Sans entrer dans l'examen de cette question, je crois devoir prévenir votre Excellence que je n'ai aucun pouvoir de Sa Majesté l'Empereur, mon maître, pour traiter de la paix, de la guerre, ou de l'évacuation des Principautés par les troupes confiées à mon commandement.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) PRINCE GORTCHAKOFF.

(Translation.)

M. le Mouchir,

*Bucharest, <sup>September 28</sup><sub>October 10</sub>, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that I received on the 27th of September, at 3 in the morning, the letter which you addressed to me on the 26th of September, o. s.

Without entering into the examination of this question, I deem it my duty to apprise your Excellency that I am not empowered by His Majesty the Emperor, my master, to treat of peace, or of war, or of the evacuation of the Principalities by the troops entrusted to my command.

Receive, &c.

(Signed) PRINCE GORTCHAKOFF.

No. 191.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 31.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, October 22, 1853.*

I WAITED upon Count Nesselrode yesterday at the Foreign Department.

His Excellency inquired if I had received a *travail*, which he understood Her Majesty's Government to have been occupied in preparing, and which he thought might have been sent to me by the messenger who arrived here on the 20th instant. I replied that I had no knowledge of this *travail*, and that I doubted its existence, inasmuch as I felt at liberty to state that if the step would prove acceptable to the Emperor's Government, your Lordship would be ready to draw up such a note, in lieu of that proposed at Vienna, and now set aside, as should guard against all ambiguities requiring explanations, and as should give to Russia all she professes to claim, and yet not expose Turkey to such an interference (*ingérence*) in her internal affairs as the Emperor declares he does not aim at.

Count Nesselrode replied that he could only repeat to me that the posture (*position*) of Russia was this: that she had no intention of resorting to aggressive measures, but should, during the winter, await the overtures for peace which might be made to her by Turkey.

To this I answered that I considered his Excellency's observation in the light of an acceptance of the offer on the part of your Lordship; that it mattered little whether overtures were made by Turkey or on the part of Turkey; and that here was a direct proposition to an instrument which might be the means of restoring peace to the two countries, and of averting evils the amount of which no one could calculate.

Count Nesselrode assented to this, observing, however, that it was hardly necessary to remark that the consideration of the *projet de note* to be proposed by your Lordship did not pledge the Russian Government to its acceptance; that the Emperor's interests and dignity could not be overlooked; and that it

must be remembered that all the interference of the English Government had hitherto been employed in supporting the views of Turkey.

Turkey, his Excellency continued, still owes us a reparation ; that indeed Her Majesty's Government itself admitted. I replied that if I understood the allusion, his Excellency was now adverting to the holy places ; that certainly Russia had possessed a claim to obtaining a full acknowledgment of her rights at Jerusalem, a security against their being called in question afresh ; but that the whole difference between us had from the commencement of the affair been this, that an undue extension had been sought upon a particular point.

But, said Count Nesselrode, you must not forget that we are at war with Turkey. She has declared war against us, and a state of war can only be put an end to by a Treaty ; to obtain a Treaty, Plenipotentiaries must be named on both sides, negotiations entered upon, and engagements taken directly by the two parties.

This, I rejoined, does not appear to me to alter the case ; preliminaries precede the signature of a Treaty, if that be requisite. Well, the Earl of Clarendon's note would be a preliminary, and might be followed by a final arrangement.

Count Nesselrode expressed his assent, saying, that if your Lordship's note should be such as the Emperor would feel at liberty to accept, it might serve as a basis of negotiation.

I then spoke of the extreme moderation of the measures which had accompanied the Porte's declaration of war, as indicative of the Sultan's wish to renew amicable relations with Russia. To these observations his Excellency did not make much reply.

#### No. 192.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 31.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, October 30, 1853, 11 P.M.*

COUNT BUOL, after a deliberate examination of the proposition of Lord Clarendon, and of the documents which accompany it, has begged us to inform our Governments, by telegraph, that he suspends his judgment and all action upon it, until a reply be received to the project presented by him at the Conference of the 25th ; but, as a first step, he submits to our Cabinets the following considerations.

The project of the 25th is based upon an overture of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, and therein lies one of the chances of its acceptance. In the two English projects of note the word " pacification " is not used, and no mention is made of the evacuation of the Principalities ; finally, the hostilities which have commenced at Isaktcha necessitate a diplomatic Convention, although the religious questions may be settled by some other sort of document. Count Buol renders full justice to the intentions of the Cabinet. He in no wise rejects the fundamental ideas of the proposition. He thinks only that they should be assimilated to the present situation of affairs, the more certainly to secure their success ; and he questions whether the Turkish note (the mode of communicating which to St. Petersburg is not indicated) would not with greater propriety be addressed by the Porte to the Four Powers, who would present it as a basis of preliminaries to Russia. I insisted strenuously upon the complete and immediate acceptation of your Lordship's proposed note, and in this I was supported by Baron Bourqueney, but we could not refuse to inform our Governments of the objections which I have above indicated. Count Arnim being instructed to transmit orders to the Prussian Minister at Constantinople in the case only of the Three Powers being agreed, has thought it necessary to demand fresh instructions from his Government. I have announced this delay by telegraph through M. Fonblanque to Lord Stratford, with whom it rests to decide whether or no he will await the ulterior decisions of the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin.

## No. 193.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 1.)*

(Télégraphique.)

*Vienne, le 31 Octobre, 1853.*

LE Commandant de la forteresse de Temesvar écrit au Gouvernement en date d'aujourd'hui que le 27 du mois courant 3,000 hommes d'infanterie de l'armée d'Omar Pasha et 400 de cavalerie ont passé le Danube à Kalafat, et marchaient sur Badouven. Beaucoup d'autres troupes continuaient à passer la rivière sur barques. Les Russes s'avançaient sur le même point, on croyait à une rencontre, le 28.

(Translation.)

*Vienna, October 31, 1853.*

THE Commander of the fortress of Temesvar writes to the Government, under this day's date, that on the 27th instant 3000 infantry and 400 cavalry of Omar Pasha's army crossed the Danube at Kalafat, and marched on Badouven. Many other troops continued to pass the river in boats. The Russians advanced on the same point, and an engagement was expected on the 28th.

## No. 194.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Wyse.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, November 1, 1853.*

WITH reference to your despatch of the 7th ultimo, respecting the movements of troops towards the frontiers, and the unsatisfactory language of M. Paicos upon the subject, I have to inform you that reports from various quarters have reached Her Majesty's Government, which leave little room for doubt that the Greek Government, instead of endeavouring to allay excitement, are encouraging the hostile feeling displayed in Greece towards Turkey.

I have accordingly to instruct you to inform M. Paicos, that Her Majesty's Government cannot too strongly express their disapprobation of the unfriendly and unjustifiable course adopted at this moment by the Greek Government towards a neighbour and an ally; and you will further say, that Her Majesty's Government are entitled to demand that energetic measures shall be forthwith taken to prevent all acts of aggression upon the Turkish territory, and to maintain tranquillity on the frontier.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

## No. 195.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, November 1, 1853.*

HER Majesty's Government entirely approve the course taken by your Excellency on the receipt of the Sultan's invitation to the British and French squadrons to enter the Dardanelles, as reported in your Excellency's despatch of the 15th ultimo.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 196.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, November 1, 1853.*

I HAVE to state to you that Her Majesty's Government approve of the communications which you addressed to Vice-Admiral Dundas respecting the entrance of the squadrons into the Dardanelles, of which copies are inclosed in your Excellency's despatch of the 21st ultimo.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 197.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, November 1, 1853.*

I HAVE to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve of the language which you held to the Sultan at the audience you had of His Imperial Majesty on the 17th ultimo, as reported in your despatch of the same date.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 198.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, November 1, 1853.*

WITH reference to your despatch of the 22nd ultimo, I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held to Count Nesselrodé with respect to further steps for the arrangement of the Eastern question, in your conversation with his Excellency on the 21st ultimo.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 199.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, November 2, 1853.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 28th ultimo, reporting your communication to Baron Manteuffel of the drafts of notes inclosed in my despatch of the 25th ultimo, I have to observe that Her Majesty's Government learn with much satisfaction that Baron Manteuffel approves of the notes, and will instruct the Prussian Minister at Constantinople to support them.

It appears, however, that a note and declaration has been forwarded by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vienna of a character similar to those which your Lordship has lately communicated to Baron Manteuffel, and as it must be inferred that the assent of the Porte to that note has been secured, and that it will not be framed in a manner unacceptable to Russia, Her Majesty's Govern-

ment would in that case strongly recommend its adoption in preference to any other mode of arrangement, as much delay and some obvious difficulties would be thereby avoided.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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## No. 200.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

Foreign Office, November 2, 1853.

COUNT COLLOREDO has read to me a despatch from Count Buol to the Austrian Minister at Athens instructing him to advise the Greek Government to repress excitement and to avoid giving any cause for alarm or complaint to Turkey at this moment.

I requested Count Colloredo to convey to Count Buol the thanks of Her Majesty's Government for this communication, which was very satisfactory, as there was reason to fear that the Greek Government stood in need of such advice, and I further informed Count Colloredo that similar instructions had been addressed by me to Mr. Wyse.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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## No. 201.

*Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 2.)*

My Lord,

Berlin, October 30, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I forwarded last night, the 29th October, at 12 $\frac{1}{4}$ , a telegraphic message to the Earl of Westmorland, in the following words :

“Le Gouvernement Prussien adhère entièrement aux projets d'arrangement proposés par Lord Clarendon. Des instructions dans ce sens sont envoyées au Comte Arnim. Baron Wildenbruch recevra l'ordre d'appuyer Lord Stratford.”\*

I have, &c.  
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

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## No. 202.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 4.)*

My Lord,

Vienna, October 30, 1853.

I WAITED upon Count Buol yesterday immediately after the receipt of your Lordship's instructions of the 25th instant, and informed him that I had to lay before him a proposal, which your Lordship considered to be the last effort that could be made, with any chance of success, to effect an arrangement between Russia and the Porte before the calamities of war should actually commence, and of which you most anxiously desired the approval of Count Buol ; and I also stated that the greatest anxiety was felt by Her Majesty's Government for the cooperation of Austria and the success of the present proposal. Count Buol replied, that he could not fail to be favourably impressed towards any proposition so recommended, and he awaited its communication. I read to him first your Lordship's despatch of the 25th, with the tenor of which he was entirely satisfied ; and I then placed in his hands the copies of the two projected notes, the one for the signature of the four Representatives, and the other for the acceptance of the Porte. Count Buol said he looked upon these documents as

“The Prussian Government adheres entirely to the drafts of arrangement proposed by Lord Clarendon. Instructions in this sense are sent to Count Arnim. Baron Wildenbruch will be instructed to support Lord Stratford.”

of so much importance that he should desire to consider them with attention ; and he thought as the French Government was already a party to them, and as Prussia was invited as well as Austria to become so, that they should be taken into consideration by the four in common. He therefore proposed that I should meet my colleagues with him at an early hour on this the following day ; and in the meantime he requested that the two notes might be left with him. I consented to this request ; and I pointed out to Count Buol that I considered these notes to be in every way calculated to meet with his approbation : first, because they fulfilled the great object the Four Powers had always had in view, that of guarding against any act or declaration which might be derogatory to the honour and independence of the Sultan, or which might leave unsatisfied any of those rights and pretensions which were secured to the Emperor of Russia by Treaty, or which His Majesty declared that he required.

I remarked also that, taking into consideration the statement which Count Buol had lately made of his own views as to the propositions to be made to the Porte, I conceived that the notes now proposed fulfilled his intentions ; and I particularly called his attention to the adoption of the modified Vienna note in all its essential points, and the omission of any claim to the future grant of rights to the Greek population of such privileges as the Sultan might at any time in future accord to religious communities not subjects of the Turkish Empire.

I left the documents in Count Buol's hands, and this morning I returned to his house, and met there Baron Bourqueney and Count Arnim. Count Buol read to us two projects of note, and then stated what I have already shortly reported to your Lordship in my telegraphic despatch of this day. He felt convinced that since the declaration of war had been made, and particularly since the unfortunate commencement of hostilities which had taken place at Isaktcha, it would be impossible to hope that the former relations existing between the two Governments could be restored by a note of the nature of that now proposed. He felt at a loss to understand in what way that note was to be communicated from the Porte to the Russian Government. It had formerly been proposed to send an Ambassador, but this seems to him to be no longer contemplated : no other form of transmission had been pointed out. The note did not call upon the Emperor for the evacuation of the Provinces, which was most essential for the restoration of peace, nor did it make any mention of the mode in which this restoration was to be effected. He therefore thought that the purport of the note proposed for the signature of Reshid Pasha, should rather be addressed to the Representatives of the Four Powers, who might present it to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg as a basis upon which the preliminaries of peace might be established.

I replied that the intense interest which was felt by my Government for the adoption of the present project by the Four Powers imposed upon me the duty of urging to the utmost its immediate adoption, and I repeated that it was considered by Her Majesty's Government as the last chance of averting the commencement of hostilities, the cessation of which it was impossible to foresee. I added that the project had, with the assent of the French Government, been already transmitted to Constantinople, where it would, even without the support of the other Powers, be submitted, and urged upon the Porte in the strongest manner ; and if it should not be accepted, the want of success might be attributed to the absence of such support. The note contained nothing which the Turkish Government ought to object to, and it granted to Russia all that Government professed to claim. It was proposed first to the Turkish Government, in order that the reasonable desire of the Emperor Nicholas should be fulfilled, that no proposal should be submitted to him, as the former one had been, with the risk of being after his acceptance refused by the Porte. In the instruction sent to Lord Stratford, although he had been authorized within certain limits to consent to some modifications which the Government of the Sultan might propose, they were to be confined to such as the Representatives of the Four Powers would approve, and which would not be objectionable to the Emperor of Russia, and it was not believed, therefore, that His Imperial Majesty would refuse to receive such a document, when he should be aware that the peace of Europe depended upon it, the great object being to obtain something from the Porte which might suspend hostilities and give a chance of peace ; and I stated that Her Majesty's Government could not give a greater proof of their deep anxiety upon

this subject than by the effort they now made for the attainment of success. I also remarked, that I had every reason to believe that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg was aware that Her Majesty's Government was engaged in drawing up a project of the nature of the one now proposed, and that they did not show disfavour to the idea; and concluded by saying that the notes before us having been framed with an anxious regard to the dignity and independence of both parties concerned, and being about to be offered to the Sultan with urgent recommendation of all the influence Her Majesty's Government might justly aspire to, I hoped I might not ask in vain for the cooperation in this honourable effort of the Government which had hitherto acted in such cordial alliance with us.

Count Buol assured me that he fully participated in the anxiety which I felt for the continued and cordial union of the Four Powers, and he felt all the advantage of the adoption at the present moment of any course which might hold out a chance of averting the continuance of that state of hostilities which, from the recent accounts of the events at Isaktcha, we now know to have commenced. It was not, therefore, from any want of the most cordial adhesion to the feelings and intentions expressed by Her Majesty's Government that he felt obliged to demur to the immediate adoption of the present proposals, but from the sincere belief that they are not applicable, without some alteration, to the actual posture of affairs, which had assumed a new aspect with which your Lordship was unacquainted when you drew up the notes. He felt convinced, from the tenor of Count Nesselrode's despatch of the 17th instant, that the state of war declared by the Porte could not be put an end to without the intervention of Plenipotentiaries or some diplomatic act, and therefore it would be risking loss of time and of that weight with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg which we possessed, if we proposed a simple note from Reshid Pasha to Count Nesselrode as a sufficient engagement upon which the Emperor of Russia would be satisfied to rest the re-establishment of peace. He earnestly appealed to me, and to the Representatives, to bring before our Governments the remarks he had made, and he should await the answers of our respective Cabinets. Count Arnim stated, that he had been instructed by his Government to support the proposition of your Lordship, and to forward orders to the Prussian Minister at Constantinople to give his best assistance towards carrying it into effect, provided it was agreed to by the other Powers; but such condition not being actually fulfilled, he should refer the statement of Count Buol for the consideration of his Government.

M. de Bourqueney, after supporting with energy the appeal I had made for the immediate assent of the four Governments to the proposal of Her Majesty's Government, consented also to refer the statement of Count Buol, as well as his reasons for the delay which he desired and the modifications he proposed, for the consideration of his Government; and in conformity with the decision of these Ministers I felt myself obliged to adopt the course they had determined upon, and I transmitted immediately a telegraphic despatch to be forwarded from Belgrade to Lord Stratford, as I have already informed your Lordship, by which I announced to him the delay which would take place in the instructions to be given to the Austrian and Prussian Ministers at Constantinople, so that he may exercise his own judgment as to the steps he will take on the arrival of your Lordship's despatches by the "Fury."

I detained the messenger Poignand, in hopes of receiving without delay your Lordship's further orders.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 203.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 4.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, November 3, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS stated to me yesterday that he had on the previous day received a communication from M. de Hübner which, he had been informed, would be equally made to your Lordship through Count Colloredo.

The substance of it was that Austria had been commissioned by the Russian Government to state that the declaration of war on the part of the Turkish Government had not altered the pacific intentions of the Emperor Nicholas; that His Majesty was still ready to settle his differences with Turkey by means of negotiation; and that a Turkish Plenipotentiary presenting himself at the Russian head-quarters in the Principalities would be met by a Russian Plenipotentiary, when a Convention, having for its object the settlement of those differences, might be discussed between them. M. de Hübner was desired to express the readiness of the Austrian Government to make this proposition to the Porte, and the support of the French Ambassador at Constantinople was asked for.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys continues ready to support the project of note sent by your Lordship on the 25th ultimo to Constantinople.

No. 204.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 6.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, November 5, 1853.*

I HAVE just seen M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the subject of the proposition lately made from Vienna, and have learnt from him the course which the French Government has the intention to pursue. M. de Lhuys informed me that he was much pressed by the Austrian Envoy for an answer, and that the language which he held to M. de Hübner, and the reply which he proposed sending through M. de Bourqueney to the Austrian Government, were to the following purport:

The French Government could not accept the proposition as placed before them by Count Buol; that is, they could not advise the Porte to send a Plenipotentiary to meet a Plenipotentiary from Russia, for the purpose of negotiating a Treaty of Peace, wherein would be comprised the several points which until now it had been proposed to settle by a note. There were three reasons why France could not offer this advice:

First, it did not require the incitement of any other Power to enable the Porte to enter into direct negotiation with Russia.

Secondly, it was next to a certainty that any advice of the kind would be refused at Constantinople.

Thirdly, such advice would, if accepted, convert a question which the Four Powers had been unanimous in considering of European interest, into one that was to be solved by a private understanding between Russia and the Porte.

The opinion of the French Government was that the negotiation which had been commenced at your Lordship's suggestion, should be pursued; that the Conference of Vienna, or one to be established elsewhere, if it was thought preferable, should in a joint or identic note recommend to the Russian Government and to the Porte the project of note which your Lordship had recently drawn up and sent to the three Courts for their approval, or the project of note drawn up by Lord Stratford. If the two parties agreed to this solution of their quarrel, it should then be proposed to them to send each a Plenipotentiary to some neutral place, where under the auspices of the Four Powers they might negotiate a short Treaty, renewing those which had existed between Russia and the Porte previous to the late declaration of war by the latter Power, and in which, if thought advisable, the evacuation of the Principalities might be recorded.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

## No. 205.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 7.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, October 27, 1853.*

THE disposition of the Russian forces, according to an account which your Lordship may rely upon, is as follows—

The 4th corps, composed of four divisions under the orders of Prince Gortchakoff and General Dannenberg, are quartered at and about Bucharest. This force hardly exceeds 60,000, comprising detached bodies of troops engaged in guarding the line of the Danube some 200 leagues in extent, from Widdin to Ismail.

The three points of the Danube which are the most closely observed, as those at which the passage of a Turkish army is the most to be apprehended, are Widdin, Nicopoli, and Silistria.

Prince Gortchakoff's reserves, formed of the 3rd corps of 60,000 men, under the command of General Baron Osten-Sacken, are in cantonments between Kieff and the Pruth.

The 5th corps, 60,000 strong, under General Lüders, are quartered about Odessa and in Bessarabia; it was the 3rd division of this corps which was lately disembarked at Soucoum Kalé.

The 6th corps, another body of 60,000 men, are at present quartered at Moscow.

Two corps of cavalry of the reserve remain among their colonies at Krumenshuk and Kharkoff.

The 2nd corps, commanded by General Paniutine, is stationed in Poland.

The 1st corps, under the orders of General Sievers, occupies the Baltic Provinces and Lithuania.

The Corps de la Garde, and that of the Grenadiers, each of 40,000 men (being still "sur le pied de paix"), are quartered in the capital, at Novogorod and Narva.

The corps of the Caucasus, with its reserve division stationed at Taganrog, forms a force of 80,000 men.

The troops in Mingrelia under the command of General Béboutoff, which are destined to operate in Asia Minor, amount at present to 25,000 men. This force, however, can at any time be reinforced by detachments from the army of Prince Woronzow.

I will only observe that the above statements, although meagre and incomplete, are, as far as they go, worthy of confidence.

As yet I have been unable to obtain any return of the number of Cossacks in the Principalities and in Asia.

## No. 206.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 7.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, October 29, 1853.*

AFTER some days of reflection I made up my mind to apprise the Chancellor, on the 27th instant, of the orders which have been issued to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, and to the Admiral of Her Majesty's fleet in the Bosphorus, respecting the opposition to be made to the landing of Russian troops upon the Turkish territory.

I explained to his Excellency the cases in which no molestation would be offered to Russian ships; and again, those in which an attempt to violate the Turkish territory would be forcibly repelled (*la force sera repoussée par la force*). Count Nesselrode admitted that he had knowledge, through the Russian Mission in London, of the resolution of which I spoke, but was not aware of the resolution having already given rise to orders being sent to Her Majesty's diplomatic and naval servants.

Count Nesselrode having adverted to the inconsistency of Her Majesty's Government in acting as it is now doing, after having admitted that the Porte

had no *casus belli* against Russia, I replied that neither Her Majesty's Government nor I believed any other had made such an admission; that what was true was that, from conciliatory motives and in the interest both of Turkey and Europe, Her Majesty's Government had recommended that the *casus belli* should not be acted upon—should not give rise to war; but that as to the real nature of the Russian act, no difference of opinion could possibly exist.

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No. 207.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 7.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, October 29, 1853.*

IN the conversation which I held with the Chancellor on the 27th instant, he remarked that all the difficulties which at present existed had arisen from the conduct of the English Cabinet; that if England had had the grievances of which Russia had to complain, redress would have been sought in a very different manner from that pursued by the Imperial Government in its demands upon Turkey; that after the admission by England of a reparation being due to Russia, it appeared as if that admission were now withdrawn; that if England had insisted as she ought to have done at Constantinople, the Porte would long ago have given way, and the Vienna note would have been signed; that England, in fact, was solely to blame for the complications of the moment, and for those disastrous consequences to which they were likely to lead; and that the conduct now pursued was an unworthy return for the proofs of friendship which had been given to England by His Imperial Majesty.

To this I replied that I must be allowed to remark that, far from this statement being admissible, it was to the Russian Government, and to them alone, that all the difficulties which beset us were to be ascribed; that on the 8th of January last I had distinctly warned him of what would be the consequences of a gathering together of troops on the Turkish frontier; that naturally those consequences, so easily to be foreseen, had been aggravated by the Russian forces being poured into the Principalities; that as for Her Majesty's Government, all that could be reproached to them was an enduring patience, and an absolute confidence in the assurances given by Russia, which had laid them open to much suspicion and reproach in England, and to which the worst return had been made, first, by the event proving that the confidence had been misplaced, and secondly, by the reproaches now cast upon them.

With regard to the reparation acknowledged to be the due of Russia, I begged once again to repeat that all that was known by Her Majesty's Government or myself as to the views of Russia in her dispute with Turkey related to the holy places; that consequently, all that had been admitted by Her Majesty's Government applied to that sole subject; that Russia had no more right to make war upon Turkey for withholding a political privilege, than England would have if she went to war upon being refused any commercial advantage for which she might apply to a foreign Government.

The Vienna note, I proceeded to say, after being withdrawn, appears to be buried (*enterrée*). Meanwhile the dispute between Russia and Turkey continues, and is aggravated by an unfortunate declaration of war; Her Majesty's Government, still bent upon peaceable measures, offer to draw up a fresh note, and if I understand your Excellency aright, this note you are ready to take into consideration.

In this plain statement of facts Count Nesselrode concurred, only cautioning me not to expect that anything approaching to assent could be given to a note the terms of which were unknown to him, and again remarking upon the necessity of providing that no expression, and, as I believe he said, no omission, should indicate a wish to lower the Emperor's position.

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No. 208.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 7.)*

My Lord,

Vienna, November 1, 1853.

UPON the receipt of Lord Stratford's despatch of the 21st October, which had been announced to me by telegraph, I waited upon Count Buol, and after communicating to him the project of notes by which these despatches were accompanied, as well as the despatch addressed to me by Lord Stratford, I pressed Count Buol, with the same anxiety and the same arguments as I used on Sunday with respect to your Lordship's project, not to reject this last attempt of Lord Stratford's at reconciliation between Russia and the Porte; and I remarked to him that your Lordship strongly recommended this project, and I read to him the passage in your Lordship's telegraphic despatch which I had just received, and which stated "if any other note arrives from Lord Stratford to which the Porte has already agreed, we hope it will be favourably received at Vienna."

Count Buol, after taking cognizance of these documents, remarked that hostilities had already commenced on the Danube, although the period announced by Lord Stratford for the suspension expired on this day only. The Turkish forces had now advanced across the Danube, and a collision with the Russian forces was immediately expected. Under such an unfortunate state of things, it appeared to him impossible to entertain a hope that a note from the Foreign Minister of Turkey to Count Nesselrode (however well adapted to a period of peace, or even to one which preceded the commencement of hostilities, and which would have been destined to prevent them) could be expected to be received as a document calculated to re-establish those relations of friendly intercourse between the two nations which had been so violently set aside. With respect to the general tenor of the assurances given in these documents, Count Buol looked upon them as so nearly identical with those proposed by your Lordship, that he should have no hesitation in adopting them generally as the basis of a preliminary proposition for the re-establishment of peace: it was therefore the form of the present proposal, under the present circumstances, which prevented him from adhering to the project, a decision which rested upon the same grounds which he had already stated as regarding your Lordship's project, and which he hoped would be considered by you as well founded and conclusive.

I replied to Count Buol by restating the arguments which I have reported to your Lordship in my despatch of the 30th ultimo; and although I admitted that both the proposal of your Lordship and that of Lord Stratford had been drawn up when it was hoped that hostilities would have been averted, yet I could not but think that their adoption by the Porte would have proved of the greatest value towards the re-establishment of peace.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

P.S.—Count Arnim has just informed me that his suspension of the instructions destined for M. de Wildenbruch has been approved by his Government.

W.

No. 209.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 7.)*

(Télégraphique.)

Le 6 Novembre, 1853, 6 P.M.

LE COMTE BUOL regarde comme urgent la rédaction en conférence d'une note qui serait remise à Constantinople.

L'Autriche ayant interrogé la Russie sur la nouvelle position, la Russie a répondu qu'elle est prête à traiter. La note exprimerait le regret des Quatre Cours en voyant la guerre succéder aux négociations. Elle rappellerait le préambule du Traité de 1841. Elle recapitulerait les assurances données à

Olmütz, et exprimerait la conviction que la Porte serait toujours fidèle à ses engagements antérieurs. Elle inviterait la Porte à traiter et lui demanderait d'indiquer sous quelles formes et conditions.

La note terminerait avec la demande d'un armistice.

Le Comte Buol désire ardemment que la Conférence de Vienne soit autorisée à rédiger la note et à l'expédier à Constantinople avec des instructions des Cours pour leurs Représentants dans le sens de cette démarche.

(Translation.)

*November 6, 1853, 6 P.M.*

COUNT BUOL considers it important that a note should be drawn up in conference for transmission to Constantinople.

Austria having questioned Russia in regard to the new position of affairs, Russia has replied that she was ready to treat. The note should express the regret of the Four Courts at seeing the negotiations succeeded by war. It should cite the preamble of the Treaty of 1841. It should recapitulate the assurances given at Olmütz, and express the conviction that the Porte would continue faithful to its previous engagements. It should invite the Porte to treat, and ask it to state under what forms and conditions.

The note should end by requiring an armistice.

Count Buol earnestly desires that the Conference of Vienna should be authorized to draw up the note and despatch it to Constantinople, with instructions from the Courts to their Representatives in the sense of this proposal.

No. 210.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, November 7, 1853.*

YOUR despatch of the 6th has been received.

The terms of the note, generally, are approved; but we cannot agree to the note without seeing it. Send it as soon as possible.

No. 211.

*Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 7.)*

(Extract.)

*Berlin, November 4, 1853.*

I HAD an interview with Baron Manteuffel this evening, and expressed to him the satisfaction with which Her Majesty's Government had learnt that the project of note to which by your Lordship's instructions I had invited the adhesion of the Prussian Government, had been approved by His Prussian Majesty.

On this occasion I communicated to Baron Manteuffel, in the spirit of your Lordship's despatch to me of the 2nd instant, the draft of the project which had been framed by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and of which copies are forwarded to your Lordship from the Earl of Westmorland by this messenger.

I informed his Excellency that the substance and terms of Lord Stratford's project were almost identical with that proposed by your Lordship, and that on submitting them to His Majesty it would be advisable to propose that instructions should be sent to Baron Wildenbruch, at Constantinople, to support Lord Stratford in urging on the Porte the adoption of either of the two projects.

No. 212.

*Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 7.)*

My Lord,

Berlin, November 4, 1853.

IN the course of a conversation with Baron Manteuffel this evening, I referred to the anxiety caused by certain movements in Greece on the Turkish frontier. His Excellency informed me that on the invitation of the Austrian Cabinet, he had instructed M. de Thile, the Prussian Minister at Athens, to advise the Government of His Hellenic Majesty to act with great prudence and caution with respect to Turkey, and carefully to abstain, under present circumstances, from giving any umbrage or cause of complaint to their neighbour and ally.

I told his Excellency that I should have much satisfaction in reporting this circumstance to your Lordship.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 213.

*Circular to Her Majesty's Missions abroad.*

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 7, 1853.

IN my circular despatch of the 13th of June last I informed you of the views of Her Majesty's Government with respect to the rupture of diplomatic relations between Russia and the Ottoman Porte, which had then recently occurred.

You were informed, that although Her Majesty's Government could not conceal from themselves the gravity of this occurrence, and had thought it necessary in consequence to order the British fleet to approach the Dardanelles, they still hoped that an amicable solution might be found of the existing differences between Russia and the Porte. That hope, I regret to say, has not yet been realized. On the contrary, affairs have assumed a still graver character by the declaration of war by the Porte, and the actual commencement of hostilities.

I shall proceed, therefore, briefly to notice the events which have led to this lamentable result; and to acquaint you with the views of Her Majesty's Government thereupon.

The demands made by Prince Menchikoff, and upon the rejection of which he retired from Constantinople, were repeated by Count Nesselrode in a letter addressed by him to the Ottoman Minister, with the threat that if, within a specified period of eight days, they should not be accepted *sans variante* by the Porte, the Russian troops would occupy the Turkish provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia.

This renewed demand was met by the Porte with the same temperate but firm refusal as before; and, accordingly, the Russian troops crossed the Pruth and occupied the Principalities. At the same time a manifesto appeared in the "St. Petersburg Journal," in which the Emperor of Russia disclaimed the intention of making war, or of extending his territory; and declared that he should hold the Principalities simply as a guarantee for the recovery of the rights withheld from him by the Porte.

Thus the Court of St. Petersburg proposed, under the name of peace, to obtain all the advantages of war. But it is scarcely necessary to point out to you, that from the moment that the first Russian soldier crossed the Pruth, as far as Russia was concerned, a state of war had virtually commenced. Nor is this the less true because actual hostilities were deferred, and the chances of an amicable arrangement prolonged, by the Porte, with the advice of her allies, abstaining at that time from issuing, as she had a perfect right to do, a formal declaration of war.

Meantime, with a view to take advantage of the opportunity thus afforded for preserving peace, a Conference of the Representatives of the Four Powers

was established at Vienna, and a note was drawn up by them, which was unanimously recommended by the Four Powers to the Sultan for his adoption, in the belief that, whilst it would prove acceptable to the Emperor of Russia, it fully guarded the honour and independence of the Sultan.

These expectations were, however, frustrated. The Emperor of Russia, indeed, declared his willingness to accept the note, and engaged, upon its transmission, without alterations, to St. Petersburg by the Porte, to withdraw his troops from the Turkish territory. But the Porte insisted upon certain modifications of it as essential, in its opinion, to the maintenance of the rights and authority of the Sultan. These modifications could not be considered by Her Majesty's Government as in themselves objectionable, but they appeared to them unnecessary, as they seemed merely to interpret the note in the sense intended by the Four Powers; and they accordingly joined in recommending the Cabinet of St. Petersburg to adopt the modifications. The Emperor of Russia, however, declined to accept the note thus modified; and Count Nesselrode entered at length into an analysis of the modifications, copy of which is herewith annexed, together with a copy of a despatch addressed by me, in consequence, to Sir Hamilton Seymour.\*

The Four Powers, in recommending the note framed at Vienna to the adoption of the Porte, acted upon the assurances repeatedly given by the Emperor of Russia, that he sought no new concessions or rights in Turkey, but only the maintenance of existing Treaties and of the *status quo* in religious matters, and the true meaning of that note, the only meaning, as they believed, which could be attached to it, was in conformity with this principle; but the reasons put forward by Count Nesselrode for rejecting the Turkish modifications, showed that he placed a different interpretation upon the original note, and thus, to a great extent, justified the fears of the Porte as to the pretensions which Russia would hereafter found upon it; and Her Majesty's Government therefore felt that, under these circumstances, it would not be just or honourable to continue to urge upon the Sultan the acceptance of the note.

The presence soon afterwards of the Emperor of Russia at Olmütz afforded Her Majesty's Government a fresh opportunity of ascertaining, through Her Majesty's Minister at the Court of Vienna, whether the Emperor was still willing to accede to an arrangement, if such could be found, by which the differences of Russia with the Porte might be amicably terminated; and they received, through the Earl of Westmorland, the most positive and formal assurances that the Emperor sought no new right—no further extension of power in Turkey; and that he looked for nothing but the maintenance of Treaties, and the *status quo* in religious matters.

In the meanwhile, however, the successive events which had taken place,—the invasion of the Principalities,—the orders issued by the Russian authorities to the Hospodars to break off their official intercourse with the Porte, and to withhold the tribute due from them to their Sovereign,—the consequent recall of the Hospodars by the Porte,—the extensive preparations of war carried on by the Ottoman Government, and the passing of large bodies of troops towards the Danube,—had roused the minds of the population of Constantinople to such a pitch of excitement, that the French and English Ambassadors thought it advisable to call up from the fleets at Besika Bay four war-steamers to protect the subjects of their respective States, and, if necessary, to afford protection to the Sultan.

The conduct of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe in taking this step was, under the circumstances, entirely approved by Her Majesty's Government; and although these apprehensions have now ceased, the whole of the fleets have subsequently, at the request of the Porte, entered the Dardanelles to support, by their presence, the Ottoman Government.

It is scarcely necessary to add, that although no formal declaration of war had been made by the Porte when the four steamers entered the Dardanelles, their entry constituted no infraction of the Treaty of 1841; for, as I have already pointed out, the Porte had ceased to be in a state of peace, and the Treaty had been virtually suspended from the moment that the Russian troops invaded the Principalities.

The rejection by the Emperor of Russia of the Turkish modifications of the Vienna note rendered it necessary in the opinion of the Porte to put an end

to the system of forbearance which she had hitherto pursued, and to have recourse to more decisive measures; and after a solemn deliberation it was unanimously resolved in the Grand Council of the Sultan that war should be declared against Russia. The advice was adopted by the Sultan and his Government; and Omar Pasha, the General commanding the Turkish forces on the Danube, was directed to summon Prince Gortchakoff to evacuate the Principalities within fifteen days.

Although Her Majesty's Government made every allowance for the great difficulties by which the Sultan was surrounded, and it was fully admitted that a declaration of war was amply justified by the Russian invasion of the Principalities, yet Her Majesty's Government could not but regret that this step had been taken by the Porte whilst attempts at negotiation were not yet wholly abandoned, but her allies were still endeavouring to bring her differences with Russia to a peaceful and honourable termination; and Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople was instructed to use every effort to induce the Porte to suspend hostilities, in order to give time for a further effort for the re-establishment of peace.

The result of these efforts, made in concert with the Representatives of the other three Powers, was successful, and the Porte was induced to suspend the commencement of hostilities for a short time in order to allow a fresh proposal for an arrangement with Russia to be submitted to her by her allies; but from some unexplained cause, either that the orders of the Porte were disregarded, or that Omar Pasha, not having received these orders, regarded the negative answer of Prince Gortchakoff as the signal for hostilities, by the latest accounts hostilities appear to have actually commenced.

Such is a brief sketch of the present state of affairs, and of the events which have led to it.

Throughout these arduous negotiations there has happily existed between the British and French Governments the most complete concert and agreement both of opinion and action. They look upon the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire as a great feature of European policy; and whilst they have left and will leave no means untried which may hold out the prospect of saving the Porte by a pacific arrangement from the dangers by which she is menaced, and Europe from the calamities of war—and they do not even now despair of such an arrangement being found—they are at the same time resolutely determined to uphold the independence of the Sultan and the integrity of his Empire.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 214.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, November 8, 1853.*

I HAVE received your despatch of the 29th ultimo, in which you report your communications with Count Nesselrode on the subject of the instructions laid down for the guidance of the Admiral of Her Majesty's fleet in the Dardanelles.

I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government approve your proceedings in this matter, and the language which you held to Count Nesselrode. But with respect to that passage in your despatch in which you report that Count Nesselrode spoke of the "inconsistency of Her Majesty's Government in acting as it is now doing, after having admitted that the Porte had no *casus belli* against Russia," I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government have learnt with surprise this statement on the part of his Excellency, the reverse having been always declared by Her Majesty's Government, as there could be no doubt that the occupation of the Principalities was an act of flagrant hostility, which the Sultan was entitled to resist by force.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 215.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.)

*Foreign Office, November 8, 1853.*

THE drafts of note and declaration inclosed in your Excellency's despatch of the 22nd ultimo, as well as the reasons which induced your Excellency to frame them, have been entirely approved by Her Majesty's Government.

We learnt by telegraph from Belgrade that that note and declaration were on their way to Vienna. We felt sure that in spirit they must be the same, and that in form they could not be essentially different from those which were inclosed to your Excellency in my despatch of the 24th ultimo; and Her Majesty's Government therefore, in order to avoid delay, did not hesitate to recommend to the Governments of Austria and Prussia that your Excellency's should be adopted in preference to those transmitted from hence, and which were then under consideration at Vienna and Berlin.

Unfortunately, however, hostilities had in the meanwhile commenced, and the Austrian Government considered that the time for notes was passed, and that the difference between Russia and the Porte could only be settled by a Treaty.

Her Majesty's Government have concurred in this opinion.

No. 216.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, November 8, 1853.*

HER Majesty's Government entirely approve the proceedings adopted by your Excellency, as reported in your despatch of the 21st ultimo, for preventing the commencement of hostilities, and they much regret that the promise you obtained to that effect should not have been acted upon.

That promise was given you on the 21st. Hostilities, as we have reason to believe, commenced on the 27th by the passage of the Danube. A Tatar might with ease have reached Omar Pasha within five days, and Her Majesty's Government are therefore led to conclude either that the orders in question were not sent by the Porte, or that they were not obeyed by the Commander-in-chief.

Her Majesty's Government are anxious to receive the explanation upon this subject which your Excellency has doubtless demanded from the Porte.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 217.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 9.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, October 25, 1853.*

I HAVE intelligence of the actual entry of the combined squadrons within the Dardanelles; but the detachments of them destined for the Bosphorus are not yet arrived here, owing, no doubt, to the strong northerly winds which have prevailed during the last two or three days.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 9.)*

My Lord,

*Vienna, November 3, 1853.*

UPON receiving last evening your Lordship's telegraphic despatch of yesterday morning, stating "the earnest desire of Her Majesty's Government that the project coming from Constantinople may be accepted in preference to any other," I sent a copy of it to Count Buol, and I requested him to allow me to wait upon him this morning, in order to bring again before him your Lordship's wishes; and I also proposed that my colleagues, Baron Bourqueney and Count Arnim, should be present at our interview.

Count Buol replied by stating that he should be happy to receive me at any hour which should be convenient to me, and that he begged I would invite the other Ministers to meet me.

In consequence of this appointment Count Arnim, Baron Bourqueney, and myself, assembled at Count Buol's, when I communicated your Lordship's telegraphic despatch, and the proposal from Lord Stratford which I had previously brought before them, and I again pressed upon them its acceptance, as being a means by which the Porte might give evidence of its desire of re-establishing friendly relations with Russia, upon such terms as the Emperor had stated himself to require, and as the Government of the Sultan had already declared themselves prepared to concede. I stated that although the term of the suspension of hostilities, under which the project of Lord Stratford had been proposed, had expired, and although hostilities between the parties had to a certain extent taken place, yet, I could not but believe that the acceptance of the note by the Porte would not be affected by these changes; and I also declared my conviction that the recommendation of such a document by the Four Powers, and its signature by Reshid Pasha, if not received at once by the Emperor of Russia as putting an end to the war, would be a great step towards facilitating any future negotiation which might take place. I remarked that notwithstanding the reasons which had already been stated against the adoption of this project in its present form, and against the probability of its being accepted as a means of reconciliation, under present circumstances, either by the Porte or by Russia, yet I had again invited a further consideration of it, in consequence of the great anxiety which was felt by my Government that it should have the recommendation of the Four Powers, and of the importance which they attached to the assurances it contained of the desire of the Porte to take the initiative towards the re-establishment of friendly relations.

Count Buol stated that it was on account of the reasons I had given that he had at once agreed to reconsider the decision which had been come to upon this project, and if he could see any grounds for changing that opinion, he should be most anxious to adopt them; but it was of essential importance for the allies of the Governments now in hostility to each other, to be careful not to propose a project which would risk being refused by either party. The first object was to ascertain whether the Porte was willing to treat; for it was impossible to suppose that a state of war, such as now existed, could be put an end to by a note. If the Porte should be willing to treat, an intention which had already been declared on the part of Russia, then a declaration of the nature of the present project, addressed to the Four Powers, might be transmitted to St. Petersburg, as the ground upon which the negotiation might be established, and the intervention of the Four Powers to recommend and support it, might secure its acceptance. But for the re-establishment of peace there are other points to be insisted upon, such as the evacuation of the Principalities, of which there is no mention in the note; and the regulation of the different interests which have been disturbed by the state of war, which by some authentic Act must be put an end to. All these interests may be regulated by a transaction between the parties, under the friendly control of the Allied Governments. The great object therefore, at present, was to obtain the assurance of both the belligerents that they are willing to enter on a negotiation; to establish an armistice during which the negotiation can be carried on; and to fix upon such a mode of communicating the proposals of each party, as may avoid delay and give protection to the interests of Europe, as well as to those of the parties directly concerned.

Count Buol stated that in considering the project submitted to him, together with the documents which accompanied it, he could perceive no assurance that it would even be accepted by the Porte. The term of ten days fixed for the suspension of hostilities, with the view of facilitating the adoption of a new project of arrangement, is already passed, and hostilities have taken place. The passage to which Reshid Pasha objected, concerning the participation by the professors of the Greek religion in the "spiritual advantages granted to other Christian communities," is placed in the note; and Reshid Pasha has distinctly stated that its acceptance by the Sultan must depend upon its examination by the General Council, and that the Ministers of the Porte cannot hold out any promise in this respect.

Count Buol conceived that your Lordship was probably not aware of these details when you transmitted your last telegraphic despatch, as he believes the despatch containing Lord Stratford's note in detail, and Reshid Pasha's letter, which were sent by the "Caradoc" from Constantinople, could not have reached London on the morning of the 2nd.

Under these circumstances of total uncertainty whether this project of note would be accepted by either party; under the conviction that the state of war at present existing could not be put an end to by such a document; with the persuasion that in its present form, as addressed to Count Nesselrode, it would not be accepted at St. Petersburg, and that a great loss of time would be the consequence, Count Buol, with the expression of his regret, declined to agree to it as it stood; while he adopted its substance if addressed to the Four Powers, and proposed as the expression of a desire on the part of the Porte to re-establish its friendly relations with Russia. He consequently desired to adjourn the consideration of the project till he was informed if the alterations he suggested would be adopted by Her Majesty's Government; and he appealed to me to report this decision, and to my colleagues to support it by their sanction.

M. de Bourqueney and Count Arnim both concurred in the decision of Count Buol; and I consented to submit the determination which had been come to, and to invite the opinion of my Government with regard to it.

Count Arnim mentioned that one of the grounds upon which he had been directed by his Government to suspend the transmission of the instructions to M. de Wildenbruch to support your Lordship's project was, that a proposal of the same nature had been made by France, which had been favourably received; he therefore inquired if any such project had been sent to Baron Bourqueney, who stated that a project of note had been forwarded to him in his last despatches from Paris, and he proposed to communicate it, as it had already been transmitted by the "Fury" to Constantinople. Count Buol remarked that he had already received a notice from Berlin of the existence of this project; and it was a reason why, while so many propositions were afloat, he should not precipitately decide upon any of them. He also stated he had received notice from M. de Hübner that his own project of arrangement of the 25th ultimo had been favourably viewed at Paris, and that he might expect an answer to it in the course of the day; and he observed that he was anxious to receive this decision, as he had not yet announced to the Porte that Russia was ready to treat, which being a commission of some importance, he ought to have fulfilled immediately, but which he had delayed, out of consideration for the other Powers, who had hitherto acted with him in such cordial union.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 219.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, November 9, 1853.*

COUNT COLLOREDO has read to me a despatch from Count Buol, reporting the language held by him at the Conference which was held at Vienna on the 30th ultimo, and setting forth the motives which have induced the Austrian Government to suspend all opinion and action with respect to the propositions of Her Majesty's Government on the Eastern question. The

Austrian Government has been informed that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, after the declaration of war by the Porte, and which has unfortunately been followed by hostilities, insists upon the form of a Treaty to bring back the relations of Russia with the Porte to their former state; nor are the Austrian Government surprised that Russia should now insist upon a formal Treaty which will expressly confirm those Treaties which have preceded it, and which the declaration of war has suspended.

Such being the case, the Austrian Government have stronger reasons for doubting whether it would be possible to obtain the assent of Russia to the mode of arrangement proposed by Her Majesty's Government: nor do they think it would be easier to persuade the Sultan to agree to these propositions, as he scarcely would, or indeed could, in the face of the present state of excitement, cause a note to be addressed to the Court of St. Petersburg, which explicitly affirms his desire "to bind more and more the ties of friendship which unite him to the Emperor of Russia," until the re-establishment of peace by a formal Treaty has placed facts and words in harmony.

The mutual relations which subsist at this moment between Russia and the Porte can scarcely be otherwise defined than as a state of war; and, in the opinion of the Austrian Government, the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, in asserting that a state of war cannot cease except by a Treaty of Peace, enunciates a principle the application of which the Sublime Porte has an equal interest in maintaining, inasmuch as she hopes to establish her future relations with her powerful neighbour on a sure and solid basis.

The Austrian Government, in pointing out their reasons for doubting the success of the plan proposed by Her Majesty's Government, consider that their endeavours contain materials which may be usefully employed in the interests of peace, if the Porte will draw from them the substance of the answer which she will make to the Four Powers, in the sense of the plan proposed in Count Buol's despatch of the 27th ultimo, namely, to indicate to the Four Powers the basis on which the Porte will be willing to enter into negotiations for peace with Russia and to regulate the religious question.

In consequence of the recent overtures of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, the Austrian Government feels called upon, either alone or in concert with the other Three Powers, to inform the Porte that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg is ready to enter at once into negotiations for peace.

The propositions of Her Majesty's Government have been agreed to in Conference by the Representatives of France and Prussia; but as Count Buol was not authorised to accede to them, he states that Count Arnim has not forwarded the telegraphic despatch to M. de Wildenbruch, empowering him to sign the note proposed by Her Majesty's Government, in case his three colleagues at Constantinople shall have done so. Count Buol does not know whether Lord Stratford will decide to proceed alone, or in concert with his French colleague, in the present state of the question.

I told Count Colloredo, that when the declaration and note were forwarded to Vienna and to Constantinople, Her Majesty's Government were under the impression that the commencement of hostilities would have been suspended, but that as the orders to that effect appeared unfortunately either not to have been received or not to have been obeyed, it was clear that the differences between Russia and the Porte could not now be terminated by a note, and that a Treaty had become necessary for that purpose.

Count Buol's proposal, that the Porte should be requested to state on what basis it would be willing to enter into negotiations for peace with Russia, and to regulate the religious questions, appeared, I said, to be fair and reasonable; but much would depend upon the form in which this invitation was conveyed, and that if Count Buol would transmit to Count Colloredo the note which, in his opinion, should be addressed by the Four Representatives at Constantinople to the Porte, it should have the immediate attention of Her Majesty's Government; but that it was impossible for them to be a party to such a note, without previous knowledge of its contents.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 220.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, November 9, 1853.*

HER Majesty's Government learn with satisfaction the instructions which have been given by the Prussian Government to their Representative at Athens with respect to the course to be pursued by the Greek Government in the present state of the Eastern question, as reported in your Lordship's despatch of the 4th instant, and I have to instruct you to inform Baron Manteuffel that similar instructions have been sent by Her Majesty's Government to Her Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I am &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 221.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, November 9, 1853.*

HER Majesty's Government approve the language held by you in your conversation with Baron Manteuffel on the present state of the Eastern question, as reported by your Lordship in your despatch of the 4th instant.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 222.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 9.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Le 8 Novembre, 1853.*

JE viens dans ce moment, 4 heures de l'après-midi, de recevoir votre dépêche du 7. La note que vous demandez n'existe pas; on attendait votre approbation des bases pour la faire rédiger par les Quatre Représentants. J'ai couru chez le Comte Buol avec cette dépêche; il réitère sa prière que vous consentiez à ce que cette rédaction soit faite ici, car le sang versé à Oltenizza le met dans l'impossibilité de retarder la communication à la Porte des ouvertures pacifiques de la Russie, et l'invitation d'y répondre d'après le plan qu'il a suggéré.

(Translation.)

*November 8, 1853.*

I HAVE this instant, at 4 P.M., received your despatch of the 7th. The note which you call for does not exist. Your approval of the basis of it was waited for in order that it might be drawn up by the four Representatives. I hurried to Count Buol with that despatch; he repeats his entreaty that you would consent that the note should be drawn up here: for the blood which has been shed at Oltenitza renders it impossible for him to defer communicating to the Porte the pacific overtures of Russia, and inviting it to reply thereto according to the plan which he has suggested.

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No. 223.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 9.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Le 8 Novembre, 1853.*

LE COMTE BUOL nous a supplié, M. de Bourqueney et moi, d'obtenir de nos Cabinets les pouvoirs nécessaires pour rédiger en Conférence sans délai et expédier à Constantinople la note collective qui concluerait à l'armistice fondé sur les dispositions du Cabinet Russe à rentrer en négociation.

Remarquez que cette note n'engage pas la responsabilité des Cabinets, puisque la Porte y serait consultée sur les conditions et la forme de la négociation. Les pièces importantes sont les instructions aux Représentants à Constantinople, et celles là le Comte Buol en soumet l'ébauche aujourd'hui même à nos Cabinets. Selon le Comte Buol nous avons ici une Conférence ou des pourparlers: si nous constituons la Conférence par des pouvoirs envoyés à ses membres, les pièces seront collectives comme la note en question; si nous n'avons que des pourparlers les pièces seront individuelles, et le Comte Buol ne croirait pas pouvoir consciencieusement retarder l'envoi à Constantinople d'une ouverture Russe de paix faite à l'Autriche au moment où la guerre est flagrante.

(Translation.)

November 8, 1853.

COUNT BUOL has entreated M. de Bourqueney and myself to obtain from our Cabinets the necessary powers, in order that we may draw up in conference, without delay, and send to Constantinople, the collective note, the object of which would be to effect an armistice founded on the disposition of Russia to resume negotiations.

It is to be observed that this note imposes no responsibility on the Cabinets, because the Porte would therein be consulted as to the conditions and form of the negotiations. The important document is the instructions to the Representatives at Constantinople, and of these Count Buol submits a sketch this very day to our Cabinets. According to Count Buol's notion, we have here either a conference or mere conversations; if we establish a conference by means of full powers sent to the members of it, the documents, like the note in question, will be collective; if we have only conversations the documents will be separate, and Count Buol would consider that he could not conscientiously defer sending to Constantinople a Russian overture for peace addressed to Austria at the time when war is raging.

No. 224.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, November 9, 1853.*

WE are willing, if the French Government send similar instructions to M. de Bourqueney, to join in a note inviting the Porte to state on what terms and conditions she is willing to negotiate a Treaty of Peace; but under present circumstances it will be quite useless to propose a cessation of hostilities which the Turks must consider disadvantageous to themselves, and we do not think it right to put them in a position to refuse a request made by the Four Powers.

An armistice might, however, be proposed with fair prospect of success, if the Russian army were to retire behind the Pruth and the Turkish army behind the Danube during the negotiation; there would be nothing unusual in this, and the Turkish army in the Principalities is now as numerous as the Russian.

No 225.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 9.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, November 1, 1853.*

AS is well known, the two great motives by which the Emperor's policy towards Turkey is represented as being actuated, are the lively interest taken by His Majesty in the welfare of his coreligionists under the Sultan's authority, and the barbarous treatment to which it is to be understood these and other Christian sects are constantly experiencing at the hands of their lawful but barbarous Governors.

It does not often happen that an opportunity is offered for instituting a

direct comparison between, not the professions, but the acts of the two Sovereigns towards large bodies of this Christian population ; but as such an occasion presents itself, with reference to the occupation of the Principalities, I am desirous of turning it to account.

In the year 1848, the occupation of Wallachia and Moldavia was considered to be essential by Russia ; the Porte taking a very different view of the case and regarding the measure as unnecessary and even hurtful.

As it was to be expected, the opinion of the Protecting Power prevailed, and large bodies of Russian troops having crossed the Pruth, the Porte, to prevent her provinces being committed to the exclusive keeping of the Emperor's armies, was compelled to take part in the occupation.

Here the contrast between the conduct of the two Powers becomes at once very striking.

The Russian Commissioner instantly instituted prosecutions and persecutions upon a very extensive scale, and expressed his surprise at the Turkish Commissioner declining to take part in them.

Fuad Effendi explained that his master was animated by totally different views ; that his object was not vengeance, but improvement ; that he looked to the future, not to the past, and was the enemy of a reactionary course.

The Turkish authorities further stated that it was the Sultan's wish that the presence of his troops should be an advantage to the provinces ; everything that was required for their maintenance was to be paid with the greatest punctuality, and no precaution was omitted which could prevent an extraordinary occasion being made use of for raising prices in a manner calculated to distress the inhabitants.

The character of the Russian proceedings was of another order.

They paid for nothing, and they devoured the country. Their course was to be traced by devastation. Consul-General Cunningham describes their progress in a few graphic words. The effect of their presence is, he wrote, like that "produced by a flight of locusts."

It was, however, to be understood that this extensive consumption was not to be gratuitous. The charge was to be defrayed by the local Governments.

To make these payments, nevertheless, the local Governments required funds, and not possessing any, they were compelled to borrow money of their invaders.

This loan the impoverished state of the land disqualified the inhabitants from repaying, and before it was possible that prosperity should return to their locust-devoured plains, a fresh Russian occupation, that of the current year, took place.

It was, however, announced that the Emperor intended to pay for everything required for his army, and Count Nesselrode stated to me that the occupation might in fact be considered as a benefit, as a kind of godsend for the inhabitants.

The advantage is one which the unfortunate Wallachians and Moldavians are little likely to appreciate, for although I believe everything that is consumed by the Russians is paid for, the payments are effected in bills (bons), the amount of which is to be deducted from the sum owing to Russia by the Principalities for the occupation of 1848, owing, that is, to the necessity of having had previously to support a large Russian army, whose presence was as unwelcome to the inhabitants as to their legitimate Sovereign.

No. 226.

*Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 9.)*

My Lord,

*Berlin, November 7, 1853.*

I HAD an interview this evening with Baron Manteuffel. His Excellency informed me that Baron Budberg, the Russian Minister at this Court, had communicated to him this morning, and left in his hands, copy of a circular despatch, dated October 19, addressed by Count Nesselrode to the Russian Missions at foreign Courts, inclosing a manifesto of the Russian Government as a reply to the declaration of war by Turkey.

His Excellency read to me these documents, and seemed to consider that they were written in a moderate and pacific spirit.

I remarked to his Excellency that the arguments they contained, and the statements on which these arguments were based, were wholly false and unfounded; that at the outset Russia had stated that the mission of Prince Menchikoff solely related to the question of the holy places; but when that question had been satisfactorily arranged (in the solution of which the able services rendered by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe had been gratefully acknowledged by Prince Menchikoff) fresh demands of a distinct nature to those previously announced by the Russian Government, and totally incompatible with the sovereign rights of the Sultan, were presented to the Porte.

I observed further to his Excellency, that for such a cause, and under such pretext, Russia had no more right to make war on Turkey, than any Power would have to violate the territory of its neighbour for a refusal to sign a Treaty of commerce; and I added, that, as to the question of war, Russia could alone be held responsible to Europe, as she herself had first broken the peace of Europe by a lawless and illegal occupation of the Sultan's territory.

Baron Manteuffel acquiesced in the justice of my remarks, and I trust I have succeeded in counteracting any false impression with which Baron Budberg may have sought to imbue his mind on the occasion of placing these documents in his Excellency's hands.

Although your Lordship will probably be already in possession of these papers, I have the honour to inclose copies of them herewith.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 226.

*Circular Despatch addressed to Russian Missions at Foreign Courts.*

*St. Pétersbourg, le 19 Octobre, 1853.*

LES efforts que nous ne cessons de faire depuis huit mois pour arriver à l'arrangement à l'amiable de nos différends avec la Porte Ottomane, sont malheureusement restés infructueux jusqu'ici. Il y a plus, la situation semble tendre à s'aggraver tous les jours davantage. Tandis que l'Empereur offrait, durant son entrevue à Olmütz avec son intime ami et allié l'Empereur François-Joseph, de nombreuses facilités au Cabinet Autrichien pour éclaircir le malentendu qui s'est attaché aux motifs exposés par nous pour rejeter les modifications que la Porte avait voulu introduire dans la note concertée à Vienne, la Porte cédant, malgré les conseils des Représentants Européens à Constantinople, à l'impulsion des idées belliqueuses et du fanatisme Mussulman, vient, comme vous l'aurez déjà appris, de nous déclarer formellement la guerre. Cette mesure précipitée n'a pourtant rien changé pour le moment aux dispositions pacifiques de l'Empereur. Nous n'abandonnons point encore pour cela les résolutions énoncées dès l'origine dans notre circulaire du <sup>20 Juin</sup><sub>5 Juillet</sub>. A cette époque, Sa Majesté Impériale a déclaré qu'en occupant temporairement les Principautés comme gage matériel destiné à lui assurer la satisfaction qu'elle réclame, elle ne voulait pas pousser plus loin les mesures de coercition, et éviterait une guerre offensive aussi longtemps que le lui permettraient sa dignité et ses intérêts. A l'heure qu'il est, et en dépit de la nouvelle provocation qui vient de lui être adressée, les intentions de notre Auguste Maître restent les mêmes.

Nantis du gage matériel qui nous donne l'occupation des deux Provinces Moldo-Valaques, bien que toujours prêts, suivant nos promesses, à les évacuer du moment que réparation nous aura été faite, nous nous contenterons provisoirement d'y maintenir nos positions, en restant sur la défensive, aussi longtemps que nous n'aurions point été forcés de sortir du cercle dans lequel nous désirons enfermer notre action. Nous attendrons l'attaque des Turcs sans prendre l'initiative des hostilités. Il dépendra donc entièrement des autres Puissances de ne point élargir les limites de la guerre, si les Turcs s'obstinent à vouloir nous la faire absolument, et de ne point lui imprimer un caractère autre que celui que nous entendons lui laisser. Cette situation toute expectante ne met point obstacle à la poursuite des négociations. Comme de raison, après la déclaration de guerre qu'on vient de lui faire, ce n'est point à la Russie à

rechercher de nouveaux expédients, à prendre l'initiative des ouvertures de conciliation. Mais si, mieux éclairée sur ses intérêts, la Porte est plus tard disposée à mettre en avant ou à accueillir de pareilles ouvertures, ce n'est point de l'Empereur qui viendront les obstacles à ce qu'elles soient prises en considération.

Voilà, M. ———, pour le moment tout ce qu'il m'est permis de vous dire, dans l'incertitude où nous sommes de savoir si la Porte Ottomane donnera une suite immédiate aux projets belliqueux qu'elle vient d'adopter. Faites part de nos intentions éventuelles au Cabinet auprès duquel vous vous trouvez accrédité. Elles attesteront une fois de plus le désir de notre Auguste Maître de circonscrire autant que possible le cercle des hostilités si elles doivent avoir lieu malgré lui, et d'en épargner les conséquences au reste de l'Europe.

Recevez, &c.

(Translation.)

*St. Petersburg, October  $\frac{1}{31}$ , 1853.*

THE efforts which we have not ceased to make for the last eight months to arrive at an amicable settlement of our differences with the Ottoman Porte have unhappily up to the present time been unavailing. Moreover, matters tend to become worse and worse every day. Whilst the Emperor, during his interview at Olmütz with his intimate friend and ally the Emperor Francis Joseph, was offering numerous facilities to the Austrian Cabinet to clear up the misunderstanding connected with the reasons stated by us for rejecting the modifications which the Porte was desirous of introducing into the note drawn up at Vienna, the Porte, notwithstanding the advice of the European Representatives at Constantinople, yielding to the impulse of bellicose notions and of Mussulman fanaticism, has now, as you will have already learnt, formally declared war against us. This precipitate measure has, however, for the time made no change in the pacific disposition of the Emperor. We do not on that account as yet abandon the resolutions expressed at the outset in our circular of the <sup>June 30</sup> ~~July 2~~. At that time His Imperial Majesty declared that in temporarily occupying the Principalities as a substantive pledge for obtaining the satisfaction which he requires, he had no desire to carry further his measures of coercion, and would avoid an offensive war so long as his dignity and his interests would permit him to do so. At the present time, notwithstanding the fresh provocation which has been offered to him, the intentions of our August Master remain the same.

Being in possession of the substantive pledge which the occupation of the Moldo-Wallachian Provinces gives us, although still prepared, in conformity with our promises, to evacuate them immediately upon reparation being made to us, we will content ourselves for the time with maintaining our position there, remaining on the defensive so long as we may not be compelled to go beyond the limits within which we are desirous of confining our operations. We will await the attack of the Turks without being the first to commence hostilities. It will therefore wholly rest with the other Powers not to extend the sphere of hostilities if the Turks are absolutely determined to make war upon us, and not to give a different character to them from that which we propose to assign to them. This state of expectation offers no obstacle to carrying on negotiations. As a matter of common sense, after war has been declared against her, it is not for Russia to devise fresh expedients, to take the first step in conciliatory overtures. But if, better enlightened as to its real interests, the Porte at a later period is inclined to put forward or to receive such overtures, the Emperor will offer no obstacle to their being taken into consideration.

This, Sir, is all that I can say to you at the present time, in the uncertainty in which we are as to whether the Ottoman Porte will immediately carry into effect the warlike plans which it has adopted. Communicate our eventual intentions to the Cabinet to which you are accredited. They manifest once more the desire of our August Master to circumscribe as much as possible the circle of hostilities, if they must break out notwithstanding his wishes, and to spare Europe from the consequences thereof.

Receive, &c.

Inclosure 2 in No. 226.

*Manifesto.*

Par la grâce de Dieu, Nous, Nicolas I, Empereur et Autocrate de toutes les Russies, &c.

Savoir faisons :

PAR notre Manifeste du 14 Juin de la présente année, nous avons fait connaître à nos fidèles et bienaimés sujets les motifs qui nous ont mis dans l'obligation de réclamer de la Porte Ottomane des garanties inviolables en faveur des droits sacrés de l'Eglise Orthodoxe.

Nous leur avons annoncé également que tous nos efforts pour ramener la Porte, par des moyens de persuasion amicale, à des sentiments d'équité et à l'observation fidèle des Traités, étaient restés infructueux, et que nous avons, par conséquent, jugé indispensable de faire avancer nos troupes dans les Principautés du Danube. Mais, en adoptant cette mesure, nous conservions encore l'espoir que la Porte reconnaîtrait ses torts, et se déciderait à faire droit à nos justes réclamations.

Notre attente a été déçue.

En vain même les principales Puissances de l'Europe ont cherché par leurs exhortations à ébranler l'aveugle obstination du Gouvernement Ottoman. C'est par une déclaration de guerre, par une proclamation remplie d'accusations mensongères contre la Russie, qu'il a répondu aux efforts pacifiques de l'Europe, ainsi qu'à notre longanimité. Enfin, enrôlant dans les rangs de son armée les révolutionnaires de tous les pays, la Porte vient de commencer les hostilités sur le Danube. La Russie est provoquée au combat ; il ne lui reste donc plus, se reposant en Dieu avec confiance, qu'à recourir à la force des armes pour contraindre le Gouvernement Ottoman à respecter les Traités et pour en obtenir la réparation des offenses par lesquelles il a répondu à nos demandes les plus modérées et à notre sollicitude légitime pour la défense de la foi orthodoxe en Orient que professe également le peuple Russe.

Nous sommes fermement convaincu que nos fidèles sujets se joindront aux ferventes prières que nous adressons au Très-Haut, afin que sa main daigne bénir nos armes dans la sainte et juste cause qui a trouvé de tout tems d'ardents défenseurs dans nos pieux ancêtres.

“ In te, Domine, speravi ; non confundar in æternum.”

Donné à Tsarskoé-Sélo, le vingtième jour du mois d'Octobre de l'an de grâce mil huit cent cinquante-trois, et de notre règne le vingt-huitième.

(Signé) NICOLAS.

(Translation.)

By the grace of God, We, Nicholas I, Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias, &c.

Make known :

BY our Manifesto of the 14th June of the present year, we acquainted our well-beloved and faithful subjects with the motives which have compelled us to demand of the Ottoman Porte inviolable guarantees in favour of the sacred rights of the Orthodox Church.

We likewise announced to them that all our efforts to recall the Porte, by means of friendly persuasion, to sentiments of equity, and to the faithful observance of Treaties, had been ineffectual ; and that we had consequently deemed it indispensable to advance our troops into the Danubian Principalities. But in adopting this measure we still entertained the hope that the Porte would admit its errors and would determine to conform to our just demands.

Our expectation has been deceived.

To no purpose even have the principal Powers of Europe sought by their exhortations to shake the blind obstinacy of the Ottoman Government. It has replied to the pacific efforts made by Europe, as well as to our forbearance, by a declaration of war, by a proclamation replete with false accusations against Russia. Finally, embodying in the ranks of its army the revolutionists of all countries, the Porte has commenced hostilities on the Danube. Russia is

challenged to the fight ; nothing therefore further remains for her, but, in confident reliance upon God, to have recourse to arms in order to compel the Ottoman Government to respect Treaties, and obtain from it reparation for the offences by which it has responded to our most moderate demands, and to our legitimate solicitude for the defence of the Orthodox faith in the East which is equally professed by the Russian people.

We are firmly convinced that our faithful subjects will join in the fervent prayers which we address to the Most High, that his hand may be pleased to bless our arms in the holy and just cause which has ever found ardent defenders in our pious ancestors.

“In thee, Lord, have I trusted ; let me never be confounded.”

Given at Tsarskoe-Selo, this 20th of October, in the year 1853, and the 28th of Our reign.

(Signed) NICHOLAS.

No. 227.

*Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 9.)*

(Extract.)

*Berlin, November 7, 1853.*

I REFERRED this evening, in conversation with Baron Manteuffel, to the instructions which he informed me had been transmitted to Baron Wildenbruch to support Lord Stratford de Redcliffe in urging the Porte to accept your Lordship's projects.

His Excellency told me that those instructions had effectively been sent, as duplicates had been forwarded direct to Constantinople *via* Trieste, in addition to those which had been transmitted through Count Arnim.

I stated to his Excellency, that it was possible that Lord Stratford might, under the existing circumstances, still find occasion either to utilize your Lordship's project or the one he had transmitted from Constantinople, which latter, though identical with your Lordship's project, had the advantage of having apparently been approved by the Porte. I said that perhaps if the form of a note was no longer tenable, Lord Stratford might possibly find it desirable to propose it as a basis or preliminary to a Treaty or Convention ; and that it was therefore most desirable that Baron Wildenbruch should be instructed by his Excellency to support Lord Stratford in any endeavours he might make to bring about a pacification, according to the terms of these projects, or with such modifications as would not render either project unacceptable by the Emperor of Russia.

His Excellency assented to this view, and said that he had already written a private letter to Baron Wildenbruch, stating clearly the position and policy of Prussia ; in that letter he referred to the instructions he had previously given to act in concert with Austria, and proceeded to explain to Baron Wildenbruch that circumstances having changed, those instructions were no longer in force.

His Excellency informed me that he would again instruct Baron Wildenbruch to support Lord Stratford in his endeavours to bring about a pacification. His Excellency further added that it was his sincere wish to cooperate with England in this sense.

No. 228.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 11.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, November 3, 1853.*

THE manifesto which has been so long expected was published this morning ; but, as I understand, not in the terms in which it had been originally drawn up.

The appearance of this important paper, of which I have the honour of inclosing a copy,\* I believe to have been hastened by the Sultan's declaration of war, followed up by actual hostilities on the banks of the Danube.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 229.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 12.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, November 11, 5 P.M.*

I HAVE received your telegraphic despatch of the 9th; M. de Bourqueney has not yet received any instructions similar to those it contains. Nevertheless I communicate it to Count Buol, who has felt himself obliged to transmit already the Russian propositions to Constantinople, as stated in my despatch of yesterday.\* As I am not authorized by your instructions to sign any document, or to act without the concurrence of M. de Bourqueney, Count Buol confined himself to the expression of his most anxious desire that you should invite the Porte to state if it is willing to enter into negotiations, and on what conditions; and he will receive any such proposal as you may forward, with the desire to concur in it, as also in any instructions to be sent to the Representatives in Constantinople to support it.

No. 230.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 12.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, November 11, 1853.*

I WAS unable to obtain an interview of M. Drouyn de Lhuys until late this evening, when I informed him of the answer which your Lordship had sent, through Lord Westmorland, to Count Buol's proposition that the Four Powers should call upon the Porte to consent to an armistice. M. Drouyn de Lhuys highly approves that answer, and will send immediate orders by telegraph to M. de Bourqueney to support the proposition which it contains.

No. 231.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 14.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, November 5, 1853.*

I CALLED yesterday upon the Chancellor, chiefly for the purpose of making inquiry respecting a report which had reached me, as to the intended nomination of General Budberg as Governor of the Principalities.

The sum of the information which I received is, that General Budberg is to be named Commissioner, the title of Governor being one which was calculated to give rise to misapprehensions as to the Emperor's intentions, which remained those of not incorporating the two Provinces (*de ne point incorporer les Provinces*).

The Government, Count Nesselrode further stated, would have been glad to have retained the Hospodars, but since the declaration of war their position had become so painful that they were unwilling to continue the exercise of their functions; it became therefore necessary to provide some present system of government for Wallachia and Moldavia.

No. 232.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 14.)*

My Lord,

*Vienna, November 8, 1853.*

COUNT BUOL has communicated to me, as well as to M. de Bourqueney, the draft of the instructions he should propose to send to the Internuncio for the direction of his conduct in recommending to the Government of the Sultan the course they might pursue in the negotiation with Russia, which will have been proposed to them by the collective note of the Four Representatives.

I inclose this document.

No. 236.

Count Buol submits this draft for the consideration of your Lordship as a mere project, upon which he will attend to any suggestions you may offer ; he does not recommend it as a draft according to which the other Governments should be bound in the instructions which they would send to their Representatives. He is aware that in the mediating position of Austria, more management of terms is required towards Russia than from England and France, but the objects to be attained being the same, a general concordance in the way of putting them forward may be of the greatest utility.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 232.

*Draft of Instructions to be addressed to Baron Bruck.*

LORSQUE la note collective aura été remise à la Porte, la tâche la plus importante dont les Quatre Représentants auront à s'acquitter consistera à exercer toute leur influence, afin que la Porte se décide sans délai à une réponse qui d'un côté corresponde aux dispositions conciliantes énoncées par la Russie, et qui de l'autre, par les termes dans lesquels elle sera conçue, facilite aux Puissances amies de travailler avec succès au rétablissement des bons rapports entre la Turquie et la Russie.

Les Représentants feront d'abord apprécier les motifs de délicatesse qui ont porté leurs Cours à ne pas s'occuper de la rédaction même de la réponse à faire. Elles ont cru plus convenable de s'en rapporter à ce sujet au tact des Ministres Turcs eux-mêmes. Convaincues d'avance qu'ils s'appliqueront à élaborer une pièce qui offrira des chances d'être bien accueillie à St. Pétersbourg, les Cours pensent que le caractère de spontanéité qu'elles désirent réserver à la réponse de la Porte, en assurera davantage le bon effet.

Si, comme il est à prévoir, les Représentants étaient toutefois consultés à cet égard, ils auraient à s'exprimer dans le sens suivant :

1. Cette pièce aurait à exprimer la disposition constante de la Porte de mettre un terme aux différends. En rendant justice aux intentions de la Russie, la Porte se déclarerait prête à s'entendre avec elle.

2. En prenant acte des assurances données par la Russie, la Porte de son côté se déclarerait prête à maintenir des points déjà concédés dans ses manifestations antérieures. Ils pourraient être énumérés dans l'ordre dans lequel ils se trouvent énoncés dans les différents projets de note. On y rattacherait, comme de raison, les conditions de l'évacuation des Principautés.

3. Quant à la forme dans laquelle auraient lieu et le rétablissement de la paix et le règlement de la question religieuse, on la fixerait de commun accord dès l'ouverture des pourparlers.

4. Quant au mode d'entrer en négociation, la Porte se déclarerait prête à nommer un Plénipotentiaire et à le munir des pleins pouvoirs nécessaires pour traiter avec un négociateur Russe.

5. Quant au lieu où on se réunirait, la Porte est sans doute la maîtresse d'accepter purement et simplement l'offre de la Russie de se réunir dans un endroit avoisinant le théâtre de la guerre.

Elle peut même ne pas objecter à la ville de Bucharest indiquée par la Russie, si elle le juge convenable à ses droits.

Comme il se pourrait, au reste, que la Porte croit devoir s'y refuser par un motif de dignité, ou bien aussi qu'elle ne jugera pas à propos de se séparer complètement de l'appui et des conseils des Puissances qui déjà lui ont donné des marques d'intérêt, elle pourrait décliner l'offre en appuyant son refus de raisons plausibles et convenables.

La Turquie devra prendre conseil d'elle-même si un lieu neutre n'offrirait pas plus de chance de réussite. On pourrait dans ce cas lui suggérer si la capitale où siège déjà la Conférence qui s'occupe plus particulièrement de cette question, ne répondrait pas peut-être mieux que toute autre à toutes les exigences de la situation.

En suivant cette proposition la Porte aurait toutefois à se garder d'insister trop déjà dès à présent sur la forme à donner à cette négociation, ainsi que sur le mode dans lequel les Puissances amies auraient à y intervenir, pour ne pas de prime abord soulever des difficultés et des longueurs.

La Porte serait bien sous ce rapport de s'en rapporter aux soins de la Conférence d'aviser la négociation, une fois entamée, aux formes les plus convenables, soit pour sa dignité, soit pour ses intérêts.

6. La Porte s'engagera formellement, en acceptant l'offre d'entrer en voie de négociation, à un armistice, tout comme les Puissances prendront sur elles d'obtenir de la Russie qu'elle persévère dans son intention de ne pas sortir de la position qu'elle a prise et de rien entreprendre de son côté qui pût mettre obstacle aux intentions de la Porte.

Dès l'entrée en négociation cet armistice pourrait être directement conclu entre les parties belligérantes, en fixant la ligne de démarcation qui séparerait les deux armées.

(Translation.)

WHEN the collective note shall have been delivered to the Porte, the most important duty which the Four Representatives will have to fulfil will consist in exerting all their influence in order that the Porte may without delay come to a decision which, on the one hand, may be in harmony with the conciliatory dispositions expressed by Russia; and, on the other, by the terms in which it will be drawn up, may render it more easy for the friendly Powers to labour successfully for the re-establishment of good relations between Turkey and Russia.

The Representatives will, in the first instance, draw attention to the motives of delicacy which have led their Courts not to proceed to actually drawing up the answer to be made. They have thought it more proper on this point to rely on the tact of the Turkish Ministers themselves. Satisfied beforehand that these will strive to compose a document which shall afford a chance of being well received at St. Petersburg, the Courts are of opinion that the spontaneous character which they wish to leave to the Porte's answer will still further ensure a good effect from it.

If, however, as is to be foreseen, the Representatives should be consulted in this respect, they should express themselves in the following sense:

1. This document should state the constant disposition of the Porte to put an end to the differences. While rendering justice to the intentions of Russia, the Porte should declare itself prepared to come to an understanding with her.

2. While taking note of the assurances given by Russia, the Porte on its side should declare itself ready to maintain the points already conceded in its previous declaration. They might be enumerated in the order in which they are stated in the different drafts of note. The condition of the evacuation of the Principalities might reasonably be attached to them.

3. As regards the form in which the re-establishment of peace and the arrangement of the religious question should be effected, that might be settled by common agreement at the opening of the discussions.

4. As regards the manner of entering into negotiation, the Porte might declare itself ready to name a Plenipotentiary, and to furnish him with the necessary full powers to treat with a Russian negotiator.

5. As regards the place where the meeting should be held, it rests doubtless with the Porte to accept without reserve the offer of Russia to meet in a place in the neighbourhood of the theatre of war.

It may perhaps not even object to the city of Bucharest, which has been mentioned by Russia, if it deems it consistent with its rights.

As, however, it is possible that from considerations of dignity the Porte may think itself bound to refuse this, or that it may likewise not think it advisable entirely to isolate itself from the counsels of the Powers which have already shown an interest in its behalf, it might decline the offer, resting its refusal on plausible and suitable grounds.

The Porte should determine for itself whether a neutral place would not offer greater chance of success. In that case it might be suggested to it whether the capital which is the present seat of the Conference more particularly occupied with this question, would not perhaps answer better than any other place all the requirements of the present state of affairs.

In adopting this proposition the Porte would still have to take care not to insist too much at the present moment upon the form to be given to this nego-

tiation, as well as upon the mode in which the friendly Powers should be called on to take part in it, in order not to raise at the outset difficulties and delays.

The Porte would do well in this respect to rely upon the Conference for adapting the negotiation, once commenced, to the forms most consistent with its dignity and its interest.

6. The Porte in accepting the offer to negotiate, will formally pledge itself to an armistice, in the same manner as the Powers will take upon themselves to obtain from Russia that she will abide by her intention of not departing from the position which she has taken up, and will on her side undertake nothing which can offer any obstacle to the intentions of the Porte.

At the commencement of the negotiations this armistice might be concluded directly between the belligerent parties, the line of demarcation which should separate the two armies being fixed.

No. 233.

*Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 14.)*

My Lord,

*Berlin, November 11, 1853.*

HAVING been informed by Sir H. Seymour's despatch of the 5th instant of the nomination of a Civil Governor for the Danubian Provinces by the Russian Government, I thought I ought to draw the attention of the Prussian Government to this circumstance, and requested to know from Baron Manteuffel what course he would pursue with regard to the Prussian political agents who were accredited to those Governments.

His Excellency replied that this matter had not yet been taken into consideration. He had, however, understood that by the Act of Constitution of those States, foreign Agents were legally accredited to the Government during the absence of the Hospodars.

I replied to his Excellency that the case might be altered, if, as my intelligence reported, a Russian General assumed the supreme Government of the country.

His Excellency said that he had not as yet received intelligence of any such nomination, but that, on my suggestion, the subject should be duly taken into consideration.

As this may become a matter of some importance, I should be happy to receive your Lordship's instructions, as a guide to the opinion I may be called upon to express on the subject in question.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 234.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, November 14, 1853.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 7th instant, reporting the substance of a conversation which your Lordship had held with Baron Manteuffel on the subject of the manifesto which had been issued by the Russian Government on the Eastern question, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government approve your language on this occasion; and I have to instruct your Lordship to observe to Baron Manteuffel that this manifesto is not founded on truth. It declares that Turkey has violated Treaties between her and Russia, but not a single instance of this has been advanced by Russia throughout the whole of the discussions, nor has a single instance been adduced of the ill-treatment of Christians, which should call forth the solicitude of the Emperor of Russia.

The sole cause of complaint urged against the Porte was that concerning the holy places, which was at once satisfactorily settled; since which the territory of the Sultan has been occupied, and Europe is exposed to the calamities of war, because the Sultan would not concede to the Emperor rights over his own

subjects that would have been utterly destructive of his independence; and Count Nesselrode in his analysis of the Turkish modifications of the Vienna note, has taken care that the world should labour under no mistake as to what the rights were which the Emperor required, and the Sultan most properly refused.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 235.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, November 14, 1853.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 7th instant, reporting that you had asked Baron Manteuffel to instruct the Prussian Representative at Constantinople to support Lord Stratford in his endeavours to bring about a settlement of the differences between Russia and Turkey, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government approve your language on this occasion.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 236.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 14.)*

My Lord,

*Vienna, November 10, 1853.*

COUNT BUOL having requested Count Arnim, M. de Bourqueney, and myself, to assemble at his house on the evening of the 9th instant, he stated, that when he had received from the Cabinet of St. Petersburg the offer to enter into negotiations with the Government of Turkey, for the re-establishment of friendly relations, he had immediately communicated it to us on the 25th of October, for the information of our Governments, with a request to know from them whether they would join in transmitting this proposition to Constantinople, and sanction a collective or identical note, recommending the Porte under certain conditions to accept it. With respect to the tenor of the note, he had not taken upon himself to do more than state what he considered might form the substance of it.

The statement of the general heads of the arrangement he proposed had been forwarded to our Governments on the 25th of October, and subsequently, on the 6th November he had stated them to us in greater detail, and he had consequently hoped that, as they had generally been approved of, the note might have been drawn up here, in conformity with any suggestions or modifications which the different Governments might have instructed their Representatives to attend to, or to require; but as this hope had not been fulfilled, and as the draft of a note was required to be sent to London and to Paris for approval, and the hostilities, which it was the object of a communication which was to accompany it to put a stop to, were unfortunately being carried on with considerable loss of life, he felt he was bound no longer to delay forwarding the proposal which had been entrusted to him; and therefore he had received the Emperor's orders at once to transmit it to the Internuncio, with directions to submit it to the Government of the Sultan, recommending it to their attention, and requesting that they would notify to him the decision they might come to with regard to it.

With a view, however, of acting as far as he was able, under these circumstances, in unison with the allied Governments, he had called us together for the purpose of communicating the despatch he should forward to the Internuncio; and he begged us to understand, that it was only a transmission of the proposals he had received from St. Petersburg. As to the advice he meant to give to the Porte, it was expressed in the instructions to Baron Bruck, a copy of which I forwarded to your Lordship in my despatch of the 8th instant, which he had communicated confidentially to Baron de Bourqueney and myself.

Count Buol then read to the Conference the draft of the note to be addressed to the Internuncio, and he has this day communicated it in the form in which he has decided to forward it, and I have the honour herewith to inclose a copy of it. Count Buol requested that we would explain to our Courts the necessity under which, after so much delay, he had felt himself obliged to adopt the course he has now taken, but that in doing so he had in no way abandoned the prospect of a collective communication of the Four Governments upon the decision which the Turkish Government will be called upon to come to.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 236.

*Count Buol to Baron Bruck.*

*Vienne, le 11 Novembre, 1853.*

PAR l'office que la Sublime Porte a bien voulu adresser à votre Excellence à la date du 4 Octobre dernier (1 Moharem, 1270), le Gouvernement Impérial a vu avec peine que celui de Sa Majesté le Sultan avait abandonné l'espoir d'arranger dans les voies pacifiques son différend avec l'Empereur de Russie. Les regrets de la Cour d'Autriche ont été d'autant plus motivés qu'au moment même où la Sublime Porte en appelait au sort des armes, l'Empereur de Russie donnait à Olmütz itérativement des assurances qui, aux yeux du Cabinet de Vienne, étaient de nature à augmenter les chances d'une solution pacifique. Quoiqu'il en soit, persuadée de la haute importance qu'il y a de maintenir le principe consacré par le préambule du Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, et animée du désir le plus sincère de voir conserver la paix générale, la Cour de Vienne a pris à tâche de connaître les résolutions que la déclaration de guerre de la Porte provoquerait de la part de l'Empereur de Russie.

C'est à sa grande satisfaction qu'elle a acquis la certitude que les dispositions conciliantes de Sa Majesté Impériale n'ont pas subi de modification, et qu'elle n'envisage pas le fil de négociations comme rompu par le fait de la déclaration de guerre.

Si l'Empereur demande que le culte et le clergé Grecs continuent à jouir de leurs privilèges spirituels, Sa Majesté entend expressément que ce soit sous l'égide du Sultan. Elle déclare ne pas vouloir toucher à l'indépendance et aux droits de ce Souverain, ni s'ingérer dans les affaires intérieures de l'Empire Ottoman. Tout ce que la Russie désire obtenir, c'est l'assurance du maintien strict du *status quo* religieux du culte Grec, savoir, une égalité entière de droits et d'immunités entre l'Eglise Grecque et les autres communautés Chrétiennes sujettes de la Porte ; par conséquent, la jouissance en faveur de l'Eglise Grecque des avantages déjà accordés à ces communautés, ainsi que la participation à ceux que le Sultan accorderait à l'avenir à d'autres rits Chrétiens. C'est sur cette base que le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg est prêt à entrer avec le Gouvernement Ottoman immédiatement et directement en négociations de paix, dont le siège, selon lui, pourrait être établi à Bucarest. En attendant, l'Empereur de Russie, non obstant la déclaration de guerre de la Porte, a énoncé l'intention de ne rien changer à son attitude actuelle, et donné à ses troupes l'ordre de rester sur la défensive. Intimement convaincu que Sa Majesté le Sultan n'a, de son côté, rien de plus à cœur que de mettre le plus promptement possible un terme à l'effusion de sang qui a malheureusement déjà commencé, et qu'elle est par conséquent décidée à maintenir inaltérablement les points déjà concédés à la Russie, le Cabinet de Vienne, en mettant ces intentions du Sultan en regard de celles que l'Empereur de Russie, à son tour, a si positivement énoncées, ne saurait se refuser à l'espoir que des négociations de paix, précédées d'un armistice, ne tarderaient pas à aboutir à une prompte et franche réconciliation. C'est dans cet espoir que je charge votre Excellence d'adresser à la Sublime Porte les plus vives instances pour qu'elle fasse un accueil favorable aux propositions renfermées dans la présente dépêche et dictées par l'amitié sincère que l'Empereur notre auguste maître voue à Sa Majesté le Sultan, ainsi que par le vif intérêt qu'il attache au prompt rétablissement des bons rapports entre les deux Empires voisins.

Votre Excellence est autorisée à remettre à Reshid Pasha une copie de cette dépêche, en témoignant à M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères le haut prix que nous attacherions à la voir accueillie dans la même esprit de conciliation qui nous a dicté la présente démarche.

Recevez, &c.  
(Signé) BUOI..

(Translation.)

*Vienna, November 11, 1853.*

THE Imperial Government has seen with concern by the communication which the Sublime Porte addressed to your Excellency on the 4th of October last (Moharem 1, 1270), that the Government of His Majesty the Sultan had abandoned the hope of settling peaceably its difference with the Emperor of Russia.

The regrets of the Court of Austria were the more warranted, since at the very moment when the Sublime Porte was appealing to the fate of arms, the Emperor of Russia was repeating at Olmütz assurances which, in the estimation of the Cabinet of Vienna, were calculated to augment the chances of a pacific solution. Be that as it may, the Court of Vienna, convinced of the great importance of maintaining the principle recorded in the preamble of the Treaty of the 13th July, 1841, and animated with the most sincere desire for the preservation of the general peace, has endeavoured to ascertain the resolutions which the Porte's declaration of war might evoke on the part of the Emperor of Russia.

She has obtained to her great satisfaction the conviction that the conciliatory dispositions of His Imperial Majesty have undergone no change, and that he does not consider the thread of negotiations to be broken by the fact of the declaration of war.

If the Emperor demands that the Greek religion and clergy should continue to enjoy their spiritual privileges, His Majesty expressly means that they should do so under the protection of the Sultan. He declares that he has no desire to assail the independence and the rights of that Sovereign, nor to interfere in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. All that Russia desires to obtain is an assurance of the strict maintenance of the religious *status quo* of the Greek religion, that is to say, entire equality of rights and immunities between the Greek Church and the other Christian communities subjects of the Porte: consequently, enjoyment in favour of the Greek Church of the advantages already granted to those communities, as well as participation in those which the Sultan might hereafter concede to other Christian sects. On this basis the Cabinet of St. Petersburg is ready to enter immediately and directly with the Ottoman Government into negotiations for peace, the seat of which, according to it, might be established at Bucharest. Meanwhile, the Emperor of Russia, notwithstanding the Porte's declaration of war, has declared his intention of making no alteration in his present attitude, and has given orders to his troops to remain on the defensive. Being fully persuaded that His Majesty the Sultan, on his side, has nothing more at heart than to put an end as quickly as possible to the effusion of blood which has unhappily already commenced, and that he is consequently resolved to maintain unaltered the points already conceded to Russia, the Cabinet of Vienna, taking into account these intentions of the Sultan, together with those which the Emperor of Russia has so positively declared, cannot renounce the hope that negotiations for peace, preceded by an armistice, would speedily terminate in a prompt and frank reconciliation. It is with this hope that I instruct your Excellency urgently to press the Sublime Porte favourably to receive the proposals contained in the present despatch, and dictated by the sincere friendship which the Emperor, our august master, entertains for the Sultan, as well as by the lively interest which he feels in the speedy re-establishment of good relations between the two neighbouring Empires.

Your Excellency is authorized to deliver to Reshid Pasha a copy of this despatch, and to signify to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the high value we set on seeing it received in the same conciliatory spirit as that by which the present step is dictated.

Receive, &c.  
(Signed) BUOL.

No. 237.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, November 15, 1853.*

WITH reference to your despatch of the 5th instant, in which you report that you have been informed by Count Nesselrode of the appointment of General Budberg as Russian Commissioner in the Principalities, I have to observe that although Count Nesselrode has assured you that it is not the intention of the Emperor to incorporate the two Provinces, yet his Excellency must be aware of the unfavourable impression that will be produced by the appointment of a Russian Commissioner, and the inferences that must necessarily be drawn from it, viz., that Commissioner means Governor, and Governor means permanent retention of the Principalities; and this inference will be further justified by the reason given for the appointment, as the absence of the Hospodars is duly provided for by the "Réglemens Organiques" of the two Principalities. A council to carry on the Government was appointed accordingly; the members of which it was composed were presented to Prince Gortchakoff, who, as Her Majesty's Government are informed, recognised their official character by desiring them to make it publicly known that if any person (of any rank whatever) should indulge in remarks on Russia, or on the present state of affairs, in the slightest degree disparagingly to the Imperial Government, such offender should immediately be hanged, be he Grand Bano (the highest rank), or simple elder of a village.

You will, however, ask Count Nesselrode what the intentions of the Russian Government really are, and you will formally protest in the name of Her Majesty's Government against any project of incorporating the Principalities either now or at any future period with Russia.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 238.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, November 16, 1853.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 11th instant, requesting instructions for your guidance in the event of a Russian military officer being appointed to the government of the Danubian Principalities, I have to inform you that it has been left to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople to give the necessary instructions to Her Majesty's Consuls in the Principalities; but if the government provided by the Constitution is superseded by a Russian Commissioner or Governor, it will be impossible for any English political agent to remain there.

I transmit to you a copy of a despatch\* which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Minister at St. Petersburg on this subject, in reply to his despatch to which you refer.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 239.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, November 16, 1853.*

I INCLOSE the copy of a despatch† which I have this day addressed to Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna, with reference to the instructions which Count

Buol proposes to send to the Internuncio, as stated in the inclosed copy of a despatch\* which I have received from Lord Westmorland.

Your Excellency will communicate my despatch to Lord Westmorland to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and inform me whether it meets with the concurrence of the French Government.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 240.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, November 16, 1853.*

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatch of the 8th instant, inclosing the draft of instructions which Count Buol proposes to send to the Internuncio for the direction of his conduct in recommending to the Government of the Sultan the course they might pursue in the negotiation with Russia, which will have been proposed to them by the collective note of the four Representatives.

Your Lordship states that Count Buol is aware that in the mediating position of Austria more management of terms is required towards Russia than from England and France, but the objects to be obtained by the Four Powers being the same, a general concordance in the way of putting them forward may be of the greatest utility.

Your Lordship will renew to Count Buol the assurances of the satisfaction that Her Majesty's Government will experience in cooperating with the Austrian Government towards the re-establishment of friendly relations between Russia and the Porte; but it seems necessary in the first instance to agree upon the collective note that is to be presented to the Porte, before the instructions with reference to the answer that is to be returned to it are taken into consideration.

The note should in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government simply state the desire of the Four Powers to mediate between the belligerent parties, and to stop the further effusion of blood; that they have received assurances of the readiness of Russia to treat, and not doubting that the Porte is animated by the same spirit, they request to know upon what conditions the Turkish Government is willing to negotiate a Treaty of Peace.

On the assumption that this form of collective note is adopted by the Four Powers, I will now proceed to state the views of Her Majesty's Government upon Count Buol's draft of instructions.

Her Majesty's Government do not consider that the object which the Four Powers have in view would be advanced by an argument founded on the conciliatory dispositions displayed by Russia. The recent manifesto of the Emperor, the appointment of a Russian Governor in the Principalities, and the announcement of Prince Gortchakoff that the subjects of the Sultan in Wallachia and Moldavia who spoke disrespectfully of Russia should be hanged without trial, render the allusion suggested by Count Buol impossible; but Her Majesty's Government entirely concur with his Excellency that no project of answer should be submitted to the Turkish Minister, and they should be left free to reply in the manner they may think fitting.

In the probable event of the four Representatives being consulted with respect to the answer, Her Majesty's Government, taking the different heads in the order proposed by Count Buol, would be prepared to recommend—

1st. That the Porte should declare that it always has manifested its desire to put an end to the difference, and is still ready to come to an understanding with Russia.

2nd. That the Porte having received formal assurances through the Four Powers that Russia seeks no rights nor any new concessions from the Sultan, and upon the condition that the Principalities are evacuated with the least possible delay, is prepared on her part to renew her former offers.

3rd. That the form in which peace shall be re-established and the religious question settled shall be matter for negotiation, upon the understanding that the Porte is not required to accede to any demands to which she has already objected.

4th. That the Porte should appoint a negotiator and furnish him with full powers to treat with a Russian negotiator.

5th. Her Majesty's Government, without any desire to fetter the decision of the Porte, will certainly recommend that the Russian and Turkish Plenipotentiaries should not meet together alone, and that the place of meeting should not be in any portion of the Sultan's territory now occupied by Russian troops. Her Majesty's Government consider that the intervention of the Four Powers in the settlement of a question which vitally affects the present and future peace of Europe is indispensable, and they think that the neutral place in which the negotiations for this object are to be conducted, should be left to the selection of the Porte, subject, of course, to the assent of Russia.

6th. The cessation of hostilities would at this moment manifestly be to the disadvantage of the Porte: if she were now to consent to an armistice for six weeks, at the end of which the negotiators found themselves unable to agree upon the terms of peace, but during which Russian reinforcements would have arrived in the Principalities, the position of Russia would be greatly improved, while that of Turkey would be proportionably deteriorated. But if the Porte received assurances from the Four Powers that the terms on which she was willing to treat would, without any essential modification, be accepted by Russia, then Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to recommend that an armistice should be forthwith concluded between the belligerent parties, who should fix the line of demarcation that would separate the two armies.

Your Lordship will give a copy of this despatch to Count Buol. If his Excellency agrees in the advice which Her Majesty's Government is prepared to offer to the Porte, instructions to that effect will be sent to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, provided that they meet with the concurrence of the French Government. This despatch shall be communicated by Lord Cowley to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who will doubtless send instructions by telegraph to the Baron de Bourqueney.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 241.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, November 16, 1853.*

YOUR Lordship's despatch of the 10th instant, inclosing a copy of a despatch from Count Buol to Baron Bruck, has been received and laid before the Queen.

Her Majesty's Government could not have concurred in Count Buol's despatch, and they are satisfied, therefore, that they came to a right decision in declining to agree to any proposal to the Turkish Government that had not previously been proposed for their consideration; but they regret that Count Buol did not think it expedient to comply with their request, as little if any delay would have been thereby occasioned, and Count Buol might possibly have been persuaded not to take a step which Her Majesty's Government fear will prove useless.

The despatch to Baron Bruck contains nothing new; it merely reiterates the assurances that the Emperor of Russia has always been willing to give, but it affords no intimation, and still less any guarantee, to the Porte that His Imperial Majesty desists from demanding rights which he professes to have no intention of exercising; and if the Turkish Government now consented to an armistice and to commence a negotiation upon the vague and indefinite terms proposed to them by Count Buol, they would simply restore things to the state in which they were on the day that Prince Menchikoff quitted Constantinople.

Her Majesty's Government accordingly regret that offers which cannot be accepted should be made to the Porte, as they must serve to irritate the Turkish Government and to indispose them to listen to advice which it would be for their interest to adopt.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

P.S.—You will communicate this despatch to Count Buol.

No. 242.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Scymour.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, November 16, 1853.*

THE manifesto of the Emperor of Russia has been received with astonishment and regret by Her Majesty's Government, and by all classes of people in this country.

It may be intended only for the Russian people; but a manifesto assigning the reasons of the Emperor of Russia for declaring war against Turkey is a document of the highest importance, and challenges the criticism of Europe.

It is difficult to comprehend what can have been the inducement to put forward statements that recent events enable every man to contradict. Facts do not bear out the statement that the principal Powers of Europe had in vain endeavoured to shake the blind obstinacy of the Porte; it is true that they endeavoured to mediate, and the Porte showed itself willing to adopt their advice with certain modifications; those Powers then attempted to shake the determination of Russia, but in vain; they received only proofs of how real were the dangers apprehended by the Porte.

The manifesto complains of the violation of Treaties, and implies that the Greek religion in Turkey stands in need of defence; but no Treaty has been violated by the Porte, and no specific charge of that nature has at any time been brought forward; no complaint has been heard from the Greek Patriarch or the Greek subjects of the Sultan: on the contrary, there have been expressions of gratitude to the Sultan for the privileges he has confirmed, and they have not invoked the protectorate that Russia was desirous to exercise.

No Treaty has in fact been violated except that which forbids the passage of the Pruth to Russian soldiers; and Russia has no right to say she has been provoked to war, when the Sultan, after long forbearance, endeavours to repel the invader from the Turkish soil. The Sultan has not appealed to the fanaticism of his people, and he has given no offence to Russia beyond refusing to grant what Russia had no right to demand, and which it would have been fatal to his independence to concede.

A comparison between the conduct and the good faith of the two Powers has thus been forced upon Europe, and the manifesto has therefore rendered signal service to Turkey.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 243.

*Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 17.)*

(Extract.)

*Berlin, November 15, 1853.*

I AGAIN reverted this evening, in conversation with Baron Manteuffel, to the position of the Prussian Agents in the Danubian Provinces since the departure of the Hospodars.

His Excellency informed me that he had learnt from Baron Wildenbruch that this subject had been mentioned to him by Reshid Pasha, and that Baron Wildenbruch had stated to the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs that, as those Consular Agents were accredited to the persons of the Hospodars, their official functions would cease on the departure of those Princes.

Baron Manteuffel told me that as these agents are under the direction of the Prussian Minister at Constantinople, it is probable that Baron Wildenbruch will have instructed them in the sense of his statement to Reshid Pasha.

His Excellency added, that it was desirable that they should not be withdrawn, as they might at this moment be called upon to render material service in protecting Prussian subjects.

I remarked, that they should take care to guard against any act which could be taken as a recognition of the Government installed by Russia; and that, therefore, any services which they might be called upon to render to Prussian subjects should be exercised "officieusement," and not officially.

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No. 244.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 18.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, November 17, 1853.*

M. DE LHUYS has addressed a circular to the French Diplomatic Agents abroad in the sense and spirit of your Lordship's circular of the 7th instant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

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No. 245.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 18.)*

(Extract.)

*Vienna, November 14, 1853.*

I READ to Count Buol your Lordship's despatch of the 9th instant, which reports the communication made to you by Count Colloredo of the despatch addressed to him by Count Buol after the Conference of the 30th ultimo, and which also states the opinions your Lordship expressed in reply to Count Colloredo.

Count Buol considers these opinions as agreeing with his own in substance, and differing only in details easy of explanation.

Your Lordship desired that the note proposed by Count Buol to be addressed by the four Representatives at Constantinople to the Porte, should be transmitted to London for approval. He considered this desire perfectly natural, but he would prefer having the note emanate from you, to drawing it up himself. So much delay had, however, taken place since he received the declaration of the readiness of the Russian Government to treat, and serious events pressed on so rapidly, that he felt it was obligatory upon him not to withhold a day longer than necessary informing the Turkish Government of the opening offered for negotiation. He had fulfilled this obligation by his despatch to the Internuncio, of which he had placed a copy in the hands of the Representatives at the Conference, but he had little expectation of any successful result from this document; and he had therefore forwarded the Russian proposals merely as discharging a duty imposed upon him, and had abstained from entering into the merits of them, and had confined his opinions upon them to his communications with the Conference, and the proposed instructions to the Internuncio, which he had confidentially submitted to Baron Bourqueney and me. He felt convinced that the only chance that existed of inducing the Porte to listen to the recommendations he had proposed to offer, was that they should be supported by the combined influence of the Four Powers. He had, therefore, abstained from forwarding them, in the hope that your Lordship would now draw up a note, which he would receive with the anxious desire of concurring in it, and should he consider any modification desirable, it might be speedily arranged by telegraphic communication. He will greatly prefer that the note should originate in London rather than Vienna.

Count Buol hopes that your Lordship will not delay in transmitting to him, first, the project of note to be addressed to the Porte, inviting the Sultan's Government to treat; and secondly, the general form and stipulations of the Treaty.

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No. 246.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 18.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, November 6, 1853.*

I BEG to transmit to your Lordship a letter which reached me yesterday evening from Mr. Consul-General Yeames, giving an account of the affair between the small Russian flotilla and the Turkish batteries of Isaktcha, which took place on the 23rd ultimo.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 246.

*Consul-General Yeames to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Odessa, October 28, 1853.*

THE announcement of your sudden departure from St. Petersburg in one of the Russian newspapers, subsequently contradicted, could not fail, for a time, causing me extreme inquietude; and to the present day every circumstance around us is of a nature to darken the gloom rather than to inspire confidence.

I shall probably not be the first to inform you, Sir, that hostilities commenced on the Danube early in the morning of last Sunday, the 23rd instant.

Eight gun-boats, with six companies on board, had on the preceding day been detached from the Russian flotilla stationed at Ismail, to proceed to Galatz and Ibraila in tow of two steamers, the "Pruth" of 100, and the "Vodinaretz," of 60 horse-power. On nearing Isaktcha, it became evident that the further progress of the boats would be opposed; upon which four guns were hastily brought down to the left bank from Satanova, where 6,000 Russians are posted, in order to cover the passage, and a cannonade immediately ensued from both sides across the river. The Turkish fire was soon diverted by the approach of the flotilla, upon which it was then directed; the cannonade was returned by the boats, and continued until it had ascended beyond the line of the Turkish fire.

The passage was thus effected, and its success is said to have caused animation along the Russian lines.

The loss on this side is reported to be 3 killed and 3 wounded, at the Satanova battery; and in the boats, 6 killed and 70 wounded, and among those that fell was unfortunately the commanding officer of the expedition.

I have seen no account of the extent of damage done to the steamer and gun-boats; but it is asserted that the Turkish battery was dismantled, and that the village of Isaktcha was seen in flames in two different places.

I am told that on the night of that day a Turkish force crossed over into Tehetal, one of the islands of the Delta opposite to Ismail, with guns, and opened a fire upon the bridge of pontoons at that place.

The particulars are not yet known to me, but it is certain that many of the inhabitants of Ismail have in their alarm fled into the country.

Apprehensions are manifested, even here, of some possible hostile demonstration by sea, and orders have been given to strengthen the batteries of the two moles.

Yesterday an Austrian steamer arrived from the Bosphorus, having on board the remaining members of the late Russian Mission, and after having landed her passengers, immediately sailed on its return.

Our news from Constantinople comes down to the 24th. There were no disturbances in that city.

The combined fleets had not arrived, but a part of them was expected on the following day.

I am sorry to say that hostilities are reported to have taken place on the Asiatic frontiers likewise.

Great efforts were still made to bring forward new armaments, exhibiting a greater vitality than Turkey was supposed to possess.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) JAMES YEAMES.

No. 247.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 19.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, October 29, 1853.*

HOSTILITIES commenced between Turkey and Russia on Sunday, the 23rd instant.

The officer who was sent to Shumla with the Porte's orders for a suspension of hostilities arrived there too late. I have applied to Reshid Pasha for an explanation of this incident, which, however, is practically of little consequence in the present state of our information from Vienna; and his Highness has replied that Omar Pasha, calculating from the day on which he knew that his summons had been received by Prince Gortchakoff, considered the term of fifteen days as having expired on Sunday, the 23rd. It appears from Colonel Neale's report, that the Porte's officer disembarked at Varna on the 22nd, and proceeded to Shumla without delay.

No. 248.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 19.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, October 31, 1853.*

RESHID PASHA has for some time made up his mind to confirm the Porte's original instructions to the Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia, commanding them to retire from their respective Principalities; but the preparation of the letters addressed to them for that purpose has undergone some unexplained delay. The letters are now ready, and have the Sultan's sanction for their transmission to Bucharest and Jassy; but the state of war between Russia and Turkey has obliged the Porte to request my assistance for conveying them respectively to those places.

This I propose to do in concert with the French Ambassador, who agrees with me in approving Reshid Pasha's opinion that the Consuls accredited to the Hospodars ought to withdraw, as the latter are commanded to do, from the Principalities.

Feeling myself at liberty under your Lordship's instructions to act in this manner, I have given the necessary directions to Mr. Colquhoun and also to Mr. Gardner.

A copy of my despatch to both of them is inclosed herewith; and M. de la Cour writes to their French colleagues in the same sense.

With respect to Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Galatz and Ibraila, I am still desirous of leaving him at his post for the protection of our commercial and shipping interests.

A copy of the instruction which I have addressed to him is inclosed herewith. It remains to be seen how long the course of events in the Black Sea will allow him to act upon it.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 248.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Consul Gardner.*

Sir,

*Therapia, October 31, 1853.*

THE Porte having confirmed its original orders to the two Hospodars, to the effect of commanding them in the Sultan's name to retire from the Principalities, after making such temporary arrangement as circumstances may allow

for the administration of the country by means of the Boyards, and hostilities having actually commenced between the respective armies on the Danube, I have to instruct you to retire with all convenient expedition from the Principality of Moldavia, after providing for the safety of the Consular correspondence, archives, and deposits, in the most available manner you may have it in your power to adopt.

You are authorised to leave some person, having the proper qualifications and worthy of confidence, to look after the more urgent interests of British subjects; and before your departure you will introduce the object of your choice to the principal local authority for that purpose.

Instructions of similar purport are addressed by the French Ambassador to M. Poujade and to M. Tastu.

As you will probably find it most convenient to repair to Varna, I shall take care to provide you with suitable means of conveyance from that port to Constantinople.

I am, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

N.B.—A similar despatch was addressed on the same day to Consul Colquhoun.

Inclosure 2 in No. 248.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Consul Cunningham.*

Sir,

*Therapia, October 31, 1853.*

I INCLOSE herewith for your own information a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to-day to Her Majesty's Consuls at Bucharest and Jassy.

Mr. Colquhoun having a political character as agent, and Mr. Gardner residing at the court of a Prince, similarly circumstanced with the Hospodar of Wallachia, there could be no hesitation as to the propriety of their retirement from the Principalities. The case is different with respect to you; and commercial and shipping interests placed under your charge have the strongest claims to our protection, especially at a moment when the exportation of grain to England and France is going on to so great an extent. It is, therefore, my wish and intention that you should hold on as long as possible, applying to the local authorities while you are allowed to do so with good effect, and even to the Russian intruders, when forced by their arrangements to do so. How long this annoyance may be necessary, and how soon it may cease to be possible, I cannot yet undertake to say; but my expectation is, that the Russian Commander-in-chief will now exert a direct authority over the Principalities, and it is impossible to shut one's eyes to the contingencies which may raise immediate differences and bring on rupture and war between Russia on the one side, and England and France on the other.

The combined squadrons are now within the Dardanelles, and detachments of them will be in the Bosphorus as soon as the violence of the prevalent north-east winds will allow.

I am, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 249.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 19.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, October 31, 1853.*

THE Sultan has publicly announced his intention of going to Adrianople in the spring, with the view, as it would seem, of encouraging his army, and perhaps even of making his appearance at the camp. This ulterior object is

rather intimated than announced in the rescript or hatti sheriff addressed by His Majesty to the Grand Vizier, copy of which, in translation, is herewith inclosed for your Lordship's more complete information.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 249.

*Hatti-Sheriff.*

(Traduction.)

Mon Illustre Vizir,

DU jour que la probabilité que les différends survenus entre notre Sublime Porte et la Cour de Russie aboutiraient à une guerre, a acquis de la consistance, j'ai observé dans nos troupes Impériales, et parmi tous les fonctionnaires et tous nos sujets, à l'occasion des préparatifs de tout genre qui étaient entrepris, un enthousiasme et des preuves de zèle et de fidélité qui ont mérité tous mes éloges ; et je ne doute pas que dans cette circonstance chacun redoublera désormais de zèle et d'efforts dans l'accomplissement de son devoir.

Comme l'objet principal de cette guerre est de maintenir les droits sacrés et l'indépendance de notre Sublime Porte, j'ai pris la résolution, mettant ma confiance dans l'assistance divine du Souverain Créateur et dans les mérites du Saint Prophète, et pour prendre part en personne à l'accomplissement d'un pareil devoir, de me mettre, s'il plaît à Dieu, en voyage au printemps prochain.

Il faut par conséquent que l'on fasse dès à présent les préparatifs nécessaires de notre voyage Impérial suivi d'un cortège ; notre première station sera à Andrinople, et il faut fournir les troupes qui doivent m'accompagner de tous les objets dont elles ont besoin. Tu auras donc à te concerter avec tous nos Ministres pour prendre les mesures que la circonstance exige.

Que le Tres-Haut veuille, par considération pour son Saint Prophète, notre Seigneur, faire toujours triompher notre Sublime Porte, et combler de bonheur dans ce monde et dans l'autre ceux qui auront fait preuve de zèle dans cette cause sacrée.

*Le 18 Moharem, 1270. (31 Octobre, 1853.)*

(Translation.)

My Illustrious Vizier,

FROM the day that the probability that the differences which have arisen between our Sublime Porte and the Court of Russia would terminate in war, became more evident, I have remarked in my Imperial troops, and among all the functionaries and all my subjects, as regards the preparations of all kinds which were in progress, an enthusiasm and proofs of zeal and fidelity which have deserved all my commendation ; and I have no doubt that, under these circumstances, every one will henceforth be doubly zealous and active in the discharge of his duty.

As the principal object of this war is the maintenance of the sacred rights and the independence of my Sublime Porte, I have resolved, placing my confidence in the divine assistance of the Sovereign Creator and in the merits of the Holy Prophet, and in order personally to take part in the fulfilment of such a duty, to undertake a journey, if it please God, in the ensuing spring.

It is, therefore, requisite that the necessary preparations should, from the present time, be made for my Imperial journey, attended by my suite ; my first halting-place will be at Adrianople, and the troops which are to accompany me must be provided with all things of which they stand in need. You will accordingly have to arrange with all the Ministers for the adoption of the measures which the circumstances require.

May the Most High, out of regard for his Holy Prophet, our Lord, vouchsafe ever to grant success to my Sublime Porte, and abundantly to bestow happiness in this world and in the next upon all those who shall have evinced zeal in this sacred cause.

*The 18 Moharem, 1270. (October 31, 1853.)*

No. 250.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 19.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, October 31, 1853.*

THE Greeks have followed the example of the Armenians in presenting an address to the Porte expressive of their loyalty, gratitude, and devotion to the Sultan's Government. A French translation of the address is inclosed herewith for your Lordship's information.

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Inclosure in No. 250.

*Address of the Greek Nation to the Porte.*

(Traduction.)

LA nation Grecque, humble et fidèle sujette de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, rend grâces à Dieu qui, dans sa sagesse providentielle, avait inspiré à Hazreti-Omer, de glorieuse mémoire, de promulguer, il y a douze siècles, l'édit sacré que prescrit que la vie, la propriété et l'honneur des Chrétiens Grecs que la volonté Divine venait de placer sous l'égide de la Puissance Mahométane, soient protégées et sauvegardées à l'instar de celles des Musulmans, sujets également du même Trône Impérial et dont les Chrétiens partagent naturellement et les joies et les peines. Elle se rappelle avec reconnaissance des faveurs signalées dont elle a été l'objet de la part de Sultan Mehmed le Conquérant, d'illustre mémoire, et des autres Souverains de la dynastie glorieuse d'Ali-Osman. Mais ce qui rend encore plus profonds les sentiments de gratitude dont elle est pénétrée en ce moment, ce sont les bienfaits innombrables qui ont résulté pour elle par le Tanzimati-Haïryé que Sa Majesté Impériale, notre gracieux Souverain et Maître actuel, dans sa bonté inépuisable pour ses peuples et dans sa sollicitude sans exemple pour le bien-être et la prospérité de tous ses sujets sans distinction, a bien voulu octroyer, et dont les dispositions sages et salutaires préservent intacts devant la loi les droits de toutes les classes de sujets; ce sont les différents rescrits autographes Impériaux, par lesquels Sa Majesté a daigné confirmer et consolider les privilèges religieux spirituels et les immunités accordés à notre nation et à notre Patriarcat; et en outre, les ordonnances Impériales successivement promulguées, et par lesquelles tous les sujets de l'Empire, natifs du même sol, appartenant à la même patrie et destinés à la même condition, sont appelés et exhortés à se conduire avec bienveillance les uns envers les autres et à observer entre eux une union cordiale. Par conséquent la nation Grecque, dans sa profonde reconnaissance, ne cesse d'adresser au Ciel des prières ferventes pour la conservation des jours précieux de Sa Majesté Impériale et pour sa prospérité et sa gloire, et elle est prête à offrir au Trône Impérial, en tout temps et lieu, en paix et en guerre, tous les services, quoique faibles, dont elle est capable, pour faciliter la réussite des projets généreux du Gouvernement Impérial, et pour les intérêts de l'Empire.

Il est notoire à tout le monde, et d'une vérité incontestable, que non seulement par la position que la Providence nous a accordée sous l'autorité bienveillante des Augustes Souverains de la Dynastie Ottomane, mais, en outre, par l'effet d'une reconnaissance sans bornes et de notre attachement naturel à la terre de notre naissance, il est le devoir constant et sacré de notre nation de servir fidèlement les vues magnanimes et la gloire de Sa Majesté Impériale, notre gracieux Souverain et Maître, qui est pour nous l'unique refuge de bien-être et de sécurité.

Encore est-il facile à concevoir quelle satisfaction immense nous a procurée et combien nous a rendus fiers la résolution digne et généreuse que le Gouvernement Impérial vient de prendre dans les circonstances actuelles, pour préserver les droits sacrés de souveraineté de Sa Majesté Impériale et l'indépendance de l'Empire, et combien cette attitude ferme et intrépide du Gouvernement Impérial a stimulé notre zèle et notre promptitude à remplir nos devoirs. Et quoiqu'il soit notoire que les habitants de Roumélie, pour la

plupart Grecs, Bulgares et Albanais, nos coreligionnaires, ainsi que ceux qui se trouvent dans l'Anatolie, sujets fidèles et reconnaissants du Trône Impérial, et animés des mêmes sentiments d'intérêt et d'enthousiasme que les sujets Musulmans de l'Empire, leurs compatriotes, leurs proches et leurs associés de condition et de devoirs, continuent à faire preuve d'un dévouement réel par des services qu'ils rendent aux armées Impériales, autant que les facultés de chacun le comportent et que la légalité et l'équité le permettent, notre Patriarcat s'est empressé d'écrire et d'expédier aux populations susmentionnées, nos coreligionnaires, de nouveaux conseils et de nouvelles exhortations pour qu'elles aient à veiller jour et nuit et à consacrer tous leurs efforts à l'accomplissement de leurs devoirs de fidélité et de reconnaissance envers notre gracieux Souverain et Maître, et à se conformer strictement et avec empressement aux ordres de leurs Excellences les Généraux de l'Empire et les Gouverneurs des provinces.

En conclusion, la nation Grecque, dans l'impossibilité où elle est d'exprimer d'une manière complète par des paroles ses sentiments de profonde gratitude pour les bienfaits immenses dont elle est redevable à Sa Majesté Impériale et à son Gouvernement éclairé, se borne à adresser des prières ardentes à l'Etre-Suprême pour qu'il accorde à Sa Majesté sa divine assistance pour amener à une heureuse et glorieuse réussite ses hautes résolutions et ses entreprises, ainsi que les conseils sages de ses illustres Ministres.

(Translation.)

THE Greek nation, the humble and faithful subjects of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, return thanks to God, who in his providential wisdom incited Hazreti-Omer, of glorious memory, twelve hundred years ago to promulgate the sacred edict which declares that the lives, the property, and the honour of the Greek Christians, whom the Divine will had placed under the protection of the Mahomedan Power, should be defended and protected in like manner as those of Mussulmans, equally subjects of the same Imperial Throne, and whose joys and troubles are naturally shared by the Christians. They remember with gratitude the signal favours of which they have been the object on the part of Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror, of illustrious memory, and of the other sovereigns of the glorious dynasty of Ali Osman. But what makes the sentiments of gratitude with which they are filled at the present time still more deep, are the innumerable benefits which have resulted to them from the Tanzimati-Haïryé which His Imperial Majesty, our present gracious Sovereign and Master, in his exhaustible goodness towards his people, and in his unexampled solicitude for the welfare and prosperity of his subjects without distinction, condescended to grant, and the wise and salutary provisions of which preserve untouched before the law the rights of all classes of subjects; the various autograph and Imperial rescripts by which His Majesty has deigned to confirm and consolidate the religious and spiritual privileges, and the immunities granted to our nation and to our patriarchate; and, in addition, the Imperial ordinances successively promulgated, by which all subjects of the Empire, natives of the same soil, belonging to the same country, and destined to the same lot, are called upon and exhorted to behave with good-will towards each other, and to preserve a cordial union among themselves. The Greek nation consequently, in their profound gratitude, cease not to address to Heaven fervent prayers for the preservation of the precious days of His Imperial Majesty, and for his prosperity and glory; and they are ready to offer to the Imperial Throne at all times and places, in peace and in war, any services they are capable of, however small, in order to facilitate the success of the generous projects of the Imperial Government, and for the interests of the Empire.

It is notorious to everybody, and an incontestable truth, that, not only from the position which Providence has awarded to us under the benevolent authority of the august Sovereigns of the Ottoman dynasty, but also as the result of boundless gratitude and of our natural attachment to the land of our birth, it is the constant and sacred duty of our nation faithfully to serve the noble views and the glory of His Imperial Majesty our gracious Sovereign and Master, who is the only refuge of our prosperity and security.

Again, it is easy to conceive what immense satisfaction the worthy and generous determination which the Imperial Government has arrived at under

present circumstances, to preserve the sacred rights of sovereignty of His Imperial Majesty and the independence of the Empire, has afforded us, and how bold it has made us, and to what an extent this firm and fearless attitude of the Imperial Government has stimulated our zeal and our readiness to fulfil our duties. And though it be notorious that the inhabitants of Roumelia, for the most part Greeks, Bulgarians, and Albanians, our co-religionists, as well as those who are in Anatolia, faithful and grateful subjects of the Imperial throne, and animated by the same feelings of interest and enthusiasm as the Mussulman subjects of the Empire, their compatriots, their neighbours, and their companions in fate and in duty, continue to manifest a sincere devotion by the services which they render to the Imperial armies, as far as the power of each admits, and as law and justice allow, our Patriarchate has hastened to write and to send to the above-named populations, our co-religionists, renewed counsels and recommendations, in order that they should watch day and night, and devote all their efforts to the fulfilment of their duties of fidelity and of gratitude towards our gracious Sovereign and Master, and comply strictly and zealously with the orders of their Excellencies the Generals of the Empire and the Governors of the provinces.

In conclusion, the Greek nation, impossible as they find it to express completely by words their sentiments of profound gratitude for the vast benefits for which they are indebted to His Imperial Majesty and to his enlightened Government, confine themselves to addressing ardent prayers to the Supreme Being that He would grant His Majesty his divine assistance to bring to a happy and glorious issue his exalted resolutions and undertakings, as well as the wise councils of his illustrious Ministers.

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No. 251.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 19.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, November 5, 1853.*

THE respective Commanders-in-chief of the two combined squadrons now within the Dardanelles having come up to Constantinople at the request of M. de la Cour and myself, a meeting of the Ambassadors and Admirals took place at my house on the night of the 1st instant, the latter not having been able to arrive here till that day.

The result of our conversation, founded on the professional opinions expressed by Vice-Admirals Dundas and Hamelin, was that the remaining portions of the two squadrons should be brought up to this part of the Bosphorus, and that, considering the large Russian force at Sevastopol, supposed to be ready for sea, it would not otherwise be expedient either for the Turks to undertake any naval operation of consequence in the Black Sea, or for the commanders of the British and French squadrons to send detachments thither with the view of protecting any part of the Ottoman coast that might be exposed to attack.

The French Ambassador agreed with me in making a previous reference to Reshid Pasha, for the purpose of putting him in full possession of our views, in so far as concerned the principles on which we were prepared to act, and to ascertain in return the real intentions of the Porte, as well with respect to negotiation as to the course of operations contemplated by the Sultan's Ministers by land and sea. We felt that it was indispensable for the honour of our respective Governments, no less than for the successful prosecution of our common purposes, that the Porte's communications to us should be wholly unreserved; and that we should be at full liberty to express our opinions thereon, with a certainty of their receiving a proper degree of attention from the Sultan's Ministers.

The accompanying copies of my instructions to M. Pisani, and of his report to me, will best acquaint your Lordship with the terms in which my agreement with M. de la Cour was carried into effect, and with the answer obtained from the Ottoman Secretary of State.

I have to add that on the morning of the 2nd instant I went down to Constantinople and had an interview with Reshid Pasha, on which occasion I urged

the several points of my instruction to M. Pisani, and endeavoured to make it clearly understood that the Porte could not be allowed under present circumstances to follow out its own notions, without a suitable and constant attention to the advice of its allies. I further impressed upon his Highness' mind the importance of keeping a door open for pacific arrangements, notwithstanding the commencement of hostilities; and I repeated my exhortations against any attempt on the part of Omar Pasha to cross the Danube with his army at the present juncture. The Pasha's language was moderate, and he evidently shared my opinion as to the last-mentioned point. He told me, however, that he could state nothing officially without the authority of the Council; and I left him after obtaining a promise that he would assemble his colleagues in Council that very evening, and put them in possession faithfully of whatever I had submitted to him.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 251.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.*

Sir,

*Therapia, November 1, 1853.*

IT is desirable that you should wait on the Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs with the least practicable delay. I wish you to inform his Highness that the intended detachments from the squadrons are arrived here after a detention of several days, owing to bad weather. The Commanders-in-chief of the two squadrons are also here. Hostile operations having already commenced between Turkey and Russia, and ships of war from both countries being in the Black Sea, it would be very imprudent to continue in a state of uncertainty as to the most advisable course of proceedings.

The British and French Ambassadors are entitled to receive from the Porte an unreserved explanation of its intentions; and a knowledge of the intended operations, whether naval or military, is absolutely necessary for them to determine, in concert with their respective Admirals, in what manner their instructions may be most efficiently and prudently carried out.

On the one side their Governments are still at peace with Russia, and desirous not only to maintain a state of peace with that Power, but also to effect a reconciliation on just and honourable principles between the two belligerents. On the other, they are prepared to interpose their forces when necessary, in order to protect the Sultan's territory from aggression and attack.

It is to be understood that the present position of the combined squadrons, though one of cordial friendship and sympathy with the Porte, is not intended to display an aggressive attitude against Russia, but an effective readiness to protect the Sultan's dominions against any directly aggressive operation from that quarter.

Having given this explanation to Reshid Pasha, you will receive from his Highness and report to me whatever communications, declaratory of the Porte's intentions, he may think proper to make in reply to this appeal, and they will be duly considered by the Ambassadors and Admirals, with a view to the adoption of such measures as may be deemed most serviceable to the Sultan's interests, within the limits of their respective instructions.

It cannot be necessary for me to add, that we consider it an essential part of the friendly duties which we are called upon to perform, that we should not withhold from the Turkish Government the frank expression of our opinions as to the expediency or probable result of any operations which they may contemplate under present circumstances.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 251.

*M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Pera, November 3, 1853.*

IN reply to your Lordship's instruction of the 1st instant, which I have duly communicated to Reshid Pasha, I have the honour to report that his Highness informs me that the Ministerial Council having met last night at the Grand Vizier's residence in order to deliberate upon its contents, came to the conclusion that Omar Pasha and Selim Pasha shall be officially instructed, the former not to attempt the passage of the Danube by the army under his command in person, to keep upon the defensive, and to have the heights taken possession of by Ismail Pasha at Kalafat, carefully fortified to preclude the possibility of the enemy regaining them. The latter (Selim Pasha) is also directed to be prudent, keeping on the defensive as much as practicable, and not venturing too much.

The Turkish squadron, with the exception of the three-deckers, is to proceed to the Black Sea, and will probably be ready by Sunday. It is intended to cruise along the Asiatic shore, returning round by the Crimea and the European coast. Should it fall in with the enemy's squadron an attack is contemplated.

The combined squadrons are requested to go into the Black Sea for the purpose of interposing their forces in order to protect the Sultan's territory against invasion or attack. The Porte leaves it to the Admirals to decide how they will divide their forces; and furthermore, should the British and French Commanders deem it expedient, they are at liberty to order up the remainder of their fleets. For the convenience of that portion of the combined squadrons that may be ordered to the Black Sea, five ports are proposed as offering good shelter; namely, Sinope on the Asiatic shore, and Bourgas, Baltzik, Kavarna, and Klegra-Alti on the European side.

The Porte will be willing to come to an amicable arrangement of the pending question, if such a wish be expressed by Russia, and she begin by evacuating the Provinces and renouncing altogether her former demands, considering them null and void. The Porte, besides, thinks itself entitled to demand an indemnification for expenses of war.

These are the results of the Council held last night, but the sanction not having yet been obtained, this communication is to be considered for the present as private.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) ET. PISANI.

No. 252.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 19.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, November 5, 1853.*

I HAVE succeeded in dissuading the Porte from sending a detachment of line-of-battle ships and sailing-frigates into the Black Sea at this moment, and also in obtaining the transmission of orders to Omar Pasha to postpone any attempt which he may have in contemplation to pass the Danube at the head of his army; and to Selim Pasha, on the Asiatic frontier, to keep as much as possible on the defensive for the present.

But I cannot answer for the strict execution of these repressive instructions; and I am not without apprehension that such interference with the plans of the Commanders-in-chief may embarrass their proceedings, and give an unfair advantage to their opponents.

Her Majesty's Consul at Trebizond informs me that the officer sent from Constantinople with orders for Selim Pasha to suspend the commencement of hostilities for ten days, arrived at the camp some hours before any aggressive movement had taken place, but that an attack on the Russians was nevertheless made soon after, the bearer of the instruction himself taking part in the attack.

On applying to Reshid Pasha for an explanation of so strange a contradiction, he assured me that Mr. Stevens had not been correctly informed ; and that the attack had been made from the advanced post where Hassan Pasha held the immediate command.

It is impossible not to view with regret and anxiety this prolonged state of vacillation between peace and war. However well meant our efforts may be, it is impossible not to deny the embarrassment which they occasion to the Porte under its present circumstances ; and it is therefore to be hoped that some manifestations of reluctance at the Porte to continue in a state of such dangerous indecision may be viewed with friendly indulgence.

I inclose herewith extracts of my instructions to M. Pisani

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 252.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.*

*Therapia, November 5, 1853.*

I HOPE you understand fully the grounds on which I propose to act with respect to the squadrons. In the first place it is generally desirable that, being so far engaged in support of the Turkish Government, we should know beforehand what course is to be followed for obtaining the common object of our exertions, and have an opportunity of expressing an opinion thereon. In the second place, we have a more immediate concern with operations in the Black Sea. The presence of the combined squadrons in these waters is the basis of any Turkish operations to be undertaken there ; and among the consequences of those operations may at any time be our active participation in measures calculated to commit us with Russia. The Porte and her allies stand, therefore, in relations of mutual responsibility towards each other ; and we must at least be careful, on our side, that we are neither drawn into operations contrary to our better judgment, nor confounded with those who, against calculation and experience, incur hazards which are out of proportion with the results in view. We do not pretend to lay our commands upon the Porte, or to deprive her in any degree of her free liberty of action ; but we claim for ourselves the right of not partaking in measures which we do not approve, and of keeping aloof—and marking to the public that we keep aloof—when attempts are made to carry them into effect against our declared opinions.

Thus it is that, in the present instance, we suspend the orders for bringing up the remainder of the squadrons until we know the Porte's final decision with respect to the proposed expedition into the Black Sea.

Read and explain the above to Reshid Pasha.

Inclosure 2 in No. 252.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, November 5, 1853.*

SATURDAY, 12 o'clock.—I have just learnt that orders are come up for sending four line-of-battle ships and ten sailing-frigates into the Black Sea to-morrow. In consequence of this, I shall not order up the remainder of the squadron till I hear from Reshid Pasha that the intended enterprize, in so far as sailing-vessels are concerned, is abandoned.

You must tell his Highness, once for all, that we will not be drawn in the wake of the Porte ; and that if they want our support, they must be content to respect our opinions.

No. 253.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 19.)*¶

My Lord,

*Therapia, November 5, 1853.*

COPIES obtained from the Porte are inclosed herewith of a deprecatory letter to Reshid Pasha, from the Hospodar of Wallachia, and of a letter from his Highness to the same Prince, confirming the order formerly issued in the Sultan's name for his retirement from the Principality.

A similar letter has been addressed to the Hospodar of Moldavia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 253.

*Prince Stirbey to Reshid Pasha.*

Monseigneur,

*Bucarest, le  $\frac{11}{23}$  Octobre, 1853.*

VENANT de constater définitivement l'impossibilité d'envoyer à la Sublime Porte le montant du dernier trimestre du tribut annuel dont le terme venait d'échoir, j'ai l'honneur d'informer votre Altesse que je me fais un devoir de me conformer aux instructions qu'elle a bien voulu me transmettre par ses deux dépêches du 25 Juillet et du 30 Août derniers, qui me prescrivent de quitter provisoirement le pays s'il me devient impossible de continuer mes rapports comme par le passé. Après avoir remis le soin de l'administration pendant mon absence au Conseil Administratif, je me propose de partir après demain (Mercredi) par la voie du Danube pour aller rejoindre la Princesse à Paris, et de là nous rendre dans l'endroit de l'Italie, qui sera jugé le plus favorable à sa santé très altérée.

Avant de m'expatrier je remplis un devoir sacré en sollicitant la bienveillante entremise de votre Altesse pour déposer aux pieds de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan les hommages, &c.

(Signed) STIRBEY.

(Translation.)

Monseigneur,

*Bucharest, October  $\frac{11}{23}$ , 1853.*

HAVING lately ascertained the impossibility of sending to the Sublime Porte the amount of the last quarter of the yearly tribute now due, I have the honour to inform your Highness that I make it my duty to act in conformity with the instructions which you were pleased to transmit to me by your two despatches of the 25th of July and 30th of August last, which enjoin me provisionally to quit the country if it should become impossible for me to continue my relations as heretofore. After having made over to the Administrative Council the charge of the administration during my absence, I propose to set out the day after to-morrow (Wednesday), by the Danube, in order to rejoin the Princess at Paris, and from thence to proceed to that part of Italy which shall be considered most favourable to her very impaired health.

Before quitting my country, I discharge a sacred duty in soliciting the benevolent intervention of your Highness to lay at the feet of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan the homage, &c.

(Signed) STIRBEY.

## Inclosure 2 in No. 253.

*Reshid Pasha to Prince Stirbey.*

Mon Prince,

Constantinople, le  $\frac{1}{31}$ <sup>9</sup> Octobre, 1853.

DANS ma dépêche à votre Altesse en date du 30 Août dernier, je lui ai fait connaître la volonté de Sa Majesté Impériale que vous continueriez à rester à votre poste aussi longtemps que les relations habituelles entre la Porte et la Principauté seraient maintenus et qu'il aurait été en votre pouvoir de payer à leurs échéances les versements du tribut établi. Dans la réponse qui nous est parvenue dans le temps de la part de votre Altesse, il était dit qu'elle s'engageait à ce qu'il n'eût pas d'omission dans l'exécution de vos devoirs; mais en attendant, rien n'a démontré depuis lors que les anciennes relations aient continué à subsister, et le versement dont l'échéance était au mois Octobre n'a pas été payé. Au reste, ce n'est pas là actuellement la seule question dont il s'agit. Comme la guerre existe maintenant de fait, il est contraire aux règles en vigueur qu'un fonctionnaire tenant la nomination de la Porte puisse continuer à rester sur un territoire occupé par la partie adverse. Par conséquent, au reçu de cette dépêche votre Altesse voudra bien charger les principaux Boyards de la formation d'un Gouvernement provisoire requis par les circonstances, et elle s'empressera de quitter la Principauté sans délai.

Telle étant la volonté de Sa Majesté Impériale, toute hésitation de la part de votre Altesse de se conformer à cet ordre péremptoire aura évidemment pour elle un résultat préjudicial.

Je saisis, &c.  
(Signé) RESHID.

(Translation.)

Mon Prince,

Constantinople, October  $\frac{1}{31}$ <sup>9</sup>, 1853.

BY my despatch to your Highness of the 30th of August last, I made known to you His Imperial Majesty's pleasure that you should remain at your post so long as the ordinary relations between the Porte and the Principality were maintained, and as it should be in your power to pay at the stated period the amount of the established tribute. In the reply which at the time reached us from your Highness, it was said that you undertook that there should be no omission in the execution of your duties; but in the meanwhile, nothing has since that time shown that the ancient relations have continued to subsist, and the payment due in the month October has not yet been effected. However that is not in reality the only question. As war now exists in fact, it is contrary to the regulations in force that a functionary holding his nomination from the Porte should continue to remain in a territory occupied by the adverse party. Consequently on the receipt of this despatch your Excellency will have the goodness to entrust to the principal Boyards the formation of a Provisional Government as required by the circumstances, and you will forthwith quit the Principality.

Such being His Imperial Majesty's pleasure, any hesitation on your Highness' part to act in conformity with this peremptory order will clearly have an injurious effect as regards you.

I avail myself, &c.  
(Signed) RESHID.

## No. 254.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 19.)*

My Lord,

Therapia, November 5, 1853.

THIS afternoon your Lordship's despatches of October 24, by the "Fury," reached my hands. From the contents of the first I learn that the official note and draft of note inclosed with it are to be submitted to the Turkish Ministers by the French Ambassador and myself, with the complete concurrence,

it is hoped, of the Austrian and Prussian Representatives, but even without that advantage should it be unfortunately withheld.

From the succeeding number I learn that, in concert with my colleagues, I am at liberty to introduce such modifications, not evidently inadmissible at St. Petersburg, as may be required to satisfy the Porte.

I observe, moreover, that the execution of your Lordship's instructions is made to depend upon the existence of such a state of things in Turkey as would not preclude a final settlement otherwise than by a new Treaty between the Porte and Russia.

Your Lordship will have learnt from the preceding parts of my correspondence how difficult, how all but impossible, is the successful execution of the instructions which I have now received, after the hostile occurrences which have taken place on the Danube as well as on the Asiatic frontier of this Empire. By a strict interpretation of those instructions, I ought indeed to hold myself precluded from making the attempt under circumstances such as those in which I am placed: but knowing the immense importance attached by Her Majesty's Government to the restoration of peaceable relations, on safe and honourable grounds, between the contending parties; aware how deeply that feeling is partaken by all the Governments of Europe; and led by the information which has reached me, together with your Lordship's despatches, to entertain a hope that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg is still disposed to a reconciliation with the Porte, I venture to confront the difficulties of the situation, and to exert all the means, contracted as they are, at my disposal, in order to obtain, if possible, a last chance for the cause of European peace.

With this intention I have seen the French Ambassador, and had the satisfaction of finding that his instructions enable him to act in perfect concert with me for the attainment of that important object. We are to meet again tomorrow with the view of settling the most advisable course of proceeding under the circumstances. We have little reason to hope for the concurrence of the Austrian and Prussian Ministers, but we are inclined to think that our proposals may be received in the first instance at the Porte with less distrust if they are understood to proceed exclusively from England and France.

I have sent private messages to the Sultan and Reshid Pasha, with the view of preparing the ground in those important quarters for this new attempt at pacification, so little, as they must necessarily think, in harmony with the present state of things.

In short, my Lord, I enter upon the execution of your instructions with a firm resolution to do justice, and, if possible, to have justice done, to them. But I cannot hope to carry them to a successful issue by my unassisted efforts, and the obstacles to success may be found insurmountable on their first communication to the Porte.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 255.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 19.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, November 5, 1853.*

AN express has this moment come in from Belgrade with a telegraphic message from Lord Westmorland, informing me that the decision of Austria and Prussia, on the propositions sent out to me by the "Fury," is delayed by a communication which it has been thought necessary to address to London and Berlin; that the final resolutions will be forwarded to me as soon as they reach Vienna, and that it remains with me, meanwhile, to wait for them or not as I may judge best.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

## No. 256.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon. — (Received November 19.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, November 11, 1853.*

WHEN I called yesterday upon Count Nesselrode, he acquainted me that, according to intelligence received on the 9th instant, there has been a sharp engagement between the Russians and Turks on the Russian territory, not far from Batoum.

This report stated that the Turks, having suddenly crossed the frontier, had driven in an advanced post and captured a small fort, called Fort Nicholas; that they were subsequently attacked by a strong detachment under Prince Gagarin, when an action took place, which cost the Russians 45 men and the Turks 500, the fort remaining, however, in Turkish possession.

Count Nesselrode regarded as inexplicable an attack on the part of the Turks at a moment when a suspension of hostilities was believed to have been agreed to.

The explanation, as I stated, was very plain. Viscount Stratford had been extremely desirous first of obtaining a cessation of hostilities, and then of causing timely orders to be sent off to Batoum; but, from the shortness of the time, his Lordship had felt and expressed his anxiety that the counter orders which he caused to be dispatched would not arrive in time to prevent bloodshed.

We conversed upon the means of putting an end to an unfortunate war, and Count Nesselrode informed me that your Lordship's *projet de note* had been considered at Vienna as inapplicable to the altered condition of affairs. As to the *projet de note* proposed by Lord Stratford, his Excellency professed to be ignorant as to its purport, and as to the impression which it had produced at Vienna.

Count Nesselrode spoke with calmness as to the chances of war; admitted that in the first instance these might prove unfavourable to the Russian arms; but he gave me to understand that the Emperor could not submit to defeat, and could only lend himself to composition when the superiority of his army was placed beyond doubt.

What fell from Count Nesselrode went to confirm what I had already been told as to the feeling of the Government being that no serious negotiation could be conducted until the Turks, calmed by a defeat, should have been driven out of the Principalities.

According, however, to the Russian statements, it is only at Kalafat that any strong body of Turkish troops have established themselves.

I remarked that Her Majesty's Government, being always disposed to peaceable measures, looked more to the object than to this or that plan of bringing about an amicable arrangement; and that, among the methods which had been thought of, I had reason for believing that the idea had presented itself of a negotiation being opened in London.

Count Nesselrode was disposed to consider this, and any method of the kind, premature (*intempestif*); the war was begun (*la partie était engagée*), and, until some decisive event should occur, Count Nesselrode was of opinion that negotiation would be out of place and abortive.

## No. 257.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

(Extract.)

*Foreign Office, November 19, 1853.*

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your Lordship's despatch of the 14th instant, requesting, on the part of Count Buol, that I should transmit to Vienna: 1st, The project of note to be addressed to the Porte, inviting the Sultan's Government to treat; 2ndly, The general form and stipulations of the Treaty.

My despatch of the 16th instant will have placed your Lordship in possession of the views of Her Majesty's Government respecting the form of

note that might properly be addressed to the Porte ; but as the note is founded upon Count Buol's own proposal that the Porte should be invited to state upon what terms it is willing to treat, it appears to Her Majesty's Government that it would be useless at this moment to prepare the draft of a Treaty.

## No. 258.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon—(Received November 19.)*

My Lord,

*Vienna, November 15, 1853.*

PRINCE STIRBEY arrived here a few days ago from Bucharest. He called in the first instance upon the Turkish Ambassador, who received him with courtesy, and he afterwards called upon the principal members of this Government, and upon the Corps Diplomatique, and amongst them upon myself. He lamented very much the misfortunes which he feared would be brought upon his country by the present events, and the interruption which they would occasion to the improvements and ameliorations which were being so successfully carried out.

The Prince is almost immediately proceeding to Paris.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

## No. 259.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 20.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, November 18, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has received a telegraphic despatch from M. de la Cour, dated from Pera, on the 7th instant, stating that, at the request of the Porte, and after concerting with each other, the two Ambassadors had addressed an invitation to the Admirals to anchor in the Bosphorus with the fleets under their command.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

## No. 260.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 20.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, November 18, 1853.*

I WENT early this morning to Fontainebleau, for the purpose of seeing M. Drouyn de Lhuys and executing the instructions conveyed to me in your Lordship's despatch of the 16th instant.

Before stating the nature of them to the French Minister I said, that as M. de Hübner was at Fontainebleau he had probably made his Excellency a communication similar to that which your Lordship had received through Lord Westmorland, and on which I had your directions to consult the French Government.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied, that a courier from Vienna had reached M. de Hübner yesterday ; and that he had last night received a communication from that Minister, the substance of which coincided with advices which had been received previously by the French Government from M. de Bourqueney. As the communication is identic with that made to your Lordship by Lord Westmorland in his despatch of the 8th instant, I need not dwell on it further.

I then proceeded to read to M. Drouyn de Lhuys your despatch of the 16th to Lord Westmorland. After reading it, I said, that if it met with his concurrence, I trusted that he would instruct M. de Bourqueney to hold a similar language.

The French Minister replied that, since Her Majesty's Government wished it, he would not refuse to direct M. de Bourqueney to regulate his language by

the instructions sent to Lord Westmorland. He asked me to leave the despatch with him, promising to draw up a despatch in the same terms for M. de Bourqueney's guidance; and at my suggestion, he agreed to instruct that Minister in the meantime, by telegraph, to put himself in communication with Lord Westmorland, who would no doubt impart to him your Lordship's views, on which M. de Bourqueney might act.

## No. 261.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon. —(Received November 21.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, November 20, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS informs me that instructions both telegraphic and written have been sent, as promised, to M. de Bourqueney, desiring him to support Lord Westmorland in the answers which his Lordship is to make to the last proposal emanating from Vienna. Copies of these instructions have likewise been transmitted to General Baraguay d'Hilliers, and he will be ready to act at Constantinople in the sense intimated by your Lordship, should the Austrian Cabinet consent to adopt your suggestions in respect to the communication to be made to the Porte.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

## No. 262.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, November 21, 1853.*

I HAVE to state to you that Her Majesty's Government approve of the instructions, of which copies are inclosed in your Excellency's despatch of the 31st ultimo, which you have addressed to Her Majesty's Consuls in Wallachia and Moldavia, and to Mr. Vice-Consul Cunningham, containing instructions for their guidance in the present state of affairs in the Principalities.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

## No. 263.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, November 21, 1853.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch of the 5th instant, containing an account of the Conference which you and your French colleague had on the 1st instant with the Admirals commanding the British and French fleets at Constantinople, and reporting your subsequent communications with the Porte as to the course now to be pursued by Turkey.

I have the satisfaction of informing you, that your language to Reshid Pasha, and your instruction to M. Pisani, of the 1st November, are entirely in accordance with the views of Her Majesty's Government with reference to the dignity of England and the true interests of the Porte.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 264.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

Foreign Office, November 21, 1853.

I HAVE to state to your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the instructions addressed by you to M. Pisani, and of which copies are inclosed in your despatch of the 5th instant.

Her Majesty's Government have no intention to dictate to the Porte, and no wish to fetter its action, but they will not take part in measures of which they disapprove; and your Excellency has correctly conveyed to Reshid Pasha the intentions of Her Majesty's Government. The energy and courage displayed by all ranks and classes in Turkey are admirable; but the rashness of enthusiasm must be guarded against, and the Turkish Government, if it understands its own interests, will readily defer to the sound judgment of your Excellency, and the practical experience of Admiral Dundas.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 265.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 22.)*

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, November 20, 1853.

JE me suis rendu chez le Comte Buol pour lui communiquer votre dépêche du 16. Il a adhéré à toutes les propositions d'arrangement que vous faites. M. de Bourqueney nous a rejoint pour appuyer votre communication. Le Comte Buol est entièrement d'accord avec Londres et Paris sur les bases de la note collective reduite à la constatation du fait que la Russie s'est déclarée disposée à traiter, et à une question à la Porte sur les conditions auxquelles elle veut négocier. Le Comte Buol demande aux Cabinets de Londres et de Paris d'envoyer sans retard à Vienne un projet de rédaction de cette note, ou d'autoriser leurs Représentants à la rédiger ici en Conférence, et à l'expédier à Constantinople. Il demande en outre si la note doit être signée ici en Conférence par les quatre Représentants et adressée à Reshid Pasha par l'intermédiaire de nos Ambassades à Constantinople même par les Représentants. Le Comte Buol approuve complètement la substance des instructions proposées par vous et approuvées par le Cabinet de Paris. Il désire que leur envoi suive d'aussi près que possible celui de la note collective.

(Translation.)

Vienna, November 20, 1853.

I WENT to Count Buol to communicate to him your despatch of the 16th. He assented to all the proposals for an arrangement made by you. M. de Bourqueney joined us in order to support your communication. Count Buol entirely agrees with London and Paris as to the bases of the collective note confined to placing on record that Russia has declared herself ready to treat, and to inquiring of the Porte the conditions on which it is willing to negotiate. Count Buol requests the Cabinets of London and Paris to send without delay to Vienna a draft of that note, or to authorize their Representatives to draw it up here in Conference and to send it to Constantinople. He further asks whether the note is to be signed here in Conference by the Four Representatives, and addressed to Reshid Pasha by the Representatives through the channel of our Embassies at Constantinople itself. Count Buol entirely approves the substance of the instructions proposed by you and approved by the Cabinet of Paris. He is desirous that they should be sent as soon as possible after the collective note.

No. 266.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 22, 1853.

THE draft of collective note shall be sent as soon as it is agreed to by the French Government. I had sent to Lord Stratford my despatch of the 16th instant to you, and I now inform him by telegraph through Marseilles that it is approved by Austria and France. He is endeavouring to give effect to the instructions sent by the "Fury" on the 25th ultimo.

No. 267.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.*

My Lord,

Foreign Office, November 22, 1853.

HER Majesty's Government approve the language held by your Lordship to Baron Manteuffel with respect to the position of Foreign Consular Agents in the Danubian Principalities since the departure of the Hospodars, as reported in your despatch of the 15th instant.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 268.

*Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 22.)*

(Extract.)

Berlin, November 19, 1853.

I HAD an interview this day with Baron Manteuffel. His Excellency was anxious to learn what view your Lordship had taken of the proposals submitted by Count Buol to the English and French Cabinets; and inquired of me what was the nature of this note which Count Buol was so anxious to have transmitted to Constantinople.

I thought it so important that the Prussian Cabinet should be fully informed of the views of Her Majesty's Government in order that Baron Manteuffel might report to the King in the same spirit, and give a similar direction to the Prussian policy, that I communicated to his Excellency your Lordship's despatch of the 16th instant, addressed to the Earl of Westmorland, which I trust will meet with your Lordship's approval.

His Excellency wholly concurred with the views and opinions expressed in that instruction, and his Excellency requested me to leave a copy of that despatch in his hands for communication to the King.

I replied that I had no permission or instruction to that effect, and that I could not give him a copy of the entire despatch; but that I would take upon myself to give him an extract which would place him in possession of the views of Her Majesty's Government laid down by your Lordship.

I have, therefore, confidentially given to his Excellency an extract of that despatch commencing from "It seems necessary in the first instance," down to the paragraph, "That would separate the two armies."

No. 269.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 23.)*

My Lord,

Vienna, November 19, 1853.

I LEARN from Baron Meyendorff that he has transmitted an order to M. Muchin, the newly appointed Russian Consul at Belgrade, to take down his consular flag, and to desist from any attempt to assume the functions to which he is appointed, and which, without an exequatur from the Sultan, would not be legally established.

Baron Meyendorff has also desired M. Muchin, in case any objection should be raised to his continuing to reside in Servia, to withdraw at once, without giving occasion for any dispute or discussion upon the subject.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 270.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 23.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, November 22, 1853.*

LATE yesterday evening M. de Hübner gave me the gratifying intelligence, that the Austrian Government adopted the whole of the conditions which your Lordship had instructed Lord Westmorland to represent to Count Buol, as those on which Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to address a further communication to the Porte, with a view of inducing the Ottoman Government to enter into fresh negotiations with Russia for the settlement of the Eastern question. M. de Hübner was further informed, that M. de Buol left it to France and England to decide whether the note to be addressed to the Porte should be the work of the two Cabinets, or whether they would intrust the Conference of Vienna with the task of drawing it up. He left it equally to those two Cabinets to decide whether the note should be collective, or whether each Representative of the Four Powers at Constantinople should present a separate one to the Porte; observing, however, that Austria would prefer the former mode, as likely to carry greater weight with

This morning M. Drouyn de Lhuys called on me, on his way from Fontainebleau.

As it was now decided to ascertain in the first place the Porte's intentions, wishes that your Lordship should undertake the task of drawing up the note which it is proposed to address to the Porte on the part of the Four Powers, as well as the instructions to be sent to the Representatives at Constantinople, and that you should transmit these papers to Paris for the information of the French Government. He had no doubt that they would be accepted at once.

No. 271.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, November 24, 1853.*

I HAVE to state to you that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the course which your Excellency proposes to pursue, as reported in your despatch of the 5th of November, with a view to carrying out the instructions contained in my despatch to your Excellency of the 24th ultimo, which was written under the expectation that the commencement of hostilities would have been suspended.

That expectation was unfortunately not realized; but Her Majesty's Government consider that no effort should be neglected to stop the effusion of blood, and to effect a just and honourable peace; and they still indulge a hope that these important objects may have been secured by the judgment and ability of your Excellency, notwithstanding the serious obstacles to success that existed at the time when your Excellency was about to make a fresh appeal to the Porte.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

## No. 272.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 26.)*

My Lord,

Vienna, November 22, 1853.

IN consequence of the hostilities which are at present being carried on in the neighbourhood of Widdin, and on the Wallachian frontiers adjoining Transylvania, the Austrian Government have felt the necessity of keeping the corps of observation which had been sent in that direction at its full complement, instead of reducing it according to the decision which has been carried into effect in all the other corps of the Austrian army. The men who have already received their leaves of absence will rejoin their battalions, so that the force will remain at its original strength. Some artillery will also be ordered to join this force, which will be placed in the neighbourhood of Temesvar.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

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## No. 273.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 26.)*

(Extract.)

Paris, November 25, 1853.

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS stated to me yesterday that, after seeing me on the 22nd instant, he had been led to draw up drafts of a note to be signed at Vienna by the Representatives of the Four Powers, and addressed by them to the Porte, of instructions to the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople by which that note was to be accompanied; and finally, of a Protocol to be signed by the Conference at Vienna, of which the note and instructions were to be annexes. These papers, he added, he had sent for your Lordship's consideration.

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## No. 274.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 27.)*

My Lord,

Vienna, November 23, 1853.

PRINCE GHIKA, the Hospodar of Moldavia, has arrived in Vienna, and in the same manner as Prince Stirbey he has called upon the Turkish Ambassador, the Ministers of State, and the diplomatic corps.

I have returned his visit, and although I have not had an opportunity of conversing with him, I learn that he holds the same language as to the line of conduct he has adopted, and the difficulties of his position as that which I have reported in my despatch of the 15th instant, as being held by Prince Stirbey.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

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## No. 275.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 27.)*

My Lord,

Vienna, November 23, 1853.

HAVING, according to your Lordship's instructions, communicated your despatch of the 16th instant\* to Count Buol, he repeated all the explanations he had already given me, and which I reported at length to your Lordship in my

despatch of the 10th instant, as to the necessity under which he had felt himself obliged to transmit the proposals he had received from St. Petersburg at once to the Internuncio, without any longer waiting for the adherence which he expected from your Lordship, and from the Governments of France and Prussia, to the recommendations which he had proposed should be transmitted to the Porte in a collective note, and which were detailed in my despatches to your Lordship of the 25th ultimo, 8th and 14th instant.

He had never intended this communication as one to which the adhesion of England, or of any other Government, would be required. He had merely adopted it as fulfilling the duty which had devolved upon him of informing the Government of the Sultan of the readiness of the Emperor of Russia to enter into a negotiation for the establishment of peace, notwithstanding the declaration of war which had taken place. The fulfilment of this duty in no way interfered with his desire of cooperating with the other allied Governments in those recommendations to the Sultan's Government which (under the modifications which he was perfectly ready to agree to) should ultimately be decided on, and which were according to his own propositions.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 276.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 27.)*

My Lord,

*Vienna, November 23, 1853.*

ACCORDING to your Lordship's instructions, I waited upon Count Buol, to submit to him the proposals contained in your first despatch addressed to me on the 16th instant. I read to him this despatch, and delivered to him a copy of it. Count Buol adhered entirely to all your Lordship's proposals. He considered them as agreeing in substance with those he had himself pointed out; and he stated that he was perfectly disposed to adopt them as the basis of the note to be addressed to the Porte by the Four Powers, as well as of the instructions to be forwarded to the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople.

Count Buol received with great pleasure the assurance given by your Lordship of the satisfaction Her Majesty's Government would experience in cooperating with the Austrian Government towards the re-establishment of friendly relations between Russia and the Porte; and he begged to assure you that this satisfaction would be entirely reciprocated by the Austrian Government.

Baron Bourqueney, having joined Count Buol and myself during our interview, produced the instructions he had received by telegraph from his Government to support your Lordship's propositions.

Count Buol stated himself to agree entirely with your Lordship's opinion, that the collective note to be addressed to the Porte should be confined to the announcement that the Government of Russia was ready to enter into negotiation for the restoration of peaceable relations between the two countries, and to a question addressed to the Porte upon what conditions they were ready to negotiate. With a view of carrying out this object with the least possible delay, Count Buol requested the Cabinets of London and of Paris to transmit to Vienna either a draft of this note, for the signature of the Four Representatives at Vienna, or an authority to those Representatives to draw up that note in accordance with the basis which had been agreed upon, and then to be transmitted to the Representatives at Constantinople. Count Buol requested also that the Cabinets of London and Paris would decide whether this note should be addressed from Vienna to Reshid Pasha, to be transmitted to him by the Representatives at Constantinople, or whether it should be signed and addressed to him by those Representatives upon their receipt of it from Vienna.

With reference to the nature of the answer which the Porte might address to this communication, Count Buol (in case the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople were consulted with regard to it) entirely concurred

in the substance of the instructions your Lordship proposed should be sent to them; and he only expressed his anxiety that they might be transmitted as early as possible after the collective note had been forwarded.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 277.

*Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 27.)*

(Extract.)

*Berlin, November 25, 1853.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL called upon me this evening, on his return from Potsdam, anticipating the hour at which he had appointed to meet me at his own house.

His Excellency told me that he had received a despatch from the Chevalier Bunsen, informing him of the *projet de note* which your Lordship had drawn up for presentation to the Porte collectively by the Representatives of the Four Powers, and stating that the text of this note would be forwarded by your Lordship to Berlin and Vienna on Saturday the 26th instant.

I informed his Excellency that the terms of this note, and of the instructions to accompany it, were in exact conformity with the opinions conveyed in your Lordship's despatch of the 16th instant to the Earl of Westmorland, of which I had already given his Excellency an extract; and I likewise stated that they had been most favourably received by the Austrian Cabinet.

I then inquired specifically what opinions the King had expressed with respect to the views of Her Majesty's Government as set forth in that despatch.

His Excellency replied, that the King had entirely approved of them, and had further authorized him to give his adhesion to any note conceived and drawn up in the sense and spirit of the views expressed by your Lordship.

No. 278.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 27.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, November 19, 1853.*

UPON calling on Count Nesselrode yesterday I observed to him that, according to the intelligence which I had received, the Cabinet of Vienna were more intent than ever upon an armistice between the Russian and Turkish forces being agreed upon, and that it appeared from advices from England that these views were shared by Her Majesty's Government.

However, I said, the great difficulty for obtaining the object appears to be the objections entertained by the Turks to assent to a suspension of hostilities; the Turks being sensible that the pause would be decidedly to the advantage of their opponents, you having it in your power to pour fresh troops into the Principalities; the Porte having despatched all their available force to the Danube, and having rather to fear that their numbers may be diminished by inaction than to hope that they can receive any reinforcements. What, then, I would desire to suggest would be, that you should give the English representations a fair chance of being listened to favourably at Constantinople; and that to effect this you should consent to a month's suspension of hostilities, and to withdrawing your troops from the Principalities. Those of Turkey might be induced simultaneously to fall back behind the Danube, during which time negotiations, which could hardly fail of proving successful, might be conducted, and probably with improved chances if the negotiation were to be removed from Vienna to London, where the parties principally interested might be represented.

The arrangement would be the less open to objection, as I would venture to remark that, in London, Russian interests would be entrusted to the management of a negotiator second in ability to none of the diplomatists of Russia.

The Chancellor, after requesting me to repeat the propositions to him, observed that he was really surprised that such a proposal should be made to him on the part of Her Majesty's Government; that the position assigned to Russia was too disadvantageous and too humiliating to be accepted; that for 150 years no such position would have been thought of for Russia in her "démêlés" with the Porte; that upon entering the Principalities the Emperor had declared that he should only withdraw his troops when he had obtained satisfaction, and that to do so sooner would be to lower himself in the eyes of the world.

He, Count Nesselrode, had done much in the way of conciliation; he had been blamed by many for having gone so far: but to this point he could not proceed. He could not possibly advise the Emperor to listen to such proposals.

I replied that I threw out the suggestions on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, knowing that the hopes of the Vienna Cabinet were founded upon the chances of a suspension of hostilities being obtained, and that the means I had proposed were those the most likely for procuring the assent of the Turks.

Count Nesselrode desired to remark that the Turks were more interested than Russia could be in bringing the war to a close; that it would be made known to the Porte through M. de Bruck that their wisest course would be to place themselves in direct negotiation with Russia; and that he must say that the idea of causing a conference to be attended by a Turkish Plenipotentiary appeared to be to sit in judgment upon Russia, to summon her to appear before the European tribunal.

He wished to remind me that there was no instance of a Turkish Plenipotentiary having taken part in deliberations having an European character.

I begged not to be suspected of any wish of making an observation which might give offence, but felt obliged to remark that all the provocation which had been given was attributable to Russia; that her only complaint—that referable to the holy places—had been redressed; and that the occupation of the Danubian Provinces, although certainly involving very important European questions, was an act bearing so directly upon the interests of Turkey that it could not be wondered at if those interests were mainly looked to, and if Turkey were allowed a voice in the decision to be taken upon them.

Count Nesselrode then made some observations which I do not think it of any importance to report, on the effect of the interference of England and France in an affair which but for the encouragement so given would long ago have been settled to the satisfaction of the Powers now at war.

His Excellency proceeded to speak of the position of England and France, which had been changed from that of mediators to that of countries he might almost say at war with Russia.

Baron Brunnow had been informed, both by your Lordship and by the Earl of Aberdeen, of the eventual orders sent to the Admiral commanding Her Majesty's fleet in the Bosphorus, and notice of this communication had already been sent off from hence to Prince Menchikoff.

It was highly improbable, Count Nesselrode stated, that before the spring any operations would be taken by the fleet at Sevastopol: still, what a position had been taken by the English and French Governments towards that of Russia! The Turks, it was evident, were at liberty to attack any part of the Russian territory, whilst, as it had been made known, any attempt on the part of the Russian ships to land troops on the coasts of Turkey would be met by the armed resistance of the allied fleets.

In the course of our conversation, Count Nesselrode enumerated the various concessions which had been made by Russia, since her first demands for satisfaction signified through Prince Menchikoff.

He concluded the conversation by saying, that for the moment there was nothing to be done; that the affairs between the two armies had been unimportant; but that it was possible that a few days might change the features of the case, and that a decided success obtained by Prince Gortchakoff might open the way to a speedy and satisfactory Treaty of Peace.

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No. 279.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, November 27, 1852.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS, who is here, approves everything. All the papers will be sent to Vienna to-morrow. M. Drouyn de Lhuys writes to the French Ambassador at Constantinople, that the French Government expect this proposition to be accepted, and to do all in his power to obtain the Porte's consent.

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No. 280.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, November 28, 1853.*

HER Majesty's Government approve your having furnished Baron Manteuffel confidentially with an extract of my despatch of the 16th instant to the Earl of Westmorland, as reported in your Lordship's despatch of the 19th instant.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 281.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, November 29, 1853.*

INFORMATION has reached Her Majesty's Government that, in the event of any quarrel between the Bosnians and the Servians, Austria meant to interfere. Her Majesty's Government cannot give credit to this rumour, which is contrary to the statement contained in your despatch of the 22nd instant; and because any interference between subjects of the Porte would not only complicate all existing difficulties, but would be a departure from the peaceful policy and principle of neutrality professed by Austria.

It would, however, be satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government to learn from Count Buol that the rumour in question is unfounded.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 282.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, November 29, 1853.*

HER Majesty's Government have learned with much satisfaction, that the form of a collective note, suggested in my despatch of the 16th instant to your Lordship, together with the amendments to Count Buol's proposed draft of instructions to the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople, have met with the concurrence of the Austrian Government; and as Count Buol conveyed to me, through your Lordship and Count Colloredo, his wish that the draft of note and of instructions should be prepared in London, I lost no time in communicating upon the subject with the French Government, to whom it

See No. 283.

appears that Count Buol had addressed a similar request. No difference of opinion existed between the two Governments, and by both my despatch of the 16th instant has been strictly adhered to. The French Government preferred our form of note, and we adopted their draft of instructions\* with some amendments which were approved of by the French Government. Copies of the two documents are herewith inclosed. Your Lordship is instructed to sign the note on the part of Her Majesty's Government, in conjunction with Count Buol, M. de Bourqueney, and Count Arnim; and you will then transmit a copy of it so signed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, who will receive from me the instructions as to the advice which his Excellency will tender to the Porte.

I inclose also a Protocol of Conference, to which the concurrence of Austria is earnestly invited by Her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor of the French, who desire to place on record a principle which at the present moment may be conducive to the restoration of peace between Russia and the Porte, and which will be vitally important to the existing balance of power and to the future tranquillity of Europe.

Her Majesty's Government are convinced that this principle must be in accordance with the policy and the true interests of Austria, and they will deeply regret that she should decline to join England and France in a declaration of which the moral effect cannot fail to be advantageous.

If, as Her Majesty's Government confidently expect, the Protocol is agreed to by the Austrian Government, your Lordship will sign it with Count Buol and Baron de Bourqueney, and with Count Arnim, who will probably receive instructions to that effect; but if for any reason which Her Majesty's Government cannot anticipate, Count Buol should decline to do so, your Lordship will not sign the Protocol until you have made known to Her Majesty's Government the reason of Count Buol's objections.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 282.

*Collective Note to be signed at Vienna.*

The Undersigned, Representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia, assembled in Conference at Vienna, have received instructions to declare that their respective Governments view with deep regret the commencement of hostilities between Russia and the Porte, and anxiously desire by mediating between the belligerent Powers to stop the further effusion of blood and to terminate a state of things which seriously endangers the peace of Europe.

Assurances have been received that Russia is willing to treat, and the Undersigned not doubting that the Porte is animated by a similar spirit, request, in the name of their respective Governments, to be informed upon what conditions the Turkish Government is willing to negotiate a Treaty of Peace.

Inclosure 2 in No. 282.

*Draft of Protocol.*

LES Soussignés, Représentants d'Autriche, de France, de Grande Bretagne, et de Prusse, conformément aux instructions de leurs Cours, se sont réunis en Conférence à l'effet de rechercher les moyens d'aplanir le différend survenu entre la Russie et la Sublime Porte.

Les proportions que ce différend a prises et la guerre qui a éclaté entre les deux Empires, malgré les efforts de leurs alliés, sont devenues pour l'Europe entière l'objet des plus sérieuses préoccupations. En conséquence, leurs Majestés l'Empereur d'Autriche, l'Empereur des Français, la Reine du Royaume Uni de

See No. 284.

Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, et le Roi de Prusse, également pénétrées de la nécessité de s'employer pour mettre un terme à des hostilités qui ne pourraient se prolonger sans affecter les intérêts de leurs propres Etats, ont résolu d'offrir leurs bons offices aux deux Hautes Parties belligérantes, dans l'espoir qu'elles ne voudront pas elles-mêmes encourir la responsabilité d'une conflagration, alors que, par un échange de loyales explications, elles peuvent encore la prévenir en remplaçant leurs rapports sur un pied de paix et de bonne entente.

Les assurances données à différentes reprises par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie excluent, de la part de cet auguste Souverain, l'idée de porter atteinte à l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman. En effet l'existence de la Turquie, dans les limites que lui ont assignées les Traités, est devenue une des conditions nécessaires de l'équilibre Européen; et les Plénipotentiaires soussignés constatent avec plaisir que la guerre actuelle ne saurait en aucun cas entraîner dans les circonscriptions territoriales des deux Empires des modifications susceptibles d'altérer l'état de possession que le temps a consacré en Orient, et qui est également nécessaire à la tranquillité de toutes les autres Puissances.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie ne s'est du reste point borné à ces assurances; elle a fait déclarer que son intention n'avait jamais été d'imposer à la Porte des obligations nouvelles ou qui ne fussent pas exactement conformes aux Traités de Koutchouk-Kaïnardji et d'Andrinople, stipulations d'après lesquelles la Sublime Porte a promis de protéger, dans toute l'étendue de ses Etats, le culte Chrétien et ses églises. La Cour de Russie a ajouté, qu'en réclamant du Gouvernement Ottoman un témoignage de sa fidélité à des engagements antérieurs, elle n'avait nullement entendu amoindrir l'autorité du Sultan sur ses sujets Chrétiens, et que son but unique avait été de demander des éclaircissements de nature à prévenir toute équivoque et tout motif de mésintelligence avec une Puissance amie et voisine.

Les sentiments manifestés par la Sublime Porte, pendant les dernières négociations, attestent d'un autre côté qu'elle était prête à reconnaître toutes ses obligations contractuelles, et à tenir compte, dans la mesure de ses droits souverains, de l'intérêt que porte Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie à un culte qui est le sien et celui de la majorité de ses peuples.

Dans cet état de choses, les Soussignés sont convaincus que le moyen le plus prompt et le plus sûr d'atteindre le but désiré par leurs Cours sera de faire en commun une communication à la Sublime Porte pour lui exposer le vœu des Puissances de contribuer, par leur intervention amicale, au rétablissement de la paix, et la mettre en demeure de faire connaître les conditions auxquelles elle serait disposée à traiter.

Tel est le but de la note collective ci-jointe, adressée au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères du Sultan, et des instructions, également ci-annexées, transmises aux Représentants d'Autriche, de France, de Grande Bretagne, et de Prusse à Constantinople.

(Translation.)

THE Undersigned, Representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain and Prussia, in conformity with the instructions of their Courts, have met together in Conference in order to devise the means of reconciling the difference which has arisen between Russia and the Sublime Porte.

The dimensions which that difference has assumed and the war which has broken out between the two Empires, notwithstanding the efforts of their allies, have become the object of most serious solicitude for Europe. Accordingly, their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of the French, the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the King of Prussia, being equally impressed with the necessity of exerting themselves in order to put an end to hostilities which could not be protracted without affecting the interests of their own States, have resolved to offer their good offices to the two high belligerent parties, in the hope that they will be unwilling themselves to incur the responsibility of a conflagration, when by an exchange of frank explanations they may still be able to avert it by replacing their relations on a footing of peace and good understanding.

The assurances given at different times by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia exclude, on the part of that august Sovereign, the notion of assailing

the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. In fact, the existence of Turkey in the limits assigned to her by Treaty is one of the necessary conditions of the balance of power in Europe; and the undersigned Plenipotentiaries record with satisfaction that the existing war cannot in any case lead to modifications in the territorial boundaries of the two Empires, which might be calculated to alter the state of possession in the East which has been established for a length of time, and which is equally necessary for the tranquillity of all the other Powers.

His Majesty the Emperor of Russia moreover has not confined himself to these assurances; he has declared that it never was his intention to impose upon the Porte any new obligations, or any which might not be in strict conformity with the Treaties of Koutchouk-Kainardji and Adrianople, according to the stipulations of which the Sublime Porte has promised to protect throughout the whole extent of its dominions the Christian religion and its churches. The Court of Russia has added that in requiring from the Ottoman Government a proof of its faithful adherence to former engagements, it by no means had the intention of diminishing the authority of the Sultan over his Christian subjects, and that its sole object had been to ask for explanations calculated to prevent any misapprehension and any cause of misunderstanding with a neighbouring and friendly Power.

The sentiments manifested by the Sublime Porte during the recent negotiations prove, on the other hand, that it was prepared to recognise all its Treaty engagements, and to take into account, as far as its sovereign rights would allow, the interest felt by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia in a religion which is his own and that of the majority of his people.

In this state of things the Undersigned are convinced that the readiest and surest means of attaining the object desired by their Courts will be to make a joint communication to the Sublime Porte in order to set before it the wish of the Powers to contribute, by their friendly intervention, to the re-establishment of peace, and to enable it to make known the conditions on which it would be disposed to treat.

Such is the object of the annexed collective note addressed to the Sultan's Minister for Foreign Affairs, and of the instructions likewise annexed, transmitted to the Representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia, at Constantinople.

No. 283.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

(Extract.)

*Foreign Office, November 29, 1853.*

THE drafts of a collective note to be signed at Vienna by the Representatives of the Four Powers, of a Protocol of Conference, and of instructions to the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople, which M. Drouyn de Lhuys had prepared, and which are referred to in your Excellency's despatch of the 25th instant, were communicated to me by M. Baudin, and were attentively considered by the Cabinet on the 26th instant. As M. Drouyn de Lhuys appeared to prefer the form of collective note prepared here, it was adopted by Her Majesty's Government, and they agreed to the French draft of instructions, with some amendments, which I explained to M. Baudin, and which he transmitted to Paris. I had the satisfaction of learning yesterday from your Excellency that those amendments had met with the approval of the Government of the Emperor.

Her Majesty's Government entirely approve of the Protocol of Conference and concur in pressing it upon the acceptance of the Austrian Government.

No. 284.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, November 29, 1853.*

I INCLOSE the copy of a note\* which Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna has been instructed to sign, together with the Representatives of Austria, France, and Prussia, as a fresh proof of the identity of views that exists between the Four Powers, and of their earnest desire to contribute by their union to the re-establishment of peace between the Porte and Russia.

The remarkable moderation which has characterised the various documents emanated from the Porte induces the Four Powers to hope that the proposition they now make will be regarded by the Turkish Government as alike consistent with the dignity and the interests of the Ottoman Empire. The Four Powers frankly address an inquiry to the Porte, to which it will doubtless reply in a corresponding spirit, without extending its differences with Russia beyond their true limits, or introducing elements of discord beyond those which already exist.

With this expectation the Four Powers feel that the answer to their inquiry should be left entirely to the wisdom and experience of the Turkish Government; but in the event of your Excellency and of your colleagues being consulted upon the subject, it would be desirable to advise the Porte to declare that the Four Powers have done justice to its conciliatory intentions by assuming that it is still desirous, upon honourable conditions, to terminate its difference with Russia, and to come to an understanding with that Power: and that with reference to the assurances that Russia has on various occasions given that she asks for no new concessions, nor for any right derogatory to the sovereignty of the Sultan, the Porte is prepared to renew its offers and to discuss the form in which peace shall be re-established and the religious question settled, upon the condition of not being asked to accede to any demand that it has already refused, and of an arrangement being concluded for the evacuation of the Principalities.

That discussion must naturally take place between a Turkish and a Russian negotiator furnished with full powers to treat; but in order to facilitate agreement between them the two Plenipotentiaries should not meet alone—they should assist at conferences where Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia would be equally represented.

It is presumed that the Porte would not negotiate with Russia in any portion of its own territory occupied by the troops of that Power, while Russia, on the other hand, might object to any other place belonging to Turkey; and the two parties ought, therefore, to agree together upon a neutral town in which the conferences should be held.

The object of the Four Powers would not be fully attained if the preliminary negotiations for peace were not at the same time a signal for the cessation of hostilities; and they conceive that the Porte would not object to an armistice, the conditions of which should be arranged between the belligerent parties, if it received from the Four Powers an assurance that the terms on which the Porte was disposed to treat would be accepted also by Russia.

But even if the terms proposed by the Turkish Government were not such as Russia would be likely to assent to at the commencement of negotiations, the Four Powers would still counsel the appointment of a Turkish Plenipotentiary and the choice of a neutral place where the Plenipotentiaries of Turkey and Russia might meet the Representatives of the Four Powers.

It is the earnest hope of those Powers that the Turkish Government will carefully weigh against the risks and eventualities of war the proposal which they now submit for the consideration of the Porte.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 285.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, November 29, 1853.*

I INCLOSE the copy of a Protocol of Conference\* to be signed by the Representatives of the Four Powers, which originated with the French Government, but which is entirely\* approved by Her Majesty's Government.

Your Excellency will learn from Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna, whether the Protocol has been agreed to by the Austrian Government.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 286.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, November 29, 1853.*

I HEREWITH transmit the copy of a despatch† which I have this day addressed to Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna, together with three inclosures, which you will communicate to Baron Manteuffel, who will see that the collective note, and the instructions to the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople, are in strict conformity with my despatch of the 16th instant to Lord Westmorland, of which his Excellency possesses an extract, and which has met with the concurrence of the Prussian Government.

Your Lordship will express to Baron Manteuffel the hope of Her Majesty's Government that Count Arnim may be directed to sign the note at Vienna in conjunction with his colleagues, and that instructions similar to those which will be addressed to Lord Stratford may be transmitted to the Prussian Minister at Constantinople.

Your Lordship will further inform Baron Manteuffel that Her Majesty's Government, upon the grounds stated in my despatch of this day to Lord Westmorland, earnestly desire that Count Arnim may receive instructions to sign the Protocol of Conference with the Representatives of Austria, England, and France.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 287.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 4.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, November 19, 1853.*

GENERAL BARAGUAY D'HILLIERS, who arrived here on the 15th instant, and had his first audience of the Sultan to-day, has sent me word that an express steamer will start for Marseilles with his despatches in the course of the afternoon; and I therefore avail myself of the opportunity to inform your Lordship that, although no official answer has been yet given by the Porte to the new proposition sent in to Reshid Pasha by M. de la Cour and myself, with the view of ascertaining the Council's disposition respecting it, I conclude, from the language of Reshid Pasha, and from other indications, that there is now even less chance than in the outset of obtaining its acceptance, even in a modified shape.

As the language of M. de la Cour's successor, in so far as it has been addressed to me, is eminently pacific, there is still a possibility of a change in the counsels of the Porte, consequent upon a joint representation, by both of us, in the sense already expressed and urged by me. For this chance, I have been anxious to keep the door open, especially as the Prussian Minister has received, within the last few days, authority to act

in concert with me; and as the Austrian Internuncio appears to expect some instruction of a similar tendency by the next courier from Vienna.

I have hitherto exerted my almost solitary efforts in favour of peace under every conceivable disadvantage, including even that which results, in Turkish estimation, from the presence of the allied squadrons in these waters.

The unexpected change which has taken place in the French Embassy, by the substitution of General Baraguay d'Hilliers for M. de la Cour, has naturally increased the embarrassment and delay to which I was previously exposed.

I abstain from going into further particulars at present. The day after to-morrow a safe and expeditious opportunity of forwarding despatches to your Lordship will probably be at my disposal. Should I be disappointed in this expectation, I have no doubt that Vice-Admiral Dundas will readily afford me the means of transmitting my correspondence to your Lordship with the least practicable delay.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 288.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 4.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, November 18, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith for the information of Her Majesty's Government a report addressed to me by M. Pisani almost immediately after the new proposition with the accompanying notes had been submitted to Reshid Pasha. Your Lordship will observe that the Ottoman Minister is therein stated to have declared his opinion that the proposal in question would have been received by the Porte with satisfaction two months ago. I have been careful to verify the correctness of M. Pisani's report by directing him to show it to Reshid Pasha, and he assures me that his Highness has given it his full and unreserved confirmation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 288.

*M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Pera, le 12 Novembre, 1853.*

CONFORMEMENT aux instructions que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser en date d'hier, je me suis rendu chez le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, et après les lui avoir communiquées mot à mot, et après qu'il a lu attentivement le mémorandum y annexé, son Altesse m'a répondu qu'elle apprécie autant que votre Excellence la convenance du projet de note, et la portée de la déclaration, qui forment dans leur ensemble la proposition que vous et l'Ambassadeur de France lui ont fait communiquer par l'entremise de vos dragomans respectifs; que ses objections personnelles se bornent à la difficulté causée par le commencement des hostilités et d'autres circonstances qui s'y rattachent, et que si le projet, dont il s'agit, était arrivée deux mois plutôt, il était persuadé que la Porte l'aurait accueilli avec satisfaction.

Quoi qu'il en soit, Reshid Pasha m'a chargé de dire à votre Excellence qu'il ne manquera pas de soumettre votre proposition, telle qu'elle est, au Conseil Ministériel, et qu'il fera ce que dépend de lui pour faire apprécier vos raisonnements.

J'ai, &c.

(Signé) E. PISANI

(Translation.)

My Lord,

*Pera, November 12, 1853.*

IN conformity with the instructions which your Excellency did me the honour to address to me yesterday I went to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and after having communicated them to him, word for word, and after he had attentively read the memorandum annexed to them, his Highness replied to me that he appreciates, as much as your Excellency, the suitableness of the draft of note and the purport of the declaration which together constitute the proposal which you and the Ambassador of France have communicated to him by your respective dragomans; that his personal objections are confined to the difficulty occasioned by the commencement of hostilities and other circumstances connected therewith, and that if the draft in question had arrived two months sooner, he was persuaded that the Porte would have received it with satisfaction.

Be that as it may, Reshid Pasha commissioned me to inform your Excellency that he will not fail to submit your proposition, in its present shape, to the Council of Ministers, and that he will do what depends on him to cause your arguments to be appreciated.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) E. PISANI.

No. 289.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 5.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, December 4, 1853.*

DESPATCHES up to the 19th instant have been received from General Baraguay d'Hilliers. I am told that they contain nothing more than the details of his reception by the Sultan and the Turkish Ministers; but they notice the conviction which he had already acquired, that the Porte had made up its mind to listen to no terms which did not comprise an immediate evacuation of the Principalities, and to enter into no arrangement which did not leave the Sultan unfettered in his sovereignty over all his subjects, whether Christian or Mussulman. The French Ambassador remarks, that the attitude of the Porte is that of a Government that has weighed well its decision before taking it, and is determined to abide by it at all hazards.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 290.

*Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 5.)*

My Lord,

*Berlin, December 2, 1853.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL stated to me this evening that he had learnt from Jassy that Prince Urusoff (a Russian General) had taken the entire government of the Province of Moldavia into his own hands; and that his language towards the inhabitants was as insulting as his acts were oppressive.

He said that on one occasion some Jews were called into his presence, and on his accosting them in his customary hard language they claimed the privileges of Austrian subjects, on which the Prince ordered them to leave at once for Lemberg.

I again expressed a hope that strict care would be taken by the Prussian agents not to recognise, by any official act, the Russian Government of these Provinces. His Excellency replied that he was anxious to leave those agents at their posts, as it had been reported to him that

through their means the Prussian subjects had been relieved from having the military quartered upon them, but that they should do nothing which could constitute a recognition of a Russian Government in those Provinces.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 291.

*Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 5.)*

My Lord,

*Berlin, December 2, 1853.*

I WAS unable to see Baron Manteuffel till early this morning, when I communicated officially to his Excellency the inclosures contained in your Lordship's despatch of the 29th ultimo, including a collective note to be signed by the Representatives of the Four Powers at Vienna, the Protocol of Conference, and lastly, the instructions which your Lordship has addressed to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe.

These documents had already been communicated to me by the French Minister (who had received them on the 29th ultimo), and I had been thus enabled to prepare Baron Manteuffel for their official communication.

The collective note and the Protocol of Conference transmitted by your Lordship were precisely similar to those which had been submitted to his Excellency by the Marquis de Moustier, with the exception that the former was in English, the original text of the French version being notified by its being headed "Traduction." The instructions to General Baraguay d'Hilliers, though not commencing in the identical language, embodied all the essential points of the despatch in a literal translation of the words used by your Lordship in your instruction to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe.

I have thought it right to be thus precise in relating these facts to your Lordship.

At my interview this morning I commenced by reading to his Excellency your Lordship's despatch of the 29th ultimo, and I informed him that another and probably a last effort was now to be made in the cause of peace, and that Her Majesty's Government earnestly hoped that all the influence possessed by Prussia would on this occasion be brought to bear upon the Cabinet of St. Petersburg.

I then read to his Excellency your Lordship's despatch of the 29th ultimo to the Earl of Westmorland, as well as the Protocol of Conference. I represented to his Excellency the earnest desire of Her Majesty's Government, in union with that of France, that the Prussian Government should concur with them in placing on record a principle which at the present moment may be conducive to the restoration of peace between Russia and the Porte, and which will be vitally important to the existing balance of power and future tranquillity of Europe; and I expressed the hope of Her Majesty's Government that Count Arnim would be directed to sign the collective note and the Protocol of Conference with the Representatives of Austria, England, and France, and that instructions similar to those which are addressed to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe would be transmitted to Baron Wildenbruch.

His Excellency at once informed me that he concurred wholly and entirely in the views set forth in these documents, and that His Majesty the King had authorized him to instruct Count Arnim to sign the collective note and the Protocol of Conference.

His Excellency also informed me that instructions to that effect would be sent this day by telegraph to Count Arnim.

His Excellency likewise stated that instructions, if not identical in language, similar in substance, would be transmitted to the Prussian Representative at Constantinople.

A similar communication has been made to the Marquis de Moustier. I have furnished his Excellency with copies of the collective note, the

Protocol of Conference, the instructions conveyed in your Lordship's despatch to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, as also an extract of your Lordship's despatch to the Earl of Westmorland, from the commencement to the paragraph ending with "advantageous."

I have, &c.  
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

## No. 292.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 5.).*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, November 26, 1853.*

IN obedience to the orders contained in your Lordship's despatch of the 15th instant, I waited upon the Chancellor on the 24th instant, and recapitulated to him the various acts of the Imperial authorities in the Principalities which gave a colour to the inference of its being intended that these provinces should remain under the dominion of Russia.

I was instructed, I said, to inquire of him whether any such purpose existed.

Count Nesselrode replied, that he had hardly got over the surprise which the proposal which I had made for the evacuation of the Principalities by the Emperor's troops, when I addressed him an inquiry so extraordinary that he was at a loss how to answer it.

After a pause, his Excellency said that the intentions of the Emperor as to evacuating the Principalities had been made known in papers to which every publicity had been given; if these assurances were not credited, it would be useless to repeat them in another form; that if it was intended not to attach credit to positive assurances, no repetition of them would be availing. Upon his Excellency remarking upon the constant disposition now manifested to find fault with the acts of Russia, I replied that I really could not admit the correctness of the assertion: that, for instance, a very unfavourable impression had been produced in England by accounts which had been received of Prince Gortchakoff having signified to the members of the Council at Bucharest that any reflections upon Russian policy would be punished by hanging, and that it would be very agreeable to me to have his authority for contradicting the statement.

Count Nesselrode had no knowledge of such a decision but that which he had derived from a French despatch. He totally disbelieved the statement, but added that certainly any person carrying on a clandestine correspondence with the enemy during war, would be put to death and would deserve his fate.

At the close of the conversation, I said that in pursuance of orders which I had received from Her Majesty's Government it became my duty to protest formally against any attempt now or at any future time on the part of the Russian Government at incorporating any portion of the Danubian provinces, and that I must reserve it to myself, if I considered it expedient, to repeat this protest in a note.

Count Nesselrode replied that I was of course at liberty to write such a note or such a protest if I thought fit, but that he must doubt whether the object which he still believed Her Majesty's Government to have in view, would be promoted by my giving the signal for an angry correspondence.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

## No. 293.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 5.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, November 26, 1853.*

ALTHOUGH I did not feel at liberty to read to Count Nesselrode your Lordship's despatch of the 16th instant, I was convinced that it was written with the intention of its contents being made fully known to his

Excellency, and according I communicated to him faithfully the feelings with which Her Majesty's Government have taken cognizance of the last Imperial manifesto.

My report was listened to without interruption, but evidently not without some impatience; and, when it was concluded, Count Nesselrode observed, that it appeared that it was a fixed resolution on the part of Her Majesty's Government to find fault with every act of the Russian Cabinet. Russia had been assailed in the most virulent manner from every quarter, and when her voice was heard in reply, a shout was raised against her. It came really to this: all that was done by Russia was wrong; all that was done by the Porte was right.

This he must consider was a very strange way of showing impartiality, and certainly it was not by pursuing such a course that the difficulties of which all complained would be solved in a peaceable manner.

I requested that his Excellency would bear in mind that the fact was, that Her Majesty's Government had from the outset considered that Russia was exclusively to blame in this affair, inasmuch as demands had been made, and violent measures adopted, for which no grounds had ever been adduced; having been wrong too, I added, at the outset, every step you have taken in that direction made you more so.

This of course the Chancellor could not admit.

The Chancellor then spoke of the position which it was wished to assign to Russia. Russia was at war with Turkey, and claimed the right of settling her disputes by means of direct negotiation with her adversary. She could admit of no interference. At the present moment he was aware of Her Majesty's Government being occupied in drawing up the very Articles of a Treaty which Russia was to be called upon to sign.

I replied, that unquestionably Her Majesty's Government was very intent, as they had been all along, upon bringing about a pacification by whatever means could be found availing; that the wish was felt as strongly at Vienna as at London, and had given rise to as much exertion there; that, obviously, neutral and friendly Governments were called upon to narrow as much as possible the ground of disagreement between belligerent Powers; above all, that I must remind his Excellency that the question of Turkey's existence was one as interesting to Her Majesty's Government as it could be to Russia.

You know very well, Count Nesselrode replied, that the existence of Turkey has never been in danger; had Russia and Turkey been left to themselves, the quarrel would have been ended long ago.

M. le Comte, I replied, you must permit me to remind you that Turkey was represented by yourself as being in so infirm and tottering a state, that her fall might be at any moment expected; and you know perfectly well that the preservation of Turkey is an English interest: this fully explains the solicitude taken in the business by Her Majesty's Government.

No. 294.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 6.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, December 4, 1853.*

I HAVE inquired of M. Drouyn de Lhuys whether information similar to that which has been conveyed to your Lordship, that Austria meant to interfere in the event of any quarrel between the Bosnians and Servians, had reached him. He replied in the negative, and he added that he had some weeks back, in a conversation with M. de Hübner, alluded to the possibility of Austria having some idea of indemnifying herself for the occupation of the Principalities by Russia, by taking possession of some other European province of Turkey, and that Count Buol had answered that Austria had no project of the kind, and had no intention of arbitrarily interfering between the Porte and her subjects.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

## No. 295.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 6.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, December 5, 1853.*

A FEW days ago M. de Lhuys mentioned to me that from despatches received at the Ministry of Marine it would appear that some misunderstanding had occurred between the Ambassadors and Admirals at Constantinople, and that the latter had refused to obey a requisition of the former to send a combined squadron into the Black Sea. M. Drouyn de Lhuys added that M. de la Cour made no mention of this in his despatches.

Yesterday he informed me further that one of General Baraguay d'Hilliers' despatches alluded to this misunderstanding, and he supposed in consequence that it had really occurred. It had been deemed necessary therefore to send additional instructions to Admiral Hamelin, giving him distinctly to understand that he was under the orders of the Ambassador. These instructions, M. de Lhuys added, had been or would be communicated to your Lordship.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

## No. 296.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, December 7, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held to Count Nesselrode, as reported in your despatch of the 26th ultimo, with reference to the late proceedings of the Russian authorities in the Principalities, and the tendency of those proceedings to give an impression that it was the intention of Russia permanently to retain possession of those Provinces.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

## No. 297.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, December 7, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint you in reply to your despatch of the 26th instant, that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held to Count Nesselrode on making known to his Excellency their opinion of the late Russian manifesto, as stated to you in my despatch of the 10th ultimo.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

## No. 298.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, December 7, 1853.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 2nd instant, reporting the substance of a conversation which you had held with Baron Manteuffel, respecting the continuance of the Prussian agents in the Principalities, I have to observe that it is much to be regretted that

those agents are not withdrawn from their posts, as until there is uniformity of acts among the Four Powers, Russia will not believe that they agree in opinion respecting her policy.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 299.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, December 7, 1853.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 2nd instant, reporting the substance of your conversation with Baron Manteuffel on communicating to his Excellency the copies of the Note and Protocol on the Eastern question, proposed to be signed at Vienna by the Representatives of the Four Powers, I have to inform your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government approve your proceedings on this occasion.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 300.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 8.)*

My Lord,

*Vienna, December 3, 1853.*

A SHORT time ago the Prince of Servia made an application to the Austrian Government for a loan of arms and of some artillery, to enable him to defend the neutrality which he had determined to maintain in the contest at present going on upon his frontier. Count Buol informed me that he had replied to this request by stating, that His Majesty the Emperor would not object to agree to this application, provided the neutrality was to be defended equally against Russia as against Turkey. The Prince, in the first instance, agreed to make this declaration; but afterwards, on the assembly of his Council, it was explained in a manner which Count Buol did not consider satisfactory, and therefore he has announced to me that the transmission of the arms had been stopped.

The intelligence which has been received here of some attempts on the part of the Turkish population of Bosnia to enter upon the Servian territory, states that they have been repelled by the Servians, but there is not the slightest indication that the Austrian Government have taken any part in these hostilities, or are in any way likely to be mixed up with them. The constant advice of the Austrian Government, both to the Porte and to the Prince of Servia, has been to maintain the strictest neutrality.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

P.S.—Since writing the above I have received your Lordship's despatch of the 29th ultimo, to the inquiries in which the information I have above given may be considered as a reply. W.

No. 301.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 8.)*

My Lord,

*Vienna, December 3, 1853.*

COUNT BUOL begged M. de Bourqueney, Count Arnim, and myself, to call upon him to-day to prepare the mode of arranging and forwarding the communication to Constantinople, the substance of which had been agreed to (as announced by telegraph) by England and Prussia, but of

which the documents had only as yet been received by M. de Bourqueney.

Count Buol stated that these having been communicated to him, he had taken the Emperor's opinion upon them, and he had received his orders to state his entire agreement with them.

Count Buol added, that with respect to the draft of the instructions he thought it would be advisable that each Government should also send a confidential communication to its Representative, in which might be set forth more forcibly than in the ostensible instructions the anxious desire of the Four Governments that the Porte should favourably receive and act upon their suggestions, and the deep regret with which any appearance of disinclination on her part to do so would be viewed by them.

In reply to this invitation, it was remarked, that if such a suggestion was proposed to our Governments, they would expect that it would be accompanied by the reciprocity of a similar assurance from the Austrian Government, that if, after the consent of the Porte had been obtained to the proposals of the Four Powers, any reluctance to accept them should be manifested on the part of Russia, they would adopt language as pressing and as energetic to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg.

Count Buol consented to take this engagement, and added, that should the case occur, he would in a like spirit consult with and adopt the views of the other Allied Powers as to the most advisable course to be pursued.

Baron Bourqueney, upon this understanding, undertook to recommend the suggestion of Count Buol to the favourable attention of his Government, and I also stated that I had no doubt the same language of friendly interest towards the Porte which had dictated the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe of the 24th of October, would be adhered to, upon the understanding, to which reference is above made, relative to the language to be held, if necessary, at St. Petersburg.

Count Buol inquired in what manner we proposed to transmit the note to Reshid Pasha. He stated that he considered the best line to be adopted would be to desire me, as the organ of the Conference and in their name, to transmit it to Lord Stratford, and to request him, as the senior Ambassador, to take upon himself the duty of delivering it; and he thought that Lord Stratford might judge that the best mode of doing so would be (after consulting with his colleagues) to propose an interview of the Four Representatives with Reshid Pasha, at which he would deliver to him the note, when each of the Representatives would have an opportunity of communicating the substance of the instructions with which they were charged.

In stating this view of the manner of proceeding, Count Buol remarked that he did so merely as a suggestion, but that if Lord Stratford took charge of the note, he considered it due to his high character and great experience to leave him to decide upon what he considered as the most proper method to be adopted.

I stated that I was quite ready to charge myself with this commission, and that I would transmit the note to Lord Stratford, accompanied with the proposed suggestion, but leaving it to him to decide the manner of proceeding.

Count Buol begged to mention a mere verbal alteration which he would propose in the Protocol to be signed by the Four Representatives. He thought the word "*plaisir*" in the third paragraph, and the words at the close of it "*à la tranquillité*," would be better altered respectively to "*satisfaction*" and "*au repos*." M. de Bourqueney and Count Arnim at once concurred in these alterations as being preferable expressions and bearing precisely the same import, and I also consequently gave my consent to them. As we were quitting Count Buol, M. de Bourqueney remarked that it would be a step in the progress of the important negotiation we were entering upon, if the present meeting, although not a regularly constituted conference, should take some step which might have the character of attesting our joint consent to the documents submitted to us; he therefore proposed that the Note and Protocol should be

“paraphéed” by the signature of our respective initials. Count Buol agreed to this proposal, and expressed his pleasure at thus taking a step which gave evidence of the concurrence of the Four Powers in the line of policy which might now be considered as adopted. He then placed his initials to the drafts of the Note and Protocol, which was equally done by Baron Bourqueney, Count Arnim, and myself.

Count Buol stated that he would charge himself with the preparation of the different documents which were to be signed by the Conference, and with their transmission by messenger to Belgrade, and thence by Tatar to Constantinople; and as it was uncertain when the despatches from London and from Berlin might arrive, he proposed that we should meet in conference on Monday for the signature of the documents and their immediate transmission. He stated also that he would prepare the form of the Protocol of the Conference, which it had been decided should be kept and registered.

Count Buol said that with regard to the communication of the note to the Russian Minister and to the Turkish Ambassador, he thought the best manner of proceeding would be that he should undertake to place a copy in the hands of Baron Meyendorff, and that (at the request of the Conference) Baron Bourqueney and myself should do the same with the Ambassador of the Porte. As to the Protocol of the Four Powers, Count Buol thought it should be considered as a confidential document, of which no copy should be given, but that the contents of it might (after the departure of the messenger for Constantinople) be communicated confidentially to Baron Meyendorff and to Ariff Effendi, in the same mode as had been adopted with regard to the note.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

P.S.—Since writing the above, I have received by the messenger Holmes your Lordship’s despatch of the 29th instant, together with its inclosures, of which I have informed Count Buol; but as Count Arnim has not received his despatches, our conference for signature remains fixed for to-morrow.

W.

No. 302.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, December 9, 1853.*

YOUR Lordship’s despatch of the 3rd instant, has been received and laid before the Queen.

Your Lordship will inform Count Buol of the sincere pleasure with which Her Majesty’s Government have learnt that his Excellency had received the Emperor of Austria’s commands to agree to the Protocol, and that the drafts of the note and Protocol have been “paraphéed,” in token of the concurrence of the Four Powers in the line of policy which might now be considered as adopted on the Eastern question.

It is the earnest hope of Her Majesty’s Government that this policy, which is honourable and just as respects both the Porte and Russia, may lead to the re-establishment of peace between them, and that the firm and united action of the Four Powers may avert the danger that now menaces the general tranquillity of Europe.

Your Lordship will also inform Count Buol that Her Majesty’s Ambassador at Constantinople has been made aware of the anxiety felt by Her Majesty’s Government for the success of the propositions now about to be made to the Porte, and that it is most satisfactory to them to know that Count Buol has engaged to consult with and to adopt the views of the other allied Powers as to the most advisable course to be pursued in the event of the Porte agreeing to the proposals of the Four Powers and of Russia being unwilling to accept them.

Her Majesty's Government agree to the verbal amendments introduced into the Protocol, and they consider that the mode of proceeding recommended to the Four Representatives at Constantinople was judicious.

I have the satisfaction to inform your Lordship that your language and conduct throughout in this matter have merited the approbation of His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 303.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 10.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, November 12, 1853.*

M. DE LA COUR has sent to inform me that he can no longer take any part in the pending question, as he has received notice from his Government that he is no longer in a position to perform the functions of Ambassador, and that his successor (General Baraguay d'Hilliers, I believe) will be here in a very few days. He had before informed me confidentially of this intended change, but did not object to act with me, or rather, as he said, to second me in presenting the new proposition to the Turkish Government. I need not observe how fatal this relinquishment, unavoidable as it may have been, must necessarily prove to the last remaining hope, if such there be, of obtaining the Porte's consent to the object of your Lordship's instruction.

No. 304.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 10.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, November 19, 1853.*

IN a despatch which I forwarded to your Lordship to-day by a French Government steamer, I stated in substance that, although I had used my best exertions to obtain the acceptance of that proposition, which formed the subject-matter of your Lordship's instructions to me of the 24th of October, I had met with no success, and had only kept open a door for further negotiation in the hope that, by acting in concert with the new French Ambassador, whose language is eminently pacific, and obtaining the support of the Prussian, and possibly of the Austrian Representative, I might still be able to make a salutary impression upon the Turkish Government.

It is now my intention to fill up the canvas by adding such particulars as I think likely to have any interest for your Lordship, and by giving, in few words, an account of my proceedings in prosecution of the object in view.

It is necessary to premise that, before your Lordship's instructions reached me, not only was the utmost term of delay for commencing hostilities exhausted, but the actual commencement of them was known here to have taken place under circumstances favourable to the Sultan's arms. The Porte, moreover, was engaged in carrying out measures intended to increase, at much fatigue and expense, its disposable means of prosecuting the war, and to convey to its subjects the impression that results proportioned to the sacrifices which they were called upon to make, would be aimed at.

Such a state of things was anything but conducive to the success of a negotiation founded upon your Lordship's instructions. Moreover it was soon ascertained, partly from communications with the Austrian and Prussian Envoys, partly from advices transmitted to me by Lord West-

morland, that, if anything was to be attempted by me, it would have no other support but that of the French Embassy.

The earnest desire of Her Majesty's Government to avoid or to shorten the calamities of war, and my own conviction that your Lordship's two-fold proposition, especially as it excluded no reasonable alterations, would, if accepted, effectually secure the Porte against every dangerous admission or encroachment in future, determined me to proceed in defiance of every obstacle and discouragement. I was sanguine enough to believe that my exertions, if they failed as to their immediate object, would at least prepare the way for success under some other form, and at no distant period.

I began by making known, confidentially, to the Sultan and to Reshid Pasha, the nature of the proposition recommended by your Lordship, and my own conscientious opinion of its merits. I learned from the latter that the Porte was already in possession of its terms, a despatch, founded on your Lordship's communications to M. Musurus in London, having been already submitted to the Council of Ministers, and received by them with marks of a decidedly unfavourable character. My next step was to effect an agreement between M. de la Cour and myself, that we should address instructions of similar purport to our respective interpreters, directing them to wait upon the Ottoman Minister together, and to lay before him the two drafts inclosed with your Lordship's despatch. This was done; and we also agreed to see Reshid Pasha ourselves separately, and to keep nothing secret from the Austrian and Prussian Ministers, though we knew that they were not then at liberty to support us.

To both of us the language of the Ottoman Secretary of State was unfavourable. Towards me it amounted in substance to this; our proposition might have been received with satisfaction at an earlier period, but circumstances were changed, and such an arrangement no longer suited the position in which the Ottoman Government were placed towards Russia on one side and towards their own people on the other. The terms proposed could not be accepted without an appeal to the General Council, and Reshid Pasha could hold out no prospect of their acquiescence, even if his colleagues were favourably disposed, which they evidently were not.

It was understood between M. de la Cour and myself, that we would not press the Turkish Ministers to a formal decision, but limit ourselves to ascertaining the real state of their opinions.

With this view I drew up a statement of our arguments, which, with M. de la Cour's knowledge, was communicated to Reshid Pasha in French, and to the Council and also to the Sultan in Turkish. Thus far my French colleague acted with me, although he was aware that he had been superseded by the appointment of General Baraguay d'Hilliers; but the arrival of later intelligence from Paris obliged him to stop short, and I was left entirely by myself.

Such were the circumstances under which I made a last effort before the Council met to bring Reshid Pasha into my sentiments. I went over to his house in the evening, and sate in discussion with his Highness until it was time for him to join his colleagues at the appointed place of deliberation. Your Lordship may be assured that I omitted nothing which my instructions, my recollections, or my reflection could suggest, in order to make an impression on his mind. I lament to say that all my efforts were unavailing, and that I could obtain nothing beyond a promise that my arguments should be faithfully repeated to the Council before he expressed any opinion of his own. I might accompany him, he said, to the Council, and make my own statement to the assembled Ministers; or if I thought that he was an obstacle to their acceptance of my proposals, he was ready to give in his resignation. It would evidently have been idle for me to make an appeal from the Pasha to his colleagues, the leading men of whom constitute what is called the war party; and so unusual a step would only have had the effect of proclaiming my failure, and rivetting their resistance. I did, however, the only thing which remained for me to do at the moment. I took my leave with evident marks of disappointment

and dissatisfaction, expressing in strong terms my apprehension that the Pasha would one day have reason to look back with painful regret on the issue of our interview ; and this I did not do till after I had vainly tried to reconcile him to my advice by changing its form, and suggesting the adoption of its principle in some way more suited to a state of actual hostilities.

I have since received the most positive assurances from Reshid Pasha that the notes and memorandum were submitted by him to the Council, together with an account of our interview. It is proper to note that, while these endeavours were in progress the Prussian Minister received instructions to support your Lordship's proposition ; and Reshid Pasha, when the Council met to take it into consideration, was aware of that circumstance.

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Inclosure 1 in No. 304.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.*

Monsieur,

*T'ierapia, le 8 Novembre, 1853.*

M'ÉTANT concerté avec son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de France, dont l'interprète sera autorisé d'agir de concert avec vous dans cette occasion, je vous invite à vous rendre au moment plutôt chez son Altesse Reshid Pasha, à qui vous direz de ma part que je suis chargé par mon Gouvernement de lui remettre la note ci-jointe, accompagnée d'un projet de note proposé, d'après une nouvelle rédaction, pour l'acceptation de la Sublime Porte.

En remettant les deux pièces à son Altesse vous lui observerez que la dernière a été rédigée avec une grande sollicitude pour la dignité et l'indépendance du Sultan, que toute objection élevée contre la note, dite de Vienne, y a été soigneusement écartée, et qu'elle est recommandée à la considération la plus sérieuse de la Porte, qui ne pourrait la rejeter sans faire éprouver à Sa Majesté la Reine et à son Gouvernement les sentimens les plus pénibles, surtout si une décision aussi regrettable viendrait à être prise par égard pour l'excitation du peuple et l'enthousiasme de l'armée.

Vu les assurances déjà données, et les mesures actuellement adoptées par la Grande Bretagne pour appuyer la Sublime Porte et pour protéger son territoire, il est indispensable que tout progrès ultérieur des hostilités soit suspendu, pendant un terme raisonnable, et durant la négociation que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté a entamée afin de rétablir les relations amicales entre la Porte et la Russie, bien entendu, toutefois, qu'aucune mouvement hostile ne soit fait de la part de celle-ci.

Vous finirez par dire à Reshid Pasha, avec l'instance de mes convictions personnelles, que je recommande cette proposition de mon Gouvernement à sa clairvoyance patriotique et à son zèle ministériel, en attendant que je puisse avoir l'honneur de réitérer mes instances de vive voix auprès de lui.

Votre, &c.  
(Signé) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

(Translation.)

Sir,

*Therapia, November 8, 1853.*

HAVING come to an understanding with his Excellency the Ambassador of France, whose interpreter will be authorized to act in concert with you on this occasion, I request you to proceed, as soon as possible, to his Highness Reshid Pasha, to whom you will say on my behalf that I am directed by my Government to deliver to him the annexed note, accompanied with a draft of note

proposed, according to a new version, for the acceptance of the Sublime Porte.

In delivering to his Excellency the two documents you will observe that the latter has been drawn up with great solicitude for the dignity and independence of the Sultan, that all the objections which have been made to the so-called Vienna note have been carefully excluded from it, and that it is recommended to the most serious consideration of the Porte, which could not reject it without causing the most painful feelings to Her Majesty the Queen and to her Government, especially if a decision so much to be regretted should be adopted out of deference to the excitement of the people and the enthusiasm of the army.

Considering the assurances already given, and the measures actually adopted by Great Britain for the support of the Sublime Porte, and for the protection of its territory, it is indispensable that all further progress of hostilities should be suspended for a reasonable time, and pending the negotiation which Her Majesty's Government has set on foot in order to reestablish friendly relations between the Porte and Russia, it being, however, clearly understood that no hostile movement shall be made on the part of the latter.

You will end by stating to Reshid Pasha with the urgency of my personal convictions, that I recommend this proposal of my Government to his penetration as a patriot and to his zeal as a Minister, until such time as I may have the honour of reiterating to him my exhortations by word of mouth.

Yours, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

#### Inclosure 2 in No. 304.

*Memorandum addressed by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Porte.*

EN offrant de nouveau à la Porte un moyen de fixer les termes de raccommodement avec la Russie, on croit satisfaire à la fois aux devoirs d'une amitié sincère et aux exigences du bien-être général. La paix est dans l'intérêt de tout les états, de toutes les classes productives. Son interruption dérange les calculs de l'industrie et les rapports du commerce. Elle déchaîne les passions, met tout au hazard, et retarde, si elle n'arrête pas, le progrès de la civilisation. La guerre ne se fait légitimement que pour révéndiquer les droits d'une nation, et maintenir l'indépendance qui doit toujours accompagner la souveraineté. Dès qu'on pourra sauvegarder ces intérêts essentiels par la négociation, les hostilités cessent d'avoir un objet légitime, et, privées de cette justification, elles perdent le prestige de la gloire, et deviennent une réproche à l'humanité. Il ne s'agit pas ici de religion. La Porte a déclaré d'une manière solennelle qu'elle faisait un appel aux armes dans le seul but de maintenir ses droits souverains et l'indépendance de son Empire contre les prétensions de la Russie.

Faisons l'application de ces principes. La proposition soumise actuellement à la Porte n'est, au fond, autre chose que ce que cette Puissance s'est montrée toujours disposée à accepter. Toutes les objections faites par la Porte à de certaines expressions susceptibles d'une sinistre interprétation y ont été soigneusement écartées, et le nouveau projet de note se trouve accompagné d'une déclaration qui lui offre tous les avantages qui se rattachent à la confirmation des principes déclarés par les Cinq Puissances en 1841, dont l'efficacité à l'avenir ne saurait à peine avoir un meilleur garant que celui de leur application efficace dans la circonstance actuelle. Ce qu'il y a, en outre, de positif, c'est que le plan recommandé aujourd'hui par les alliés les plus cordiaux du Sultan, aurait été regardé à Constantinople trois mois après le départ du Prince Menchikoff comme propre à résoudre toutes les complications, et à rassurer les esprits les plus méfiants.

Il est vrai, pourtant, de dire que, depuis cette époque, la situation a

subi des changemens. La Porte a réuni les forces de son Empire à grands frais. Elle a monté l'enthousiasme de la nation. Elle a communiqué sa déclaration de guerre à toutes les Puissances ses amies. Elle a pris l'engagement de commencer les hostilités, et les hostilités se poursuivent à l'heure qu'il est à son avantage. Elle pourrait à peine les suspendre sans le consentement de l'ennemi, à moins que de risquer la sûreté de ses armées, et le fruit des succès qu'elles ont déjà remportés.

Personne ne voudrait jeter une doute sur l'exactitude de ces faits. On ne saurait même nier que la difficulté d'arranger à l'amiable les différends qui ont amenés la lutte actuelle, ne soit visiblement augmentée par le recours aux armes, et par les opérations hostiles qui s'en sont suivies. Cependant, la véritable question ne gît pas dans cette difficulté. Si, d'un côté, les obstacles qui retardent un arrangement sont devenus plus nombreux, les risques et les dangers qui accompagnent la guerre n'en sont pas diminués. La Porte se trouve en lutte avec une Puissance colossale, et il est à craindre que l'épuisement causé par la guerre ne se fasse sentir à la longue plus fortement en Turquie qu'en Russie. L'opinion publique en Europe approuve la résistance de la Porte, et les escadres de l'Angleterre et de la France sont mouillées dans le Bosphore pour la protection du territoire Ottoman. Mais les alliés les plus sincères de la Porte ne peuvent pas sacrifier les intérêts de leurs sujets à son désir, tout naturel qu'il soit, d'obtenir les avantages imprévus dans le commencement de sa querelle avec la Russie, et les nations les plus civilisées sont exactement celles qui seraient les premières à se revolter contre une guerre poussée par quelque motif que ce soit au-delà des limites de la raison et de la nécessité.

Il est tout simple que la Porte doit souhaiter tel résultat de la guerre qui la mettrait dorénavant à l'abri des prétensions injustes de ses voisins. Chercher cet avantage par la prolongation indéfinie des hostilités n'est autre chose que de s'exposer à des périls qui puissent avoir une toute autre issue, et, en cas de quelque succès, à la tentation de réhausser encore les conditions de la paix selon l'impulsion d'un peuple excité, ou d'une armée avide de gloire.

Les alliés de la Porte ne lui conseillent que ce que la raison et une juste appréciation des forces et des éventualités lui ont déjà prescrit. Quelques embarras de position et de forme ne peuvent pas servir de contrepoids aux considérations dominantes et aux obligations d'une portée trop haute pour se laisser facilement effacer. Il va sans dire que l'adhésion du Gouvernement Ottoman à la proposition qui vient de lui être soumise, servirait de motif aux alliés pour tâcher encore plus activement à écarter tout obstacle à son acceptation ailleurs, et, arrive ce qui pourra, la Porte, en déférant à leurs conseils, acquerrait un nouveau titre à leur sympathie, et, en cas de besoin, à leur coopération.

La Porte, enfin, servirait mal sa propre cause si elle faisait trop de cas des obstacles existans, ou si elle se laissait emporter par l'espoir de tout obtenir par la force des armes. Une réconciliation effectuée entre elle et la Russie dans les circonstances actuelles et dans les termes proposées ne manquerait pas de tourner à son profit durable, autant par l'effet moral de sa modération, de son énergie, et du zèle loyal de ses peuples, que par le rétablissement de son repos et le maintien de ses droits.

(Translation)

THE duties of sincere friendship and the exigencies of the general welfare may be considered to be consulted, by again offering to the Porte a means of settling the terms of reconciliation with Russia. Peace is the interest of all States, of all the productive classes. Its interruption deranges the calculations of industry and the relations of commerce. It unchains the passions, puts everything in jeopardy, and retards, if it does not arrest, the progress of civilization. War cannot be lawfully carried on save for the assertion of the rights of a nation, and for the maintenance of the independence which should

always accompany sovereignty. When these essential interests can be protected by negotiation, hostilities cease to have any legitimate object, and deprived of that justification, they lose the charm of glory and become a reproach to humanity. There is here no question of religion. The Porte has declared in a solemn manner that it has appealed to arms for the sole purpose of maintaining its sovereign rights and the independence of its empire against the pretensions of Russia.

Let us apply these principles. The proposition at present submitted to the Porte is, substantially, nothing else but what that Power has always shown herself disposed to accept. All the objections made by the Porte to certain expressions susceptible of being misinterpreted have been carefully excluded from it, and the new draft of note is accompanied by a declaration which offers to the Porte all the advantages attaching to the confirmation of the principles declared by the Five Powers in 1841; the future efficacy of which could scarcely have a better guarantee than that of their effective application under existing circumstances. What is certain, moreover, is that the plan now recommended by the most cordial allies of the Sultan would have been looked upon at Constantinople three months after Prince Menchikoff's departure as calculated to solve all difficulties and to re-assure the most sceptical minds.

It is true, however, that since that period the situation of affairs has been changed. The Porte has collected at great cost the forces of its Empire. It has roused the enthusiasm of the nation. It has communicated its declaration of war to all friendly Powers. It has undertaken to commence hostilities, and those hostilities are at the present time prosecuted with advantage. It could scarcely suspend them without the enemy's consent, without risking the safety of its armies and the fruits of the success which they have already achieved.

No one could be inclined to cast a doubt on the correctness of these facts. It cannot even be denied that the difficulty of amicably settling the differences which have led to the existing contest are visibly increased by the recourse which has been had to arms, and by the hostilities which have ensued. The true question, however, does not lie in this difficulty. If, on the one hand, the obstacles which retard an arrangement are become more numerous, the risks and the dangers which accompany war are not diminished. The Porte is engaged in a struggle with a colossal Power, and it is to be apprehended that the exhaustion occasioned by the war may in the long run be felt more strongly in Turkey than in Russia. Public opinion in Europe approves the resistance of the Porte, and the squadrons of England and France are anchored in the Bosphorus for the protection of the Ottoman territory. But the most sincere allies of the Porte cannot sacrifice the interests of their own subjects to its desire, however natural it may be, to obtain the advantages unlooked for at the commencement of its quarrel with Russia, and the most civilized nations are precisely those which would be the first to feel horror at a war, pushed for any motive whatever beyond the limits of reason and of necessity.

It is very natural that the Porte should desire such a result of the war as might hereafter secure it against the unjust pretensions of its neighbours. To seek for this advantage by the indefinite prolongation of hostilities, is nothing else than to run the risk of dangers which may have an altogether different result, and, in case of some success, to enhance the conditions of peace, in proportion to the impulse given by an excited people, and by an army eager for glory.

The allies of the Porte recommend to it nothing but what is already prescribed to it by reason and by a just appreciation of the forces of the Two Powers, and of the contingencies of warfare. Certain embarrassments of position and form cannot counterbalance overbearing considerations, and obligations of too high a character to be easily effaced. It is obvious that the adherence of the Ottoman Government to the proposition which has been laid before it, would be an inducement to the allies still more actively to endeavour to remove any obstacle to its acceptance in another place, and, happen what may, the Porte, by deferring to their advice, would acquire a fresh title to their sympathy, and, in case of need, to their cooperation.

Finally, the Porte would badly serve its own cause, if it took existing obstacles too much into account, or if it suffered itself to be carried away by the hope of obtaining everything by force of arms. A reconciliation between it

and Russia, effected under existing circumstances and in the terms proposed, would not fail to turn to its lasting advantage, as much by the moral effect of its moderation, its energy, and the loyal zeal of its people, as by the re-establishment of its tranquillity and the maintenance of its rights.

Inclosure 3 in No. 304.

*M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.)

*Pera, November 15, 1853.*

RESHID PASHA of his own accord gave me an account of the result of last night's Council. He told me that he read to them the projet de note, the note to be signed by the Representatives, and also the memorandum containing the arguments put forward by your Excellency, and stated to his colleagues the conversation which he had with your Lordship on the subject of the new proposal. He abstained, said he, from expressing any opinion, either in favour or against it, before ascertaining their own. Although Reshid Pasha did not say that the Council rejected the new proposal, yet, according to private information I obtained, it would appear that the Council is unwilling to accept it under present circumstances.

No. 305.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 10.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, November 21, 1853.*

THE French Ambassador having called here to-day, I had some conversation with him, grounded on his assurances that peace between Russia and Turkey was an object of earnest desire to his Government. I found his Excellency most cordial in all that relates to the establishment of a thorough concurrence between us in matters pertaining to the difference between Turkey and Russia.

No. 306.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 10.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, November 21, 1853.*

HAVING in a former despatch transmitted to your Lordship a copy of the official letter by which the Hospodar of Wallachia had apprised Reshid Pasha of his retirement, I have now the honour to forward herewith, in copy, a similar letter received by the Ottoman Minister from Prince Ghyka, the Hospodar of Moldavia.

The Porte's letters confirming its previous order for the retirement of both Princes had not been received by them before their departure from the Principalities. Reshid Pasha has informed me of his intention to forward them to their Highnesses, wherever they are to be found.

My instructions to Her Majesty's Consuls at Bucharest and Jassy have shared the fate of the Porte's despatches; Saïd Pasha, Governor of Rustchouk, to whom the latter were addressed, having returned them, stating that the Russian authorities in Wallachia would not allow him to send them on.

I have made another attempt to get the instructions delivered to Mr. Colquhoun and Mr. Gardner, by sending them to Mr. Cunningham, at Galatz.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 306.

*Prince Ghyka to Reshid Pasha.*

Monseigneur,

*Jassy, le 14 Octobre, 1853.*

LA fausse position dans laquelle m'ont placé les évènements d'un ordre majeur, ayant fini par devenir incompatible avec l'état actuel des choses, j'ai cru de mon devoir de résigner mes pouvoirs entre les mains du Conseil Administratif et de m'absenter du pays. En informant de cette démarche votre Altesse, et en la priant de la soumettre au pied du Trône de Sa Majesté le Sultan, j'ose espérer qu'elle appréciera les motifs de ma conduite, et qu'elle voudra bien me conserver dans tous les cas la bienveillance dont elle m'a constamment honoré.

Je crois de mon devoir, en même temps, de donner connaissance à votre Altesse que je fixerai provisoirement ma résidence à Vienne.

Daignez, &c.

(Signé) G. GHYKA.

(Translation.)

Monseigneur,

*Jassy, October 14, 1853.*

THE false position in which important events have placed me, having finally become incompatible with the existing state of things, I have deemed it to be my duty to make over my powers to the Administrative Council, and to absent myself from the country. In informing your Excellency of this proceeding, and requesting you to lay it before the throne of His Majesty the Sultan, I venture to hope that you will appreciate the motives of my conduct, and that you will be pleased in any case to retain for me the kindness with which you have constantly honoured me.

I deem it to be my duty at the same time to apprise your Highness that I shall provisionally fix my residence at Vienna.

Be pleased, &c.

(Signed) G. GHYKA.

No. 307.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 10.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, November 24, 1853.*

CONCEIVING it desirable that Vice-Admiral Dundas, and the officers under his command, should present their respects to the Sultan, I applied for an audience, which was immediately granted.

It was not without a feeling of national pride that I performed the duty of presenting to the Turkish Emperor so many gallant officers bearing Her Majesty's Commission, and called to Constantinople, under circumstances of unprecedented importance, for the protection of rights unjustly assailed, and in vindication of those great principles on which the tranquillity of Europe in a great measure reposes.

Reshid Pasha assisted at the presentation, accompanied by the Chief Dragoman of the Porte, and the Master of the Ceremonies.

In addressing the Sultan, according to the practice of this Court, I took occasion to remind His Majesty of those essential objects to which the Queen and Government of England principally looked in giving him so signal a proof of their cordial sympathy and concurrence.

I endeavoured, in particular, to direct his thoughts towards an early restoration of peace under all the advantages of his present position; and I felt more deeply the obligation of doing so, in consequence of the language which His Majesty had been advised to hold on that subject to my colleague, the French Ambassador.

The substance of my address is faithfully recorded in the accompanying memorandum; and the words with which His Majesty honoured me in reply, are also inclosed herewith on the authority of the Minister who attended.

The Sultan gave a most affable reception to the whole party, and expressed in gracious terms the pleasure he felt in seeing them, distinguishing Vice-Admiral Dundas by the inquiries which he particularly addressed to him.

After the officers had retired I saw the Sultan in private, and availed myself of the opportunity, as I had previously done with Reshid Pasha, who interpreted between us, to press the arguments which I had already employed in favour of peace. Whatever impression I may have made on His Majesty's mind,—and his manner encouraged some hope in that respect, especially on the score of humanity, and of the approach of winter,—his language was in complete accordance with that of his Minister. Peace, indeed, was desirable, but his rights were to be maintained, and he threw himself altogether on his Council. When I asked His Majesty whether he had in view the Council of Ministers, or the General Council, his answer was, Both. When I proposed that Reshid should be authorized to confer privately with me and the French Ambassador, as to the practicability of framing a sound plan of arrangement out of the existing elements, the idea was not rejected; neither was it distinctly accepted. When I reminded His Majesty of what I had so often urged as to internal improvements, productive of benefit to all classes of his subjects, the answer was one of acquiescence; but not, I think, such as I was entitled to expect.

Although my conversation with the Sultan lasted some time, I could only repeat the arguments which had been previously submitted to him in writing; and it is but just to bear in mind, that His Majesty's position is one of unusual delicacy, not exempt from contingencies of greater embarrassment, and even of personal danger.

Inclosure 1 in No. 307.

*Speech addressed to the Sultan by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

IN presenting to your Imperial Majesty the admiral and captains of the squadron which my gracious Sovereign has sent at your Majesty's request, and in concert with the Emperor of the French, Her Majesty's powerful ally, to protect the rights and independence of this friendly Empire, I perform a duty honourable and gratifying alike to them and to me.

Their presence here at so extraordinary a juncture shows how wisely your Majesty, and your Majesty's Government, have appreciated the friendship, and relied upon the sympathies of the British nation.

Such binding and generous sentiments derive no small accession from the just and enlightened benevolence displayed in your Majesty's administrative policy. It is not only to the successful maintenance of a great European principle, that the British Government look for the reward of any sacrifice which they may have to make in contributing to the protection of Turkey from unprovoked aggression. They look with equal steadiness to the prosperity and strength which your Majesty could not fail to realize through-

out your extensive dominions by carrying into effect a system of improvement, complete though gradual, towards all classes and interests of your Majesty's subjects.

Still, their unrelinquished hope, and the more immediate aim of their effective concurrence, is peace; not, indeed, an illusive or precarious peace, but one which, by simple means, would fix on safe and honourable grounds, without injustice to any other Power, the rights of your Majesty's sovereignty and the independence of your Majesty's Empire.

To obtain such a peace at the earliest practicable moment is always, I must presume, the anxious desire of your Majesty, as it is the point most earnestly recommended by your Majesty's allies. I should be happy to learn that it is also an object duly appreciated, and strenuously promoted, in a spirit of continued moderation by your Majesty's Ministers.

Inclosure 2 in No. 307.

*Answer of the Sultan to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

JE commence par remercier l'Ambassadeur de m'avoir procuré le plaisir de voir l'Amiral et MM. les Officiers de son escadre.

Dans les circonstances actuelles la présence de la flotte Anglaise ici sous le commandement d'un Amiral si distingué, étant une preuve patente de l'amitié de Sa Majesté la Reine de la Grande Bretagne, ma puissante alliée, je prie l'Ambassadeur de vouloir bien lui en exprimer mes sentiments de reconnaissance.

L'Angleterre ayant montré dans maintes circonstances de nombreuses marques de bienveillance à l'égard de mon Empire, je ne doute pas qu'elle ne repousse par tous les moyens les prétensions injustes de la Russie qui toucheraient à mon indépendance et à mes droits souverains, et le monde entier verra quels avantages immenses peuvent résulter d'une Puissance forte et bienveillante comme l'Angleterre, et de la sympathie d'un peuple juste, éclairé, et généreux comme la nation Anglaise.

Quant à la paix, mon Gouvernement la désire autant que les autres, mais tout autant qu'elle serait honorable et compatible avec mes droits souverains.

Pour ce qui regarde les améliorations intérieures et la prospérité de mes sujets, son Excellence est plus à même que personne de connaître mes sentiments à cet égard.

(Translation.)

I BEGIN by thanking the Ambassador for having procured me the pleasure of seeing the Admiral and the officers of his squadron.

Under existing circumstances, the presence here of the English fleet, under the command of so distinguished an Admiral, being an evident proof of the friendship of the Queen of Great Britain, my powerful ally, I request the Ambassador to be pleased to express to her my gratitude for it.

England having on many occasions shown numerous marks of kindness as regards my Empire, I have no doubt but that she will repel by all means the unjust pretensions of Russia which would affect my independence and my sovereign rights, and the whole world will see what immense advantages can result from a strong and benevolent Power like England, and from the sympathy of a just, enlightened, and generous people like the English nation.

As regards peace, my Government desires it as much as others, but so far only as it may be honourable and compatible with my sovereign rights.

As regards internal improvements and the prosperity of my subjects, his Excellency has better means than any one else of knowing my sentiments in that respect.

No. 308.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 10.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, November 24, 1853.*

IN other parts of my correspondence, prepared for transmission to England, I have stated my recent proceedings, and their results, with a degree of fulness trying to your Lordship's patience; and I have done so under a strong sense of the disappointment which my total want of success, however unavoidable, will probably occasion to Her Majesty's Government.

It remains for me to complete the performance of my duty, by explaining the position in which the Porte is placed, as being the main cause of our present difficulties, and by offering some obvious conjectures as to our future prospects in this complicated affair.

Moderation and firmness are the two principles of conduct which the Porte has been most assiduously advised to maintain in the course of her differences with Russia. She has exhibited the former to a striking degree from the time of Prince Menchikoff's ultimatum to the publication of her final manifesto. She has displayed the latter most particularly in rejecting the note of Vienna without modifications, and in collecting her means of defence with an amount of energy, good order, and perseverance not easily surpassed.

The great test of her moderation was the course pursued by Her Government when a Russian army crossed her frontier, and insultingly occupied the Principalities. A respectful protest, and a confiding appeal to Europe, were her substitutes for a declaration of war. But half her duty would have been neglected, if, while she gave time for negotiation, she had not provided for the contingency of a failure, by preparing the means of an efficient armed resistance against Russia. Her allies might well have complained, if the Sultan had betrayed a weak indifference to his own cause, and thrown the whole burthen of its vindication on their shoulders.

The Ottoman Ministers, in carrying out the policy prescribed to them, alike by interest and by duty, roused, of necessity, a strong national feeling throughout the Empire; and at the same time, a general expectation that unusual sacrifices would be followed by an adequate return. Among the Mahometans, as your Lordship knows, a patriotic is always more or less a religious sentiment, and the Porte could hardly be expected to restrain the fanaticism of its adherents without directing their zeal to some distinct object of national desire. It was no longer thought enough to resist any specific pretensions of Russia. The mortifying ascendancy of that Power was to be shaken off altogether, and the independence of the Empire to be placed once for all on a level with that of its neighbour. A concurrence of circumstances, originating in the presumption and duplicity of Russia, appeared to favour this very natural ambition, and the united sympathies of the Government, the army, and the people, excited no doubt by the partizans of a war policy, had only to be acted upon with spirit in order to repress all dissensions in the Cabinet, and to avert the danger, whatever may have been its degree, of a popular outbreak. The personal antagonism of Reshid Pasha and the Seraskier no longer disturbs the administration; the former has gained a large accession of popularity, and also of the Sultan's favour; and His Majesty, to all appearance, has accepted frankly the decision of his people as expressed with unanimity by the General Council some two months ago.

If, then, it was true that circumstances for which the Porte is not answerable, naturally brought on a state of things imparting force, unity, and direction to a general sentiment, laudable in itself, and offering, when adopted by the Government, much advantage and convenience to the Sultan and to his leading Ministers, it is hardly surprising that with considerable armies on the frontier, the squadrons of England and France on the Bosphorus, a pervading enthusiasm in their favour, and some unexpected successes in battle, the Sultan and his Cabinet should receive with reluctance and dislike any proposition invested with the badge of their old inferiority towards Russia, and calculated to disappoint the hopes of the nation, and, with the

overthrow of their popularity, to expose them to most serious embarrassments.

It may be alleged with truth, and I have striven to impress the truth in every form of language on their minds, that however natural such sentiments may be, their indulgence on the present occasion is neither just, nor wise, nor humane, seeing that the original difference can now be settled on safe and honourable grounds with every moral and political advantage on the Sultan's side, while an unnecessary continuance of hostilities would involve the most perilous hazards, the most exhausting sacrifices, a vast effusion of blood, and, more than possibly, the horrors of a general war.

Unfortunately, the motives to forbearance are thrown into the shade by the dazzling illusions of hope, and passion is in league with occasion to merge all fears of danger and all considerations of prudence in a wild, though attractive speculation, difficult, at best, to realize, and of which even the accomplishment would not be unattended with formidable drawbacks.

I question whether at all times Reshid Pasha himself is entirely free from these delusive influences, though, to do justice both to him and to his colleagues, they still profess a willingness to seek no further advantage from war than a relinquishment of Russia's religious pretensions, and of the notes prepared to embody them. In their hearts they may aspire to arrangements calculated to secure them from future disturbance, and they would gladly put forward claims to a new disposition in the Provinces, to the recognition of Circassian independence, and to the reimbursement of their military expenses. But deference to the advice of their allies would prevail with them to forego such notions, and their cooler aspirations would, I think, be satisfied with a renewal in clear and comprehensive terms of the formal declarations and Treaties already existing in favour of the Porte. What they never cease to insist upon is a clear and unquestionable deliverance from Russian interference applied to spiritual matters. They are persuaded that silence would be the best and safest form of accomplishing that purpose, and they are now bent upon excluding every kind of note, however carefully expressed, as liable to offend their own people, and to afford a dangerous opening for what they presume to be the real designs of Russia.

This apprehension is, I fear, but too well justified by the late proceedings of the Russian Cabinet, and after so many sacrifices forced upon Turkey by that Power, it is but fair that the Porte should be secured from further molestation on the same score, not only virtually, but in a form and manner calculated to leave no room for mistake upon the subject either here or elsewhere.

Should the Emperor of Russia, acting in the spirit of his new manifesto, after supporting by force of arms his usurpation in the Principalities, decline a form of arrangement accepted by the Porte, and recommended by her allies, your Lordship would probably agree with the Ottoman Ministers in thinking that a wider range would then be opened for diplomatic views, as well as for military operations.

Most sincerely do I deprecate the occurrence of any such case, and no exertion will be wanting on my part, under the guidance of your Lordship's instructions, to dissuade the Porte from wantonly bringing on a necessity of the kind. But should it so happen that Russia herself continues to be the obstacle to a pacific arrangement, the interests of international security, no less than those of Turkish independence, will probably be found to require exertions and remedies little short of those which the more sanguine Mahomedans already contemplate.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

## No. 309.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 10.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, November 24, 1853.*

I HAVE already stated in a previous part of my correspondence the reply given by Reshid Pasha to my inquiry as to the commencement of hostilities on the Danube before the expiry of the term appointed for their suspension.

In obedience to your Lordship's instructions, I have now to add that a similar inquiry was rendered necessary by a report which had reached me from Trebizond, to the effect that hostilities had been commenced on the Asiatic frontier after the order of suspension had been received by the Pasha in command.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs assured me in reply, that I had been misinformed, and that the first act of hostility had been committed by the officer commanding the advanced post, before the Commander-in-chief on that side could possibly transmit to him the orders of his Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

## No. 310.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 10.)*

My Lord,

*Therapia, November 24, 1853.*

INCLOSED herewith in copy is a letter which I addressed to Vice-Admiral Dundas at the time of its date, in concert with M. de la Cour, who addressed a similar application to Vice-Admiral Hamelin.

The latter objected to taking any measure in consequence of M. de la Cour's requisition, as a new Ambassador was appointed and expected to arrive from day to day.

General Baraguay d'Hilliers, to whom I mentioned the circumstance soon after his arrival, communicated with Admiral Hamelin, and informed me that he experienced some difficulty in joining in the measure on account of his having fewer steam-vessels at his disposal than the British Commander-in-chief.

It so happened that the original object of the proposed excursion had been unavoidably delayed by the return of my despatches to Bucharest and Jassy.

This circumstance enabled me to acquiesce without difficulty in the French Admiral's objection; but I replied to the Ambassador, that although I thought it desirable for the first appearance of any of our ships in the Black Sea, that one at least from each nation should be present, yet that I should feel myself obliged to send for Her Majesty's Consuls, whenever they were known to be at Varna, even if the French Commander were still unable to detach one of his steam-vessels in company with ours.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 310.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.*

Sir,

*Constantinople, November 11, 1853.*

THE French Ambassador agrees with me in thinking it desirable, the squadrons being now united here, that measures should be forthwith taken for visiting Bourgas, Varna, and other places on the European coast of the

Black Sea between the mouths of the Danube and the entrance of the Bosphorus.

In requesting that you will communicate with the French Admiral in order to direct the performance of this service in concert with him, I have to inform you that according to official advices received from Sulina under date of the 5th instant, "four large Russian Government steamers" had arrived there and were "lying at anchor in the roads outside the bar." It is added in Mr. Lloyd's report that "a large Russian steamer" had also arrived there, and left again after discharging a cargo of cannon and ammunition, and that a small steamer and a gun-boat were still there.

I infer from the same report that British commercial shipping is exposed to much embarrassment, danger, and loss, from the want of water at the bar of the Sulina passage, and you will be the best judge whether any vessels sent in that direction can be instructed, as I hope, to assist them, without prejudice to the more urgent necessities of Her Majesty's service.

Despatches from Varna of the 6th instant state that on that day a large steamer, supposed to be Russian, had looked into the harbour, and that two others had been seen in the offing.

I mention these circumstances in order to assist your judgment as to the rank and force of the vessels, English and French, which it may be advisable to send out on this occasion.

You are aware that Her Majesty's Government are anxious to remain at peace with Russia, and that the employment of force, except for the protection of any Turkish territory attacked, or threatened with a direct attack, by Russia, would involve the commanding officer in a most serious responsibility.

In conclusion, I have to request that you will give directions for the conveyance hither of Her Majesty's Consuls at Bucharest and Jassy on board any vessel that you may select to receive them at Varna, together with their respective families and attendants.

They were to proceed to Varna under instructions from me.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 311.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 10.)*

(Extract.)

*Therapia, November 24, 1853.*

THE Austrian Internuncio sent his interpreter yesterday to put me in possession of a despatch addressed to him on the 11th instant by Count Buol de Schauenstein, and communicated by his Excellency this morning to Reshid Pasha.

Though your Lordship is no doubt in possession of this despatch, I nevertheless inclose a copy of it herewith.\* I am informed that Baron de Bruck has not pressed for an immediate answer to his Government's proposal, but intimates an intention of waiting for further communication with his colleagues, requesting that Count Buol's despatch may in the mean time be submitted, I suppose confidentially, to the Council.

No. 312.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 10.)*

(Extract.)

*Vienna, December 6, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour of inclosing herewith a copy of the letter which, as organ of the Conference, I have addressed to Lord Stratford, transmitting to him the note to Reshid Pasha, signed by the Four Representatives, and requesting him, in conjunction with his colleagues, to present it to that Minister.

\* Inclosure in No. 236.

Inclosure in No. 312.

*The Earl of Westmorland to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

Vienna, December 5, 1853.

MY colleagues, the members of the Conference assembled here, under the instructions of our respective Governments, having, together with myself, affixed our signatures to the note which we have been directed to address to his Excellency Reshid Pasha, have requested me to be their organ in placing in your Lordship's hands, as the senior Ambassador at the Court of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, the original documents.

My colleagues, Count Buol, Count Arnim, and Baron Bourqueney, desire that the mode in which this note should be submitted to his Excellency Reshid Pasha should be left to be decided by you, in concurrence with your Lordship's colleagues. They would, however, suggest for your consideration, whether, with the view of giving all the importance to this document which, as emanating from the Governments of the Four Powers it is calculated to command, it might not be advisable to ask, in conjunction with your colleagues, an audience of his Excellency, when your Lordship might place the note in his hands, and when they might, together with you, explain the objects of the identical instructions, with reference to this note, which each Representative will have received from his Government.

It is the intention of the Conference that your Lordship's experience and the high consideration you command should be resorted to in the deliberation which will take place between your Lordship and your colleagues as to the most advisable method to be adopted in carrying this commission into execution.

I have only to add, that I feel great satisfaction in being the channel through which this communication is made to your Lordship, and in forwarding to you this important document.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 313.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 12.)*

(Extract.)

St. Petersburg, December 1, 1853.

I AM very little able to offer your Lordship any details of the various military preparations which are in progress throughout this vast Empire, but I am certainly not in error when I state that these arrangements assume the great probability of war being resumed upon an extensive scale in spring, even if its operations should be restricted or put an end to by winter.

No. 314.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 12.)*

(Extract.)

St. Petersburg, December 5, 1853.

WHEN I entered Count Nesselrode's room on the 2nd instant, he observed at once that he understood that Her Majesty's Government were engaged in drawing up a Treaty between Russia and Turkey.

Being aware that this belief prevailed here, and that it had caused considerable irritation, I replied that his Excellency had been misinformed; that as far as I was aware, it was in devising the preliminaries and basis of a Treaty that Her Majesty's Government was engaged.

After hearing what I had to say respecting the note about to be presented to the Porte in consequence, I observed incidentally, of a suggestion which had been made by the Austrian Cabinet, Count Nesselrode questioned

me as to the accounts received by your Lordship respecting the state of public feeling in Turkey.

I did not conceal from him that great exasperation existed among the Turks, and that all the influence which was possessed by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and his three colleagues would be required to induce the Porte to listen to peaceful counsels.

I added that I learned from the correspondence sent to me by your Lordship, that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe pursued uninterruptedly the same wise and conciliatory course which he had followed throughout the negotiations, and that I would take the opportunity of remarking, if I might do so without giving offence, that if the Turks had been restrained from following the example set by Russia in giving a religious character to the war, it might be inferred that it was to the prudence of Lord Stratford's advice that this result was attributable.

No. 315.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 12.)*

My Lord,

Vienna, December 6, 1853.

THE Conference assembled yesterday at Count Buol's, according to the appointment which I reported to your Lordship in my despatch of the 3rd instant.

Count Buol announced that the documents which we were to sign had been prepared, and that he had directed legitimized copies of them to be made, which would be delivered to each of the Representatives.

He then proceeded to read the note which was to be addressed by the Conference to Reshid Pasha, as also the Protocol which was to be signed by the Members of the Conference.

These documents having been found to be in accordance with the copies which had been transmitted to us by our respective Governments, were signed by Count Buol, Baron Bourqueney, Count Arnim, and myself, and the note addressed to Reshid Pasha was placed in my hands for transmission to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, according to the arrangement which I have already announced to your Lordship in my despatch above referred to. It was settled that the Protocol should be placed in the keeping of Count Buol as presiding over the Conference, and that it should for the present be considered as confidential.

Count Buol then read the instructions which he had drawn up for the guidance of the Internuncio, and which were found to be identical in substance with those which had been addressed by our Governments to M. de Bourqueney and to myself.

Count Arnim also read the instructions he was charged by his Government to forward to M. de Wildenbruch, which although somewhat different in language, were considered as identical in meaning.

In terminating this Conference, Count Buol expressed his anxious hope that the Representatives of our respective Governments at Constantinople should be instructed to use their utmost endeavours to induce the Government of the Sultan, by their adherence to the measure now proposed, to give effect to the earnest solicitude for the welfare and independence of the Ottoman Empire by which the Four Governments had been actuated in framing that measure. The advisers of the Sultan could not fail to see that there was now traced out before them the fittest and most satisfactory course by which with honour to themselves, and with the fullest approbation of their allies, the best interests of the Empire would be secured. He added, that if the fair expectations of the united Governments were realized with regard to Turkey, it would then become the duty of those Governments to use the same exertions to obtain a similar result from the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, and by this means he hoped that the present unhappy complication by which the peace and tranquillity of Europe were threatened might be brought to a close.

Count Buol then announced that his messenger was ready to take charge of the documents which each of the Representatives was desirous of forwarding

to Constantinople ; and after referring to the arrangement already come to, that he would deliver a copy of the note to Reshid Pashia to Baron Meyendorff, and communicate to him confidentially the Protocol, while Baron Bourqueney and myself had undertaken to fulfil the same duty towards the Turkish Ambassador, he delivered to us the legitimized copies of the documents which had been signed, and of which I have now the honour of inclosing copies.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure 1 in No. 315.

*Note addressed by the Vienna Conference to Reshid Pasha.*

*Vienne, le 5 Décembre, 1853.*

LES Soussignés, Représentants de l'Autriche, de la France, de la Grande Bretagne, et de la Prusse, réunis en conférence à Vienne, ont reçu des instructions à l'effet de déclarer que leurs Gouvernements respectifs envisagent avec un profond regret le commencement des hostilités entre la Russie et la Porte, et désirent vivement, en intervenant entre les Puissances belligérantes, arrêter toute nouvelle effusion de sang et mettre un terme à un état de choses qui menace sérieusement la paix de l'Europe.

La Russie ayant donné l'assurance qu'elle était disposée à traiter, et les Soussignés ne doutant pas que la Porte ne soit animée du même esprit, ils demandent au nom de leurs Gouvernements respectifs d'être informés des conditions auxquelles le Gouvernement Ottoman consentirait à négocier un Traité de Paix.

Les Soussignés, &c.

(Signé) BUOL-SCHAUENSTEIN.  
BOURQUENEY.  
WESTMORLAND.  
ARNIM.

(Translation.)

THE Undersigned, Representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia, assembled in Conference at Vienna, have received instructions to declare that their respective Governments view with deep regret the commencement of hostilities between Russia and the Porte, and anxiously desire by mediating between the belligerent Powers to stop the further effusion of blood and to terminate a state of things which seriously endangers the peace of Europe.

Russia having given an assurance that she is willing to treat, and the Undersigned not doubting that the Porte is animated by a similar spirit, they request, in the name of their respective Governments, to be informed upon what conditions the Turkish Government is willing to negotiate a Treaty of Peace.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed) BUOL-SCHAUENSTEIN.  
BOURQUENEY.  
WESTMORLAND.  
ARNIM.

Inclosure 2 in No. 315.

*Protocol of a Conference of the Four Representatives, held at Vienna,  
December 5, 1853.*

LES Soussignés, Représentants d'Autriche, de France, de Grande Bretagne et de Prusse, conformément aux instructions de leurs Cours, se sont réunis en conférence à l'effet de rechercher les moyens d'aplanir le différend survenu entre la Cour de Russie et la Sublime Porte.

Les proportions que ce différend a prises et la guerre qui a éclaté entre les deux Empires, malgré les efforts de leurs alliés, sont devenues pour l'Europe entière l'objet des plus sérieuses préoccupations. En conséquence, leurs Majestés l'Empereur d'Autriche, l'Empereur des Français, la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, et le Roi de Prusse, également pénétrés de la nécessité de mettre un terme à ces hostilités, qui ne pourraient se prolonger sans affecter les intérêts de leurs propres Etats, ont résolu d'offrir leurs bons offices aux deux Hautes Parties belligérantes, dans l'espoir qu'elles ne voudront pas elles-mêmes encourir la responsabilité d'une conflagration, alors que par un échange de loyales explications elles peuvent encore la prévenir en replaçant leurs rapports sur un pied de paix et de bonne entente.

Les assurances données à différentes reprises par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, excluent de la part de cet Auguste Souverain l'idée de porter atteinte à l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman. L'existence de la Turquie dans les limites que les Traités lui ont assignées est en effet devenue une des conditions nécessaires de l'équilibre Européen, et les Plénipotentiaires Soussignés constatent avec satisfaction que la guerre actuelle ne saurait, en aucune cas, entraîner dans les circonscriptions territoriales des deux Empires des modifications susceptibles d'altérer l'état de possession que le temps a consacré en Orient, et qui est également nécessaire au repos de toutes les autres Puissances.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie ne s'est du reste point bornée à ces assurances; elle a fait déclarer que son intention n'avait jamais été d'imposer à la Porte des obligations nouvelles, ou qui ne fussent pas exactement conformes aux Traités de Koutchouk-Kainardji et d'Andrinople, stipulations d'après lesquelles la Sublime Porte a promis de protéger dans toute l'étendue de ses Etats le culte Chrétien et ses églises. La Cour de Russie a ajouté qu'en réclamant du Gouvernement Ottoman un témoignage de sa fidélité à des engagements antérieurs, elle n'avait nullement entendu amoindrir l'autorité du Sultan sur ses sujets Chrétiens, et que son but unique avait été de demander des éclaircissements de nature à prévenir toute équivoque et tout motif de mésintelligence avec une Puissance amie et voisine.

Les sentiments manifestés par la Sublime Porte pendant les derniers négociations attestent d'un autre côté qu'elle était prête à reconnaître toutes ses obligations contractuelles, et à tenir compte, dans la mesure de ses droits souverains, de l'intérêt de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie pour un culte qui est le sien et celui de la majorité de ses peuples.

Dans cet état de choses, les Soussignés sont convaincus que le moyen le plus prompt et le plus sûr d'atteindre le but désiré par leurs Cours serait de faire en commun une communication à la Sublime Porte pour lui exposer le vœu des Puissances de contribuer par leur intervention amicale au rétablissement de la paix et la mettre en demeure de faire connaître les conditions auxquelles elle serait disposée à traiter.

Tel est le but de la note collective ci-jointe adressée au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères du Sultan, et des instructions identiques transmises en même temps par les Cours d'Autriche, de France, de Grande Bretagne, et de Prusse, à leurs Représentants à Constantinople.

(Signé)

BUOL-SCHAUENSTEIN.  
BOURQUENEY.  
WESTMORLAND.  
ARNIM.

(Translation.)

THE Undersigned, Representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia, in conformity with the instructions of their Courts, have met together in Conference, in order to devise the means of reconciling the difference which has arisen between Russia and the Sublime Porte.

The dimensions which that difference has assumed, and the war which has broken out between the two Empires, notwithstanding the efforts of their Allies, have become the object of most serious solicitude for Europe. Accordingly, their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of the French,

the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the King of Prussia, being equally impressed with the necessity of exerting themselves in order to put an end to hostilities which would not be protracted without affecting the interests of their own States, have resolved to offer their good offices to the two high belligerent parties, in the hope that they will be unwilling themselves to incur the responsibility of a conflagration, when, by an exchange of frank explanations, they may still be able to avert it, by replacing their relations on a footing of peace and good understanding.

The assurances given at different times by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia exclude, on the part of that August Sovereign, the notion of assailing the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. In fact, the existence of Turkey in the limits assigned to her by Treaty is one of the necessary conditions of the balance of power in Europe, and the Undersigned Plenipotentiaries record, with satisfaction, that the existing war cannot in any case lead to modifications in the territorial boundaries of the two Empires, which would be calculated to alter the state of possession in the East established for a length of time, and which is equally necessary for the tranquillity of all the other Powers.

His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, moreover, has not confined himself to these assurances; he has declared that it never was his intention to impose upon the Porte any new obligations, or any which might not be in conformity with the Treaties of Koutchouk-Kainardji and Adrianople, according to the stipulations of which, the Sublime Porte has promised to protect throughout the whole extent of its dominions the Christian religion and its churches. The Court of Russia has added, that in requiring from the Ottoman Government a proof of its faithful adherence to former engagements, it by no means had the intention of diminishing the authority of the Sultan over his Christian subjects, and that its sole object had been to ask for explanations calculated to prevent any misapprehension and any cause of misunderstanding with a neighbouring and friendly Power.

The sentiments manifested by the Sublime Porte during the recent negotiations prove, on the other hand, that it was prepared to recognise all its Treaty engagements, and to take into account, as far as its sovereign rights would allow, the interest felt by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia in a religion which is his own and that of the majority of his people.

In this state of things, the Undersigned are convinced that the readiest and surest means of attaining the object desired by their Courts will be to make a joint communication to the Sublime Porte, in order to set before it the wish of the Powers to contribute, by their friendly intervention, to the re-establishment of peace, and to enable it to make known the conditions on which it would be disposed to treat.

This is the object of the annexed collective note, addressed to the Sultan's Minister for Foreign Affairs, and of the instructions likewise annexed, transmitted to the Representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia, at Constantinople.

(Signed) BUOL-SCHAUENSTEIN.  
BOURQUENEY.  
WESTMORLAND.  
ARNIM.

No. 316.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 12.)*

My Lord,

*Vienna, December 6, 1853.*

BARON BOURQUENEY and myself waited this day upon the Turkish Ambassador according to appointment, and we stated that we were come to him as representing the members of the Conference, who, having adopted a measure which they believed was calculated to serve the most essential interests of his Government, were anxious that he should be made acquainted with it, and that he should give to it his best support and assistance.

We then read to the Ambassador a legitimized copy of the note which had been addressed by the members of the Conference to Reshid Pasha,

and placed it in his hands. We also read to him the Protocol which had been signed in Conference, and explained to him that, as it had been determined that this document should be considered for the present as confidential, we were not authorized to leave with him a copy, but only to make him acquainted with its contents.

We then stated that the same mark of confidence which had thus been shown him had also been manifested towards Baron Meyendorff, to whom Count Buol had been charged to make the same communication. The Ambassador received our visit and the communication we were charged to make to him with the greatest courtesy, and with the expression of his sincerest thanks. He stated that, being without instructions, he could not anticipate the decisions his Government might come to as to the measures we had adopted, but he assured us he would not fail to report to them the mark of attention which, on the part of the Conference, he had received from us, nor to point out to them the solicitude we had expressed for the welfare and independence of his country.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 317.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 12.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, December 11, 1853.*

A TELEGRAPHIC despatch received this morning by the French Government from Vienna, announces the destruction, by a Russian squadron, on the 30th ultimo, in the roadstead of Sinope, of six Turkish frigates, two corvettes, a steamer, and three transports. The Turkish Admiral was taken prisoner and carried to Sebastopol. The Russian force consisted of six sail-of-the-line.

Your Lordship will probably have received this untoward news from the Earl of Westmorland; but M. Drouyn de Lhuys, at my request, promised to send it by telegraph, as soon as the London office was opened, to Count Walewski, for communication to your Lordship.

I found the French Minister greatly chagrined by this intelligence, not so much on account of the loss to the Turks, as of the moral effect which must be produced by this act being committed, as it were, under the guns of the French and English fleets. His Excellency had not seen the Emperor when I visited him, and I shall probably have to recur to this subject by to-morrow's messenger.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 318.

*Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 12.)*

My Lord,

*Berlin, December 10, 1853.*

THE following telegraphic despatch has been received this evening by Baron Manteuffel from the Prussian Consul-General at Bucharest:

*“ Bucharest, December 8, 1853.*

Prince Menchikoff announces to Prince Gortchakoff:

“ A Turkish squadron of seven frigates, one sloop, one steamer, and five transports, destined to land troops at Soucoum-Kalé, was pursued by a division of the Russian fleet to the harbour of Sinope, and forced to engage on the 30th of November, under the guns of the newly-erected batteries of Sinope, which engagement ended by the entire destruction of the Turkish squadron, and the capture of the Vice-Admiral, Osmar Pasha.

“ Only one Turkish steamer escaped.

The Russian squadron suffered considerably.”

A similar telegraphic despatch has been likewise received from Count Arnim, at Vienna, who also reported the return of the Russian fleet to Sevastopol.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 319.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 13.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, December 12, 1853.*

I SAW M. Drouyn de Lhuys for a few moments this afternoon, when he informed me he had spoken with the Emperor this morning, on the subject of the disastrous intelligence received yesterday from Constantinople. He need not add, he said, that he had found His Majesty preoccupied with this untoward news.

Both the Emperor and his Minister are of opinion that the instructions sent to the Ambassadors and Admirals would have justified them in giving material support to the Turkish squadron, had any French or English vessels been near enough to do so. At this distance from the scene of action they do not see what fresh instructions can be sent, and they opine that, at all events, nothing can be done until accounts are received from Constantinople, giving more ample details of the affair than those which we now possess.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY

No. 320.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 13.)*

(Telegraphic.)

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, le 3 Décembre, 1853.*

LA Russie parle de paix, mais fait la guerre. Son escadre vient d'attaquer la flotille Turque à Sinope. Six vaisseaux de ligne y entrèrent, et ayant mouillés armèrent leurs chaloupes pour prendre des bâtiments Turques au nombre de douze. Ces derniers tirent feu pour se défendre, et en tout que nous le savons, furent détruits à l'exception d'une seule à vapeur, qui vient d'en apporter la nouvelle. Aujourd'hui j'ai eu une réunion avec l'Ambassadeur de France et les deux Amiraux. Nous envoyons deux frégates à vapeur, une de chaque nation, à Sinope, et deux autres à Varna pour recueillir des renseignements exacts. A leur retour les escadres combinées entreront selon toute probabilité dans le Mer Noire. Nous avons adopté cette démarche préliminaire dans l'intérêt de la paix. En cas où les Russes tenteraient faire retourner les frégates à vapeur, celles-ci y persisteraient pour peu que la force fût inférieure ou égale; dans le cas qu'elle fût supérieure, elles se retireraient après avoir protesté.

La bonne harmonie et les concerts les plus parfaits existent entre les Ambassadeurs et les Amiraux d'Angleterre et de France.

(Translation.)

*Constantinople, December 3, 1853.*

RUSSIA speaks of peace, but carries on war. Her squadron has just attacked the Turkish flotilla at Sinope. Six ships-of-the-line entered there and having anchored manned their boats in order to take possession of the Turkish vessels, twelve in number. The latter fired in self-defence, and, as far as we know, were all destroyed with the exception of a single steamer which has just brought the intelligence. I had a meeting to-day with the French

Ambassador and the two Admirals. We are sending two steam-frigates, one of each nation, to Sinope, and two others to Varna, in order to obtain exact information ; on their return the two squadrons according to all probability will enter the Black Sea. We have adopted this preliminary measure in the interest of peace. In case the Russians should attempt to turn back the steam-frigates, the latter would persevere, provided the force was inferior or equal ; in case it should be superior, they would retire after having made a protest.

The most perfect harmony and concert prevail between the Ambassadors and the Admirals of England and of France.

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## No. 321.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.*

(Extract.)

*Foreign Office, December 13, 1853.*

I HAVE to instruct your Lordship to express to Baron Manteuffel the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government that the Prussian Government have agreed to the Protocol ; and Her Majesty's Government hope that the firm and united action of the Four Powers may lead to the results contemplated.

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## No. 322.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, December 12, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the letter which you addressed to Vice-Admiral Dundas on the 11th of November, and of which a copy is inclosed in your despatch of the 24th, with a view to a detachment of the English and French squadrons being sent to the European coast of the Black Sea, between the mouths of the Danube and the entrance of the Bosphorus.

Her Majesty's Government consider that your Excellency, in consequence of the information which you had received from Mr. Vice-Consul Lloyd, exercised a sound discretion in directing that a British force should make its appearance in in the Black Sea ; and they therefore regret extremely that Admiral Hamelin should not have been in a position to give effect to the instruction of the French Ambassador.

Your Excellency was, however, quite justified in not directing that British ships should at that time enter the Black Sea without a corresponding French force, as it might have caused an erroneous impression that the two Governments were not acting cordially together in behalf of the Porte.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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## No. 323.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, December 13, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, in reply to your despatch of the 24th of November, that Her Majesty's Government approve of your having presented to the Sultan Vice-Admiral Dundas and the officers of his squadrons, and of the speech which on that occasion you addressed to his Highness.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 324.

*The Ear of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, December 14, 1853.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch of the 19th ultimo, giving an account of the steps which you had taken in order to give effect to the instructions conveyed to you in my despatch of the 24th of October, for a proposal to be made to the Porte with a view to bringing about a settlement of its differences with Russia.

With reference to my previous despatch on this subject of the 24th of November, I have to repeat to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government are fully alive to the great difficulties with which you have had to contend in bringing under the consideration of the Porte a proposal having reference to a very different state of things to that which existed at the time it reached you, and the success of which, in fact, depended upon hostilities not having actually commenced.

Her Majesty's Government entirely approve of your proceedings as reported in your despatch of the 19th ultimo, and of the manner in which you have sought to carry out their views; and Her Majesty's Government, in accordance with the very clear and able memorandum communicated by your Excellency to the Porte, are convinced that an honourable peace at this moment will uphold the dignity of the Sultan, and promote the true interests of his people.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 325.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, December 13, 1853.*

HER Majesty's Government approve your letter to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, in transmitting to his Excellency the note signed in Conference by the Representatives of the Four Powers at Vienna, a copy of which is inclosed in your Lordship's despatch of the 6th instant.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 326.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, December 14, 1853.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 6th instant, inclosing copies of the Protocol and Note which were signed in Conference by the Representatives of the Four Powers on the 5th instant, and reporting the proceedings which took place on this occasion, I have to inform your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government approve the conduct pursued by you at this Conference.

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 327.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, December 14, 1853.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 6th instant, reporting your communication to the Turkish Ambassador of the Protocol and Note which had been signed in Conference by the Representatives of the Four Powers at Vienna, I have to inform your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government approve your proceedings on this occasion.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 328.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

(Extract.)

*Foreign Office, December 16, 1853.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch of the 5th instant, stating that M. Drouyn de Lhuys had mentioned to your Excellency that it appeared that some misunderstanding had occurred between the Ambassadors and Admirals of England and France at Constantinople, as to the extent to which the naval forces of the two Powers are placed under the control of the Ambassadors; and I have to inform your Excellency, in reply, that I delayed answering that despatch, as no information respecting this disagreement had at that time been received, either from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe or Admiral Dundas.

No instructions had been issued to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople or to the British Admiral but those which are in possession of the French Government, and Admiral Dundas was then, and is still, acting under the instructions contained in my letter to the Admiralty of the 2nd of June last, of which a copy was inclosed in my despatch to your Excellency of that date, at which time the Admiral was instructed "to comply with any requisition in regard to the movements and operations of the fleet under his orders which he may receive from Her Majesty's Ambassador."

I have now received a despatch from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, of which I inclose a copy,\* by which it appears that the joint instructions of the Ambassadors to the Admirals were not acted upon, because Admiral Hamelin experienced some difficulty in joining in the measure on account of his having fewer steam-vessels at his disposal than the British Commander-in-chief.

No. 329.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, December 17, 1853.*

I HAVE the satisfaction of informing your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely concur in the views contained in your able and interesting despatch of the 24th of November, respecting the position in which the Porte is now placed. Her Majesty's Government do full justice to the firmness and moderation which has been exhibited by the Turkish Government. They admit that adequate preparations for repelling an unjust aggression could not have been made, and that great sacrifices on the part of the people could not have been called for, without at the same time evoking a spirit of enthusiasm which, however useful for its immediate object, may prove a source of future embarrassment to the Porte by fettering its independent action, and disabling it from adopting at the right moment that course of policy which would best promote the interests of Turkey.

If the proposal which, on the 24th of October, your Excellency was instructed to make, had arrived before the commencement of hos-

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ilities, before military successes had been obtained, and the national spirit highly excited, it would have caused great dissatisfaction to Her Majesty's Government that a reasonable project of settlement should have been declined. But the contingency had arrived that was contemplated by Her Majesty's Government; the form of proposal had become inapplicable to the altered state of circumstances. The steps taken by your Excellency in the matter were, however, highly judicious, and, though unsuccessful, may still be productive of useful results. For the Porte must now clearly understand the moral force it has acquired during the last few months in Europe, and how imprudent it would be to expose a position that may be productive of so much future advantage, to the hazards and dangers of a protracted war.

It is to be hoped, therefore, that the Porte will have been prepared by your Excellency's arguments to receive in a proper spirit the proposal sent from Vienna, which is applicable to present circumstances, and is calculated to secure that just and honourable peace which must be the object even of the most successful war.

If the terms proposed by the Porte in answer to the collective note are in their spirit and character reasonable; and if, when communicated by the Four Powers to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, they should be rejected by Russia, Her Majesty's Government would then be of opinion that the time had arrived for adopting measures of more active coercion against a Power which, for its own unjustifiable objects, had shown itself regardless of the best interests of Europe.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 330.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, December 17, 1853.*

HER Majesty's Government have received with feelings of deep regret your Excellency's telegraphic despatch of the 3rd instant, announcing the destruction, by a Russian squadron, on the 30th of November, of a Turkish flotilla at Sinope.

The reports which have since reached this country are of a nature so contradictory that Her Majesty's Government are unable at present to judge of the circumstances which led to this attack upon the Turkish squadron. I inclose the copy of a despatch,\* received through Her Majesty's Mission at Berlin, from Prince Menchikoff to General Gortchakoff, stating that a Turkish squadron, destined to land troops at Soucoum-Kale, was pursued by a division of the Russian fleet to the harbour of Sinope, and forced to engage on the 30th of November, and thereupon entirely destroyed; but Her Majesty's Government are disinclined to believe this statement, or that the squadron was conveying provisions to Batoum; because at a time when it was known that a Russian fleet was cruising in the Black Sea, the Turkish Government would have been guilty of extreme imprudence in sending so small a force upon either of the above-mentioned services without sufficient convoy and protection.

If, however, the Turkish squadron was at anchor in the harbour of Sinope, which is Turkish territory, and being found there was attacked and destroyed by the Russian Admiral, such an act would come entirely within the instructions of the 8th of October.

Whatever may have been the motive of the attack, the dignity of this country and the interests of Turkey alike require that the most effectual means should be taken to guard against the recurrence of a similar disaster.

Her Majesty's Government do not doubt that on the return of the ships sent to Sinope and to Varna, your Excellency, acting in concert with General Baraguay d'Hilliers, will have directed that the combined fleets should enter the

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**Black Sea.** Special instructions as to the manner in which they should act do not appear to be necessary. We have undertaken to defend the territory of the Sultan from aggression, and that engagement must be fulfilled.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 331.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 18.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, 9 Décembre, 1853.*

LES bateaux à vapeur Anglais et Français sont revenus de Sinope et de Varne. A Sinope ils ont appris que tous les bâtiments Turcs, au nombre d'onze, ont été détruits; plus de 4,000 Turcs ont péri; les survivants, à quelques exceptions près, ont été apportés ici à bord de la "Retribution" et du "Mogador;" presque tous sont plus ou moins blessés. Ils n'excèdent pas le nombre de 400. La ville de Sinope a beaucoup souffert. Les batteries, qui sont peu de chose, ont aussi souffert. Il paraît que les Turcs ont été les premiers à tirer; ce que n'empêche pas que les Russes n'aient été les agresseurs. Tout en plaignant leur manque de prévoyance, on ne saurait suffisamment admirer le courage et le dévouement des matelots Turcs. Les 6 vaisseaux de ligne Russes ont quitté Sinope le lendemain du combat; on ne sait pas quelles avaries ils ont souffert. A Varne le Capitaine Tatham n'a rien appris des Consuls de Bucharest et de Jassy. Aucun des bâtiments à vapeur n'a vu des bâtiments Russes, ni en allant ni en revenant.

Le Commandant Russe a déclaré que son unique but était de combattre la flotille Turque, pour empêcher de nouveaux soulèvements sur la côte de l'Asie. Il est probable que les escadres sortiront.

L'intention de faire sortir celle du Sultan nous est annoncée. Dans tous les cas un message dans le sens de nos instructions sera envoyé à Sevastopol. Je travaille en attendant pour la paix avec un peu plus d'espoir de succès; trois ou quatre jours doivent suffire pour tirer les choses au clair.

(Signé)

STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S.—J'apprends par la lecture d'un rapport officiel que les Russes ont continué leur feu avec une cruauté inusitée.

S. DE R.

(Translation.)

*Constantinople, December 9, 1853.*

THE English and French steamers have returned from Sinope and Varna. At Sinope they learned that all the Turkish vessels to the number of eleven were destroyed: more than 4,000 Turks perished; the survivors, with few exceptions, have been brought here on board the "Retribution" and the "Mogador;" almost the whole of them are more or less wounded. They do not exceed 400 in number. The town of Sinope has suffered severely. The batteries, which are unimportant, have likewise suffered. It appears that the Turks were the first to fire; this does not prevent the Russians from having been the aggressors. While deploring their want of foresight, it is impossible sufficiently to admire the courage and devotion of the Turkish sailors. The six Russian line-of-battle ships quitted Sinope the day after the battle; it is not known what damage they suffered. At Varna Captain Tatham heard nothing of Consuls from Bucharest and Jassy. None of the steamers saw any Russian vessels either going or returning.

The Russian commander declared that his only object was to fight the Turkish flotilla, in order to prevent fresh insurrections on the coast of Asia. It is probable that the squadrons will go out.

The intention of sending out that of the Sultan is announced to us. A communication in the sense of our instructions will, in any case, be sent to Sevastopol. Meanwhile, I am labouring for peace with some small additional hope of success; three or four days must suffice for clearing up matters.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S.—I learn from an official report that the Russians continued their fire with unusual cruelty. S. DE R.

No. 332.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 18.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, December 16, 1853.*

LATE yesterday afternoon M. Drouyn de Lhuys made me acquainted with the outline of a proposition, to be laid before your Lordship this morning by Count Walewski in the name of the Imperial Government, which has for its object to prevent the repetition of such sanguinary scenes as that lately enacted at Sinope, and to make the Russian Government understand that France and England are determined to hold possession of the Black Sea as an equivalent for the Russian occupation of the Danubian Provinces. This afternoon his Excellency read to me the despatch on this subject, addressed to Count Walewski for communication to your Lordship.\* Whatever Her Majesty's Government may think of the proposition itself, they will do justice to the clearness and precision with which M. Drouyn de Lhuys has placed it before them.

Supposing, then, your Lordship to be in possession of this document, I abstain from offering any analysis of its contents, and propose confining myself to a statement of the arguments put forward by M. Drouyn de Lhuys in a lengthened conversation in support of the plan of action which he recommends.

He first examined the abstract right of France and England to interfere in the summary manner which he proposed. He argued that, it being both their interest and their duty to protect the Turkish territory from all aggressive attacks on the part of Russia, motives of humanity should impel them to prevent the repetition of such a carnage as must have accompanied the destruction of the Turkish flotilla at Sinope. They had not, unfortunately, the means (he observed) of enforcing a suspension of hostilities, either upon the Danube or in Asia Minor; but they could enforce it in the Black Sea, and the interests of peace and humanity not only gave them the right, but enjoined them so to do. If the two Governments had not sent their fleets into the Black Sea at an earlier period, it was because they confided in the voluntary assurances of Russia not to prosecute the war by offensive operations, and they were unwilling to meet so laudable a declaration by any act of theirs which could imply distrust, or which might give the Russian Government an excuse for taking a less conciliatory course. Now, however, that Russia had thrown off the mask, he saw no certain means of controlling her action in the Black Sea, but by sweeping that sea of the Russian flag.

But there were other considerations of hardly less importance which M. Drouyn de Lhuys said must be taken into account in the consideration of his proposition. He alluded to the material, moral, and commercial consequences by which it must be followed, should the short-sightedness of Russia give any permanence to its execution.

1st. As to the material effect which would be produced. Besides the forced suspension of hostilities between Turkey and Russia within the limits of the Black Sea, the latter would find it very difficult, if not impossible, to advance from the Principalities on Constantinople, unless she had her sea communications with Odessa and Sebastopol assured; she would be equally unable to transport reinforcements, arms, ammunition, or provisions for the use of the troops engaged on the Asiatic coast. On the other hand, the various resources of water communication would remain open to the Turks.

2nd. As to the moral effect. At this moment the Russian flag of war was

paramount in the Black Sea. In fact, that sea was little better than a Russian lake. The races which inhabited its shores believed probably that there was no navy which could compete with that of Russia, or dispute her maritime preponderance. They would now be taught that there were other nations with superior naval means at their disposal, ready to exert them for the protection of the oppressed. They would be encouraged to rise against their hereditary enemies, and thus render the position of the latter far more perilous.

3rd. With respect to commercial effects. Vessels from the combined fleets would visit every nook and corner of the Black Sea; would sound its coasts and examine its harbours and roadsteads. A more intimate knowledge would thus be gained of the races which people its shores; of their wants; of their means; and of the productions of the countries which they inhabit. Foundations might thus be laid for commercial intercourse of great future value.

I have thought it my duty to caution M. Drouyn de Lhuys against placing the occupation of the Danubian Provinces by Russia, and the presence of the combined fleets in the Black Sea, on the same footing of irregularity. To do so would be to allow that the Euxine was a "mare clausum," and would be a dangerous admission to make. True, our late Treaties with the Porte effectually shut the Black Sea to our ships of war in time of peace; but the exclusion was the effect and not the stipulation of a Treaty; and it behoved us, in any negotiation on this matter, to keep this distinction in view.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys agreed in this remark.

It only remains for me to state that I have had an opportunity of speaking to the Emperor on the subject of this proposition, and that His Majesty partakes entirely the sentiments of his Minister. He desired me to recommend it in the strongest terms to the favourable consideration of Her Majesty's Government as a measure incumbent upon himself and them to take, avowing the disappointment which he should feel if a difference of opinion prevented its adoption.

### No. 333.

*M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Count Walewski.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Walewski, December 17.)*

M. le Comte,

*Paris, le 15 Décembre, 1853.*

LA dépêche que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous écrire sous le No. 159, vous a fait connaître la première impression du Gouvernement de l'Empereur à la nouvelle de la destruction de la flotille Ottomane dans la rade de Sinopé, et je ne doutais pas qu'elle ne fût complètement partagée par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique. Je vois par la dépêche télégraphique de Lord Stratford que Lord Clarendon a bien voulu vous communiquer, que nos Représentants à Constantinople ont tout de suite compris la nécessité d'une démonstration de nos forces navales dans la Mer Noire, et je me plais à penser qu'au retour des frégates-à-vapeur envoyés en reconnaissance à Bourgas et à Sinopé même, ils n'auront pas hésité à faire sortir du Bosphore le gros des deux escadres. L'opération qu'ils se proposaient de seconder, et qui est celle dont Lord Clarendon et moi nous avons eu également l'idée, sera un premier indice de la surveillance qu'il est devenu nécessaire d'exercer sur un côté où nous n'avions pas supposé qu'une agression pût si vite se produire.

En effet, nos dernières informations de St. Pétersbourg nous représentaient encore la Russie comme disposée à traiter, et décidée surtout à ne prendre, nulle part, l'offensive. Cette confiance expliquait l'immobilité de nos flottes. Il nous paraissait suffire que la présence de notre pavillon dans les eaux de Constantinople attestât notre ferme intention de protéger cette capitale contre un danger soudain; et nous ne voulions pas que notre apparition prématurée dans les parages plus rapprochés du territoire Russe risquât d'être prise pour une provocation. L'état de guerre rendait, sans doute, une collision possible sur mer comme sur terre entre les parties belligérantes, mais nous avons été autorisés à inférer des

déclarations réitérées de la Russie, que notre réserve serait imitée par elle, et que, ne se méprenant point sur le véritable but de notre démonstration, elle éviterait avec le même soin que nous les occasions d'une rencontre, en s'abstenant de procéder à des mesures agressives dans ces limites où, si nous avions pu la croire animée d'intentions différentes, notre action aurait naturellement dû s'exercer concurremment avec la sienne.

En un mot, M. le Comte, nous admettions, sans le dire cependant, que la flotte de Sevastopol protégeât le littoral Asiatique de l'Empire Russe, en éclairât les approches, et en ravitaillât les garnisons; et dans aucune de ces circonstances, nous n'aurions eu à intervenir pour gêner ses mouvements. C'eût été attaquer la Russie; et nous n'avions franchi les Dardanelles que pour défendre la Turquie.

L'expédition dirigée contre Sinopé a donc dépassé toutes nos prévisions. Ce fait modifie également le rôle que nous aurions désiré pouvoir garder jusqu'au bout. A l'usage que nous lui laissions de la mer, dans l'intérêt de sa défense, la Russie a substitué comme une sorte d'abus de sa position pour attaquer notre allié dans ses ports, et non contente d'exercer une souveraineté illégale dans les Principautés du Danube, elle semble vouloir encore étendre, avec toutes les horreurs de la guerre, sa domination absolue sur l'Euxin.

Lorsque le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale et celui de Sa Majesté Britannique ont décidé le mouvement de leurs escadres vers Constantinople, il avait été question, vous vous rappelez, d'inviter nos Amiraux à informer le Commandant-en-chef des forces navales Russes de l'objet de leur mission. Le moment est venu d'accomplir cette démarche, puisque nos ménagements n'ont en définitive servi qu'à empirer la situation.

Je propose donc, M. le Comte, d'ordonner à MM. les Vice-Amiraux Hamelin et Dundas de déclarer à M. le Prince Menchikoff ou à M. le Vice-Amiral Korniloff, que les Gouvernements de France et d'Angleterre sont résolus à prévenir la répétition de l'événement de Sinopé; que tout bâtiment Russe rencontré en mer par les nôtres sera dorénavant invité à rentrer dans le port de Sevastopol, et que toute agression tentée, malgré cet avertissement, contre le territoire ou le pavillon Ottoman sera repoussée par la force.

Par suite de cette déclaration, nous nous trouverons, conjointement avec la Turquie, les maîtres d'un vaste bassin qui baigne les provinces à la fois les plus importantes et les plus exposées de l'Empire Russe; et à l'occupation de la Valachie et de la Moldavie nous opposerons, tant qu'elle durera, une occupation correspondante dont les conséquences seront assurément plus graves pour le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg que celles de la prise de possession des Principautés ne saurait être pour la Porte. Ou l'armée commandée par le Prince Gortchakoff repassera le Pruth, ou nos vaisseaux, autant que la saison le permettra, croiseront dans l'Euxin et intercepteront toutes les communications maritimes de la Russie avec ses Provinces Asiatiques. Nous conserverions ainsi la Mer Noire comme un gage jusqu'à l'évacuation des Principautés et le rétablissement de la paix. En attendant, l'influence de l'Occident, presque inconnue dans ces parages, y pénétrera; les dangers auxquels notre présence exposera une domination mal assise, les rapports et les intérêts nouveaux qu'elle peut développer dans des contrées perdues pour le commerce du monde, tels sont, M. le Comte, les sérieux motifs de réflexion qu'une pareille démonstration, accomplie avec vigueur, est faite pour inspirer au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg.

L'attitude de ce Cabinet, les prétensions qu'il a affichées, l'envahissement de la Moldavie et de la Valachie en pleine paix, l'agression hardie dont Sinopé était le théâtre il y a peu de jours, tout cet ensemble de circonstances annonce des vues et des résolutions que l'Europe ne saurait changer qu'en prenant, à son tour, un parti énergique; et je n'en vois pas, pour le moment, de plus efficace que celui que je viens d'indiquer. La France et l'Angleterre, par l'indépendance de leur politique et les moyens dont elles disposent, se trouvent appelées à se décider les premières. C'est une tâche, M. le Comte, que le Gouvernement de l'Empereur est prêt

**pour sa part, à accepter, si le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique est de son côté disposé à la soutenir avec lui. La volonté de Sa Majesté Impériale est donc que vous en transmettiez l'assurance à Lord Clarendon, en lui remettant copie de cette dépêche.**

Agréé, &c.  
(Signé) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

(Translation.)

M. le Comte,

*Paris, December 15, 1853.*

THE despatch which I have had the honour to write to you under No. 159, has made known to you the first impression of the Emperor's Government in regard to the destruction of the Ottoman flotilla in the roads of Sinope, and I entertained no doubt that it was fully shared in by Her Britannic Majesty's Government. I perceive by Lord Stratford's telegraphic despatch which Lord Clarendon has had the goodness to communicate to you, that our Representatives at Constantinople have instantly understood the necessity for a demonstration on the part of our naval forces in the Black Sea, and I am pleased to think that on the return of the steam-vessels sent to reconnoitre at Bourgas and at Sinope itself, they will not have hesitated to send out of the Bosphorus the greater portion of the two squadrons. The operation which they proposed to support, and which is that of which Lord Clarendon and myself had equally the idea, will be a first indication of the inspection which it is become necessary to enforce on a coast where we had not supposed that an aggression could so quickly take place.

In fact, our last information from St. Petersburg still represented Russia as disposed to treat, and as determined, above all, to assume the offensive in no quarter. This confidence explained why our fleets did not move. It appeared to us that the presence of our flag in the waters of Constantinople demonstrated our firm intention to protect that capital against a sudden danger, and we were unwilling that our premature appearance in quarters more in the vicinity of the Russian territory should run the risk of being taken for a provocation. The state of war doubtless rendered a collision possible by sea as well as by land between the belligerent parties, but we had been authorized to infer from the repeated declarations of Russia that our reserve would be imitated by her, and that, not misunderstanding the real object of our demonstration, she would avoid, with the same care as ourselves, the occasions of collision, by abstaining from proceeding to aggressive measures within the limits in which, if we could have supposed her to be influenced by different intentions, our action would have naturally taken effect concurrently with her own.

In a word, M. le Comte, we admitted, without however stating it, that the Sevastopol fleet should protect the Asiatic coast of the Russian Empire, keep the approach to it clear, and provision the garrisons, and in none of those circumstances would we have had to interfere with its movements. To do so would have been to attack Russia; and we had passed the Dardanelles only to defend Turkey.

The expedition directed against Sinope has consequently surpassed our anticipations; that fact modifies, in the same degree, the attitude which we should have wished to have been able to maintain until the end.

Instead of availing herself of the sea, which we left free to her, for the purpose of her own defence, Russia abusing, as it were, her position, has availed herself of it in order to attack our ally in his ports, and not satisfied with exercising an illegal sovereignty in the Principalities of the Danube, she appears inclined still further to extend, with all the horrors of war, her absolute dominion over the Euxine.

When His Imperial Majesty's Government and that of Her Britannic Majesty determined upon the movement of their squadrons towards Constantinople, there was a question, you remember, of inviting our Admirals to inform the Commander-in-chief of the Russian naval forces of the object of their mission. The time has come for carrying this step into execution, since our forbearance has in the end only served to make matters worse.

I propose, therefore, to order Vice-Admirals Hamelin and Dundas to declare to Prince Menchikoff or to Admiral Korniloff, that the Governments of

France and of England are resolved to prevent the repetition of the affair of Sinope ; that every Russian ship met with at sea by our ships will henceforward be invited to return to Sevastopol ; and that any act of aggression which notwithstanding this notice may be attempted against the Ottoman territory or flag will be repelled by force.

As a consequence of this declaration, we shall find ourselves, in conjunction with Turkey, masters of a vast basin which washes the provinces of the Russian Empire, at once the most important and the most exposed ; and to the occupation of Wallachia and Moldavia, so long as that shall last, we shall oppose a corresponding occupation, of which the consequences will assuredly be more serious for the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, than the taking possession of the Principalities can be for the Porte. Either the army commanded by Prince Gortchakoff will repass the Pruth, or our vessels, as far as the season will admit, will cruize in the Black Sea, and will interrupt all the maritime communications of Russia with her Asiatic Provinces. We should thus retain the Black Sea as a pledge until the evacuation of the Principalities and the re-establishment of peace. Meanwhile, the influence of the West, almost unknown in those quarters, will penetrate there ; the dangers to which our presence will expose a rule badly settled, the new relations and interests which it may develop in countries lost to the commerce of the world ; such, M. le Comte, are the serious grounds for reflection with such a demonstration, executed with vigour, is calculated to inspire the Cabinet of St. Petersburg.

The attitude of that Cabinet ; the pretensions which it has announced ; the invasion of Moldavia and Wallachia in full peace ; the bold aggression of which Sinope a few days ago was the scene ; all these circumstances taken together announce views and resolutions which Europe can only alter by adopting in its turn an energetic course ; and at present I see no one more efficacious than that which I have just pointed out. France and England, by the independence of their policy and by the means at their disposal, are called upon first to come to a decision. It is a duty, M. le Comte, which the Emperor's Government, for its part, is ready to undertake, if Her Britannic Majesty's Government, on its side, is disposed to bear it with it. It is accordingly His Imperial Majesty's pleasure that you should give this assurance to Lord Clarendon, while delivering to him a copy of this despatch.

Receive, &c.  
(Signed) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

No. 334.

*Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 20.)*

My Lord,

*Berlin, December 17, 1853.*

I WAITED on Baron Manteuffel this morning, and in conformity with your Lordship's despatch of the 13th instant, communicated to his Excellency the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government that the Prussian Government had agreed to the collective note and protocol, by which a means of reconciliation is sought to be attained between Russia and the Porte ; and I expressed to his Excellency the hopes of Her Majesty's Government, that the firm and united action of the Four Powers may lead to the results contemplated in his Excellency's despatch addressed on that occasion to Count Arnim.

I took this opportunity to refer to the continuance of the Prussian agents in the Principalities. I stated that the departure of the Hospodars, and the entire assumption of the civil and military government of those provinces by Russia, would place those agents in a very embarrassing position ; and that some occasion would undoubtedly arise where they would be brought into relationship with the Russian authorities, which, even were it not to occasion a virtual, would be viewed as a tacit recognition of Russian usurpation.

Baron Manteuffel said that he had looked into the original instructions which had been furnished to these consular servants, and he found that they were purely for commercial and not for political purposes ; that they were under the Prussian Minister at Constantinople accredited to the Sultan ; that they had

only their commercial duties to perform, and that they had received the strictest injunctions to take no step which could compromise their Government by any recognition of Russian dominion.

His Excellency stated that they had not only the interests of Prussian subjects, but those of the Zollverein to watch over ; and he had been informed, that there had lately been several failures of Prussian merchants in those provinces whose affairs, in default of their administration, would have fallen into the hands of the Russians.

I could plainly see that Baron Manteuffel is of opinion that they should remain at their posts, confining themselves strictly to their commercial relations.

His Excellency, however, informed me that the Consul-General at Jassy, M. König, is at present here, and, under present circumstances, will not return to Jassy. The Prussian Consul at Galatz, M. Moroni, has lately been called to Constantinople, as an assistant to Baron Wildenbruch ; so that the question of their recall merely relates to Baron Meusenbach, the Consul-General at Bucharest.

I did not press the matter further on his Excellency, as I perceived that it would be useless for me to do so, and I thought it better to await another opportunity.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 335.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 20.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, December 4, 1853.*

ALTHOUGH the operations of the Sultan's armies, both on the Danube and in Asia, whether acting offensively or defensively, have been hitherto attended in every instance with more or less advantage, Fortune has by no means shown an equal degree of favour to His Majesty's naval forces in the Black Sea. Two frigates under Ottoman colours, one of them belonging to a Turkish Navigation Company, have been captured by the Russians, who in their turn have undergone some loss of men, if not, in one instance, of shipping. But far worse than this, there is much reason to apprehend that a Turkish flotilla, composed of seven frigates, three corvettes, and two war-steamers, have, with the exception of one of the steamers, been utterly destroyed by a Russian squadron in the port, or bay, of Sinope.

Our information is still imperfect ; but we know enough of the circumstances to warrant the most painful forebodings.

At my request, on a full understanding with the French Ambassador, and agreeably to a wish expressed by the Captain Pasha, Vice-Admiral Dundas has sent Her Majesty's steam-frigate "Retribution" to Sinope this morning for information. A French steam-frigate has been sent simultaneously on the same errand.

We have also sent two steamers, one of each nation, to Varna and other places on the Turkish coast in Europe.

The nature of the instructions addressed to the respective commanders may be collected from the accompanying copy of my despatch to Vice-Admiral Dundas. That part of it which relates to Her Majesty's Consuls at Bucharest and Jassy, is exclusively a British concern.

Rumours of Russian ships of the line being at sea have occasionally prevailed for some time. Uncertainty of information, a wish to avoid as long as possible the chances of collision, the arrival of a new French Ambassador, and the state of the weather, were natural causes of demur in coming to a decision as to sending the squadrons into the Black Sea at this time of year.

Soon after my return to town for the winter, four or five days ago, I received an official note from Reshid Pasha, announcing the appearance of six Russian sail of the line off Sinope, and of several Russian frigates off other parts of the Asiatic coast. Copies of this note, and of the statement annexed to it, are inclosed herewith.

After seeing Reshid Pasha at his house, I had an interview with General Baraguay d'Hilliers, which terminated in our agreeing to meet again the next day, in company with the two Admirals, who were at some considerable distance up the Bosphorus.

Scarcely three hours had elapsed from the time of our separation when we heard of the disaster at Sinope, of which I obtained next morning a melancholy confirmation.

Although the intelligence had not been conveyed to us officially, it was evident that a heavy loss had been suffered by the Turkish Government, and, consequently, our meeting was so far changed in character that we had less to consider how to prevent than how to redress the misfortune which had occurred.

Our first thought was to send out a sufficient force to Sinope with the view of delivering the town and port from whatever portion of the Russian squadron might have remained there after the action. The extreme probability that such a measure would have led immediately to war with Russia, a result which Her Majesty's Government are anxious, if it be possible, to avoid, inclined us to take the preliminary step which I have stated above. I felt at the same time how desirable it was in other respects that the combined squadrons should at once appear in the Black Sea, and your Lordship's instructions would have borne me out in taking that course, after we had acquired a positive knowledge of so large a portion of the Russian fleet as six sail-of-the-line being not only at sea, but employed in carrying destruction into the very ports of Turkey. But other considerations required a share of my attention. The cordial concurrence of our ally was an object of primary importance. A professional opinion was expressed in favour of our waiting for the return of the steam-frigates. That opinion was grounded on the risk of missing them at sea by reason of the fogs and violent winds prevailing in the Euxine at this time of year. It was also advisable for the Admirals to be within reach of consultation when the intelligence from Sinope should enable us to come to a conclusive decision.

The time necessary for this purpose is not likely to exceed an interval of five days; and we shall in all probability have to make our choice between two courses: one being to send out the squadrons with the immediate view of clearing Sinope of the Russians, and the other to protect the coasts generally, apprising the Russian Admiral at Sevastopol of our intention.

It cannot be denied, that the necessity which now impels us, when traced to its origin, leaves the whole responsibility with those who have trampled on principles which the Powers of Christendom united with Turkey ten years ago to proclaim and to respect.

Inclosure 1 in No. 335.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.*

Sir,

*Constantinople, December 3, 1853.*

I HAVE to request that you will send one of Her Majesty's steam-vessels under your command, with the least practicable delay, to Sinope, in order to make inquiry there, and to report as to the exact circumstances attending the action which took place in that port on the 30th ultimo, between the Turkish flotilla at anchor there, and a Russian force consisting of six line-of-battle ships.

It is particularly desirable to know what has since become of the Russian squadron, and in what condition the port, town, and batteries, if any, of Sinope, now are.

The French Ambassador writes in a similar sense to the Commander-in-chief of the French squadron; and Vice-Admiral Hamelin is prepared to send a French steam-frigate with the one to be dispatched by you.

We agree that the officers respectively in command are to avoid communication with any Russian man-of-war; but should a necessity for communicating occur, to state that they are destined for points on the Ottoman coast in connexion with the interests of the two Governments. If told not to proceed; they

are to retire, after protesting, if the Russian force be superior to theirs; but to persist in going to their destination, if that force be equal or inferior.

I have further to request that you will send a steam-vessel to Varna for the purposes stated in my despatch of the 11th ultimo, the execution of which, as you know, has been delayed by unavoidable considerations. The French Admiral is also to send a steam-vessel in company; but as there are objections to going at present beyond the Turkish line of coast, that part which relates to Sulina had better remain suspended.

In case of favourable weather, it might be well to include Kavarna in the inspection of the Turkish coast; and should the Consuls from Bucharest and Jassy not have reached Varna, to wait two or three days for their arrival.

I am, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 335.

*Reshid Pasha to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Traduction.)

28 Safer, 1270. (Le 29 Novembre, 1853.)

J'ENVOIE ci-inclus à votre Excellence, à fin qu'elle en prenne connaissance, copie d'une dépêche arrivée de la part du commandant des bâtiments de la flotte Impériale qui se trouvent à Sinope, et par laquelle il nous informe qu'une division de vaisseaux de guerre Russe croise à l'embouchure du port de Sinope, et dans les eaux de Sinope, et qu'une division croise dans les parages de Bartin et d'Amastre.

J'ai fait la même communication à l'Ambassade de France.

Je saisis, &c.

(Signé) MUSTAPHA RESHID.

(Translation.)

28 Safer, 1270. (November 29, 1853.)

I SEND to your Excellency herewith, in order that you may become acquainted with it, a copy of a despatch which has arrived from the commander of the vessels of the Imperial fleet which are at Sinope, and by which he informs us that a division of Russian ships-of-war is cruising off the port of Sinope and in the waters of Sinope, and that a division is cruising off Bartin and Amastre.

I have made the same communication to the Embassy of France.

I avail, &c.

(Signed) MUSTAPHA RESHID.

Inclosure 3 in No. 335.

*Annex to Note of Reshid Pasha of November 29, 1853.*

(Traduit du Turc.)

LE lendemain du départ de son Excellence Moustapha Pasha, jour de Mercredi, vers les sept heures (à la Turquie), on a aperçu à la distance d'environ dix milles de l'Ile de Sinope sept bâtiments à voile et deux bateaux à vapeur. Ces bâtiments viennent avec un vent de nord-est vers le port de Sinopé. Nous avons fait faire immédiatement bran-le-bas aux bâtiments de la flotte Impériale que nous avons, et les deux bateaux à vapeur, savoir, le "Taif" et "l'Erighly," ont mis leurs roux en état de tourner, et nous nous sommes préparés.

Des sept bâtiments les quatre se sont séparés et sont entrés dans le port, et les autres trois vaisseaux, ainsi que les deux bâtiments à vapeur, sont restés devant le Cap Indjé-Bournou. Trois vaisseaux de ligne et un brig, c'est à dire, quatre bâtiments, sont entrés dans le port susmentionné, et puis ils ont fait de longues bordées vers Guirgé, après quoi ayant fait

tira-mola (une espèce de manœuvre) ils venaient droit à nous, et quoiqu'ils sont venus à une distance qui était loin de la portée des boulets, ils se sont mis à louvoyer à pleines voiles, et vers le soir ils se sont éloignés de la terre et ont gagné le large.

Le lendemain, Jeudi, vers les six heures, on a aperçu de nouveau sept bâtimens, savoir, six vaisseaux de ligne et un brig, et deux bateaux à vapeur. Les trois ont louvoyé, portant peu de voiles, à l'embouchure de l'endroit susmentionné jusqu'au soir, et vers le soir ils ont repris le large. Enfin, six vaisseaux, un brig, et deux bateaux à vapeur sont toujours à l'embouchure du port susdit, et tantôt ils se mettent en panne, et tantôt ils louvoyent.

Six à huit frégates et deux bateaux à vapeur ont été vus à la hauteur du port de Bartin et d'Amastre, et cette nouvelle est certaine. Or, l'arsenal de l'ennemi est près d'ici ; il peut donc se renforcer, ou bien nous attaquer avec des brulôts, ce qui est présumable. Cela étant, si on ne nous envoie pas des renforts, et que notre position reste la même pour quelque temps—Dieu nous en préserve!—il se peut bien que la flotte Impériale essuye quelque perte.

(Translation.)

THE day after the departure of his Excellency Mustapha Pasha, Wednesday, about 7 o'clock according to Turkish time, seven sailing vessels and two steamers were perceived at a distance of about ten miles from Sinope. These vessels were coming with a north-east wind towards Sinope. We immediately caused the vessels of the Imperial fleet which are with us to clear for action, and the two steamers "Taif" and "Erighly" got their machinery ready for movement; and we made preparations.

Of the seven vessels four parted company and entered into the port, and the other three vessels and the two steamers remained off Cape Indjé Bournou. Three line-of-battle ships and one brig, that is to say, four vessels, entered into the above-mentioned port, and then made long tacks towards Guirgé, after which they bore down upon us, and although they came within a distance which was far beyond range, they turned to windward under all sail, and towards the evening stood away from the land and gained an offing.

The following day, Thursday, at about 6 o'clock, seven vessels were again observed, that is to say, six of-the-line and one brig, and two steamers. Three of them under easy sail stood towards the opening of the port above mentioned until the evening, and towards evening they bore away. In fine, six sail-of-the-line, a brig, and two steamers, are constantly off the port above-mentioned, and at one time they lie to, and another they beat about.

From six to eight frigates and two steamers have been seen off the port of Bartin and Amastre, and this news is certain. Consequently the station of the enemy is in this neighbourhood; he may therefore receive reinforcements, or attack us with fire-ships. That being the case, if reinforcements are not sent to us, and our position continues the same for some time—may God preserve us from them!—it may well happen that the Imperial fleet may sustain some loss.

No. 336.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 20.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, December 5, 1853.*

COPIES of three despatches, which I have recently received from Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Samsoon, are inclosed herewith for your Lordship's information. They relate, in general, to the naval operations in progress along the Asiatic sea-board of Turkey; and show how greatly a confirmed ascendancy on the part of Russia is likely to prove injurious to the interests of commerce, and to the Porte's maritime establishments on that line of coast. The scarcity of grain in Western Europe presents an additional consideration of no small importance.

Your Lordship will perceive from Mr. Guarracino's reports, that the danger to which the Turkish flotilla at Sinope was exposed had not escaped observation before the catastrophe. Unfortunately, our knowledge of the position was not obtained in time to prevent the disaster which has occurred. I have proposed to my French colleague a joint expression to the Porte of our opinion that an inquiry into the causes of that occurrence ought to be instituted. It is probable that the step will be taken as soon as complete information arrives from the scene of action. Meanwhile, it is whispered that the Captain Pasha will find it difficult to retain his office. In case of his dismissal, a professional man will probably be appointed in his place.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 336.

*Vice-Consul Guarracino to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Samsoon, November 22, 1853.*

I AVAIL of the departure of an express dispatched by land by our Pasha, to report to your Excellency that, two days ago, a Turkish steamer, called the "Medari Tidjaret," was captured about fifteen miles outside of Sinope by a Russian squadron of seven sail and one war-steamer, which has been cruising within sight of Sinope for some days back. The "Medari Tidjaret" was proceeding to Constantinople, and had taken on board at Sinope a quantity of rice for the use of the arsenal, a number of packages of merchandize belonging to merchants and groups, to the amount of 150,000 piastres, they say.

At the time the "Medari Tidjaret" was captured, there were seven Turkish sailing men-of-war at anchor at Sinope. After hearing of the capture of the steamer, the commander of this squadron gave orders that the ship should put to sea directly; and the steamers lit their fires to prepare, but a contrary order was issued soon after.

I am not exactly aware in what position English vessels would be placed were they met by Russian men-of-war at present; but I think it well to report to your Excellency, that several British merchant-vessels are about to load corn on this coast, and that an English merchant screw-steamer will commence to ply on this line, running backwards and forwards between Constantinople, this place, and Trebizond, this week, carrying Turkish passengers and merchandize.

As the express leaves immediately, and is calling out for this despatch, I must beg your Excellency to excuse haste.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) FREDK. GUARRACINO.

Inclosure 2 in No. 336.

*Vice-Consul Guarracino to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Samsoon, November 25, 1853.*

I HAD the honour to report to your Excellency on the 22nd instant, by overland post, the capture by the Russians of the Turkish steamer "Medari Tidjaret." I now beg to acquaint your Lordship that a merchant-vessel, which arrived here the day before yesterday with a Jerusalem flag, met the Russian squadron which I mentioned as cruising in the neighbourhood of Sinope, and was boarded by several boats from one of the Russian ships, and examined to see if there were any ammunition or Government stores on board for the Turks. The captain of the merchant-vessel, who is a Greek, was then ordered to go close to a Russian frigate, the captain of which interrogated him about the news from Constantinople, the number of English and French men-of-war at anchor in the Bosphorus, and asked exultingly if the capture of two Turkish steamers by the Russians had been heard of at the capital. The Greek captain tells me that this Russian squadron is composed of seven sail of frigates and corvettes, and

one large steamer; that the vessels appeared to form a line across the Black Sea, or from north to south, and commencing about fifteen miles from this coast, so that it would be almost impossible for any ship to pass to and fro, between this and Constantinople, without being observed by the Russians. There are two or three Turkish craft at Sinope laden with corn from this, the captains of which are afraid to proceed with their cargoes lest they should fall into the hands of the Russians.

The Greek captain before mentioned told me that he was also accosted by a Russian corvette about 100 miles on this side of the Bosphorus, and that this corvette ran foul of his vessel in approaching her, and carried away her jib-boom and fore-topmast; the vessel in port is now minus this part of her rigging. These Russian cruizers will prove very prejudicial to the trade of this coast, and to many Constantinople merchants who have Turkish vessels laden with corn, because the masters of these are kept in port now from fear of the Russians, and in two or three weeks hence they will be afraid to venture out to sea on account of the weather, so that the cargoes of corn will most probably remain on their way until spring.

Yesterday nearly 100 horses, for the use of the Turkish army, left this for Trebizond and Batoom under an escort provided by the Pasha. The horses were voluntarily and gratuitously given by merchants and other natives, both Mahomedans and Rayahs, of this place and the neighbouring towns of Baffra and Charshambah.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) FREDK. GUARRACINO.

Inclosure 3 in No. 336.

*Vice-Consul Guarracino to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Samsoun, November 26, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that Tufan Pasha read a "mazbata" to me yesterday afternoon which he had just received from the medjlis of Unich (a town twenty hours eastward of this), stating that the captain of a Turkish vessel, which had arrived on its way to Trebizond from Penderakli, laden with coals for the Ottoman Steam Company, had deposed before the Council that, not far from Cape Kerempeh, he had met four Russian two-deckers, two frigates, and a steamer; that the latter boarded him and ordered him to surrender, upon which the Turkish captain told the Russian commander that his vessel contained a cargo of coals, going to Trebizond for the Austrian Lloyd's Company; that, hearing this, the Russians made him take an oath that his statement was true, and that, on his swearing to this effect, the commander of the steamer made him give up about 1,800 kintals, or nearly 100 tons of coals, for which a receipt was delivered to him, with directions to give it to the Austrian agent, telling him to pass the coals taken in his accounts, and that they would be paid for. The Turkish captain was then obliged to give up what ready cash he had on board (the "mazbata" mentions nearly 10,000 piastres), with a small cannon and a brace of pistols, and was allowed to continue his voyage.

Tufan Pasha said he would report this occurrence to the Porte; and mentioned that, if some steps were not taken to prevent it, the trade of this coast would be completely stopped, and that he likewise felt some anxiety respecting the fate of the vessels loading in this roadstead, as no assistance or defence that could be afforded from the miserable town-batteries could prevent Russian men-of-war from approaching and capturing them while at anchor. I consider the Pasha quite right in this conclusion.

Tufan Pasha's remarks about the Turkish squadron lying at Sinope were also not very flattering.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) FREDK. GUARRACINO.

## No. 337.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 20.)*

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 5, 1853.

THE Turkish Council of Ministers assembled yesterday to take the late unfortunate occurrence at Sinope into consideration. An official note, addressed to the British and French Ambassadors, containing a request that the combined squadrons should be sent forthwith into the Black Sea, was in consequence ordered to be drawn up. A draft, sanctioned by the Sultan, was immediately prepared for transmission to the two Embassies, and a translation of it, which is inclosed herewith, reached me this morning.

I have since communicated by message with the French Ambassador, and, according to the tenour of his Excellency's reply, as reported to me, we are agreed as to the propriety of complying with the Porte's request, under a reserve of consulting the Admirals professionally. We are also, as it appears, of the same opinion as to recommending an inquiry into the causes of the late disaster at Sinope, and referring to the Admirals officially for advice as to the expediency of sending the Turkish squadron to sea. We believe their impression to be that the Porte's line-of-battle ships are not in a condition to navigate the Black Sea with impunity at this season.

I shall be careful to make the Ottoman Ministers understand that, whatever nautical assistance may be given by the combined squadrons in the Black Sea, it will not be intended thereby to make any difference as to the desire of peace, and the ground on which the principle of a pacific arrangement is to be looked for.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 337.

*Reshid Pasha to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Traduction.)

8 Rebiul-errel, 1270. (Le 4 Décembre, 1853.)

VOTRE Excellence a été informée dernièrement par une note officielle que des vaisseaux de guerre Russes croisaient dans les parages de Sinopé.

Nous apprenons par le rapport du commandant du bateau-à-vapeur le "Taif," qui vient d'arriver de Sinopé, que Mercredi le 29 Safer (30 Novembre), trois vaisseaux Russes à trois ponts, trois vaisseaux de ligne, et deux frégates sont entrés dans le port de Sinopé, et ont attaqué une division de la flotte Impériale que s'y trouvait et qui était composée de frégates et de corvettes.

Le résultat du combat n'est pas encore connu ; mais à juger de la position de cette division et de la supériorité des forces de l'ennemi, elle doit avoir beaucoup souffert.

Or, l'objet salulaire de la présence des flottes Anglaise et Française dans le Bosphore est de protéger le littoral Ottoman ; et, quant aux forces maritimes Russes, ce qu'elles viennent de faire montre qu'elles attaqueront telles parties des côtes où des succès leur paraîtront possibles.

La défense d'une si grand étendu de côtes exige, d'ailleurs, la présence dans la Mer Noire d'une force maritime suffisante. La Sublime Porte a l'intention d'expédier sa flotte dans la Mer Noire. Mais, comme ces forces maritimes qui seront expédiées, à cause de ce qui vient de passer à Sinopé, ne pourront pas suffire, il est devenu nécessaire de recourir aux efforts actifs des deux Puissances alliées.

C'est ce que je m'empresse de porter à votre connaissance, comme je l'ai porté à celle de l'Ambassade de France, et je saisis cette occasion de renouveler à votre Excellence des assurances de ma haute considération.

(Signé)

MUSTAPHA RESHID.

## (Translation.)

8 *Rebiul-evvel*, 1270. (December 4, 1853.)

YOUR Excellency was lately informed by an official note that Russian ships of war were cruising off Sinope.

We learn by the report of the commander of the steamer "Taif," which has just arrived from Sinope, that on Wednesday the 20th of Safer (November 30) three Russian three-deckers, three ships of the line, and two frigates, entered the port of Sinope, and attacked a division of the Imperial fleet which was there, and which consisted of frigates and corvettes.

The result of that battle is not yet known; but judging from the position of that division, and from the superiority of the enemy's forces, it must have greatly suffered.

The salutary object of the presence of the English and the French fleets in the Bosphorus is, however, to protect the Ottoman coast; and as regards the Russian maritime forces, what they have done shows that they will attack those parts of the coasts where it may seem possible for them to succeed.

The defence of so great an extent of coast requires, moreover, the presence of a sufficient maritime force in the Black Sea. The Sublime Porte intends to send its fleet into the Black Sea. But as those maritime forces which will be sent, on account of what has happened at Sinope, will be insufficient, it has become necessary to have recourse to the active efforts of the two allied Powers.

This is what I hasten to bring to your knowledge, as I have likewise communicated it to the Embassy of France; and I take this opportunity to renew, &c.

(Signed) MUSTAPHA RESHID.

No. 338.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 20.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, December 5, 1853.*

MY exertions in favour of peace have not been relaxed; but no apparent result has yet attended them. Circumstances have not admitted of my taking any further official step. The Austrian proposals, founded in great part on the assurances given by the Emperor Nicholas at Olmütz, have failed. The Porte has made up its mind to reject them; but the communication of its intention has not been called for by Baron Bruck, who prefers keeping the door of negotiation open. The Prussian Envoy has met with no better success; and I am assured that the exhortations of General Baraguay d'Hilliers have hitherto led to no ostensible conclusion. It would seem, in short, that the Porte will no longer hear of notes and Ambassadors to be sent to St. Petersburg. To judge from the language of its Ministers the main object and ardent desire of the Sultan and his Government are to escape from the necessity of making any concession whatever to Russia on the ground of spiritual privilege beyond a communication of the firmans, and what relates to the holy places in Palestine.

My efforts of late have been necessarily confined to those of a private and confidential character. Individuals must be persuaded, or nothing can be done. It is indispensable to begin with turning the convictions of Reshid Pasha into a new channel. Though naturally of a peaceful and conciliatory character, he expresses opinions almost entirely identical with those of his colleagues who looked to war from the first. He conceives the very existence of the Empire to be endangered, not only by the declared pretensions, but also by the real, yet clandestine, designs of Russia. I have endeavoured, by all the means in my power, to overcome this tendency of his mind; and in order to increase my chances of success I have admitted fairly all the truths of the question between Turkey and Russia, and laboured not the less strenuously to open his eyes to the

dangers of a war pursued on a fresh basis without the full assent and concurrence of the Porte's efficient allies.

I have so far succeeded in these repeated attempts that his Highness has promised to consult unreservedly with his colleagues, and to explain to me with equal frankness on what principle, and in what modes, such proposals for peace might be arranged between him and me as would afford a reasonable prospect of acceptance as well by the General Council as by the Porte's allies.

In ignorance of what he will finally propose, I am inclined to think that the only chance of success is now to be found in setting aside all the preceding modes of arrangement, and forming a new plan, adapted to present circumstances and requirements, out of those elements which cannot be excluded from our calculation.

I am willing to believe that a certain amount of impression has been made upon his mind; but whether it will prove sufficient to counterbalance his national feelings and political views I cannot yet presume to determine. He is to have a meeting with his colleagues to-day, and he has promised to let me know the result of the conference in private to-morrow. Should it be such as to offer a tolerable prospect of arrangement, I shall enter into further communications with the French Ambassador, and in concert with him, and, if possible, with the Austrian and Prussian Representatives also, endeavour to elaborate a proposal which, if approved by the General Council and our respective Governments, may be urged with advantage upon the acceptance of Russia.

I cannot allow myself to entertain a sanguine hope of success. I can only assure your Lordship that I perceive no other mode of proceeding with any good prospect under present circumstances; and I am anxious beyond expression that Her Majesty's Government should not be misled by illusive hopes of peace into a course of uncertainty which would be alike unfair to the Porte and dangerous to its Empire, with no advantage but what the aggressor would reap at our expense.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 339.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, December 20, 1853.*

YOUR Excellency will have been prepared by my despatch of the 17th instant, to learn that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the decision, announced in your despatch of the 4th instant, of sending the combined fleets into the Black Sea, and informing the Russian Admiral at Sevastopol of the purposes for which they are sent.

Her Majesty's Government approve also of the whole of the combined fleets being ordered on this service; as in fact it is only by obtaining the complete command of the Black Sea that the policy of the English and French Governments can be effectually carried out, and the recurrence of disasters such as that at Sinope can be prevented.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 340.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, December 20, 1853.*

I HAVE to state to your Excellency, in reply to your despatch of the 5th instant, that Her Majesty's Government agree in your opinion that a complete inquiry should be instituted into the circumstances which preceded and

attended the late fatal occurrence at Sinope ; as it would seem from the reports inclosed in your despatch, that if timely notice had been conveyed to Constantinople of the Russian force that was cruising off Sinope, the catastrophe which ensued might have been averted by the combined fleets.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 341.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, December 20, 1853.*

I HAVE to state to your Excellency, in reply to your despatch of the 5th instant, that Her Majesty's Government approve the communication which you propose to make to the Porte, as to the unabated desire for peace by which the British Government will be animated, notwithstanding the material assistance given to the Porte by the presence of the British and French fleets in the Black Sea.

Furthermore, it must be borne in mind, and your Excellency will make it clear to the Porte, that when the combined fleets are in the Black Sea, it will be indispensable that no naval operations are undertaken by the Turkish fleet without the previous sanction of the British and French Admirals.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 342.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, December 20, 1853.*

YOUR Excellency will have learned by my previous despatches that the course which, as appears from your despatch of the 5th instant, you are taking, with the view to the adoption by the Porte of pacific counsels, is in accordance with the wishes of Her Majesty's Government as being calculated to prepare the Porte to give a favourable reception to the proposals which have been forwarded from Vienna.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 343.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 20.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, December 12, 1853.*

I HAVE not seen Count Nesselrode since the receipt of the intelligence of the signature of the Protocol, but I am not ignorant of the feelings entertained upon the subject of by the Russian Government.

The Protocol is considered to be highly unfavourable to their interests and very partially favourable to those of the Turks ; it is held to be unjust that the Sultan should receive assurances of his not being liable to have any of those demands made upon him which he has already refused.

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No. 344.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, December 24, 1853.*

COUNT WALEWSKI has communicated to me the important despatch of M. Drouyn de Lhuys which forms the subject of your Lordship's despatch of the 16th instant.

That despatch has received the attentive consideration of Her Majesty's Government, whose views, as it must be superfluous for me to inform your Excellency, are in entire accordance with those of the French Government upon the unjustifiable course that Russia has throughout pursued on the Eastern question, and the absolute necessity of preventing the recurrence of a disaster such as that which has lately taken place at Sinope.

That necessity is in fact so evident that Her Majesty's Government did not doubt that the combined fleets had at once been sent into the Black Sea, and as your Excellency has already been made aware by my despatch of the 17th instant to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, Her Majesty's Government did not consider that any fresh instructions were called for on the occasion, because special instructions having already been given to protect the territory of the Sultan from attack, they must be faithfully and effectually carried out.

Despatches have since been received from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe by which it appears that on the 4th the fleets were about to be sent into the Black Sea, either to clear Sinope of the Russians or to protect the coasts of Turkey generally, and that the Russian Admiral at Sevastopol was to be apprised of the service on which they would be employed; and, thereupon, I have conveyed to his Excellency the approval of Her Majesty's Government.

In my despatch to Lord Stratford of the 20th December, I have also stated that it was only by obtaining a complete command of the Black Sea that the policy of the English and French Governments could be effectually carried out, and the recurrence of disasters such as that at Sinope could be prevented.

These instructions are in accordance with the instructions that Count Walewski told me would be addressed to the French Ambassador at Constantinople; but the French Government now propose to us in addition that the Ottoman flag, as well as the Ottoman territory, should be protected by the combined fleets, and that all Russian vessels, other than merchantmen, met in the Black Sea, should be required to return to Sevastopol.

Her Majesty's Government having clearly announced that the recurrence of a disaster such as that at Sinope must be prevented, and that the command of the Black Sea must be secured, would have been content to have left the manner of executing those instructions to the discretion of the Admirals, but they attach so much importance not alone to the united action of the two Governments, but to the instructions addressed to their respective agents being precisely the same, that they are prepared to adopt the specific mode of action now proposed by the Government of the Emperor.

Instructions to that effect will accordingly be addressed to Lord Stratford.

Even if the Governments of England and France were not in honour bound to protect the Sultan, they could not, in the interests of humanity, tolerate that such scenes of horrible carnage, as that of which Sinope has been the theatre, should be renewed, and for both these objects they must exercise complete command in the Black Sea; but they will at the same render a signal service to the Porte; and Her Majesty's Government consider it indispensable that no naval operation should be undertaken by the Turkish fleet without the previous knowledge and sanction of the British and French Admirals, who cannot be made responsible for operations of which they may be kept in ignorance, or of which they may disapprove. Nor can Her Majesty's Government think it just, so long as England and France are not actually at war with Russia, that the combined fleets should aid and protect the Turkish forces in acts of aggression upon the Russian territory, while the Russian fleet is prevented from repelling such attacks or conveying the means necessary for the defence of that territory.

Her Majesty's Government have not hesitated to adopt the course which the honour and dignity of this country prescribe, but at the same time they do

not disguise from themselves that it may at no distant period involve England and France in war with Russia, and they consider it equally for the honour and dignity of the two Powers not to allow the peace of Europe to be dependent upon that national spirit in Turkey, which, however admirable in itself, and however useful against the aggressor, is now evidently beyond the control of the Turkish Government. Her Majesty's Government would therefore propose to the Government of the Emperor that, in making known to the Porte the course which the two Governments are about to pursue, the English and French Ambassadors should at the same time be instructed to demand, in the event of the answer to the proposal recently sent from Vienna having been unsatisfactory, that the terms on which a Treaty of Peace between Russia and Turkey shall be negotiated may be left to the decision of England and France, on the distinct understanding that nothing shall be proposed on her part to which she has already officially objected.

I communicated this proposal on the 22nd to Count Walewski, who engaged to refer it to his Government, and his Excellency has this day informed me that it has been entirely approved of by M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 345.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, December 27, 1853.*

AUTHENTIC information, dated the 9th instant, from Constantinople, has reached Her Majesty's Government, that on the 30th ultimo a Turkish squadron at anchor in the harbour of Sinope was completely destroyed by an overwhelming Russian force; that 4,000 Turks perished; and that the survivors, not exceeding in number more than 400, who have been brought away by English and French vessels, were all more or less wounded.

The feelings of horror which this dreadful carnage could not fail to create, have been general throughout all ranks and classes of Her Majesty's subjects in this country.

The circumstances which have attended this disastrous affair are of the greatest importance, and with respect to them it is necessary that there should be no misunderstanding between Her Majesty's Government and the Cabinet of St. Petersburg.

The object with which the combined fleets were sent to Constantinople, was not to attack Russia, but to defend Turkey; and the English and French Ambassadors and Admirals were informed that the fleets were not to assume an aggressive position, but that they were to protect the Turkish territory from attack.

On the 27th of October you informed Count Nesselrode of the nature of these instructions, and the service upon which Her Majesty's fleet would be employed; and Her Majesty's Government hoped that that communication, made in no unfriendly spirit to Russia, would have sufficed to prevent an attack upon a Turkish harbour which is Turkish territory.

Had the Turkish squadron been about to make a descent upon Secoum-Kalé, as is stated in a despatch from Prince Menchikoff to Prince Gortchakoff, which there is every reason to consider authentic; if it had been fallen in with and destroyed by the Russian fleet off the Russian coasts in Asia, Her Majesty's Government, however much they might have lamented such a disastrous loss of life, would have regarded it as an ordinary though unfortunate casualty of war. But the Sultan's squadron was destroyed while at anchor in a Turkish harbour, and where, consequently, the English and French fleets, if they had been present, would have protected it, and would have repelled the attack.

The Russian Admiral, however, must have acted upon the orders of his Government, which Government was well aware of the instructions which were to guide the British and French Admirals; and Her Majesty's Government are compelled therefore to consider that it was not the Turkish squadron alone that was deliberately attacked in the harbour of Sinope.

The events of the last six months, and the proceedings of the English and French Governments, afford abundant proof of their desire to maintain friendly relations with Russia, and to effect an honourable settlement of the difference between that Power and the Porte; but the Cabinet of St. Petersburg has greatly erred if it has mistaken forbearance for indifference, or has calculated upon any want of firmness in carrying out a policy which those Governments have adopted with a due regard to their own and to European interests.

Her Majesty's Government have not abandoned the hope that peace may be re-established, for they are unwilling to believe that any insurmountable obstacle can exist to carrying out the declared objects of Russia in a manner compatible with the dignity and the independence of the Porte; and it would therefore have been a matter of sincere satisfaction to Her Majesty's Government that the combined fleets should have remained at anchor in the Bosphorus while negotiations were pending. But this has been rendered impossible by the attack on the Turkish squadron at Sinope. The intentions of the English and French Governments, which were long since announced to the Porte, must be firmly and faithfully executed. For this purpose, although with no hostile design against Russia, it is essential that the combined fleets should have the command of the Black Sea; and the necessary instructions have accordingly been addressed to the Ambassadors and Admirals of England and France.

In making known to Count Nesselrode that such instructions have been sent, you will govern yourself by the language of this despatch, and you will inform his Excellency that in order to prevent the recurrence of disasters such as that at Sinope, the combined fleets will require, and, if necessary, compel Russian ships of war to return to Sevastopol, or the nearest port; and it is considered that the Turkish fleet should undertake no aggressive operations by sea so long as matters remain in their present state.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 346.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, December 27, 1851.*

YOUR Excellency will have learned by my despatch of the 20th instant, that the entry of the whole of the combined fleets into the Black Sea, and the communication with the Russian Admiral, which were announced as probable on the 4th instant by your Excellency, met with the approbation of Her Majesty's Government, who considered that no instructions were necessary in addition to those already in the possession of your Excellency, for defending the European and Asiatic territory of the Sultan from attack.

The French Government wrote in the same sense to General Baraguay d'Hilliers.

The details which have subsequently arrived, respecting the disastrous affair at Sinope, have given rise to further communications between Her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor of the French, and the necessity of more stringent instructions has been recognized.

In my despatch I stated that it was only by obtaining the complete command of the Black Sea that the policy of the English and French Governments could be effectually carried out, and the recurrence of disasters such as that at Sinope, be prevented. But in order to exercise that command to the fullest and most beneficial extent, we have agreed with the French Government that the Russian naval commander should in appropriate, but unmistakeable terms, be informed that the Governments of England and France are resolved to prevent the recurrence of another such event as that at Sinope; that every Russian ship of war will henceforth be required to return to Sevastopol, or the most neighbouring port; and that all aggression against the Ottoman territory or flag would impose upon the Admirals the painful necessity of repelling force by force.

Your Excellency is accordingly instructed to communicate this to Vice-

Admiral Dundas for his guidance in conjunction with Admiral Hamelin, whose instructions from the French Ambassador will be in all respects similar.

In adopting this course, and in giving this substantial aid to Turkey, England and France are far from intending to abandon the position in which they are now placed with respect to Austria and Prussia. They think, on the contrary, that it is their duty and their right to demand the acceptance by the Porte of the proposals recently made by the Four Powers, and which have for their object to secure the dignity and independence of the Sultan.

Were England and France to act otherwise, they would impair, if not destroy, the union which now exists between the Four Powers, and which on every account it is so important to maintain, and they would endanger the peace of the world by encouraging the prolongation of a war which they would then regard as unnecessary.

In short, if the Governments of England and France are prepared to act with all the energy that the efficient protection of Turkey may render necessary, and if they are prepared to meet all the consequences it may entail, they are not the less anxious to act cordially with Austria and Prussia for the restoration of peace upon the bases established by the Conference at Vienna. The measures they are about to adopt will afford to Europe a guarantee that the Ottoman Empire will be maintained inviolate; and they expect in return that whenever negotiations commence, the Porte will honourably contribute to their success, and will abstain from putting forward demands which might be impracticable, and which the great Powers of Europe could have no interest in sustaining at the cost of a general war.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 347.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, December 28, 1853.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 27th instant, I inclose for your Excellency's information copies of two despatches\* which I have addressed to Lord Cowley and to Sir Hamilton Seymour respecting the decision taken by Her Majesty's Government in conjunction with that France as to the entrance of the combined fleets into the Black Sea.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 348.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.†*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, December 27, 1853.*

I INCLOSE for your Lordship's information copies of despatches‡ which I have addressed to Sir H. Seymour and to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, announcing the decision of the British and French Governments to send their fleets into the Black Sea for the purposes therein specified.

You will read these despatches to Baron Manteuffel.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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\* Nos. 344 and 345.

† A similar despatch was addressed on the same day to Lord Westmorland.

‡ Nos. 315 and 346.

## No. 349.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 27.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, December 19, 1853.*

THE short conversation which I held with Count Nesselrode on the 17th instant, was in so far unsatisfactory that it tended to confirm the notion of the Emperor having made up his mind not to recede from his demands upon the Sultan's Government.

His Excellency took occasion to advert to the Protocol signed on the 5th instant at Vienna, and expressed his belief that it could not operate favourably, and might operate very disadvantageously upon the restoration of peace.

His Excellency had, he said, no objection to the principle of respecting the existing state of territorial possession in Turkey; the principle indeed had been put forward in every paper which had been lately issued by the Imperial Government: but the declaration to this effect at the present moment could not but be expected to have the effect of encouraging the Turks in their actual policy, and to lead them to believe that their resistance could have no dangerous results.

Before taking leave of the Chancellor, I observed to him that among the many points which caused me anxiety, there was perhaps no one which gave me so much as the possible passage of the Danube by Prince Gortchakoff. I thought such a movement likely to be attended with immediate serious consequences.

Nothing of the sort was, in Count Nesselrode's opinion, to be apprehended. He believed Prince Gortchakoff to have no thought of passing the Danube during the winter, and were he desirous of doing so, it would not be in his power, the difficulties were so great and the Prince's available forces inadequate.

Some short conversation respecting Kalafat ensued, in which although nothing distinct was said by Count Nesselrode, it was rather intimated to me that there was no certainty as to this position being attacked by the Russian army.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

## No. 350.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 27.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, le 19 Décembre, 1853, 7 P.M.*

LE Conseil-Général après de vifs débats a décidée pour la négociation sur la base d'évacuer plutôt les Principautés, de sauvegarder les droits souverains du Sultan, et de confirmer la garantie des Puissances.

Le projet des Quatre Représentants d'ici pour établir une négociation, avec un armistice, était déjà entre les mains du Ministre Ottoman. Il doit être pris en considération par le Conseil Ministériel en deux ou trois jours: les chances du succès sont favorable. La note collective de Vienne est arrivée trop tard, d'après l'opinion des Quatre Représentants, pour être présentée à Reshid Pasha sans une risque imminente de tout déranger. On a par conséquent pris le parti de la réserver.

(Translation.)

*Constantinople, December 19, 1853, 7 P.M.*

THE General Council after warm debates has decided to negotiate on the basis of the evacuation of the Principalities as soon as possible, of the protection of the sovereign rights of the Sultan, and the confirmation of the guarantee of the Powers.

The project of the Four Representatives here for setting on foot a negotiation with an armistice was already in the hands of the Ottoman Minister. It is to be taken into consideration in two or three days; the chances of success are favourable. The collective Vienna note arrived too late, in the opinion of the Four Representatives, to be presented to Reshid Pasha without imminent risk of deranging everything. It has consequently been decided to withhold it.

No. 351.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 27.)*

My Lord,

Vienna, December 20, 1853.

I COMMUNICATED to Count Buol your Lordship's despatch of the 9th instant, in which you direct me to state to him the sincere pleasure with which Her Majesty's Government had learnt that he had received the Emperor's commands to agree to the Protocol and the draft of the note to Reshid Pasha, which had been submitted to him by Her Majesty's Government and the Government of France, and by which the concurrence of the Four Powers in the same line of policy on the Eastern question might be considered as established.

Count Buol reciprocated these expressions of satisfaction at the important result which had thus been obtained, and coincided with your Lordship in the hope that, by a strict adherence to it, peace might be reestablished between Russia and the Porte, and the dangers which now menaced the general tranquillity of Europe be averted.

Count Buol was perfectly satisfied with the assurance given by your Lordship, that Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople had been made aware of the anxiety felt by Her Majesty's Government for the success of the propositions now about to be made to the Porte, and he renewed his assurance that he should consider himself bound to act in consultation and in entire unity with the other allied Powers towards Russia, in case that Government should refuse to accept the proposals of the Four Powers which the Porte might have agreed to.

Count Buol was glad to find that the verbal amendments introduced into the Protocol had been agreed to by Her Majesty's Government, and that the mode of proceeding recommended to the Representatives at Constantinople by the Conference had been approved of.

In closing this despatch I beg to express to your Lordship my acknowledgments for the manner in which you have conveyed to me the approbation by Her Majesty's Government of my language and conduct throughout the course of these transactions.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 352.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 27.)*

(Extract.)

Vienna, December 20, 1853.

WITH reference to the desire expressed by your Lordship to learn more distinctly than you had done from a communication you had received from Count Colloredo, whether Count Buol was decided to maintain the principle of a negotiation between the Government of Russia and the Porte, to which the Four Powers should be parties, Count Buol stated that the instruction he had addressed to that Minister was written with the view only of establishing the fact that, if the Cabinet of St. Petersburg should absolutely object to a Conference of the Six Powers, in which the Treaty for the re-establishment of peace with Turkey should be negotiated, that determination should not be considered as a total bar to any negotiation. He said that he approved entirely of the proposal that the negotiation should be carried on in presence of the Six Representatives, and that this opinion was entirely in unison with that of the Emperor. He, therefore, would neglect no effort to obtain its adoption by the Russian Government; but that if a decided obstacle as to form was at once opposed to that proposal, he had thought it right to call the attention of the allied Governments to the danger which might arise from insisting upon an exclusive form of negotiation, for which it was not impossible that an equivalent might be found without impairing our action as mediators.

In stating this, Count Buol remarked that he meant in no way to admit of

a negotiation between the two belligerents without the control of the Four Powers; he disclaimed entirely any admission of that nature: he insisted upon the action of the allied Powers in every stage of the negotiation, upon every difficulty which might arise between the negotiators, and consequently upon receiving a constant report or communication of their proceedings; but he conceived that if an objection which he should look upon as futile should be raised by Russia as to the negotiation being carried on in the presence of the Representatives of the Four Powers, they ought not to bind themselves by a positive refusal to a course which would prevent all negotiation from taking place.

Count Buol stated that this alone was the view with which he had put forward the opinion he had instructed both Count Colloredo and M. de Hübner to submit for the consideration of the Governments to which these Ministers are accredited. He gave his decided preference to the negotiation in presence of the Six Representatives; he would support it with all the means he could dispose of: for it was impossible that the many questions which must be brought into the negotiation, and which would partake entirely of an European character, should not necessitate the direct intervention of the allied Powers; and as to the question of the re-establishment of peace between the belligerents, even if it was agreed to and signed by their Representatives alone, it would be with the entire approval of all its conditions by the Representatives of their allies. Count Buol repeated that the reasoning he had thus put forward was merely in support of the views he conceived he was bound to submit to the allied Governments, as those which might meet a case of difficulty which it would be advantageous to be prepared for, but he in no way desired their adoption; it was a suggestion with regard to which, if unfortunately the case he apprehended should arise, he was entirely prepared to attend to the views and opinions of the allied Governments, and to adopt the course which, in consultation with them, should be decided upon as most advisable.

No. 353.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 27.)*

My Lord,

Vienna, December 20, 1853.

I INCLOSE the report which has appeared in the Vienna "Presse" of the decision which has been taken by the Administrative Council of the Principality of Wallachia, which was ordered to assemble by Prince Gortchakoff, by which the whole of the militia of that province has been formally incorporated in the Russian army. It is also stated that these troops will be considerably increased in numbers, and it is supposed they will be placed under the orders of the Imperial Russian General Sala.

I brought these circumstances under the notice of Count Buol, who, although not officially informed of them, believed them to be correctly stated, and considered them as highly reprehensible. The explanations upon this subject which he had received from Baron Meyendorff were, that it was not intended these troops should be employed against the arms of the Sultan; but he did not look upon this assurance as being in any way to be considered as a satisfactory explanation of the measure, and he had so expressed himself in his communications on the subject.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 353.

*Extract from the "Presse" of December 18, 1853.*

(Translation.)

INTELLIGENCE has been received from Bucharest that in a sitting of the Administrative Council of the Principalities, by order of Prince Gortchakoff, the whole Wallachian militia had been formally incorporated in the Russian army.

This measure was only sanctioned by a majority of four voices to three. The President of the Council protested against it on the grounds that the Wallachian country was not at war with either Russia or Turkey; on the contrary, it belonged to Turkey, and the participation of the militia in a war against the Porte was in fact high treason against their legitimate Suzerain.

The regiments forming the Wallachian militia are to be increased from 2,000 men (their present complement) to 4,000, and an additional infantry regiment raised.

The intelligence received from Bucharest of the 13th instant states that the Imperial Russian General Sala will probably take the command of the Moldavian and Wallachian troops, and that they will be augmented according to the orders already issued.

No. 354.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 26.)*

My Lord,

Vienna, December 21, 1853.

WITH reference to my despatch of yesterday's date, I have the honour of inclosing herewith the extract of a private letter from Prince Gortchakoff to Baron Meyendorff, dated from Bucharest, the 2nd instant, which gives the same explanation with regard to the service in which it was his intention to employ the Wallachian troops, which I reported to your Lordship as coming from Baron Meyendorff.

Prince Gortchakoff, besides what is stated in this extract, gives as his reason for removing the Wallachian artillery from Bucharest that he did not conceive it to be fitting to retain a considerable force of that arm in the town destined for his head-quarters, and which did not belong to his own army.

With respect to the employment of the Cossacks with the gendarmes in the district between Craiova and Kalafat, he states that their service is entirely confined to the duties of the police.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 354.

*Prince Gortchakoff to Baron Meyendorff.*

Bucharest, le 2 Décembre, 1853.

LES Valaques ne sont employés que pour le service intérieur et de police, et pour l'occupation, comme durant la paix, des postes d'observation sur la ligne des quarantaines. Du côté de Kalafat, où cette ligne est interrompue par l'ennemi, les gendarmes sont chargés d'explorer la contrée en commun avec les Cosaques. J'ai dirigé sur Braila l'artillerie Valaque, parceque je trouve qu'elle y est mieux qu'à Bucharest.

(Translation.)

THE Wallachians are only employed for service in the interior and police, and for the occupation, as in time of peace, of the guard-posts on the line of the quarantines. On the side of Kalafat, where that line is interrupted by the enemy, the gendarmes are employed to scour the country in common with the Cossacks. I have moved the Wallachian artillery upon Braila, because I find that it is better there than at Bucharest.

No. 355.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 27.)*

My Lord,

Vienna, December 20, 1853.

I INQUIRED of Count Buol what intelligence he had lately received from Servia as to the grounds upon which the Government of that country had claimed a right to maintain the observance of a strict neutrality in the contest now carried on between Russia and the Porte. Count Buol stated, that he considered it as a point of great interest to the tranquillity of Servia, and the provinces adjoining to it, that this neutrality should be acceded to; he had, therefore, directed Baron Bruck to recommend the Government of the Sultan, upon a clear understanding that it was equally to be maintained towards Russia, to concur in its adoption; and he had just received from him a despatch announcing that Reshid Pasha had notified to him the consent which he had been instructed by the Sultan to convey to the Prince of Servia that this neutrality should be so maintained.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 356.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 28.)*

(Extract.)

Vienna, December 23, 1853.

WITH regard to the form of negotiation, Count Buol strongly coincides with the opinion entertained by the Cabinets of London and Paris, in supporting the Conference of Six. Turkey demanding it, the Four Powers will urge its acceptance at St. Petersburg; but should the Russian Government refuse or modify the proposition, Count Buol begs the Allied Cabinets will deliberate together and decide whether we are to make it a *sine quâ non*, and declare the negotiation to be broken off on a difference of form, when we might find equivalents to ensure the official control of the Four Powers upon it in every phase.

No. 357.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 28, 1853.

BARON BRUNNOW called upon me yesterday by appointment to read to me a despatch from Count Nesselrode, respecting the facilities that the Russian Government are desirous of affording to neutral vessels leaving the port of Galatz.

I took the opportunity of informing Baron Brunnow that Her Majesty's Government, in conjunction with the French Government, had determined to take a more active part than hitherto in the Eastern question, and that effectual measures would be adopted for protecting the territory and the flag of the Sultan, as well as for the suppression of hostilities in the Black Sea. That both Governments would willingly have postponed such measures so long as a prospect remained of terminating the question peacefully, but that the course pursued by Russia had left them no option. The Russian Government was fully aware of the objects entertained by England and France, after the combined fleets had been called up to Constantinople from Besica Bay, and that an attack upon a Turkish squadron in a Turkish harbour, was therefore an act of defiance to England and France, which assuredly would not remain unnoticed.

Baron Brunnow said he could not accept my interpretation of the affair

at Sinope, which was simply an act of war between belligerents, and was not to be considered as a hostile manifestation towards England and France.

After some further and unimportant conversation upon the subject, I expressed to Baron Brunnow my belief, founded upon information from various quarters, that the Emperor would make no concessions, and was determined upon war if he could not make peace upon his own terms.

In reply to Baron Brunnow's inquiry, I informed him that instructions would be sent to you this evening to communicate to Count Nesselrode the determination that has been come to by Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 358.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 28.)*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, December 28, 1853, 2½ P.M.*

LE Comte Buol vient de réunir la Conférence. Nous avons lu la dépêche de Lord Stratford du 19, seule source d'information jusqu'ici. Nous avons été unanimes sur le point que la non-remise de la note collective consignée dans le Protocole du 5 Décembre, anéantissait l'action de la Conférence; et pénétrés que nous sommes de l'importance que nos Gouvernements attachent à son maintien, nous avons pensé que nous ne pouvons la rétablir qu'en donnant cours à la pièce originale sur laquelle se sont concentrées les opinions des Quatre Cours. D'après le désir exprimé par le Comte Buol, chacun de nous réclame en conséquence l'autorisation de son Cabinet de décider en Conférence qu'un duplicat de la note collective soit remis sans retard à l'Ambassadeur Ottoman à Vienne avec l'invitation de la faire parvenir à son Gouvernement. La Conférence naturellement n'a pas eu à régler le mode de transmission de la réponse de Constantinople. C'est une question sur laquelle nous aurons à revenir.

(Translation.)

*Vienna, December 28, 1853, 2½ P.M.*

COUNT BUOL has assembled the Conference. We have read Lord Stratford's despatch of the 19th, at present our only source of information. We were unanimous on the point that the non-delivery of the collective note annexed to the Protocol of December 5 destroyed the action of the Conference; and being persuaded of the importance which our Governments attach to its being maintained, we have thought that we can only set it on foot again by giving effect to the original documents on which the Four Courts are agreed in opinion. Agreeably to the desire expressed by Count Buol, each of us applies in consequence for the authority of his Cabinet to decide in conference that a duplicate of the collective note shall be delivered without delay to the Ottoman Ambassador at Vienna with an invitation to forward it to his Government. The Conference has naturally not had to settle the manner of forwarding the answer from Constantinople. We shall have to return to this question.

No. 359.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, December 29, 1853.*

A REPORT has reached Her Majesty's Government that previously to the attack by the Russian fleet on the Turkish squadron at Sinope the Austrian Consul-General had been observed to make a telegraphic signal to the Russian fleet. Your Lordship will express to Count Buol the disbelief of Her Majesty's Government in the truth of this report, but you will at the same time suggest that an inquiry should be made into the origin of such a rumour.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 360.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, December 29, 1853.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 17th instant, reporting your conversation with Baron Manteuffel relative to the collective Note and Protocol, and to the continuance of Prussian agents in the Principalities, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government approve your language on this occasion.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 361.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, December 30, 1853.*

BEFORE taking any further steps we think it better to wait till full information is received as to the course pursued by the Four Representatives at Constantinople, when the action of the Conference may be resumed as to the nature of the proposal of the Porte, and the mode of making it known at St. Petersburg. We cannot see any practical utility in giving the collective note at this moment to the Turkish Ambassador.

No. 362.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 30.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, December 29, 1853.*

IT appears from a telegraphic despatch received yesterday from M. de Bourqueney, that the telegraphic despatch from Lord Stratford of the 19th instant was received by Lord Westmorland and laid before the Conference. Your Lordship will have received that despatch before this can reach your hands, and you will have learnt the painful impression which the non-presentation to the Porte of the collective note of the 5th instant had made upon the Conference, and the resolution to which the members had come to ask permission of their respective Governments to address a duplicate of that note to the Turkish Minister at Vienna, and thus to ensure its reaching the hands of the Sultan's Ministers.

Simultaneously with this intelligence M. Drouyn de Lhuys had received his mail of the 15th from the Levant. The Vienna note had not then arrived at Constantinople; but the Representatives of the Four Powers had commenced negotiations with the Porte on pretty nearly the same basis as those which were suggested from Vienna, and which appear from Lord Stratford's telegraphic despatch to have been received subsequently.

Such was the state of matters when I called on M. Drouyn de Lhuys this morning. I found him somewhat embarrassed to know what answer to send respecting the new proposition of the Conference.

I said that, until we were informed of the reasons which had induced the Representatives to pursue the negotiations on which they had entered with the Porte rather than present the collective note, we could not form a proper opinion; that, knowing as I did the soil of Constantinople, I could well understand that any alteration in the form of treating a negotiation already commenced would lead to delay, if not to a worse issue; and that as the suggestions made by the Four Representatives to the Porte coincided or nearly so with those which emanated from Vienna, it did not appear to me that the state of things was much altered; a conclusion in which M. Drouyn de Lhuys coincided.

No. 363.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.*

(Extract.)

*Foreign Office, December 30, 1853.*

I HAVE seen Count Walewski, and held to him nearly the same language as your Excellency to M. de Lhuys, upon the proposal of Count Buol that the collective note should be delivered to the Turkish Ambassador at Vienna.

That proposal, I said, appeared to be useless in itself, and unjust towards the Four Representatives at Constantinople. The Turkish Ambassador could only transmit the note to his Government; and where would be the advantage of inquiring a fortnight hence of the Porte, whether she was disposed to negotiate for peace, when we already knew that she was so disposed, and, in substance, the terms to which she was ready to agree? On the other hand, such a mode of proceeding would amount to a disavowal of the Representatives, and a rebuke to them in the face of Europe for the course they had pursued, without even waiting to know on what grounds, or under what circumstances, they had abstained from delivering the collective note to Reshid Pasha. The Four Governments would thus appear to be less anxious about the settlement of the differences between Russia and the Porte, than about its being effected according to their own project, and they would run the risk of delay and confusion upon no other data than an imperfect telegraphic despatch from Lord Stratford.

At the time I was conversing with Count Walewski, I had not seen the note which has been addressed to the Porte, but assuming that some reasonable proposition had been made before the collective note arrived from Vienna, I said that the Four Representatives had probably exercised a sound discretion in suspending it, as the Turkish Ministers might otherwise have been induced to depart from what they had already agreed to, and to think that it was open to them to propose fresh terms in replying to the collective note of the Four Powers.

Count Walewski, on finding that I had not seen the note, was so good as to give me a copy he had with him, and it confirmed my opinion with respect to the judicious course pursued by the Representatives, as the terms are such as the Porte has thought proper to accept, and which the Emperor of Russia will put himself more than ever in the wrong by refusing.

Count Walewski having agreed with me, that upon the whole it would be advisable to take no further step until complete information had been received, I forwarded to the Earl of Westmorland by the telegraph, a despatch of which I herewith inclose a copy to your Excellency.\*

No. 364.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 3, 1854.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, December 30, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has communicated to me the despatches which he transmitted yesterday to St. Petersburg. General Castelbajac is furnished with a copy of the instructions sent to General Baraguay d'Hilliers respecting the intended entry of the combined fleets into the Black Sea; and he is desired, after consultation with Sir Hamilton Seymour, to communicate verbally to Count Nesselrode such parts of them as may be deemed advisable.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys addressed, at the same time, a long despatch to General Castelbajac, in which, after recounting the history of the Eastern question since its commencement, he observes that the moderation of the Governments of England and France having apparently been misunderstood by Russia, more energetic measures on their part have become indispensable; that the Russian Government having declared that the occupation of the Danubian Provinces by the Russian troops was a set-off against the presence of the British

\* No. 361.

and French fleets in the waters of the Bosphorus, England and France might see in the occupation of the Black Sea an equivalent to them for the occupation of the Principalities.

I read to M. Drouyn de Lhuys your Lordship's despatch of the 27th instant to Sir Hamilton Seymour, which prescribes the line of conduct to be pursued by that Minister. His Excellency expressed himself to be perfectly satisfied.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 365.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 3.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, January 2, 1854.*

MY despatches up to yesterday's date were intended to reach your Lordship's hands this morning, but the messenger to whom they were confided yesterday evening missed the train in consequence of the state of the streets of Paris, and they have been delayed until to-day.

I saw M. Drouyn de Lhuys this morning, who stated to me that he had received yesterday a telegraphic despatch from M. de Bourqueney informing him that Count Buol was in possession of the principal points of the instructions sent to Constantinople respecting the fleets; that the Count was not surprised, after all that had occurred, at the measures taken by the two Governments, though he could not shut his eyes to their gravity, and he could only hope that they would come in aid of the last attempt now making for a pacific solution of the Eastern question. "Le langage du Comte Buol," adds M. de Bourqueney, "est parfait."

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 366.

*Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 4, 1854.)*

(Extract.)

*Berlin, December 31, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that a telegraphic despatch has been received from Count Arnim, stating that by intelligence which has reached Vienna from Constantinople, the collective note lately signed at Vienna had not been presented by the Four Representatives to the Porte.

Baron Manteuffel has been informed that a note similar in substance, but more explicit, has been agreed upon at Constantinople by the Four Representatives, and had been collectively presented to the Divan on the 15th instant. It is further reported to his Excellency that the Divan had shown a disposition to accept the invitation, and to enter on the arrangement of a basis of negotiation.

His Excellency refrained, until further reports shall have reached him from Constantinople, from expressing his opinion on the conduct of Baron Wildenbruch in this matter, but he stated that great annoyance had been felt at Vienna on the receipt of this intelligence.

Count Buol had proposed to the Conference that a copy of the Vienna note should be presented collectively by the Conference to the Turkish Minister at Vienna, for transmission to Reshid Pasha, and Count Arnim had applied for authorization to associate himself to this step.

Baron Manteuffel has replied, that if the proposition to which Count Arnim alludes is supported by the Representatives of the Four Powers, he is authorized to join in it; but that if any difference of opinion should arise, he was to refer to Berlin for further orders.

No. 367.

*Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 4, 1854.)*

(Extract.)

*Berlin, December 31, 1853.*

I WAITED upon Baron Manteuffel yesterday evening, and in obedience to your Lordship's instructions read to him the copies of your Lordship's despatches to Sir Hamilton Seymour and to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe of the 27th instant, inclosed in your Lordship's despatch of that day to me.

I explained to his Excellency that more stringent measures had been rendered imperative in consequence of the Sinope affair, and that with every desire for a pacific arrangement, the cause of humanity called loudly for those active measures which would prevent the recurrence of such frightful bloodshed and loss of life.

His Excellency informed me this evening that he had reported to the King the decision, as stated in those despatches, which the English and French Governments had taken to send their fleets into the Black Sea, and the nature of the service on which they were to be employed.

His Excellency told me that the King had been already prepared by the reports of the Chevalier Bunsen for this intelligence.

No. 368.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 4, 1854.)*

(Extract.)

*Vienna, December 28, 185*

THE telegraphic despatch of Lord Stratford of the 19th has been received, and I have transmitted to your Lordship, by telegraph, the decision which at the recommendation of Count Buol was taken by the Conference, requesting that each of the members might ask for the authorisation of their Governments to transmit to the Turkish Ambassador in Vienna a duplicate of the note signed and forwarded through Lord Stratford to Reshid Pasha (but which has not been presented). The only remedy Count Buol sees with the view of re-establishing the collective action of the Conference at Constantinople, is that the Turkish Ambassador here should convey to his Government the note to Reshid Pasha, and should call for a reply to it.

No. 369.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 4, 1854.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, December 17, 1853.*

IN reporting on the subject of my efforts to overcome the Porte's reluctance to accept the note and declaration which the late French Ambassador and myself were authorized by our respective Governments to present to Reshid Pasha, I stated in substance that the inducement to recommend that mode of restoring peace was not so much my hope of success, which was very faint, as an impression that a failure in that respect, if not invested with an official character, might smooth the way for some proposition better suited to the altered circumstances of the case.

Acting upon this principle, when I had thoroughly ascertained that even a modified note and declaration would not prove acceptable to the Turkish Ministry, I entered into private communication with Reshid Pasha on the ground of taking a common sense view of the existing circumstances, and endeavouring to form a plan of proceeding which in its issue might secure every reasonable advantage to Turkey without injustice or palpable humiliation to Russia.

I was encouraged to embark in this course by the corresponding disposition which I found in my new French colleague, and by the knowledge which your Lordship's correspondence afforded of the views of the several Powers who take a leading interest in the settlement of the Eastern question. The principal difficulties to be encountered were the illusions of frontier success, the national enthusiasm in favour of war, the fears of leading statesmen unwilling to oppose the current of popular sentiment, and, above all, the necessity of applying to the General Council for permission to entertain any plan of pacification with Russia. The Sultan, his Ministers, and the Council, all stood in fear of each other, and though, perhaps, at heart desirous of peace, were reluctant to forfeit their share of the popularity enjoyed by the votaries of war.

The first necessary step towards a negotiation for peace was to wean Reshid Pasha from his new-born propensities to war; the second was to obtain his sincere cooperation in opening a door for his more moderate colleagues to avow their real sentiments with safety. Aided by auxiliary incidents, I succeeded, after a time, in making him a partaker of my own convictions. It was in consequence agreed between us that the General Council should be assembled, that its consent should, if possible, be obtained for negotiating a pacific settlement on safe and honourable terms, and that a more distinct proposition, satisfactory to both of us in the interest of the Porte, should be submitted officially to him and his colleagues.

On my part I followed out this plan by putting together in a practicable form the several points which it was evidently desirable or necessary to provide for in the contemplated negotiation and its preliminary steps. Sufficient elements were fortunately at hand in your Lordship's correspondence with Paris and Vienna. They had only to be combined with some indispensable additions, and adapted to the present state of things and of parties here.

The short memorandum inclosed herewith exhibits the project of arrangement approved in private by Reshid Pasha, and subsequently adopted, in private also, by General Baraguay d'Hilliers, with whose ideas I had made myself previously acquainted.

In concert with him, and after sounding Baron de Bruck, I proposed a meeting of the Four Representatives at the Internuncio's house.

The result of our deliberations there on the 12th instant was the adoption in substance of the plan which, on a perfect understanding with the French Ambassador, I submitted to our colleagues in the terms already made known to your Lordship. A second meeting, which took place at his Excellency's house on the 13th, confirmed, with some verbal alterations, the agreement already made; and I joined in signing it, thus completed, with the more confidence as I had in the interval ascertained privately that Reshid Pasha saw no objection to its amended form.

Our principal difficulty in coming to an agreement lay with the Internuncio. With every inclination to meet his wishes, I found it impossible in some instances to acquiesce in his proposals, whether of omission or of insertion. But I trust that in striking out expedients for the removal of his scruples, his colleagues at the meeting, including myself, have retained whatever was necessary to guard the interests of Turkey and of Europe; while his acceptance of our counter-amendments may warrant a sanguine hope that the plan, as it stands now, will, if accepted here, present few points of reasonable objection, even at St. Petersburg.

The form of an identic communication to the Porte, subscribed separately by each Representative, and presented by their respective interpreters in a body, is referable to the same spirit of scrupulousness towards Russia, on the one side, and of accommodation, as far as principles admit, on the other.

In recording these circumstances, I must in justice acquit Baron de Bruck of any personal disposition to make difficulties; and nothing could be more satisfactory than the support afforded to every just and reasonable view of the points in question by General Baraguay d'Hilliers and M. de Wildenbruch.

Our simultaneous communication of the plan agreed upon was made to Reshid Pasha officially on the 15th; and the manner in which his Highness received it is best described in the words of M. Pisani, a copy of whose report, together with a copy of my instruction to him, is inclosed herewith.

As soon as possible after the decision to be taken by the General Council to-morrow on the broad question of peace or war, our note will be submitted by

the Ottoman Secretary of State to his colleagues in the Ministry. Appearances are at present in favour of a pacific vote, but not with unanimity, nor without considerable opposition.

The proposition in favour of peace will, if adopted, make room for a negotiation on the two conditions of evacuating the Principalities, and guarding completely the sovereign rights and independence of the Sultan. The hope which I entertain, in common with Reshid Pasha, is that the adoption of such a basis by the General Council will enable him to prevail upon his colleagues to accept the proposal which he has already received from the Four Representatives.

Inclosure 1 in No. 369.

*Memorandum of Bases of Negotiation.*

LES Représentants déclareraient que la Russie a donné des assurances de vouloir la paix.

La Porte leur répondrait par une déclaration de la même portée.

La négociation à suivre serait basée sur l'évacuation aussitôt que possible des Principautés, le renouvellement des Traités, et la communication des firmans relatifs aux privilèges spirituels à toutes les Puissances, accompagnée d'assurances convenables.

L'arrangement déjà fait pour compléter l'accord relatif aux saints lieux serait définitivement adopté.

La Porte déclarerait aux Représentants qu'elle est prête à nommer un Plénipotentiaire, à établir un armistice, et à négocier sur les bases ci-dessus énoncées dans quelque endroit neutre avec le concours des Quatre Puissances.

Les principes déclarés par les Puissances dans les années 1840 et 1841 seraient solennellement confirmés d'une manière efficace par les mêmes Puissances ; et la Porte, de son côté, s'engagerait à développer effectivement un système d'amélioration intérieure propre à rasseoir l'indépendance de son Empire sur des bases solides et telles qui devraient satisfaire à la juste attente de ses sujets de toutes les classes.

(Translation.)

THE Representatives would declare that Russia had given assurances of her wish for peace.

The Porte would reply to them by a declaration of the same purport.

The negotiation to ensue would be based upon the evacuation as soon as possible of the Principalities, the renewal of the Treaties, and the communication to all the Powers of the firmans relative to the spiritual privileges, accompanied with suitable assurances.

The arrangement already made for the completion of the agreement relating to the holy places would be definitively adopted.

The Porte would declare to the Representatives that it is ready to name a Plenipotentiary, to establish an armistice, and to negotiate on the bases above mentioned in some neutral place with the concurrence of the Four Powers.

The principles declared by the Powers in the years 1840 and 1841 would be solemnly and effectively confirmed by the same Powers ; and the Porte, on its side, would engage to give effectual development to a system of internal improvement calculated to replace the independence of its Empire on solid bases such as should satisfy the just expectation of all its subjects of every class.

Inclosure 2 in No. 369.

*Identic Note addressed by the Four Representatives to the Porte.*

LE Soussigné, Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Britannique, d'accord avec les Représentants de l'Autriche, de la France, et de la Prusse, a l'honneur de faire connaître à la Sublime Porte que leurs Gouvernements ayant encore lieu de croire que Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie n'envisage pas le fil des négociations comme rompu par la déclaration de guerre et les faits qui en ont été la conséquence ; et sachant, de plus, d'après les propres déclarations de Sa Majesté Impériale, qu'elle désire seulement voir assurer une égalité parfaite des droits et des immunités octroyés par Sa Majesté le Sultan et ses glorieux ancêtres aux communautés Chrétiennes sujettes de la Porte ;

Et, de son côté, la Sublime Porte répondant à cette déclaration par la déclaration qu'elle regarde comme étant de son honneur de continuer à maintenir les susdits droits et immunités, et qu'elle est toujours disposée à mettre un terme au différend survenu entre les deux Empires ;

La négociation à suivre serait basée :

1. Sur l'évacuation la plus prompte possible des Principautés ;
2. Sur le renouvellement des anciens Traités ;
3. Sur la communication des firmans relatifs aux privilèges spirituels octroyés par la Sublime Porte à tous ses sujets non-Musulmans, communication qui, faite aux Puissances, serait accompagnée d'assurances convenables données à chacune d'elles.

L'arrangement déjà fait pour compléter l'accord relatif aux saints lieux et aux établissements religieux à Jérusalem, serait définitivement adopté.

La Porte déclarerait aux Représentants des Quatre Puissances qu'elle est prête à nommer un Plénipotentiaire, à établir un armistice, et à négocier sur les bases ci-dessus énoncées, avec le concours des Puissances, et dans une ville neutre dont elles conviendraient.

Les déclarations faites par les Puissances dans le préambule du Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, seraient solennellement confirmées par ces mêmes Puissances dans l'intérêt de l'indépendance et de l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, et de celui du concert Européen.

Et la Porte, de son côté, déclarerait dans le même intérêt sa ferme résolution de développer plus efficacement son système administratif et les améliorations intérieures qui devraient satisfaire aux besoins et à la juste attente de ses sujets de toutes les classes.

*Péra, le 12 Décembre, 1853.*

(Signé)

STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

(Translation.)

THE Undersigned, Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, in concert with the Representatives of Austria, France, and Prussia, has the honour to make known to the Sublime Porte that their Governments having still reason to believe that His Majesty the Emperor of Russia does not consider the thread of the negotiations as broken off by the declaration of war and the circumstances which have ensued from it ; and knowing, moreover, from the actual declaration of His Imperial Majesty, that he is only desirous of obtaining an assurance of perfect equality as regards the rights and the immunities granted by His Majesty the Sultan and his glorious ancestors to the Christian communities subjects of the Porte ;

And the Sublime Porte, on its side, responding to this declaration by the declaration that it considers itself bound in honour to continue to uphold the aforesaid rights and immunities, and that it is still disposed to put an end to the difference which has arisen between the two Empires ;

The negotiation to be pursued would be based :

1. On the evacuation as soon as possible of the Principalities ;
2. On the renewal of the ancient Treaties ;
3. On the communication of the firmans relative to the spiritual privileges granted by the Sublime Porte to all its non-Mussulman subjects, a communication which, being made to all the Powers, would be accompanied with suitable assurances given to each of them.

The arrangement already made for the completion of the agreement relative to the holy places and religious establishments at Jerusalem would be definitively adopted.

The Porte would declare to the Representatives of the Four Powers that it is ready to name a Plenipotentiary, to establish an armistice, and to negotiate on the bases above specified, with the concurrence of the Powers, and in a neutral town on which they might agree.

The declarations made by the Powers in the preamble of the Treaty of July 13, 1841, would be solemnly confirmed by those same Powers with a view to the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and to European concert.

And the Porte, on its side, would declare, with the same view, its firm resolution more effectually to develop its system of administration, and the internal improvements which should satisfy the wants and the just expectation of its subjects of all classes.

*Pera, December 13, 1853.*

(Signed)

STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 369.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.*

Monsieur,

*Péra, le 14 Décembre, 1853.*

JE vous invite à vous rendre demain chez son Altesse le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, et de concert avec MM. les Interprètes de l'Autriche, de la France et de la Prusse, qui seront munis d'instructions identiques à celle-ci, vous lui remettrez la note ci-jointe, datée le 12 du courant, à laquelle la note que chacun d'eux remettra en même temps à son Altesse, est textuellement conforme.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé)

STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

(Translation.)

Sir,

*Pera, December 14, 1853.*

I REQUEST you to proceed to-morrow to his Highness the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and in concert with the interpreters of Austria, France, and Prussia, who will be furnished with instructions identical with this, you will deliver to him the annexed note, dated the 12th instant, with which the note that each of them will at the same time deliver to his Excellency corresponds word for word.

Receive, &c.

(Signed)

STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 369.

*M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Pera, December 15, 1853.*

IN obedience to your Excellency's instructions of yesterday's date, I waited upon Reshid Pasha and presented to his Highness, in concert with my colleagues of Austria, France, and Prussia, the identical note, dated the 12th instant, and signed by each of our respective chiefs.

After attentively perusing the note, Reshid Pasha told us that he could not take upon himself to give any answer previously to communicating it to the Ministerial Council. That, as soon as the meeting of the General Council, which was to be convened on Saturday next for the purpose of discussing the principle of peace so repeatedly recommended by the Four Powers, had come to some final conclusion, he would then submit to the consideration of his colleagues the basis proposed in the above-mentioned note.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

ET. PISANI.

No. 370.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received  
January 4, 1854.)*

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 17, 1853.

I RECEIVED yesterday from Lord Westmorland, in pursuance of your Lordship's instructions, a collective note addressed to the Porte by the Representatives of the Four Powers at Vienna, acting together in the authorized capacity of a resuscitated Conference.

The sealed letter directed to Reshid Pasha, and containing the note in question, reached me at the same time, with a request that I would personally present it to his Highness, accompanied by my colleagues the French Ambassador, the Internuncio, and the Prussian Envoy.

This note, suggesting the expediency of an early pacification, and inviting the Porte to state the terms on which it is disposed to negotiate with Russia, would, I conceive, be of questionable advantage under other circumstances ; but I do not hesitate to express my clear conviction that it could not be delivered to the Porte at this juncture without unsettling our prospects of peace, and rendering the acceptance of the *projet*, received on the 15th by Reshid Pasha from me and my colleagues, still more precarious and difficult than it is even now. Such is also the opinion of my colleagues. The terms of the note are, doubtless, most considerate and flattering to the Turkish Government, but they afford, at the same time, so much encouragement to the pretensions of the war party, that the communication of them could hardly fail to strengthen that interest, and to render a successful negotiation more remote. At all events, by reserving its delivery we retain in our hands an occasion for reopening the question of negotiation in the case of our pending proposal being declined. Such is, therefore, the course which I have determined to pursue, and I trust that it will meet with your Lordship's approval.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 371.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received  
January 4, 1854.)*

(Extract.)

Constantinople, December 17, 1853.

MUCH as I regret the necessity, and alive as I am to the objections of more than one kind, I entertain, nevertheless, a decided opinion that reasons of a preponderating order require the appearance of the combined squadrons in the Black Sea. I cannot indeed conceal from myself that the late destruction of so many Turkish vessels at Sinope would probably never have occurred if the ships of England and France had been sent thither at an earlier period. Not that I would throw the blame of that disaster anywhere but on the Porte and its officers. They alone, or their professional counsellors, were cognizant of the miserable state of the land defences at Sinope. They alone are answerable for the obvious imprudence of leaving so long in helpless danger a squadron exposed to attack from hostile ships of far superior force. But referring to the simple fact, irrespective of its causes, I am naturally anxious that the loss of the example should not be added to that of the ships.

We have learnt from an occurrence which cannot be sufficiently deplored, that the Russians are willing as well as able to attack and destroy the Sultan's means of defence even in the fancied shelter of a port. They have committed not only an act of overt hostility, but of direct aggression, on the Ottoman territory. Their commander was indeed most careful not to land, and he excused the rigours of his violence by presuming that the Turkish squadron had in view an insurrection in Circassia, and by endeavouring on that presumption to put his attack in the light of a defensive operation. But he seems to have forgotten that the Porte had been compelled to take up arms by

the original aggression of Russia, and that a fresh violation of the Sultan's territory was not to be justified by a supposed intention of counter-aggression, in principle defensive, on the part of His Majesty's forces. It is evident that if a British squadron had been cruising off Sinope when the Russians advanced on their errand of destruction, it would have been the duty of its commander to interpose for the protection of Her Majesty's ally, threatened in a manner which involved the violation of his territorial rights; and had the friendly intervention failed, he would have felt himself ultimately compelled to enforce it according to his means. It is not hazarding too much to say that, in either case, the Sultan's successes on the frontier would not have been cancelled at once by the blow struck at Sinope.

It is true that what has been effected so cruelly there, is not likely to be attempted again for the present in the same shape.

But the Russians have a general interest in weakening their adversary. Since they frown upon his progress in peace, and thwart it as occasions offer, are they likely to neglect the opportunities which war presents of crippling his means and curtailing his power? They have already been defeated in an attempt to land troops in the rear of the Turkish positions. The attempt may be repeated by a disembarkation on Turkish territory; and on the same territory are defenceless commercial towns and ports at best imperfectly protected, to say nothing of coal depôts and building yards completely exposed.

Your Lordship's instructions to me are positive as to the employment of Her Majesty's squadron for the protection of the Sultan's territory from direct aggression, and they are equally clear as to its passage into the Black Sea in the event of the Russian fleet coming out of Sevastopol.

Now, the known facts, with respect to the latter point, are these; six sail-of-the-line, half of them three deckers, have come out of Sevastopol at once, and steam and sailing frigates from the same quarter are also known to have been at sea, partly in company with the liners.

Surely a division of such magnitude must be considered as constituting to all intents and purposes the fleet. As to the aggression itself, it was not indeed accompanied with any landing of troops or occupation of the soil. But it was a direct attack on the Sultan's means of defence within his territorial limits, and it involved the partial conflagration of a town, and the destruction of at least one inoffensive merchant-vessel under British colours, to say nothing of the batteries.

So much for the facts, as cases in point and as warnings for the future. But there is more, distinguishable indeed from proved fact, yet worthy of attention as being credibly asserted by competent eye-witnesses. Two British masters of British trading vessels have stated that they saw a Russian fleet—one asserts of twelve or more sail-of-the-line—about nine days ago at sea, in the neighbourhood of the Crimea. Another has deposed to having seen six sail-of-the-line on the afternoon of the 9th instant between Samsoon and Sinope, and the distance, he adds, was such that there might have been more.

From all that precedes it appears that the cases for which your Lordship's instructions provided have actually occurred, that a severe loss which a timely interposition of the squadrons might have prevented, has been sustained by the Porte, and moreover, that there is a reason to apprehend a renewal of aggressive operations by Russia in some shape or other.

It is further to be borne in mind that the squadrons while stationed in the Bosphorus at this time of year, are powerless for defending the coasts of the Black Sea situated at any considerable distance from the Strait; that the Porte has been officially informed of the objects for which they brought the national colours to these waters; that the two Ambassadors have received an official application from the Porte requesting that the squadrons may go to sea; that we have dissuaded the Porte from sending out its own squadron, and that Russian ships of the line are known to have kept the sea during a part, if not the whole of the late tempestuous weather.

Forgive me, my Lord, if in this combination of circumstances all tending to the same conclusion, I cannot lose sight of public opinion, or of that maturer judgment which later times will pronounce upon our conduct at this unprecedented juncture, and if, while stating my reasons for purposing to send the squadrons into the Black Sea now, I feel that an explanation of the causes which restrained them from going sooner, might be more reasonably expected. The causes in question may be reduced to the following heads; want of positive

information as to the movements of the Russian fleet, an unwillingness to incur any risk of collision, or to narrow the claims of peace by premature provocation of any kind, and an impression that we should do best to wait for an invitation from the Turkish Government. In aid of these leading considerations come the strong prevailing northerly winds which retarded the squadrons in their passage from Besika Bay, and the delays occasioned by the departure of one French Ambassador and the arrival of another.

The action near Sinope took place on the 30th ultimo; the steamer which escaped, brought the first news of it on the evening of the 2nd instant. In the interval I received an official note from the Porte informing me that three Russian sail-of-the-line had been seen off Sinope, where, as we had heard only a few days before, a squadron of Turkish frigates was supposed to be lying at anchor. This information was the cause of an interview between General Baraguay and myself on the 2nd, and we parted under an agreement to summon the Admirals to confer with us on the following day, with respect to the expediency of their going into the Black Sea. The conference took place accordingly, but instead of discussing how to prevent any disaster, we were called upon to deplore the one which had already occurred. At the close of a discussion it was agreed to send two steamers, one of each flag, to Varna, and the same number to Sinope. We purposed by this measure to obtain intelligence on which we could rely, and it was understood between the French Ambassador and myself that, on the return of the steamers, we should send out the squadrons either to dispossess the Russians of Sinope if they were still there, or to cruize round the Turkish coasts on both sides of the Black Sea within the latitudes of that port and of Varna.

During the absence of the "Retribution," the "Mogador," the "Fury," and the "Heron," I received another official note from Reshid Pasha containing an imperfect account of the loss sustained at Sinope, announcing the Porte's intention to send its squadron to sea, and requesting the active assistance of Her Majesty's ships in concert with those of France.

On the return of the steam-frigates from Sinope, I lost no time in exchanging opinions with General Baraguay on the subject of the Porte's request considered with reference to the information obtained from their commanders. The final result, after some discussion and mutual explanations, was that the ships should go to sea at least on a cruize, with a reserve of any remarks which the Admirals might offer as to the number or risk from weather.

It only remains for me to state that I have answered the Porte's official notes in terms corresponding, I hope, with the requirements of the case, yet calculated to discourage any unreasonable expectations. My colleague assures me that he has written in the same sense to Reshid Pasha. A copy of my note is inclosed herewith for your Lordship's more complete information.

Inclosure in No. 371.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Reshid Pasha.*

*Pera, December 11, 1853.*

THE notes addressed to me by your Highness under the respective dates of the 29th ultimo and the 4th instant, have been duly received, and I should have done myself the honour of acknowledging them at an earlier moment, had it not been advisable for me to consult previously with the French Ambassador, to whom similar notes had been addressed, and, in concert with his Excellency, to wait for the return of the steam-vessels which we sent to Sinope soon after receiving your Highness' second note.

It is with sentiments of deep affliction that we have learnt the full extent of loss sustained by the Porte's flotilla in its late unfortunate conflict with a Russian force of disproportioned magnitude; and, for my own part, I find no adequate consolation either in the heroic devotion displayed by the Turkish seamen on that occasion, or in the relief which has been conveyed to the wounded survivors by the vessels dispatched to Sinope under the respective

colours of England and France. There is the more reason to lament a disaster so distressing to humanity, as the exposure of the Sultan's vessels at Sinope to certain destruction might, to all appearance, have been avoided, if earlier attention had been paid either to the dangers of their position or to the means of protecting them by effective batteries on shore. It now only remains for me to hope that greater foresight and more activity will be henceforward employed by the Porte in rendering available for the protection of her coasts, her ports, and her naval forces, such means as are still left at her disposal. I should ill discharge the duties of a friendly Representative, if I omitted this opportunity of pressing once more upon the Porte's most serious attention what I have so often recommended in previous communications.

Your Highness' note of the 4th instant announces the readiness of your Government to send their squadron into the Black Sea, and intimates, at the same time, an expectation that the allied squadrons, which are now anchored in the Bosphorus, will concur in lending their active assistance for the protection of the Turkish coasts.

A friendly attention has already been paid to this appeal, and indeed the presence of the squadrons in the immediate neighbourhood of Constantinople is itself a very significant fact. It can hardly be necessary either for me or for the French Ambassador to assure your Highness that such measures will be taken by the respective Admirals as the season may permit, and as circumstances may require, for giving effect to the instructions under which they are called upon to act. Their principal object is the protection of the Turkish territory against any direct aggression; but in the performance of that defensive duty, they cannot be expected to lose sight of those considerations which are prescribed by the earnest desire of both Governments to render their operations as much as possible conducive to the restoration of peace as well as to the maintenance of the Sultan's rights.

With respect to the Turkish squadron, I cannot too strongly advise a reconsideration of the Porte's intention under such further information as may be obtained from the experience and professional judgment of those distinguished officers who are in command of the united squadrons. I cannot conceal from your Highness that the impressions which I have derived from that source are anything but calculated to inspire me with confidence in the fitness of the Ottoman squadron for active service at sea in presence of an imposing enemy, and at this unfavourable season. My observation is particularly directed to vessels under sail.

Your Highness is too enlightened not to appreciate the frankness with which I have expressed my sentiments at a moment of such pregnant importance to the interests of the Empire and its august Sovereign.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 372.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received  
January 4, 1854.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, December 19, 1853.*

IT is with real satisfaction that I hasten to inform your Lordship of the decision taken by the General Council, assembled on the 16th and 18th instant. It is entirely in favour of peace on just and reasonable grounds. M. Pisani's report, inclosed herewith in copy, will be sufficient to satisfy your Lordship in this respect. The debates, I understand, were far more animated than is usual among the statesmen of Constantinople. The Seraskier appears to have voted with his colleagues, but not without giving signs of the reluctance which he felt. All who were present will, no doubt, be called upon to sign the report.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 372.

*M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, December 18, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the General Council which met to-day for the second time has come to the decision that peace should be concluded with Russia on the following bases, namely: immediate evacuation of the Principalities by the Russian troops; preservation of the sovereign rights unimpaired; and a guarantee from the Four Powers for the future.

Having asked for explanation as to the nature of the guarantee expected by the Council, Reshid Pasha replied, that the note given in lately by the Four Representatives provides for that contingency.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) ET. PISANI.

No. 373.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received  
January 4, 1854.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, December 23, 1853.*

DURING the last three days the Turkish capital has been in a state which threatened insurrection. The Softas, or religious students, took umbrage at the pacific decision adopted by the General Council, and formed themselves into assemblies of an illegal character; expressed loudly their discontent; and threatened to wreak their vengeance on Reshid Pasha and other obnoxious Ministers.

Early the day before yesterday information reached me to that effect, and it was soon followed by alarming statements of intended violence, including the conflagration of the city and the massacre of its Christian inhabitants. These reports, with other indications of terror, came in so thick that, even making allowance for much probable exaggeration, it became a duty to lose no time in adopting precautionary measures. Such as it was in my power to take, I therefore took, but with as little display or demonstration of alarm as possible. The diplomatic body assembled at my house; I addressed, with their sanction, a letter—copy inclosed herewith—to the Ottoman Secretary of State; and steamers from the British and French squadrons were prepared for any service which might be required.

Before long it became evident that the danger was less urgent than had been at first apprehended; and on sending to the Porte, I found that, although the Ministers were not there, the streets were free from tumult, and the authorities prepared to maintain order. I could not, however, learn till late in the evening where Reshid Pasha, who had left his house in the morning, was to be found.

At an early hour next morning I went to see that Minister, who had taken refuge in his son's house at a distance from the city, and not far from the Sultan's palace. While I was listening to his recital of the late occurrences, and to his opinion of their cause, a message arrived from the President of the Council, to inform him that the Softas were still in a state of agitation and disobedience to the Government; that the effects of their example upon the more dangerous classes of the populace were to be apprehended; and that doubts were entertained of the steadiness of the troops.

Conceiving that under such circumstances there was but one course to pursue, and that further indecision would endanger the most vital interests, and render every immediate chance of peace impossible, I went at once to the Seraglio, and requested a private audience of the Sultan. His Majesty having received me with his usual affability, I made no secret of what I understood to be the real state of things, and placed before him in strong colours the absolute

necessity of acting with vigour and determination, so as to leave no time for the rebellion to gather strength and to assume more formidable proportions.

I will not trouble your Lordship with the details of a long conversation, which showed that His Majesty was by no means insensible to the demands upon his resolution, though not perhaps thoroughly aware of those tendencies which called for an immediate exercise of his authority. The interview ended by an assurance from His Majesty that he would forthwith order the measures which I had recommended to be carried into effect; and that he would himself pass over into his city palace in order to make an additional impression on his subjects. He informed me at the same time that he had decided on giving his formal sanction to the vote of the General Council in favour of peace; and I urged the importance of his accepting also, without loss of time, the plan of negotiation which I had submitted to his Ministers, in concert with my three colleagues.

I had scarcely left the palace when the Sultan sent for the Grand Vizier, the Sheik-ul-Islam, and the Seraskier. He apprized them of his views, and ordered them to summon a Council at the Porte. He then crossed over to Constantinople, and sent an officer of his Court to the assembled Ministers, apprizing them of his assent to the Council's decision, and commanding them to take immediate measures for the maintenance of public order and the apprehension of the insurgents.

His Majesty's commands were executed equally without delay and without difficulty.

About two hundred of the more active Softas were seized by the soldiery, and taken before the Council in detachments of ten or twelve. They were required to explain what their insubordination meant. They replied that the conditions prescribed by the Koran for peace after war had been disregarded. They were told in return that neither peace nor armistice existed, that the Council had only declared a willingness to negotiate on terms which would keep their territory and their rights entire, and that the war would be maintained with vigour till then. Upon which they declared their loyalty and obedience to the Sultan; but on being required, in proof of their sincerity, to join the Sultan's army, they declined, and were then condemned to exile in Candia, whither they are to be conveyed in a day or two.

It appears that the troops behaved with perfect discipline.

A paper declaring the Sultan's adherence to the last decision of the Council has been published. I have the honour to inclose a copy of it herewith.

Reshid Pasha was the only Minister not present at the meeting of the Council yesterday. The meeting was held at the Seraskierat, or what we should call the Horse Guards, as being nearer to the scene of disturbance. He sent in his resignation to the Sultan yesterday, but was commanded to retain his office, being informed in His Majesty's handwriting of the commands which he had issued. I have reason to believe that, all being restored to order, the Pasha will return to his house to-night or to-morrow morning.

To-day he has replied to the letter which I addressed to him the day before yesterday in the name of the diplomatic body, and a copy of his answer is inclosed herewith for your Lordship's more complete information.

Inclosure 1 in No. 373.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Reshid Pasha.*

M. le Ministre,

*Péra de Constantinople, le 21 Décembre, 1853.*

JE viens d'apprendre d'une manière digne de foi que les Softas et autres individus ont eu recours à des réunions qui menacent la capitale d'une insurrection immédiate, et les Chrétiens d'un grand désastre.

N'ayant ni le temps ni les moyens de vérifier, soit la cause, soit la portée de cet incident, je crois devoir m'adresser en premier lieu à votre Altesse pour avoir des informations plus exactes de ce qui en est, et en même temps de lui exprimer toute la confiance que je place dans la fermeté, la vigueur, et la loyauté du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan.

Le Gouvernement n'hésitera pas, sans doute, de prendre les mesures

nécessaires pour maintenir le bon ordre, et je croirais lui faire tort si je rappelais à votre Altesse la grave responsabilité qui peserait, aux yeux de toute l'Europe, sur la Porte et son Empire, s'il était permis aux factieux de donner le défi à l'autorité des lois et de fouler aux pieds les droits et la vie des Chrétiens, ou d'autres classes des sujets de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

Votre Altesse doit comprendre que dans cette occasion je suis l'organe du corps diplomatique, dont les membres, à l'exception de ceux qui ne sont pas en ville, m'ont fait l'honneur de se réunir chez moi.

Je profite, &c.

(Signé) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

(Translation.)

M. le Ministre,

*Pera of Constantinople, December 21, 1853.*

I HAVE just heard, in a credible manner, that the Softas and other persons have had recourse to meetings which threaten the capital with an immediate insurrection and the Christians with a great disaster.

Having neither the time nor the means of verifying either the truth or the bearing of this incident, I deem it my duty, in the first instance, to apply to your Excellency for exact information on the subject, and at the same time to express to you the entire confidence which I repose in the firmness, the vigour, and the loyalty of the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan.

The Government will doubtless not hesitate to adopt the requisite measures for the maintenance of good order, and I should conceive that I wronged it if I reminded your Excellency of the serious responsibility which, in the estimation of Europe, would attach to the Porte and to its Empire if the factious were suffered to set at defiance the authority of the laws, and to trample under foot the rights and the lives of the Christians, or other classes of His Majesty the Sultan's subjects.

Your Highness will understand that on the present occasion I am the organ of the diplomatic body, the members of which, with the exception of those who are not in town, have done me the honour to assemble at my house.

I avail, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 373.

*Supplement to the "Turkish Gazette" of December 23, 1853.*

(Translation.)

SEEING that the Russian Government is constantly manifesting its pacific intentions, the Allied Governments have recommended them to the consideration of the Sublime Porte, and asked its intentions concerning them. The matter was, therefore, reflected upon and discussed in a general assembly, held at the Porte, composed of all the Ministers, Viziers, Ulemas, military and naval officers and functionaries, on Saturday the 17th, and Sunday the 18th of Rebiul-evel.

Considering that war was determined upon in order to maintain the rights and territorial integrity of the Sublime Porte, it was unanimously decided that an answer should be given to the effect that a peace capable of assuring these conditions for the present and for the future, should not be rejected. The fetva, given by the Sheik-ul-Islam, having confirmed the proposal, His Majesty's will has also been expressed in that sense, and the matter has been communicated to the Embassies of the Four Governments in this shape. Now behold that the present stage of the matter is one of question and answer, and that for the present, so far from there being peace on the *tapis*, there is no talk of an armistice, and the state of war is still in permanency. Letters have been sent to the commanders of the armies of Asia and Europe, and other functionaries, acquainting them with the state of the case, in order that the present movements may undergo no suspension. This has been published in order that every one may know it.

Considering, therefore, that this decision has been come to unanimously in accordance with the prescriptions of the sacred fetva, emanated as above from

the holy law, whosoever shall say anything against it will be guilty of raising his voice in opposition to a matter which has been voted unanimously, and he will therefore, without the least delay, be subjected to the punishment he shall have thereby incurred. In order that this may be known to every one beforehand it has been hereby proclaimed.

21 *Rebiul-evvel*, 1270. (December 22, 1853.)

Inclosure 3 in No. 373.

*Reshid Pasha to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

M. l'Ambassadeur,

*Beschiktash, le 23 Décembre, 1853.*

J'AI reçu la lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser le 21 Décembre, par laquelle vous me demandez des informations sur les réunions des Softas.

Je me suis empressé de mettre votre lettre sous les yeux de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, mon auguste maître; et je me fais un devoir de vous informer que c'étaient quelques étudiants de plusieurs Medreschs qui s'étaient permis de faire des rassemblemens illégaux, en déclarant à l'instigation des ennemis de l'ordre public une opinion contraire à la politique du Gouvernement Impérial; qu'aux ordres péremptaires de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, les autorités civiles et militaires ont pris des mesures énergiques et immédiates pour arrêter les plus coupables et les plus récalcitans.

Je me fais un véritable plaisir d'ajouter qu'à peu près cent soixante personnes des plus turbulens se trouvent aujourd'hui aux arrêts sous la surveillance de la police, prêts à s'embarquer pour être exilées de la capitale, et que la police continue à faire ses recherches nécessaires; que l'autorité des lois est respectée; que les droits et la vie des populations se trouvent à l'abri du danger; et que le bon ordre règne comme par le passé.

En vous exprimant cet état de choses comme à l'organe du corps diplomatique, je prie votre Excellence de vouloir bien lui en faire part.

Agréez, &c.  
(Signé) RESHID.

(Translation.)

M. l'Ambassadeur,

*Beschiktash, December 23, 1853.*

I HAVE received the letter which your Excellency did me the honour to address to me on the 21st of December, by which you request information respecting the meeting of the Softas.

I hastened to lay your letter before His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, my august master, and I make it my duty to inform you that they were some students of various Medresches, who assembled themselves in an illegal manner, declaring, at the instigation of the enemies of public order, an opinion contrary to the policy of the Imperial Government; that, on the peremptory orders of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, the civil and military authorities adopted energetic and immediate measures for the arrest of the most culpable and most refractory.

It is with real pleasure that I add, that about 160 of the most turbulent individuals are at present under arrest in the custody of the police, ready to be embarked as exiles from the capital, and that the police is still engaged in making the necessary inquiries; that the authority of the laws is respected; that the rights and lives of the people are in security; and that good order prevails as heretofore.

In making you, as the organ of the diplomatic body, acquainted with this state of things, I request your Excellency to have the goodness to impart it to them.

Receive, &c.  
(Signed) RESHID.

## No. 374.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received  
January 4, 1854.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, December 26, 1853.*

AT an early hour to-day I sent to Reshid Pasha requesting that no further delay might take place, now that order was restored through the capital, in coming to a decision on the subject of the proposed negotiation. I invited my colleagues to send a message of similar purport to his Highness. The result of the several applications addressed to him is, that to-morrow, if possible, or a day or two later, if necessary, the proposals sent in to him by the Four Representatives on the 15th instant shall be taken into consideration by the Council of Ministers.

The Pasha excused his inability to meet our wishes to-day on the ground of some remaining apprehension as to the tranquillity of the capital. It appears that although 170 of the Softas were shipped off for Candia yesterday, those who remain have ventured to express their discontent. It has consequently been deemed prudent to keep a part of the troops under arms and to extend the number of arrests. The Ministers were to assemble forthwith at the Porte, and certain known ringleaders, six in number, were to be placed under arrest and brought before the Council.

Upon the whole, I see no reason to apprehend any disturbance of a more serious kind, and if the Ministers accept our proposals, I hope a more steady and cheerful state of things will ensue. For the moment there is much to regret in the general interruption of business which has attended the disorderly manœuvres of the last three days. Not only is the matter of paramount importance retarded, but every kind of pending affair has undergone a total stoppage.

The French Ambassador, who saw Reshid Pasha this morning, has sent me word that appearances are less favourable to our views than before the late disturbance; but M. Pisani, who saw his Highness and other members of the Government after the Ambassador's departure, assures me that he entertains little or no doubt that our proposals will be accepted.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

## No. 375.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received  
January 4, 1854.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, December 25, 1853, 3 P.M*

THE French Ambassador called here an hour ago to say that he had received yesterday a telegraphic instruction from Paris, dated the 14th instant, ordering him to send the French squadron into the Black Sea upon an understanding with Her Majesty's Government.

I have no such instruction yet; but I refer your Lordship to my public correspondence for the reasons which called, in my judgment, for the appearance of the combined squadrons in the Euxine without any delay at all.

It is my present intention to act as fully in concert with my French colleague as the spirit of my older instructions will allow.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 4, 1854.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, December 26, 1853.*

YOUR Lordship's wishes as to the frankness to be observed towards the Russian Government at a juncture of this importance are so well known to me, that I have not hesitated to state to Count Nesselrode the feelings excited in England by the intelligence of the destruction of the Turkish squadron at Sinope.

The language which I held to his Excellency when I waited upon him the day before yesterday, was as follows :

Dismiss, I entreat of you, from your mind the unfounded notion of the existence on the part of Her Majesty's Government of a desire to humiliate Russia ; no feeling of the sort exists. Do not imagine either that it can be for our interests that Russia should be injured—quite the contrary. Her Majesty's Government consider that they have reason to complain of Russia ; that the unlimited confidence placed in her assurances has been ill-repaid ; but the feeling does not alter their policy, or inspire the Government with the wish of returning evil for evil. The case is plainly this : Her Majesty's Government have a British interest and an European interest in maintaining the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire ; and they hold that the first would have been virtually destroyed if Prince Menchikoff's demand had been successful ; and that the second is placed in great danger by the occupation of the Principalities, which is moreover a precedent and example against which it behoves all the Great Powers of Europe to enter a protest. Her Majesty's Government accordingly have duties to perform—duties not voluntarily undertaken, but imposed upon them by Russia ; and from the discharge of these duties Her Majesty's Government cannot and will not shrink. Turkey must be defended from aggression ; Her Majesty's Government are pledged to defend her, and the obligation must be discharged. Now as to the application of this. The victory over the Turks has produced a very painful effect in England ; it may be regarded as an intentional insult to the maritime Powers, for the statement which has been made respecting the affair is incorrect. It is not true that the Turkish squadron had on board troops destined to attack Sécoum-Kalé ; these ships were charged with provisions for Batoum, and they have been destroyed in a Turkish harbour, which is Turkish territory, which England is bound to protect.

Before I had concluded this last sentence, Count Nesselrode interrupted me by strong assurances that nothing could be more unfounded than the supposition of its having been the wish of the Russian Government to offer any affront to England and France ; that which had happened was, he observed, the unavoidable consequence of the position taken by the Two Powers and of that assigned to Russia. Turkey, said Count Nesselrode, declares war upon us, she opens the campaign before the term laid down by herself, she invades our territory, she takes a small fortress which she still holds, and then you find fault with us because we oppose hostilities by hostilities ; but remember, I beg, that we are at war with Turkey, and that no one ever heard of a war which was not attended by acts such as you complain of : our attack too was a defensive act—the Turkish ships were notoriously laden with military stores, intended for the tribes who are lighting up war on our borders.

As to the last point, M. le Comte, I said, it is a question of fact, and our two versions differ ; I am prepared to maintain, as I before stated, that the Turkish ships were conveying stores to a Turkish town. As regards what you say respecting the practices of war, I must repeat what I once before observed— if the present war is anomalous, it is not we who brought about this extraordinary state of things. However I am now not so much complaining as I am pointing out what is to be expected, and I do not wish to conceal from you that whilst great forbearance as to the entrance by our ships of the Black Sea has been observed and might have been continued, this, after what has lately occurred, is no longer possible.

The Chancellor only replied that, as he had before stated, he could well understand the public feeling excited in England and France ; that his intelligence

gave him no reason to believe that Her Majesty's ships had entered the Black Sea, or even that their dispatch thither had been finally resolved upon; and that as to the intended bombardment of Varna, which had been spoken of, no such intention had existed on the part of the Russian Government.

After this, as I believe, salutary notice had been given to the Russian Minister, we spoke of other points.

Count Nesselrode complained of the conduct which was pursued towards the Russian Cabinet: it was unheard of; the Sultan was consulted as to the conditions upon which he was disposed to make peace, and when these were ascertained and arranged, of course with exclusive reference to Turkish interests, he supposed Russia would be called upon to sign what had been prepared for her. Then again the idea of asking Russia to send a Plenipotentiary to meet a Turkish Plenipotentiary under the auspices of the allied Ministers was perfectly novel, was an indignity which would be offered only to one of the smallest of the European States, was a course which during the last hundred years Russia had never submitted to in her intercourse with Turkey, and to which she could not now be expected to lend herself.

I entreated Count Nesselrode to bear in mind that if her relations with Turkey were of importance to Russia, our interest in Turkey was not less important; that her weakness and decrepitude, of which so much had been said, were but additional motives for the support of her friends not being withheld. Then, I added, as to the feeling which you profess of being humiliated by our policy, although, as you admit, it may not be our wish that you should be humiliated, I protest to you that it is in vain that I endeavour to comprehend the statement. Here is a question of avowed general European interest, and you are to be hurt because Europe chooses to attend to that interest. I must again say that I find it quite impossible to understand the objection which you are raising.

This comes, replied Count Nesselrode, from your not choosing to put yourselves into our situation.

On the contrary, I said, that is the way in which, but to little purpose, I am endeavouring to judge of your objections. I suppose England engaged in an altercation or a war with Turkey, and I can easily understand other European States desiring to take part in the settlement of the affair: what I cannot realize is the idea of England feeling insulted by the wish of other States to participate in an adjustment in which their interests should be immediately concerned.

Count Nesselrode would only ask what the feelings of England would have been if some of the Great Powers had come forward to take part in the settlement of her difference with China.

It appeared to me, I said, very easy to understand what the English policy would have been: in the first place the question was one in which no great European interests, other than our own, were engaged; and secondly, any such offer on the part of the leading Powers to assist in the promotion of a settlement of differences would have been gladly received by Her Majesty's Government.

The above, my Lord, is a correct outline of my last conversation with the Chancellor.

No. 377.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 4, 1854.*

I HAVE to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held to Count Nesselrode on Eastern affairs, in the conversation with his Excellency of which you give an account in your despatch of the 26th ultimo.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 378.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 5.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, January 4, 1854.*

M. DE BOURQUENEY has inquired by telegraph of M. Drouyn de Lhuys what attitude he is to take on the arrival at Vienna of the answer of the Porte, which is now known to be favourable, and is expected in a few days. M. Drouyn de Lhuys has replied that he has no fresh instructions to give. If the answer is conformable to the propositions of the Conference, it is to be transmitted to St. Petersburg in the same way in which it was transmitted to the Porte; but no alterations are to be made by the Conference without the previous sanction of the Governments represented at it.

No. 379.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, January 7, 1854.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve your proceedings, as reported in your despatch of the 17th of December, with a view of bringing about a negotiation between the Porte and the Russian Government.

I am, &c,  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 380.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, January 7, 1854*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that, with reference to the circumstances stated in your first despatch of the 17th ultimo, and to the reasons assigned in your second despatch of the same day, Her Majesty's Government consider that you exercised a sound discretion in withholding from the Porte the collective note transmitted from Vienna.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 381.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.)

*Foreign Office, January 7, 1854.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch of the 17th of December, upon the question of the entrance of the combined fleets into the Black Sea.

The several despatches which I have addressed to your Excellency since the news of the disastrous affair at Sinope reached this country, will have shown you how entirely the views of Her Majesty's Government are in concurrence with your own, as to the necessity of the combined fleets entering the Black Sea. Your Excellency is quite right in considering that the instructions of which you have long since been in possession, fully justified you in taking measures for the entrance of the whole or of an adequate portion of the combined squadrons into the Black Sea.

No. 382.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, January 7, 1854.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve your proceedings, as reported in your despatch of the 23rd of December, with reference to the insurrectionary movement by which Constantinople had been threatened a few days before.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 383.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, January 7, 1854.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve your intentions, as announced in your despatch of the 25th of December, to act in concert with the French Ambassador in carrying out the orders which he had on that day received from his Government for the entrance of the French squadron into the Black Sea.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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No. 384.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 7.)*

My Lord,

*Paris, January 6, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the copy of a circular despatch respecting the present state of the Eastern question, addressed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys to the French Diplomatic Agents at foreign Courts, which it has been thought advisable to publish in the "Moniteur."

I have, &c.  
(Signed) COWLEY.

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Inclosure in No. 384.

*Circular despatch addressed to French Ministers abroad.*

Monsieur,

*Paris, le 30 Décembre, 1853.*

LES affaires d'Orient prennent une tournure trop grave pour que je ne veuille pas, au moment même où les circonstances imposent de nouveaux devoirs au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale, vous rappeler les efforts que nous n'avons cessé de faire dans le but de prévenir les complications dont l'Europe est si sérieusement menacée.

La question des lieux saints, mal présentée ou mal comprise, avait excité les alarmes du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg; nous avons essayé de calmer ces inquiétudes par de loyales et complètes explications. Il nous avait paru que, tout en réservant les droits de la Porte, un débat de cette nature gagnerait à être éclairci loin du théâtre où il était né. Notre opinion n'a pas été partagée par la Russie, et M. le Prince Menchikoff a reçu l'ordre de se rendre à Constantinople. Je me bornerai à dire que, si nous avions eu les vues exclusives que l'on nous supposait, que si la revendication de nos anciens et incontestables privilèges n'eût pas été soutenue avec autant de modération, la mission de cet Ambassadeur Extraordinaire serait tout de suite devenue l'objet d'un conflit que nous avons su éviter.

L'affaire des sanctuaires de Jérusalem assoupie et, d'après le témoignage de

M. le Comte de Nesselrode lui-même, réglée d'une manière satisfaisante, une autre difficulté s'est élevée. M. le Prince Menchikoff a réclamé des garanties pour le maintien des privilèges de l'Eglise Grecque. Le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg n'établissait, par aucun fait particulier, que ces privilèges eussent été violés, et la Porte, au contraire, confirmait solennellement les immunités religieuses de ses sujets Chrétiens.

Animé du désir d'apaiser un différend qui, s'il concernait d'un côté les droits souverains du Sultan, de l'autre touchait à la conscience de Sa Majesté l'Empereur Nicolas, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale, de concert avec celui de Sa Majesté Britannique, a recherché avec soin le moyen de concilier les intérêts, à la fois si délicats et si complexes, qui s'y trouvaient engagés. Le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg ne peut avoir oublié le zèle et la loyauté que nous avons mis à remplir cette tâche difficile ; il ne saurait davantage disconvenir que la résistance de la Porte à accéder à un premier plan de transaction, émané de la Conférence de Vienne, n'a pas été la seule cause de notre insuccès.

Pendant le cours de ces diverses négociations, des faits graves s'étaient produits : une armée Russe avait franchi le Pruth et envahi, en pleine paix, deux provinces de l'Empire Ottoman. Les escadres de France et d'Angleterre avaient dû se rapprocher des Dardanelles, et, dès cette époque, si le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale l'eût voulu, ses forces navales auraient mouillé dans les eaux de Constantinople. Cependant, s'il a jugé nécessaire d'établir son droit, ce n'a été en quelque sorte que pour faire ressortir davantage sa modération. La nature des rapports de la Russie avec la Sublime Porte était devenue trop anormale pour que l'état de guerre ne succédât point à l'état de paix, ou, pour mieux dire, il fallait que les choses reprissent leur véritable nom et que l'agression, dont le territoire Turc avait été l'objet, produisît ses conséquences. Ce changement dans la situation a nécessité un nouveau mouvement de notre escadre, et, à la demande du Sultan, le pavillon Français a paru dans le Bosphore en même temps que le pavillon Britannique.

Toutefois, M. , nous n'avions pas renoncé à l'espoir d'un arrangement, et, d'accord avec l'Autriche et la Prusse, comme déjà nous l'étions avec l'Angleterre, nous poursuivions encore un but pacifique. Des propositions nouvelles, au succès desquelles nous ne cesserons d'employer nos efforts, ont été adressés à la Porte par les Représentants des Quatre Puissances.

Aucun Traité conclu avec la Russie n'interdisait à nos vaisseaux de guerre la navigation de la Mer Noire. Le Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, en fermant, en temps de paix, les passages des Dardanelles et du Bosphore, réservait au Sultan la faculté de les ouvrir en temps de guerre, et, du jour où Sa Hautesse nous avait laissé le libre accès des Détroits, celui de l'Euxin nous était légalement acquis. Les mêmes motifs qui nous avaient retenus si longtemps dans la Baie de Besika arrêtaient notre escadre dans la rade de Beïkos. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale avait à cœur de témoigner jusqu'au bout des sentiments d'amitié qu'il professe pour la Russie, et de rejeter aux yeux du monde la responsabilité d'une aggravation dans un état de choses que tous ses ménagements n'étaient point parvenus à modifier. Il se plaisait à penser, d'ailleurs, d'après le contenu de plus récentes dépêches de M. le Général de Castelbajac, que le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, satisfait d'une prise de possession qu'il considérait comme un gage, ne prendrait nulle part l'offensive dans la lutte qu'il a si malheureusement commencée avec la Turquie. Il nous paraissait suffire que la présence de notre pavillon dans les eaux de Constantinople attestât notre ferme intention de protéger cette capitale contre un danger soudain, et nous ne voulions pas que son apparition prématurée dans les parages plus rapprochés du territoire Russe risquât de passer pour une provocation.

L'état de guerre rendait, sans doute, une collision possible sur mer comme sur terre entre les parties belligérantes ; mais nous avions été autorisés à croire que notre réserve serait imitée par la Russie, et que ses amiraux éviteraient avec le même soin que les nôtres les occasions d'une rencontre, en s'abstenant de procéder à des mesures d'agression dans des limites où, si nous avions pu supposer le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg animé d'intentions différentes, notre escadre aurait certainement exercé une surveillance plus active.

L'événement de Sinope, M. , s'est donc produit en dehors de toutes nos prévisions, et ce fait déplorable modifie également l'attitude que nous aurions désiré garder.

L'accord qui s'est opéré récemment à Vienne entre la France, l'Autriche,

l'Angleterre et la Prusse, a établi le caractère Européen du différend qui existe entre la Russie et la Porte. Les quatre Cours ont solennellement reconnu que l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman était une des conditions de leur équilibre politique. L'occupation de la Moldavie et de la Valachie constitue une première atteinte à cette intégrité, et il n'est pas douteux que les chances de la guerre ne puissent encore l'entamer davantage.

M. le Comte de Nesselrode, il y a quelques mois, représentait comme une compensation nécessaire à ce qu'il appelait dès lors notre occupation maritime l'envahissement des Principautés du Danube. A notre tour, M. , nous croyons qu'il est devenu indispensable de mesurer nous-mêmes l'étendue de la compensation à laquelle nous donnent droit et notre titre de Puissance intéressée à l'existence de la Turquie et les positions militaires déjà prises par l'armée Russe. Il nous faut un gage qui nous assure le rétablissement de la paix en Orient à des conditions qui ne changent pas la distribution des forces respectives des Grands Etats de l'Europe.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique ont, en conséquence, décidé que leurs escadres entreraient dans la Mer Noire et combineraient leurs mouvements de façon à empêcher le territoire ou le pavillon Ottoman d'être en butte à une nouvelle attaque de la part des forces navales de la Russie.

MM. les Vice-Amiraux Hamelin et Dundas vont recevoir l'ordre de communiquer à qui de droit l'objet de leur mission, et nous nous plaçons à espérer que cette démarche loyale préviendra des conflits que nous ne verrions éclater qu'avec le plus vif regret. Le Gouvernement de l'Empereur, je le répète, n'a qu'un but —celui de contribuer à opérer, à des conditions honorables, un rapprochement entre les deux parties belligérantes; et, si les circonstances l'obligent à se prémunir contre des éventualités redoutables, il conserve la confiance que le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, qui a donné de si nombreux exemples de sa sagesse, ne voudra pas exposer l'Europe, à peine remise de ses secousses, à des épreuves que la haute raison des Souverains a su lui épargner depuis de si longues années.

Je vous autorise à donner lecture de cette dépêche à M. ———.

(Signé) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

(Translation.)

Sir,

*Paris, December 30, 1853.*

THE affairs of the East are taking too serious a turn for me not to be desirous, at the very moment when circumstances impose new duties upon the Government of His Imperial Majesty, of reminding you of the efforts which we have not ceased to make, with a view to prevent the complications with which Europe is so seriously threatened.

The question of the Holy Places, ill represented or ill understood, had excited the alarm of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg: we endeavoured to calm this uneasiness by frank and complete explanations. It appeared to us that whilst reserving the rights of the Porte, a discussion of this nature would gain by being carried on at a distance from the scene where it originated. Our opinion was not shared by Russia, and Prince Menchikoff received instructions to proceed to Constantinople. I will confine myself to observing that if we had had the exclusive views which were attributed to us, that if the vindication of our ancient and incontestable privileges had not been maintained with so much moderation, the mission of this Ambassador Extraordinary would immediately have become the cause of a conflict which we have been enabled to avoid.

The affair of the Sanctuaries of Jerusalem being set at rest, and, according to the testimony of Count Nesselrode himself, decided in a satisfactory manner, another difficulty arose. Prince Menchikoff demanded guarantees for the maintenance of the privileges of the Greek Church. The Cabinet of St. Petersburg did not prove by any particular fact that those privileges had been violated, and the Porte, on the contrary, solemnly confirmed the religious immunities of her Christian subjects.

Animated by the desire of appeasing a difference which, if on the one hand it concerned the sovereign rights of the Sultan, on the other affected the conscience of His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas, the Government of His Imperial

Majesty, in concert with that of Her Britannic Majesty, anxiously sought the means of reconciling the interests, at once so delicate and so complicated, which were involved in it. The Cabinet of St. Petersburg cannot have forgotten the zeal and loyalty with which we endeavoured to fulfil this difficult task; nor can it deny that the resistance of the Porte to accede to a first plan of arrangement, which emanated from the Conference of Vienna, has not been the only cause of our want of success.

In the course of these various negotiations, grave events had taken place. A Russian army had crossed the Pruth and invaded, in the time of perfect peace, two Provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The squadrons of France and England were compelled to approach the Dardanelles, and from that period, if the Government of His Imperial Majesty had so desired, his naval forces would have anchored in the waters of Constantinople. Nevertheless, if it has judged it necessary to establish its right, it has only been in order still further to show its moderation. The nature of the relations of Russia with the Sublime Porte had become too irregular for it to be possible that the state of war should not succeed to the state of peace, or, speaking more correctly, it was requisite that things should assume their true names, and that the aggression of which the Turkish territory had been the object should produce its consequences. This change in the posture of affairs rendered necessary a new movement of our squadron, and on the requisition of the Sultan, the French flag appeared in the Bosphorus simultaneously with the British flag.

Nevertheless, M. ———, we did not give up the hope of an arrangement, and acting in concert with Austria and Prussia, as we already were with England, we still followed a pacific course. New proposals, for the success of which we shall not cease to exert our efforts, have been addressed to the Porte by the Representatives of the Four Powers.

No Treaty concluded with Russia interdicted our vessels of war from the navigation of the Black Sea. The Treaty of July 13, 1841, while closing in time of peace the passages of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus, reserved to the Sultan the privilege of opening them in time of war; and from the day on which His Highness allowed us free access to the Straits, free access to the Euxine was legally ours. The same motives which had so long detained us in Besika Bay, detained our squadron in the roadstead of Beicos. The Government of His Imperial Majesty earnestly desired to manifest to the last the sentiments of friendship which it professes for Russia, and to relieve itself in public estimation from the responsibility of aggravating a state of affairs which all its endeavours had not succeeding in modifying. It flattered itself, moreover, that according to the contents of more recent despatches from General Castelbajac, the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, satisfied with a seizure which it considered as a pledge, would nowhere assume the offensive in the contest which it has so unhappily begun with Turkey. It appeared to us sufficient that the presence of our flag in the waters of Constantinople should evince our firm intention to protect that capital against sudden danger, and we were unwilling that its premature appearance in localities nearer the Russian territory should incur the risk of being considered as a provocation.

The state of war, doubtless, rendered possible a collision between the belligerent parties by sea as well as on land; but we had been led to believe that our forbearance would be imitated by Russia, and that her Admirals would avoid, with the same care as our own, occasions of collision, by abstaining from proceeding to measures of aggression within those limits in which, could we possibly have supposed the Cabinet of St. Petersburg to be animated by different intentions, our squadron would assuredly have exercised a more active surveillance.

The affair of Sinope, M. ———, took place altogether unexpectedly; and this deplorable event modifies in the same degree the attitude which we would have desired to maintain.

The agreement which has recently been come to at Vienna between France, Austria, England, and Prussia, has established the European character of the difference which exists between Russia and the Porte. The Four Courts have solemnly recognized that the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire is one of the conditions of their political equilibrium. The occupation of Moldavia and of Wallachia is the first blow to this integrity; and it is unquestionable that the chances of war may still further encroach upon it.

Count Nesselrode some months ago represented the invasion of the Danubian Principalities as a necessary compensation for what he at that time designated as our maritime occupation. In our turn, M. ———, we are of opinion that it has become indispensable ourselves to calculate the amount of compensation to which we are entitled as well by our character of a Power interested in the existence of Turkey, as by the military positions already taken by the Russian army. We require a pledge which shall secure to us the re-establishment of peace in the East, upon conditions which shall not alter the distribution of the respective power of the Great States of Europe.

The Government of His Imperial Majesty and the Government of Her Britannic Majesty have in consequence decided that their squadrons should enter the Black Sea, and combine their movements in such a way as to prevent the Ottoman territory or flag from being exposed to a fresh attack on the part of the naval forces of Russia.

Vice-Admirals Hamelin and Dundas will receive instructions to communicate to those whom it may concern the object of their mission; and we flatter ourselves with the hope that this frank step will prevent conflicts the occurrence of which we could not witness without the deepest regret. The Government of the Emperor, I repeat, has but one object—that of contributing to effect, upon honourable conditions, a reconciliation between the two belligerent parties; and if circumstances compel it to take precautions against contingencies to be apprehended, it still retains the confidence that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, which has given such numerous proofs of its wisdom, will not be willing to expose Europe, hardly recovered from her convulsions, to trials which the high intelligence of her Sovereigns has succeeded in sparing her from for so many years.

I authorize you to read this despatch to M. ———.

(Signed)

DROUYN DE LHUYS.

No. 385.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 10.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, January 8, 1854.*

I HAD a few days ago some further conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, as to the course to be adopted by the Conference at Vienna whenever the answer of the Porte to the communication sent from Vienna on the 5th ultimo should be received.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that, in his opinion, something must depend upon the proceedings of the Four Representatives at Constantinople. According to the information which we had received at the present moment, they, having commenced a negotiation with the Porte before the receipt of the Vienna propositions, had judged it advisable to leave those propositions in abeyance. If the Representatives at Constantinople had transmitted to Vienna the result of their negotiations with the Porte, as an answer to the propositions of the Conference, without having presented the collective note, he was of opinion that the Conference should accept it as an answer, consign it to a protocol, in which they should declare that it ought to satisfy the Russian Government, and leave Count Buol to be the channel of communicating the opinion of the Conference to Count Nesselrode.

I suggested to M. Drouyn de Lhuys that he should draw up such a protocol as he deemed desirable, and send it to London for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government.

I learn from subsequent communications from your Lordship and from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that this course has been followed; that a draft of protocol, of which, for form's sake, I do myself the honour to inclose a copy, has been agreed to by the two Governments; and have only further to add that it was sent from hence on the evening of the 7th with directions to M. de Bourqueney to propose it for the signature of the Conference, whenever the expected answer of the Porte should be received at Vienna.

Inclosure in No. 385.

*Draft of Protocol.*

LES Représentants d'Autriche, de France, de Grande Bretagne et de Prusse, s'étant réunis en Conférence, le , ont pris connaissance de la note remise par la Sublime Porte à , et ont unanimement trouvé qu'elle répondait au but qu'ils s'étaient proposé dans leur réunion du 5 Décembre dernier.

Les conditions auxquelles la Sublime Porte se déclare prête à traiter du rétablissement de la paix avec la Russie, paraissent aux Soussignés conformes aux vœux de leurs Gouvernements, et ils jugent en conséquence qu'elles doivent être communiquées sans retard au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg.

Pénétrés, de plus en plus, de la gravité de la situation et de la nécessité d'y mettre un terme, les Soussignés expriment la confiance que la Russie acceptera la reprise des négociations sur des bases qui dans leur opinion en assurent le succès et offrent aux deux parties belligérantes l'occasion de se rapprocher, d'une manière digne et honorable, sans que l'Europe soit plus longtemps attristée par le spectacle de la guerre.

Les Représentants de France, de Grande Bretagne, et de Prusse, s'en remettent au Représentant d'Autriche du soin de faire connaître au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg l'opinion consignée dans le présent Protocole.

(Translation.)

THE Representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia, being assembled in Conference on the , have taken cognizance of the note delivered by the Sublime Porte to , and have unanimously agreed that it answered the object which they had proposed to themselves in their meeting of the 5th of December last.

The conditions on which the Porte declares its readiness to treat for the re-establishment of peace with Russia, appear to the Undersigned to be in conformity with the wishes of their Governments, and they consequently are of opinion that they should be communicated without delay to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg.

Impressed more and more with the serious character of the existing state of things, and with the necessity of putting an end to it, the Undersigned express their confidence that Russia will accept of the resumption of negotiations on the basis which in their opinion offer an assurance of their success, and afford the two belligerent parties an opportunity for coming to an understanding in a suitable and honourable manner, without Europe being any longer grieved by the spectacle of war.

The Representatives of France, Great Britain, and Prussia, intrust to the Representative of Austria the task of making known to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg the opinion recorded in the present Protocol.

No. 386.

*Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 10.)*

(Extract.)

*Paris, January 9, 1854.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has received a despatch from M. de Bourqueney, dated the 3rd instant, mentioning the feeling shown by the Austrian Government at not having been informed of the intentions of England and France to send their squadrons into the Black Sea, previously to the execution of that measure.

In a telegraphic despatch of the 5th instant, M. de Bourqueney announces that his own instructions relative to the movement of the fleets had at length reached him, and that he had communicated them to Count Buol, and that he could assure M. Drouyn de Lhuys that the Austrian Government, although

not prepared for the lengths to which the two Governments had gone, would not separate from them in consequence.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys purposes answering that every deference had been shown to the Austrian Government by communicating to them the instructions sent to St. Petersburg and Constantinople, on the very day on which they were expedited; that there were two sides to the Eastern question, the diplomatic and the military; that France was engaged in the one with Austria, England and Prussia—in the other with England alone; that the object of the one was to restore peace between Russia and Turkey, the object of the other, the defence of the Turkish territory from Russian aggression; and that until Austria declared herself ready to aid in the latter, she could not expect to be consulted on the measures necessary to insure its success.

I observed that he might add that the instructions now sent were but a complement to those which had been issued long before the establishment of a Conference at Vienna, and which, if they had been acted upon, would have produced nearly the same state of affairs as existed now; besides, what was the use of consulting other Governments, unless we intended to listen to their advice, a course clearly impossible so long as the intentions of the Conference were pacific only?

No. 387.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 10.)*

My Lord,

Vienna, January 4, 1854.

UPON the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 27th ultimo, I waited upon Count Buol in pursuance of the instructions contained in it, and I read to him first the despatch addressed to Sir H. Seymour, and next the one addressed to Lord Stratford, both of that date.

Count Buol remarked upon the language of the former, particularly the expression "taking command of the Black Sea and requiring, and if necessary compelling, the Russian ships of war to return to Sevastopol, or the nearest Russian port." He expressed surprise at these strong declarations, and stated that although he was fully prepared for the entry of the combined fleets into the Black Sea, with a view of establishing a state of neutrality between the belligerents, he was not prepared to expect that they would be directed to use coercion against the Russian ships of war while navigating upon their own coasts in the manner described.

With respect to the despatch addressed to Lord Stratford, Count Buol observed that while the same language was adopted as to the operations of the fleets, yet he saw with satisfaction that the Governments of England and France adhered to the position in which they were at present placed with respect to Austria and Prussia, and that by the words, "It was the duty of the English and French Governments, and their right, to demand the acceptance by the Porte of the proposals recently made by the Four Powers," they gave undoubted assurances that the two Governments still looked to the re-establishment of peace, and to the maintenance of the union which now existed between the Four Powers. Count Buol stated that he cordially adopted these views. He looked upon the continuance of that union as most essential to the best interests of the Powers engaged in it, and he would use every effort to maintain it and to secure its success.

I stated to Count Buol that in judging of the measures which the Governments of England and France had now adopted, he must bear in mind that they considered the attack upon the Turkish squadron in Sinope as an offence which they were called upon to resent, and it was because the Austrian and Prussian Governments had not the same cause for action, that they had abstained from seeking to make them a party to the measures which had now been adopted; but he might rely upon it that both those Governments were as little desirous of going to war at present, as they had been at any time since the commencement of the unfortunate discussions between the Governments of Russia and the Porte.

Count Buol acknowledged the explanation which I had thus given for not calling upon the Austrian and Prussian Governments to be parties to the

decisions which had been taken; but he thought that it might have been considered as an understanding between the Four Powers, that while they were engaged in a mediation for peace, which appeared at present to promise some success, time should have been given to ascertain its result, without endangering the common action by any act which might be construed by Russia as an operation of war.

Count Buol felt that the more decided and menacing position which the Governments of England and France had now taken by their declarations to Russia would render it essential that any pacific offers which might be transmitted from Constantinople, should in the first instance be recommended by Austria as the channel through which the proposal to treat for peace had been transmitted from Russia. He was satisfied, from the reports he had received from the Internuncio, that no reply from the Porte would be directed to the Conference, but that it would be addressed to the Representatives at Constantinople, who would transmit it to their Governments. He should therefore, upon the receipt of this communication, and as the mode which would offer the greatest chance of success, submit it to the Conference, and if it was judged of such a nature as to be recommended, he should consult with them as to the nature of the announcement he should make to the Russian Cabinet; but he should transmit it without delay to St. Petersburg, and he would employ every means in his power to obtain its acceptance.

I had yesterday a second interview with Count Buol at which I read to him the statements I have thus given to your Lordship of his remarks, and he said that so soon as he received the communication of a similar nature which he was expecting from Baron Bourqueney, he would instruct Count Colloredo to convey to your Lordship the same sentiments.

Upon the receipt of your Lordship's despatch on Monday, before I waited upon Count Buol, I saw M. de Bourqueney and informed him of the nature of the communications I was directed to make; and immediately after my interview with Count Buol, I reported to him the observations which his Excellency had made with regard to them. M. de Bourqueney had not then received his instructions from Paris.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 388.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 9.)*

My Lord,

*Vienna, January 5, 1854.*

THE French Minister, Baron Bourqueney, has this day received the despatches from his Government of the 29th ultimo which he has been expecting, and which he has communicated to me. Your Lordship will be already aware of the analogy of the instructions to General Baraguay d'Hilliers with those addressed to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and inclosed in your Lordship's despatch to me of the 27th ultimo.

Baron Bourqueney will immediately submit this document, together with the despatches which accompany it, to Count Buol, whose opinions with regard to it he is already aware of, and has reported to his Government, in consequence of the conversations he has held with him upon the similar documents which I had communicated to him.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 389.

*Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 10.)*

My Lord,

*Berlin, January 7, 1854.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL has informed me that on receiving a report from Baron Wildenbruch, the Prussian Representative at Constantinople, detailing the circumstances under which he had signed, in conjunction with his colleagues,

the note lately addressed by the Representatives of the Four Powers to Reshid Pasha, and had subsequently concurred with them in suspending the presentation of the Vienna note, he had conveyed to him his entire approval of his conduct.

Baron Manteuffel further expressed to me the satisfaction with which he had learnt from the Chevalier Bunsen that his views and opinions on this subject had entirely coincided with those of your Lordship.

The despatch to Baron Wildenbruch, conveying the approval of his Government, has already been forwarded to him under flying seal through Vienna.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 390.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 10, 1854.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, December 31, 1853.*

MANY of the statements which are made to me respecting the movements of troops so much require confirmation, that I do not venture to submit them to your Lordship.

What I can state upon unquestionable authority is that of the 6th corps d'armée, lately quartered in and about Moscow, one division is sent to the Caucasus, one to the Crimea, and the remaining division to Odessa and its environs.

The troops at present in Wallachia and Moldavia are the 3rd and 4th corps of infantry, two and a half divisions of cavalry, seven regiments of Cossacks, and about 250 pieces of artillery.

General de Lüders, commander of the 5th corps d'armée, occupies Galatz and Ismail with one and a half divisions of infantry; one division was sent in October to the Caucasus; and half of a division remains at Odessa.

The Guards and the Grenadiers will remain, according to the intentions which now prevail, at St. Petersburg and Novogorod, and the 1st and 2nd corps d'armée are still in the kingdom of Poland.

This much may be looked upon as certain intelligence. What I have heard upon less good authority, but am still disposed to believe, is that General Schilders, with two battalions of Sappers, has been sent from Warsaw to the Principalities.

No. 391.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 10.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, January 2, 1854.*

WHEN I waited upon the Chancellor on the 30th ultimo, he inquired whether I had any communication to make to him upon the subject of the entry of the allied fleets into the Black Sea.

I replied that I had not, but that, as I had before stated, they were to be expected there.

Count Nesselrode inquired with what intent? To which I replied by adverting to the feeling which had been produced in England and France by the affair of Sinope, and by saying that it might be assumed that it was intended to take measures for preventing the recurrence of a similar catastrophe.

In the course of an amicable conversation which ensued, Count Nesselrode expressed his belief that the Russian fleet would in consequence of the advanced season be little likely to leave Sevastopol. He spoke likewise of the possible operations of the English and French ships, observing that if it were intended that their presence in the Black Sea should prevent the Turks from being attacked by the Russians, there would be little justice in the proceeding, unless it were likewise proposed that the Turks should be restrained from molesting the coast of Russia.

I replied that upon this and other points of the kind I had no information to offer, but that it was not likely that a Power so eager for peace as England, a Power which had recommended the Turks to conclude an armistice with a view to peace, should come forward to promote warlike operations, but certainly that the defence of Turkey was an object never lost sight of by Her Majesty's Government.

I proceeded to express my hope that the communications which might shortly be expected from Vienna, after the overtures made to the Porte, would be received in a friendly spirit at St. Petersburg.

Till the Sultan's answer should be made known here, it was impossible, Count Nesselrode said, that he should express any opinion upon the subject. He would only say that the diplomatic papers lately made public did not in his opinion improve the chances of the Sultan being brought to such conditions as it would be in the power of the Emperor to accept.

Again the Chancellor adverted to the idea of a negotiation at which a Turkish negotiator should be admitted, and to the extreme repugnance of His Imperial Majesty to countenance a plan so much at variance with the established usage of Russia in her dealings with the Porte.

Why, he would ask, should Russia be called upon to do now what she had not done for one hundred years?

The objection, I said, was one, as was well known to his Excellency, which I found it absolutely impossible to understand. I conjectured, however, that it must arise from some false point of honour. Now, I said, this I might understand if Turkey were a Power of the same calibre as Russia; but when you tell me that her vitality is gone, that she is a Power only in name, and when you reflect that the interest which is felt by Europe in the preservation of this weakened Empire is greater than it ever was, again I must say that I am utterly at a loss to comprehend how the association of a Turkish negotiator to your compliance is to wound the dignity of Russia. A great Power may be jealous of its equal, but it is condescending to its inferior.

Before leaving the Chancellor, I observed that his Excellency had, I believed, spoken to one of my colleagues of the advantage which might be derived from the attention of the allied Ministers being turned to the object of obtaining, if possible, from the Porte the admission of its Christian subjects to full civil and religious rights.

Count Nesselrode remembered having thrown out such a suggestion; the plan was one which might have the effect, if fairly adopted, of putting an end to the complaints which foreign Governments had so constantly to make of the Porte—and none so often as the Russian Government—for this, continued the Chancellor, is the point to be attended to; we desire a security against the causes of complaint, and if this is not obtained, even if peace were to be established with Turkey, it would not be maintained for two years.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

### No. 392.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 10.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, January 2, 1854.*

ASSERTIONS made with confidence are too commonly accepted without hesitation, and this is strikingly the case with regard to the statements of the Russian Cabinet as to their relations with Turkey.

We cannot, says the Russian Cabinet, withdraw our troops from the Principalities until our difficulties with the Porte shall be settled; neither can we suffer any Power to intervene between us and the Porte, as it would be contrary to the practice which has prevailed for the last century were we to negotiate otherwise than directly with the Sultan's Government.

So little is this the real state of the case, that a reference to the Treaty of Tilsit will show that the signature of the Convention was the signal for the cessation of hostilities between Russia and Turkey; that the Russian troops

were immediately withdrawn from Moldavia and Wallachia; and that the Emperor Alexander did not hesitate to accept Bonaparte's mediation for the purpose of negotiating a peace between the Russian and Turkish Empires.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 393.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 11, 1854.*

I HAVE to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held to Count Nesselrode on Eastern affairs in the conversation with his Excellency, of which a report is contained in your despatch of the 2nd instant.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 394.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, January 8, 1854.*

M. BOURQUENEY will receive a project of Protocol which you are authorized to sign. The answer of the Porte, if considered favourable, may be adopted, although it should not be addressed to the Conference, and its terms should be embodied in the Protocol.

No. 395.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 14, 1854.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, December 26, 1853.*

I AVAIL myself of an express dispatched by the French Embassy, to inform your Lordship that the Ottoman Ministers assemble in Council to-day for the purpose of deliberating, and, I hope, deciding favourably, on the proposals of negotiation submitted to them by the Four Representatives.

I have to add that no fresh cause of disturbance has shown itself in the capital, and that the French Ambassador is agreed with me to send into the Black Sea such portions of the combined squadrons as may be required to carry out the existing instructions.

Your Lordship will at once understand that with every solicitude to guard against unnecessary collision, the squadrons cannot enter the Black Sea for protective purposes without incurring that hazard.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 396.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 14, 1854.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, December 31, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, in copy and translation, the Porte's official answer to the identic note of the Four Representatives, dated the 12th instant, and presented collectively to Reshid Pasha on the 15th.

Your Lordship will perceive that the Porte's note confirms entirely what I have already announced by means of a telegraphic message. It is addressed not only to me, but to each of my three colleagues respectively. Our proposals are formally accepted under the Sultan's sanction, and it now remains with the Four Powers to obtain the assent of Russia, and to set on foot the negotiation which they have expressed their desire to obtain, and which, if the Court of St. Petersburg be sincere in its professions, ought to terminate at an early period in peace.

I venture to congratulate your Lordship on the prospect of that consummation. The hope which it encourages may not, indeed, be realized ; but it will always be gratifying to remember, that the injured and by no means unsuccessful party was the first to give proof of its pacific views, and to accede, with almost unlimited confidence, to the suggestion of its European Allies.

The Porte has intimated an expectation that the answer from Russia shall not be more than forty days from the present date in reaching Constantinople. It is also her intention that the armistice, proposed to be established on both sides during the negotiation, should be of limited, though sufficient extent.

It appears to me that in both particulars the Porte takes a just view of what is required alike by her interests and by her duties. Exposed to the attacks of Russia even at this season, and obliged, therefore, to continue her defensive operations at great cost, it is very desirable that the present uncertainty should not be indefinitely prolonged. An armistice, it is true, would suspend the prosecution of hostilities on either side ; but it would also leave undiminished whatever disadvantage results from continued preparations against the contingency of their renewal, and it would operate at once as a damp on military ardour, and as a motive for popular discontent.

Whether in substance or in form, the Porte, I verily believe, has reached the utmost verge of concession with respect to spiritual privileges. Nothing short of prostration, the consequence of military reverses, could, to all appearance, induce her to overstep the line traced out in the plan of negotiation proposed by the Four Representatives, and now accepted by her.

With respect to the last two paragraphs of the Ottoman reply, I conceive that the Porte does not so much pretend to a positive technical guarantee against future encroachments, as a formal admission into the circle of Europe's international law and system of mutual respect for each other's rights, established among its independent States. I am further of opinion, that with a view to the condition of the non-Mussulman communities in this Empire, and the development of those resources on which the Porte's independence must ever mainly rest, it would not be safe to hedge round the Ottoman Empire with European guarantees, unless the Porte engaged at the same time to realize and extend her system of improved administration in good earnest.

It was under this conviction that I urged the adoption of the paragraph which concludes the identic note of the Four Representatives.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 396.

*Reshid Pasha to the Four Representatives.*

1 *Rebiul-akhir*, 1270. (*Le 31 Décembre*, 1853.)

SA Majesté le Sultan a vu la note que votre Excellence nous a envoyée, note identique avec celles de l'Ambassadeur de France et des Ministres d'Autriche et de Prusse, vos collègues, en date du 12 Décembre, n. s., relativement à la paix.

Comme on relève par ces communications collectives les intentions pacifiques de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie ; que si la Sublime Porte s'est trouvée dans la nécessité d'entreprendre la guerre, c'est uniquement pour le maintien de ses droits souverains ; qu'il n'y a rien dans le projet d'arrangement qui vient d'être proposé, que porte atteinte aux droits sacrés de l'Empire Ottoman ; et que les égards tout particuliers et la parfaite confiance de Sa Majesté le Sultan envers les Quatre Puissances, ses hautes alliées, réclament son

adhésion à leurs vœux pour l'œuvre de la paix, la Sublime Porte a trouvé le projet d'arrangement qui vient de lui être proposé, acceptable.

Il faut donc que l'évacuation des Principautés de la Valachie et de la Moldavie, évacuation à avoir lieu avec toute la célérité possible, soit le premier point des négociations. Et comme, pour ne pas s'écarter de son système de modération, et pour ne pas s'éloigner des conseils de ses alliés, la Sublime Porte consentira au renouvellement des Traités, cela doit être le second point des Conférences.

Quant aux privilèges spirituels des communautés composées de toutes les classes de sujets non-Musulmans de l'Empire Ottoman, comme ces privilèges ont été octroyés, il y a déjà très longtemps, par les augustes ancêtres de Sa Majesté le Sultan ; qu'il y a peu de temps encore sa Hautesse les a confirmés par un firman décoré de son khatti-humayoun (autographe Impérial) ; et que le Gouvernement de sa Hautesse considère comme étant de sa dignité de les maintenir toujours, la Sublime Porte ne fera pas difficulté d'annoncer à toutes les Puissances, comme elle l'a fait par le passé et dernièrement encore, et comme elle l'a déclaré à toute l'Europe lorsque elle a établi les Tanzimat, que son intention ferme et loyale est de maintenir à jamais les privilèges spirituels des communautés composées de ses propres sujets : et que, si quelque-une de ces communautés se trouve avoir, en fait de privilèges spirituels, quelque chose de plus que les autres, elle accordera à celles-ci, si elles demandent d'en jouir également, la faveur d'être mises à cet égard aussi sur un pied d'égalité. Cela étant, il n'y aura pas la moindre hésitation à ce qu'il soit remis au Cabinet Russe aussi, comme il en sera donné à chacune des Quatre Puissances, copie des ordres de la Sublime Porte à cet égard, accompagnée d'une note identique conçue dans ce sens.

Le mode d'arrangement pour ce qui concerne les lieux saints, et pour la mise à exécution de ce qui a été décidé par rapport à l'érection de certains édifices religieux à Jerusalem, sera complètement adopté.

Ainsi, voilà que la Sublime Porte est prête à conclure une paix de la manière que ses alliés viennent de lui indiquer ; et si l'on apprend que le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg aussi a accepté ces bases, elle nommera et enverra un Plénipotentiaire à un Congrès à être tenu dans une ville neutre qui sera désignée par les Quatre Puissances, et auquel les délégués des Quatre Puissances assisteront afin qu'il arrange les affaires avec le Plénipotentiaire de la Cour de Russie. Et alors, comme cela est naturel, on conclura un armistice temporaire, et pour un délai déterminé.

Vû les grandes relations de cet Empire avec les Gouvernements d'Europe, la Sublime Porte a pleinement le droit de se trouver dans le cercle d'une sûreté collective et d'être comprise dans le concert Européen. Et pour cela, il sera nécessaire de confirmer et de compléter, dans ce sens, le Traité de l'an 1841. Ainsi, on a la confiance que les Cours alliées voudront bien employer leurs bons offices à cet égard.

Comme on calcule que quarante jours suffisent pour faire parvenir cette décision à St. Pétersbourg et recevoir une réponse, les Puissances sont priées de mettre tous leurs soins à cet égard aussi.

Sa Majesté le Sultan a particulièrement à cœur que chaque classe de ses sujets ait à jouir de cette sécurité et de cette justice que les Tanzimat, réellement et complètement mis à exécution, lui promet ; et en un mot, qu'en faisant dans le système administratif les réformes nécessaires, il soit par là donné une grande force aux principes de la justice et de l'équité en faveur de tous.

Sa Majesté le Sultan ayant ordonné que l'on mette la plus grand soin à mettre en pratique ces maximes sublimes, je m'empresse de l'annoncer aussi, de pareils ordres ne pouvant que faire du plaisir aux Puissances.

(Signé) MUSTAPHA RESHID.

(Translation.)

1 *Rebiul-akhir*, 1270. (December 31, 1853.)

HIS Majesty the Sultan has seen the note dated the 12th of December, n.s., relative to peace, which your Excellency has sent us, and which is identical with that of the Ambassador of France and the Ministers of Austria and Prussia, your colleagues.

As it appears from these collective communications that the intentions of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia are pacific ; that if the Sublime Porte has been forced to undertake the war, it is solely for the maintenance of its sovereign rights ; that there is nothing in the proposed plan of arrangement prejudicial to the sacred rights of the Ottoman Empire ; and that His Majesty the Sultan's very special regard for, and entire confidence in, the Four Powers, his exalted allies, require his acquiescence in their wishes for the work of peace, the Sublime Porte has found the plan of arrangement, which has been proposed to it, to be such as it can accept.

It is requisite, then, that the evacuation of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, to take effect as quickly as possible, should be the first point of the negotiations. And as, in order not to deviate from its system of moderation, and not to separate itself from the counsels of its allies, the Sublime Porte will consent to the renewal of the Treaties, that should be the second point of the conferences.

With regard to the spiritual privileges of the communities, consisting of all classes of the non-Mussulman subjects of the Ottoman Empire, as these privileges have already for a long time been granted by the august ancestors of His Majesty the Sultan ; as it is only a short time since His Highness has confirmed them by a firman decorated with his hattî-humâyoun (Imperial autograph) ; and as the Government of His Highness considers it a point of dignity always to maintain them, the Sublime Porte will make no difficulty in announcing to all the Powers, as it has done heretofore and again lately, and as it declared to the whole of Europe when it established the Tanzimat, that it is its firm and sincere intention to uphold for ever the spiritual privileges of the communities consisting of its own subjects : and that, if one of those communities should possess, as regards spiritual privileges, something more than the others, it will grant to the latter, if they desire to enjoy them in the same manner, the favour to be put in this respect also on a footing of equality. That being the case, there will not be the slightest hesitation in delivering to the Russian Cabinet also, as there will be given to each of the Four Powers, a copy of the orders of the Porte in this respect, accompanied by an identical note drawn up in this sense.

The mode of arrangement as regards the holy places, and for carrying into execution what has been decided with regard to the construction of certain religious buildings at Jerusalem, shall be completely adopted.

Thus the Porte is prepared to conclude a peace in the manner pointed out to it by its allies, and if intelligence is received that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg likewise accepts these bases, the Porte will name and send a Plenipotentiary to a Congress to be held in a neutral city which shall be specified by the Four Powers, and at which delegates of the Four Powers shall assist for the arrangement of affairs with the Plenipotentiary of the Court of Russia ; and, thereupon, as is natural, a temporary armistice for a fixed period will be concluded.

Considering the great relations of this Empire with the Governments of Europe, the Sublime Porte is fully entitled to be included within the limits of collective security, and to be admitted into the European union ; and for this purpose it will be necessary to confirm and complete in this sense the Treaty of 1841. Accordingly, the Porte is persuaded that the allied Courts will be pleased to exert their good offices in this respect.

As it is calculated that forty days are sufficient to convey this decision to St. Petersburg, and to receive an answer, the Powers are requested to provide for this likewise.

His Majesty the Sultan has particularly at heart that every class of his subjects should enjoy that security and that justice which the Tanzimat, really and completely carried into execution, hold out to it ; and, in a word, that by making the necessary reforms in the administrative system, great force may thereby be given to the principles of justice and equity in favour of all.

His Majesty the Sultan having directed that the greatest care should be taken to carry into effect these sublime maxims, I likewise hasten to announce it, as such commands cannot fail to give pleasure to the Powers.

(Signed)

MUSTAPHA RESHID.

## No. 397.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 17.)*

(Extract.)

*Vienna, January 11, 1854.*

COUNT BUOL has received a telegraphic message from Semlin, announcing the arrival in that place of the communications he has been expecting from Constantinople, and which have been forwarded from thence by messenger, who is expected to arrive to-morrow.

He mentioned the hope he entertained, from the telegraphic communication he had received from the Internuncio, that the reply of the Porte to the Representatives, which was now transmitted, might be of a satisfactory nature; he intended, therefore, as I have reported in my despatch of the 4th instant, to communicate it immediately to the Conference, and, after consultation, and in accordance with them, to transmit it by Count Esterhazy to St. Petersburg, with directions to make every possible effort to obtain its acceptance.

I told Count Buol that your Lordship felt that some collective form of communication would be necessary, as otherwise the action of the Four Powers in this important transaction would be set aside; and as the first step which had been taken in this negotiation had been made known to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg by the communication through Baron Meyendorff of the note to Reshid Pasha and the Protocol, it would be naturally expected by Russia that the opinion of the Four Governments upon the present propositions should be made known to her.

Count Buol concurred entirely in this view; he was anxious the opinions of the Four Powers should be communicated to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, and he intended to employ the decision the Conference might come to as the strongest argument in favour of the proposals he should advocate. He stated that, with respect to the line he meant to adopt in transmitting, without delay, the communications he should receive from the Internuncio, he had fully explained it in his communications to Count Colloredo, for your Lordship's information, by a messenger he had forwarded on Sunday last to Paris and London.

After I had held this conversation with Count Buol, I learnt from M. de Bourqueney that he had received a telegraphic despatch, transmitting to him a form of Protocol, which he was directed to sign after the Conference should have approved of the communications from Constantinople, and which should be placed in the hands of Count Buol; and shortly afterwards I received your Lordship's instruction to sign the same document.

## No. 398.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 15.)*

(Extract.)

*Vienna, January 12, 1854.*

THE Conference of this day called by Count Buol, that he might communicate the answer of Reshid Pasha to the note addressed to him by the Internuncio, which was identical with those presented by the other Representatives at Constantinople, was perfectly satisfactory to M. de Bourqueney and to myself. Count Buol, after comparing the note he had received with the copies which had been transmitted to M. de Bourqueney and myself, and having found them identical in meaning although not so in language (which is supposed to have arisen from a difference of translation), recommended that the terms for a negotiation proposed by the Porte should be recognized by the Conference as answering to the object they had in view in the proposition which had been transmitted to Constantinople on the 5th of December; and that this should be stated in a Protocol which he was ready to sign. He likewise declared his intention, in undertaking to communicate these terms to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, to enforce their acceptance by all the means in his power, and engaged to convey punctually to the Russian Government the sentiments and recommendation of the Conference.

After this declaration the draft of the Protocol was drawn up, being a copy of the one transmitted to M. de Bourqueney from the French Government, and it was left to be transcribed and prepared for signature at the Conference which is to take place to-morrow.

As there is hardly any difference in this document from the one which I have received your Lordship's orders to sign, I shall not hesitate to put my name to it.

No. 399.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, January 17, 1854.*

I RECEIVED on the 14th instant your Excellency's despatch of the 31st of December, inclosing the answer of the Porte to the propositions made to it by your Excellency and your colleagues on the 12th of that month, with the view of bringing about a negotiation between Turkey and Russia; and I have to acquaint your Excellency that the manner in which the negotiation on this point between your Excellency and your colleagues on the one side, and the Ottoman Government on the other, has been brought to a successful issue, reflects the highest credit on your Excellency, and I have the pleasure to convey to you the entire approbation of Her Majesty's Government for the zeal and judgment which you have displayed.

Her Majesty's Government consider the answer of the Porte to the identic notes of the Four Representatives to be quite satisfactory. It fully maintains the dignity and independence of the Sultan; while, on the other hand, it meets every demand that Russia is entitled to make, and all that she has professed to desire. It presents the bases of a just and honourable peace, and of a guarantee of the Sultan's rights, together with a formal pledge on the part of the Porte to carry out the measures of internal reform upon which must mainly depend the future welfare and prosperity of Turkey.

It is to be hoped that Russia, alive to her own interests and to those of Europe, will agree to the reasonable terms now offered for her acceptance, with the approbation of the Four Powers, and thus put an end to the further effusion of blood, and to a state of things which endangers the peace of the world.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 400.

*Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 17.)*

My Lord,

*Berlin, January 14, 1854.*

THE Marquis de Moustier has communicated to Baron Manteuffel the Protocol which is to be signed at Vienna on the arrival there of the Turkish communication.

His Excellency informed me this evening that he had not received as yet intimation from Count Arnim that it had been signed.

Baron Manteuffel told me that he had received a copy of the Turkish reply to the note of the Four Representatives at Constantinople.

He considered it moderate and well drawn up. He remarked to me on the absence of any direct reference therein to the Orthodox Church, saying that the concessions made were generally for all subjects of the Sultan not of the Mahomedan faith.

I could perceive that his Excellency is by no means sanguine that the pacific endeavours of the Four Powers will meet with success.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

## No. 401.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 17.)*

My Lord,

Vienna, January 11, 1854.

I MENTIONED to Count Buol the report of which your Lordship speaks in your despatch of the 29th of December, as to the Austrian Consul at Sinope having made telegraphic signals to the Russian fleet at the moment of its entry into that harbour. Count Buol said he considered this report could have its origin only in an attempted calumny against the Austrian Government, and he could not therefore take any notice of it. He was happy to find that Her Majesty's Government had expressed their disbelief in it, being convinced that the story was wholly undeserving of credit.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND

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## No. 402.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 17.)*

My Lord,

Vienna, January 13, 1854.

I HAVE the honour of inclosing the copy of a despatch which I have received from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, dated from Constantinople, the 28th ultimo, returning to me (for the reasons he states) the sealed letter addressed to Reshid Pasha by the Conference at Vienna, which I had, at the request of my colleagues, forwarded to him for presentation on the 5th of December last.

Lord Stratford states that this manner of dealing with the letter (its object having been obtained by the identic note of the Representatives at Constantinople) had been concurred in by his three colleagues.

I took this returned letter to the Conference yesterday. Count Buol declined receiving it, as he had already written to the Internuncio disapproving its not having been presented to Reshid Pasha; and he had likewise communicated his sentiments upon the subject of its retention to Count Colloredo, with a view to their being submitted to your Lordship. He therefore requested me to retain the letter; and my other colleagues having concurred in this wish, the letter remains for the present in my possession.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

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Inclosure in No. 402.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 31, 1853.

FINDING myself at liberty to send back the messenger Capel by Trieste and Vienna, I gladly take advantage of the opportunity to inform your Lordship that the plan of negotiation arranged by the four Representatives here, and presented officially to the Turkish Ministry by them, has obtained the formal acceptance of the Sultan and his Government.

The arrangement in question, of which a copy is herewith inclosed, together with a copy of the Porte's reply, had so completely anticipated whatever is known of the intentions of the Four Cabinets, that the presentation of the sealed letter addressed to Reshid Pasha by the Conference at Vienna, and

forwarded to me by your Lordship, would only have been an idle form, accompanied with the hazard of disturbing, or rather, as I had reason to believe, with the certainty of extinguishing for the time, those favourable impressions which had been fortunately created.

The letter did not arrive at Constantinople till a day or two after the identic note had been officially sent in to the Porte; and my own opinion as to the most advisable mode of dealing with it was fully confirmed by the opinions of my three colleagues. I kept it, nevertheless, in my possession, so long as there was any doubt as to the acceptance of the proposed terms. I have now the honour to return it herewith; and I entertain no doubt that your Lordship will view with satisfaction the circumstances which authorize me to return it unopened.

I have &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 403.

*The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 18.)*

My Lord,

Vienna, January 13, 1854.

I HAVE already reported to your Lordship by telegraph that I, this day, in conjunction with the other members of the Conference, signed the Protocol which was (with the addition of a preamble) drawn up in accordance with the one proposed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys and transmitted to M. de Bourqueney. I have the honour of inclosing a copy of this document, as well as of the note of Reshid Pasha which is annexed to it. This Protocol is marked No. 2, for the purpose of showing that it is a continuation of the acts of the Conference as recorded in the first Protocol, which had been signed on the 5th of December.

After this document had been agreed upon, Count Buol read to the Conference the despatch he had drawn up, and which he intended to address to Baron Lebzeltern, with an order to place a copy of it in the hands of Count Nesselrode. He at the same stated, that his first intention had been to transmit this document by Count Valentin Esterhazy, the newly-appointed Minister to the Court of St. Petersburg; but that, as he was too unwell to be able immediately to undertake the journey, and as he thought it was of the utmost consequence that the communication should not be delayed, he had determined to send it at once by a messenger, who would leave Vienna this evening.

This despatch to Baron Lebzeltern will, without delay, be communicated to Count Colloredo for your Lordship's information, but in the mean time I feel it my duty to state, that it was most highly approved by the members of the Conference; that it was considered as doing full justice to the anxiety with which the Four Powers had laboured to obtain from the Government of the Sultan such proposals for the re-establishment of peace, as, while honourable to themselves, would equally be so to the Emperor Nicholas; as explaining that, in consequence of the non-arrival in time of the propositions by the Conference of Vienna, those which, in the same sense, had been proposed to Reshid Pasha by the Representatives at Constantinople had been adhered to; and lastly, as bringing before the Imperial Government the opinion of the allied Governments as contained in their Protocol, that the proposals of the Porte were conformable to the views they entertained, as stated in the Acts of the Conference of the 5th of December, and consequently that they were such as they confidently expected the Emperor of Russia would accept as the basis of a negotiation which offered to both parties the mode of terminating with honour the unfortunate state of war at present existing, and which, in the unanimous conviction of the Four Powers, is so deeply to be deplored.

The tone of this despatch is full of friendly interest for the Emperor Nicholas, but it does not fail to point out to him the anxious expectation of the Austrian Government that, in pursuance of that respect for the maintenance of the tranquillity and independence of the States of Europe by which his policy

has been distinguished, he will seize this opportunity of putting an end to a state of things which, by being prolonged, might compromise all those interests which he has hitherto so eminently cooperated in maintaining.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure 1 in No. 403.

*Reshid Pasha to Baron Bruck, December 31, 1853.*

[See Inclosure in No. 396.]

Inclosure 2 in No. 403.

*Protocol of a Conference held at Vienna, January 13, 1854.*

Présens: Les Représentants d'Autriche, de France, de Grande Bretagne, et de Prusse.

LES Représentants d'Autriche, de France, de Grande Bretagne, et de Prusse, s'étant réunis en conférence, le Représentant d'Autriche a donné lecture d'une note adressée par Reshid Pasha à l'Internonce en réponse à celle qu'il lui aurait remise sous la date du 12 Décembre dernier, et qui était identique à la communication faite en même temps à la Porte par les Représentants des trois autres Cours à Constantinople. La réponse de Reshid Pasha étant le résultat d'une démarche faite par les Quatre Représentants, avant que la note collective signée dans la Conférence du 5 Décembre fut arrivée à Constantinople, le Représentant d'Autriche a invité la Conférence à examiner avec lui si le contenu de cette pièce était en accord avec les vues et les intentions énoncées dans le Protocole de la même date.

Après mûre délibération, les Soussignés ont été unanimement d'avis que les conditions auxquelles la Sublime Porte se déclare prête à traiter du rétablissement de la paix avec la Russie, sont conformes aux vœux de leurs Gouvernements et de nature à être communiquées au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg. De plus en plus pénétrés de la gravité de la situation et de l'urgence d'y mettre un terme, les Soussignés expriment la confiance que la Russie acceptera la reprise des négociations sur les bases qui dans leur opinion en assurent le succès, et offrent aux deux parties belligérantes l'occasion de se rapprocher d'une manière digne et honorable, sans que l'Europe soit plus longtemps attristée par le spectacle de la guerre.

Les Représentants de la Grande Bretagne, de la France, et de la Prusse s'en remettent au Représentant de l'Autriche du soin de faire connaître au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg l'opinion consignée dans le présent Protocole, auquel est annexé copie de la note adressée dans une forme identique par Reshid Pasha aux Quatre Représentants à Constantinople.

(Signé)

BUOL-SCHAUENSTEIN.  
BOURQUENEY.  
WESTMORLAND.  
ARNIM.

(Translation.)

Present: The Representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia.

THE Representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia being assembled in Conference, the Representative of Austria read a note addressed by Reshid Pasha to the Internuncio in reply to that which he had delivered to him under date of the 12th of December last, and which was identical with the

communication made at the same time to the Porte by the Representatives of the three other Courts at Constantinople. Reshid Pasha's answer being the result of a step taken by the Four Representatives before the arrival at Constantinople of the collective note signed in the Conference of the 5th of December, the Representative of Austria invited the Conference to examine with him whether the contents of that document were in accordance with the views and intentions expressed in the Protocol of the same date.

After full deliberation the Undersigned were unanimously of opinion that the conditions on which the Porte declared its readiness to treat for the reestablishment of peace with Russia were in conformity with the wishes of their Governments and proper for communication to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg.

Impressed more and more with the serious character of the existing state of things and with the urgency for putting an end to it, the Undersigned express their confidence that Russia will accept the resumption of negotiations on the bases which in their opinion offer an assurance of their success, and afford to the two belligerent parties an opportunity for coming to an understanding in a suitable and honourable manner, without Europe being any longer grieved by the spectacle of war.

The Representatives of Great Britain, France and Prussia entrust to the Representative of Austria the task of making known to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg the opinion recorded in the present Protocol, to which is annexed a copy of the note addressed in an identic form by Reshid Pasha to the Four Representatives at Constantinople.

(Signed)

BUOL-SCHAUENSTEIN.  
BOURQUENEY.  
WESTMORLAND.  
ARNIM.

No. 404.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, January 17, 1854.*

ON the 14th instant Count Colloredo read to me a despatch from Count Buol, stating that your Lordship had communicated to him the instructions addressed to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and Sir Hamilton Seymour, and expressing his regret that the combined fleets should have entered the Black Sea, and that no notice should have been given to the Austrian Government of a measure which might be injurious to the pending negotiation, and was calculated to impair the united action of the Four Powers for a termination of the differences between Russia and the Porte.

I told Count Colloredo that the entrance of the combined fleets into the Black Sea without the previous knowledge of the Austrian Government gave no just cause for complaint, for, although England and France were united with Austria in negotiation, they acted independently of her in protecting the Sultan's territory from aggression. Count Buol, I said, was well aware that the English and French Governments had no wish to precipitate matters, and that they would have been satisfied to leave the combined fleets in the Bosphorus until the negotiation now pending had, in one way or another, been brought to a conclusion; but that this had been rendered impossible by the disastrous affair at Sinope. Further inaction would then, for reasons that had already been stated to Count Buol, have been dishonourable to England and France, who alone were the competent judges of the duty that their honour prescribed, and who, upon such a question, could certainly not be expected to take counsel with any other Power; but as soon as their decision had been come to, no time was lost in making it known to Count Buol.

I am, &c.

(Signed)

CLARENDON.

No. 405.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, January 18, 1854.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 13th instant, inclosing a copy of the despatch addressed to your Lordship by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, explaining his Excellency's reasons for returning to you the sealed letter addressed to Reshid Pasha by the Representatives of the Four Powers in Conference at Vienna, I have to inform your Lordship that Count Colloredo has read to me a despatch from Count Buol, stating that he had disapproved of the collective note not having been delivered to Reshid Pasha.

I stated to Count Colloredo the grounds upon which Her Majesty's Government considered that the Four Representatives had exercised a sound discretion in this matter. An identic note had been sent to Reshid Pasha by each of the Representatives two days before the arrival of the collective note from Vienna, and if the latter had then been delivered it would probably have disturbed the arrangement which the Porte was about to agree to, and certainly would have caused delay.

This arrangement, embodied in the note of Reshid Pasha, has been approved by the Four Powers as being in conformity with the instructions drawn up at Vienna, and Her Majesty's Government were, therefore, confirmed in their opinion as to the expediency and prudence of the course adopted by the Four Representatives.

I added that, as a collective note had not been presented to the Porte, the necessity for addressing one to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg no longer existed, and Count Buol was thus enabled to convey the Porte's answer to the Russian Government in the manner which he considered most likely to insure its favourable reception.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 406.

*The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, January 18, 1854.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 13th instant, inclosing a copy of the Protocol which had been signed by the Representatives of the Four Powers at the Conference held at Vienna on that day, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government approve your proceedings on this occasion, and that Count Buol's despatch to Baron Lebzeltern transmitting the Protocol to St. Petersburg, the substance of which is reported in your despatch, is satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 407.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, January 18, 1854.*

I INCLOSE, for your information, a copy of a despatch\* from Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe transmitting a copy of the answer returned by the Porte to the propositions made to it by the Representatives of the Four Powers on the 12th of December, with the view of bringing about a negotiation between Turkey and Russia, and a copy of a despatch† which I have addressed to his Excellency in reply.

\* No. 396.

† No. 399.

I also inclose a copy of a despatch\* from Lord Westmorland, reporting the proceedings of the Conference at Vienna with reference to the Porte's note, and a copy of the Protocol† alluded to by his Lordship as to be signed at Vienna on the 13th instant.

I have to inform you that the terms proposed by the Porte are considered to be just and reasonable by Her Majesty's Government, and that they fairly meet the objects that Russia has throughout professed to have in view; you will, therefore, use your best endeavours to promote the acceptance of these terms by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, and you will express to Count Nesselrode the hope of Her Majesty's Government that the painful state of excitement and suspense which now prevails in Europe may thus be terminated, and that all cause of difference between England and Russia will disappear.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 408.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 17.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, January 9, 1854.*

IT has been with great regret that I have found myself unable to execute the instructions given to me in your Lordship's despatch of the 27th ultimo, which reached me on the 4th instant.

Your Lordship will, I am convinced, approve of my having determined not to communicate with Count Nesselrode on the subject of the orders sent to the allied fleets until the French Minister shall be enabled to make a similar and simultaneous communication.

The non-arrival of the Paris despatches is in all probability to be ascribed to the accumulation of snow in Belgium and France. The communications appear to be interrupted, the latest intelligence received here from Paris and London being of the date of the 28th ultimo.

I have settled with General Castelbajac that as soon as he receives his instructions we shall write to Count Nesselrode to ask for an interview, at which will be made respectively the communication respecting the orders sent to the French and English Admirals.

No. 409.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 17.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, January 9, 1854.*

THE following information respecting the Russian armies, although somewhat incomplete, and in some points only confirmatory of the statements already made to your Lordship, may be entirely depended upon.

The 1st and 2nd infantry corps are in Poland and Lithuania; the reserve battalions of these corps are in course of being formed. Two battalions being raised for each regiment, twenty-four will be added to each corps d'armée.

It is stated that no additions have been made yet to the artillery and cavalry of these two corps, but here a slight explanation becomes necessary; the horses have not yet been purchased, but as regards men the number required have already been assembled.

The 3rd, 4th, and 5th corps have already been placed on the full war footing, and the same statement may be made respecting their cavalry and artillery.

The 6th corps is in course of being put upon a footing of war. One division proceeds to the Crimea, one to the Caucasus, and the 3rd to the Government of Cherson.

Those troops not already marching will proceed shortly to their destinations.

\* No. 398.

† Inclosure in No. 385.

The half of the cavalry of this corps is ordered to the Crimea, the other half to the Government of Cherson.

The Corps de Dragons is equally in course of being put upon the war footing. Two regiments have already been sent off to the Caucasus, the other six are to proceed next week to the Principalities.

The Corps des Gardes, and the Grenadier corps, have likewise received orders for being placed upon the footing of war. The Guards are to be increased by a fresh battalion and squadron for each regiment: the Grenadiers by two battalions and one squadron for each regiment.

I should here observe that the battalion, when upon the war footing, numbers 1000 men, and the squadron 130 horses, while the reserve battalions are 600 or 700 men strong, and the reserve squadrons have each 150 horses.

As regards the army of the Caucasus under the command of Prince Woronzow, its numbers cannot be less than 150,000 men, and may amount to 170,000 or 180,000.

No. 410.

*Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 20.)*

My Lord,

*Berlin, January 18, 1854.*

A COPY of the Austrian note addressed to Baron Lebzeltern at St. Petersburg, embodying the answer of the Porte to the invitation submitted by the Four Powers, has been communicated to the Prussian Government.

Baron Manteuffel has expressed to me his satisfaction at the language of these instructions, and a despatch will be forwarded this evening to General Rochow couched in as strong and expressive terms, with orders to place a copy of it in Count Nesselrode's hands.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 411.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 20.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, January 11, 1854.*

YESTERDAY, at an early hour, Count de Reizet, the First Secretary of the French Legation, reached St. Petersburg with the instructions for General Castelbajac, which we have been anxiously expecting for the last six days.

M. de Reizet had been detained on the road by the heavy snows which have fallen lately in Belgium and Germany.

In the course of the same morning I called upon General Castelbajac, who was good enough to show me the two despatches which he has received, together with a copy of the instructions sent to Admiral Hamelin.

With regard to the instruction sent to General Castelbajac, I need only say that it is the exact counterpart of that addressed to me by your Lordship in your despatch of December 27. The one might have been substituted for the other. The only differences which I could observe are, that the French Minister is desired to concert with his English colleague before communicating to Count Nesselrode the substance of the instructions sent to the allied fleets at Constantinople; that he is empowered either to read the despatch to his Excellency, or to state to him its substance; and that no expression is to be found in the French despatch like that with which your Lordship's despatch concludes: "It is considered that the Turkish fleet should undertake no aggressive operations by sea, so long as matters remain in their present state."

As your Lordship does not authorise me to read your despatch to the Chancellor, General Castelbajac has determined not to communicate his instruction to his Excellency, but merely to give him its substance, and that this may be done faithfully we made notes of the points upon which particular stress is to be laid.

Before separating, General Castelbajac and myself agreed that we should,

without loss of time, write severally to Count Nesselrode to say that, having a communication to make to him, we beg to be informed on what day and at what hour it will suit his convenience to receive us.

This I did as soon as I returned home.

No. 412.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 20.)*

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, January 13, 1854.*

I RECEIVED a note yesterday from the Chancellor, whom I knew to be ill, to say that he should be ready to receive me at half-past 12 o'clock. I found his Excellency very imperfectly recovered, and evidently still weak and unfit for exertion.

I expressed my regret at having a painful communication to make to him, observing however that what I had remarked, as soon as I heard of the disaster at Sinope, as to the feeling which that event would produce in England, would have prepared his Excellency for what I had now to state.

Her Majesty's fleet, I said, had been sent to Constantinople, not with the intention of attacking Russia, but certainly with that of defending Turkey. Her Majesty's Government would have been well pleased that no necessity for naval exertion should have presented itself, and this very probably would have been the case but for the catastrophe to which I had alluded.

The intimation which I had made to his Excellency on the 27th October would have had, it had been hoped, the effect of preventing an attack upon the Turkish coast—an attack which, had it been made when the English ships had been at hand, they would have assisted in repelling. These hopes were found to have been illusory: an attack upon a Turkish squadron anchored peaceably in a Turkish port had been made, and a dreadful slaughter had ensued.

I here entered into some particulars of the horrors of Sinope, and dwelt upon the effect which the account of these misfortunes must have produced upon the public mind in England; the upshot, I said, was a conviction on the part of Her Majesty's Government that more stringent measures were required; sufficient account had not been taken of the conciliatory dispositions of Her Majesty's Government, of the notice which had been given in an amicable spirit, and it had been determined to take measures which should guard against the recurrence of such scenes as Sinope had witnessed.

Her Majesty's ships, and those of the Emperor of the French as well—for there was an entire uniformity in the orders sent to the two fleets as in the intentions with which they had been drawn up—will, I said, enter the Black Sea and will require (*requérir*) every Russian ship which they may meet with to re-enter a Russian port. It is painful to me, I continued, *M. le Comte*, to make such an allusion, but if the summons is not attended to it will be enforced (*on aura recours à la force*). On the other hand, as Her Majesty's Government are not less intent than they were before upon effecting a peaceful settlement of difficulties, measures will be taken for preventing Turkish ships of war from making descents upon the coasts of Russia.

Are you sure, Count Nesselrode said, that this intention is expressed in your instruction? I was, I replied, quite sure; if I were not I should certainly not have made the statement; in fact, *M. le Comte*, I said, I like truth and should feel to be wanting in duty both to Her Majesty's Government and to yourself if I either held back any part of the communication which I am charged with for you, or endeavoured to give it another colour.

In proof of this, I continued, I was about to remark to you that my instruction dwells more upon the coercive measures which will be employed towards Russian vessels than upon those which will be used against those of Turkey.

In a word, I said, England has promised assistance and support to the Turkish Government, and she will keep her engagements with fidelity. Her ships have been ordered into the Black Sea for the protection of the Turkish territory and of the Turkish flag.

Count Nesselrode inquired whether I had been directed to make any

written communication to him upon the subject. I replied that I had not; that I had been ordered to communicate to him the substance of your Lordship's despatch, had endeavoured to do so faithfully, and was quite ready to clear up, as far as I was able, any point which might appear doubtful.

His Excellency desired to read me a despatch which had reached him from Baron Brunnow, in which he gives an account of a conversation which he had held with your Lordship as to the instructions which had been sent to Her Majesty's Admiral in the Bosphorus. I could only say that I felt sure that Baron Brunnow's was a very faithful one, as the language ascribed to your Lordship corresponded closely with that of the despatch which I had received.

After a short controversy respecting the right of Her Majesty's Government to feel aggrieved by the affair of Sinope, Count Nesselrode said that he felt obliged to observe that it was most unfortunate that Her Majesty's Government should have determined upon taking measures of so decided a character at the precise moment when strenuous efforts were being made at Vienna for coming to a peaceable arrangement.

This opinion, I replied, was entirely shared by Her Majesty's Government, and, as I had before stated, nothing of the sort would have happened but for the attack upon Sinope and the dreadful incidents by which this attack had been attended; Her Majesty's Government were nevertheless still intent upon peace if it were attainable.

As I saw that Count Nesselrode was too ill to carry on a longer conversation, I rose to take leave of him, when he said that he could not at present make any reply to my communication beyond this, that it would be his duty to bring it as soon as possible to the Emperor's knowledge, and to take His Majesty's orders upon the subject.

No. 413.

*Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 20.)*

My Lord,

*St. Petersburg, January 13, 1854.*

AS I was closing the despatch bag the French Minister called here to acquaint me that he was suddenly summoned yesterday evening by Count Nesselrode, to whom he made the communication respecting the orders sent to the French Admiral in the Bosphorus.

At night, as it appears, a Council of the Ministers was held.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 414.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 21.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, January 3, 1854.*

THE combined squadrons left their anchorage in Beicos Bay at an early hour this morning, and, towed by the steamers, were proceeding towards the Black Sea, when a sudden change of wind and weather obliged them to remain in the Channel.

I have the honour to inclose herewith a copy of the letter to be addressed by each of the Admirals to the chief naval authority at Sevastopol.

## Inclosure in No. 414.

*Letter to be addressed by the British and French Admirals to the Russian Admiral at Sevastopol.*

L'ESCADRE sous mes ordres étant sur le point de paraître dans la Mer Noire, de concert avec celle de la France, et l'objet de ce mouvement étant de protéger le territoire et le pavillon Ottoman contre toute agression ou acte d'hostilité, j'en avertis votre Excellence dans le but de prévenir toute collision pouvant nuire aux relations amicales qui existent entre mon Gouvernement et le votre, relations que nous désirons conserver, et que vous tenez aussi, sans doute, à maintenir.

Je serais heureux d'apprendre que votre Excellence, animée des mêmes intentions pacifiques, a bien voulu donner aux commandants des forces Russes dans la Mer Noire des instructions destinées à prévenir tout événement qui pourrait compromettre la paix.

(Translation.)

THE squadron under my orders being on the point of appearing in the Black Sea, in concert with that of France, and the object of this movement being the protection of the Ottoman territory and flag against any aggression or act of hostility, I apprise your Excellency of it with the view of preventing any collision which might prejudice the friendly relations existing between my Government and yours, relations which we are desirous of preserving, and which doubtless you also wish to maintain.

I should be happy to learn that your Excellency, animated by the same pacific intentions, has been pleased to give to the commanders of the Russian forces in the Black Sea instructions intended to prevent any event which might compromise peace.

## No. 415.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 21, 1854.)*

(Extract.)

*Constantinople, January 5, 1853.*

THE combined squadrons succeeded at length in making good their entrance into the Black Sea at an early hour yesterday morning.

## No. 416.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 21.)*

My Lord,

*Constantinople, January 5, 1854.*

INCLOSED herewith in copy are an instruction addressed by me to M. Pisani, and his report in answer.

Your Lordship will perceive that I have acted on this occasion in pursuance of what I understood to be the intention of Her Majesty's Government.

The Porte has availed itself of the entrance of the united squadrons into the Black Sea to send a small squadron of steamers with troops and ammunition on board to Trebizond.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 416.

*Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.*

Sir,

*Pera, January 4, 1854.*

YOU will inform Reshid Pasha that I have instructed Admiral Dundas to protect the Porte's shipping as well as territory in the Black Sea. I expect, in return, that the Porte will send no vessels to sea in that direction without my knowledge and the Admiral's concurrence.

A similar communication will be made to his Highness by the French Embassy.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 416.

*M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

My Lord,

*Pera, January 4, 1854.*

IN conformity with your Excellency's instruction of this day's date, I waited upon Reshid Pasha and informed him that you have instructed Admiral Dundas to protect the Porte's shipping as well as territory in the Black Sea. His Highness told me that a similar communication has also been received from the French Embassy, and requested me to express his heartfelt gratitude for this important information, and acquaint your Excellency that he will lose no time in conveying the same to his Imperial master.

The five Turkish war-steamers, which for some days were preparing to go into the Black Sea, left this morning with a number of troops and with ammunition for Trebizond. Should any more Turkish ships go in that direction, the Porte will not fail to acquaint the Embassy beforehand of such an intention. The Capoudan Pasha has been accordingly officially directed to abstain from any steps whatever without the previous knowledge of the Embassy, and without the concurrence of the British and French Admirals.

I have, &c.  
(Signed) ET. PISANI.

No. 417.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.*

(Extract.)

*Foreign Office, January 24, 1854.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, in reply to your despatch of the 3rd instant, that Her Majesty's Government approve of the letter to be addressed by Vice-Admiral Dundas to the Russian naval authorities at Sevastopol.

No. 418.

*The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 24, 1854.*

I HAVE to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the manner in which, as reported in your despatch of the 13th instant, you executed the instructions respecting the entrance of the combined English and French fleets into the Black Sea, contained in my despatch of the 27th of December.

I am, &c.  
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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